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FEDERALIST No. 1. General Introduction
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, October 27, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting
federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution
for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance;
comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the
UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the
fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has
been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people
of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important
question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing
good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever
destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If
there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with
propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a
wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be
considered as the general misfortune of mankind.
This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism,
to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for
the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious
estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations
not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be
wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations
affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local
institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its
merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the
discovery of truth.
Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution
will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of
a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard
a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they
hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another
class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the
confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects
of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial
confederacies than from its union under one government.
It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I
am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the
opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject
them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us
to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it
cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its
appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources,
blameless at least, if not respectable—the honest errors of minds led astray
by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful
are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we,
upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on
the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This
circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to
those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any
controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be
drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who
advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists.
Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other
motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those
who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there
not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged
than that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political
parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making
proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by
persecution.
And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have
already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases
of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will
be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be
led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their
opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of
their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened
zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the
offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of
liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people,
which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be
represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the
expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that
jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of
liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On
the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is
essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and
well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a
dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for
the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the
firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former
has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism
than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of
republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an
obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending
tyrants.
In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my
fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from
whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost
moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may
result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have
collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source
not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you
that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion
it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for
your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I
do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I
have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will
freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The
consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however,
multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the
depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be
judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not
disgrace the cause of truth.
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting
particulars:
THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL
PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT
CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY
OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE
ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE
CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE
PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO
YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL
SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE
PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO
LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.
In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory
answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that
may seem to have any claim to your attention.
It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the
utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of
the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be
imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it
whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution,
that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and
that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct
portions of the whole.(1) This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually
propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it.
For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged
view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new
Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to
begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the
probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution.
This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.
PUBLIUS
1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out
in several of the late publications against the new Constitution.

FEDERALIST No. 2. Concerning Dangers from
Foreign Force and Influence
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, October 31, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to
decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most
important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a
very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident.
Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government,
and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the
people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with
requisite powers. It is well worthy of consideration therefore, whether it
would conduce more to the interest of the people of America that they
should, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one federal
government, or that they should divide themselves into separate
confederacies, and give to the head of each the same kind of powers which
they are advised to place in one national government.
It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the
prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly
united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest citizens
have been constantly directed to that object. But politicians now appear,
who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead of looking for
safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a division of the States
into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. However extraordinary this new
doctrine may appear, it nevertheless has its advocates; and certain
characters who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present of the
number. Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have
wrought this change in the sentiments and declarations of these gentlemen,
it certainly would not be wise in the people at large to adopt these new
political tenets without being fully convinced that they are founded in truth
and sound policy.
It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was
not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one connected,
fertile, wide-spreading country was the portion of our western sons of
liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety of
soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable streams, for the
delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable
waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together;
while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient distances,
present them with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids,
and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities.
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been
pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a people
descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing
the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very
similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels,
arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war,
have nobly established general liberty and independence.
This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and
it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper
and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest
ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien
sovereignties.
Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and
denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have
uniformly been one people each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the
same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made
peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies; as a
nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and entered into
various compacts and conventions with foreign states.
A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people, at
a very early period, to institute a federal government to preserve and
perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political
existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when many
of their citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility and
desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and
reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and well-
balanced government for a free people. It is not to be wondered at, that a
government instituted in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be
found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to
answer.
This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still
continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they
observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more
remotely the latter; and being persuaded that ample security for both could
only be found in a national government more wisely framed, they as with
one voice, convened the late convention at Philadelphia, to take that
important subject under consideration.
This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of the
people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their
patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts of
men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season of peace, with minds
unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many months in cool,
uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally, without having been awed
by power, or influenced by any passions except love for their country, they
presented and recommended to the people the plan produced by their joint
and very unanimous councils.
Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not
imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to BLIND
approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate and candid
consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject demand,
and which it certainly ought to receive. But this (as was remarked in the
foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished than expected, that it
may be so considered and examined. Experience on a former occasion
teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. It is not yet forgotten that
well-grounded apprehensions of imminent danger induced the people of
America to form the memorable Congress of 1774. That body
recommended certain measures to their constituents, and the event proved
their wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to
teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very measures. Not
only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of
personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, or
the undue influence of former attachments, or whose ambition aimed at
objects which did not correspond with the public good, were indefatigable
in their efforts to persuade the people to reject the advice of that patriotic
Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived and deluded, but the great majority
of the people reasoned and decided judiciously; and happy they are in
reflecting that they did so.
They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and
experienced men. That, being convened from different parts of the country,
they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety of useful
information. That, in the course of the time they passed together in
inquiring into and discussing the true interests of their country, they must
have acquired very accurate knowledge on that head. That they were
individually interested in the public liberty and prosperity, and therefore
that it was not less their inclination than their duty to recommend only such
measures as, after the most mature deliberation, they really thought prudent
and advisable.
These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly
on the judgment and integrity of the Congress; and they took their advice,
notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter them from it.
But if the people at large had reason to confide in the men of that Congress,
few of whom had been fully tried or generally known, still greater reason
have they now to respect the judgment and advice of the convention, for it
is well known that some of the most distinguished members of that
Congress, who have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and
abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring political information, were
also members of this convention, and carried into it their accumulated
knowledge and experience.
It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding
Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably joined with the
people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its Union. To
preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the people in forming that
convention, and it is also the great object of the plan which the convention
has advised them to adopt. With what propriety, therefore, or for what good
purposes, are attempts at this particular period made by some men to
depreciate the importance of the Union? Or why is it suggested that three or
four confederacies would be better than one? I am persuaded in my own
mind that the people have always thought right on this subject, and that
their universal and uniform attachment to the cause of the Union rests on
great and weighty reasons, which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in
some ensuing papers. They who promote the idea of substituting a number
of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem
clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the
Union in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly would be the case, and I
sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen, that
whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have reason to
exclaim, in the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL
TO ALL MY GREATNESS."
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 3. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign
Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 3, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the
Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily
persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests.
That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high
opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly
entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one
federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and
national purposes.
The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear
to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they
are cogent and conclusive.
Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it
necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their SAFETY
seems to be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a
great variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords
great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively.
At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the
preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from
FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND
arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it
is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to
examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial
Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best
security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad.
The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world
will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the
causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE
them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many
JUST causes of war are likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA as by
DISUNITED America; for if it should turn out that United America will
probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union
tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.
The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation of
treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties with
no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are
maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also extensive
commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect to the two
latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws
of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this
will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government
than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct
confederacies.
Because when once an efficient national government is established, the
best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will
generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or other
contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates, or
courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and extensive
reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to
recommend men to offices under the national government,—especially as it
will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of
proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence, it will
result that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial
decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematical, and
judicious than those of individual States, and consequently more
satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more SAFE with
respect to us.
Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties,
as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and
executed in the same manner,—whereas, adjudications on the same points
and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not
always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of
independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent
governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may
affect and influence them. The wisdom of the convention, in committing
such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and
responsible only to one national government, cannot be too much
commended.
Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the
governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice;
but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently
having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will
be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty
of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.
Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to
resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do,
result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great
number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if
willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But
the national government, not being affected by those local circumstances,
will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or
inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.
So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties
and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are less to be
apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones,
and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of the people.
As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful
violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national government
affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived
from any other quarter.
Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and
interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the Union.
Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the
present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several instances of
Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of
individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish
offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.
The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some
States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more
immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those
who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent
interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence, to excite war with
these nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger as a
national government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished
by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested.
But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national
government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and
settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that
respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than
the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men, naturally
disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledging,
correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The national government,
in such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed with
moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper to
extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.
Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and
compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united
nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or
confederacy of little consideration or power.
In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,
endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge,
or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to FRANCE, to
ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it for
the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have
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Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign
Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 7, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people
would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by
JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show that
such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more
easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the State
governments or the proposed little confederacies.
But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN
force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST causes of war to
other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a
situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need not be observed
that there are PRETENDED as well as just causes of war.
It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations
in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything
by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to
get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely personal, such as
thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private
compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.
These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the
sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the
voice and interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to
war, which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well
deserve our attention, there are others which affect nations as often as
kings; and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of our
relative situation and circumstances.
With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can
supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding any
efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign fish.
With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in
navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we
suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our carrying
trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more
their interest, and will be more their policy, to restrain than to promote it.
In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation,
inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a
manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with
commodities which we used to purchase from them.
The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give
pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this continent,
because the cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the
circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our merchants
and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which those
territories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their respective
sovereigns.
Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one
side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor will
either of them permit the other waters which are between them and us to
become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.
From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent with
prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that jealousies
and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other
nations, and that we are not to expect that they should regard our
advancement in union, in power and consequence by land and by sea, with
an eye of indifference and composure.
The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out
of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present, and
that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for
operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely,
therefore, do they consider union and a good national government as
necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of
INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation
consists in the best possible state of defense, and necessarily depends on the
government, the arms, and the resources of the country.
As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be
provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us inquire
whether one good government is not, relative to the object in question,
more competent than any other given number whatever.
One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience
of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can
move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and
protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its
foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties, it will regard
the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as
connected with that of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of
the whole to the defense of any particular part, and that more easily and
expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can
possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia
under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of
subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into
one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into
thirteen or into three or four distinct independent companies.
What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the
government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of
Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales?
Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at all)
be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy so
effectually as the single government of Great Britain would?
We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if
we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one
national government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to
make it a nursery for seamen—if one national government had not called
forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their prowess
and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England have its
navigation and fleet—let Scotland have its navigation and fleet—let Wales
have its navigation and fleet—let Ireland have its navigation and fleet—let
those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be be under four
independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would
each dwindle into comparative insignificance.
Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen
or, if you please, into three or four independent governments—what armies
could they raise and pay—what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one
was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and
money in its defense? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into
neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for
peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake
of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose
importance they are content to see diminished? Although such conduct
would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The history of the
states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds with such instances, and it
is not improbable that what has so often happened would, under similar
circumstances, happen again.
But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or
confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men and
money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which
of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of peace, and
in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and compel
acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable
from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over the general
and common interests, and combining and directing the powers and
resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments, and
conduce far more to the safety of the people.
But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one
national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is,
that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act
toward us accordingly. If they see that our national government is efficient
and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly
organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed,
our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be
much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our
resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual
government (each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem
convenient), or split into three or four independent and probably discordant
republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a
third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what
a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would she
become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and how soon would
dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it
never fails to be against themselves.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 5. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign
Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 10, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch
Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then
forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall
present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and perfect
union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your
religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves,
and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must
increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island,
being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different
interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES." "We most
earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and
weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being
the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and future happiness, and
disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this
occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR
DELAY THIS UNION."
It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at
home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more
to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within
ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the
best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their
experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems
obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be but
one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that
those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one
another. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental
nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those
nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a
long series of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than
they were useful and assisting to each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four
nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies
arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined in
affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests," envy and
jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial
interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America,
would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most
other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in
disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.
The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot
reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing
in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first; but,
admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the
continuance of such equality? Independent of those local circumstances
which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to impede its
progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and
good management which would probably distinguish the government of one
above the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength and
consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same
degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be
observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it
would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the
scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that
moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear. Both
those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever
might promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain them
from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much
time would not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly
dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her
neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them.
Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind
conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid
imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and many local
circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed
confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more
formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become evident
than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and sensations in
the more southern parts of America which it formerly did in the southern
parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young
swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields
and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.
They who well consider the history of similar divisions and
confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in
contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be
borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on the
contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short,
that they would place us exactly in the situations in which some nations
doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER.
From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly
mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be
formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination
and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to
put and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign enemies.
When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were
formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces against a
foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT NATIONS.
Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by
distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different and
proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different.
Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course
different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different
foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign
nation with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be
the one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would be the most
desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their
immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed,
would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith.
Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring
nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly
passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering our
distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies to
apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations, and therefore
that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others by the
aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances
between themselves. And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to
receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country,
than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many conquests did
the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what
innovations did they under the same character introduce into the
governments of those whom they pretended to protect.
Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any
given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against
the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 6. Concerning Dangers from
Dissensions Between the States
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 14, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an
enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of
disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to
delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more alarming kind—
those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between the States
themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions. These have been
already in some instances slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more
particular and more full investigation.
A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt
that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in
partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown
would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To presume a
want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence,
would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To
look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent,
unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard
the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated
experience of ages.
The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are some
which have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective
bodies of society. Of this description are the love of power or the desire of
pre-eminence and dominion—the jealousy of power, or the desire of
equality and safety. There are others which have a more circumscribed
though an equally operative influence within their spheres. Such are the
rivalships and competitions of commerce between commercial nations. And
there are others, not less numerous than either of the former, which take
their origin entirely in private passions; in the attachments, enmities,
interests, hopes, and fears of leading individuals in the communities of
which they are members. Men of this class, whether the favorites of a king
or of a people, have in too many instances abused the confidence they
possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not
scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquillity to personal advantage or
personal gratification.
The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a
prostitute,(1) at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his
countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the
SAMMIANS. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the
MEGARENSIANS,(2) another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution
with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a supposed theft of the
statuary Phidias,(3) or to get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought
against him for dissipating the funds of the state in the purchase of
popularity,(4) or from a combination of all these causes, was the primitive
author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by
the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after various vicissitudes,
intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of the Athenian
commonwealth.
The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII.,
permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,(5) entertained hopes of
succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence of the
Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor and interest of this enterprising and
powerful monarch, he precipitated England into a war with France, contrary
to the plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and
independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided by his
counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there ever was a sovereign who bid
fair to realize the project of universal monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles
V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once the instrument and the dupe.
The influence which the bigotry of one female,(6) the petulance of
another,(7) and the cabals of a third,(8) had in the contemporary policy,
ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are topics that
have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known.
To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the
production of great national events, either foreign or domestic, according to
their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time. Those who have but
a superficial acquaintance with the sources from which they are to be
drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of instances; and those who have
a tolerable knowledge of human nature will not stand in need of such lights
to form their opinion either of the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps,
however, a reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may with
propriety be made to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. If
Shays had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted
whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war.
But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this
particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing men, who stand
ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States,
though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of republics
(say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the
manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have
so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be
disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They
will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual
amity and concord.
Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of all
nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If this be
their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary,
invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate interest,
have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general
or remote considerations of policy, utility or justice? Have republics in
practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the former
administered by MEN as well as the latter? Are there not aversions,
predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect
nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to
the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular
and violent propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are
often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and
are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those
individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the
objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a
passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars
founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing
system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or
dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered
new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other? Let
experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an
answer to these inquiries.
Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them,
Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often
engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of
the same times. Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp; and
Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest.
Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very
war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her arms into the
heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an
overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of the
commonwealth.
Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition, till,
becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius II. found means
to accomplish that formidable league,(9) which gave a deadly blow to the
power and pride of this haughty republic.
The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes,
took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They had
furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were among
the most persevering and most implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV.
In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose
one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the
predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have been
more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom has
been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people.
There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal
wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their representatives
have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war, or
continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary
to the real interests of the State. In that memorable struggle for superiority
between the rival houses of AUSTRIA and BOURBON, which so long kept
Europe in a flame, it is well known that the antipathies of the English
against the French, seconding the ambition, or rather the avarice, of a
favorite leader,(10) protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by
sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the
court.
The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure
grown out of commercial considerations,—the desire of supplanting and the
fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic or in the
general advantages of trade and navigation, and sometimes even the more
culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of other nations without their
consent.
The last war but between Britain and Spain sprang from the attempts of
the British merchants to prosecute an illicit trade with the Spanish main.
These unjustifiable practices on their part produced severity on the part of
the Spaniards toward the subjects of Great Britain which were not more
justifiable, because they exceeded the bounds of a just retaliation and were
chargeable with inhumanity and cruelty. Many of the English who were
taken on the Spanish coast were sent to dig in the mines of Potosi; and by
the usual progress of a spirit of resentment, the innocent were, after a while,
confounded with the guilty in indiscriminate punishment. The complaints of
the merchants kindled a violent flame throughout the nation, which soon
after broke out in the House of Commons, and was communicated from that
body to the ministry. Letters of reprisal were granted, and a war ensued,
which in its consequences overthrew all the alliances that but twenty years
before had been formed with sanguine expectations of the most beneficial
fruits.
From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose
situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason can
we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an
expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present
confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not already seen enough of
the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us
with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and
evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from the
deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the
direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of
the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and
perfect virtue?
Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and
credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax and ill
administration of government, let the revolt of a part of the State of North
Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the actual
insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare—!
So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the tenets
of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord and
hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has from long
observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom in politics,
that vicinity or nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies.
An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect:
"NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other
unless their common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE
REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences that
neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes
all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors."(11)
This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and suggests the
REMEDY.
PUBLIUS
1. Aspasia, vide "Plutarch's Life of Pericles."
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold, with the
connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the statue of Minerva.
5. Worn by the popes.
6. Madame de Maintenon.
7. Duchess of Marlborough.
8. Madame de Pompadour.
9. The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of
France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and states.
10. The Duke of Marlborough.
11. Vide "Principes des Negociations" par l'Abbé de Mably.

FEDERALIST No. 7. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions
Between the States)
For the Independent Journal. Thursday, November 15, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what
inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each
other? It would be a full answer to this question to say—precisely the same
inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations
in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more
particular answer. There are causes of differences within our immediate
contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the restraints of a
federal constitution, we have had sufficient experience to enable us to form
a judgment of what might be expected if those restraints were removed.
Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile
sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest proportion of wars
that have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. This cause would
exist among us in full force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory
within the boundaries of the United States. There still are discordant and
undecided claims between several of them, and the dissolution of the Union
would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. It is well
known that they have heretofore had serious and animated discussion
concerning the rights to the lands which were ungranted at the time of the
Revolution, and which usually went under the name of crown lands. The
States within the limits of whose colonial governments they were
comprised have claimed them as their property, the others have contended
that the rights of the crown in this article devolved upon the Union;
especially as to all that part of the Western territory which, either by actual
possession, or through the submission of the Indian proprietors, was
subjected to the jurisdiction of the king of Great Britain, till it was
relinquished in the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all events
an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has
been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by
prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the United States for the
benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under a
continuation of the Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable
termination of the dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however,
would revive this dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At
present, a large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if
not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If that were at
an end, the States which made the cession, on a principle of federal
compromise, would be apt when the motive of the grant had ceased, to
reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other States would no doubt insist on a
proportion, by right of representation. Their argument would be, that a
grant, once made, could not be revoked; and that the justice of participating
in territory acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy,
remained undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it should be admitted by
all the States, that each had a right to a share of this common stock, there
would still be a difficulty to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of
apportionment. Different principles would be set up by different States for
this purpose; and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties,
they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment.
In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample
theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to
interpose between the contending parties. To reason from the past to the
future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that the sword would
sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences. The
circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania,
respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in
expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles of
confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a
federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided in favor of
Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction
with that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it, till,
by negotiation and management, something like an equivalent was found
for the loss she supposed herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is
intended to convey the slightest censure on the conduct of that State. She no
doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the decision; and
States, like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to
their disadvantage.
Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions
which attended the progress of the controversy between this State and the
district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as well from
States not interested as from those which were interested in the claim; and
can attest the danger to which the peace of the Confederacy might have
been exposed, had this State attempted to assert its rights by force. Two
motives preponderated in that opposition: one, a jealousy entertained of our
future power; and the other, the interest of certain individuals of influence
in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants of lands under the actual
government of that district. Even the States which brought forward claims,
in contradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to dismember this State,
than to establish their own pretensions. These were New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all
occasions, discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and
Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between Canada
and that State, entered deeply into the same views. These being small
States, saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness.
In a review of these transactions we may trace some of the causes which
would be likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their
unpropitious destiny to become disunited.
The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of
contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of
escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the
advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State, or separate
confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself.
This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would
beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges,
to which we have been accustomed since the earliest settlement of the
country, would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent than they
would naturally have independent of this circumstance. WE SHOULD BE
READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE THINGS WHICH WERE
IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT
SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of
enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no
occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this
unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by
which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their
own citizens. The infractions of these regulations, on one side, the efforts to
prevent and repel them, on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and
these to reprisals and wars.
The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others
tributary to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently
submitted to by the tributary States. The relative situation of New York,
Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an example of this kind. New
York, from the necessities of revenue, must lay duties on her importations.
A great part of these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other
States in the capacity of consumers of what we import. New York would
neither be willing nor able to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not
consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in favor of the citizens
of her neighbors; nor would it be practicable, if there were not this
impediment in the way, to distinguish the customers in our own markets.
Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York
for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long permitted to remain in the
quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of
which we derived an advantage so odious to our neighbors, and, in their
opinion, so oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the
incumbent weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating
pressure of New Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity
alone will answer in the affirmative.
The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision
between the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the
first instance, and the progressive extinguishment afterward, would be alike
productive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible to agree
upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that
can be proposed which is entirely free from real objections. These, as usual,
would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties. There are even
dissimilar views among the States as to the general principle of discharging
the public debt. Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of
national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate
interest in the question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the
payment of the domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to
magnify the difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body
of whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the State
in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some
equitable and effective provision. The procrastinations of the former would
excite the resentments of the latter. The settlement of a rule would, in the
meantime, be postponed by real differences of opinion and affected delays.
The citizens of the States interested would clamour; foreign powers would
urge for the satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of the States
would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and
internal contention.
Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the
apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule
agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some
States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would naturally
seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as naturally be
disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an increase of their own
incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible a pretext to the
complaining States to withhold their contributions, not to be embraced with
avidity; and the non-compliance of these States with their engagements
would be a ground of bitter discussion and altercation. If even the rule
adopted should in practice justify the equality of its principle, still
delinquencies in payments on the part of some of the States would result
from a diversity of other causes—the real deficiency of resources; the
mismanagement of their finances; accidental disorders in the management
of the government; and, in addition to the rest, the reluctance with which
men commonly part with money for purposes that have outlived the
exigencies which produced them, and interfere with the supply of
immediate wants. Delinquencies, from whatever causes, would be
productive of complaints, recriminations, and quarrels. There is, perhaps,
nothing more likely to disturb the tranquillity of nations than their being
bound to mutual contributions for any common object that does not yield an
equal and coincident benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite,
that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money.
Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on
the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them, may be
considered as another probable source of hostility. We are not authorized to
expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would preside over the
legislations of the individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any
additional checks, than we have heretofore seen in too many instances
disgracing their several codes. We have observed the disposition to
retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the enormities
perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we reasonably infer
that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not of
PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches of
moral obligation and social justice.
The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States or
confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this situation
upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some
preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part of the
subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all,
or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would,
by the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the
pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive
contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to
become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the
enemies of them all. Divide et impera(1) must be the motto of every nation
that either hates or fears us.(2)
PUBLIUS
1. Divide and command.
2. In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as possible
be laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them four times a week—
on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in the Daily
Advertiser.

FEDERALIST No. 8. The Consequences of
Hostilities Between the States
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 20, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in
case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be
formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to
those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each
other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united
under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the
consequences that would attend such a situation.
War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence,
would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in
those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained.
The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe,
though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have,
notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering
sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation
which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. The art
of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are
encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion.
Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain
admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur at every
step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader. Formerly,
an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country
almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a
comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive,
with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the
enterprises of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that
quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires
overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing;
of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little
acquisition.
In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of
military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want
of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would
facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun
their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as
difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory.
PLUNDER and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The
calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the events
which would characterize our military exploits.
This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not
long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful
director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a
time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property
incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of
continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort
for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy
their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become
willing to run the risk of being less free.
The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the
correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing armies, it is
said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and it is therefore
inferred that they may exist under it.(1) Their existence, however, from the
very terms of the proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But
standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a dissolution
of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require
a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker
States or confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves
upon an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to
supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular and
effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications.
They would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive
arm of government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a
progressive direction toward monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase
the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.
The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States
or confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors.
Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous governments,
and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often triumphed over
large states, or states of greater natural strength, which have been destitute
of these advantages. Neither the pride nor the safety of the more important
States or confederacies would permit them long to submit to this mortifying
and adventitious superiority. They would quickly resort to means similar to
those by which it had been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-
eminence. Thus, we should, in a little time, see established in every part of
this country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of
the Old World. This, at least, would be the natural course of things; and our
reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are
accommodated to this standard.
These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative
defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the hands
of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they are solid
conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of human
affairs.
It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not
standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often distracted
the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally satisfactory,
may be given to this question. The industrious habits of the people of the
present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the
improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the
condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people
of those republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly
multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of industry, and
the science of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring
with the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system
of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the
citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility.
There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a
country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in one
which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. The rulers
of the former can have no good pretext, if they are even so inclined, to keep
on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be maintained in the latter.
These armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into activity for
interior defense, the people are in no danger of being broken to military
subordination. The laws are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of
military exigencies; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted,
nor confounded with the principles or propensities of the other state. The
smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the community an
overmatch for it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military
power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear
the soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a
necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may
be exerted to the prejudice of their rights.
The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to
suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will
be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the great
body of the people.
In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this
happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be
always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant
defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance
of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The
military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of
territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent
infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those
rights; and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery not
only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this
disposition to that of considering them masters, is neither remote nor
difficult; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such
impressions, to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported
by the military power.
The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An insular
situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure against the
possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of a numerous army
within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head against a sudden
descent, till the militia could have time to rally and embody, is all that has
been deemed requisite. No motive of national policy has demanded, nor
would public opinion have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon its
domestic establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little room for
the operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated as the
consequences of internal war. This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a
great degree, contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this
day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the
contrary, Britain had been situated on the continent, and had been
compelled, as she would have been, by that situation, to make her military
establishments at home coextensive with those of the other great powers of
Europe, she, like them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to
the absolute power of a single man. It is possible, though not easy, that the
people of that island may be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be by
the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually
kept up within the kingdom.
If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an
advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great
distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too
much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous
annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be
necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral
parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be
thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short
course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe—
our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against
the ambition and jealousy of each other.
This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It deserves
the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and honest man
of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn pause, and
meditate dispassionately on the importance of this interesting idea; if they
will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences,
they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Constitution, the
rejection of which would in all probability put a final period to the Union.
The airy phantoms that flit before the distempered imaginations of some of
its adversaries would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of
dangers, real, certain, and formidable.
PUBLIUS
1. This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it will be
shown that the only natural precaution which could have been taken on this
subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to be found in any
constitution that has been heretofore framed in America, most of which
contain no guard at all on this subject.
FEDERALIST No. 9. The Union as a Safeguard
Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 21, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of
the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is
impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy
without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with
which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of
revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration
between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional
calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to the furious storms that are
to succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open to view, we behold
them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing
scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of
sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the
gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at
the same time admonish us to lament that the vices of government should
pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted
endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been so
justly celebrated.
From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the
advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms
of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty.
They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of
society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its
friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on
the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious
instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the
broad and solid foundation of other edifices, not less magnificent, which
will be equally permanent monuments of their errors.
But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of
republican government were too just copies of the originals from which
they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models
of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have
been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as
indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has
received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well
understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the
ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the
introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts
composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the
representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own
election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal
progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful
means, by which the excellences of republican government may be retained
and its imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of
circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil
government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add
one more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an
objection to the new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the
ORBIT within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the
dimensions of a single State or to the consolidation of several smaller States
into one great Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns
the object under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the
principle in its application to a single State, which shall be attended to in
another place.
The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard the
internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external force and security,
is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon in different countries
and ages, and has received the sanction of the most approved writers on the
subject of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have, with great
assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on the
necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government. But they
seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man
expressed in another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the
consequences of the principle to which they subscribe with such ready
acquiescence.
When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the
standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of
almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be
compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms
of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point as the
criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking
refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an
infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the
wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of
universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who have come forward on
the other side of the question seem to have been aware of the dilemma; and
have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a
desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient,
might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men who
possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow
circles of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or
happiness of the people of America.
Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as has
been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that, in the
sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon the
occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more
considerable MEMBERS of the Union, but would not militate against their
being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the true
question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.
So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to
a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a confederate
republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government,
and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.
"It is very probable," (says he(1)) "that mankind would have been
obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single person,
had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal
advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a
monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC."
"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller
STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they intend to
form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one,
capable of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such
a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united
body."
"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support
itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all
manner of inconveniences."
"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he
could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the
confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would
alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free
might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped
and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation."
"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states
the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are
reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one
side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the
confederates preserve their sovereignty."
"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the
internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation, it is
possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of large
monarchies."
I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages,
because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments in
favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false impressions
which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to make.
They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more
immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the
Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.
A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a
CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The essential
characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its authority to the
members in their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals
of whom they are composed. It is contended that the national council ought
to have no concern with any object of internal administration. An exact
equality of suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a
leading feature of a confederate government. These positions are, in the
main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has
indeed happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in
the manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in
their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the
practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no
absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown in the course of
this investigation that as far as the principle contended for has prevailed, it
has been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the government.
The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an
assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states into one
state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal authority are
mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the
members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity,
for local purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to the
general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an
association of states, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far
from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes them
constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct
representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive
and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in
every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.
In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES or
republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON
COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE.
The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and
magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most, delicate
species of interference in their internal administration; for if there be any
thing that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the
appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this
association, says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate
Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the distinctions
insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this enlightened civilian;
and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements of an
erroneous theory.
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MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed
Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to
break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular
governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and
fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He
will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without
violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for
it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public
councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular
governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite
and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most
specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American
constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot
certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality,
to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as
was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most
considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private
faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too
unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties,
and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice
and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested
and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these
complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit
us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a
candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we
labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments;
but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone
account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that
prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for
private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other.
These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and
injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by
removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one,
by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by
giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same
interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was
worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment
without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish
liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than
it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life,
because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As
long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise
it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists
between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have
a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which
the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from
which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to
a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object
of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of
acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property
immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and
views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into
different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we
see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to
the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions
concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well
of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously
contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions
whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn,
divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and
rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to
co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind
to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents
itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to
kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But
the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and
unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without
property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are
creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A
landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed
interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized
nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different
sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering
interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the
spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the
government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his
integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be
both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most
important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not
indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of
large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but
advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law
proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors
are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold
the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the
judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful
faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be
encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures?
are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the
manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice
and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions
of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet
there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and
temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of
justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a
shilling saved to their own pockets.
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these
clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good.
Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases,
can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and
remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest
which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good
of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction
cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of
controlling its EFFECTS.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views
by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society;
but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the
Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular
government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or
interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the
public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at
the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is
then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it
is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued
from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be
recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only.
Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same
time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or
interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to
concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the
opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor
religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not
found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their
efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in
proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy,
by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who
assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for
the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every
case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result
from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the
inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.
Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence
and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security
or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as
they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have
patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by
reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would,
at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their
possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure
for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from
pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and
the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic
are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number
of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and
greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge
the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country,
and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well
happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the
people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by
the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the
effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of
sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first
obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The
question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more
favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is
clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic
may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to
guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they
must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion
of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not
being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally
greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit
characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will
present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit
choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater
number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more
difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by
which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being
more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most
attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean,
on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too
much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little
acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by
reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little
fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal
Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and
aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to
the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent
of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of
democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which
renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the
latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties
and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the
more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller
the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the
compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and
execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult
for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with
each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where
there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication
is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose
concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has
over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large
over a small republic,—is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing
it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose
enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local
prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the
representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite
endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater
variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to
outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased
variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does
it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and
accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority?
Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration
through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political
faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over
the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger
from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an
equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will
be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular
member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to
taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.
And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being
republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the
character of Federalists.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those
points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion,
and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of men who
have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to our
intercourse with foreign countries as with each other.
There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous
spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has
already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of
Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in that
carrying trade, which is the support of their navigation and the foundation
of their naval strength. Those of them which have colonies in America look
forward to what this country is capable of becoming, with painful
solicitude. They foresee the dangers that may threaten their American
dominions from the neighborhood of States, which have all the dispositions,
and would possess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful
marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy of
fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible, of an
ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would answer the
threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their navigation, of
monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of clipping the wings by which
we might soar to a dangerous greatness. Did not prudence forbid the detail,
it would not be difficult to trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the
cabinets of ministers.
If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our
prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations, extending, at the
same time, throughout the States, we may oblige foreign countries to bid
against each other, for the privileges of our markets. This assertion will not
appear chimerical to those who are able to appreciate the importance of the
markets of three millions of people—increasing in rapid progression, for the
most part exclusively addicted to agriculture, and likely from local
circumstances to remain so—to any manufacturing nation; and the immense
difference there would be to the trade and navigation of such a nation,
between a direct communication in its own ships, and an indirect
conveyance of its products and returns, to and from America, in the ships of
another country. Suppose, for instance, we had a government in America,
capable of excluding Great Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty
of commerce) from all our ports; what would be the probable operation of
this step upon her politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the
fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable
and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When these
questions have been asked, upon other occasions, they have received a
plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has been said that
prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the system of Britain,
because she could prosecute her trade with us through the medium of the
Dutch, who would be her immediate customers and paymasters for those
articles which were wanted for the supply of our markets. But would not
her navigation be materially injured by the loss of the important advantage
of being her own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal part of its
profits be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and
risk? Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable
deduction? Would not so circuitous an intercourse facilitate the
competitions of other nations, by enhancing the price of British
commodities in our markets, and by transferring to other hands the
management of this interesting branch of the British commerce?
A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will
justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such a state of
things, conspiring with the pre-possessions of a great part of the nation in
favor of the American trade, and with the importunities of the West India
islands, would produce a relaxation in her present system, and would let us
into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those islands elsewhere,
from which our trade would derive the most substantial benefits. Such a
point gained from the British government, and which could not be expected
without an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our markets, would
be likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations,
who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our
trade.
A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations
toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a federal
navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union under an
efficient government would put it in our power, at a period not very distant,
to create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime
powers, would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of
either of two contending parties. This would be more peculiarly the case in
relation to operations in the West Indies. A few ships of the line, sent
opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to
decide the fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests of the greatest
magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this respect, a most
commanding one. And if to this consideration we add that of the usefulness
of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of military operations in
the West Indies, it will readily be perceived that a situation so favorable
would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges.
A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality.
By a steady adherence to the Union we may hope, erelong, to become the
arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of
European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate.
But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that the
rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other, and would
frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly placed within
our reach. In a state so insignificant our commerce would be a prey to the
wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each other; who, having
nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple or remorse, supply their
wants by depredations on our property as often as it fell in their way. The
rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an
adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the
privilege of being neutral.
Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources
of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the
combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. This situation
would even take away the motive to such combinations, by inducing an
impracticability of success. An active commerce, an extensive navigation,
and a flourishing marine would then be the offspring of moral and physical
necessity. We might defy the little arts of the little politicians to control or
vary the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature.
But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might
operate with success. It would be in the power of the maritime nations,
availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the conditions
of our political existence; and as they have a common interest in being our
carriers, and still more in preventing our becoming theirs, they would in all
probability combine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner as would
in effect destroy it, and confine us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should
then be compelled to content ourselves with the first price of our
commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us to enrich
our enemies and persecutors. That unequaled spirit of enterprise, which
signalizes the genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which
is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and
lost, and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which, with
wisdom, might make herself the admiration and envy of the world.
There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are rights
of the Union—I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of the Western
lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the Confederacy
would give room for delicate questions concerning the future existence of
these rights; which the interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail
to solve to our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain with regard to the
Mississippi needs no comment. France and Britain are concerned with us in
the fisheries, and view them as of the utmost moment to their navigation.
They, of course, would hardly remain long indifferent to that decided
mastery, of which experience has shown us to be possessed in this valuable
branch of traffic, and by which we are able to undersell those nations in
their own markets. What more natural than that they should be disposed to
exclude from the lists such dangerous competitors?
This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit. All
the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously participate
in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile capital,
would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of seamen, it now is, or when
time shall have more nearly assimilated the principles of navigation in the
several States, will become, a universal resource. To the establishment of a
navy, it must be indispensable.
To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in various
ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the quantity
and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and support. A
navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources of all, is an
object far less remote than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy,
which would only embrace the resources of a single part. It happens,
indeed, that different portions of confederated America possess each some
peculiar advantage for this essential establishment. The more southern
States furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval stores—tar, pitch,
and turpentine. Their wood for the construction of ships is also of a more
solid and lasting texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of
which the navy might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern
wood, would be of signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or
of national economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a
greater plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn
from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection to external or
maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation, no more than
the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of a navy.
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance
the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not only
for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to foreign
markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished, and will
acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the
commodities of every part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater
scope, from the diversity in the productions of different States. When the
staple of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its
aid the staple of another. The variety, not less than the value, of products for
exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be
conducted upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a
given value than with a small number of materials of the same value;
arising from the competitions of trade and from the fluctuations of markets.
Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods, and unsalable
at others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can scarcely happen that
they should all be at one time in the latter predicament, and on this account
the operations of the merchant would be less liable to any considerable
obstruction or stagnation. The speculative trader will at once perceive the
force of these observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate
balance of the commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much
more favorable than that of the thirteen States without union or with partial
unions.
It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are united or
disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse between them which
would answer the same ends; this intercourse would be fettered, interrupted,
and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, which in the course of these
papers have been amply detailed. A unity of commercial, as well as
political, interests, can only result from a unity of government.
There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed, of a
striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too far into the regions
of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a newspaper discussion.
I shall briefly observe, that our situation invites and our interests prompt us
to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs. The world may
politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four parts, each having
a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms
and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees,
extended her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have
successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained
has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to
consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men admired as
profound philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a
physical superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals, and with
them the human species, degenerate in America—that even dogs cease to
bark after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere.(1) Facts have too long
supported these arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to
vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother,
moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will will add another
victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of
European greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and
indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior
to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the
terms of the connection between the old and the new world!
PUBLIUS "Recherches philosophiques sur les Americains."
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have
been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of
revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry.
The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all
enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most productive
source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of
their political cares. By multiplying the means of gratification, by
promoting the introduction and circulation of the precious metals, those
darling objects of human avarice and enterprise, it serves to vivify and
invigorate the channels of industry, and to make them flow with greater
activity and copiousness. The assiduous merchant, the laborious
husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious manufacturer,—all
orders of men, look forward with eager expectation and growing alacrity to
this pleasing reward of their toils. The often-agitated question between
agriculture and commerce has, from indubitable experience, received a
decision which has silenced the rivalship that once subsisted between them,
and has proved, to the satisfaction of their friends, that their interests are
intimately blended and interwoven. It has been found in various countries
that, in proportion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. And
how could it have happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer
vent for the products of the earth, which furnishes new incitements to the
cultivation of land, which is the most powerful instrument in increasing the
quantity of money in a state—could that, in fine, which is the faithful
handmaid of labor and industry, in every shape, fail to augment that article,
which is the prolific parent of far the greatest part of the objects upon which
they are exerted? It is astonishing that so simple a truth should ever have
had an adversary; and it is one, among a multitude of proofs, how apt a
spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of too great abstraction and refinement, is
to lead men astray from the plainest truths of reason and conviction.
The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in a
great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the celerity with
which it circulates. Commerce, contributing to both these objects, must of
necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the requisite
supplies to the treasury. The hereditary dominions of the Emperor of
Germany contain a great extent of fertile, cultivated, and populous territory,
a large proportion of which is situated in mild and luxuriant climates. In
some parts of this territory are to be found the best gold and silver mines in
Europe. And yet, from the want of the fostering influence of commerce, that
monarch can boast but slender revenues. He has several times been
compelled to owe obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations for
the preservation of his essential interests, and is unable, upon the strength of
his own resources, to sustain a long or continued war.
But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union will be seen to
conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are other points of view, in which
its influence will appear more immediate and decisive. It is evident from the
state of the country, from the habits of the people, from the experience we
have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very
considerable sums by direct taxation. Tax laws have in vain been
multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried;
the public expectation has been uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries
of the States have remained empty. The popular system of administration
inherent in the nature of popular government, coinciding with the real
scarcity of money incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has
hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collections, and has at
length taught the different legislatures the folly of attempting them.
No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be
surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that of Britain,
where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much more tolerable, and,
from the vigor of the government, much more practicable, than in America,
far the greatest part of the national revenue is derived from taxes of the
indirect kind, from imposts, and from excises. Duties on imported articles
form a large branch of this latter description.
In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means
of revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it, excises must be
confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill brook
the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws. The pockets of the
farmers, on the other hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the
unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands; and personal
property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in any other
way than by the imperceptible agency of taxes on consumption.
If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which will best
enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource must be best
adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serious doubt, that
this state of things must rest on the basis of a general Union. As far as this
would be conducive to the interests of commerce, so far it must tend to the
extension of the revenue to be drawn from that source. As far as it would
contribute to rendering regulations for the collection of the duties more
simple and efficacious, so far it must serve to answer the purposes of
making the same rate of duties more productive, and of putting it into the
power of the government to increase the rate without prejudice to trade.
The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers with which
they are intersected, and of bays that wash their shores; the facility of
communication in every direction; the affinity of language and manners; the
familiar habits of intercourse;—all these are circumstances that would
conspire to render an illicit trade between them a matter of little difficulty,
and would insure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations of each
other. The separate States or confederacies would be necessitated by mutual
jealousy to avoid the temptations to that kind of trade by the lowness of
their duties. The temper of our governments, for a long time to come, would
not permit those rigorous precautions by which the European nations guard
the avenues into their respective countries, as well by land as by water; and
which, even there, are found insufficient obstacles to the adventurous
stratagems of avarice.
In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly
employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the inroads of the dealers
in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar computes the number of these patrols at
upwards of twenty thousand. This shows the immense difficulty in
preventing that species of traffic, where there is an inland communication,
and places in a strong light the disadvantages with which the collection of
duties in this country would be encumbered, if by disunion the States
should be placed in a situation, with respect to each other, resembling that
of France with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers
with which the patrols are necessarily armed, would be intolerable in a free
country.
If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all the States,
there will be, as to the principal part of our commerce, but ONE SIDE to
guard—the ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels arriving directly from foreign
countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely choose to hazard
themselves to the complicated and critical perils which would attend
attempts to unlade prior to their coming into port. They would have to dread
both the dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well after as before their
arrival at the places of their final destination. An ordinary degree of
vigilance would be competent to the prevention of any material infractions
upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed
at the entrances of our ports, might at a small expense be made useful
sentinels of the laws. And the government having the same interest to
provide against violations everywhere, the co-operation of its measures in
each State would have a powerful tendency to render them effectual. Here
also we should preserve by Union, an advantage which nature holds out to
us, and which would be relinquished by separation. The United States lie at
a great distance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from all other
places with which they would have extensive connections of foreign trade.
The passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a single night, as
between the coasts of France and Britain, and of other neighboring nations,
would be impracticable. This is a prodigious security against a direct
contraband with foreign countries; but a circuitous contraband to one State,
through the medium of another, would be both easy and safe. The
difference between a direct importation from abroad, and an indirect
importation through the channel of a neighboring State, in small parcels,
according to time and opportunity, with the additional facilities of inland
communication, must be palpable to every man of discernment.
It is therefore evident, that one national government would be able, at
much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond comparison,
further than would be practicable to the States separately, or to any partial
confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be asserted, that these
duties have not upon an average exceeded in any State three per cent. In
France they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent., and in Britain they
exceed this proportion.(1) There seems to be nothing to hinder their being
increased in this country to at least treble their present amount. The single
article of ardent spirits, under federal regulation, might be made to furnish a
considerable revenue. Upon a ratio to the importation into this State, the
whole quantity imported into the United States may be estimated at four
millions of gallons; which, at a shilling per gallon, would produce two
hundred thousand pounds. That article would well bear this rate of duty;
and if it should tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would
be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals, and
to the health of the society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject of
national extravagance as these spirits.
What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail ourselves of the
resource in question in its full extent? A nation cannot long exist without
revenues. Destitute of this essential support, it must resign its independence,
and sink into the degraded condition of a province. This is an extremity to
which no government will of choice accede. Revenue, therefore, must be
had at all events. In this country, if the principal part be not drawn from
commerce, it must fall with oppressive weight upon land. It has been
already intimated that excises, in their true signification, are too little in
unison with the feelings of the people, to admit of great use being made of
that mode of taxation; nor, indeed, in the States where almost the sole
employment is agriculture, are the objects proper for excise sufficiently
numerous to permit very ample collections in that way. Personal estate (as
has been before remarked), from the difficulty in tracing it, cannot be
subjected to large contributions, by any other means than by taxes on
consumption. In populous cities, it may be enough the subject of conjecture,
to occasion the oppression of individuals, without much aggregate benefit
to the State; but beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure, escape the
eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. As the necessities of the State,
nevertheless, must be satisfied in some mode or other, the defect of other
resources must throw the principal weight of public burdens on the
possessors of land. And as, on the other hand, the wants of the government
can never obtain an adequate supply, unless all the sources of revenue are
open to its demands, the finances of the community, under such
embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation consistent with its
respectability or its security. Thus we shall not even have the consolations
of a full treasury, to atone for the oppression of that valuable class of the
citizens who are employed in the cultivation of the soil. But public and
private distress will keep pace with each other in gloomy concert; and unite
in deploring the infatuation of those counsels which led to disunion.
PUBLIUS
1. If my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent.
FEDERALIST No. 13. Advantage of the Union in
Respect to Economy in Government
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 28, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety
consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be
usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn
from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under one
government, there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are
divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different national
civil lists to be provided for—and each of them, as to the principal
departments, coextensive with that which would be necessary for a
government of the whole. The entire separation of the States into thirteen
unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too replete with
danger to have many advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the
dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned toward three
confederacies—one consisting of the four Northern, another of the four
Middle, and a third of the five Southern States. There is little probability
that there would be a greater number. According to this distribution, each
confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than that of the
kingdom of Great Britain. No well-informed man will suppose that the
affairs of such a confederacy can be properly regulated by a government
less comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which has been
proposed by the convention. When the dimensions of a State attain to a
certain magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and the same
forms of administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent.
This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no rule by
which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the
government of any given number of individuals; but when we consider that
the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the supposed
confederacies, contains about eight millions of people, and when we reflect
upon the degree of authority required to direct the passions of so large a
society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt that the like
portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same task in a society
far more numerous. Civil power, properly organized and exerted, is capable
of diffusing its force to a very great extent; and can, in a manner, reproduce
itself in every part of a great empire by a judicious arrangement of
subordinate institutions.
The supposition that each confederacy into which the States would be
likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive
than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition, more
probable than that which presents us with three confederacies as the
alternative to a general Union. If we attend carefully to geographical and
commercial considerations, in conjunction with the habits and prejudices of
the different States, we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion they
will most naturally league themselves under two governments. The four
Eastern States, from all the causes that form the links of national sympathy
and connection, may with certainty be expected to unite. New York,
situated as she is, would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and
unsupported flank to the weight of that confederacy. There are other
obvious reasons that would facilitate her accession to it. New Jersey is too
small a State to think of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more
powerful combination; nor do there appear to be any obstacles to her
admission into it. Even Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to
join the Northern league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her
own navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and
dispositions of her citizens. The more Southern States, from various
circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in the
encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system which would give
unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well as the purchasers of
their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests
in a connection so adverse to her policy. As she must at all events be a
frontier, she may deem it most consistent with her safety to have her
exposed side turned towards the weaker power of the Southern, rather than
towards the stronger power of the Northern, Confederacy. This would give
her the fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders of America. Whatever
may be the determination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy
includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to
the south of that State.
Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able to
support a national government better than one half, or one third, or any
number less than the whole. This reflection must have great weight in
obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on the
principle of expense; an objection, however, which, when we come to take a
nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground.
If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we take into
view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed to guard the
inland communication between the different confederacies against illicit
trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of the necessities of
revenue; and if we also take into view the military establishments which it
has been shown would unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts
of the several nations into which the States would be divided, we shall
clearly discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the
economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and liberty of every
part.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 14. Objections to the Proposed
Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered
From the New York Packet. Friday, November 30, 1787.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
WE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against
foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the
guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only
substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the
liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of
faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of
which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that
remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an objection
that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the Union
embraces. A few observations on this subject will be the more proper, as it
is perceived that the adversaries of the new Constitution are availing
themselves of the prevailing prejudice with regard to the practicable sphere
of republican administration, in order to supply, by imaginary difficulties,
the want of those solid objections which they endeavor in vain to find.
The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has
been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that it
seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a
republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from
the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was also
adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the people meet
and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and
administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy,
consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended
over a large region.
To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice of some
celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in forming the
modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects either of an absolute
or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to heighten the advantages, or
palliate the evils of those forms, by placing in comparison the vices and
defects of the republican, and by citing as specimens of the latter the
turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy. Under the
confusion of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a republic
observations applicable to a democracy only; and among others, the
observation that it can never be established but among a small number of
people, living within a small compass of territory.
Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular
governments of antiquity were of the democratic species; and even in
modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation, no
example is seen of a government wholly popular, and founded, at the same
time, wholly on that principle. If Europe has the merit of discovering this
great mechanical power in government, by the simple agency of which the
will of the largest political body may be concentred, and its force directed to
any object which the public good requires, America can claim the merit of
making the discovery the basis of unmixed and extensive republics. It is
only to be lamented that any of her citizens should wish to deprive her of
the additional merit of displaying its full efficacy in the establishment of the
comprehensive system now under her consideration.
As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central point
which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their
public functions demand, and will include no greater number than can join
in those functions; so the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the
centre which will barely allow the representatives to meet as often as may
be necessary for the administration of public affairs. Can it be said that the
limits of the United States exceed this distance? It will not be said by those
who recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union, that
during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the States have been
almost continually assembled, and that the members from the most distant
States are not chargeable with greater intermissions of attendance than those
from the States in the neighborhood of Congress.
That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting subject,
let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. The limits, as fixed by
the treaty of peace, are: on the east the Atlantic, on the south the latitude of
thirty-one degrees, on the west the Mississippi, and on the north an irregular
line running in some instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others
falling as low as the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies
below that latitude. Computing the distance between the thirty-first and
forty-fifth degrees, it amounts to nine hundred and seventy-three common
miles; computing it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to seven hundred
and sixty-four miles and a half. Taking the mean for the distance, the
amount will be eight hundred and sixty-eight miles and three-fourths. The
mean distance from the Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably
exceed seven hundred and fifty miles. On a comparison of this extent with
that of several countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering our
system commensurate to it appears to be demonstrable. It is not a great deal
larger than Germany, where a diet representing the whole empire is
continually assembled; or than Poland before the late dismemberment,
where another national diet was the depositary of the supreme power.
Passing by France and Spain, we find that in Great Britain, inferior as it
may be in size, the representatives of the northern extremity of the island
have as far to travel to the national council as will be required of those of
the most remote parts of the Union.
Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations remain
which will place it in a light still more satisfactory.
In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is
not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws.
Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all
the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the
separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend
their care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided for,
will retain their due authority and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of
the convention to abolish the governments of the particular States, its
adversaries would have some ground for their objection; though it would
not be difficult to show that if they were abolished the general government
would be compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them
in their proper jurisdiction.
A second observation to be made is that the immediate object of the
federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen primitive States,
which we know to be practicable; and to add to them such other States as
may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhoods, which we cannot
doubt to be equally practicable. The arrangements that may be necessary for
those angles and fractions of our territory which lie on our northwestern
frontier, must be left to those whom further discoveries and experience will
render more equal to the task.
Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse throughout the
Union will be facilitated by new improvements. Roads will everywhere be
shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for travelers will be
multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on our eastern side will be
opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the thirteen
States. The communication between the Western and Atlantic districts, and
between different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy by
those numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has intersected
our country, and which art finds it so little difficult to connect and complete.
A fourth and still more important consideration is, that as almost every
State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and will thus find, in regard to
its safety, an inducement to make some sacrifices for the sake of the general
protection; so the States which lie at the greatest distance from the heart of
the Union, and which, of course, may partake least of the ordinary
circulation of its benefits, will be at the same time immediately contiguous
to foreign nations, and will consequently stand, on particular occasions, in
greatest need of its strength and resources. It may be inconvenient for
Georgia, or the States forming our western or northeastern borders, to send
their representatives to the seat of government; but they would find it more
so to struggle alone against an invading enemy, or even to support alone the
whole expense of those precautions which may be dictated by the
neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less benefit,
therefore, from the Union in some respects than the less distant States, they
will derive greater benefit from it in other respects, and thus the proper
equilibrium will be maintained throughout.
I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full
confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your decisions
will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you will never suffer
difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or however fashionable the
error on which they may be founded, to drive you into the gloomy and
perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion would conduct you.
Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of
America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no
longer live together as members of the same family; can no longer continue
the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellow
citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire. Hearken not to
the voice which petulantly tells you that the form of government
recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world; that it
has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors; that it
rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen,
shut your ears against this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against
the poison which it conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of
American citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of
their sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of
their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to be shunned,
believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild of all projects,
the most rash of all attempts, is that of rendering us in pieces, in order to
preserve our liberties and promote our happiness. But why is the
experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may
comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that,
whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and
other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for
custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense,
the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own
experience? To this manly spirit, posterity will be indebted for the
possession, and the world for the example, of the numerous innovations
displayed on the American theatre, in favor of private rights and public
happiness. Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the
Revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered, no government
established of which an exact model did not present itself, the people of the
United States might, at this moment have been numbered among the
melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring
under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of
the rest of mankind. Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole
human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished
a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They
reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the
globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is
incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works
betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them. If they erred most
in the structure of the Union, this was the work most difficult to be
executed; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of your
convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to
decide.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 15. The Insufficiency of the
Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 1, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York.
IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow
citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the importance
of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to you a
complication of dangers to which you would be exposed, should you permit
that sacred knot which binds the people of America together be severed or
dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In
the sequel of the inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, the
truths intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation from facts
and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road over which you will still have
to pass should in some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will
recollect that you are in quest of information on a subject the most
momentous which can engage the attention of a free people, that the field
through which you have to travel is in itself spacious, and that the
difficulties of the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes
with which sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the
obstacles from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be done,
without sacrificing utility to despatch.
In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of the
subject, the point next in order to be examined is the "insufficiency of the
present Confederation to the preservation of the Union." It may perhaps be
asked what need there is of reasoning or proof to illustrate a position which
is not either controverted or doubted, to which the understandings and
feelings of all classes of men assent, and which in substance is admitted by
the opponents as well as by the friends of the new Constitution. It must in
truth be acknowledged that, however these may differ in other respects,
they in general appear to harmonize in this sentiment, at least, that there are
material imperfections in our national system, and that something is
necessary to be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that
support this opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced
themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at length
extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the principal share in
precipitating the extremity at which we are arrived, a reluctant confession
of the reality of those defects in the scheme of our federal government,
which have been long pointed out and regretted by the intelligent friends of
the Union.
We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last
stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the
pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which we do not
experience. Are there engagements to the performance of which we are held
by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and
unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners and to our own
citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the preservation of our
political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory
provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important
posts in the possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations,
ought long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the
prejudice of our interests, not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition
to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury,
nor government.(1) Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity?
The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought
first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free
participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it.
Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We
seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is
commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of
declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard
against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our government even
forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere
pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the
value of land a symptom of national distress? The price of improved land in
most parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the
quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that
want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent
among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of
every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most
useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the
narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from
the scarcity of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can
afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded, what
indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and insignificance that
could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as
we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public
misfortunes?
This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by those
very maxims and councils which would now deter us from adopting the
proposed Constitution; and which, not content with having conducted us to
the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss that
awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive that
ought to influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for our
safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break the
fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and
prosperity.
It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn to be
resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract
proposition that there exist material defects in our national system; but the
usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries of federal
measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only
principles that can give it a chance of success. While they admit that the
government of the United States is destitute of energy, they contend against
conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that energy.
They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an
augmentation of federal authority, without a diminution of State authority;
at sovereignty in the Union, and complete independence in the members.
They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster
of an imperium in imperio. This renders a full display of the principal
defects of the Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils we
experience do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from
fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be
amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main
pillars of the fabric.
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing
Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or
GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE
CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of
which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the
powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which
the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment, the
United States has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and
money; but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending
to the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that
though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws,
constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they
are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at their
option.
It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that
after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head, there
should still be found men who object to the new Constitution, for deviating
from a principle which has been found the bane of the old, and which is in
itself evidently incompatible with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a principle,
in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent and
sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy.
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or
alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely
stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and
quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its
execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind exist
among all civilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and
war, of observance and non-observance, as the interests or passions of the
contracting powers dictate. In the early part of the present century there was
an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts, from which the
politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never
realized. With a view to establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace
of that part of the world, all the resources of negotiation were exhausted,
and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely
formed before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson
to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no
other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose general
considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate interest
or passion.
If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar
relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general
DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be
pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been
enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at
least, consistent and practicable Abandoning all views towards a
confederate government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive
and defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternate friends and
enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by
the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us.
But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we still
will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is the same
thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common council,
we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may
be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and
a government; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of
the citizens,—the only proper objects of government.
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea
of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or
punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to
disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will,
in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This
penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the
agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the
COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first
kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity, be
employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is evident that
there is no process of a court by which the observance of the laws can, in
the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for
violations of their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into
execution by the sword. In an association where the general authority is
confined to the collective bodies of the communities, that compose it, every
breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must
become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can
certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent man
choose to commit his happiness to it.
There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States, of the
regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that a sense of
common interest would preside over the conduct of the respective members,
and would beget a full compliance with all the constitutional requisitions of
the Union. This language, at the present day, would appear as wild as a
great part of what we now hear from the same quarter will be thought, when
we shall have received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom,
experience. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by
which human conduct is actuated, and belied the original inducements to
the establishment of civil power. Why has government been instituted at
all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason
and justice, without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act
with more rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The
contrary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of
mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to
reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to
be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one. A spirit
of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies
of men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are composed into
improprieties and excesses, for which they would blush in a private
capacity.
In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power, an
impatience of control, that disposes those who are invested with the
exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to restrain
or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that in every political
association which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common
interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of
eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the operation of
which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common
centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in
the love of power. Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival
and enemy of that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple
proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect, that the
persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the particular
members of a confederacy will at all times be ready, with perfect good-
humor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to execute the resolutions
or decrees of the general authority. The reverse of this results from the
constitution of human nature.
If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed
without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will be little
prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the respective
members, whether they have a constitutional right to do it or not, will
undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures themselves. They will
consider the conformity of the thing proposed or required to their
immediate interests or aims; the momentary conveniences or
inconveniences that would attend its adoption. All this will be done; and in
a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny, without that knowledge of
national circumstances and reasons of state, which is essential to a right
judgment, and with that strong predilection in favor of local objects, which
can hardly fail to mislead the decision. The same process must be repeated
in every member of which the body is constituted; and the execution of the
plans, framed by the councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on the
discretion of the ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those
who have been conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies; who
have seen how difficult it often is, where there is no exterior pressure of
circumstances, to bring them to harmonious resolutions on important points,
will readily conceive how impossible it must be to induce a number of such
assemblies, deliberating at a distance from each other, at different times,
and under different impressions, long to co-operate in the same views and
pursuits.
In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is
requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete execution of every
important measure that proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was to
have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have not been executed; the
delinquencies of the States have, step by step, matured themselves to an
extreme, which has, at length, arrested all the wheels of the national
government, and brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time
scarcely possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till
the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute for the
present shadow of a federal government. Things did not come to this
desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been specified
produced at first only unequal and disproportionate degrees of compliance
with the requisitions of the Union. The greater deficiencies of some States
furnished the pretext of example and the temptation of interest to the
complying, or to the least delinquent States. Why should we do more in
proportion than those who are embarked with us in the same political
voyage? Why should we consent to bear more than our proper share of the
common burden? These were suggestions which human selfishness could
not withstand, and which even speculative men, who looked forward to
remote consequences, could not, without hesitation, combat. Each State,
yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or convenience, has
successively withdrawn its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems
ready to fall upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or communities,
in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we
have made of it, is equally attested by the events which have befallen all
other governments of the confederate kind, of which we have any account,
in exact proportion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirmations of
this fact will be worthy of a distinct and particular examination. I shall
content myself with barely observing here, that of all the confederacies of
antiquity, which history has handed down to us, the Lycian and Achaean
leagues, as far as there remain vestiges of them, appear to have been most
free from the fetters of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those
which have best deserved, and have most liberally received, the applauding
suffrages of political writers.
This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphatically, be styled the
parent of anarchy: It has been seen that delinquencies in the members of the
Union are its natural and necessary offspring; and that whenever they
happen, the only constitutional remedy is force, and the immediate effect of
the use of it, civil war.
It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of government, in its
application to us, would even be capable of answering its end. If there
should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of the national
government it would either not be able to employ force at all, or, when this
could be done, it would amount to a war between parts of the Confederacy
concerning the infractions of a league, in which the strongest combination
would be most likely to prevail, whether it consisted of those who
supported or of those who resisted the general authority. It would rarely
happen that the delinquency to be redressed would be confined to a single
member, and if there were more than one who had neglected their duty,
similarity of situation would induce them to unite for common defense.
Independent of this motive of sympathy, if a large and influential State
should happen to be the aggressing member, it would commonly have
weight enough with its neighbors to win over some of them as associates to
its cause. Specious arguments of danger to the common liberty could easily
be contrived; plausible excuses for the deficiencies of the party could,
without difficulty, be invented to alarm the apprehensions, inflame the
passions, and conciliate the good-will, even of those States which were not
chargeable with any violation or omission of duty. This would be the more
likely to take place, as the delinquencies of the larger members might be
expected sometimes to proceed from an ambitious premeditation in their
rulers, with a view to getting rid of all external control upon their designs of
personal aggrandizement; the better to effect which it is presumable they
would tamper beforehand with leading individuals in the adjacent States. If
associates could not be found at home, recourse would be had to the aid of
foreign powers, who would seldom be disinclined to encouraging the
dissensions of a Confederacy, from the firm union of which they had so
much to fear. When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men observe
no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the
instigations of irritated resentment, would be apt to carry the States against
which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any extremes necessary to
avenge the affront or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of
this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union.
This may be considered as the violent death of the Confederacy. Its more
natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of experiencing, if the
federal system be not speedily renovated in a more substantial form. It is
not probable, considering the genius of this country, that the complying
States would often be inclined to support the authority of the Union by
engaging in a war against the non-complying States. They would always be
more ready to pursue the milder course of putting themselves upon an equal
footing with the delinquent members by an imitation of their example. And
the guilt of all would thus become the security of all. Our past experience
has exhibited the operation of this spirit in its full light. There would, in
fact, be an insuperable difficulty in ascertaining when force could with
propriety be employed. In the article of pecuniary contribution, which
would be the most usual source of delinquency, it would often be
impossible to decide whether it had proceeded from disinclination or
inability. The pretense of the latter would always be at hand. And the case
must be very flagrant in which its fallacy could be detected with sufficient
certainty to justify the harsh expedient of compulsion. It is easy to see that
this problem alone, as often as it should occur, would open a wide field for
the exercise of factious views, of partiality, and of oppression, in the
majority that happened to prevail in the national council.
It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not to prefer a
national Constitution which could only be kept in motion by the
instrumentality of a large army continually on foot to execute the ordinary
requisitions or decrees of the government. And yet this is the plain
alternative involved by those who wish to deny it the power of extending its
operations to individuals. Such a scheme, if practicable at all, would
instantly degenerate into a military despotism; but it will be found in every
light impracticable. The resources of the Union would not be equal to the
maintenance of an army considerable enough to confine the larger States
within the limits of their duty; nor would the means ever be furnished of
forming such an army in the first instance. Whoever considers the
populousness and strength of several of these States singly at the present
juncture, and looks forward to what they will become, even at the distance
of half a century, will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme
which aims at regulating their movements by laws to operate upon them in
their collective capacities, and to be executed by a coercion applicable to
them in the same capacities. A project of this kind is little less romantic
than the monster-taming spirit which is attributed to the fabulous heroes and
demi-gods of antiquity.
Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members
smaller than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for sovereign
States, supported by military coercion, has never been found effectual. It
has rarely been attempted to be employed, but against the weaker members;
and in most instances attempts to coerce the refractory and disobedient have
been the signals of bloody wars, in which one half of the confederacy has
displayed its banners against the other half.
The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be clearly
this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a federal government
capable of regulating the common concerns and preserving the general
tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the objects committed to its care, upon
the reverse of the principle contended for by the opponents of the proposed
Constitution. It must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must
stand in need of no intermediate legislations; but must itself be empowered
to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions.
The majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the
medium of the courts of justice. The government of the Union, like that of
each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears
of individuals; and to attract to its support those passions which have the
strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short, possess all the
means, and have aright to resort to all the methods, of executing the powers
with which it is intrusted, that are possessed and exercised by the
government of the particular States.
To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if any State should be
disaffected to the authority of the Union, it could at any time obstruct the
execution of its laws, and bring the matter to the same issue of force, with
the necessity of which the opposite scheme is reproached.
The plausibility of this objection will vanish the moment we advert to the
essential difference between a mere NON-COMPLIANCE and a DIRECT
and ACTIVE RESISTANCE. If the interposition of the State legislatures be
necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union, they have only NOT TO
ACT, or TO ACT EVASIVELY, and the measure is defeated. This neglect
of duty may be disguised under affected but unsubstantial provisions, so as
not to appear, and of course not to excite any alarm in the people for the
safety of the Constitution. The State leaders may even make a merit of their
surreptitious invasions of it on the ground of some temporary convenience,
exemption, or advantage.
But if the execution of the laws of the national government should not
require the intervention of the State legislatures, if they were to pass into
immediate operation upon the citizens themselves, the particular
governments could not interrupt their progress without an open and violent
exertion of an unconstitutional power. No omissions nor evasions would
answer the end. They would be obliged to act, and in such a manner as
would leave no doubt that they had encroached on the national rights. An
experiment of this nature would always be hazardous in the face of a
constitution in any degree competent to its own defense, and of a people
enlightened enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and an illegal
usurpation of authority. The success of it would require not merely a
factious majority in the legislature, but the concurrence of the courts of
justice and of the body of the people. If the judges were not embarked in a
conspiracy with the legislature, they would pronounce the resolutions of
such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law of the land,
unconstitutional, and void. If the people were not tainted with the spirit of
their State representatives, they, as the natural guardians of the Constitution,
would throw their weight into the national scale and give it a decided
preponderancy in the contest. Attempts of this kind would not often be
made with levity or rashness, because they could seldom be made without
danger to the authors, unless in cases of a tyrannical exercise of the federal
authority.
If opposition to the national government should arise from the disorderly
conduct of refractory or seditious individuals, it could be overcome by the
same means which are daily employed against the same evil under the State
governments. The magistracy, being equally the ministers of the law of the
land, from whatever source it might emanate, would doubtless be as ready
to guard the national as the local regulations from the inroads of private
licentiousness. As to those partial commotions and insurrections, which
sometimes disquiet society, from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction,
or from sudden or occasional illhumors that do not infect the great body of
the community the general government could command more extensive
resources for the suppression of disturbances of that kind than would be in
the power of any single member. And as to those mortal feuds which, in
certain conjunctures, spread a conflagration through a whole nation, or
through a very large proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty causes
of discontent given by the government or from the contagion of some
violent popular paroxysm, they do not fall within any ordinary rules of
calculation. When they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions and
dismemberments of empire. No form of government can always either
avoid or control them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too
mighty for human foresight or precaution, and it would be idle to object to a
government because it could not perform impossibilities.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated
and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against
the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be
said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful,
and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be
judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the
utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require,
I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted
with the administration of the general government could ever feel to divest
the States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere
domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to
ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all
the objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all
the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be
lodged in the national depository. The administration of private justice
between the citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of
other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are
proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares
of a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable that there should exist a
disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they are
connected; because the attempt to exercise those powers would be as
troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the possession of them, for that
reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the importance, or to the
splendor of the national government.
But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere wantonness and lust
of domination would be sufficient to beget that disposition; still it may be
safely affirmed, that the sense of the constituent body of the national
representatives, or, in other words, the people of the several States, would
control the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be far
more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national
authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the State
authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree of
influence which the State governments if they administer their affairs with
uprightness and prudence, will generally possess over the people; a
circumstance which at the same time teaches us that there is an inherent and
intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions; and that too much pains
cannot be taken in their organization, to give them all the force which is
compatible with the principles of liberty.
The superiority of influence in favor of the particular governments would
result partly from the diffusive construction of the national government, but
chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the attention of the State
administrations would be directed.
It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly weak
in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same
principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his
neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the
people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local
governments than towards the government of the Union; unless the force of
that principle should be destroyed by a much better administration of the
latter.
This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful
auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.
The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall under
the superintendence of the local administrations, and which will form so
many rivulets of influence, running through every part of the society, cannot
be particularized, without involving a detail too tedious and uninteresting to
compensate for the instruction it might afford.
There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the
State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear and
satisfactory light,—I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil
justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most
attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. It is that which,
being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property, having its
benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating
all those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of
individuals is more immediately awake, contributes, more than any other
circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of the people, affection,
esteem, and reverence towards the government. This great cement of
society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the
particular governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would
insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render
them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently, dangerous
rivals to the power of the Union.
The operations of the national government, on the other hand, falling less
immediately under the observation of the mass of the citizens, the benefits
derived from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by speculative
men. Relating to more general interests, they will be less apt to come home
to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire an
habitual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment of attachment.
The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the
experience of all federal constitutions with which we are acquainted, and of
all others which have borne the least analogy to them.
Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking,
confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of association.
There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose authority
extended over the whole nation; and a number of subordinate vassals, or
feudatories, who had large portions of land allotted to them, and numerous
trains of INFERIOR vassals or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that
land upon the tenure of fealty or obedience, to the persons of whom they
held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of sovereign, within his particular
demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual opposition to
authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between the great barons or
chief feudatories themselves. The power of the head of the nation was
commonly too weak, either to preserve the public peace, or to protect the
people against the oppressions of their immediate lords. This period of
European affairs is emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal
anarchy.
When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike
temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight and
influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more regular
authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed over that of the
prince; and in many instances his dominion was entirely thrown off, and the
great fiefs were erected into independent principalities or States. In those
instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his
success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their
dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign and
the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and detested by both;
till mutual danger and mutual interest effected a union between them fatal
to the power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct of clemency
and justice, preserved the fidelity and devotion of their retainers and
followers, the contests between them and the prince must almost always
have ended in their favor, and in the abridgment or subversion of the royal
authority.
This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or conjecture.
Among other illustrations of its truth which might be cited, Scotland will
furnish a cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at an early day,
introduced into that kingdom, uniting the nobles and their dependants by
ties equivalent to those of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant
overmatch for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England
subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those rules
of subordination which a more rational and more energetic system of civil
polity had previously established in the latter kingdom.
The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with
the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the reasons
already explained, they will generally possess the confidence and good-will
of the people, and with so important a support, will be able effectually to
oppose all encroachments of the national government. It will be well if they
are not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. The points
of similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both, and in the
CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the community into
particular DEPOSITORIES, in one case at the disposal of individuals, in the
other case at the disposal of political bodies.
A concise review of the events that have attended confederate
governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an inattention to
which has been the great source of our political mistakes, and has given our
jealousy a direction to the wrong side. This review shall form the subject of
some ensuing papers.
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MADISON, with HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that
of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic council. From
the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a very
instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the American States.
The members retained the character of independent and sovereign states,
and had equal votes in the federal council. This council had a general
authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the
common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in the
last resort, all controversies between the members; to fine the aggressing
party; to employ the whole force of the confederacy against the disobedient;
to admit new members. The Amphictyons were the guardians of religion,
and of the immense riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they
had the right of jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and
those who came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the efficacy
of the federal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend and protect the
united cities, to punish the violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance on
sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.
In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply
sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances, they exceed
the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation. The Amphictyons
had in their hands the superstition of the times, one of the principal engines
by which government was then maintained; they had a declared authority to
use coercion against refractory cities, and were bound by oath to exert this
authority on the necessary occasions.
Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory. The
powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered by deputies
appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities; and exercised
over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness, the disorders, and
finally the destruction of the confederacy. The more powerful members,
instead of being kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized successively
over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of
Greece seventy-three years. The Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-
nine years; at a subsequent period, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans
had their turn of domination.
It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the deputies of the
strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the weaker; and that judgment
went in favor of the most powerful party.
Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia and
Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or fewer of
them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy. The
intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissitudes convulsions,
and carnage.
After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the
Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned out of
the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The Athenians,
finding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer partisans by such a
measure than themselves, and would become masters of the public
deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece of
history proves at once the inefficiency of the union, the ambition and
jealousy of its most powerful members, and the dependent and degraded
condition of the rest. The smaller members, though entitled by the theory of
their system to revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common
center, had become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude.
Had the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot, been as wise as they were
courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the
necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of the peace
which followed their success against the Persian arms, to establish such a
reformation. Instead of this obvious policy, Athens and Sparta, inflated with
the victories and the glory they had acquired, became first rivals and then
enemies; and did each other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered
from Xerxes. Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in
the celebrated Peloponnesian war; which itself ended in the ruin and slavery
of the Athenians who had begun it.
As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by internal
dissentions, so these never fail to bring on fresh calamities from abroad.
The Phocians having ploughed up some consecrated ground belonging to
the temple of Apollo, the Amphictyonic council, according to the
superstition of the age, imposed a fine on the sacrilegious offenders. The
Phocians, being abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the
decree. The Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to maintain the
authority of the Amphictyons, and to avenge the violated god. The latter,
being the weaker party, invited the assistance of Philip of Macedon, who
had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly seized the opportunity of
executing the designs he had long planned against the liberties of Greece.
By his intrigues and bribes he won over to his interests the popular leaders
of several cities; by their influence and votes, gained admission into the
Amphictyonic council; and by his arts and his arms, made himself master of
the confederacy.
Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which this
interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a judicious
observer on her fate, been united by a stricter confederation, and persevered
in her union, she would never have worn the chains of Macedon; and might
have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome.
The Achaean league, as it is called, was another society of Grecian
republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction.
The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much wiser,
than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly appear, that though not
exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means equally deserved it.
The cities composing this league retained their municipal jurisdiction,
appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The senate, in
which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right of peace and
war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into treaties and
alliances; of appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who
commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten of the
senators, not only administered the government in the recess of the senate,
but had a great share in its deliberations, when assembled. According to the
primitive constitution, there were two praetors associated in the
administration; but on trial a single one was preferred.
It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the same
weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this effect
proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left in uncertainty. It
is said only that the cities were in a manner compelled to receive the same
laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was brought into the league by
Philopoemen, it was attended with an abolition of the institutions and laws
of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the Achaeans. The Amphictyonic
confederacy, of which she had been a member, left her in the full exercise
of her government and her legislation. This circumstance alone proves a
very material difference in the genius of the two systems.
It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain of this
curious political fabric. Could its interior structure and regular operation be
ascertained, it is probable that more light would be thrown by it on the
science of federal government, than by any of the like experiments with
which we are acquainted.
One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians who take
notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the renovation of the
league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the arts of Macedon, there was
infinitely more of moderation and justice in the administration of its
government, and less of violence and sedition in the people, than were to be
found in any of the cities exercising SINGLY all the prerogatives of
sovereignty. The Abbe Mably, in his observations on Greece, says that the
popular government, which was so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no
disorders in the members of the Achaean republic, BECAUSE IT WAS
THERE TEMPERED BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY AND LAWS OF
THE CONFEDERACY.
We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did not, in a
certain degree, agitate the particular cities; much less that a due
subordination and harmony reigned in the general system. The contrary is
sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate of the republic.
Whilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, that of the Achaeans,
which comprehended the less important cities only, made little figure on the
theatre of Greece. When the former became a victim to Macedon, the latter
was spared by the policy of Philip and Alexander. Under the successors of
these princes, however, a different policy prevailed. The arts of division
were practiced among the Achaeans. Each city was seduced into a separate
interest; the union was dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny
of Macedonian garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing out of
their own confusions. Shame and oppression erelong awaken their love of
liberty. A few cities reunited. Their example was followed by others, as
opportunities were found of cutting off their tyrants. The league soon
embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus. Macedon saw its progress; but
was hindered by internal dissensions from stopping it. All Greece caught
the enthusiasm and seemed ready to unite in one confederacy, when the
jealousy and envy in Sparta and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achaeans,
threw a fatal damp on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power
induced the league to court the alliance of the Kings of Egypt and Syria,
who, as successors of Alexander, were rivals of the king of Macedon. This
policy was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led by his
ambition to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the Achaeans, and
who, as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and
Syrian princes to effect a breach of their engagements with the league.
The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to
Cleomenes, or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former oppressor.
The latter expedient was adopted. The contests of the Greeks always
afforded a pleasing opportunity to that powerful neighbor of intermeddling
in their affairs. A Macedonian army quickly appeared. Cleomenes was
vanquished. The Achaeans soon experienced, as often happens, that a
victorious and powerful ally is but another name for a master. All that their
most abject compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the
exercise of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon, soon
provoked by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The
Achaeans, though weakened by internal dissensions and by the revolt of
Messene, one of its members, being joined by the AEtolians and Athenians,
erected the standard of opposition. Finding themselves, though thus
supported, unequal to the undertaking, they once more had recourse to the
dangerous expedient of introducing the succor of foreign arms. The
Romans, to whom the invitation was made, eagerly embraced it. Philip was
conquered; Macedon subdued. A new crisis ensued to the league.
Dissensions broke out among it members. These the Romans fostered.
Callicrates and other popular leaders became mercenary instruments for
inveigling their countrymen. The more effectually to nourish discord and
disorder the Romans had, to the astonishment of those who confided in their
sincerity, already proclaimed universal liberty(1) throughout Greece. With
the same insidious views, they now seduced the members from the league,
by representing to their pride the violation it committed on their
sovereignty. By these arts this union, the last hope of Greece, the last hope
of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces; and such imbecility and distraction
introduced, that the arms of Rome found little difficulty in completing the
ruin which their arts had commenced. The Achaeans were cut to pieces, and
Achaia loaded with chains, under which it is groaning at this hour.
I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important
portion of history; both because it teaches more than one lesson, and
because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean constitution, it
emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to anarchy
among the members, than to tyranny in the head.
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MADISON, with HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not
exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject. There are
existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit particular
consideration. The first which presents itself is the Germanic body.
In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven distinct
nations, who had no common chief. The Franks, one of the number, having
conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has taken its name
from them. In the ninth century Charlemagne, its warlike monarch, carried
his victorious arms in every direction; and Germany became a part of his
vast dominions. On the dismemberment, which took place under his sons,
this part was erected into a separate and independent empire. Charlemagne
and his immediate descendants possessed the reality, as well as the ensigns
and dignity of imperial power. But the principal vassals, whose fiefs had
become hereditary, and who composed the national diets which
Charlemagne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke and advanced
to sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The force of imperial
sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful dependants; or to
preserve the unity and tranquillity of the empire. The most furious private
wars, accompanied with every species of calamity, were carried on between
the different princes and states. The imperial authority, unable to maintain
the public order, declined by degrees till it was almost extinct in the
anarchy, which agitated the long interval between the death of the last
emperor of the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of the
Austrian lines. In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full
sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and
decorations of power.
Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the important features
of a confederacy, has grown the federal system which constitutes the
Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a diet representing the
component members of the confederacy; in the emperor, who is the
executive magistrate, with a negative on the decrees of the diet; and in the
imperial chamber and the aulic council, two judiciary tribunals having
supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern the empire, or which
happen among its members.
The diet possesses the general power of legislating for the empire; of
making war and peace; contracting alliances; assessing quotas of troops and
money; constructing fortresses; regulating coin; admitting new members;
and subjecting disobedient members to the ban of the empire, by which the
party is degraded from his sovereign rights and his possessions forfeited.
The members of the confederacy are expressly restricted from entering into
compacts prejudicial to the empire; from imposing tolls and duties on their
mutual intercourse, without the consent of the emperor and diet; from
altering the value of money; from doing injustice to one another; or from
affording assistance or retreat to disturbers of the public peace. And the ban
is denounced against such as shall violate any of these restrictions. The
members of the diet, as such, are subject in all cases to be judged by the
emperor and diet, and in their private capacities by the aulic council and
imperial chamber.
The prerogatives of the emperor are numerous. The most important of
them are: his exclusive right to make propositions to the diet; to negative its
resolutions; to name ambassadors; to confer dignities and titles; to fill
vacant electorates; to found universities; to grant privileges not injurious to
the states of the empire; to receive and apply the public revenues; and
generally to watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the electors form
a council to him. In quality of emperor, he possesses no territory within the
empire, nor receives any revenue for his support. But his revenue and
dominions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the most powerful
princes in Europe.
From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the representatives and
head of this confederacy, the natural supposition would be, that it must form
an exception to the general character which belongs to its kindred systems.
Nothing would be further from the reality. The fundamental principle on
which it rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet is
a representation of sovereigns and that the laws are addressed to sovereigns,
renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own
members, insecure against external dangers, and agitated with unceasing
fermentations in its own bowels.
The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the
princes and states; of wars among the princes and states themselves; of the
licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of foreign
intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of requisitions of men and money
disregarded, or partially complied with; of attempts to enforce them,
altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, involving the
innocent with the guilty; of general imbecility, confusion, and misery.
In the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part of the empire on his
side, was seen engaged against the other princes and states. In one of the
conflicts, the emperor himself was put to flight, and very near being made
prisoner by the elector of Saxony. The late king of Prussia was more than
once pitted against his imperial sovereign; and commonly proved an
overmatch for him. Controversies and wars among the members themselves
have been so common, that the German annals are crowded with the bloody
pages which describe them. Previous to the peace of Westphalia, Germany
was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the emperor, with one half
of the empire, was on one side, and Sweden, with the other half, on the
opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated, and dictated by foreign
powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign powers are parties, made a
fundamental part of the Germanic constitution.
If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the
necessity of self-defense, its situation is still deplorable. Military
preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions, arising from
the jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing pretensions of sovereign
bodies, that before the diet can settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the
field; and before the federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into
winter quarters.
The small body of national troops, which has been judged necessary in
time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected with local
prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate contributions to
the treasury.
The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice among
these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing the empire
into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an interior organization,
and of charging them with the military execution of the laws against
delinquent and contumacious members. This experiment has only served to
demonstrate more fully the radical vice of the constitution. Each circle is
the miniature picture of the deformities of this political monster. They either
fail to execute their commissions, or they do it with all the devastation and
carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are defaulters; and then they
increase the mischief which they were instituted to remedy.
We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion from a
sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and imperial city of the
circle of Suabia, the Abbe de St. Croix enjoyed certain immunities which
had been reserved to him. In the exercise of these, on some public
occasions, outrages were committed on him by the people of the city. The
consequence was that the city was put under the ban of the empire, and the
Duke of Bavaria, though director of another circle, obtained an appointment
to enforce it. He soon appeared before the city with a corps of ten thousand
troops, and finding it a fit occasion, as he had secretly intended from the
beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on the pretext that his ancestors
had suffered the place to be dismembered from his territory,(1) he took
possession of it in his own name, disarmed, and punished the inhabitants,
and reannexed the city to his domains.
It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed machine
from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is obvious: The weakness of
most of the members, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the mercy
of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the principal members,
compared with the formidable powers all around them; the vast weight and
influence which the emperor derives from his separate and hereditary
dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which his
family pride is connected, and which constitutes him the first prince in
Europe;—these causes support a feeble and precarious Union; whilst the
repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which time
continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded on a proper
consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this obstacle could be
surmounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer a revolution to take
place which would give to the empire the force and preeminence to which it
is entitled. Foreign nations have long considered themselves as interested in
the changes made by events in this constitution; and have, on various
occasions, betrayed their policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.
If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a government over
local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor could any
proof more striking be given of the calamities flowing from such
institutions. Equally unfit for self-government and self-defense, it has long
been at the mercy of its powerful neighbors; who have lately had the mercy
to disburden it of one third of its people and territories.
The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a
confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the stability of
such institutions.
They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no
common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common mark of
sovereignty.
They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical position;
by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the fear of powerful
neighbors, to one of which they were formerly subject; by the few sources
of contention among a people of such simple and homogeneous manners;
by their joint interest in their dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they
stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and rebellions, an aid
expressly stipulated and often required and afforded; and by the necessity of
some regular and permanent provision for accommodating disputes among
the cantons. The provision is, that the parties at variance shall each choose
four judges out of the neutral cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose
an umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pronounces
definitive sentence, which all the cantons are bound to enforce. The
competency of this regulation may be estimated by a clause in their treaty
of 1683, with Victor Amadeus of Savoy; in which he obliges himself to
interpose as mediator in disputes between the cantons, and to employ force,
if necessary, against the contumacious party.
So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with that
of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle intended to be
established. Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary cases, it
appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up, capable of trying
its strength, it failed. The controversies on the subject of religion, which in
three instances have kindled violent and bloody contests, may be said, in
fact, to have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic cantons have
since had their separate diets, where all the most important concerns are
adjusted, and which have left the general diet little other business than to
take care of the common bailages.
That separation had another consequence, which merits attention. It
produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of Berne, at the head of
the Protestant association, with the United Provinces; and of Luzerne, at the
head of the Catholic association, with France.
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MADISON, with HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of
aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all the lessons
derived from those which we have already reviewed.
The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and each
state or province is a composition of equal and independent cities. In all
important cases, not only the provinces but the cities must be unanimous.
The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States-General,
consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces. They
hold their seats, some for life, some for six, three, and one years; from two
provinces they continue in appointment during pleasure.
The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and alliances; to
make war and peace; to raise armies and equip fleets; to ascertain quotas
and demand contributions. In all these cases, however, unanimity and the
sanction of their constituents are requisite. They have authority to appoint
and receive ambassadors; to execute treaties and alliances already formed;
to provide for the collection of duties on imports and exports; to regulate
the mint, with a saving to the provincial rights; to govern as sovereigns the
dependent territories. The provinces are restrained, unless with the general
consent, from entering into foreign treaties; from establishing imposts
injurious to others, or charging their neighbors with higher duties than their
own subjects. A council of state, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges
of admiralty, aid and fortify the federal administration.
The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is now an
hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence in the republic are
derived from this independent title; from his great patrimonial estates; from
his family connections with some of the chief potentates of Europe; and,
more than all, perhaps, from his being stadtholder in the several provinces,
as well as for the union; in which provincial quality he has the appointment
of town magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees,
presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has throughout the
power of pardon.
As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable prerogatives.
In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes between the
provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at the deliberations of the
States-General, and at their particular conferences; to give audiences to
foreign ambassadors, and to keep agents for his particular affairs at foreign
courts.
In his military capacity he commands the federal troops, provides for
garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs; disposes of all
appointments, from colonels to ensigns, and of the governments and posts
of fortified towns.
In his marine capacity he is admiral-general, and superintends and directs
every thing relative to naval forces and other naval affairs; presides in the
admiralties in person or by proxy; appoints lieutenant-admirals and other
officers; and establishes councils of war, whose sentences are not executed
till he approves them.
His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to three hundred
thousand florins. The standing army which he commands consists of about
forty thousand men.
Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as delineated on
parchment. What are the characters which practice has stamped upon it?
Imbecility in the government; discord among the provinces; foreign
influence and indignities; a precarious existence in peace, and peculiar
calamities from war.
It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred of his
countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being ruined by the
vices of their constitution.
The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes an
authority in the States-General, seemingly sufficient to secure harmony, but
the jealousy in each province renders the practice very different from the
theory.
The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to levy certain
contributions; but this article never could, and probably never will, be
executed; because the inland provinces, who have little commerce, cannot
pay an equal quota.
In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive the articles of the
constitution. The danger of delay obliges the consenting provinces to
furnish their quotas, without waiting for the others; and then to obtain
reimbursement from the others, by deputations, which are frequent, or
otherwise, as they can. The great wealth and influence of the province of
Holland enable her to effect both these purposes.
It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies had to be ultimately
collected at the point of the bayonet; a thing practicable, though dreadful, in
a confederacy where one of the members exceeds in force all the rest, and
where several of them are too small to meditate resistance; but utterly
impracticable in one composed of members, several of which are equal to
each other in strength and resources, and equal singly to a vigorous and
persevering defense.
Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself a foreign
minister, elude matters taken ad referendum, by tampering with the
provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by these
means a whole year. Instances of a like nature are numerous and notorious.
In critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled to
overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded a treaty of
themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, by
which their independence was formerly and finally recognized, was
concluded without the consent of Zealand. Even as recently as the last
treaty of peace with Great Britain, the constitutional principle of unanimity
was departed from. A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in
dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation of powers requisite
for the public safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at
the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend on
the contingencies of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of
the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective
constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional
authorities.
Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership, it has
been supposed that without his influence in the individual provinces, the
causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would long ago have
dissolved it. "Under such a government," says the Abbe Mably, "the Union
could never have subsisted, if the provinces had not a spring within
themselves, capable of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them to
the same way of thinking. This spring is the stadtholder." It is remarked by
Sir William Temple, "that in the intermissions of the stadtholdership,
Holland, by her riches and her authority, which drew the others into a sort
of dependence, supplied the place."
These are not the only circumstances which have controlled the tendency
to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding powers impose an absolute
necessity of union to a certain degree, at the same time that they nourish by
their intrigues the constitutional vices which keep the republic in some
degree always at their mercy.
The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these vices,
and have made no less than four regular experiments by
EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLIES, convened for the special purpose, to
apply a remedy. As many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible
to UNITE THE PUBLIC COUNCILS in reforming the known, the
acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing constitution. Let us pause, my
fellow-citizens, for one moment, over this melancholy and monitory lesson
of history; and with the tear that drops for the calamities brought on
mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish passions, let our gratitude
mingle an ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious concord which has
distinguished the consultations for our political happiness.
A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to be
administered by the federal authority. This also had its adversaries and
failed.
This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular convulsions,
from dissensions among the states, and from the actual invasion of foreign
arms, the crisis of their destiny. All nations have their eyes fixed on the
awful spectacle. The first wish prompted by humanity is, that this severe
trial may issue in such a revolution of their government as will establish
their union, and render it the parent of tranquillity, freedom and happiness:
The next, that the asylum under which, we trust, the enjoyment of these
blessings will speedily be secured in this country, may receive and console
them for the catastrophe of their own.
I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of
these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its
responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The
important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case, is
that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a
legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is
a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of
civil polity, by substituting VIOLENCE in place of LAW, or the destructive
COERCION of the SWORD in place of the mild and salutary COERCION
of the MAGISTRACY.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 21. Other Defects of the
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the
principal circumstances and events which have depicted the genius and fate
of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration
of the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our
hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and
satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely necessary that
we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the disease.
The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is the total
want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now composed,
have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their
resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or divestiture of
privileges, or by any other constitutional mode. There is no express
delegation of authority to them to use force against delinquent members;
and if such a right should be ascribed to the federal head, as resulting from
the nature of the social compact between the States, it must be by inference
and construction, in the face of that part of the second article, by which it is
declared, "that each State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and right,
not EXPRESSLY delegated to the United States in Congress assembled."
There is, doubtless, a striking absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind
does not exist, but we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing that
supposition, preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or explaining
away a provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies of
those who oppose the new Constitution; and the want of which, in that plan,
has been the subject of much plausible animadversion, and severe criticism.
If we are unwilling to impair the force of this applauded provision, we shall
be obliged to conclude, that the United States afford the extraordinary
spectacle of a government destitute even of the shadow of constitutional
power to enforce the execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the
specimens which have been cited, that the American Confederacy, in this
particular, stands discriminated from every other institution of a similar
kind, and exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political
world.
The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another
capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this kind
declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guaranty from
considerations of utility, would be a still more flagrant departure from the
clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a tacit power of coercion
from the like considerations. The want of a guaranty, though it might in its
consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately attack its
existence as the want of a constitutional sanction to its laws.
Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in
repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the
existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may
rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the people,
while the national government could legally do nothing more than behold
its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction may
erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no succor could
constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of
the government. The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has
scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely
speculative. Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late
convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a
Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism, established in
Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode
Island, of Connecticut or New York?
The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an
objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal government, as
involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the
members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the principal
advantages to be expected from union, and can only flow from a
misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. It could be no
impediment to reforms of the State constitution by a majority of the people
in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain undiminished. The
guaranty could only operate against changes to be effected by violence.
Towards the preventions of calamities of this kind, too many checks cannot
be provided. The peace of society and the stability of government depend
absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this head. Where
the whole power of the government is in the hands of the people, there is
the less pretense for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional
distempers of the State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a
popular or representative constitution, is a change of men. A guaranty by
the national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of
rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the
community.
The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the common
treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the Confederation. Its
repugnancy to an adequate supply of the national exigencies has been
already pointed out, and has sufficiently appeared from the trial which has
been made of it. I speak of it now solely with a view to equality among the
States. Those who have been accustomed to contemplate the circumstances
which produce and constitute national wealth, must be satisfied that there is
no common standard or barometer by which the degrees of it can be
ascertained. Neither the value of lands, nor the numbers of the people,
which have been successively proposed as the rule of State contributions,
has any pretension to being a just representative. If we compare the wealth
of the United Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany, or even of
France, and if we at the same time compare the total value of the lands and
the aggregate population of that contracted district with the total value of
the lands and the aggregate population of the immense regions of either of
the three last-mentioned countries, we shall at once discover that there is no
comparison between the proportion of either of these two objects and that
of the relative wealth of those nations. If the like parallel were to be run
between several of the American States, it would furnish a like result. Let
Virginia be contrasted with North Carolina, Pennsylvania with Connecticut,
or Maryland with New Jersey, and we shall be convinced that the respective
abilities of those States, in relation to revenue, bear little or no analogy to
their comparative stock in lands or to their comparative population. The
position may be equally illustrated by a similar process between the
counties of the same State. No man who is acquainted with the State of
New York will doubt that the active wealth of King's County bears a much
greater proportion to that of Montgomery than it would appear to be if we
should take either the total value of the lands or the total number of the
people as a criterion!
The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes.
Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature of the
government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of information they
possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry, these circumstances and
many more, too complex, minute, or adventitious to admit of a particular
specification, occasion differences hardly conceivable in the relative
opulence and riches of different countries. The consequence clearly is that
there can be no common measure of national wealth, and, of course, no
general or stationary rule by which the ability of a state to pay taxes can be
determined. The attempt, therefore, to regulate the contributions of the
members of a confederacy by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of
glaring inequality and extreme oppression.
This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the
eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing a compliance
with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering States would not long
consent to remain associated upon a principle which distributes the public
burdens with so unequal a hand, and which was calculated to impoverish
and oppress the citizens of some States, while those of others would
scarcely be conscious of the small proportion of the weight they were
required to sustain. This, however, is an evil inseparable from the principle
of quotas and requisitions.
There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but by
authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in its own
way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon articles of
consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in time, find its level
with the means of paying them. The amount to be contributed by each
citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and can be regulated by an
attention to his resources. The rich may be extravagant, the poor can be
frugal; and private oppression may always be avoided by a judicious
selection of objects proper for such impositions. If inequalities should arise
in some States from duties on particular objects, these will, in all
probability, be counterbalanced by proportional inequalities in other States,
from the duties on other objects. In the course of time and things, an
equilibrium, as far as it is attainable in so complicated a subject, will be
established everywhere. Or, if inequalities should still exist, they would
neither be so great in their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor so
odious in their appearance, as those which would necessarily spring from
quotas, upon any scale that can possibly be devised.
It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that they
contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe their
own limit; which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end proposed,
that is, an extension of the revenue. When applied to this object, the saying
is as just as it is witty, that, "in political arithmetic, two and two do not
always make four." If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the
collection is eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when
they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. This forms a
complete barrier against any material oppression of the citizens by taxes of
this class, and is itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them.
Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect
taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part of the revenue
raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which principally relate to
land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value
of land, or the number of the people, may serve as a standard. The state of
agriculture and the populousness of a country have been considered as
nearly connected with each other. And, as a rule, for the purpose intended,
numbers, in the view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a preference.
In every country it is a herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land; in a
country imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties
are increased almost to impracticability. The expense of an accurate
valuation is, in all situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of taxation
where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the
nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not incompatible with the
end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences than to leave that
discretion altogether at large.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 22. The Same Subject
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Confederation)
From the New York Packet. Friday, December 14, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal
system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it
altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union.
The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be
of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated under the
first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as from the universal
conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be added in this place. It
is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object, either
as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more strongly demands a
federal superintendence. The want of it has already operated as a bar to the
formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given
occasions of dissatisfaction between the States. No nation acquainted with
the nature of our political association would be unwise enough to enter into
stipulations with the United States, by which they conceded privileges of
any importance to them, while they were apprised that the engagements on
the part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its members, and
while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage
they desired in our markets, without granting us any return but such as their
momentary convenience might suggest. It is not, therefore, to be wondered
at that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the House of Commons a bill for
regulating the temporary intercourse between the two countries, should
preface its introduction by a declaration that similar provisions in former
bills had been found to answer every purpose to the commerce of Great
Britain, and that it would be prudent to persist in the plan until it should
appear whether the American government was likely or not to acquire
greater consistency.(1)
Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibitions, restrictions,
and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that kingdom in this particular,
but the want of concert, arising from the want of a general authority and
from clashing and dissimilar views in the State, has hitherto frustrated every
experiment of the kind, and will continue to do so as long as the same
obstacles to a uniformity of measures continue to exist.
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to
the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just cause of
umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this
nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and
extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord
than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of
the Confederacy. "The commerce of the German empire(2) is in continual
trammels from the multiplicity of the duties which the several princes and
states exact upon the merchandises passing through their territories, by
means of which the fine streams and navigable rivers with which Germany
is so happily watered are rendered almost useless." Though the genius of
the people of this country might never permit this description to be strictly
applicable to us, yet we may reasonably expect, from the gradual conflicts
of State regulations, that the citizens of each would at length come to be
considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of foreigners
and aliens.
The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the
articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions
upon the States for quotas of men. This practice in the course of the late
war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous and to an economical
system of defense. It gave birth to a competition between the States which
created a kind of auction for men. In order to furnish the quotas required of
them, they outbid each other till bounties grew to an enormous and
insupportable size. The hope of a still further increase afforded an
inducement to those who were disposed to serve to procrastinate their
enlistment, and disinclined them from engaging for any considerable
periods. Hence, slow and scanty levies of men, in the most critical
emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an unparalleled expense;
continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to their discipline and
subjecting the public safety frequently to the perilous crisis of a disbanded
army. Hence, also, those oppressive expedients for raising men which were
upon several occasions practiced, and which nothing but the enthusiasm of
liberty would have induced the people to endure.
This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and
vigor than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. The States near the
seat of war, influenced by motives of self-preservation, made efforts to
furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities; while those at a
distance from danger were, for the most part, as remiss as the others were
diligent, in their exertions. The immediate pressure of this inequality was
not in this case, as in that of the contributions of money, alleviated by the
hope of a final liquidation. The States which did not pay their proportions
of money might at least be charged with their deficiencies; but no account
could be formed of the deficiencies in the supplies of men. We shall not,
however, see much reason to regret the want of this hope, when we consider
how little prospect there is, that the most delinquent States will ever be able
to make compensation for their pecuniary failures. The system of quotas
and requisitions, whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every view, a
system of imbecility in the Union, and of inequality and injustice among the
members.
The right of equal suffrage among the States is another exceptionable
part of the Confederation. Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair
representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode
Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts, or
Connecticut, or New York; and to Delaware an equal voice in the national
deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Carolina. Its
operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican government,
which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail. Sophistry may
reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a majority of the votes of the
States will be a majority of confederated America. But this kind of logical
legerdemain will never counteract the plain suggestions of justice and
common-sense. It may happen that this majority of States is a small
minority of the people of America;(3) and two thirds of the people of
America could not long be persuaded, upon the credit of artificial
distinctions and syllogistic subtleties, to submit their interests to the
management and disposal of one third. The larger States would after a while
revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in
such a privation of their due importance in the political scale, would be not
merely to be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire
of equality. It is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the
last. The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare
depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not
relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration.
It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine States, or two thirds of
the whole number, must consent to the most important resolutions; and it
may be thence inferred that nine States would always comprehend a
majority of the Union. But this does not obviate the impropriety of an equal
vote between States of the most unequal dimensions and populousness; nor
is the inference accurate in point of fact; for we can enumerate nine States
which contain less than a majority of the people;(4) and it is constitutionally
possible that these nine may give the vote. Besides, there are matters of
considerable moment determinable by a bare majority; and there are others,
concerning which doubts have been entertained, which, if interpreted in
favor of the sufficiency of a vote of seven States, would extend its operation
to interests of the first magnitude. In addition to this, it is to be observed
that there is a probability of an increase in the number of States, and no
provision for a proportional augmentation of the ratio of votes.
But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in reality, a
poison. To give a minority a negative upon the majority (which is always
the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision), is, in its
tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser.
Congress, from the nonattendance of a few States, have been frequently in
the situation of a Polish diet, where a single VOTE has been sufficient to
put a stop to all their movements. A sixtieth part of the Union, which is
about the proportion of Delaware and Rhode Island, has several times been
able to oppose an entire bar to its operations. This is one of those
refinements which, in practice, has an effect the reverse of what is expected
from it in theory. The necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of
something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposition
that it would contribute to security. But its real operation is to embarrass the
administration, to destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute
the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt
junto, to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. In
those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the
weakness or strength of its government, is of the greatest importance, there
is commonly a necessity for action. The public business must, in some way
or other, go forward. If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a
majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order
that something may be done, must conform to the views of the minority;
and thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the greater,
and give a tone to the national proceedings. Hence, tedious delays;
continual negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public
good. And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when such compromises
can take place: for upon some occasions things will not admit of
accommodation; and then the measures of government must be injuriously
suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of
obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state
of inaction. Its situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes border
upon anarchy.
It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind gives greater
scope to foreign corruption, as well as to domestic faction, than that which
permits the sense of the majority to decide; though the contrary of this has
been presumed. The mistake has proceeded from not attending with due
care to the mischiefs that may be occasioned by obstructing the progress of
government at certain critical seasons. When the concurrence of a large
number is required by the Constitution to the doing of any national act, we
are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be
likely TO BE DONE, but we forget how much good may be prevented, and
how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what
may be necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in
which they may happen to stand at particular periods.
Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction with one
foreign nation, against another. Suppose the necessity of our situation
demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to seek the
prosecution of the war, with views that might justify us in making separate
terms. In such a state of things, this ally of ours would evidently find it
much easier, by his bribes and intrigues, to tie up the hands of government
from making peace, where two thirds of all the votes were requisite to that
object, than where a simple majority would suffice. In the first case, he
would have to corrupt a smaller number; in the last, a greater number. Upon
the same principle, it would be much easier for a foreign power with which
we were at war to perplex our councils and embarrass our exertions. And, in
a commercial view, we may be subjected to similar inconveniences. A
nation, with which we might have a treaty of commerce, could with much
greater facility prevent our forming a connection with her competitor in
trade, though such a connection should be ever so beneficial to ourselves.
Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imaginary. One of
the weak sides of republics, among their numerous advantages, is that they
afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption. An hereditary monarch,
though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his ambition, has so great
a personal interest in the government and in the external glory of the nation,
that it is not easy for a foreign power to give him an equivalent for what he
would sacrifice by treachery to the state. The world has accordingly been
witness to few examples of this species of royal prostitution, though there
have been abundant specimens of every other kind.
In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by the
suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great pre-eminence and
power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, which, to any but
minds animated and guided by superior virtue, may appear to exceed the
proportion of interest they have in the common stock, and to overbalance
the obligations of duty. Hence it is that history furnishes us with so many
mortifying examples of the prevalency of foreign corruption in republican
governments. How much this contributed to the ruin of the ancient
commonwealths has been already delineated. It is well known that the
deputies of the United Provinces have, in various instances, been purchased
by the emissaries of the neighboring kingdoms. The Earl of Chesterfield (if
my memory serves me right), in a letter to his court, intimates that his
success in an important negotiation must depend on his obtaining a major's
commission for one of those deputies. And in Sweden the parties were
alternately bought by France and England in so barefaced and notorious a
manner that it excited universal disgust in the nation, and was a principal
cause that the most limited monarch in Europe, in a single day, without
tumult, violence, or opposition, became one of the most absolute and
uncontrolled.
A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains
yet to be mentioned, the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter
without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation. The
treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as
part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals,
must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. To
produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in
the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to
be instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves.
These ingredients are both indispensable. If there is in each State a court of
final jurisdiction, there may be as many different final determinations on the
same point as there are courts. There are endless diversities in the opinions
of men. We often see not only different courts but the judges of the came
court differing from each other. To avoid the confusion which would
unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a number of
independent judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to establish
one court paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintendence, and
authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil
justice.
This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is so
compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being contravened
by the laws of the parts. In this case, if the particular tribunals are invested
with a right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides the contradictions to be
expected from difference of opinion, there will be much to fear from the
bias of local views and prejudices, and from the interference of local
regulations. As often as such an interference was to happen, there would be
reason to apprehend that the provisions of the particular laws might be
preferred to those of the general laws; for nothing is more natural to men in
office than to look with peculiar deference towards that authority to which
they owe their official existence.
The treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are
liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures, and as many
different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those
legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are
thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the
interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it possible that
foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a government? Is it
possible that the people of America will longer consent to trust their honor,
their happiness, their safety, on so precarious a foundation?
In this review of the Confederation, I have confined myself to the
exhibition of its most material defects; passing over those imperfections in
its details by which even a great part of the power intended to be conferred
upon it has been in a great measure rendered abortive. It must be by this
time evident to all men of reflection, who can divest themselves of the
prepossessions of preconceived opinions, that it is a system so radically
vicious and unsound, as to admit not of amendment but by an entire change
in its leading features and characters.
The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the exercise of
those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the Union. A single
assembly may be a proper receptacle of those slender, or rather fettered,
authorities, which have been heretofore delegated to the federal head; but it
would be inconsistent with all the principles of good government, to intrust
it with those additional powers which, even the moderate and more rational
adversaries of the proposed Constitution admit, ought to reside in the
United States. If that plan should not be adopted, and if the necessity of the
Union should be able to withstand the ambitious aims of those men who
may indulge magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement from its
dissolution, the probability would be, that we should run into the project of
conferring supplementary powers upon Congress, as they are now
constituted; and either the machine, from the intrinsic feebleness of its
structure, will moulder into pieces, in spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop
it; or, by successive augmentations of its force an energy, as necessity might
prompt, we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important
prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the
most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived.
Thus, we should create in reality that very tyranny which the adversaries of
the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert.
It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal
system, that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. Resting on no better
foundation than the consent of the several legislatures, it has been exposed
to frequent and intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers, and
has, in some instances, given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of
legislative repeal. Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it has been
contended that the same authority might repeal the law by which it was
ratified. However gross a heresy it may be to maintain that a PARTY to a
COMPACT has a right to revoke that COMPACT, the doctrine itself has
had respectable advocates. The possibility of a question of this nature
proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our national government
deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of
American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF
THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately
from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.
PUBLIUS
1. This, as nearly as I can recollect, was the sense of his speech on
introducing the last bill.
2. Encyclopedia, article "Empire."
3. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, South
Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the States,
but they do not contain one third of the people.
4. Add New York and Connecticut to the foregoing seven, and they will
be less than a majority.
FEDERALIST No. 23. The Necessity of a
Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to
the Preservation of the Union
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 18, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one
proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point at the examination
of which we are now arrived.
This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches—the objects
to be provided for by the federal government, the quantity of power
necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, the persons upon whom
that power ought to operate. Its distribution and organization will more
properly claim our attention under the succeeding head.
The principal purposes to be answered by union are these—the common
defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as well against
internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with
other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our
intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.
The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise
armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of
both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These powers
ought to exist without limitation, BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO
FORESEE OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY OF NATIONAL
EXIGENCIES, OR THE CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY
OF THE MEANS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO SATISFY THEM.
The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for
this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power
to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive
with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be
under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside
over the common defense.
This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind,
carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be
made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple as
they are universal; the MEANS ought to be proportioned to the END; the
persons, from whose agency the attainment of any END is expected, ought
to possess the MEANS by which it is to be attained.
Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with the care of
the common defense, is a question in the first instance, open for discussion;
but the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will follow, that that
government ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to complete
execution of its trust. And unless it can be shown that the circumstances
which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate
limits; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally
disputed, it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be
no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defense and
protection of the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy that is, in
any matter essential to the FORMATION, DIRECTION, or SUPPORT of
the NATIONAL FORCES.
Defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be, this
principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers of it; though
they have not made proper or adequate provision for its exercise. Congress
have an unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men and money; to
govern the army and navy; to direct their operations. As their requisitions
are made constitutionally binding upon the States, who are in fact under the
most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies required of them, the
intention evidently was that the United States should command whatever
resources were by them judged requisite to the "common defense and
general welfare." It was presumed that a sense of their true interests, and a
regard to the dictates of good faith, would be found sufficient pledges for
the punctual performance of the duty of the members to the federal head.
The experiment has, however, demonstrated that this expectation was ill-
founded and illusory; and the observations, made under the last head, will, I
imagine, have sufficed to convince the impartial and discerning, that there
is an absolute necessity for an entire change in the first principles of the
system; that if we are in earnest about giving the Union energy and
duration, we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the States in
their collective capacities; we must extend the laws of the federal
government to the individual citizens of America; we must discard the
fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions, as equally impracticable and
unjust. The result from all this is that the Union ought to be invested with
full power to levy troops; to build and equip fleets; and to raise the revenues
which will be required for the formation and support of an army and navy,
in the customary and ordinary modes practiced in other governments.
If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound
instead of a simple, a confederate instead of a sole, government, the
essential point which will remain to be adjusted will be to discriminate the
OBJECTS, as far as it can be done, which shall appertain to the different
provinces or departments of power; allowing to each the most ample
authority for fulfilling the objects committed to its charge. Shall the Union
be constituted the guardian of the common safety? Are fleets and armies
and revenues necessary to this purpose? The government of the Union must
be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have
relation to them. The same must be the case in respect to commerce, and to
every other matter to which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend. Is the
administration of justice between the citizens of the same State the proper
department of the local governments? These must possess all the authorities
which are connected with this object, and with every other that may be
allotted to their particular cognizance and direction. Not to confer in each
case a degree of power commensurate to the end, would be to violate the
most obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and improvidently to trust the
great interests of the nation to hands which are disabled from managing
them with vigor and success.
Who is likely to make suitable provisions for the public defense, as that
body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided; which, as
the centre of information, will best understand the extent and urgency of the
dangers that threaten; as the representative of the WHOLE, will feel itself
most deeply interested in the preservation of every part; which, from the
responsibility implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most sensibly
impressed with the necessity of proper exertions; and which, by the
extension of its authority throughout the States, can alone establish
uniformity and concert in the plans and measures by which the common
safety is to be secured? Is there not a manifest inconsistency in devolving
upon the federal government the care of the general defense, and leaving in
the State governments the EFFECTIVE powers by which it is to be
provided for? Is not a want of co-operation the infallible consequence of
such a system? And will not weakness, disorder, an undue distribution of
the burdens and calamities of war, an unnecessary and intolerable increase
of expense, be its natural and inevitable concomitants? Have we not had
unequivocal experience of its effects in the course of the revolution which
we have just accomplished?
Every view we may take of the subject, as candid inquirers after truth,
will serve to convince us, that it is both unwise and dangerous to deny the
federal government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects which
are intrusted to its management. It will indeed deserve the most vigilant and
careful attention of the people, to see that it be modeled in such a manner as
to admit of its being safely vested with the requisite powers. If any plan
which has been, or may be, offered to our consideration, should not, upon a
dispassionate inspection, be found to answer this description, it ought to be
rejected. A government, the constitution of which renders it unfit to be
trusted with all the powers which a free people ought to delegate to any
government, would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the
NATIONAL INTERESTS. Wherever THESE can with propriety be
confided, the coincident powers may safely accompany them. This is the
true result of all just reasoning upon the subject. And the adversaries of the
plan promulgated by the convention ought to have confined themselves to
showing, that the internal structure of the proposed government was such as
to render it unworthy of the confidence of the people. They ought not to
have wandered into inflammatory declamations and unmeaning cavils about
the extent of the powers. The POWERS are not too extensive for the
OBJECTS of federal administration, or, in other words, for the management
of our NATIONAL INTERESTS; nor can any satisfactory argument be
framed to show that they are chargeable with such an excess. If it be true, as
has been insinuated by some of the writers on the other side, that the
difficulty arises from the nature of the thing, and that the extent of the
country will not permit us to form a government in which such ample
powers can safely be reposed, it would prove that we ought to contract our
views, and resort to the expedient of separate confederacies, which will
move within more practicable spheres. For the absurdity must continually
stare us in the face of confiding to a government the direction of the most
essential national interests, without daring to trust it to the authorities which
are indispensable to their proper and efficient management. Let us not
attempt to reconcile contradictions, but firmly embrace a rational
alternative.
I trust, however, that the impracticability of one general system cannot be
shown. I am greatly mistaken, if any thing of weight has yet been advanced
of this tendency; and I flatter myself, that the observations which have been
made in the course of these papers have served to place the reverse of that
position in as clear a light as any matter still in the womb of time and
experience can be susceptible of. This, at all events, must be evident, that
the very difficulty itself, drawn from the extent of the country, is the
strongest argument in favor of an energetic government; for any other can
certainly never preserve the Union of so large an empire. If we embrace the
tenets of those who oppose the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as the
standard of our political creed, we cannot fail to verify the gloomy doctrines
which predict the impracticability of a national system pervading entire
limits of the present Confederacy.
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FEDERALIST No. 24. The Powers Necessary to
the Common Defense Further Considered
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 19, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
TO THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government,
in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met
with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is this, that
proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies
in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on
weak and unsubstantial foundations.
It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form,
supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of argument;
without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to the
practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of America, as
expressed in most of the existing constitutions. The proprietary of this
remark will appear, the moment it is recollected that the objection under
consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the
LEGISLATIVE authority of the nation, in the article of military
establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our State
constitutions, and rejected in all the rest.
A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the present
juncture, without having previously inspected the plan reported by the
convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions: either that it
contained a positive injunction, that standing armies should be kept up in
time of peace; or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of
levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the
control of the legislature.
If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised to
discover, that neither the one nor the other was the case; that the whole
power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the
EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of
the representatives of the people periodically elected; and that instead of the
provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be
found, in respect to this object, an important qualification even of the
legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the appropriation of
money for the support of an army for any longer period than two years a
precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great and real
security against the keeping up of troops without evident necessity.
Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed would be
apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would naturally say to
himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic declamation can
be without some colorable pretext. It must needs be that this people, so
jealous of their liberties, have, in all the preceding models of the
constitutions which they have established, inserted the most precise and
rigid precautions on this point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has
given birth to all this apprehension and clamor.
If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several State
constitutions, how great would be his disappointment to find that TWO
ONLY of them(1) contained an interdiction of standing armies in time of
peace; that the other eleven had either observed a profound silence on the
subject, or had in express terms admitted the right of the Legislature to
authorize their existence.
Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible
foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would never be able to
imagine, while any source of information remained unexplored, that it was
nothing more than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated either
by a deliberate intention to deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too
intemperate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that he would
be likely to find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive
compact between the States. Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a
solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, the existing
Confederation must contain the most explicit provisions against military
establishments in time of peace; and a departure from this model, in a
favorite point, has occasioned the discontent which appears to influence
these political champions.
If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the
articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be increased, but
would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery, that
these articles, instead of containing the prohibition he looked for, and
though they had, with jealous circumspection, restricted the authority of the
State legislatures in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint on
that of the United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility, or
ardent temper, he could now no longer refrain from regarding these clamors
as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to a plan
which ought at least to receive a fair and candid examination from all
sincere lovers of their country! How else, he would say, could the authors of
them have been tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a
point in which it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of
America as declared in its different forms of government, and in which it
has even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them?
If, on the contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate
feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and would
lament, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true
merits of the question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so
unfriendly to an impartial and right determination. Even such a man could
hardly forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too much the
appearance of an intention to mislead the people by alarming their passions,
rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their
understandings.
But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by
precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer view of
its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will appear that restraints
upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in
time of peace, would be improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the
necessities of society, would be unlikely to be observed.
Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there
are various considerations that warn us against an excess of confidence or
security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are growing
settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On the other side, and
extending to meet the British settlements, are colonies and establishments
subject to the dominion of Spain. This situation and the vicinity of the West
India Islands, belonging to these two powers create between them, in
respect to their American possessions and in relation to us, a common
interest. The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as
our natural enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to fear
from us, and most to hope from them. The improvements in the art of
navigation have, as to the facility of communication, rendered distant
nations, in a great measure, neighbors. Britain and Spain are among the
principal maritime powers of Europe. A future concert of views between
these nations ought not to be regarded as improbable. The increasing
remoteness of consanguinity is every day diminishing the force of the
family compact between France and Spain. And politicians have ever with
great reason considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of
political connection. These circumstances combined, admonish us not to be
too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger.
Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a
constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier. No
person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it should
only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians. These garrisons
must either be furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by
permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is impracticable;
and if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia would not long, if at all,
submit to be dragged from their occupations and families to perform that
most disagreeable duty in times of profound peace. And if they could be
prevailed upon or compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent
rotation of service, and the loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious
pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the scheme. It
would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private
citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of the
government amounts to a standing army in time of peace; a small one,
indeed, but not the less real for being small. Here is a simple view of the
subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional
interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter
to the discretion and prudence of the legislature.
In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may be
said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their military
establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be
exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to their insults and
encroachments, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier
garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements might
be annoyed. There are, and will be, particular posts, the possession of which
will include the command of large districts of territory, and facilitate future
invasions of the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be
keys to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it would be
wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized by one or
the other of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would
be to desert all the usual maxims of prudence and policy.
If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our
Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy. To this
purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and for the defense of these,
fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a nation has become so
powerful by sea that it can protect its dock-yards by its fleets, this
supersedes the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but where naval
establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons will, in all
likelihood, be found an indispensable security against descents for the
destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.
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1 This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collection of
State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the two which
contain the interdiction in these words: "As standing armies in time of
peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up." This is,
in truth, rather a CAUTION than a PROHIBITION. New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland have, in each of their bills of
rights, a clause to this effect: "Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and
ought not to be raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE"; which is a formal admission of the authority of the
Legislature. New York has no bills of rights, and her constitution says not a
word about the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions
of the other States, except the foregoing, and their constitutions are equally
silent. I am told, however that one or two States have bills of rights which
do not appear in this collection; but that those also recognize the right of the
legislative authority in this respect.
FEDERALIST No. 25. The Same Subject
Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common
Defense Further Considered)
From the New York Packet. Friday, December 21, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding
number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the
direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of the
primary principle of our political association, as it would in practice transfer
the care of the common defense from the federal head to the individual
members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful
to the Confederacy.
The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our
neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union
from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore
common. And the means of guarding against it ought, in like manner, to be
the objects of common councils and of a common treasury. It happens that
some States, from local situation, are more directly exposed. New York is of
this class. Upon the plan of separate provisions, New York would have to
sustain the whole weight of the establishments requisite to her immediate
safety, and to the mediate or ultimate protection of her neighbors. This
would neither be equitable as it respected New York nor safe as it respected
the other States. Various inconveniences would attend such a system. The
States, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary establishments,
would be as little able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear
the burden of competent provisions. The security of all would thus be
subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part. If the
resources of such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its
provisions should be proportionally enlarged, the other States would
quickly take the alarm at seeing the whole military force of the Union in the
hands of two or three of its members, and those probably amongst the most
powerful. They would each choose to have some counterpoise, and
pretenses could easily be contrived. In this situation, military
establishments, nourished by mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond
their natural or proper size; and being at the separate disposal of the
members, they would be engines for the abridgment or demolition of the
national authority.
Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State
governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the
Union, the foundation of which will be the love of power; and that in any
contest between the federal head and one of its members the people will be
most apt to unite with their local government. If, in addition to this
immense advantage, the ambition of the members should be stimulated by
the separate and independent possession of military forces, it would afford
too strong a temptation and too great a facility to them to make enterprises
upon, and finally to subvert, the constitutional authority of the Union. On
the other hand, the liberty of the people would be less safe in this state of
things than in that which left the national forces in the hands of the national
government. As far as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon
of power, it had better be in those hands of which the people are most likely
to be jealous than in those of which they are least likely to be jealous. For it
is a truth, which the experience of ages has attested, that the people are
always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the
possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion.
The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to
the Union from the separate possession of military forces by the States,
have, in express terms, prohibited them from having either ships or troops,
unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that the existence of a
federal government and military establishments under State authority are
not less at variance with each other than a due supply of the federal treasury
and the system of quotas and requisitions.
There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which the
impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the national legislature will be
equally manifest. The design of the objection, which has been mentioned, is
to preclude standing armies in time of peace, though we have never been
informed how far it is designed the prohibition should extend; whether to
raising armies as well as to KEEPING THEM UP in a season of tranquillity
or not. If it be confined to the latter it will have no precise signification, and
it will be ineffectual for the purpose intended. When armies are once raised
what shall be denominated "keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the
Constitution? What time shall be requisite to ascertain the violation? Shall it
be a week, a month, a year? Or shall we say they may be continued as long
as the danger which occasioned their being raised continues? This would be
to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF PEACE, against
threatening or impending danger, which would be at once to deviate from
the literal meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce an extensive latitude
of construction. Who shall judge of the continuance of the danger? This
must undoubtedly be submitted to the national government, and the matter
would then be brought to this issue, that the national government, to
provide against apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise troops,
and might afterwards keep them on foot as long as they supposed the peace
or safety of the community was in any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to
perceive that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford ample room
for eluding the force of the provision.
The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on
the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a combination between
the executive and the legislative, in some scheme of usurpation. Should this
at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabricate pretenses of
approaching danger! Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain or Britain, would
always be at hand. Provocations to produce the desired appearances might
even be given to some foreign power, and appeased again by timely
concessions. If we can reasonably presume such a combination to have
been formed, and that the enterprise is warranted by a sufficient prospect of
success, the army, when once raised, from whatever cause, or on whatever
pretext, may be applied to the execution of the project.
If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the
prohibition to the RAISING of armies in time of peace, the United States
would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet
seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for
defense, before it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a formal
denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy
within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to the
government to begin its levies of men for the protection of the State. We
must receive the blow, before we could even prepare to return it. All that
kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the
gathering storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims
of a free government. We must expose our property and liberty to the mercy
of foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness to seize the naked and
defenseless prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created by our choice,
dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the
means necessary to its preservation.
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural
bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national defense. This
doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our independence. It cost
millions to the United States that might have been saved. The facts which,
from our own experience, forbid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to
permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations of war
against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted
by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of
stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the
course of the late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected
eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that
the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts
alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most other things, is
a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by
time, and by practice.
All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced course
of human affairs, defeats itself. Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an
example of the truth of this remark. The Bill of Rights of that State declares
that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up in
time of peace. Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time of profound peace,
from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of her counties, has
resolved to raise a body of troops; and in all probability will keep them up
as long as there is any appearance of danger to the public peace. The
conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the same subject, though on
different ground. That State (without waiting for the sanction of Congress,
as the articles of the Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops
to quell a domestic insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a
revival of the spirit of revolt. The particular constitution of Massachusetts
opposed no obstacle to the measure; but the instance is still of use to
instruct us that cases are likely to occur under our government, as well as
under those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force
in time of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is
therefore improper in this respect to control the legislative discretion. It also
teaches us, in its application to the United States, how little the rights of a
feeble government are likely to be respected, even by its own constituents.
And it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment provisions
are to a struggle with public necessity.
It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that
the post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the same person. The
Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea from the
Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before served with success in that
capacity, to command the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to gratify
their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient
institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander
with the real power of admiral, under the nominal title of vice-admiral. This
instance is selected from among a multitude that might be cited to confirm
the truth already advanced and illustrated by domestic examples; which is,
that nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very
nature to run counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians will be
cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be
observed, because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws,
though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to
be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a country,
and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity
does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 26. The Idea of Restraining
the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
Common Defense Considered.
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 22, 1788
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the
minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary
boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of
government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and
important point is the great source of the inconveniences we experience,
and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in our future
attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we may travel from one
chimerical project to another; we may try change after change; but we shall
never be likely to make any material change for the better.
The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing
for the national defense, is one of those refinements which owe their origin
to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened. We have seen, however,
that it has not had thus far an extensive prevalency; that even in this
country, where it made its first appearance, Pennsylvania and North
Carolina are the only two States by which it has been in any degree
patronized; and that all the others have refused to give it the least
countenance; wisely judging that confidence must be placed somewhere;
that the necessity of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating power;
and that it is better to hazard the abuse of that confidence than to embarrass
the government and endanger the public safety by impolitic restrictions on
the legislative authority. The opponents of the proposed Constitution
combat, in this respect, the general decision of America; and instead of
being taught by experience the propriety of correcting any extremes into
which we may have heretofore run, they appear disposed to conduct us into
others still more dangerous, and more extravagant. As if the tone of
government had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach
are calculated to induce us to depress or to relax it, by expedients which,
upon other occasions, have been condemned or forborne. It may be
affirmed without the imputation of invective, that if the principles they
inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as to become the popular
creed, they would utterly unfit the people of this country for any species of
government whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to be apprehended.
The citizens of America have too much discernment to be argued into
anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if experience has not wrought a deep
and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater energy of
government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the community.
It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin and
progress of the idea, which aims at the exclusion of military establishments
in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it may arise from a
contemplation of the nature and tendency of such institutions, fortified by
the events that have happened in other ages and countries, yet as a national
sentiment, it must be traced to those habits of thinking which we derive
from the nation from whom the inhabitants of these States have in general
sprung.
In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority of
the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads were gradually made upon the
prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by the barons, and afterwards by the
people, till the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions became
extinct. But it was not till the revolution in 1688, which elevated the Prince
of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was
completely triumphant. As incident to the undefined power of making war,
an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles II. had, by his own
authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular troops. And
this number James II. increased to 30,000; who were paid out of his civil
list. At the revolution, to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an authority,
it became an article of the Bill of Rights then framed, that "the raising or
keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, UNLESS
WITH THE CONSENT OF PARLIAMENT, was against law."
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch, no
security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite,
beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by the mere authority
of the executive magistrate. The patriots, who effected that memorable
revolution, were too temperate, too wellinformed, to think of any restraint
on the legislative discretion. They were aware that a certain number of
troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable; that no precise bounds
could be set to the national exigencies; that a power equal to every possible
contingency must exist somewhere in the government: and that when they
referred the exercise of that power to the judgment of the legislature, they
had arrived at the ultimate point of precaution which was reconcilable with
the safety of the community.
From the same source, the people of America may be said to have
derived an hereditary impression of danger to liberty, from standing armies
in time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public
sensibility on every point connected with the security of popular rights, and
in some instances raise the warmth of our zeal beyond the degree which
consisted with the due temperature of the body politic. The attempts of two
of the States to restrict the authority of the legislature in the article of
military establishments, are of the number of these instances. The principles
which had taught us to be jealous of the power of an hereditary monarch
were by an injudicious excess extended to the representatives of the people
in their popular assemblies. Even in some of the States, where this error was
not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought
not to be kept up, in time of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE. I call them unnecessary, because the reason which had
introduced a similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not
applicable to any of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies at
all, under those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to reside
anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it was superfluous, if
not absurd, to declare that a matter should not be done without the consent
of a body, which alone had the power of doing it. Accordingly, in some of
these constitutions, and among others, in that of this State of New York,
which has been justly celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one of the
best of the forms of government established in this country, there is a total
silence upon the subject.
It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have
meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of peace, the
mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than prohibitory. It is
not said, that standing armies SHALL NOT BE kept up, but that they
OUGHT NOT to be kept up, in time of peace. This ambiguity of terms
appears to have been the result of a conflict between jealousy and
conviction; between the desire of excluding such establishments at all
events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be unwise and
unsafe.
Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of public
affairs was understood to require a departure from it, would be interpreted
by the legislature into a mere admonition, and would be made to yield to the
necessities or supposed necessities of the State? Let the fact already
mentioned, with respect to Pennsylvania, decide. What then (it may be
asked) is the use of such a provision, if it cease to operate the moment there
is an inclination to disregard it?
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of efficacy,
between the provision alluded to and that which is contained in the new
Constitution, for restraining the appropriations of money for military
purposes to the period of two years. The former, by aiming at too much, is
calculated to effect nothing; the latter, by steering clear of an imprudent
extreme, and by being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the
exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and powerful operation.
The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision,
once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping
a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to
declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their
constituents. They are not AT LIBERTY to vest in the executive department
permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious
enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit
of party, in different degrees, must be expected to infect all political bodies,
there will be, no doubt, persons in the national legislature willing enough to
arraign the measures and criminate the views of the majority. The provision
for the support of a military force will always be a favorable topic for
declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public attention
will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition; and if
the majority should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the
community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity of
taking measures to guard against it. Independent of parties in the national
legislature itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the State
legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant but suspicious and jealous
guardians of the rights of the citizens against encroachments from the
federal government, will constantly have their attention awake to the
conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing
improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the
VOICE, but, if necessary, the ARM of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community REQUIRE TIME
to mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace
those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations; which
would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the
legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of time. Is
it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it
would be persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive
variations in a representative body, which biennial elections would naturally
produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant he
took his seat in the national Senate or House of Representatives, would
commence a traitor to his constituents and to his country? Can it be
supposed that there would not be found one man, discerning enough to
detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise his
constituents of their danger? If such presumptions can fairly be made, there
ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority. The people should
resolve to recall all the powers they have heretofore parted with out of their
own hands, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are
counties, in order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in
person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the
concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable. It
would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the army to
so great an extent in time of profound peace. What colorable reason could
be assigned, in a country so situated, for such vast augmentations of the
military force? It is impossible that the people could be long deceived; and
the destruction of the project, and of the projectors, would quickly follow
the discovery.
It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation of
money for the support of an army to the period of two years would be
unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large
enough to awe the people into submission, would find resources in that very
force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from the acts of the
legislature. But the question again recurs, upon what pretense could he be
put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we
suppose it to have been created in consequence of some domestic
insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the principles
of the objection; for this is levelled against the power of keeping up troops
in time of peace. Few persons will be so visionary as seriously to contend
that military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an
invasion; and if the defense of the community under such circumstances
should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its
liberty, this is one of those calamities for which there is neither preventative
nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of government;
it might even result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it
should ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for
common defense.
But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than in a
disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted that it is an evil altogether
unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is not easy to conceive a
possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the whole Union, as to
demand a force considerable enough to place our liberties in the least
jeopardy, especially if we take into our view the aid to be derived from the
militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful
auxiliary. But in a state of disunion (as has been fully shown in another
place), the contrary of this supposition would become not only probable,
but almost unavoidable.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 27. The Same Subject
Continued (The Idea of Restraining the
Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common
Defense Considered)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 25, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind
proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military
force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have
been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion, unsupported by
any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons upon which it is
founded. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the
objectors, it seems to originate in a presupposition that the people will be
disinclined to the exercise of federal authority in any matter of an internal
nature. Waiving any exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or
inexplicitness of the distinction between internal and external, let us inquire
what ground there is to presuppose that disinclination in the people. Unless
we presume at the same time that the powers of the general government will
be worse administered than those of the State government, there seems to
be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the
people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that their confidence
in and obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the
goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted that there are
exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions depend so entirely on
accidental causes, that they cannot be considered as having any relation to
the intrinsic merits or demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged
of by general principles and maxims.
Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to
induce a probability that the general government will be better administered
than the particular governments; the principal of which reasons are that the
extension of the spheres of election will present a greater option, or latitude
of choice, to the people; that through the medium of the State legislatures
which are select bodies of men, and which are to appoint the members of
the national Senate there is reason to expect that this branch will generally
be composed with peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances
promise greater knowledge and more extensive information in the national
councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction,
and more out of the reach of those occasional ill-humors, or temporary
prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently
contaminate the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of
the community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify a
momentary inclination or desire, terminate in general distress,
dissatisfaction, and disgust. Several additional reasons of considerable
force, to fortify that probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a
more critical eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited
to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory reasons
can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal government is likely
to be administered in such a manner as to render it odious or contemptible
to the people, there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposition that
the laws of the Union will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or
will stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the
laws of the particular members.
The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of
punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the
government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power, can
call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy, be more
likely to repress the FORMER sentiment and to inspire the LATTER, than
that of a single State, which can only command the resources within itself?
A turbulent faction in a State may easily suppose itself able to contend with
the friends to the government in that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated
as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the Union. If this
reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from irregular
combinations of individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that
of a single member.
I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the less just
because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more the operations
of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of
government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the
common occurrences of their political life, the more it is familiarized to
their sight and to their feelings, the further it enters into those objects which
touch the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs of
the human heart, the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the
respect and attachment of the community. Man is very much a creature of
habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses will generally have but little
influence upon his mind. A government continually at a distance and out of
sight can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the people. The
inference is, that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the
citizens towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its
extension to what are called matters of internal concern; and will have less
occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and
comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through those
channels and currents in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the
less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of
compulsion.
One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the one
proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force, than
that species of league contend for by most of its opponents; the authority of
which should only operate upon the States in their political or collective
capacities. It has been shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no
sanction for the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members
are the natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as
often as these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by war and
violence.
The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the
federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the
government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of
its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common
apprehension, all distinction between the sources from which they might
proceed; and will give the federal government the same advantage for
securing a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the
government of each State, in addition to the influence on public opinion
which will result from the important consideration of its having power to
call to its assistance and support the resources of the whole Union. It merits
particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the
ENUMERATED and LEGITIMATE objects of its jurisdiction, will become
the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which all officers,
legislative, executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the
sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the
respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national
government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY EXTENDS; and will be rendered auxiliary to the
enforcement of its laws.(1) Any man who will pursue, by his own
reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive that there is
good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the
laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common share of
prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may deduce any
inferences we please from the supposition; for it is certainly possible, by an
injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best government that ever was,
or ever can be instituted, to provoke and precipitate the people into the
wildest excesses. But though the adversaries of the proposed Constitution
should presume that the national rulers would be insensible to the motives
of public good, or to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them how the
interests of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by
such a conduct?
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1. The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend to
the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will, in its proper place,
be fully detected.
FEDERALIST No. 28. The Same Subject
Continued (The Idea of Restraining the
Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common
Defense Considered)
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 26, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may be
necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has
corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that
emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies, however
constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as
inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural
body; that the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law
(which we have been told is the only admissible principle of republican
government), has no place but in the reveries of those political doctors
whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction.
Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national
government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be
employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it should be
a slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the residue
would be adequate to its suppression; and the national presumption is that
they would be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its
immediate cause, eventually endangers all government. Regard to the
public peace, if not to the rights of the Union, would engage the citizens to
whom the contagion had not communicated itself to oppose the insurgents;
and if the general government should be found in practice conducive to the
prosperity and felicity of the people, it were irrational to believe that they
would be disinclined to its support.
If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole State, or a
principal part of it, the employment of a different kind of force might
become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to
raise troops for repressing the disorders within that State; that Pennsylvania,
from the mere apprehension of commotions among a part of her citizens,
has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose the State
of New York had been inclined to re-establish her lost jurisdiction over the
inhabitants of Vermont, could she have hoped for success in such an
enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone? Would she not have been
compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular force for the execution of
her design? If it must then be admitted that the necessity of recurring to a
force different from the militia, in cases of this extraordinary nature, is
applicable to the State governments themselves, why should the possibility,
that the national government might be under a like necessity, in similar
extremities, be made an objection to its existence? Is it not surprising that
men who declare an attachment to the Union in the abstract, should urge as
an objection to the proposed Constitution what applies with tenfold weight
to the plan for which they contend; and what, as far as it has any foundation
in truth, is an inevitable consequence of civil society upon an enlarged
scale? Who would not prefer that possibility to the unceasing agitations and
frequent revolutions which are the continual scourges of petty republics?
Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose, in lieu of one
general system, two, or three, or even four Confederacies were to be
formed, would not the same difficulty oppose itself to the operations of
either of these Confederacies? Would not each of them be exposed to the
same casualties; and when these happened, be obliged to have recourse to
the same expedients for upholding its authority which are objected to in a
government for all the States? Would the militia, in this supposition, be
more ready or more able to support the federal authority than in the case of
a general union? All candid and intelligent men must, upon due
consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is equally
applicable to either of the two cases; and that whether we have one
government for all the States, or different governments for different parcels
of them, or even if there should be an entire separation of the States, there
might sometimes be a necessity to make use of a force constituted
differently from the militia, to preserve the peace of the community and to
maintain the just authority of the laws against those violent invasions of
them which amount to insurrections and rebellions.
Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full answer to
those who require a more peremptory provision against military
establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole power of the
proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the
people. This is the essential, and, after all, only efficacious security for the
rights and privileges of the people, which is attainable in civil society.(1)
If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then
no resource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense
which is paramount to all positive forms of government, and which against
the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better
prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual state. In
a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers,
the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having
no distinct government in each, can take no regular measures for defense.
The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without
system, without resource; except in their courage and despair. The usurpers,
clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush the opposition
in embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult will it
be for the people to form a regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the
more easy will it be to defeat their early efforts. Intelligence can be more
speedily obtained of their preparations and movements, and the military
force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against
the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a
peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular
resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with
the increased extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their
rights and are disposed to defend them. The natural strength of the people in
a large community, in proportion to the artificial strength of the
government, is greater than in a small, and of course more competent to a
struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny. But in a
confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the
masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the
general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of
the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the
general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale,
will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either,
they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. How wise will
it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an
advantage which can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the
State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete
security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.
Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so likely to escape
the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The
legislatures will have better means of information. They can discover the
danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the
confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of
opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the community.
They can readily communicate with each other in the different States, and
unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty.
The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already
experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign power. And it would
have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious rulers in
the national councils. If the federal army should be able to quell the
resistance of one State, the distant States would have it in their power to
make head with fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be
abandoned to subdue the opposition in others; and the moment the part
which had been reduced to submission was left to itself, its efforts would be
renewed, and its resistance revive.
We should recollect that the extent of the military force must, at all
events, be regulated by the resources of the country. For a long time to
come, it will not be possible to maintain a large army; and as the means of
doing this increase, the population and natural strength of the community
will proportionably increase. When will the time arrive that the federal
government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a despotism
over the great body of the people of an immense empire, who are in a
situation, through the medium of their State governments, to take measures
for their own defense, with all the celerity, regularity, and system of
independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a disease, for
which there can be found no cure in the resources of argument and
reasoning.
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FEDERALIST No. 29. Concerning the Militia
From the New York Packet. Wednesday, January 9, 1788
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in
times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of
superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal
peace of the Confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the
organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most
beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the public
defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the
field with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage of peculiar moment
in the operations of an army; and it would fit them much sooner to acquire
the degree of proficiency in military functions which would be essential to
their usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by
confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the national
authority. It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of
the convention proposes to empower the Union "to provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as
may be employed in the service of the United States, RESERVING TO
THE STATES RESPECTIVELY THE APPOINTMENT OF THE
OFFICERS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE MILITIA
ACCORDING TO THE DISCIPLINE PRESCRIBED BY CONGRESS."
Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan
of the convention, there is none that was so little to have been expected, or
is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this particular provision has
been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be the most natural defense of a
free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal
of that body which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If
standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the
militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is committed,
ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to
such unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid
of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in
support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the
employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the
former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army
unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence than
a thousand prohibitions upon paper.
In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is nowhere
any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the POSSE
COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty, whence
it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his only
auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have
appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated
to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their
authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath, that the powers of the
federal government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the next,
that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the POSSE
COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the
former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, that a right to pass all
laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute its declared powers, would
include that of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who
may be intrusted with the execution of those laws, as it would be to believe,
that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and
collection of taxes would involve that of varying the rules of descent and of
the alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases
relating to it. It being therefore evident that the supposition of a want of
power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of
color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its
application to the authority of the federal government over the militia, is as
uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that force
was intended to be the sole instrument of authority, merely because there is
a power to make use of it when necessary? What shall we think of the
motives which could induce men of sense to reason in this manner? How
shall we prevent a conflict between charity and conviction?
By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are
even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of the
federal government. It is observed that select corps may be formed,
composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the
views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia may be
pursued by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far
from viewing the matter in the same light with those who object to select
corps as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my
sentiments to a member of the federal legislature from this State on the
subject of a militia establishment, I should hold to him, in substance, the
following discourse:
"The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as futile
as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried into execution.
A tolerable expertness in military movements is a business that requires
time and practice. It is not a day, or even a week, that will suffice for the
attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and of the other
classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of going through
military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire
the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-
regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious
public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the
productive labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating upon the
present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of the whole expense
of the civil establishments of all the States. To attempt a thing which would
abridge the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an extent, would
be unwise: and the experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it
would not long be endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with
respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed and
equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary
to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.
"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be
abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the utmost
importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible, be adopted
for the proper establishment of the militia. The attention of the government
ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a select corps of
moderate extent, upon such principles as will really fit them for service in
case of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an
excellent body of well-trained militia, ready to take the field whenever the
defense of the State shall require it. This will not only lessen the call for
military establishments, but if circumstances should at any time oblige the
government to form an army of any magnitude that army can never be
formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of
citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms,
who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-
citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a
standing army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist."
Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should
I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety from the very
sources which they represent as fraught with danger and perdition. But how
the national legislature may reason on the point, is a thing which neither
they nor I can foresee.
There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of
danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to treat it
with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill,
like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous artifice to instil
prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism.
Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not
trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What
shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling with the
rest of their countrymen and who participate with them in the same feelings,
sentiments, habits and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension
can be inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe regulations for the
militia, and to command its services when necessary, while the particular
States are to have the SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE
OFFICERS? If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia
upon any conceivable establishment under the federal government, the
circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of the States ought at
once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will
always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.
In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is apt
to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or romance, which
instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing but
frightful and distorted shapes—
                "Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire";
discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming
everything it touches into a monster.
A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable
suggestions which have taken place respecting the power of calling for the
services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to Georgia,
of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky
to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch are to be
paid in militiamen instead of louis d'ors and ducats. At one moment there is
to be a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the people; at another
moment the militia of Virginia are to be dragged from their homes five or
six hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy of Massachusetts; and
that of Massachusetts is to be transported an equal distance to subdue the
refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the persons who
rave at this rate imagine that their art or their eloquence can impose any
conceits or absurdities upon the people of America for infallible truths?
If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of despotism,
what need of the militia? If there should be no army, whither would the
militia, irritated by being called upon to undertake a distant and hopeless
expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of slavery upon a part of
their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had
meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush them in their
imagined intrenchments of power, and to make them an example of the just
vengeance of an abused and incensed people? Is this the way in which
usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous and enlightened nation? Do
they begin by exciting the detestation of the very instruments of their
intended usurpations? Do they usually commence their career by wanton
and disgustful acts of power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon
themselves universal hatred and execration? Are suppositions of this sort
the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning people? Or are
they the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts? If
we were even to suppose the national rulers actuated by the most
ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would employ
such preposterous means to accomplish their designs.
In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper that
the militia of a neighboring State should be marched into another, to resist a
common enemy, or to guard the republic against the violence of faction or
sedition. This was frequently the case, in respect to the first object, in the
course of the late war; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal end of
our political association. If the power of affording it be placed under the
direction of the Union, there will be no danger of a supine and listless
inattention to the dangers of a neighbor, till its near approach had
superadded the incitements of self-preservation to the too feeble impulses
of duty and sympathy.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought to
possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces; in
which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising
troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any wise
connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are not the
only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in respect to revenue,
must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must embrace a provision for
the support of the national civil list; for the payment of the national debts
contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in general, for all those matters
which will call for disbursements out of the national treasury. The
conclusion is, that there must be interwoven, in the frame of the
government, a general power of taxation, in one shape or another.
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body
politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform
its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a
regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the community
will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every
constitution. From a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must
ensue; either the people must be subjected to continual plunder, as a
substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the
government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of time,
perish.
In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in other respects
absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects, has no right to
impose a new tax. The consequence is that he permits the bashaws or
governors of provinces to pillage the people without mercy; and, in turn,
squeezes out of them the sums of which he stands in need, to satisfy his
own exigencies and those of the state. In America, from a like cause, the
government of the Union has gradually dwindled into a state of decay,
approaching nearly to annihilation. Who can doubt, that the happiness of
the people in both countries would be promoted by competent authorities in
the proper hands, to provide the revenues which the necessities of the public
might require?
The present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to repose in the United
States, an unlimited power of providing for the pecuniary wants of the
Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been done in
such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the intention. Congress, by the
articles which compose that compact (as has already been stated), are
authorized to ascertain and call for any sums of money necessary, in their
judgment, to the service of the United States; and their requisitions, if
conformable to the rule of apportionment, are in every constitutional sense
obligatory upon the States. These have no right to question the propriety of
the demand; no discretion beyond that of devising the ways and means of
furnishing the sums demanded. But though this be strictly and truly the
case; though the assumption of such a right would be an infringement of the
articles of Union; though it may seldom or never have been avowedly
claimed, yet in practice it has been constantly exercised, and would
continue to be so, as long as the revenues of the Confederacy should remain
dependent on the intermediate agency of its members. What the
consequences of this system have been, is within the knowledge of every
man the least conversant in our public affairs, and has been amply unfolded
in different parts of these inquiries. It is this which has chiefly contributed
to reduce us to a situation, which affords ample cause both of mortification
to ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies.
What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of the system
which has produced it in a change of the fallacious and delusive system of
quotas and requisitions? What substitute can there be imagined for this ignis
fatuus in finance, but that of permitting the national government to raise its
own revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every well-
ordered constitution of civil government? Ingenious men may declaim with
plausibility on any subject; but no human ingenuity can point out any other
expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences and embarrassments
naturally resulting from defective supplies of the public treasury.
The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit the force
of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a distinction between
what they call INTERNAL and EXTERNAL taxation. The former they
would reserve to the State governments; the latter, which they explain into
commercial imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they declare
themselves willing to concede to the federal head. This distinction,
however, would violate the maxim of good sense and sound policy, which
dictates that every POWER ought to be in proportion to its OBJECT; and
would still leave the general government in a kind of tutelage to the State
governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor or efficiency. Who can
pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone equal to the
present and future exigencies of the Union? Taking into the account the
existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment which
a man moderately impressed with the importance of public justice and
public credit could approve, in addition to the establishments which all
parties will acknowledge to be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter
ourselves, that this resource alone, upon the most improved scale, would
even suffice for its present necessities. Its future necessities admit not of
calculation or limitation; and upon the principle, more than once adverted
to, the power of making provision for them as they arise ought to be equally
unconfined. I believe it may be regarded as a position warranted by the
history of mankind, that, IN THE USUAL PROGRESS OF THINGS, THE
NECESSITIES OF A NATION, IN EVERY STAGE OF ITS EXISTENCE,
WILL BE FOUND AT LEAST EQUAL TO ITS RESOURCES.
To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the
States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system cannot be
depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for every thing
beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully attended to its vices and
deformities as they have been exhibited by experience or delineated in the
course of these papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to trusting the
national interests in any degree to its operation. Its inevitable tendency,
whenever it is brought into activity, must be to enfeeble the Union, and sow
the seeds of discord and contention between the federal head and its
members, and between the members themselves. Can it be expected that the
deficiencies would be better supplied in this mode than the total wants of
the Union have heretofore been supplied in the same mode? It ought to be
recollected that if less will be required from the States, they will have
proportionably less means to answer the demand. If the opinions of those
who contend for the distinction which has been mentioned were to be
received as evidence of truth, one would be led to conclude that there was
some known point in the economy of national affairs at which it would be
safe to stop and to say: Thus far the ends of public happiness will be
promoted by supplying the wants of government, and all beyond this is
unworthy of our care or anxiety. How is it possible that a government half
supplied and always necessitous, can fulfill the purposes of its institution,
can provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the
reputation of the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either energy or
stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad?
How can its administration be any thing else than a succession of
expedients temporizing, impotent, disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid
a frequent sacrifice of its engagements to immediate necessity? How can it
undertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good?
Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very
first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will presume, for
argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers the
purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace establishment for
the Union. Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be the
probable conduct of the government in such an emergency? Taught by
experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the success of
requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh resources, and
urged by considerations of national danger, would it not be driven to the
expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their proper
objects to the defense of the State? It is not easy to see how a step of this
kind could be avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident that it would
prove the destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was
becoming essential to the public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis
credit might be dispensed with, would be the extreme of infatuation. In the
modern system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have
recourse to large loans. A country so little opulent as ours must feel this
necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a government
that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated that
no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures for paying?
The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited in their extent as
burdensome in their conditions. They would be made upon the same
principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and fraudulent debtors,
with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums.
It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness of the resources of
the country, the necessity of diverting the established funds in the case
supposed would exist, though the national government should possess an
unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations will serve to quiet
all apprehension on this head: one is, that we are sure the resources of the
community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit
of the Union; the other is, that whatever deficiences there may be, can
without difficulty be supplied by loans.
The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation, by its
own authority, would enable the national government to borrow as far as its
necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of America,
could then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements; but to depend
upon a government that must itself depend upon thirteen other governments
for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situation is clearly
understood, would require a degree of credulity not often to be met with in
the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with the usual
sharp-sightedness of avarice.
Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men who hope to
see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the poetic or fabulous age;
but to those who believe we are likely to experience a common portion of
the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the lot of other nations,
they must appear entitled to serious attention. Such men must behold the
actual situation of their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate the
evils which ambition or revenge might, with too much facility, inflict upon
it.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or
first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These
contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or
combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this
effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in the organs of
perception, or from the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or
prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry, that "the whole is
greater than its part; things equal to the same are equal to one another; two
straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right angles are equal to each
other." Of the same nature are these other maxims in ethics and politics, that
there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to be
proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate with
its object; that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a
purpose which is itself incapable of limitation. And there are other truths in
the two latter sciences which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class of
axioms, are yet such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in
themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of
common-sense, that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased
mind, with a degree of force and conviction almost equally irresistible.
The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely abstracted from those
pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly passions of the human
heart, that mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only the more simple
theorems of the science, but even those abstruse paradoxes which, however
they may appear susceptible of demonstration, are at variance with the
natural conceptions which the mind, without the aid of philosophy, would
be led to entertain upon the subject. The INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of
matter, or, in other words, the INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing,
extending even to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among
geometricians, though not less incomprehensible to common-sense than any
of those mysteries in religion, against which the batteries of infidelity have
been so industriously leveled.
But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far less
tractable. To a certain degree, it is right and useful that this should be the
case. Caution and investigation are a necessary armor against error and
imposition. But this untractableness may be carried too far, and may
degenerate into obstinacy, perverseness, or disingenuity. Though it cannot
be pretended that the principles of moral and political knowledge have, in
general, the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics, yet
they have much better claims in this respect than, to judge from the conduct
of men in particular situations, we should be disposed to allow them. The
obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner
than in the subject. Men, upon too many occasions, do not give their own
understandings fair play; but, yielding to some untoward bias, they entangle
themselves in words and confound themselves in subtleties.
How else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be sincere in their
opposition), that positions so clear as those which manifest the necessity of
a general power of taxation in the government of the Union, should have to
encounter any adversaries among men of discernment? Though these
positions have been elsewhere fully stated, they will perhaps not be
improperly recapitulated in this place, as introductory to an examination of
what may have been offered by way of objection to them. They are in
substance as follows:
A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full
accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the complete
execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other
control but a regard to the public good and to the sense of the people.
As the duties of superintending the national defense and of securing the
public peace against foreign or domestic violence involve a provision for
casualties and dangers to which no possible limits can be assigned, the
power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the
exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community.
As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of answering the
national exigencies must be procured, the power of procuring that article in
its full extent must necessarily be comprehended in that of providing for
those exigencies.
As theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of procuring
revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in their collective
capacities, the federal government must of necessity be invested with an
unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes.
Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural to conclude
that the propriety of a general power of taxation in the national government
might safely be permitted to rest on the evidence of these propositions,
unassisted by any additional arguments or illustrations. But we find, in fact,
that the antagonists of the proposed Constitution, so far from acquiescing in
their justness or truth, seem to make their principal and most zealous effort
against this part of the plan. It may therefore be satisfactory to analyze the
arguments with which they combat it.
Those of them which have been most labored with that view, seem in
substance to amount to this: "It is not true, because the exigencies of the
Union may not be susceptible of limitation, that its power of laying taxes
ought to be unconfined. Revenue is as requisite to the purposes of the local
administrations as to those of the Union; and the former are at least of equal
importance with the latter to the happiness of the people. It is, therefore, as
necessary that the State governments should be able to command the means
of supplying their wants, as that the national government should possess the
like faculty in respect to the wants of the Union. But an indefinite power of
taxation in the LATTER might, and probably would in time, deprive the
FORMER of the means of providing for their own necessities; and would
subject them entirely to the mercy of the national legislature. As the laws of
the Union are to become the supreme law of the land, as it is to have power
to pass all laws that may be NECESSARY for carrying into execution the
authorities with which it is proposed to vest it, the national government
might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects upon the
pretense of an interference with its own. It might allege a necessity of doing
this in order to give efficacy to the national revenues. And thus all the
resources of taxation might by degrees become the subjects of federal
monopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of the State
governments."
This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the supposition
of usurpation in the national government; at other times it seems to be
designed only as a deduction from the constitutional operation of its
intended powers. It is only in the latter light that it can be admitted to have
any pretensions to fairness. The moment we launch into conjectures about
the usurpations of the federal government, we get into an unfathomable
abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the reach of all reasoning. Imagination
may range at pleasure till it gets bewildered amidst the labyrinths of an
enchanted castle, and knows not on which side to turn to extricate itself
from the perplexities into which it has so rashly adventured. Whatever may
be the limits or modifications of the powers of the Union, it is easy to
imagine an endless train of possible dangers; and by indulging an excess of
jealousy and timidity, we may bring ourselves to a state of absolute
scepticism and irresolution. I repeat here what I have observed in substance
in another place, that all observations founded upon the danger of
usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and structure of the
government, not to the nature or extent of its powers. The State
governments, by their original constitutions, are invested with complete
sovereignty. In what does our security consist against usurpation from that
quarter? Doubtless in the manner of their formation, and in a due
dependence of those who are to administer them upon the people. If the
proposed construction of the federal government be found, upon an
impartial examination of it, to be such as to afford, to a proper extent, the
same species of security, all apprehensions on the score of usurpation ought
to be discarded.
It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State governments to
encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as probable as a disposition
in the Union to encroach upon the rights of the State governments. What
side would be likely to prevail in such a conflict, must depend on the means
which the contending parties could employ toward insuring success. As in
republics strength is always on the side of the people, and as there are
weighty reasons to induce a belief that the State governments will
commonly possess most influence over them, the natural conclusion is that
such contests will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of the Union; and
that there is greater probability of encroachments by the members upon the
federal head, than by the federal head upon the members. But it is evident
that all conjectures of this kind must be extremely vague and fallible: and
that it is by far the safest course to lay them altogether aside, and to confine
our attention wholly to the nature and extent of the powers as they are
delineated in the Constitution. Every thing beyond this must be left to the
prudence and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the scales in
their own hands, it is to be hoped, will always take care to preserve the
constitutional equilibrium between the general and the State governments.
Upon this ground, which is evidently the true one, it will not be difficult to
obviate the objections which have been made to an indefinite power of
taxation in the United States.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the
consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State governments from
a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money, because I am
persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the
resentments of the State governments, and a conviction of the utility and
necessity of local administrations for local purposes, would be a complete
barrier against the oppressive use of such a power; yet I am willing here to
allow, in its full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires that the
individual States should possess an independent and uncontrollable
authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants. And
making this concession, I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on
imports and exports) they would, under the plan of the convention, retain
that authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense; and that an
attempt on the part of the national government to abridge them in the
exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any
article or clause of its Constitution.
An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national
sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever
powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the general
will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or
consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of
sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act,
EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United States. This exclusive delegation,
or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty, would only exist in three
cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive
authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the
Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like
authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar
authority in the States would be absolutely and totally CONTRADICTORY
and REPUGNANT. I use these terms to distinguish this last case from
another which might appear to resemble it, but which would, in fact, be
essentially different; I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction
might be productive of occasional interferences in the POLICY of any
branch of administration, but would not imply any direct contradiction or
repugnancy in point of constitutional authority. These three cases of
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal government may be exemplified by the
following instances: The last clause but one in the eighth section of the first
article provides expressly that Congress shall exercise "EXCLUSIVE
LEGISLATION" over the district to be appropriated as the seat of
government. This answers to the first case. The first clause of the same
section empowers Congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and
excises"; and the second clause of the tenth section of the same article
declares that, "NO STATE SHALL, without the consent of Congress, lay
any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except for the purpose of
executing its inspection laws." Hence would result an exclusive power in
the Union to lay duties on imports and exports, with the particular exception
mentioned; but this power is abridged by another clause, which declares
that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State; in
consequence of which qualification, it now only extends to the DUTIES
ON IMPORTS. This answers to the second case. The third will be found in
that clause which declares that Congress shall have power "to establish an
UNIFORM RULE of naturalization throughout the United States." This
must necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe
a DISTINCT RULE, there could not be a UNIFORM RULE.
A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble the latter, but which is
in fact widely different, affects the question immediately under
consideration. I mean the power of imposing taxes on all articles other than
exports and imports. This, I contend, is manifestly a concurrent and coequal
authority in the United States and in the individual States. There is plainly
no expression in the granting clause which makes that power EXCLUSIVE
in the Union. There is no independent clause or sentence which prohibits
the States from exercising it. So far is this from being the case, that a plain
and conclusive argument to the contrary is to be deduced from the restraint
laid upon the States in relation to duties on imports and exports. This
restriction implies an admission that, if it were not inserted, the States
would possess the power it excludes; and it implies a further admission, that
as to all other taxes, the authority of the States remains undiminished. In
any other view it would be both unnecessary and dangerous; it would be
unnecessary, because if the grant to the Union of the power of laying such
duties implied the exclusion of the States, or even their subordination in this
particular, there could be no need of such a restriction; it would be
dangerous, because the introduction of it leads directly to the conclusion
which has been mentioned, and which, if the reasoning of the objectors be
just, could not have been intended; I mean that the States, in all cases to
which the restriction did not apply, would have a concurrent power of
taxation with the Union. The restriction in question amounts to what
lawyers call a NEGATIVE PREGNANT that is, a NEGATION of one thing,
and an AFFIRMANCE of another; a negation of the authority of the States
to impose taxes on imports and exports, and an affirmance of their authority
to impose them on all other articles. It would be mere sophistry to argue
that it was meant to exclude them ABSOLUTELY from the imposition of
taxes of the former kind, and to leave them at liberty to lay others
SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL of the national legislature. The restraining
or prohibitory clause only says, that they shall not, WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF CONGRESS, lay such duties; and if we are to understand
this in the sense last mentioned, the Constitution would then be made to
introduce a formal provision for the sake of a very absurd conclusion;
which is, that the States, WITH THE CONSENT of the national legislature,
might tax imports and exports; and that they might tax every other article,
UNLESS CONTROLLED by the same body. If this was the intention, why
not leave it, in the first instance, to what is alleged to be the natural
operation of the original clause, conferring a general power of taxation
upon the Union? It is evident that this could not have been the intention,
and that it will not bear a construction of the kind.
As to a supposition of repugnancy between the power of taxation in the
States and in the Union, it cannot be supported in that sense which would be
requisite to work an exclusion of the States. It is, indeed, possible that a tax
might be laid on a particular article by a State which might render it
INEXPEDIENT that thus a further tax should be laid on the same article by
the Union; but it would not imply a constitutional inability to impose a
further tax. The quantity of the imposition, the expediency or inexpediency
of an increase on either side, would be mutually questions of prudence; but
there would be involved no direct contradiction of power. The particular
policy of the national and of the State systems of finance might now and
then not exactly coincide, and might require reciprocal forbearances. It is
not, however a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers,
but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate
and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty.
The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the
division of the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities, of which
the States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with
them in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence of that division, but is
clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument which contains the
articles of the proposed Constitution. We there find that, notwithstanding
the affirmative grants of general authorities, there has been the most pointed
care in those cases where it was deemed improper that the like authorities
should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the
exercise of them by the States. The tenth section of the first article consists
altogether of such provisions. This circumstance is a clear indication of the
sense of the convention, and furnishes a rule of interpretation out of the
body of the act, which justifies the position I have advanced and refutes
every hypothesis to the contrary.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE residue of the argument against the provisions of the Constitution in
respect to taxation is ingrafted upon the following clause. The last clause of
the eighth section of the first article of the plan under consideration
authorizes the national legislature "to make all laws which shall be
NECESSARY and PROPER for carrying into execution THE POWERS by
that Constitution vested in the government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof"; and the second clause of the sixth article
declares, "that the Constitution and the laws of the United States made IN
PURSUANCE THEREOF, and the treaties made by their authority shall be
the SUPREME LAW of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
These two clauses have been the source of much virulent invective and
petulant declamation against the proposed Constitution. They have been
held up to the people in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresentation as
the pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be
destroyed and their liberties exterminated; as the hideous monster whose
devouring jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor
sacred nor profane; and yet, strange as it may appear, after all this clamor,
to those who may not have happened to contemplate them in the same light,
it may be affirmed with perfect confidence that the constitutional operation
of the intended government would be precisely the same, if these clauses
were entirely obliterated, as if they were repeated in every article. They are
only declaratory of a truth which would have resulted by necessary and
unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a federal
government, and vesting it with certain specified powers. This is so clear a
proposition, that moderation itself can scarcely listen to the railings which
have been so copiously vented against this part of the plan, without
emotions that disturb its equanimity.
What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing? What is the
ability to do a thing, but the power of employing the MEANS necessary to
its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power, but a power of making
LAWS? What are the MEANS to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but
LAWS? What is the power of laying and collecting taxes, but a
LEGISLATIVE POWER, or a power of MAKING LAWS, to lay and
collect taxes? What are the proper means of executing such a power, but
NECESSARY and PROPER laws?
This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with a test by which to
judge of the true nature of the clause complained of. It conducts us to this
palpable truth, that a power to lay and collect taxes must be a power to pass
all laws NECESSARY and PROPER for the execution of that power; and
what does the unfortunate and calumniated provision in question do more
than declare the same truth, to wit, that the national legislature, to whom the
power of laying and collecting taxes had been previously given, might, in
the execution of that power, pass all laws NECESSARY and PROPER to
carry it into effect? I have applied these observations thus particularly to the
power of taxation, because it is the immediate subject under consideration,
and because it is the most important of the authorities proposed to be
conferred upon the Union. But the same process will lead to the same result,
in relation to all other powers declared in the Constitution. And it is
EXPRESSLY to execute these powers that the sweeping clause, as it has
been affectedly called, authorizes the national legislature to pass all
NECESSARY and PROPER laws. If there is any thing exceptionable, it
must be sought for in the specific powers upon which this general
declaration is predicated. The declaration itself, though it may be
chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless.
But SUSPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced? The answer is,
that it could only have been done for greater caution, and to guard against
all cavilling refinements in those who might hereafter feel a disposition to
curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the Union. The Convention
probably foresaw, what it has been a principal aim of these papers to
inculcate, that the danger which most threatens our political welfare is that
the State governments will finally sap the foundations of the Union; and
might therefore think it necessary, in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to
construction. Whatever may have been the inducement to it, the wisdom of
the precaution is evident from the cry which has been raised against it; as
that very cry betrays a disposition to question the great and essential truth
which it is manifestly the object of that provision to declare.
But it may be again asked, Who is to judge of the NECESSITY and
PROPRIETY of the laws to be passed for executing the powers of the
Union? I answer, first, that this question arises as well and as fully upon the
simple grant of those powers as upon the declaratory clause; and I answer,
in the second place, that the national government, like every other, must
judge, in the first instance, of the proper exercise of its powers, and its
constituents in the last. If the federal government should overpass the just
bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people,
whose creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take
such measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency
may suggest and prudence justify. The propriety of a law, in a constitutional
light, must always be determined by the nature of the powers upon which it
is founded. Suppose, by some forced constructions of its authority (which,
indeed, cannot easily be imagined), the Federal legislature should attempt to
vary the law of descent in any State, would it not be evident that, in making
such an attempt, it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and infringed upon that of
the State? Suppose, again, that upon the pretense of an interference with its
revenues, it should undertake to abrogate a landtax imposed by the
authority of a State; would it not be equally evident that this was an
invasion of that concurrent jurisdiction in respect to this species of tax,
which its Constitution plainly supposes to exist in the State governments? If
there ever should be a doubt on this head, the credit of it will be entirely due
to those reasoners who, in the imprudent zeal of their animosity to the plan
of the convention, have labored to envelop it in a cloud calculated to
obscure the plainest and simplest truths.
But it is said that the laws of the Union are to be the SUPREME LAW of
the land. But what inference can be drawn from this, or what would they
amount to, if they were not to be supreme? It is evident they would amount
to nothing. A LAW, by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It
is a rule which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to observe. This
results from every political association. If individuals enter into a state of
society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of their
conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a larger political
society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers
intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those
societies, and the individuals of whom they are composed. It would
otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and
not a government, which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER
AND SUPREMACY. But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of
the large society which are NOT PURSUANT to its constitutional powers,
but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies,
will become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of
usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such. Hence we perceive that
the clause which declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the
one we have just before considered, only declares a truth, which flows
immediately and necessarily from the institution of a federal government. It
will not, I presume, have escaped observation, that it EXPRESSLY confines
this supremacy to laws made PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION;
which I mention merely as an instance of caution in the convention; since
that limitation would have been to be understood, though it had not been
expressed.
Though a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of the United States
would be supreme in its nature, and could not legally be opposed or
controlled, yet a law for abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid
by the authority of the State, (unless upon imports and exports), would not
be the supreme law of the land, but a usurpation of power not granted by
the Constitution. As far as an improper accumulation of taxes on the same
object might tend to render the collection difficult or precarious, this would
be a mutual inconvenience, not arising from a superiority or defect of power
on either side, but from an injudicious exercise of power by one or the
other, in a manner equally disadvantageous to both. It is to be hoped and
presumed, however, that mutual interest would dictate a concert in this
respect which would avoid any material inconvenience. The inference from
the whole is, that the individual States would, under the proposed
Constitution, retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise
revenue to any extent of which they may stand in need, by every kind of
taxation, except duties on imports and exports. It will be shown in the next
paper that this CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of taxation
was the only admissible substitute for an entire subordination, in respect to
this branch of power, of the State authority to that of the Union.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last number that the
particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have COEQUAL
authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on
imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the
resources of the community, there can be no color for the assertion that they
would not possess means as abundant as could be desired for the supply of
their own wants, independent of all external control. That the field is
sufficiently wide will more fully appear when we come to advert to the
inconsiderable share of the public expenses for which it will fall to the lot
of the State governments to provide.
To argue upon abstract principles that this co-ordinate authority cannot
exist, is to set up supposition and theory against fact and reality. However
proper such reasonings might be to show that a thing OUGHT NOT TO
EXIST, they are wholly to be rejected when they are made use of to prove
that it does not exist contrary to the evidence of the fact itself. It is well
known that in the Roman republic the legislative authority, in the last resort,
resided for ages in two different political bodies not as branches of the same
legislature, but as distinct and independent legislatures, in each of which an
opposite interest prevailed: in one the patrician; in the other, the plebian.
Many arguments might have been adduced to prove the unfitness of two
such seemingly contradictory authorities, each having power to ANNUL or
REPEAL the acts of the other. But a man would have been regarded as
frantic who should have attempted at Rome to disprove their existence. It
will be readily understood that I allude to the COMITIA CENTURIATA
and the COMITIA TRIBUTA. The former, in which the people voted by
centuries, was so arranged as to give a superiority to the patrician interest;
in the latter, in which numbers prevailed, the plebian interest had an entire
predominancy. And yet these two legislatures coexisted for ages, and the
Roman republic attained to the utmost height of human greatness.
In the case particularly under consideration, there is no such
contradiction as appears in the example cited; there is no power on either
side to annul the acts of the other. And in practice there is little reason to
apprehend any inconvenience; because, in a short course of time, the wants
of the States will naturally reduce themselves within A VERY NARROW
COMPASS; and in the interim, the United States will, in all probability, find
it convenient to abstain wholly from those objects to which the particular
States would be inclined to resort.
To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this question, it
will be well to advert to the proportion between the objects that will require
a federal provision in respect to revenue, and those which will require a
State provision. We shall discover that the former are altogether unlimited,
and that the latter are circumscribed within very moderate bounds. In
pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we are not to confine our
view to the present period, but to look forward to remote futurity.
Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed upon a calculation of
existing exigencies, but upon a combination of these with the probable
exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of human
affairs. Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of
any power, proper to be lodged in the national government, from an
estimate of its immediate necessities. There ought to be a CAPACITY to
provide for future contingencies as they may happen; and as these are
illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that capacity. It is
true, perhaps, that a computation might be made with sufficient accuracy to
answer the purpose of the quantity of revenue requisite to discharge the
subsisting engagements of the Union, and to maintain those establishments
which, for some time to come, would suffice in time of peace. But would it
be wise, or would it not rather be the extreme of folly, to stop at this point,
and to leave the government intrusted with the care of the national defense
in a state of absolute incapacity to provide for the protection of the
community against future invasions of the public peace, by foreign war or
domestic convulsions? If, on the contrary, we ought to exceed this point,
where can we stop, short of an indefinite power of providing for
emergencies as they may arise? Though it is easy to assert, in general terms,
the possibility of forming a rational judgment of a due provision against
probable dangers, yet we may safely challenge those who make the
assertion to bring forward their data, and may affirm that they would be
found as vague and uncertain as any that could be produced to establish the
probable duration of the world. Observations confined to the mere prospects
of internal attacks can deserve no weight; though even these will admit of
no satisfactory calculation: but if we mean to be a commercial people, it
must form a part of our policy to be able one day to defend that commerce.
The support of a navy and of naval wars would involve contingencies that
must baffle all the efforts of political arithmetic.
Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment in
politics of tying up the hands of government from offensive war founded
upon reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not to disable it from guarding
the community against the ambition or enmity of other nations. A cloud has
been for some time hanging over the European world. If it should break
forth into a storm, who can insure us that in its progress a part of its fury
would not be spent upon us? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce
that we are entirely out of its reach. Or if the combustible materials that
now seem to be collecting should be dissipated without coming to maturity,
or if a flame should be kindled without extending to us, what security can
we have that our tranquillity will long remain undisturbed from some other
cause or from some other quarter? Let us recollect that peace or war will
not always be left to our option; that however moderate or unambitious we
may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the
ambition of others. Who could have imagined at the conclusion of the last
war that France and Britain, wearied and exhausted as they both were,
would so soon have looked with so hostile an aspect upon each other? To
judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to conclude that
the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with
much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of
peace; and that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting
tranquillity, is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human character.
What are the chief sources of expense in every government? What has
occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with which several of the
European nations are oppressed? The answers plainly is, wars and
rebellions; the support of those institutions which are necessary to guard the
body politic against these two most mortal diseases of society. The
expenses arising from those institutions which are relative to the mere
domestic police of a state, to the support of its legislative, executive, and
judicial departments, with their different appendages, and to the
encouragement of agriculture and manufactures (which will comprehend
almost all the objects of state expenditure), are insignificant in comparison
with those which relate to the national defense.
In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the ostentatious apparatus of
monarchy is to be provided for, not above a fifteenth part of the annual
income of the nation is appropriated to the class of expenses last mentioned;
the other fourteen fifteenths are absorbed in the payment of the interest of
debts contracted for carrying on the wars in which that country has been
engaged, and in the maintenance of fleets and armies. If, on the one hand, it
should be observed that the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the
ambitious enterprises and vainglorious pursuits of a monarchy are not a
proper standard by which to judge of those which might be necessary in a
republic, it ought, on the other hand, to be remarked that there should be as
great a disproportion between the profusion and extravagance of a wealthy
kingdom in its domestic administration, and the frugality and economy
which in that particular become the modest simplicity of republican
government. If we balance a proper deduction from one side against that
which it is supposed ought to be made from the other, the proportion may
still be considered as holding good.
But let us advert to the large debt which we have ourselves contracted in
a single war, and let us only calculate on a common share of the events
which disturb the peace of nations, and we shall instantly perceive, without
the aid of any elaborate illustration, that there must always be an immense
disproportion between the objects of federal and state expenditures. It is
true that several of the States, separately, are encumbered with considerable
debts, which are an excrescence of the late war. But this cannot happen
again, if the proposed system be adopted; and when these debts are
discharged, the only call for revenue of any consequence, which the State
governments will continue to experience, will be for the mere support of
their respective civil list; to which, if we add all contingencies, the total
amount in every State ought to fall considerably short of two hundred
thousand pounds.
In framing a government for posterity as well as ourselves, we ought, in
those provisions which are designed to be permanent, to calculate, not on
temporary, but on permanent causes of expense. If this principle be a just
one our attention would be directed to a provision in favor of the State
governments for an annual sum of about two hundred thousand pounds;
while the exigencies of the Union could be susceptible of no limits, even in
imagination. In this view of the subject, by what logic can it be maintained
that the local governments ought to command, in perpetuity, an
EXCLUSIVE source of revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two
hundred thousand pounds? To extend its power further, in EXCLUSION of
the authority of the Union, would be to take the resources of the community
out of those hands which stood in need of them for the public welfare, in
order to put them into other hands which could have no just or proper
occasion for them.
Suppose, then, the convention had been inclined to proceed upon the
principle of a repartition of the objects of revenue, between the Union and
its members, in PROPORTION to their comparative necessities; what
particular fund could have been selected for the use of the States, that
would not either have been too much or too little too little for their present,
too much for their future wants? As to the line of separation between
external and internal taxes, this would leave to the States, at a rough
computation, the command of two thirds of the resources of the community
to defray from a tenth to a twentieth part of its expenses; and to the Union,
one third of the resources of the community, to defray from nine tenths to
nineteen twentieths of its expenses. If we desert this boundary and content
ourselves with leaving to the States an exclusive power of taxing houses
and lands, there would still be a great disproportion between the MEANS
and the END; the possession of one third of the resources of the community
to supply, at most, one tenth of its wants. If any fund could have been
selected and appropriated, equal to and not greater than the object, it would
have been inadequate to the discharge of the existing debts of the particular
States, and would have left them dependent on the Union for a provision for
this purpose.
The preceding train of observation will justify the position which has
been elsewhere laid down, that "A CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the
article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire
subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of State authority to that
of the Union." Any separation of the objects of revenue that could have
been fallen upon, would have amounted to a sacrifice of the great
INTERESTS of the Union to the POWER of the individual States. The
convention thought the concurrent jurisdiction preferable to that
subordination; and it is evident that it has at least the merit of reconciling an
indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the Federal government with
an adequate and independent power in the States to provide for their own
necessities. There remain a few other lights, in which this important subject
of taxation will claim a further consideration.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite
power of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark; which is,
that if the jurisdiction of the national government, in the article of revenue,
should be restricted to particular objects, it would naturally occasion an
undue proportion of the public burdens to fall upon those objects. Two evils
would spring from this source: the oppression of particular branches of
industry; and an unequal distribution of the taxes, as well among the several
States as among the citizens of the same State.
Suppose, as has been contended for, the federal power of taxation were to
be confined to duties on imports, it is evident that the government, for want
of being able to command other resources, would frequently be tempted to
extend these duties to an injurious excess. There are persons who imagine
that they can never be carried to too great a length; since the higher they
are, the more it is alleged they will tend to discourage an extravagant
consumption, to produce a favorable balance of trade, and to promote
domestic manufactures. But all extremes are pernicious in various ways.
Exorbitant duties on imported articles would beget a general spirit of
smuggling; which is always prejudicial to the fair trader, and eventually to
the revenue itself: they tend to render other classes of the community
tributary, in an improper degree, to the manufacturing classes, to whom
they give a premature monopoly of the markets; they sometimes force
industry out of its more natural channels into others in which it flows with
less advantage; and in the last place, they oppress the merchant, who is
often obliged to pay them himself without any retribution from the
consumer. When the demand is equal to the quantity of goods at market, the
consumer generally pays the duty; but when the markets happen to be
overstocked, a great proportion falls upon the merchant, and sometimes not
only exhausts his profits, but breaks in upon his capital. I am apt to think
that a division of the duty, between the seller and the buyer, more often
happens than is commonly imagined. It is not always possible to raise the
price of a commodity in exact proportion to every additional imposition laid
upon it. The merchant, especially in a country of small commercial capital,
is often under a necessity of keeping prices down in order to a more
expeditious sale.
The maxim that the consumer is the payer, is so much oftener true than
the reverse of the proposition, that it is far more equitable that the duties on
imports should go into a common stock, than that they should redound to
the exclusive benefit of the importing States. But it is not so generally true
as to render it equitable, that those duties should form the only national
fund. When they are paid by the merchant they operate as an additional tax
upon the importing State, whose citizens pay their proportion of them in the
character of consumers. In this view they are productive of inequality
among the States; which inequality would be increased with the increased
extent of the duties. The confinement of the national revenues to this
species of imposts would be attended with inequality, from a different
cause, between the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing States. The
States which can go farthest towards the supply of their own wants, by their
own manufactures, will not, according to their numbers or wealth, consume
so great a proportion of imported articles as those States which are not in
the same favorable situation. They would not, therefore, in this mode alone
contribute to the public treasury in a ratio to their abilities. To make them
do this it is necessary that recourse be had to excises, the proper objects of
which are particular kinds of manufactures. New York is more deeply
interested in these considerations than such of her citizens as contend for
limiting the power of the Union to external taxation may be aware of. New
York is an importing State, and is not likely speedily to be, to any great
extent, a manufacturing State. She would, of course, suffer in a double light
from restraining the jurisdiction of the Union to commercial imposts.
So far as these observations tend to inculcate a danger of the import
duties being extended to an injurious extreme it may be observed,
conformably to a remark made in another part of these papers, that the
interest of the revenue itself would be a sufficient guard against such an
extreme. I readily admit that this would be the case, as long as other
resources were open; but if the avenues to them were closed, HOPE,
stimulated by necessity, would beget experiments, fortified by rigorous
precautions and additional penalties, which, for a time, would have the
intended effect, till there had been leisure to contrive expedients to elude
these new precautions. The first success would be apt to inspire false
opinions, which it might require a long course of subsequent experience to
correct. Necessity, especially in politics, often occasions false hopes, false
reasonings, and a system of measures correspondingly erroneous. But even
if this supposed excess should not be a consequence of the limitation of the
federal power of taxation, the inequalities spoken of would still ensue,
though not in the same degree, from the other causes that have been
noticed. Let us now return to the examination of objections.
One which, if we may judge from the frequency of its repetition, seems
most to be relied on, is, that the House of Representatives is not sufficiently
numerous for the reception of all the different classes of citizens, in order to
combine the interests and feelings of every part of the community, and to
produce a due sympathy between the representative body and its
constituents. This argument presents itself under a very specious and
seducing form; and is well calculated to lay hold of the prejudices of those
to whom it is addressed. But when we come to dissect it with attention, it
will appear to be made up of nothing but fair-sounding words. The object it
seems to aim at is, in the first place, impracticable, and in the sense in
which it is contended for, is unnecessary. I reserve for another place the
discussion of the question which relates to the sufficiency of the
representative body in respect to numbers, and shall content myself with
examining here the particular use which has been made of a contrary
supposition, in reference to the immediate subject of our inquiries.
The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people, by
persons of each class, is altogether visionary. Unless it were expressly
provided in the Constitution, that each different occupation should send one
or more members, the thing would never take place in practice. Mechanics
and manufacturers will always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give
their votes to merchants, in preference to persons of their own professions
or trades. Those discerning citizens are well aware that the mechanic and
manufacturing arts furnish the materials of mercantile enterprise and
industry. Many of them, indeed, are immediately connected with the
operations of commerce. They know that the merchant is their natural
patron and friend; and they are aware, that however great the confidence
they may justly feel in their own good sense, their interests can be more
effectually promoted by the merchant than by themselves. They are sensible
that their habits in life have not been such as to give them those acquired
endowments, without which, in a deliberative assembly, the greatest natural
abilities are for the most part useless; and that the influence and weight, and
superior acquirements of the merchants render them more equal to a contest
with any spirit which might happen to infuse itself into the public councils,
unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading interests. These considerations,
and many others that might be mentioned prove, and experience confirms it,
that artisans and manufacturers will commonly be disposed to bestow their
votes upon merchants and those whom they recommend. We must therefore
consider merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes of the
community.
With regard to the learned professions, little need be observed; they truly
form no distinct interest in society, and according to their situation and
talents, will be indiscriminately the objects of the confidence and choice of
each other, and of other parts of the community.
Nothing remains but the landed interest; and this, in a political view, and
particularly in relation to taxes, I take to be perfectly united, from the
wealthiest landlord down to the poorest tenant. No tax can be laid on land
which will not affect the proprietor of millions of acres as well as the
proprietor of a single acre. Every landholder will therefore have a common
interest to keep the taxes on land as low as possible; and common interest
may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy. But if we
even could suppose a distinction of interest between the opulent landholder
and the middling farmer, what reason is there to conclude, that the first
would stand a better chance of being deputed to the national legislature than
the last? If we take fact as our guide, and look into our own senate and
assembly, we shall find that moderate proprietors of land prevail in both;
nor is this less the case in the senate, which consists of a smaller number,
than in the assembly, which is composed of a greater number. Where the
qualifications of the electors are the same, whether they have to choose a
small or a large number, their votes will fall upon those in whom they have
most confidence; whether these happen to be men of large fortunes, or of
moderate property, or of no property at all.
It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have some of
their own number in the representative body, in order that their feelings and
interests may be the better understood and attended to. But we have seen
that this will never happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of
the people free. Where this is the case, the representative body, with too few
exceptions to have any influence on the spirit of the government, will be
composed of landholders, merchants, and men of the learned professions.
But where is the danger that the interests and feelings of the different
classes of citizens will not be understood or attended to by these three
descriptions of men? Will not the landholder know and feel whatever will
promote or insure the interest of landed property? And will he not, from his
own interest in that species of property, be sufficiently prone to resist every
attempt to prejudice or encumber it? Will not the merchant understand and
be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of the
mechanic and manufacturing arts, to which his commerce is so nearly
allied? Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality
to the rivalships between the different branches of industry, be likely to
prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either, so far as it
shall appear to him conducive to the general interests of the society?
If we take into the account the momentary humors or dispositions which
may happen to prevail in particular parts of the society, and to which a wise
administration will never be inattentive, is the man whose situation leads to
extensive inquiry and information less likely to be a competent judge of
their nature, extent, and foundation than one whose observation does not
travel beyond the circle of his neighbors and acquaintances? Is it not natural
that a man who is a candidate for the favor of the people, and who is
dependent on the suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the continuance of his
public honors, should take care to inform himself of their dispositions and
inclinations, and should be willing to allow them their proper degree of
influence upon his conduct? This dependence, and the necessity of being
bound himself, and his posterity, by the laws to which he gives his assent,
are the true, and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the
representative and the constituent.
There is no part of the administration of government that requires
extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of
political economy, so much as the business of taxation. The man who
understands those principles best will be least likely to resort to oppressive
expedients, or sacrifice any particular class of citizens to the procurement of
revenue. It might be demonstrated that the most productive system of
finance will always be the least burdensome. There can be no doubt that in
order to a judicious exercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the
person in whose hands it should be acquainted with the general genius,
habits, and modes of thinking of the people at large, and with the resources
of the country. And this is all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge
of the interests and feelings of the people. In any other sense the proposition
has either no meaning, or an absurd one. And in that sense let every
considerate citizen judge for himself where the requisite qualification is
most likely to be found.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 36. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning the General Power of
Taxation)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 8, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
WE HAVE seen that the result of the observations, to which the
foregoing number has been principally devoted, is, that from the natural
operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the
community, whether the representation of the people be more or less
numerous, it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land, of
merchants, and of members of the learned professions, who will truly
represent all those different interests and views. If it should be objected that
we have seen other descriptions of men in the local legislatures, I answer
that it is admitted there are exceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient
number to influence the general complexion or character of the government.
There are strong minds in every walk of life that will rise superior to the
disadvantages of situation, and will command the tribute due to their merit,
not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from the
society in general. The door ought to be equally open to all; and I trust, for
the credit of human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigorous
plants flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State legislation; but
occasional instances of this sort will not render the reasoning founded upon
the general course of things, less conclusive.
The subject might be placed in several other lights that would all lead to
the same result; and in particular it might be asked, What greater affinity or
relation of interest can be conceived between the carpenter and blacksmith,
and the linen manufacturer or stocking weaver, than between the merchant
and either of them? It is notorious that there are often as great rivalships
between different branches of the mechanic or manufacturing arts as there
are between any of the departments of labor and industry; so that, unless the
representative body were to be far more numerous than would be consistent
with any idea of regularity or wisdom in its deliberations, it is impossible
that what seems to be the spirit of the objection we have been considering
should ever be realized in practice. But I forbear to dwell any longer on a
matter which has hitherto worn too loose a garb to admit even of an
accurate inspection of its real shape or tendency.
There is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature that claims
our attention. It has been asserted that a power of internal taxation in the
national legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as well from
the want of a sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, as from an
interference between the revenue laws of the Union and of the particular
States. The supposition of a want of proper knowledge seems to be entirely
destitute of foundation. If any question is depending in a State legislature
respecting one of the counties, which demands a knowledge of local details,
how is it acquired? No doubt from the information of the members of the
county. Cannot the like knowledge be obtained in the national legislature
from the representatives of each State? And is it not to be presumed that the
men who will generally be sent there will be possessed of the necessary
degree of intelligence to be able to communicate that information? Is the
knowledge of local circumstances, as applied to taxation, a minute
topographical acquaintance with all the mountains, rivers, streams,
highways, and bypaths in each State; or is it a general acquaintance with its
situation and resources, with the state of its agriculture, commerce,
manufactures, with the nature of its products and consumptions, with the
different degrees and kinds of its wealth, property, and industry?
Nations in general, even under governments of the more popular kind,
usually commit the administration of their finances to single men or to
boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and prepare, in the first
instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards passed into laws by the
authority of the sovereign or legislature.
Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere best
qualified to make a judicious selection of the objects proper for revenue;
which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of mankind can have weight
in the question, of the species of knowledge of local circumstances requisite
to the purposes of taxation.
The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination of
internal taxes may be subdivided into those of the DIRECT and those of the
INDIRECT kind. Though the objection be made to both, yet the reasoning
upon it seems to be confined to the former branch. And indeed, as to the
latter, by which must be understood duties and excises on articles of
consumption, one is at a loss to conceive what can be the nature of the
difficulties apprehended. The knowledge relating to them must evidently be
of a kind that will either be suggested by the nature of the article itself, or
can easily be procured from any well-informed man, especially of the
mercantile class. The circumstances that may distinguish its situation in one
State from its situation in another must be few, simple, and easy to be
comprehended. The principal thing to be attended to, would be to avoid
those articles which had been previously appropriated to the use of a
particular State; and there could be no difficulty in ascertaining the revenue
system of each. This could always be known from the respective codes of
laws, as well as from the information of the members from the several
States.
The objection, when applied to real property or to houses and lands,
appears to have, at first sight, more foundation, but even in this view it will
not bear a close examination. Land taxes are commonly laid in one of two
modes, either by ACTUAL valuations, permanent or periodical, or by
OCCASIONAL assessments, at the discretion, or according to the best
judgment, of certain officers whose duty it is to make them. In either case,
the EXECUTION of the business, which alone requires the knowledge of
local details, must be devolved upon discreet persons in the character of
commissioners or assessors, elected by the people or appointed by the
government for the purpose. All that the law can do must be to name the
persons or to prescribe the manner of their election or appointment, to fix
their numbers and qualifications and to draw the general outlines of their
powers and duties. And what is there in all this that cannot as well be
performed by the national legislature as by a State legislature? The attention
of either can only reach to general principles; local details, as already
observed, must be referred to those who are to execute the plan.
But there is a simple point of view in which this matter may be placed
that must be altogether satisfactory. The national legislature can make use
of the SYSTEM OF EACH STATE WITHIN THAT STATE. The method of
laying and collecting this species of taxes in each State can, in all its parts,
be adopted and employed by the federal government.
Let it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes is not to be left to
the discretion of the national legislature, but is to be determined by the
numbers of each State, as described in the second section of the first article.
An actual census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule, a
circumstance which effectually shuts the door to partiality or oppression.
The abuse of this power of taxation seems to have been provided against
with guarded circumspection. In addition to the precaution just mentioned,
there is a provision that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be
UNIFORM throughout the United States."
It has been very properly observed by different speakers and writers on
the side of the Constitution, that if the exercise of the power of internal
taxation by the Union should be discovered on experiment to be really
inconvenient, the federal government may then forbear the use of it, and
have recourse to requisitions in its stead. By way of answer to this, it has
been triumphantly asked, Why not in the first instance omit that ambiguous
power, and rely upon the latter resource? Two solid answers may be given.
The first is, that the exercise of that power, if convenient, will be preferable,
because it will be more effectual; and it is impossible to prove in theory, or
otherwise than by the experiment, that it cannot be advantageously
exercised. The contrary, indeed, appears most probable. The second answer
is, that the existence of such a power in the Constitution will have a strong
influence in giving efficacy to requisitions. When the States know that the
Union can apply itself without their agency, it will be a powerful motive for
exertion on their part.
As to the interference of the revenue laws of the Union, and of its
members, we have already seen that there can be no clashing or repugnancy
of authority. The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense, interfere with each
other; and it is far from impossible to avoid an interference even in the
policy of their different systems. An effectual expedient for this purpose
will be, mutually, to abstain from those objects which either side may have
first had recourse to. As neither can CONTROL the other, each will have an
obvious and sensible interest in this reciprocal forbearance. And where
there is an IMMEDIATE common interest, we may safely count upon its
operation. When the particular debts of the States are done away, and their
expenses come to be limited within their natural compass, the possibility
almost of interference will vanish. A small land tax will answer the purpose
of the States, and will be their most simple and most fit resource.
Many spectres have been raised out of this power of internal taxation, to
excite the apprehensions of the people: double sets of revenue officers, a
duplication of their burdens by double taxations, and the frightful forms of
odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been played off with all the
ingenious dexterity of political legerdemain.
As to the first point, there are two cases in which there can be no room
for double sets of officers: one, where the right of imposing the tax is
exclusively vested in the Union, which applies to the duties on imports; the
other, where the object has not fallen under any State regulation or
provision, which may be applicable to a variety of objects. In other cases,
the probability is that the United States will either wholly abstain from the
objects preoccupied for local purposes, or will make use of the State
officers and State regulations for collecting the additional imposition. This
will best answer the views of revenue, because it will save expense in the
collection, and will best avoid any occasion of disgust to the State
governments and to the people. At all events, here is a practicable expedient
for avoiding such an inconvenience; and nothing more can be required than
to show that evils predicted to not necessarily result from the plan.
As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence, it is a
sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed; but the
supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer. If such a spirit should
infest the councils of the Union, the most certain road to the
accomplishment of its aim would be to employ the State officers as much as
possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their
emoluments. This would serve to turn the tide of State influence into the
channels of the national government, instead of making federal influence
flow in an opposite and adverse current. But all suppositions of this kind are
invidious, and ought to be banished from the consideration of the great
question before the people. They can answer no other end than to cast a
mist over the truth.
As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain. The wants of
the Union are to be supplied in one way or another; if to be done by the
authority of the federal government, it will not be to be done by that of the
State government. The quantity of taxes to be paid by the community must
be the same in either case; with this advantage, if the provision is to be
made by the Union that the capital resource of commercial imposts, which
is the most convenient branch of revenue, can be prudently improved to a
much greater extent under federal than under State regulation, and of course
will render it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient methods; and
with this further advantage, that as far as there may be any real difficulty in
the exercise of the power of internal taxation, it will impose a disposition to
greater care in the choice and arrangement of the means; and must naturally
tend to make it a fixed point of policy in the national administration to go as
far as may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich tributary to the
public treasury, in order to diminish the necessity of those impositions
which might create dissatisfaction in the poorer and most numerous classes
of the society. Happy it is when the interest which the government has in
the preservation of its own power, coincides with a proper distribution of
the public burdens, and tends to guard the least wealthy part of the
community from oppression!
As to poll taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapprobation of them;
and though they have prevailed from an early period in those States(1)
which have uniformly been the most tenacious of their rights, I should
lament to see them introduced into practice under the national government.
But does it follow because there is a power to lay them that they will
actually be laid? Every State in the Union has power to impose taxes of this
kind; and yet in several of them they are unknown in practice. Are the State
governments to be stigmatized as tyrannies, because they possess this
power? If they are not, with what propriety can the like power justify such a
charge against the national government, or even be urged as an obstacle to
its adoption? As little friendly as I am to the species of imposition, I still
feel a thorough conviction that the power of having recourse to it ought to
exist in the federal government. There are certain emergencies of nations, in
which expedients, that in the ordinary state of things ought to be forborne,
become essential to the public weal. And the government, from the
possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the option of making
use of them. The real scarcity of objects in this country, which may be
considered as productive sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar to itself,
for not abridging the discretion of the national councils in this respect.
There may exist certain critical and tempestuous conjunctures of the State,
in which a poll tax may become an inestimable resource. And as I know
nothing to exempt this portion of the globe from the common calamities
that have befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every
project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single weapon,
which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed for the
general defense and security.
(I have now gone through the examination of such of the powers
proposed to be vested in the United States, which may be considered as
having an immediate relation to the energy of the government; and have
endeavored to answer the principal objections which have been made to
them. I have passed over in silence those minor authorities, which are either
too inconsiderable to have been thought worthy of the hostilities of the
opponents of the Constitution, or of too manifest propriety to admit of
controversy. The mass of judiciary power, however, might have claimed an
investigation under this head, had it not been for the consideration that its
organization and its extent may be more advantageously considered in
connection. This has determined me to refer it to the branch of our inquiries
upon which we shall next enter.)(E1)
(I have now gone through the examination of those powers proposed to
be conferred upon the federal government which relate more peculiarly to
its energy, and to its efficiency for answering the great and primary objects
of union. There are others which, though omitted here, will, in order to
render the view of the subject more complete, be taken notice of under the
next head of our inquiries. I flatter myself the progress already made will
have sufficed to satisfy the candid and judicious part of the community that
some of the objections which have been most strenuously urged against the
Constitution, and which were most formidable in their first appearance, are
not only destitute of substance, but if they had operated in the formation of
the plan, would have rendered it incompetent to the great ends of public
happiness and national prosperity. I equally flatter myself that a further and
more critical investigation of the system will serve to recommend it still
more to every sincere and disinterested advocate for good government and
will leave no doubt with men of this character of the propriety and
expediency of adopting it. Happy will it be for ourselves, and more
honorable for human nature, if we have wisdom and virtue enough to set so
glorious an example to mankind!)(E1)
PUBLIUS
1. The New England States.
E1. Two versions of this paragraph appear in different editions.
FEDERALIST No. 37. Concerning the Difficulties
of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of
Government.
From the Daily Advertiser. Friday, January 11, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
IN REVIEWING the defects of the existing Confederation, and showing
that they cannot be supplied by a government of less energy than that before
the public, several of the most important principles of the latter fell of
course under consideration. But as the ultimate object of these papers is to
determine clearly and fully the merits of this Constitution, and the
expediency of adopting it, our plan cannot be complete without taking a
more critical and thorough survey of the work of the convention, without
examining it on all its sides, comparing it in all its parts, and calculating its
probable effects. That this remaining task may be executed under
impressions conducive to a just and fair result, some reflections must in this
place be indulged, which candor previously suggests.
It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public measures
are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to a
just estimate of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good;
and that this spirit is more apt to be diminished than promoted, by those
occasions which require an unusual exercise of it. To those who have been
led by experience to attend to this consideration, it could not appear
surprising, that the act of the convention, which recommends so many
important changes and innovations, which may be viewed in so many lights
and relations, and which touches the springs of so many passions and
interests, should find or excite dispositions unfriendly, both on one side and
on the other, to a fair discussion and accurate judgment of its merits. In
some, it has been too evident from their own publications, that they have
scanned the proposed Constitution, not only with a predisposition to
censure, but with a predetermination to condemn; as the language held by
others betrays an opposite predetermination or bias, which must render their
opinions also of little moment in the question. In placing, however, these
different characters on a level, with respect to the weight of their opinions, I
wish not to insinuate that there may not be a material difference in the
purity of their intentions. It is but just to remark in favor of the latter
description, that as our situation is universally admitted to be peculiarly
critical, and to require indispensably that something should be done for our
relief, the predetermined patron of what has been actually done may have
taken his bias from the weight of these considerations, as well as from
considerations of a sinister nature. The predetermined adversary, on the
other hand, can have been governed by no venial motive whatever. The
intentions of the first may be upright, as they may on the contrary be
culpable. The views of the last cannot be upright, and must be culpable. But
the truth is, that these papers are not addressed to persons falling under
either of these characters. They solicit the attention of those only, who add
to a sincere zeal for the happiness of their country, a temper favorable to a
just estimate of the means of promoting it.
Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the plan
submitted by the convention, not only without a disposition to find or to
magnify faults; but will see the propriety of reflecting, that a faultless plan
was not to be expected. Nor will they barely make allowances for the errors
which may be chargeable on the fallibility to which the convention, as a
body of men, were liable; but will keep in mind, that they themselves also
are but men, and ought not to assume an infallibility in rejudging the
fallible opinions of others.
With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides these inducements
to candor, many allowances ought to be made for the difficulties inherent in
the very nature of the undertaking referred to the convention.
The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes us. It has been shown
in the course of these papers, that the existing Confederation is founded on
principles which are fallacious; that we must consequently change this first
foundation, and with it the superstructure resting upon it. It has been shown,
that the other confederacies which could be consulted as precedents have
been vitiated by the same erroneous principles, and can therefore furnish no
other light than that of beacons, which give warning of the course to be
shunned, without pointing out that which ought to be pursued. The most
that the convention could do in such a situation, was to avoid the errors
suggested by the past experience of other countries, as well as of our own;
and to provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors, as future
experiences may unfold them.
Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very important
one must have lain in combining the requisite stability and energy in
government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the
republican form. Without substantially accomplishing this part of their
undertaking, they would have very imperfectly fulfilled the object of their
appointment, or the expectation of the public; yet that it could not be easily
accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling to betray his
ignorance of the subject. Energy in government is essential to that security
against external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary
execution of the laws which enter into the very definition of good
government. Stability in government is essential to national character and to
the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the
minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings of civil society.
An irregular and mutable legislation is not more an evil in itself than it is
odious to the people; and it may be pronounced with assurance that the
people of this country, enlightened as they are with regard to the nature, and
interested, as the great body of them are, in the effects of good government,
will never be satisfied till some remedy be applied to the vicissitudes and
uncertainties which characterize the State administrations. On comparing,
however, these valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty, we
must perceive at once the difficulty of mingling them together in their due
proportions. The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side,
not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those
intrusted with it should be kept in independence on the people, by a short
duration of their appointments; and that even during this short period the
trust should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands. Stability, on the
contrary, requires that the hands in which power is lodged should continue
for a length of time the same. A frequent change of men will result from a
frequent return of elections; and a frequent change of measures from a
frequent change of men: whilst energy in government requires not only a
certain duration of power, but the execution of it by a single hand.
How far the convention may have succeeded in this part of their work,
will better appear on a more accurate view of it. From the cursory view here
taken, it must clearly appear to have been an arduous part.
Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the proper line of
partition between the authority of the general and that of the State
governments. Every man will be sensible of this difficulty, in proportion as
he has been accustomed to contemplate and discriminate objects extensive
and complicated in their nature. The faculties of the mind itself have never
yet been distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, by all the
efforts of the most acute and metaphysical philosophers. Sense, perception,
judgment, desire, volition, memory, imagination, are found to be separated
by such delicate shades and minute gradations that their boundaries have
eluded the most subtle investigations, and remain a pregnant source of
ingenious disquisition and controversy. The boundaries between the great
kingdom of nature, and, still more, between the various provinces, and
lesser portions, into which they are subdivided, afford another illustration of
the same important truth. The most sagacious and laborious naturalists have
never yet succeeded in tracing with certainty the line which separates the
district of vegetable life from the neighboring region of unorganized matter,
or which marks the termination of the former and the commencement of the
animal empire. A still greater obscurity lies in the distinctive characters by
which the objects in each of these great departments of nature have been
arranged and assorted.
When we pass from the works of nature, in which all the delineations are
perfectly accurate, and appear to be otherwise only from the imperfection of
the eye which surveys them, to the institutions of man, in which the
obscurity arises as well from the object itself as from the organ by which it
is contemplated, we must perceive the necessity of moderating still further
our expectations and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity. Experience
has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been
able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great
provinces the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges
and powers of the different legislative branches. Questions daily occur in
the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reins in these
subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.
The experience of ages, with the continued and combined labors of the
most enlightened legislatures and jurists, has been equally unsuccessful in
delineating the several objects and limits of different codes of laws and
different tribunals of justice. The precise extent of the common law, and the
statute law, the maritime law, the ecclesiastical law, the law of corporations,
and other local laws and customs, remains still to be clearly and finally
established in Great Britain, where accuracy in such subjects has been more
industriously pursued than in any other part of the world. The jurisdiction of
her several courts, general and local, of law, of equity, of admiralty, etc., is
not less a source of frequent and intricate discussions, sufficiently denoting
the indeterminate limits by which they are respectively circumscribed. All
new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the
fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure
and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series
of particular discussions and adjudications. Besides the obscurity arising
from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties,
the medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each
other adds a fresh embarrassment. The use of words is to express ideas.
Perspicuity, therefore, requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly
formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and
exclusively appropriate to them. But no language is so copious as to supply
words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include
many equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen that
however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and
however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of
them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it
is delivered. And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less,
according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined. When the
Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own language,
his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the
cloudy medium through which it is communicated.
Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect definitions:
indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of conception,
inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas. Any one of these must produce a
certain degree of obscurity. The convention, in delineating the boundary
between the federal and State jurisdictions, must have experienced the full
effect of them all.
To the difficulties already mentioned may be added the interfering
pretensions of the larger and smaller States. We cannot err in supposing that
the former would contend for a participation in the government, fully
proportioned to their superior wealth and importance; and that the latter
would not be less tenacious of the equality at present enjoyed by them. We
may well suppose that neither side would entirely yield to the other, and
consequently that the struggle could be terminated only by compromise. It
is extremely probable, also, that after the ratio of representation had been
adjusted, this very compromise must have produced a fresh struggle
between the same parties, to give such a turn to the organization of the
government, and to the distribution of its powers, as would increase the
importance of the branches, in forming which they had respectively
obtained the greatest share of influence. There are features in the
Constitution which warrant each of these suppositions; and as far as either
of them is well founded, it shows that the convention must have been
compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety to the force of extraneous
considerations.
Nor could it have been the large and small States only, which would
marshal themselves in opposition to each other on various points. Other
combinations, resulting from a difference of local position and policy, must
have created additional difficulties. As every State may be divided into
different districts, and its citizens into different classes, which give birth to
contending interests and local jealousies, so the different parts of the United
States are distinguished from each other by a variety of circumstances,
which produce a like effect on a larger scale. And although this variety of
interests, for reasons sufficiently explained in a former paper, may have a
salutary influence on the administration of the government when formed,
yet every one must be sensible of the contrary influence, which must have
been experienced in the task of forming it.
Would it be wonderful if, under the pressure of all these difficulties, the
convention should have been forced into some deviations from that
artificial structure and regular symmetry which an abstract view of the
subject might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution
planned in his closet or in his imagination? The real wonder is that so many
difficulties should have been surmounted, and surmounted with a unanimity
almost as unprecedented as it must have been unexpected. It is impossible
for any man of candor to reflect on this circumstance without partaking of
the astonishment. It is impossible for the man of pious reflection not to
perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand which has been so frequently
and signally extended to our relief in the critical stages of the revolution.
We had occasion, in a former paper, to take notice of the repeated trials
which have been unsuccessfully made in the United Netherlands for
reforming the baneful and notorious vices of their constitution. The history
of almost all the great councils and consultations held among mankind for
reconciling their discordant opinions, assuaging their mutual jealousies, and
adjusting their respective interests, is a history of factions, contentions, and
disappointments, and may be classed among the most dark and degraded
pictures which display the infirmities and depravities of the human
character. If, in a few scattered instances, a brighter aspect is presented,
they serve only as exceptions to admonish us of the general truth; and by
their lustre to darken the gloom of the adverse prospect to which they are
contrasted. In revolving the causes from which these exceptions result, and
applying them to the particular instances before us, we are necessarily led to
two important conclusions. The first is, that the convention must have
enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption from the pestilential
influence of party animosities the disease most incident to deliberative
bodies, and most apt to contaminate their proceedings. The second
conclusion is that all the deputations composing the convention were
satisfactorily accommodated by the final act, or were induced to accede to it
by a deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and
partial interests to the public good, and by a despair of seeing this necessity
diminished by delays or by new experiments.

FEDERALIST No. 38. The Same Subject
Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections
to the New Plan Exposed.
From The Independent Journal. Saturday, January 12, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS not a little remarkable that in every case reported by ancient history,
in which government has been established with deliberation and consent,
the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men, but
has been performed by some individual citizen of preeminent wisdom and
approved integrity.
Minos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the government of Crete,
as Zaleucus was of that of the Locrians. Theseus first, and after him Draco
and Solon, instituted the government of Athens. Lycurgus was the lawgiver
of Sparta. The foundation of the original government of Rome was laid by
Romulus, and the work completed by two of his elective successors, Numa
and Tullius Hostilius. On the abolition of royalty the consular
administration was substituted by Brutus, who stepped forward with a
project for such a reform, which, he alleged, had been prepared by Tullius
Hostilius, and to which his address obtained the assent and ratification of
the senate and people. This remark is applicable to confederate
governments also. Amphictyon, we are told, was the author of that which
bore his name. The Achaean league received its first birth from Achaeus,
and its second from Aratus.
What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have in their
respective establishments, or how far they might be clothed with the
legitimate authority of the people, cannot in every instance be ascertained.
In some, however, the proceeding was strictly regular. Draco appears to
have been intrusted by the people of Athens with indefinite powers to
reform its government and laws. And Solon, according to Plutarch, was in a
manner compelled, by the universal suffrage of his fellow-citizens, to take
upon him the sole and absolute power of new-modeling the constitution.
The proceedings under Lycurgus were less regular; but as far as the
advocates for a regular reform could prevail, they all turned their eyes
towards the single efforts of that celebrated patriot and sage, instead of
seeking to bring about a revolution by the intervention of a deliberative
body of citizens.
Whence could it have proceeded, that a people, jealous as the Greeks
were of their liberty, should so far abandon the rules of caution as to place
their destiny in the hands of a single citizen? Whence could it have
proceeded, that the Athenians, a people who would not suffer an army to be
commanded by fewer than ten generals, and who required no other proof of
danger to their liberties than the illustrious merit of a fellow-citizen, should
consider one illustrious citizen as a more eligible depositary of the fortunes
of themselves and their posterity, than a select body of citizens, from whose
common deliberations more wisdom, as well as more safety, might have
been expected? These questions cannot be fully answered, without
supposing that the fears of discord and disunion among a number of
counsellors exceeded the apprehension of treachery or incapacity in a single
individual. History informs us, likewise, of the difficulties with which these
celebrated reformers had to contend, as well as the expedients which they
were obliged to employ in order to carry their reforms into effect. Solon,
who seems to have indulged a more temporizing policy, confessed that he
had not given to his countrymen the government best suited to their
happiness, but most tolerable to their prejudices. And Lycurgus, more true
to his object, was under the necessity of mixing a portion of violence with
the authority of superstition, and of securing his final success by a voluntary
renunciation, first of his country, and then of his life. If these lessons teach
us, on one hand, to admire the improvement made by America on the
ancient mode of preparing and establishing regular plans of government,
they serve not less, on the other, to admonish us of the hazards and
difficulties incident to such experiments, and of the great imprudence of
unnecessarily multiplying them.
Is it an unreasonable conjecture, that the errors which may be contained
in the plan of the convention are such as have resulted rather from the
defect of antecedent experience on this complicated and difficult subject,
than from a want of accuracy or care in the investigation of it; and,
consequently such as will not be ascertained until an actual trial shall have
pointed them out? This conjecture is rendered probable, not only by many
considerations of a general nature, but by the particular case of the Articles
of Confederation. It is observable that among the numerous objections and
amendments suggested by the several States, when these articles were
submitted for their ratification, not one is found which alludes to the great
and radical error which on actual trial has discovered itself. And if we
except the observations which New Jersey was led to make, rather by her
local situation, than by her peculiar foresight, it may be questioned whether
a single suggestion was of sufficient moment to justify a revision of the
system. There is abundant reason, nevertheless, to suppose that immaterial
as these objections were, they would have been adhered to with a very
dangerous inflexibility, in some States, had not a zeal for their opinions and
supposed interests been stifled by the more powerful sentiment of self-
preservation. One State, we may remember, persisted for several years in
refusing her concurrence, although the enemy remained the whole period at
our gates, or rather in the very bowels of our country. Nor was her pliancy
in the end effected by a less motive, than the fear of being chargeable with
protracting the public calamities, and endangering the event of the contest.
Every candid reader will make the proper reflections on these important
facts.
A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse, and that an
efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme danger, after
coolly revolving his situation, and the characters of different physicians,
selects and calls in such of them as he judges most capable of administering
relief, and best entitled to his confidence. The physicians attend; the case of
the patient is carefully examined; a consultation is held; they are
unanimously agreed that the symptoms are critical, but that the case, with
proper and timely relief, is so far from being desperate, that it may be made
to issue in an improvement of his constitution. They are equally unanimous
in prescribing the remedy, by which this happy effect is to be produced. The
prescription is no sooner made known, however, than a number of persons
interpose, and, without denying the reality or danger of the disorder, assure
the patient that the prescription will be poison to his constitution, and forbid
him, under pain of certain death, to make use of it. Might not the patient
reasonably demand, before he ventured to follow this advice, that the
authors of it should at least agree among themselves on some other remedy
to be substituted? And if he found them differing as much from one another
as from his first counsellors, would he not act prudently in trying the
experiment unanimously recommended by the latter, rather than be
hearkening to those who could neither deny the necessity of a speedy
remedy, nor agree in proposing one?
Such a patient and in such a situation is America at this moment. She has
been sensible of her malady. She has obtained a regular and unanimous
advice from men of her own deliberate choice. And she is warned by others
against following this advice under pain of the most fatal consequences. Do
the monitors deny the reality of her danger? No. Do they deny the necessity
of some speedy and powerful remedy? No. Are they agreed, are any two of
them agreed, in their objections to the remedy proposed, or in the proper
one to be substituted? Let them speak for themselves. This one tells us that
the proposed Constitution ought to be rejected, because it is not a
confederation of the States, but a government over individuals. Another
admits that it ought to be a government over individuals to a certain extent,
but by no means to the extent proposed. A third does not object to the
government over individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to the want of a
bill of rights. A fourth concurs in the absolute necessity of a bill of rights,
but contends that it ought to be declaratory, not of the personal rights of
individuals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their political capacity.
A fifth is of opinion that a bill of rights of any sort would be superfluous
and misplaced, and that the plan would be unexceptionable but for the fatal
power of regulating the times and places of election. An objector in a large
State exclaims loudly against the unreasonable equality of representation in
the Senate. An objector in a small State is equally loud against the
dangerous inequality in the House of Representatives. From this quarter, we
are alarmed with the amazing expense, from the number of persons who are
to administer the new government. From another quarter, and sometimes
from the same quarter, on another occasion, the cry is that the Congress will
be but a shadow of a representation, and that the government would be far
less objectionable if the number and the expense were doubled. A patriot in
a State that does not import or export, discerns insuperable objections
against the power of direct taxation. The patriotic adversary in a State of
great exports and imports, is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of
taxes may be thrown on consumption. This politician discovers in the
Constitution a direct and irresistible tendency to monarchy; that is equally
sure it will end in aristocracy. Another is puzzled to say which of these
shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees clearly it must be one or other of
them; whilst a fourth is not wanting, who with no less confidence affirms
that the Constitution is so far from having a bias towards either of these
dangers, that the weight on that side will not be sufficient to keep it upright
and firm against its opposite propensities. With another class of adversaries
to the Constitution the language is that the legislative, executive, and
judiciary departments are intermixed in such a manner as to contradict all
the ideas of regular government and all the requisite precautions in favor of
liberty. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and general expressions,
there are but a few who lend their sanction to it. Let each one come forward
with his particular explanation, and scarce any two are exactly agreed upon
the subject. In the eyes of one the junction of the Senate with the President
in the responsible function of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this
executive power in the Executive alone, is the vicious part of the
organization. To another, the exclusion of the House of Representatives,
whose numbers alone could be a due security against corruption and
partiality in the exercise of such a power, is equally obnoxious. With
another, the admission of the President into any share of a power which
ever must be a dangerous engine in the hands of the executive magistrate, is
an unpardonable violation of the maxims of republican jealousy. No part of
the arrangement, according to some, is more inadmissible than the trial of
impeachments by the Senate, which is alternately a member both of the
legislative and executive departments, when this power so evidently
belonged to the judiciary department. "We concur fully," reply others, "in
the objection to this part of the plan, but we can never agree that a reference
of impeachments to the judiciary authority would be an amendment of the
error. Our principal dislike to the organization arises from the extensive
powers already lodged in that department." Even among the zealous patrons
of a council of state the most irreconcilable variance is discovered
concerning the mode in which it ought to be constituted. The demand of
one gentleman is, that the council should consist of a small number to be
appointed by the most numerous branch of the legislature. Another would
prefer a larger number, and considers it as a fundamental condition that the
appointment should be made by the President himself.
As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the plan of the federal
Constitution, let us suppose, that as they are the most zealous, so they are
also the most sagacious, of those who think the late convention were
unequal to the task assigned them, and that a wiser and better plan might
and ought to be substituted. Let us further suppose that their country should
concur, both in this favorable opinion of their merits, and in their
unfavorable opinion of the convention; and should accordingly proceed to
form them into a second convention, with full powers, and for the express
purpose of revising and remoulding the work of the first. Were the
experiment to be seriously made, though it required some effort to view it
seriously even in fiction, I leave it to be decided by the sample of opinions
just exhibited, whether, with all their enmity to their predecessors, they
would, in any one point, depart so widely from their example, as in the
discord and ferment that would mark their own deliberations; and whether
the Constitution, now before the public, would not stand as fair a chance for
immortality, as Lycurgus gave to that of Sparta, by making its change to
depend on his own return from exile and death, if it were to be immediately
adopted, and were to continue in force, not until a BETTER, but until
ANOTHER should be agreed upon by this new assembly of lawgivers.
It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many
objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the
defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the
former should be perfect; it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. No
man would refuse to give brass for silver or gold, because the latter had
some alloy in it. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering
habitation for a firm and commodious building, because the latter had not a
porch to it, or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller,
or the ceilings a little higher or lower than his fancy would have planned
them. But waiving illustrations of this sort, is it not manifest that most of
the capital objections urged against the new system lie with tenfold weight
against the existing Confederation? Is an indefinite power to raise money
dangerous in the hands of the federal government? The present Congress
can make requisitions to any amount they please, and the States are
constitutionally bound to furnish them; they can emit bills of credit as long
as they will pay for the paper; they can borrow, both abroad and at home, as
long as a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to raise troops
dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that power also; and they
have already begun to make use of it. Is it improper and unsafe to intermix
the different powers of government in the same body of men? Congress, a
single body of men, are the sole depositary of all the federal powers. Is it
particularly dangerous to give the keys of the treasury, and the command of
the army, into the same hands? The Confederation places them both in the
hands of Congress. Is a bill of rights essential to liberty? The Confederation
has no bill of rights. Is it an objection against the new Constitution, that it
empowers the Senate, with the concurrence of the Executive, to make
treaties which are to be the laws of the land? The existing Congress,
without any such control, can make treaties which they themselves have
declared, and most of the States have recognized, to be the supreme law of
the land. Is the importation of slaves permitted by the new Constitution for
twenty years? By the old it is permitted forever.
I shall be told, that however dangerous this mixture of powers may be in
theory, it is rendered harmless by the dependence of Congress on the State
for the means of carrying them into practice; that however large the mass of
powers may be, it is in fact a lifeless mass. Then, say I, in the first place,
that the Confederation is chargeable with the still greater folly of declaring
certain powers in the federal government to be absolutely necessary, and at
the same time rendering them absolutely nugatory; and, in the next place,
that if the Union is to continue, and no better government be substituted,
effective powers must either be granted to, or assumed by, the existing
Congress; in either of which events, the contrast just stated will hold good.
But this is not all. Out of this lifeless mass has already grown an excrescent
power, which tends to realize all the dangers that can be apprehended from
a defective construction of the supreme government of the Union. It is now
no longer a point of speculation and hope, that the Western territory is a
mine of vast wealth to the United States; and although it is not of such a
nature as to extricate them from their present distresses, or for some time to
come, to yield any regular supplies for the public expenses, yet must it
hereafter be able, under proper management, both to effect a gradual
discharge of the domestic debt, and to furnish, for a certain period, liberal
tributes to the federal treasury. A very large proportion of this fund has been
already surrendered by individual States; and it may with reason be
expected that the remaining States will not persist in withholding similar
proofs of their equity and generosity. We may calculate, therefore, that a
rich and fertile country, of an area equal to the inhabited extent of the
United States, will soon become a national stock. Congress have assumed
the administration of this stock. They have begun to render it productive.
Congress have undertaken to do more: they have proceeded to form new
States, to erect temporary governments, to appoint officers for them, and to
prescribe the conditions on which such States shall be admitted into the
Confederacy. All this has been done; and done without the least color of
constitutional authority. Yet no blame has been whispered; no alarm has
been sounded. A GREAT and INDEPENDENT fund of revenue is passing
into the hands of a SINGLE BODY of men, who can RAISE TROOPS to
an INDEFINITE NUMBER, and appropriate money to their support for an
INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. And yet there are men, who have not
only been silent spectators of this prospect, but who are advocates for the
system which exhibits it; and, at the same time, urge against the new system
the objections which we have heard. Would they not act with more
consistency, in urging the establishment of the latter, as no less necessary to
guard the Union against the future powers and resources of a body
constructed like the existing Congress, than to save it from the dangers
threatened by the present impotency of that Assembly?
I mean not, by any thing here said, to throw censure on the measures
which have been pursued by Congress. I am sensible they could not have
done otherwise. The public interest, the necessity of the case, imposed upon
them the task of overleaping their constitutional limits. But is not the fact an
alarming proof of the danger resulting from a government which does not
possess regular powers commensurate to its objects? A dissolution or
usurpation is the dreadful dilemma to which it is continually exposed.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 39. The Conformity of the
Plan to Republican Principles
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 16, 1788
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to
introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the
convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our
undertaking.
The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and
aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other
form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with
the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable
determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our
political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the
plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican
character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.
What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an
answer to this question to be sought, not by recurring to principles, but in
the application of the term by political writers, to the constitution of
different States, no satisfactory one would ever be found. Holland, in which
no particle of the supreme authority is derived from the people, has passed
almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The same title has
been bestowed on Venice, where absolute power over the great body of the
people is exercised, in the most absolute manner, by a small body of
hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and of
monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified with the same
appellation. The government of England, which has one republican branch
only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has, with
equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of republics. These
examples, which are nearly as dissimilar to each other as to a genuine
republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in
political disquisitions.
If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different
forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at
least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered
by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or
during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be
derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable
proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles,
exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to
the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title
of republic. It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons
administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people;
and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified;
otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other
popular government that has been or can be well organized or well
executed, would be degraded from the republican character. According to
the constitution of every State in the Union, some or other of the officers of
government are appointed indirectly only by the people. According to most
of them, the chief magistrate himself is so appointed. And according to one,
this mode of appointment is extended to one of the co-ordinate branches of
the legislature. According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the
highest offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instances, both
within the legislative and executive departments, to a period of years.
According to the provisions of most of the constitutions, again, as well as
according to the most respectable and received opinions on the subject, the
members of the judiciary department are to retain their offices by the firm
tenure of good behavior.
On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the
standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the most rigid sense,
conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at
least of all the State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of
the people. The Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of
Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the people. The President
is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the
example in most of the States. Even the judges, with all other officers of the
Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice,
of the people themselves, the duration of the appointments is equally
conformable to the republican standard, and to the model of State
constitutions The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all
the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina.
The Senate is elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year
more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that
of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to continue in
office for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware, the chief
magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In
the other States the election is annual. In several of the States, however, no
constitutional provision is made for the impeachment of the chief
magistrate. And in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of
office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during
his continuance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their
places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior. The
tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal
regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the
State constitutions.
Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this
system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of
titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and in
its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter.
"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed
Constitution, "for the convention to adhere to the republican form. They
ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which
regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of
which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the
Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States." And it is asked by what
authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The handle
which has been made of this objection requires that it should be examined
with some precision.
Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the
objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, first,
to ascertain the real character of the government in question; secondly, to
inquire how far the convention were authorized to propose such a
government; and thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could
supply any defect of regular authority.
First. In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be
considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to
the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the
operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by
which future changes in the government are to be introduced.
On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the
Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of
America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the
other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as
individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and
independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent
and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in
each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore,
establishing the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL
act.
That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are
understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so many
independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from
this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a
MAJORITY of the people of the Union, nor from that of a MAJORITY of
the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several
States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent
than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of
the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction as
forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the
United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority
in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be
determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by
considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a
majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these rules have been
adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a
sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own
voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established,
be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL constitution.
The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of
government are to be derived. The House of Representatives will derive its
powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in
the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature
of a particular State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL.
The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as
political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the
principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress.
So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL. The executive
power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate
election of the President is to be made by the States in their political
characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which
considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal
members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by
that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives;
but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual
delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this
aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at
least as many FEDERAL as NATIONAL features.
The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to
the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this,
that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the
Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual
citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the
Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the
FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely as has been
understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to
which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in
their collective and political capacities only. So far the national countenance
of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal
features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the
operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in
its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it,
in this relation, a NATIONAL government.
But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its
powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the
EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it,
not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite
supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful
government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy
is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united
for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the
municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are
subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished
by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their
respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is
subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed
government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction
extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States
a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that
in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the
tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general
government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The
decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the
Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to
secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an
appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be
established under the general rather than under the local governments, or, to
speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone,
is a position not likely to be combated.
If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which
amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor
wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate
authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and
this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of
every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were
it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the
Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all.
The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either
of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In
requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion
by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and
advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of
less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the
FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.
The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national
nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is
federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the
government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the
operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them,
again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of
introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 40. On the Powers of the
Convention to Form a Mixed Government
Examined and Sustained.
For the New York Packet. Friday, January 18, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE SECOND point to be examined is, whether the convention were
authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitution.
The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an
inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective
constituents. As all of these, however, had reference, either to the
recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in September, 1786, or to
that from Congress, in February, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these
particular acts.
The act from Annapolis recommends the "appointment of commissioners
to take into consideration the situation of the United States; to devise SUCH
FURTHER PROVISIONS as shall appear to them necessary to render the
Constitution of the federal government ADEQUATE TO THE
EXIGENCIES OF THE UNION; and to report such an act for that purpose,
to the United States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to by them, and
afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every State, will effectually
provide for the same."
The recommendatory act of Congress is in the words following:
"WHEREAS, There is provision in the articles of Confederation and
perpetual Union, for making alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress
of the United States, and of the legislatures of the several States; and
whereas experience hath evinced, that there are defects in the present
Confederation; as a mean to remedy which, several of the States, and
PARTICULARLY THE STATE OF NEW YORK, by express instructions
to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a convention for the purposes
expressed in the following resolution; and such convention appearing to be
the most probable mean of establishing in these States A FIRM
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:
"Resolved, That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient, that on the
second Monday of May next a convention of delegates, who shall have
been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole
and express purpose OF REVISING THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures
such ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS THEREIN, as shall, when
agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal
Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT
AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION."
From these two acts, it appears, 1st, that the object of the convention was
to establish, in these States, A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; 2d,
that this government was to be such as would be ADEQUATE TO THE
EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT and THE PRESERVATION OF THE
UNION; 3d, that these purposes were to be effected by ALTERATIONS
AND PROVISIONS IN THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, as it is
expressed in the act of Congress, or by SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS
AS SHOULD APPEAR NECESSARY, as it stands in the recommendatory
act from Annapolis; 4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be
reported to Congress, and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the
former and confirmed by the latter.
From a comparison and fair construction of these several modes of
expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the convention
acted. They were to frame a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, adequate to the
EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT, and OF THE UNION; and to reduce
the articles of Confederation into such form as to accomplish these
purposes.
There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as well as
founded on legal axioms. The one is, that every part of the expression
ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to
some common end. The other is, that where the several parts cannot be
made to coincide, the less important should give way to the more important
part; the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the
means.
Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the authority of the
convention were irreconcilably at variance with each other; that a
NATIONAL and ADEQUATE GOVERNMENT could not possibly, in the
judgment of the convention, be affected by ALTERATIONS and
PROVISIONS in the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION; which part of
the definition ought to have been embraced, and which rejected? Which
was the more important, which the less important part? Which the end;
which the means? Let the most scrupulous expositors of delegated powers;
let the most inveterate objectors against those exercised by the convention,
answer these questions. Let them declare, whether it was of most
importance to the happiness of the people of America, that the articles of
Confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate government be
provided, and the Union preserved; or that an adequate government should
be omitted, and the articles of Confederation preserved. Let them declare,
whether the preservation of these articles was the end, for securing which a
reform of the government was to be introduced as the means; or whether the
establishment of a government, adequate to the national happiness, was the
end at which these articles themselves originally aimed, and to which they
ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed.
But is it necessary to suppose that these expressions are absolutely
irreconcilable to each other; that no ALTERATIONS or PROVISIONS in
the articles of the confederation could possibly mould them into a national
and adequate government; into such a government as has been proposed by
the convention?
No stress, it is presumed, will, in this case, be laid on the TITLE; a
change of that could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted power.
ALTERATIONS in the body of the instrument are expressly authorized.
NEW PROVISIONS therein are also expressly authorized. Here then is a
power to change the title; to insert new articles; to alter old ones. Must it of
necessity be admitted that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the
old articles remain? Those who maintain the affirmative ought at least to
mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innovations; between
that degree of change which lies within the compass of ALTERATIONS
AND FURTHER PROVISIONS, and that which amounts to a
TRANSMUTATION of the government. Will it be said that the alterations
ought not to have touched the substance of the Confederation? The States
would never have appointed a convention with so much solemnity, nor
described its objects with so much latitude, if some SUBSTANTIAL reform
had not been in contemplation. Will it be said that the FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES of the Confederation were not within the purview of the
convention, and ought not to have been varied? I ask, What are these
principles? Do they require that, in the establishment of the Constitution,
the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They
are so regarded by the Constitution proposed. Do they require that the
members of the government should derive their appointment from the
legislatures, not from the people of the States? One branch of the new
government is to be appointed by these legislatures; and under the
Confederation, the delegates to Congress MAY ALL be appointed
immediately by the people, and in two States(1) are actually so appointed.
Do they require that the powers of the government should act on the States,
and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been shown,
the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective
characters. In some instances, also, those of the existing government act
immediately on individuals. In cases of capture; of piracy; of the post
office; of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims
under grants of land by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials
by courts-marshal in the army and navy, by which death may be inflicted
without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil magistrate; in all these
cases the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons
and interests of individual citizens. Do these fundamental principles require,
particularly, that no tax should be levied without the intermediate agency of
the States? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain
extent, on the post office. The power of coinage has been so construed by
Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source also. But
pretermitting these instances, was it not an acknowledged object of the
convention and the universal expectation of the people, that the regulation
of trade should be submitted to the general government in such a form as
would render it an immediate source of general revenue? Had not Congress
repeatedly recommended this measure as not inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of the Confederation? Had not every State but one;
had not New York herself, so far complied with the plan of Congress as to
recognize the PRINCIPLE of the innovation? Do these principles, in fine,
require that the powers of the general government should be limited, and
that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of their
sovereignty and independence? We have seen that in the new government,
as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all
unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and
independent jurisdiction.
The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the
convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion
of principles which are found in the articles of Confederation. The
misfortune under the latter system has been, that these principles are so
feeble and confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have
been urged against it, and to require a degree of enlargement which gives to
the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old.
In one particular it is admitted that the convention have departed from the
tenor of their commission. Instead of reporting a plan requiring the
confirmation OF THE LEGISLATURES OF ALL THE STATES, they have
reported a plan which is to be confirmed by the PEOPLE, and may be
carried into effect by NINE STATES ONLY. It is worthy of remark that this
objection, though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the
publications which have swarmed against the convention. The forbearance
can only have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of
subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a
thirteenth; from the example of inflexible opposition given by a
MAJORITY of one sixtieth of the people of America to a measure
approved and called for by the voice of twelve States, comprising fifty-nine
sixtieths of the people an example still fresh in the memory and indignation
of every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and prosperity of his
country. As this objection, therefore, has been in a manner waived by those
who have criticised the powers of the convention, I dismiss it without
further observation.
The THIRD point to be inquired into is, how far considerations of duty
arising out of the case itself could have supplied any defect of regular
authority.
In the preceding inquiries the powers of the convention have been
analyzed and tried with the same rigor, and by the same rules, as if they had
been real and final powers for the establishment of a Constitution for the
United States. We have seen in what manner they have borne the trial even
on that supposition. It is time now to recollect that the powers were merely
advisory and recommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and
so understood by the convention; and that the latter have accordingly
planned and proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more consequence
than the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the
approbation of those to whom it is addressed. This reflection places the
subject in a point of view altogether different, and will enable us to judge
with propriety of the course taken by the convention.
Let us view the ground on which the convention stood. It may be
collected from their proceedings, that they were deeply and unanimously
impressed with the crisis, which had led their country almost with one voice
to make so singular and solemn an experiment for correcting the errors of a
system by which this crisis had been produced; that they were no less
deeply and unanimously convinced that such a reform as they have
proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their
appointment. It could not be unknown to them that the hopes and
expectations of the great body of citizens, throughout this great empire,
were turned with the keenest anxiety to the event of their deliberations.
They had every reason to believe that the contrary sentiments agitated the
minds and bosoms of every external and internal foe to the liberty and
prosperity of the United States. They had seen in the origin and progress of
the experiment, the alacrity with which the PROPOSITION, made by a
single State (Virginia), towards a partial amendment of the Confederation,
had been attended to and promoted. They had seen the LIBERTY
ASSUMED by a VERY FEW deputies from a VERY FEW States,
convened at Annapolis, of recommending a great and critical object, wholly
foreign to their commission, not only justified by the public opinion, but
actually carried into effect by twelve out of the thirteen States. They had
seen, in a variety of instances, assumptions by Congress, not only of
recommendatory, but of operative, powers, warranted, in the public
estimation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent than those by
which their conduct was to be governed. They must have reflected, that in
all great changes of established governments, forms ought to give way to
substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former, would render
nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the people to
"abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their safety and happiness,"(2) since it is impossible for the people
spontaneously and universally to move in concert towards their object; and
it is therefore essential that such changes be instituted by some
INFORMAL AND UNAUTHORIZED PROPOSITIONS, made by some
patriotic and respectable citizen or number of citizens. They must have
recollected that it was by this irregular and assumed privilege of proposing
to the people plans for their safety and happiness, that the States were first
united against the danger with which they were threatened by their ancient
government; that committees and congresses were formed for concentrating
their efforts and defending their rights; and that CONVENTIONS were
ELECTED in THE SEVERAL STATES for establishing the constitutions
under which they are now governed; nor could it have been forgotten that
no little ill-timed scruples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary forms, were
anywhere seen, except in those who wished to indulge, under these masks,
their secret enmity to the substance contended for. They must have borne in
mind, that as the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted TO
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, the disapprobation of this supreme
authority would destroy it forever; its approbation blot out antecedent errors
and irregularities. It might even have occurred to them, that where a
disposition to cavil prevailed, their neglect to execute the degree of power
vested in them, and still more their recommendation of any measure
whatever, not warranted by their commission, would not less excite
animadversion, than a recommendation at once of a measure fully
commensurate to the national exigencies.
Had the convention, under all these impressions, and in the midst of all
these considerations, instead of exercising a manly confidence in their
country, by whose confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished,
and of pointing out a system capable, in their judgment, of securing its
happiness, taken the cold and sullen resolution of disappointing its ardent
hopes, of sacrificing substance to forms, of committing the dearest interests
of their country to the uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events, let me
ask the man who can raise his mind to one elevated conception, who can
awaken in his bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought to have
been pronounced by the impartial world, by the friends of mankind, by
every virtuous citizen, on the conduct and character of this assembly? Or if
there be a man whose propensity to condemn is susceptible of no control,
let me then ask what sentence he has in reserve for the twelve States who
USURPED THE POWER of sending deputies to the convention, a body
utterly unknown to their constitutions; for Congress, who recommended the
appointment of this body, equally unknown to the Confederation; and for
the State of New York, in particular, which first urged and then complied
with this unauthorized interposition?
But that the objectors may be disarmed of every pretext, it shall be
granted for a moment that the convention were neither authorized by their
commission, nor justified by circumstances in proposing a Constitution for
their country: does it follow that the Constitution ought, for that reason
alone, to be rejected? If, according to the noble precept, it be lawful to
accept good advice even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example
of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends? The prudent
inquiry, in all cases, ought surely to be, not so much FROM WHOM the
advice comes, as whether the advice be GOOD.
The sum of what has been here advanced and proved is, that the charge
against the convention of exceeding their powers, except in one instance
little urged by the objectors, has no foundation to support it; that if they had
exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted, but required, as the
confidential servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they
were placed, to exercise the liberty which they assume; and that finally, if
they had violated both their powers and their obligations, in proposing a
Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to
accomplish the views and happiness of the people of America. How far this
character is due to the Constitution, is the subject under investigation.
PUBLIUS
1. Connecticut and Rhode Island.
2. Declaration of Independence.

FEDERALIST No. 41. General View of the
Powers Conferred by The Constitution
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, January 19, 1788
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under
two general points of view. The FIRST relates to the sum or quantity of
power which it vests in the government, including the restraints imposed on
the States. The SECOND, to the particular structure of the government, and
the distribution of this power among its several branches.
Under the FIRST view of the subject, two important questions arise: 1.
Whether any part of the powers transferred to the general government be
unnecessary or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous
to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several States?
Is the aggregate power of the general government greater than ought to
have been vested in it? This is the FIRST question.
It cannot have escaped those who have attended with candor to the
arguments employed against the extensive powers of the government, that
the authors of them have very little considered how far these powers were
necessary means of attaining a necessary end. They have chosen rather to
dwell on the inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all
political advantages; and on the possible abuses which must be incident to
every power or trust, of which a beneficial use can be made. This method of
handling the subject cannot impose on the good sense of the people of
America. It may display the subtlety of the writer; it may open a boundless
field for rhetoric and declamation; it may inflame the passions of the
unthinking, and may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: but cool
and candid people will at once reflect, that the purest of human blessings
must have a portion of alloy in them; that the choice must always be made,
if not of the lesser evil, at least of the GREATER, not the PERFECT, good;
and that in every political institution, a power to advance the public
happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused. They
will see, therefore, that in all cases where power is to be conferred, the point
first to be decided is, whether such a power be necessary to the public good;
as the next will be, in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually
as possible against a perversion of the power to the public detriment.
That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, it will be proper to
review the several powers conferred on the government of the Union; and
that this may be the more conveniently done they may be reduced into
different classes as they relate to the following different objects: 1. Security
against foreign danger; 2. Regulation of the intercourse with foreign
nations; 3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the
States; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of the
States from certain injurious acts; 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to
all these powers.
The powers falling within the FIRST class are those of declaring war and
granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and
calling forth the militia; of levying and borrowing money.
Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil
society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The
powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal
councils.
Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this
question in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a
proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power
in the most ample form.
Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets necessary? This is
involved in the foregoing power. It is involved in the power of self-defense.
But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising
TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in PEACE,
as well as in WAR?
The answer to these questions has been too far anticipated in another
place to admit an extensive discussion of them in this place. The answer
indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such a
discussion in any place. With what color of propriety could the force
necessary for defense be limited by those who cannot limit the force of
offense? If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds to
the exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the
discretion of its own government, and set bounds to the exertions for its
own safety.
How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited,
unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the preparations and
establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be
regulated by the means and the danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever
determined by these rules, and by no others. It is in vain to oppose
constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in
vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of
power, every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied
repetitions. If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for
the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who
may be within the reach of its enterprises to take corresponding precautions.
The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in
the time of peace. They were introduced by Charles VII. of France. All
Europe has followed, or been forced into, the example. Had the example not
been followed by other nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the
chains of a universal monarch. Were every nation except France now to
disband its peace establishments, the same event might follow. The veteran
legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor of all other
nations and rendered her the mistress of the world.
Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to
her military triumphs; and that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever
existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military
establishments. A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time
that it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its
inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. On
any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise
nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly
preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety,
will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger
of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.
The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on the proposed
Constitution. The Union itself, which it cements and secures, destroys every
pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous. America
united, with a handful of troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more
forbidding posture to foreign ambition than America disunited, with a
hundred thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, on a former
occasion, that the want of this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation
in Europe. Being rendered by her insular situation and her maritime
resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors, the rulers of Great
Britain have never been able, by real or artificial dangers, to cheat the
public into an extensive peace establishment. The distance of the United
States from the powerful nations of the world gives them the same happy
security. A dangerous establishment can never be necessary or plausible, so
long as they continue a united people. But let it never, for a moment, be
forgotten that they are indebted for this advantage to the Union alone. The
moment of its dissolution will be the date of a new order of things. The
fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States, or Confederacies,
will set the same example in the New, as Charles VII. did in the Old World.
The example will be followed here from the same motives which produced
universal imitation there. Instead of deriving from our situation the precious
advantage which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of America
will be but a copy of that of the continent of Europe. It will present liberty
everywhere crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The
fortunes of disunited America will be even more disastrous than those of
Europe. The sources of evil in the latter are confined to her own limits. No
superior powers of another quarter of the globe intrigue among her rival
nations, inflame their mutual animosities, and render them the instruments
of foreign ambition, jealousy, and revenge. In America the miseries
springing from her internal jealousies, contentions, and wars, would form a
part only of her lot. A plentiful addition of evils would have their source in
that relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and which
no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe.
This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly
colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, every man who
loves his country, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it ever before
his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a due attachment to the Union of
America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it.
Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the best possible
precaution against danger from standing armies is a limitation of the term
for which revenue may be appropriated to their support. This precaution the
Constitution has prudently added. I will not repeat here the observations
which I flatter myself have placed this subject in a just and satisfactory
light. But it may not be improper to take notice of an argument against this
part of the Constitution, which has been drawn from the policy and practice
of Great Britain. It is said that the continuance of an army in that kingdom
requires an annual vote of the legislature; whereas the American
Constitution has lengthened this critical period to two years. This is the
form in which the comparison is usually stated to the public: but is it a just
form? Is it a fair comparison? Does the British Constitution restrain the
parliamentary discretion to one year? Does the American impose on the
Congress appropriations for two years? On the contrary, it cannot be
unknown to the authors of the fallacy themselves, that the British
Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion of the legislature, and
that the American ties down the legislature to two years, as the longest
admissible term.
Had the argument from the British example been truly stated, it would
have stood thus: The term for which supplies may be appropriated to the
army establishment, though unlimited by the British Constitution, has
nevertheless, in practice, been limited by parliamentary discretion to a
single year. Now, if in Great Britain, where the House of Commons is
elected for seven years; where so great a proportion of the members are
elected by so small a proportion of the people; where the electors are so
corrupted by the representatives, and the representatives so corrupted by the
Crown, the representative body can possess a power to make appropriations
to the army for an indefinite term, without desiring, or without daring, to
extend the term beyond a single year, ought not suspicion herself to blush,
in pretending that the representatives of the United States, elected FREELY
by the WHOLE BODY of the people, every SECOND YEAR, cannot be
safely intrusted with the discretion over such appropriations, expressly
limited to the short period of TWO YEARS?
A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this truth, the management
of the opposition to the federal government is an unvaried exemplification.
But among all the blunders which have been committed, none is more
striking than the attempt to enlist on that side the prudent jealousy
entertained by the people, of standing armies. The attempt has awakened
fully the public attention to that important subject; and has led to
investigations which must terminate in a thorough and universal conviction,
not only that the constitution has provided the most effectual guards against
danger from that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution fully
adequate to the national defense and the preservation of the Union, can save
America from as many standing armies as it may be split into States or
Confederacies, and from such a progressive augmentation, of these
establishments in each, as will render them as burdensome to the properties
and ominous to the liberties of the people, as any establishment that can
become necessary, under a united and efficient government, must be
tolerable to the former and safe to the latter.
The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy has
protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure, which has
spared few other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered among the greatest
blessings of America, that as her Union will be the only source of her
maritime strength, so this will be a principal source of her security against
danger from abroad. In this respect our situation bears another likeness to
the insular advantage of Great Britain. The batteries most capable of
repelling foreign enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can never be
turned by a perfidious government against our liberties.
The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply interested
in this provision for naval protection, and if they have hitherto been
suffered to sleep quietly in their beds; if their property has remained safe
against the predatory spirit of licentious adventurers; if their maritime
towns have not yet been compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors
of a conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden
invaders, these instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed to the
capacity of the existing government for the protection of those from whom
it claims allegiance, but to causes that are fugitive and fallacious. If we
except perhaps Virginia and Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on
their eastern frontiers, no part of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on
this subject than New York. Her seacoast is extensive. A very important
district of the State is an island. The State itself is penetrated by a large
navigable river for more than fifty leagues. The great emporium of its
commerce, the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy
of events, and may almost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious
compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the
rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of
the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions
attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and
depredations, not only on that element, but every part of the other bordering
on it, will be truly miraculous. In the present condition of America, the
States more immediately exposed to these calamities have nothing to hope
from the phantom of a general government which now exists; and if their
single resources were equal to the task of fortifying themselves against the
danger, the object to be protected would be almost consumed by the means
of protecting them.
The power of regulating and calling forth the militia has been already
sufficiently vindicated and explained.
The power of levying and borrowing money, being the sinew of that
which is to be exerted in the national defense, is properly thrown into the
same class with it. This power, also, has been examined already with much
attention, and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be necessary, both in the
extent and form given to it by the Constitution. I will address one additional
reflection only to those who contend that the power ought to have been
restrained to external—taxation by which they mean, taxes on articles
imported from other countries. It cannot be doubted that this will always be
a valuable source of revenue; that for a considerable time it must be a
principal source; that at this moment it is an essential one. But we may form
very mistaken ideas on this subject, if we do not call to mind in our
calculations, that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign commerce must
vary with the variations, both in the extent and the kind of imports; and that
these variations do not correspond with the progress of population, which
must be the general measure of the public wants. As long as agriculture
continues the sole field of labor, the importation of manufactures must
increase as the consumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures are
begun by the hands not called for by agriculture, the imported manufactures
will decrease as the numbers of people increase. In a more remote stage, the
imports may consist in a considerable part of raw materials, which will be
wrought into articles for exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the
encouragement of bounties, than to be loaded with discouraging duties. A
system of government, meant for duration, ought to contemplate these
revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to them.
Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation, have
grounded a very fierce attack against the Constitution, on the language in
which it is defined. It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for
the common defense and general welfare of the United States," amounts to
an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to
be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof
could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for
objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction.
Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress
been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the
authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would
have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an
authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom
of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or
the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms
"to raise money for the general welfare."
But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects
alluded to by these general terms immediately follows, and is not even
separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the
same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part
which will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded
altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and
indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise
expressions be denied any signification whatsoever? For what purpose
could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all
others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing
is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to
explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an
enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general
meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an
absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on
the authors of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must
take the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter.
The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the
language used by the convention is a copy from the articles of
Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States, as described in
article third, are "their common defense, security of their liberties, and
mutual and general welfare." The terms of article eighth are still more
identical: "All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred
for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United
States in Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury," etc. A
similar language again occurs in article ninth. Construe either of these
articles by the rules which would justify the construction put on the new
Constitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate in
all cases whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that assembly,
if, attaching themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the
specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an
unlimited power of providing for the common defense and general welfare?
I appeal to the objectors themselves, whether they would in that case have
employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now make
use of against the convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own
condemnation!
PUBLIUS
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MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE SECOND class of powers, lodged in the general government,
consists of those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, to wit:
to make treaties; to send and receive ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, and offenses against the law of nations; to regulate foreign
commerce, including a power to prohibit, after the year 1808, the
importation of slaves, and to lay an intermediate duty of ten dollars per
head, as a discouragement to such importations.
This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of the federal
administration. If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to
be in respect to other nations.
The powers to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors, speak
their own propriety. Both of them are comprised in the articles of
Confederation, with this difference only, that the former is disembarrassed,
by the plan of the convention, of an exception, under which treaties might
be substantially frustrated by regulations of the States; and that a power of
appointing and receiving "other public ministers and consuls," is expressly
and very properly added to the former provision concerning ambassadors.
The term ambassador, if taken strictly, as seems to be required by the
second of the articles of Confederation, comprehends the highest grade only
of public ministers, and excludes the grades which the United States will be
most likely to prefer, where foreign embassies may be necessary. And under
no latitude of construction will the term comprehend consuls. Yet it has
been found expedient, and has been the practice of Congress, to employ the
inferior grades of public ministers, and to send and receive consuls.
It is true, that where treaties of commerce stipulate for the mutual
appointment of consuls, whose functions are connected with commerce, the
admission of foreign consuls may fall within the power of making
commercial treaties; and that where no such treaties exist, the mission of
American consuls into foreign countries may PERHAPS be covered under
the authority, given by the ninth article of the Confederation, to appoint all
such civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of
the United States. But the admission of consuls into the United States,
where no previous treaty has stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere
provided for. A supply of the omission is one of the lesser instances in
which the convention have improved on the model before them. But the
most minute provisions become important when they tend to obviate the
necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved usurpations of power. A
list of the cases in which Congress have been betrayed, or forced by the
defects of the Confederation, into violations of their chartered authorities,
would not a little surprise those who have paid no attention to the subject;
and would be no inconsiderable argument in favor of the new Constitution,
which seems to have provided no less studiously for the lesser, than the
more obvious and striking defects of the old.
The power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, and offenses against the law of nations, belongs with equal
propriety to the general government, and is a still greater improvement on
the articles of Confederation. These articles contain no provision for the
case of offenses against the law of nations; and consequently leave it in the
power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign
nations. The provision of the federal articles on the subject of piracies and
felonies extends no further than to the establishment of courts for the trial of
these offenses. The definition of piracies might, perhaps, without
inconveniency, be left to the law of nations; though a legislative definition
of them is found in most municipal codes. A definition of felonies on the
high seas is evidently requisite. Felony is a term of loose signification, even
in the common law of England; and of various import in the statute law of
that kingdom. But neither the common nor the statute law of that, or of any
other nation, ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this, unless
previously made its own by legislative adoption. The meaning of the term,
as defined in the codes of the several States, would be as impracticable as
the former would be a dishonorable and illegitimate guide. It is not
precisely the same in any two of the States; and varies in each with every
revision of its criminal laws. For the sake of certainty and uniformity,
therefore, the power of defining felonies in this case was in every respect
necessary and proper.
The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen within several views
which have been taken of this subject, has been too fully discussed to need
additional proofs here of its being properly submitted to the federal
administration.
It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the
importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather
that it had been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not difficult
to account, either for this restriction on the general government, or for the
manner in which the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as
a great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may
terminate forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so
loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; that within that period, it
will receive a considerable discouragement from the federal government,
and may be totally abolished, by a concurrence of the few States which
continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has been
given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy would it be for the
unfortunate Africans, if an equal prospect lay before them of being
redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren!
Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against
the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an
illicit practice, and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and
beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I mention these
misconstructions, not with a view to give them an answer, for they deserve
none, but as specimens of the manner and spirit in which some have
thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed government.
The powers included in the THIRD class are those which provide for the
harmony and proper intercourse among the States.
Under this head might be included the particular restraints imposed on
the authority of the States, and certain powers of the judicial department;
but the former are reserved for a distinct class, and the latter will be
particularly examined when we arrive at the structure and organization of
the government. I shall confine myself to a cursory review of the remaining
powers comprehended under this third description, to wit: to regulate
commerce among the several States and the Indian tribes; to coin money,
regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin; to provide for the
punishment of counterfeiting the current coin and securities of the United
States; to fix the standard of weights and measures; to establish a uniform
rule of naturalization, and uniform laws of bankruptcy, to prescribe the
manner in which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each
State shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other States; and to
establish post offices and post roads.
The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the
commerce between its several members, is in the number of those which
have been clearly pointed out by experience. To the proofs and remarks
which former papers have brought into view on this subject, it may be
added that without this supplemental provision, the great and essential
power of regulating foreign commerce would have been incomplete and
ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the relief of the States
which import and export through other States, from the improper
contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate
the trade between State and State, it must be foreseen that ways would be
found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage
through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the
latter and the consumers of the former. We may be assured by past
experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances;
and both by that and a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would
nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious
interruptions of the public tranquillity. To those who do not view the
question through the medium of passion or of interest, the desire of the
commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their
uncommercial neighbors, must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair;
since it would stimulate the injured party, by resentment as well as interest,
to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign trade. But the mild
voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is
but too often drowned, before public bodies as well as individuals, by the
clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain.
The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of
confederated States, has been illustrated by other examples as well as our
own. In Switzerland, where the Union is so very slight, each canton is
obliged to allow to merchandises a passage through its jurisdiction into
other cantons, without an augmentation of the tolls. In Germany it is a law
of the empire, that the princes and states shall not lay tolls or customs on
bridges, rivers, or passages, without the consent of the emperor and the diet;
though it appears from a quotation in an antecedent paper, that the practice
in this, as in many other instances in that confederacy, has not followed the
law, and has produced there the mischiefs which have been foreseen here.
Among the restraints imposed by the Union of the Netherlands on its
members, one is, that they shall not establish imposts disadvantageous to
their neighbors, without the general permission.
The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly
unfettered from two limitations in the articles of Confederation, which
render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is there
restrained to Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not to violate
or infringe the legislative right of any State within its own limits. What
description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is not yet
settled, and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the
federal councils. And how the trade with Indians, though not members of a
State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an
external authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights of
legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is not the only case in
which the articles of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored to
accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union,
with complete sovereignty in the States; to subvert a mathematical axiom,
by taking away a part, and letting the whole remain.
All that need be remarked on the power to coin money, regulate the value
thereof, and of foreign coin, is, that by providing for this last case, the
Constitution has supplied a material omission in the articles of
Confederation. The authority of the existing Congress is restrained to the
regulation of coin STRUCK by their own authority, or that of the respective
States. It must be seen at once that the proposed uniformity in the VALUE
of the current coin might be destroyed by subjecting that of foreign coin to
the different regulations of the different States.
The punishment of counterfeiting the public securities, as well as the
current coin, is submitted of course to that authority which is to secure the
value of both.
The regulation of weights and measures is transferred from the articles of
Confederation, and is founded on like considerations with the preceding
power of regulating coin.
The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has long been remarked as
a fault in our system, and as laying a foundation for intricate and delicate
questions. In the fourth article of the Confederation, it is declared "that the
FREE INHABITANTS of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and
fugitives from justice, excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of FREE CITIZENS in the several States; and THE PEOPLE of
each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and
commerce," etc. There is a confusion of language here, which is
remarkable. Why the terms FREE INHABITANTS are used in one part of
the article, FREE CITIZENS in another, and PEOPLE in another; or what
was meant by superadding to "all privileges and immunities of free
citizens," "all the privileges of trade and commerce," cannot easily be
determined. It seems to be a construction scarcely avoidable, however, that
those who come under the denomination of FREE INHABITANTS of a
State, although not citizens of such State, are entitled, in every other State,
to all the privileges of FREE CITIZENS of the latter; that is, to greater
privileges than they may be entitled to in their own State: so that it may be
in the power of a particular State, or rather every State is laid under a
necessity, not only to confer the rights of citizenship in other States upon
any whom it may admit to such rights within itself, but upon any whom it
may allow to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction. But were an
exposition of the term "inhabitants" to be admitted which would confine the
stipulated privileges to citizens alone, the difficulty is diminished only, not
removed. The very improper power would still be retained by each State, of
naturalizing aliens in every other State. In one State, residence for a short
term confirms all the rights of citizenship: in another, qualifications of
greater importance are required. An alien, therefore, legally incapacitated
for certain rights in the latter, may, by previous residence only in the former,
elude his incapacity; and thus the law of one State be preposterously
rendered paramount to the law of another, within the jurisdiction of the
other. We owe it to mere casualty, that very serious embarrassments on this
subject have been hitherto escaped. By the laws of several States, certain
descriptions of aliens, who had rendered themselves obnoxious, were laid
under interdicts inconsistent not only with the rights of citizenship but with
the privilege of residence. What would have been the consequence, if such
persons, by residence or otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens
under the laws of another State, and then asserted their rights as such, both
to residence and citizenship, within the State proscribing them? Whatever
the legal consequences might have been, other consequences would
probably have resulted, of too serious a nature not to be provided against.
The new Constitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision
against them, and all others proceeding from the defect of the
Confederation on this head, by authorizing the general government to
establish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States.
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately
connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many
frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into
different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into
question.
The power of prescribing by general laws, the manner in which the
public acts, records and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved,
and the effect they shall have in other States, is an evident and valuable
improvement on the clause relating to this subject in the articles of
Confederation. The meaning of the latter is extremely indeterminate, and
can be of little importance under any interpretation which it will bear. The
power here established may be rendered a very convenient instrument of
justice, and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States,
where the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated,
in any stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction.
The power of establishing post roads must, in every view, be a harmless
power, and may, perhaps, by judicious management, become productive of
great public conveniency. Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse
between the States can be deemed unworthy of the public care.
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MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE FOURTH class comprises the following miscellaneous powers:
1. A power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries."
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of
authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of
common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to
belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with
the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual
provisions for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the
decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.
2. "To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such
district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular
States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government
of the United States; and to exercise like authority over all places purchased
by the consent of the legislatures of the States in which the same shall be,
for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful
buildings."
The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of
government, carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by
every legislature of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its
general supremacy. Without it, not only the public authority might be
insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity; but a dependence of
the members of the general government on the State comprehending the
seat of the government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might
bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally
dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other members of
the Confederacy. This consideration has the more weight, as the gradual
accumulation of public improvements at the stationary residence of the
government would be both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands
of a single State, and would create so many obstacles to a removal of the
government, as still further to abridge its necessary independence. The
extent of this federal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every
jealousy of an opposite nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use
with the consent of the State ceding it; as the State will no doubt provide in
the compact for the rights and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it; as
the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to become
willing parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in the
election of the government which is to exercise authority over them; as a
municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages,
will of course be allowed them; and as the authority of the legislature of the
State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it, to concur in the cession,
will be derived from the whole people of the State in their adoption of the
Constitution, every imaginable objection seems to be obviated.
The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines, etc., established
by the general government, is not less evident. The public money expended
on such places, and the public property deposited in them, requires that they
should be exempt from the authority of the particular State. Nor would it be
proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend,
to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections
and scruples are here also obviated, by requiring the concurrence of the
States concerned, in every such establishment.
3. "To declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall
work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person
attained."
As treason may be committed against the United States, the authority of
the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled and
artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent factions, the
natural offspring of free government, have usually wreaked their alternate
malignity on each other, the convention have, with great judgment, opposed
a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional definition of
the crime, fixing the proof necessary for conviction of it, and restraining the
Congress, even in punishing it, from extending the consequences of guilt
beyond the person of its author.
4. "To admit new States into the Union; but no new State shall be formed
or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed
by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent
of the legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress."
In the articles of Confederation, no provision is found on this important
subject. Canada was to be admitted of right, on her joining in the measures
of the United States; and the other COLONIES, by which were evidently
meant the other British colonies, at the discretion of nine States. The
eventual establishment of NEW STATES seems to have been overlooked by
the compilers of that instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of this
omission, and the assumption of power into which Congress have been led
by it. With great propriety, therefore, has the new system supplied the
defect. The general precaution, that no new States shall be formed, without
the concurrence of the federal authority, and that of the States concerned, is
consonant to the principles which ought to govern such transactions. The
particular precaution against the erection of new States, by the partition of a
State without its consent, quiets the jealousy of the larger States; as that of
the smaller is quieted by a like precaution, against a junction of States
without their consent.
5. "To dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the United States," with a
proviso, that "nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as to
prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State."
This is a power of very great importance, and required by considerations
similar to those which show the propriety of the former. The proviso
annexed is proper in itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necessary
by jealousies and questions concerning the Western territory sufficiently
known to the public.
6. "To guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of
government; to protect each of them against invasion; and on application of
the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be
convened), against domestic violence."
In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of
republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to
possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial
innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the
greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other;
and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the
compact was entered into should be SUBSTANTIALLY maintained. But a
right implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy be deposited, than
where it is deposited by the Constitution? Governments of dissimilar
principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of
any sort, than those of a kindred nature. "As the confederate republic of
Germany," says Montesquieu, "consists of free cities and petty states,
subject to different princes, experience shows us that it is more imperfect
than that of Holland and Switzerland." "Greece was undone," he adds, "as
soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons." In
the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the
monarchical form, of the new confederate, had its share of influence on the
events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a
precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the
State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These
questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general
government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a
harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what
experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the
ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign
powers? To the second question it may be answered, that if the general
government should interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it
will be, of course, bound to pursue the authority. But the authority extends
no further than to a GUARANTY of a republican form of government,
which supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to be
guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are
continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution.
Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they
have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The
only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican
for antirepublican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will
hardly be considered as a grievance.
A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts
composing it. The latitude of the expression here used seems to secure each
State, not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vindictive
enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The history, both of ancient and
modern confederacies, proves that the weaker members of the union ought
not to be insensible to the policy of this article.
Protection against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has
been remarked, that even among the Swiss cantons, which, properly
speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this object;
and the history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently
claimed and afforded; and as well by the most democratic, as the other
cantons. A recent and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to
be prepared for emergencies of a like nature.
At first view, it might seem not to square with the republican theory, to
suppose, either that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will
have the force, to subvert a government; and consequently, that the federal
interposition can never be required, but when it would be improper. But
theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the
lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of
violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State
as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if the
authority of the State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local
magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the former, to support the
State authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State constitutions
which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow
cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other.
Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the
number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of
government. It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be
repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left
to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a
right to interpose, will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it.
Is it true that force and right are necessarily on the same side in
republican governments? May not the minor party possess such a
superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of
secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an
appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position
turn the scale on the same side, against a superior number so situated as to
be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its strength? Nothing
can be more chimerical than to imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory
may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants,
or which determine the event of an election! May it not happen, in fine, that
the minority of CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS, by the
accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of
those whom the constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of
suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in
some of the States, who, during the calm of regular government, are sunk
below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil
violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a superiority of
strength to any party with which they may associate themselves.
In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better
umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and
tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States, not
heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges, they would unite
the affection of friends. Happy would it be if such a remedy for its
infirmities could be enjoyed by all free governments; if a project equally
effectual could be established for the universal peace of mankind!
Should it be asked, what is to be the redress for an insurrection pervading
all the States, and comprising a superiority of the entire force, though not a
constitutional right? the answer must be, that such a case, as it would be
without the compass of human remedies, so it is fortunately not within the
compass of human probability; and that it is a sufficient recommendation of
the federal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity for which
no possible constitution can provide a cure.
Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated by
Montesquieu, an important one is, "that should a popular insurrection
happen in one of the States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses
creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound."
7. "To consider all debts contracted, and engagements entered into,
before the adoption of this Constitution, as being no less valid against the
United States, under this Constitution, than under the Confederation."
This can only be considered as a declaratory proposition; and may have
been inserted, among other reasons, for the satisfaction of the foreign
creditors of the United States, who cannot be strangers to the pretended
doctrine, that a change in the political form of civil society has the magical
effect of dissolving its moral obligations.
Among the lesser criticisms which have been exercised on the
Constitution, it has been remarked that the validity of engagements ought to
have been asserted in favor of the United States, as well as against them;
and in the spirit which usually characterizes little critics, the omission has
been transformed and magnified into a plot against the national rights. The
authors of this discovery may be told, what few others need to be informed
of, that as engagements are in their nature reciprocal, an assertion of their
validity on one side, necessarily involves a validity on the other side; and
that as the article is merely declaratory, the establishment of the principle in
one case is sufficient for every case. They may be further told, that every
constitution must limit its precautions to dangers that are not altogether
imaginary; and that no real danger can exist that the government would
DARE, with, or even without, this constitutional declaration before it, to
remit the debts justly due to the public, on the pretext here condemned.
8. "To provide for amendments to be ratified by three fourths of the
States under two exceptions only."
That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could not but be
foreseen. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing them
should be provided. The mode preferred by the convention seems to be
stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against that
extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that
extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It,
moreover, equally enables the general and the State governments to
originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the
experience on one side, or on the other. The exception in favor of the
equality of suffrage in the Senate, was probably meant as a palladium to the
residuary sovereignty of the States, implied and secured by that principle of
representation in one branch of the legislature; and was probably insisted on
by the States particularly attached to that equality. The other exception must
have been admitted on the same considerations which produced the
privilege defended by it.
9. "The ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient
for the establishment of this Constitution between the States, ratifying the
same."
This article speaks for itself. The express authority of the people alone
could give due validity to the Constitution. To have required the unanimous
ratification of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essential
interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single member. It
would have marked a want of foresight in the convention, which our own
experience would have rendered inexcusable.
Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves on this
occasion: 1. On what principle the Confederation, which stands in the
solemn form of a compact among the States, can be superseded without the
unanimous consent of the parties to it? 2. What relation is to subsist
between the nine or more States ratifying the Constitution, and the
remaining few who do not become parties to it?
The first question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute
necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the
transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the
safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political
institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed.
PERHAPS, also, an answer may be found without searching beyond the
principles of the compact itself. It has been heretofore noted among the
defects of the Confederation, that in many of the States it had received no
higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification. The principle of
reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other States should
be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent
sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of legislative authority, can pretend to
no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an
established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the articles are
mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one article is a
breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, committed by either of the
parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to
pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary
to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the
consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact, will not the
complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the MULTIPLIED and
IMPORTANT infractions with which they may be confronted? The time has
been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph
exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same
motives dictate.
The second question is not less delicate; and the flattering prospect of its
being merely hypothetical forbids an overcurious discussion of it. It is one
of those cases which must be left to provide for itself. In general, it may be
observed, that although no political relation can subsist between the
assenting and dissenting States, yet the moral relations will remain
uncancelled. The claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will
be in force, and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity must in all cases be
duly and mutually respected; whilst considerations of a common interest,
and, above all, the remembrance of the endearing scenes which are past,
and the anticipation of a speedy triumph over the obstacles to reunion, will,




FEDERALIST No. 44. Restrictions on the
Authority of the Several States
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MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
A FIFTH class of provisions in favor of the federal authority consists of
the following restrictions on the authority of the several States:
1. "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant
letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any
thing but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of
attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or
grant any title of nobility."
The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations makes a
part of the existing articles of Union; and for reasons which need no
explanation, is copied into the new Constitution. The prohibition of letters
of marque is another part of the old system, but is somewhat extended in the
new. According to the former, letters of marque could be granted by the
States after a declaration of war; according to the latter, these licenses must
be obtained, as well during war as previous to its declaration, from the
government of the United States. This alteration is fully justified by the
advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers; and of
immediate responsibility to the nation in all those for whose conduct the
nation itself is to be responsible.
The right of coining money, which is here taken from the States, was left
in their hands by the Confederation, as a concurrent right with that of
Congress, under an exception in favor of the exclusive right of Congress to
regulate the alloy and value. In this instance, also, the new provision is an
improvement on the old. Whilst the alloy and value depended on the
general authority, a right of coinage in the particular States could have no
other effect than to multiply expensive mints and diversify the forms and
weights of the circulating pieces. The latter inconveniency defeats one
purpose for which the power was originally submitted to the federal head;
and as far as the former might prevent an inconvenient remittance of gold
and silver to the central mint for recoinage, the end can be as well attained
by local mints established under the general authority.
The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit must give pleasure to
every citizen, in proportion to his love of justice and his knowledge of the
true springs of public prosperity. The loss which America has sustained
since the peace, from the pestilent effects of paper money on the necessary
confidence between man and man, on the necessary confidence in the
public councils, on the industry and morals of the people, and on the
character of republican government, constitutes an enormous debt against
the States chargeable with this unadvised measure, which must long remain
unsatisfied; or rather an accumulation of guilt, which can be expiated no
otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice, of the power
which has been the instrument of it. In addition to these persuasive
considerations, it may be observed, that the same reasons which show the
necessity of denying to the States the power of regulating coin, prove with
equal force that they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper medium
in the place of coin. Had every State a right to regulate the value of its coin,
there might be as many different currencies as States, and thus the
intercourse among them would be impeded; retrospective alterations in its
value might be made, and thus the citizens of other States be injured, and
animosities be kindled among the States themselves. The subjects of foreign
powers might suffer from the same cause, and hence the Union be
discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member. No one of
these mischiefs is less incident to a power in the States to emit paper
money, than to coin gold or silver. The power to make any thing but gold
and silver a tender in payment of debts, is withdrawn from the States, on the
same principle with that of issuing a paper currency.
Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of
contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to
every principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly
prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the State constitutions,
and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental
charters. Our own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional
fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly,
therefore, have the convention added this constitutional bulwark in favor of
personal security and private rights; and I am much deceived if they have
not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the
undoubted interests of their constituents. The sober people of America are
weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils. They
have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative
interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of
enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more-industrious
and less-informed part of the community. They have seen, too, that one
legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain of repetitions,
every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of the
preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is
wanting, which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a
general prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the business of
society. The prohibition with respect to titles of nobility is copied from the
articles of Confederation and needs no comment.
2. "No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts
or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing its inspection laws, and the net produce of all duties and
imposts laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the
treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the
revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of
Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of
peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a
foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent danger as will not admit of delay."
The restraint on the power of the States over imports and exports is
enforced by all the arguments which prove the necessity of submitting the
regulation of trade to the federal councils. It is needless, therefore, to
remark further on this head, than that the manner in which the restraint is
qualified seems well calculated at once to secure to the States a reasonable
discretion in providing for the conveniency of their imports and exports,
and to the United States a reasonable check against the abuse of this
discretion. The remaining particulars of this clause fall within reasonings
which are either so obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may
be passed over without remark.
The SIXTH and last class consists of the several powers and provisions
by which efficacy is given to all the rest.
1. Of these the first is, the "power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and
all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof."
Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more intemperance
than this; yet on a fair investigation of it, no part can appear more
completely invulnerable. Without the SUBSTANCE of this power, the
whole Constitution would be a dead letter. Those who object to the article,
therefore, as a part of the Constitution, can only mean that the FORM of the
provision is improper. But have they considered whether a better form
could have been substituted?
There are four other possible methods which the Constitution might have
taken on this subject. They might have copied the second article of the
existing Confederation, which would have prohibited the exercise of any
power not EXPRESSLY delegated; they might have attempted a positive
enumeration of the powers comprehended under the general terms
"necessary and proper"; they might have attempted a negative enumeration
of them, by specifying the powers excepted from the general definition;
they might have been altogether silent on the subject, leaving these
necessary and proper powers to construction and inference.
Had the convention taken the first method of adopting the second article
of Confederation, it is evident that the new Congress would be continually
exposed, as their predecessors have been, to the alternative of construing
the term "EXPRESSLY" with so much rigor, as to disarm the government
of all real authority whatever, or with so much latitude as to destroy
altogether the force of the restriction. It would be easy to show, if it were
necessary, that no important power, delegated by the articles of
Confederation, has been or can be executed by Congress, without recurring
more or less to the doctrine of CONSTRUCTION or IMPLICATION. As
the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive, the
government which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed
with the alternative of betraying the public interests by doing nothing, or of
violating the Constitution by exercising powers indispensably necessary
and proper, but, at the same time, not EXPRESSLY granted.
Had the convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers
necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt
would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which
the Constitution relates; accommodated too, not only to the existing state of
things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce; for in
every new application of a general power, the PARTICULAR POWERS,
which are the means of attaining the OBJECT of the general power, must
always necessarily vary with that object, and be often properly varied whilst
the object remains the same.
Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not
necessary or proper for carrying the general powers into execution, the task
would have been no less chimerical; and would have been liable to this
further objection, that every defect in the enumeration would have been
equivalent to a positive grant of authority. If, to avoid this consequence,
they had attempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions, and described
the residue by the general terms, NOT NECESSARY OR PROPER, it must
have happened that the enumeration would comprehend a few of the
excepted powers only; that these would be such as would be least likely to
be assumed or tolerated, because the enumeration would of course select
such as would be least necessary or proper; and that the unnecessary and
improper powers included in the residuum, would be less forcibly excepted,
than if no partial enumeration had been made.
Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that
all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the general powers
would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication. No
axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever
the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to
do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is
included. Had this last method, therefore, been pursued by the convention,
every objection now urged against their plan would remain in all its
plausibility; and the real inconveniency would be incurred of not removing
a pretext which may be seized on critical occasions for drawing into
question the essential powers of the Union.
If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall
misconstrue this part of the Constitution, and exercise powers not warranted
by its true meaning, I answer, the same as if they should misconstrue or
enlarge any other power vested in them; as if the general power had been
reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to be violated; the same,
in short, as if the State legislatures should violate the irrespective
constitutional authorities. In the first instance, the success of the usurpation
will depend on the executive and judiciary departments, which are to
expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last resort a
remedy must be obtained from the people who can, by the election of more
faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is, that this
ultimate redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of
the federal than of the State legislatures, for this plain reason, that as every
such act of the former will be an invasion of the rights of the latter, these
will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to sound the alarm to the people,
and to exert their local influence in effecting a change of federal
representatives. There being no such intermediate body between the State
legislatures and the people interested in watching the conduct of the former,
violations of the State constitutions are more likely to remain unnoticed and
unredressed.
2. "This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
The indiscreet zeal of the adversaries to the Constitution has betrayed
them into an attack on this part of it also, without which it would have been
evidently and radically defective. To be fully sensible of this, we need only
suppose for a moment that the supremacy of the State constitutions had
been left complete by a saving clause in their favor.
In the first place, as these constitutions invest the State legislatures with
absolute sovereignty, in all cases not excepted by the existing articles of
Confederation, all the authorities contained in the proposed Constitution, so
far as they exceed those enumerated in the Confederation, would have been
annulled, and the new Congress would have been reduced to the same
impotent condition with their predecessors.
In the next place, as the constitutions of some of the States do not even
expressly and fully recognize the existing powers of the Confederacy, an
express saving of the supremacy of the former would, in such States, have
brought into question every power contained in the proposed Constitution.
In the third place, as the constitutions of the States differ much from each
other, it might happen that a treaty or national law, of great and equal
importance to the States, would interfere with some and not with other
constitutions, and would consequently be valid in some of the States, at the
same time that it would have no effect in others.
In fine, the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of
government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all
government; it would have seen the authority of the whole society every
where subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a
monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members.
3. "The Senators and Representatives, and the members of the several
State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United
States and the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to
support this Constitution."
It has been asked why it was thought necessary, that the State magistracy
should be bound to support the federal Constitution, and unnecessary that a
like oath should be imposed on the officers of the United States, in favor of
the State constitutions.
Several reasons might be assigned for the distinction. I content myself
with one, which is obvious and conclusive. The members of the federal
government will have no agency in carrying the State constitutions into
effect. The members and officers of the State governments, on the contrary,
will have an essential agency in giving effect to the federal Constitution.
The election of the President and Senate will depend, in all cases, on the
legislatures of the several States. And the election of the House of
Representatives will equally depend on the same authority in the first
instance; and will, probably, forever be conducted by the officers, and
according to the laws, of the States.
4. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the federal powers might
be added those which belong to the executive and judiciary departments:
but as these are reserved for particular examination in another place, I pass
them over in this.
We have now reviewed, in detail, all the articles composing the sum or
quantity of power delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government, and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no part of
the power is unnecessary or improper for accomplishing the necessary
objects of the Union. The question, therefore, whether this amount of power
shall be granted or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or not
a government commensurate to the exigencies of the Union shall be
established; or, in other words, whether the Union itself shall be preserved.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 45. The Alleged Danger From
the Powers of the Union to the State
Governments.
Considered For the Independent Journal. Saturday, January
26, 1788
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal
government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered
is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of
authority left in the several States.
The adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of considering in
the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the
purposes of the federal government, have exhausted themselves in a
secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of
power to the governments of the particular States. But if the Union, as has
been shown, be essential to the security of the people of America against
foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against contentions and
wars among the different States; if it be essential to guard them against
those violent and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of
liberty, and against those military establishments which must gradually
poison its very fountain; if, in a word, the Union be essential to the
happiness of the people of America, is it not preposterous, to urge as an
objection to a government, without which the objects of the Union cannot
be attained, that such a government may derogate from the importance of
the governments of the individual States? Was, then, the American
Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the
precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions
lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and
safety, but that the government of the individual States, that particular
municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be
arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard
of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for
kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the
New, in another shape that the solid happiness of the people is to be
sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is too
early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the
real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be
pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value than
as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were the plan of the
convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, Reject the
plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, it would
be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of the States
cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good
citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the
sacrifice is necessary, has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue
will be endangered, is the question before us.
Several important considerations have been touched in the course of
these papers, which discountenance the supposition that the operation of the
federal government will by degrees prove fatal to the State governments.
The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am persuaded that the
balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the
last than of the first scale.
We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies,
the strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the members, to
despoil the general government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual
capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroachments. Although,
in most of these examples, the system has been so dissimilar from that
under consideration as greatly to weaken any inference concerning the latter
from the fate of the former, yet, as the States will retain, under the proposed
Constitution, a very extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference
ought not to be wholly disregarded. In the Achaean league it is probable
that the federal head had a degree and species of power, which gave it a
considerable likeness to the government framed by the convention. The
Lycian Confederacy, as far as its principles and form are transmitted, must
have borne a still greater analogy to it. Yet history does not inform us that
either of them ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one
consolidated government. On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of
them proceeded from the incapacity of the federal authority to prevent the
dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities. These
cases are the more worthy of our attention, as the external causes by which
the component parts were pressed together were much more numerous and
powerful than in our case; and consequently less powerful ligaments within
would be sufficient to bind the members to the head, and to each other.
In the feudal system, we have seen a similar propensity exemplified.
Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in every instance between the
local sovereigns and the people, and the sympathy in some instances
between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that the
local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments. Had no
external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination, and
particularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the people,
the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of as many
independent princes as there were formerly feudatory barons.
The State governments will have the advantage of the Federal
government, whether we compare them in respect to the immediate
dependence of the one on the other; to the weight of personal influence
which each side will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them; to
the predilection and probable support of the people; to the disposition and
faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other.
The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts
of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the
operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the
State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all.
They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will,
perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate will be
elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures. Even the House
of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will be
chosen very much under the influence of that class of men, whose influence
over the people obtains for themselves an election into the State
legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the federal government
will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State governments,
and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to
beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them. On
the other side, the component parts of the State governments will in no
instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the
federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its
members.
The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the
United States will be much smaller than the number employed under the
particular States. There will consequently be less of personal influence on
the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative,
executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the
justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all
the county, corporation, and town officers, for three millions and more of
people, intermixed, and having particular acquaintance with every class and
circle of people, must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and
influence, those of every description who will be employed in the
administration of the federal system. Compare the members of the three
great departments of the thirteen States, excluding from the judiciary
department the justices of peace, with the members of the corresponding
departments of the single government of the Union; compare the militia
officers of three millions of people with the military and marine officers of
any establishment which is within the compass of probability, or, I may add,
of possibility, and in this view alone, we may pronounce the advantage of
the States to be decisive. If the federal government is to have collectors of
revenue, the State governments will have theirs also. And as those of the
former will be principally on the seacoast, and not very numerous, whilst
those of the latter will be spread over the face of the country, and will be
very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the same side. It is
true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of
collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the States; but it is
probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental
purposes of revenue; that an option will then be given to the States to
supply their quotas by previous collections of their own; and that the
eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union, will
generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by
the several States. Indeed it is extremely probable, that in other instances,
particularly in the organization of the judicial power, the officers of the
States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union. Should
it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue should be
appointed under the federal government, the influence of the whole number
would not bear a comparison with that of the multitude of State officers in
the opposite scale. Within every district to which a federal collector would
be allotted, there would not be less than thirty or forty, or even more,
officers of different descriptions, and many of them persons of character
and weight, whose influence would lie on the side of the State.
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign
commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be
connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the
objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.
The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and
important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments, in
times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably bear a
small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy another
advantage over the federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the
federal powers may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent
will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over the
governments of the particular States.
If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be
found that the change which it proposes consists much less in the addition
of NEW POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL
POWERS. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that
seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no
apprehensions are entertained. The powers relating to war and peace,
armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other more considerable
powers, are all vested in the existing Congress by the articles of
Confederation. The proposed change does not enlarge these powers; it only
substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them. The change
relating to taxation may be regarded as the most important; and yet the
present Congress have as complete authority to REQUIRE of the States
indefinite supplies of money for the common defense and general welfare,
as the future Congress will have to require them of individual citizens; and
the latter will be no more bound than the States themselves have been, to
pay the quotas respectively taxed on them. Had the States complied
punctually with the articles of Confederation, or could their compliance
have been enforced by as peaceable means as may be used with success
towards single persons, our past experience is very far from countenancing
an opinion, that the State governments would have lost their constitutional
powers, and have gradually undergone an entire consolidation. To maintain
that such an event would have ensued, would be to say at once, that the
existence of the State governments is incompatible with any system
whatever that accomplishes the essential purposes of the Union.
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MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
RESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether
the federal government or the State governments will have the advantage
with regard to the predilection and support of the people. Notwithstanding
the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of
them as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the
United States. I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving
the proofs for another place. The federal and State governments are in fact
but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different
powers, and designed for different purposes. The adversaries of the
Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their
reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different
establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled
by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each
other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be
told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found,
resides in the people alone, and that it will not depend merely on the
comparative ambition or address of the different governments, whether
either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at
the expense of the other. Truth, no less than decency, requires that the event
in every case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction
of their common constituents.
Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion,
seem to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of
the people will be to the governments of their respective States. Into the
administration of these a greater number of individuals will expect to rise.
From the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will
flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and
personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the
affairs of these, the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant.
And with the members of these, will a greater proportion of the people have
the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party
attachments; on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be
expected most strongly to incline.
Experience speaks the same language in this case. The federal
administration, though hitherto very defective in comparison with what may
be hoped under a better system, had, during the war, and particularly whilst
the independent fund of paper emissions was in credit, an activity and
importance as great as it can well have in any future circumstances
whatever. It was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for their
object the protection of everything that was dear, and the acquisition of
everything that could be desirable to the people at large. It was,
nevertheless, invariably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early
Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment of the people were
turned anew to their own particular governments; that the federal council
was at no time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to proposed
enlargements of its powers and importance was the side usually taken by
the men who wished to build their political consequence on the
prepossessions of their fellow-citizens.
If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future
become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the
change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better
administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in
that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of
their confidence where they may discover it to be most due; but even in that
case the State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only
within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be
advantageously administered.
The remaining points on which I propose to compare the federal and
State governments, are the disposition and the faculty they may respectively
possess, to resist and frustrate the measures of each other.
It has been already proved that the members of the federal will be more
dependent on the members of the State governments, than the latter will be
on the former. It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of the people, on
whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State governments,
than of the federal government. So far as the disposition of each towards the
other may be influenced by these causes, the State governments must
clearly have the advantage. But in a distinct and very important point of
view, the advantage will lie on the same side. The prepossessions, which the
members themselves will carry into the federal government, will generally
be favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members of
the State governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of
the general government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in
the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the
legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion
of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the
disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent
interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or
districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their
policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it
be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and
the dignity and respectability of its government, the objects of their
affections and consultations? For the same reason that the members of the
State legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to
national objects, the members of the federal legislature will be likely to
attach themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the latter
what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too often be
decided according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity
and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the
governments and people of the individual States. What is the spirit that has
in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their
journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat
in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently
displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of
impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one occasion
improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations, to the
aggrandizement of the federal government, the great interests of the nation
have suffered on a hundred, from an undue attention to the local prejudices,
interests, and views of the particular States. I mean not by these reflections
to insinuate, that the new federal government will not embrace a more
enlarged plan of policy than the existing government may have pursued;
much less, that its views will be as confined as those of the State
legislatures; but only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both, to
be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the
prerogatives of their governments. The motives on the part of the State
governments, to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the federal
government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the
members.
Were it admitted, however, that the Federal government may feel an
equal disposition with the State governments to extend its power beyond the
due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the means of
defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though
unfriendly to the national government, be generally popular in that State
and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is
executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending
on the State alone. The opposition of the federal government, or the
interposition of federal officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on
the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at
all, without the employment of means which must always be resorted to
with reluctance and difficulty. On the other hand, should an unwarrantable
measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular States, which
would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so,
which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are
powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and,
perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of
the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by
legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would
oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large
State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several
adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions
which the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter.
But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the authority
of the State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State,
or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every
government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be
opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate
and conduct the whole. The same combinations, in short, would result from
an apprehension of the federal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign,
yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced,
the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was
made in the other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the federal
government to such an extremity. In the contest with Great Britain, one part
of the empire was employed against the other. The more numerous part
invaded the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt was unjust and
unwise; but it was not in speculation absolutely chimerical. But what would
be the contest in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A
few representatives of the people would be opposed to the people
themselves; or rather one set of representatives would be contending against
thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body of their common
constituents on the side of the latter.
The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State
governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government may
previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. The
reasonings contained in these papers must have been employed to little
purpose indeed, if it could be necessary now to disprove the reality of this
danger. That the people and the States should, for a sufficient period of
time, elect an uninterrupted succession of men ready to betray both; that the
traitors should, throughout this period, uniformly and systematically pursue
some fixed plan for the extension of the military establishment; that the
governments and the people of the States should silently and patiently
behold the gathering storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it
should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to every one
more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged
exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of
genuine patriotism. Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be
made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be
formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; still
it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments, with the
people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number
to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried
in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of
souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This
proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than
twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia
amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands,
officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their
common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing
their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia
thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular
troops. Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of
this country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny the
possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the
Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the
existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and
by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the
enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple
government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military
establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far
as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the
people with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid alone they would
not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the
additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who
could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers
appointed out of the militia, by these governments, and attached both to
them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that
the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite
of the legions which surround it. Let us not insult the free and gallant
citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would be less able to
defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession, than the
debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the
hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the
supposition that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making
the experiment, by a blind and tame submission to the long train of
insidious measures which must precede and produce it.
The argument under the present head may be put into a very concise
form, which appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which the
federal government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent
on the people, or it will not. On the first supposition, it will be restrained by
that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents. On
the other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the people, and
its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State governments,
who will be supported by the people.
On summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper, they
seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the powers proposed
to be lodged in the federal government are as little formidable to those
reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to
accomplish the purposes of the Union; and that all those alarms which have
been sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation of the State
governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to the
chimerical fears of the authors of them.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 47. The Particular Structure
of the New Government and the Distribution of
Power Among Its Different Parts.
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 30, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed government and the
general mass of power allotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular
structure of this government, and the distribution of this mass of power
among its constituent parts.
One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable
adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political
maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to
be separate and distinct. In the structure of the federal government, no
regard, it is said, seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in
favor of liberty. The several departments of power are distributed and
blended in such a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of
form, and to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger
of being crushed by the disproportionate weight of other parts.
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with
the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the
objection is founded. The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore,
really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of
powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further
arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the
system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be made apparent to every
one, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on which it
relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to form
correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to investigate the
sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the three great
departments of power should be separate and distinct.
The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the
celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in
the science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and
recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind. Let us
endeavor, in the first place, to ascertain his meaning on this point.
The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the
didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered the work of the
immortal bard as the perfect model from which the principles and rules of
the epic art were to be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be
judged, so this great political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution
of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the mirror of
political liberty; and to have delivered, in the form of elementary truths, the
several characteristic principles of that particular system. That we may be
sure, then, not to mistake his meaning in this case, let us recur to the source
from which the maxim was drawn.
On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that
the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally
separate and distinct from each other. The executive magistrate forms an
integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has the prerogative of
making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under
certain limitations, the force of legislative acts. All the members of the
judiciary department are appointed by him, can be removed by him on the
address of the two Houses of Parliament, and form, when he pleases to
consult them, one of his constitutional councils. One branch of the
legislative department forms also a great constitutional council to the
executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial
power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate
jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges, again, are so far connected with
the legislative department as often to attend and participate in its
deliberations, though not admitted to a legislative vote.
From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be
inferred that, in saying "There can be no liberty where the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates," or,
"if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers," he did not mean that these departments ought to have no
PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other. His
meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated
by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the
WHOLE power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the WHOLE power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constitution are subverted. This would have been the
case in the constitution examined by him, if the king, who is the sole
executive magistrate, had possessed also the complete legislative power, or
the supreme administration of justice; or if the entire legislative body had
possessed the supreme judiciary, or the supreme executive authority. This,
however, is not among the vices of that constitution. The magistrate in
whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law,
though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in person,
though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges
can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the
executive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised
with by the legislative councils. The entire legislature can perform no
judiciary act, though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may
be removed from their offices, and though one of its branches is possessed
of the judicial power in the last resort. The entire legislature, again, can
exercise no executive prerogative, though one of its branches constitutes the
supreme executive magistracy, and another, on the impeachment of a third,
can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the executive
department.
The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further
demonstration of his meaning. "When the legislative and executive powers
are united in the same person or body," says he, "there can be no liberty,
because apprehensions may arise lest THE SAME monarch or senate
should ENACT tyrannical laws to EXECUTE them in a tyrannical manner."
Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for THE
JUDGE would then be THE LEGISLATOR. Were it joined to the executive
power, THE JUDGE might behave with all the violence of AN
OPPRESSOR." Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other
passages; but briefly stated as they are here, they sufficiently establish the
meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated
author.
If we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find that,
notwithstanding the emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified
terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance
in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely
separate and distinct. New Hampshire, whose constitution was the last
formed, seems to have been fully aware of the impossibility and
inexpediency of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments, and
has qualified the doctrine by declaring "that the legislative, executive, and
judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of,
each other AS THE NATURE OF A FREE GOVERNMENT WILL
ADMIT; OR AS IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT CHAIN OF
CONNECTION THAT BINDS THE WHOLE FABRIC OF THE
CONSTITUTION IN ONE INDISSOLUBLE BOND OF UNITY AND
AMITY." Her constitution accordingly mixes these departments in several
respects. The Senate, which is a branch of the legislative department, is also
a judicial tribunal for the trial of impeachments. The President, who is the
head of the executive department, is the presiding member also of the
Senate; and, besides an equal vote in all cases, has a casting vote in case of
a tie. The executive head is himself eventually elective every year by the
legislative department, and his council is every year chosen by and from the
members of the same department. Several of the officers of state are also
appointed by the legislature. And the members of the judiciary department
are appointed by the executive department.
The constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient though less
pointed caution, in expressing this fundamental article of liberty. It declares
"that the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and
judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the
legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them." This
declaration corresponds precisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu, as it
has been explained, and is not in a single point violated by the plan of the
convention. It goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire
departments from exercising the powers of another department. In the very
Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been
admitted. The executive magistrate has a qualified negative on the
legislative body, and the Senate, which is a part of the legislature, is a court
of impeachment for members both of the executive and judiciary
departments. The members of the judiciary department, again, are
appointable by the executive department, and removable by the same
authority on the address of the two legislative branches. Lastly, a number of
the officers of government are annually appointed by the legislative
department. As the appointment to offices, particularly executive offices, is
in its nature an executive function, the compilers of the Constitution have,
in this last point at least, violated the rule established by themselves.
I pass over the constitutions of Rhode Island and Connecticut, because
they were formed prior to the Revolution, and even before the principle
under examination had become an object of political attention.
The constitution of New York contains no declaration on this subject; but
appears very clearly to have been framed with an eye to the danger of
improperly blending the different departments. It gives, nevertheless, to the
executive magistrate, a partial control over the legislative department; and,
what is more, gives a like control to the judiciary department; and even
blends the executive and judiciary departments in the exercise of this
control. In its council of appointment members of the legislative are
associated with the executive authority, in the appointment of officers, both
executive and judiciary. And its court for the trial of impeachments and
correction of errors is to consist of one branch of the legislature and the
principal members of the judiciary department.
The constitution of New Jersey has blended the different powers of
government more than any of the preceding. The governor, who is the
executive magistrate, is appointed by the legislature; is chancellor and
ordinary, or surrogate of the State; is a member of the Supreme Court of
Appeals, and president, with a casting vote, of one of the legislative
branches. The same legislative branch acts again as executive council of the
governor, and with him constitutes the Court of Appeals. The members of
the judiciary department are appointed by the legislative department and
removable by one branch of it, on the impeachment of the other.
According to the constitution of Pennsylvania, the president, who is the
head of the executive department, is annually elected by a vote in which the
legislative department predominates. In conjunction with an executive
council, he appoints the members of the judiciary department, and forms a
court of impeachment for trial of all officers, judiciary as well as executive.
The judges of the Supreme Court and justices of the peace seem also to be
removable by the legislature; and the executive power of pardoning in
certain cases, to be referred to the same department. The members of the
executive council are made EX-OFFICIO justices of peace throughout the
State.
In Delaware, the chief executive magistrate is annually elected by the
legislative department. The speakers of the two legislative branches are
vice-presidents in the executive department. The executive chief, with six
others, appointed, three by each of the legislative branches constitutes the
Supreme Court of Appeals; he is joined with the legislative department in
the appointment of the other judges. Throughout the States, it appears that
the members of the legislature may at the same time be justices of the
peace; in this State, the members of one branch of it are EX-OFFICIO
justices of the peace; as are also the members of the executive council. The
principal officers of the executive department are appointed by the
legislative; and one branch of the latter forms a court of impeachments. All
officers may be removed on address of the legislature.
Maryland has adopted the maxim in the most unqualified terms;
declaring that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government
ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other. Her constitution,
notwithstanding, makes the executive magistrate appointable by the
legislative department; and the members of the judiciary by the executive
department.
The language of Virginia is still more pointed on this subject. Her
constitution declares, "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise the
powers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any person exercise the
powers of more than one of them at the same time, except that the justices
of county courts shall be eligible to either House of Assembly." Yet we find
not only this express exception, with respect to the members of the inferior
courts, but that the chief magistrate, with his executive council, are
appointable by the legislature; that two members of the latter are triennially
displaced at the pleasure of the legislature; and that all the principal offices,
both executive and judiciary, are filled by the same department. The
executive prerogative of pardon, also, is in one case vested in the legislative
department.
The constitution of North Carolina, which declares "that the legislative,
executive, and supreme judicial powers of government ought to be forever
separate and distinct from each other," refers, at the same time, to the
legislative department, the appointment not only of the executive chief, but
all the principal officers within both that and the judiciary department.
In South Carolina, the constitution makes the executive magistracy
eligible by the legislative department. It gives to the latter, also, the
appointment of the members of the judiciary department, including even
justices of the peace and sheriffs; and the appointment of officers in the
executive department, down to captains in the army and navy of the State.
In the constitution of Georgia, where it is declared "that the legislative,
executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct, so that
neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other," we find that
the executive department is to be filled by appointments of the legislature;
and the executive prerogative of pardon to be finally exercised by the same
authority. Even justices of the peace are to be appointed by the legislature.
In citing these cases, in which the legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments have not been kept totally separate and distinct, I wish not to
be regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the several
State governments. I am fully aware that among the many excellent
principles which they exemplify, they carry strong marks of the haste, and
still stronger of the inexperience, under which they were framed. It is but
too obvious that in some instances the fundamental principle under
consideration has been violated by too great a mixture, and even an actual
consolidation, of the different powers; and that in no instance has a
competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation
delineated on paper. What I have wished to evince is, that the charge
brought against the proposed Constitution, of violating the sacred maxim of
free government, is warranted neither by the real meaning annexed to that
maxim by its author, nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been
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Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No
Constitutional Control Over Each Other.
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MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT WAS shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there
examined does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall
undertake, in the next place, to show that unless these departments be so far
connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the
others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a
free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.
It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the
departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either
of the other departments. It is equally evident, that none of them ought to
possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the
administration of their respective powers. It will not be denied, that power
is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained
from passing the limits assigned to it. After discriminating, therefore, in
theory, the several classes of power, as they may in their nature be
legislative, executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to
provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others.
What this security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved.
Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these
departments, in the constitution of the government, and to trust to these
parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? This is the
security which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers
of most of the American constitutions. But experience assures us, that the
efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated; and that some more
adequate defense is indispensably necessary for the more feeble, against the
more powerful, members of the government. The legislative department is
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into
its impetuous vortex.
The founders of our republics have so much merit for the wisdom which
they have displayed, that no task can be less pleasing than that of pointing
out the errors into which they have fallen. A respect for truth, however,
obliges us to remark, that they seem never for a moment to have turned
their eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping
prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by an
hereditary branch of the legislative authority. They seem never to have
recollected the danger from legislative usurpations, which, by assembling
all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened
by executive usurpations.
In a government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed
in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the executive department is very
justly regarded as the source of danger, and watched with all the jealousy
which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a multitude
of people exercise in person the legislative functions, and are continually
exposed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted
measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their executive magistrates, tyranny
may well be apprehended, on some favorable emergency, to start up in the
same quarter. But in a representative republic, where the executive
magistracy is carefully limited; both in the extent and the duration of its
power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which
is inspired, by a supposed influence over the people, with an intrepid
confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the
passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable
of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes; it
is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought
to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.
The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from
other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive,
and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask,
under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it
makes on the co-ordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question of
real nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular
measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere. On the other
side, the executive power being restrained within a narrower compass, and
being more simple in its nature, and the judiciary being described by
landmarks still less uncertain, projects of usurpation by either of these
departments would immediately betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this
all: as the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the
people, and has in some constitutions full discretion, and in all a prevailing
influence, over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other
departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter, which gives still
greater facility to encroachments of the former.
I have appealed to our own experience for the truth of what I advance on
this subject. Were it necessary to verify this experience by particular proofs,
they might be multiplied without end. I might find a witness in every citizen
who has shared in, or been attentive to, the course of public administrations.
I might collect vouchers in abundance from the records and archives of
every State in the Union. But as a more concise, and at the same time
equally satisfactory, evidence, I will refer to the example of two States,
attested by two unexceptionable authorities.
The first example is that of Virginia, a State which, as we have seen, has
expressly declared in its constitution, that the three great departments ought
not to be intermixed. The authority in support of it is Mr. Jefferson, who,
besides his other advantages for remarking the operation of the government,
was himself the chief magistrate of it. In order to convey fully the ideas
with which his experience had impressed him on this subject, it will be
necessary to quote a passage of some length from his very interesting Notes
on the State of Virginia, p. 195. "All the powers of government, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body. The concentrating
these in the same hands, is precisely the definition of despotic government.
It will be no alleviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of
hands, and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots
would surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it, turn their eyes
on the republic of Venice. As little will it avail us, that they are chosen by
ourselves. An ELECTIVE DESPOTISM was not the government we fought
for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles, but in
which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among
several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal
limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others. For
this reason, that convention which passed the ordinance of government, laid
its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should
exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time. BUT NO
BARRIER WAS PROVIDED BETWEEN THESE SEVERAL POWERS.
The judiciary and the executive members were left dependent on the
legislative for their subsistence in office, and some of them for their
continuance in it. If, therefore, the legislature assumes executive and
judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be made; nor, if made, can be
effectual; because in that case they may put their proceedings into the form
of acts of Assembly, which will render them obligatory on the other
branches. They have accordingly, IN MANY instances, DECIDED
RIGHTS which should have been left to JUDICIARY CONTROVERSY,
and THE DIRECTION OF THE EXECUTIVE, DURING THE WHOLE
TIME OF THEIR SESSION, IS BECOMING HABITUAL AND
FAMILIAR."
The other State which I shall take for an example is Pennsylvania; and
the other authority, the Council of Censors, which assembled in the years
1783 and 1784. A part of the duty of this body, as marked out by the
constitution, was "to inquire whether the constitution had been preserved
inviolate in every part; and whether the legislative and executive branches
of government had performed their duty as guardians of the people, or
assumed to themselves, or exercised, other or greater powers than they are
entitled to by the constitution." In the execution of this trust, the council
were necessarily led to a comparison of both the legislative and executive
proceedings, with the constitutional powers of these departments; and from
the facts enumerated, and to the truth of most of which both sides in the
council subscribed, it appears that the constitution had been flagrantly
violated by the legislature in a variety of important instances.
A great number of laws had been passed, violating, without any apparent
necessity, the rule requiring that all bills of a public nature shall be
previously printed for the consideration of the people; although this is one
of the precautions chiefly relied on by the constitution against improper acts
of legislature.
The constitutional trial by jury had been violated, and powers assumed
which had not been delegated by the constitution.
Executive powers had been usurped.
The salaries of the judges, which the constitution expressly requires to be
fixed, had been occasionally varied; and cases belonging to the judiciary
department frequently drawn within legislative cognizance and
determination.
Those who wish to see the several particulars falling under each of these
heads, may consult the journals of the council, which are in print. Some of
them, it will be found, may be imputable to peculiar circumstances
connected with the war; but the greater part of them may be considered as
the spontaneous shoots of an ill-constituted government.
It appears, also, that the executive department had not been innocent of
frequent breaches of the constitution. There are three observations,
however, which ought to be made on this head: FIRST, a great proportion of
the instances were either immediately produced by the necessities of the
war, or recommended by Congress or the commander-in-chief; SECOND,
in most of the other instances, they conformed either to the declared or the
known sentiments of the legislative department; THIRD, the executive
department of Pennsylvania is distinguished from that of the other States by
the number of members composing it. In this respect, it has as much affinity
to a legislative assembly as to an executive council. And being at once
exempt from the restraint of an individual responsibility for the acts of the
body, and deriving confidence from mutual example and joint influence,
unauthorized measures would, of course, be more freely hazarded, than
where the executive department is administered by a single hand, or by a
few hands.
The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these observations
is, that a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the
several departments, is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments




FEDERALIST No. 49. Method of Guarding
Against the Encroachments of Any One
Department of Government by Appealing to the
People Through a Convention.
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, February 2, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE author of the "Notes on the State of Virginia," quoted in the last
paper, has subjoined to that valuable work the draught of a constitution,
which had been prepared in order to be laid before a convention, expected
to be called in 1783, by the legislature, for the establishment of a
constitution for that commonwealth. The plan, like every thing from the
same pen, marks a turn of thinking, original, comprehensive, and accurate;
and is the more worthy of attention as it equally displays a fervent
attachment to republican government and an enlightened view of the
dangerous propensities against which it ought to be guarded. One of the
precautions which he proposes, and on which he appears ultimately to rely
as a palladium to the weaker departments of power against the invasions of
the stronger, is perhaps altogether his own, and as it immediately relates to
the subject of our present inquiry, ought not to be overlooked.
His proposition is, "that whenever any two of the three branches of
government shall concur in opinion, each by the voices of two thirds of
their whole number, that a convention is necessary for altering the
constitution, or CORRECTING BREACHES OF IT, a convention shall be
called for the purpose."
As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from
them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of
government hold their power, is derived, it seems strictly consonant to the
republican theory, to recur to the same original authority, not only whenever
it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the powers of the
government, but also whenever any one of the departments may commit
encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others. The several
departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common
commission, none of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or
superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers;
and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented, or the
wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an appeal to the people
themselves, who, as the grantors of the commissions, can alone declare its
true meaning, and enforce its observance?
There is certainly great force in this reasoning, and it must be allowed to
prove that a constitutional road to the decision of the people ought to be
marked out and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary occasions.
But there appear to be insuperable objections against the proposed
recurrence to the people, as a provision in all cases for keeping the several
departments of power within their constitutional limits.
In the first place, the provision does not reach the case of a combination
of two of the departments against the third. If the legislative authority,
which possesses so many means of operating on the motives of the other
departments, should be able to gain to its interest either of the others, or
even one third of its members, the remaining department could derive no
advantage from its remedial provision. I do not dwell, however, on this
objection, because it may be thought to be rather against the modification of
the principle, than against the principle itself.
In the next place, it may be considered as an objection inherent in the
principle, that as every appeal to the people would carry an implication of
some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in a great measure,
deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on every
thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would
not possess the requisite stability. If it be true that all governments rest on
opinion, it is no less true that the strength of opinion in each individual, and
its practical influence on his conduct, depend much on the number which he
supposes to have entertained the same opinion. The reason of man, like man
himself, is timid and cautious when left alone, and acquires firmness and
confidence in proportion to the number with which it is associated. When
the examples which fortify opinion are ANCIENT as well as NUMEROUS,
they are known to have a double effect. In a nation of philosophers, this
consideration ought to be disregarded. A reverence for the laws would be
sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a nation
of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings
wished for by Plato. And in every other nation, the most rational
government will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices
of the community on its side.
The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by interesting too
strongly the public passions, is a still more serious objection against a
frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the whole
society. Notwithstanding the success which has attended the revisions of
our established forms of government, and which does so much honor to the
virtue and intelligence of the people of America, it must be confessed that
the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied.
We are to recollect that all the existing constitutions were formed in the
midst of a danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly to order and
concord; of an enthusiastic confidence of the people in their patriotic
leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national
questions; of a universal ardor for new and opposite forms, produced by a
universal resentment and indignation against the ancient government; and
whilst no spirit of party connected with the changes to be made, or the
abuses to be reformed, could mingle its leaven in the operation. The future
situations in which we must expect to be usually placed, do not present any
equivalent security against the danger which is apprehended.
But the greatest objection of all is, that the decisions which would
probably result from such appeals would not answer the purpose of
maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the government. We have seen
that the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the
legislative at the expense of the other departments. The appeals to the
people, therefore, would usually be made by the executive and judiciary
departments. But whether made by one side or the other, would each side
enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us view their different situations.
The members of the executive and judiciary departments are few in number,
and can be personally known to a small part only of the people. The latter,
by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency
of it, are too far removed from the people to share much in their
prepossessions. The former are generally the objects of jealousy, and their
administration is always liable to be discolored and rendered unpopular.
The members of the legislative department, on the other hand, are
numerous. They are distributed and dwell among the people at large. Their
connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance embrace a great
proportion of the most influential part of the society. The nature of their
public trust implies a personal influence among the people, and that they are
more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of
the people. With these advantages, it can hardly be supposed that the
adverse party would have an equal chance for a favorable issue.
But the legislative party would not only be able to plead their cause most
successfully with the people. They would probably be constituted
themselves the judges. The same influence which had gained them an
election into the legislature, would gain them a seat in the convention. If
this should not be the case with all, it would probably be the case with
many, and pretty certainly with those leading characters, on whom every
thing depends in such bodies. The convention, in short, would be composed
chiefly of men who had been, who actually were, or who expected to be,
members of the department whose conduct was arraigned. They would
consequently be parties to the very question to be decided by them.
It might, however, sometimes happen, that appeals would be made under
circumstances less adverse to the executive and judiciary departments. The
usurpations of the legislature might be so flagrant and so sudden, as to
admit of no specious coloring. A strong party among themselves might take
side with the other branches. The executive power might be in the hands of
a peculiar favorite of the people. In such a posture of things, the public
decision might be less swayed by prepossessions in favor of the legislative
party. But still it could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the
question. It would inevitably be connected with the spirit of pre-existing
parties, or of parties springing out of the question itself. It would be
connected with persons of distinguished character and extensive influence
in the community. It would be pronounced by the very men who had been
agents in, or opponents of, the measures to which the decision would relate.
The PASSIONS, therefore, not the REASON, of the public would sit in
judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and
regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated
by the government.
We found in the last paper, that mere declarations in the written
constitution are not sufficient to restrain the several departments within
their legal rights. It appears in this, that occasional appeals to the people
would be neither a proper nor an effectual provision for that purpose. How
far the provisions of a different nature contained in the plan above quoted
might be adequate, I do not examine. Some of them are unquestionably
founded on sound political principles, and all of them are framed with
singular ingenuity and precision.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 50. Periodical Appeals to the
People Considered
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 5, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT MAY be contended, perhaps, that instead of OCCASIONAL appeals
to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against them,
PERIODICAL appeals are the proper and adequate means of
PREVENTING AND CORRECTING INFRACTIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
It will be attended to, that in the examination of these expedients, I
confine myself to their aptitude for ENFORCING the Constitution, by
keeping the several departments of power within their due bounds, without
particularly considering them as provisions for ALTERING the Constitution
itself. In the first view, appeals to the people at fixed periods appear to be
nearly as ineligible as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge. If the
periods be separated by short intervals, the measures to be reviewed and
rectified will have been of recent date, and will be connected with all the
circumstances which tend to vitiate and pervert the result of occasional
revisions. If the periods be distant from each other, the same remark will be
applicable to all recent measures; and in proportion as the remoteness of the
others may favor a dispassionate review of them, this advantage is
inseparable from inconveniences which seem to counterbalance it. In the
first place, a distant prospect of public censure would be a very feeble
restraint on power from those excesses to which it might be urged by the
force of present motives. Is it to be imagined that a legislative assembly,
consisting of a hundred or two hundred members, eagerly bent on some
favorite object, and breaking through the restraints of the Constitution in
pursuit of it, would be arrested in their career, by considerations drawn from
a censorial revision of their conduct at the future distance of ten, fifteen, or
twenty years? In the next place, the abuses would often have completed
their mischievous effects before the remedial provision would be applied.
And in the last place, where this might not be the case, they would be of
long standing, would have taken deep root, and would not easily be
extirpated.
The scheme of revising the constitution, in order to correct recent
breaches of it, as well as for other purposes, has been actually tried in one
of the States. One of the objects of the Council of Censors which met in
Pennsylvania in 1783 and 1784, was, as we have seen, to inquire, "whether
the constitution had been violated, and whether the legislative and executive
departments had encroached upon each other." This important and novel
experiment in politics merits, in several points of view, very particular
attention. In some of them it may, perhaps, as a single experiment, made
under circumstances somewhat peculiar, be thought to be not absolutely
conclusive. But as applied to the case under consideration, it involves some
facts, which I venture to remark, as a complete and satisfactory illustration
of the reasoning which I have employed.
First. It appears, from the names of the gentlemen who composed the
council, that some, at least, of its most active members had also been active
and leading characters in the parties which pre-existed in the State.
Second. It appears that the same active and leading members of the
council had been active and influential members of the legislative and
executive branches, within the period to be reviewed; and even patrons or
opponents of the very measures to be thus brought to the test of the
constitution. Two of the members had been vice-presidents of the State, and
several other members of the executive council, within the seven preceding
years. One of them had been speaker, and a number of others distinguished
members, of the legislative assembly within the same period.
Third. Every page of their proceedings witnesses the effect of all these
circumstances on the temper of their deliberations. Throughout the
continuance of the council, it was split into two fixed and violent parties.
The fact is acknowledged and lamented by themselves. Had this not been
the case, the face of their proceedings exhibits a proof equally satisfactory.
In all questions, however unimportant in themselves, or unconnected with
each other, the same names stand invariably contrasted on the opposite
columns. Every unbiased observer may infer, without danger of mistake,
and at the same time without meaning to reflect on either party, or any
individuals of either party, that, unfortunately, PASSION, not REASON,
must have presided over their decisions. When men exercise their reason
coolly and freely on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into
different opinions on some of them. When they are governed by a common
passion, their opinions, if they are so to be called, will be the same.
Fourth. It is at least problematical, whether the decisions of this body do
not, in several instances, misconstrue the limits prescribed for the
legislative and executive departments, instead of reducing and limiting
them within their constitutional places.
Fifth. I have never understood that the decisions of the council on
constitutional questions, whether rightly or erroneously formed, have had
any effect in varying the practice founded on legislative constructions. It
even appears, if I mistake not, that in one instance the contemporary
legislature denied the constructions of the council, and actually prevailed in
the contest.
This censorial body, therefore, proves at the same time, by its researches,
the existence of the disease, and by its example, the inefficacy of the
remedy.
This conclusion cannot be invalidated by alleging that the State in which
the experiment was made was at that crisis, and had been for a long time
before, violently heated and distracted by the rage of party. Is it to be
presumed, that at any future septennial epoch the same State will be free
from parties? Is it to be presumed that any other State, at the same or any
other given period, will be exempt from them? Such an event ought to be
neither presumed nor desired; because an extinction of parties necessarily
implies either a universal alarm for the public safety, or an absolute
extinction of liberty.
Were the precaution taken of excluding from the assemblies elected by
the people, to revise the preceding administration of the government, all
persons who should have been concerned with the government within the
given period, the difficulties would not be obviated. The important task
would probably devolve on men, who, with inferior capacities, would in
other respects be little better qualified. Although they might not have been
personally concerned in the administration, and therefore not immediately
agents in the measures to be examined, they would probably have been
involved in the parties connected with these measures, and have been
elected under their auspices.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 51. The Structure of the
Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and
Balances Between the Different Departments.
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, February 6, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in
practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as
laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as
all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be
supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its
several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of
keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a
full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general
observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to
form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the
government planned by the convention.
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of
the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on
all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each
department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so
constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as
possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this
principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments
for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be
drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels
having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan
of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice
than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some
additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations,
therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the
judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist
rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being
essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select
that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly,
because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that
department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority
conferring them.
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as
little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments
annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not
independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every
other would be merely nominal.
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer
each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to
resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this,
as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack.
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man
must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a
reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control
the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of
all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would
be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in
the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of
better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs,
private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the
subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and
arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on
the other—that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel
over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite
in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-
defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily
predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature
into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election
and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the
nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the
society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous
encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative
authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the
executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An
absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural
defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps
it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary
occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on
extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect
of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between
this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department,
by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the
former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own
department?
If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I
persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several
State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the
latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less
able to bear such a test.
There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the
federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting
point of view.
First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is
submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations
are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and
separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among
distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at
the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the
society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily
exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common
interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two
methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the
community independent of the majority—that is, of the society itself; the
other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of
citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole
very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all
governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at
best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the
society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful
interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both
parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of
the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and
dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many
parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of
the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the
majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same
as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of
interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security
in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may
be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people
comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must
particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and
considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact
proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more
circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a
majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms,
for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and
consequently the stability and independence of some member of the
government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased.
Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has
been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in
the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can
readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign
as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against
the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger
individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to
a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the
former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually
induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all
parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted
that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and
left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government
within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated
oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent
of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions
whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of
the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects
which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could
seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the
general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of
a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of
the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the
latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less
certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which
have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a
practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And
happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be
carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of
the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 52. The House of
Representatives
From the New York Packet. Friday, February 8, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass
on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government.
I shall begin with the House of Representatives.
The first view to be taken of this part of the government relates to the
qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be
the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the
State legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly
regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It was
incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in
the Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the
Congress, would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. To have
submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States, would have been
improper for the same reason; and for the additional reason that it would
have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch of the
federal government which ought to be dependent on the people alone. To
have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one
uniform rule, would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the
States as it would have been difficult to the convention. The provision made
by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their
option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to
the standard already established, or which may be established, by the State
itself. It will be safe to the United States, because, being fixed by the State
constitutions, it is not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be
feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions
in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal
Constitution.
The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly
defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more
susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated
by the convention. A representative of the United States must be of the age
of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United
States; must, at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to
represent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no office under the
United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of
the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native
or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth,
or to any particular profession of religious faith.
The term for which the representatives are to be elected falls under a
second view which may be taken of this branch. In order to decide on the
propriety of this article, two questions must be considered: first, whether
biennial elections will, in this case, be safe; secondly, whether they be
necessary or useful.
First. As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should
have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that
the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence
on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are
unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can
be effectually secured. But what particular degree of frequency may be
absolutely necessary for the purpose, does not appear to be susceptible of
any precise calculation, and must depend on a variety of circumstances with
which it may be connected. Let us consult experience, the guide that ought
always to be followed whenever it can be found.
The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens
in person, being at most but very imperfectly known to ancient polity, it is
in more modern times only that we are to expect instructive examples. And
even here, in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive, it will be
proper to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and
which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case. The first to which
this character ought to be applied, is the House of Commons in Great
Britain. The history of this branch of the English Constitution, anterior to
the date of Magna Charta, is too obscure to yield instruction. The very
existence of it has been made a question among political antiquaries. The
earliest records of subsequent date prove that parliaments were to SIT only
every year; not that they were to be ELECTED every year. And even these
annual sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch, that,
under various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions were often
contrived by royal ambition. To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a
statute in the reign of Charles II, that the intermissions should not be
protracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession of William III,
when a revolution took place in the government, the subject was still more
seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the fundamental rights
of the people that parliaments ought to be held FREQUENTLY. By another
statute, which passed a few years later in the same reign, the term
"frequently," which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of
Charles II, is reduced to a precise meaning, it being expressly enacted that a
new parliament shall be called within three years after the termination of
the former. The last change, from three to seven years, is well known to
have been introduced pretty early in the present century, under an alarm for
the Hanoverian succession. From these facts it appears that the greatest
frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom,
for binding the representatives to their constituents, does not exceed a
triennial return of them. And if we may argue from the degree of liberty
retained even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious
ingredients in the parliamentary constitution, we cannot doubt that a
reduction of the period from seven to three years, with the other necessary
reforms, would so far extend the influence of the people over their
representatives as to satisfy us that biennial elections, under the federal
system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the
House of Representatives on their constituents.
Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated entirely by the discretion
of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on the accession of a new
prince, or some other contingent event. The parliament which commenced
with George II. was continued throughout his whole reign, a period of about
thirty-five years. The only dependence of the representatives on the people
consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies by the
election of new members, and in the chance of some event which might
produce a general new election. The ability also of the Irish parliament to
maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the disposition might
exist, was extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects
of their deliberation. Of late these shackles, if I mistake not, have been
broken; and octennial parliaments have besides been established. What
effect may be produced by this partial reform, must be left to further
experience. The example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but little
light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must
be that if the people of that country have been able under all these
disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial
elections would secure to them every degree of liberty, which might depend
on a due connection between their representatives and themselves.
Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The example of these States,
when British colonies, claims particular attention, at the same time that it is
so well known as to require little to be said on it. The principle of
representation, in one branch of the legislature at least, was established in
all of them. But the periods of election were different. They varied from one
to seven years. Have we any reason to infer, from the spirit and conduct of
the representatives of the people, prior to the Revolution, that biennial
elections would have been dangerous to the public liberties? The spirit
which everywhere displayed itself at the commencement of the struggle,
and which vanquished the obstacles to independence, is the best of proofs
that a sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed to inspire
both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement This remark
holds good, as well with regard to the then colonies whose elections were
least frequent, as to those whose elections were most frequent Virginia was
the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpations of
Great Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by public act, the resolution
of independence. In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed,
elections under the former government were septennial. This particular
example is brought into view, not as a proof of any peculiar merit, for the
priority in those instances was probably accidental; and still less of any
advantage in SEPTENNIAL elections, for when compared with a greater
frequency they are inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to
be a very substantial proof, that the liberties of the people can be in no
danger from BIENNIAL elections.
The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little
strengthened by recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that the
federal legislature will possess a part only of that supreme legislative
authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament; and which,
with a few exceptions, was exercised by the colonial assemblies and the
Irish legislature. It is a received and well-founded maxim, that where no
other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter
ought to be its duration; and, conversely, the smaller the power, the more
safely may its duration be protracted. In the second place, it has, on another
occasion, been shown that the federal legislature will not only be restrained
by its dependence on its people, as other legislative bodies are, but that it
will be, moreover, watched and controlled by the several collateral
legislatures, which other legislative bodies are not. And in the third place,
no comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by
the more permanent branches of the federal government for seducing, if
they should be disposed to seduce, the House of Representatives from their
duty to the people, and the means of influence over the popular branch
possessed by the other branches of the government above cited. With less
power, therefore, to abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted
on one side, and will be doubly watched on the other.
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For the Independent Journal. Saturday, February 9, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, "that
where annual elections end, tyranny begins." If it be true, as has often been
remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in
reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often applied
to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a
proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which this
proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to the
ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists between the sun
or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can bear the
temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect,
confined to any single point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford
sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be required by the
various situations and circumstances of civil society. The election of
magistrates might be, if it were found expedient, as in some instances it
actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; and if
circumstances may require a deviation from the rule on one side, why not
also on the other side? Turning our attention to the periods established
among ourselves, for the election of the most numerous branches of the
State legislatures, we find them by no means coinciding any more in this
instance, than in the elections of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and
Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the other States, South
Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South Carolina they are biennial—as
is proposed in the federal government. Here is a difference, as four to one,
between the longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to
show, that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a
greater share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that either the one
or the other of these States is distinguished in these respects, and by these
causes, from the States whose elections are different from both.
In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one, and
that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important distinction so well
understood in America, between a Constitution established by the people
and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the
government and alterable by the government, seems to have been little
understood and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme
power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full
power to change the form of the government. Even in Great Britain, where
the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and
where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained that
the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, as well
with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of legislative
provision. They have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, by
legislative acts, some of the most fundamental articles of the government.
They have in particular, on several occasions, changed the period of
election; and, on the last occasion, not only introduced septennial in place
of triennial elections, but by the same act, continued themselves in place
four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the people. An
attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in
the votaries of free government, of which frequency of elections is the
corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty, against
the danger to which it is exposed. Where no Constitution, paramount to the
government, either existed or could be obtained, no constitutional security,
similar to that established in the United States, was to be attempted. Some
other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security
would the case admit, than that of selecting and appealing to some simple
and familiar portion of time, as a standard for measuring the danger of
innovations, for fixing the national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic
exertions? The most simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to the
subject was that of a year; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a
laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an
unlimited government, that the advance towards tyranny was to be
calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of annual
elections. But what necessity can there be of applying this expedient to a
government limited, as the federal government will be, by the authority of a
paramount Constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of the people
of America will not be more secure under biennial elections, unalterably
fixed by such a Constitution, than those of any other nation would be,
where elections were annual, or even more frequent, but subject to
alterations by the ordinary power of the government?
The second question stated is, whether biennial elections be necessary or
useful. The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative will
appear from several very obvious considerations.
No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright
intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the
subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be
acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of men in
private as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained, or at
least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which requires
the use of it. The period of service, ought, therefore, in all such cases, to
bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the
due performance of the service. The period of legislative service established
in most of the States for the more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one
year. The question then may be put into this simple form: does the period of
two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal
legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State
legislation? The very statement of the question, in this form, suggests the
answer that ought to be given to it.
In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing laws
which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all the citizens are
more or less conversant; and to the general affairs of the State, which lie
within a small compass, are not very diversified, and occupy much of the
attention and conversation of every class of people. The great theatre of the
United States presents a very different scene. The laws are so far from being
uniform, that they vary in every State; whilst the public affairs of the Union
are spread throughout a very extensive region, and are extremely diversified
by the local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be
correctly learnt in any other place than in the central councils to which a
knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of every part of
the empire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws, of all
the States, ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States.
How can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws, without some
acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulations
of the different States? How can the trade between the different States be
duly regulated, without some knowledge of their relative situations in these
and other respects? How can taxes be judiciously imposed and effectually
collected, if they be not accommodated to the different laws and local
circumstances relating to these objects in the different States? How can
uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided, without a similar
knowledge of many internal circumstances by which the States are
distinguished from each other? These are the principal objects of federal
legislation, and suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the
representatives ought to acquire. The other interior objects will require a
proportional degree of information with regard to them.
It is true that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much
diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the
government and the primeval formation of a federal code. Improvements on
the first draughts will every year become both easier and fewer. Past
transactions of the government will be a ready and accurate source of
information to new members. The affairs of the Union will become more
and more objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large.
And the increased intercourse among those of different States will
contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as this
again will contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws.
But with all these abatements, the business of federal legislation must
continue so far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative
business of a single State, as to justify the longer period of service assigned
to those who are to transact it.
A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal
representative, and which has not been mentioned is that of foreign affairs.
In regulating our own commerce he ought to be not only acquainted with
the treaties between the United States and other nations, but also with the
commercial policy and laws of other nations. He ought not to be altogether
ignorant of the law of nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of
municipal legislation, is submitted to the federal government. And although
the House of Representatives is not immediately to participate in foreign
negotiations and arrangements, yet from the necessary connection between
the several branches of public affairs, those particular branches will
frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legislation, and will
sometimes demand particular legislative sanction and co-operation. Some
portion of this knowledge may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; but
some of it also can only be derived from the public sources of information;
and all of it will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the
subject during the period of actual service in the legislature.
There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but which are
not unworthy of notice. The distance which many of the representatives will
be obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered necessary by that
circumstance, might be much more serious objections with fit men to this
service, if limited to a single year, than if extended to two years. No
argument can be drawn on this subject, from the case of the delegates to the
existing Congress. They are elected annually, it is true; but their re-election
is considered by the legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. The
election of the representatives by the people would not be governed by the
same principle.
A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess
superior talents; will, by frequent reelections, become members of long
standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps not
unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. The greater the
proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of the
members the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid
for them. This remark is no less applicable to the relation which will subsist
between the House of Representatives and the Senate.
It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent
elections even in single States, where they are large, and hold but one
legislative session in a year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated
and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. If a return can
be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means, the irregular member, who
takes his seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his
purposes. Hence, a very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of
unlawful means, for obtaining irregular returns. Were elections for the
federal legislature to be annual, this practice might become a very serious
abuse, particularly in the more distant States. Each house is, as it
necessarily must be, the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of
its members; and whatever improvements may be suggested by experience,
for simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a
portion of a year would unavoidably elapse, before an illegitimate member
could be dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would
be little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat.
All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming, that
biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we have
seen that they will be safe to the liberty of the people.
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MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates
to the appointment of its members to the several States which is to be
determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes.
It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to
be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent
the people of each State. The establishment of the same rule for the
appointment of taxes, will probably be as little contested; though the rule
itself in this case, is by no means founded on the same principle. In the
former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the
people, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it
has reference to the proportion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise
measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the
imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions
of the States, it is evidently the least objectionable among the practicable
rules, and had too recently obtained the general sanction of America, not to
have found a ready preference with the convention.
All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said; but does it follow, from an
admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves
combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be
included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as
property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be comprehended in
estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be excluded
from representation which is regulated by a census of persons. This is the
objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force. I shall be equally candid
in stating the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side.
"We subscribe to the doctrine," might one of our Southern brethren
observe, "that representation relates more immediately to persons, and
taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of this
distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the fact, that slaves
are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons.
The true state of the case is, that they partake of both these qualities: being
considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects
as property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for a master; in
being vendible by one master to another master; and in being subject at all
times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the
capricious will of another—the slave may appear to be degraded from the
human rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the
legal denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in his
life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of
his labor and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence
committed against others—the slave is no less evidently regarded by the
law as a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a
moral person, not as a mere article of property. The federal Constitution,
therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it
views them in the mixed character of persons and of property. This is in fact
their true character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under
which they live; and it will not be denied, that these are the proper criterion;
because it is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the
negroes into subjects of property, that a place is disputed them in the
computation of numbers; and it is admitted, that if the laws were to restore
the rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be
refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants.
"This question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all sides,
that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as they are the only
proper scale of representation. Would the convention have been impartial or
consistent, if they had rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when
the shares of representation were to be calculated, and inserted them on the
lists when the tariff of contributions was to be adjusted? Could it be
reasonably expected, that the Southern States would concur in a system,
which considered their slaves in some degree as men, when burdens were to
be imposed, but refused to consider them in the same light, when
advantages were to be conferred? Might not some surprise also be
expressed, that those who reproach the Southern States with the barbarous
policy of considering as property a part of their human brethren, should
themselves contend, that the government to which all the States are to be
parties, ought to consider this unfortunate race more completely in the
unnatural light of property, than the very laws of which they complain?
"It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not included in the estimate of
representatives in any of the States possessing them. They neither vote
themselves nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon what principle,
then, ought they to be taken into the federal estimate of representation? In
rejecting them altogether, the Constitution would, in this respect, have
followed the very laws which have been appealed to as the proper guide.
"This objection is repelled by a single observation. It is a fundamental
principle of the proposed Constitution, that as the aggregate number of
representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal
rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of
choosing this allotted number in each State is to be exercised by such part
of the inhabitants as the State itself may designate. The qualifications on
which the right of suffrage depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two
States. In some of the States the difference is very material. In every State, a
certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by the
constitution of the State, who will be included in the census by which the
federal Constitution apportions the representatives. In this point of view the
Southern States might retort the complaint, by insisting that the principle
laid down by the convention required that no regard should be had to the
policy of particular States towards their own inhabitants; and consequently,
that the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the census
according to their full number, in like manner with other inhabitants, who,
by the policy of other States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A
rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is waived by those who
would be gainers by it. All that they ask is that equal moderation be shown
on the other side. Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a
peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the Constitution be
mutually adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by
servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the
SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the MAN.
"After all, may not another ground be taken on which this article of the
Constitution will admit of a still more ready defense? We have hitherto
proceeded on the idea that representation related to persons only, and not at
all to property. But is it a just idea? Government is instituted no less for
protection of the property, than of the persons, of individuals. The one as
well as the other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who
are charged with the government. Upon this principle it is, that in several of
the States, and particularly in the State of New York, one branch of the
government is intended more especially to be the guardian of property, and
is accordingly elected by that part of the society which is most interested in
this object of government. In the federal Constitution, this policy does not
prevail. The rights of property are committed into the same hands with the
personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore, to be paid to property in
the choice of those hands.
"For another reason, the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the
people of each State, ought to bear some proportion to the comparative
wealth of the States. States have not, like individuals, an influence over
each other, arising from superior advantages of fortune. If the law allows an
opulent citizen but a single vote in the choice of his representative, the
respect and consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation very
frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his choice; and through
this imperceptible channel the rights of property are conveyed into the
public representation. A State possesses no such influence over other States.
It is not probable that the richest State in the Confederacy will ever
influence the choice of a single representative in any other State. Nor will
the representatives of the larger and richer States possess any other
advantage in the federal legislature, over the representatives of other States,
than what may result from their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as
their superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it
ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation. The new
Constitution is, in this respect, materially different from the existing
Confederation, as well as from that of the United Netherlands, and other
similar confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of the federal
resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary resolutions of the
states composing the union. Hence the states, though possessing an equal
vote in the public councils, have an unequal influence, corresponding with
the unequal importance of these subsequent and voluntary resolutions.
Under the proposed Constitution, the federal acts will take effect without
the necessary intervention of the individual States. They will depend merely
on the majority of votes in the federal legislature, and consequently each
vote, whether proceeding from a larger or smaller State, or a State more or
less wealthy or powerful, will have an equal weight and efficacy: in the
same manner as the votes individually given in a State legislature, by the
representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have each a precise
equality of value and effect; or if there be any difference in the case, it
proceeds from the difference in the personal character of the individual
representative, rather than from any regard to the extent of the district from
which he comes."
Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern interests might
employ on this subject; and although it may appear to be a little strained in
some points, yet, on the whole, I must confess that it fully reconciles me to
the scale of representation which the convention have established.
In one respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation
and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the census
to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in a considerable
degree on the disposition, if not on the co-operation, of the States, it is of
great importance that the States should feel as little bias as possible, to
swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their share of
representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have an interest
in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to decide their share of
taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule
to both objects, the States will have opposite interests, which will control
and balance each other, and produce the requisite impartiality.
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For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, February 13, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms
another and a very interesting point of view, under which this branch of the
federal legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any article, indeed, in the
whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the
weight of character and the apparent force of argument with which it has
been assailed. The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a
number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public
interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the
local circumstances of their numerous constituents; thirdly, that they will be
taken from that class of citizens which will sympathize least with the
feelings of the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at a permanent
elevation of the few on the depression of the many; fourthly, that defective
as the number will be in the first instance, it will be more and more
disproportionate, by the increase of the people, and the obstacles which will
prevent a correspondent increase of the representatives.
In general it may be remarked on this subject, that no political problem is
less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the number
most convenient for a representative legislature; nor is there any point on
which the policy of the several States is more at variance, whether we
compare their legislative assemblies directly with each other, or consider
the proportions which they respectively bear to the number of their
constituents. Passing over the difference between the smallest and largest
States, as Delaware, whose most numerous branch consists of twenty-one
representatives, and Massachusetts, where it amounts to between three and
four hundred, a very considerable difference is observable among States
nearly equal in population. The number of representatives in Pennsylvania
is not more than one fifth of that in the State last mentioned. New York,
whose population is to that of South Carolina as six to five, has little more
than one third of the number of representatives. As great a disparity prevails
between the States of Georgia and Delaware or Rhode Island. In
Pennsylvania, the representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their
constituents than of one for every four or five thousand. In Rhode Island,
they bear a proportion of at least one for every thousand. And according to
the constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one to every
ten electors; and must unavoidably far exceed the proportion in any of the
other States.
Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio between the
representatives and the people ought not to be the same where the latter are
very numerous as where they are very few. Were the representatives in
Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode Island, they would, at this
time, amount to between four and five hundred; and twenty or thirty years
hence, to a thousand. On the other hand, the ratio of Pennsylvania, if
applied to the State of Delaware, would reduce the representative assembly
of the latter to seven or eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious than
to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles. Sixty or
seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power
than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be
proportionably a better depositary. And if we carry on the supposition to six
or seven thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is,
that in all cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the
benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a
combination for improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the number ought
at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the confusion and
intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever
character composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason.
Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly
would still have been a mob.
It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were applied
to the case of biennial elections. For the same reason that the limited
powers of the Congress, and the control of the State legislatures, justify less
frequent elections than the public safely might otherwise require, the
members of the Congress need be less numerous than if they possessed the
whole power of legislation, and were under no other than the ordinary
restraints of other legislative bodies.
With these general ideas in our mind, let us weigh the objections which
have been stated against the number of members proposed for the House of
Representatives. It is said, in the first place, that so small a number cannot
be safely trusted with so much power.
The number of which this branch of the legislature is to consist, at the
outset of the government, will be sixty-five. Within three years a census is
to be taken, when the number may be augmented to one for every thirty
thousand inhabitants; and within every successive period of ten years the
census is to be renewed, and augmentations may continue to be made under
the above limitation. It will not be thought an extravagant conjecture that
the first census will, at the rate of one for every thirty thousand, raise the
number of representatives to at least one hundred. Estimating the negroes in
the proportion of three fifths, it can scarcely be doubted that the population
of the United States will by that time, if it does not already, amount to three
millions. At the expiration of twenty-five years, according to the computed
rate of increase, the number of representatives will amount to two hundred,
and of fifty years, to four hundred. This is a number which, I presume, will
put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the body. I take for
granted here what I shall, in answering the fourth objection, hereafter show,
that the number of representatives will be augmented from time to time in
the manner provided by the Constitution. On a contrary supposition, I
should admit the objection to have very great weight indeed.
The true question to be decided then is, whether the smallness of the
number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty?
Whether sixty-five members for a few years, and a hundred or two hundred
for a few more, be a safe depositary for a limited and well-guarded power
of legislating for the United States? I must own that I could not give a
negative answer to this question, without first obliterating every impression
which I have received with regard to the present genius of the people of
America, the spirit which actuates the State legislatures, and the principles
which are incorporated with the political character of every class of citizens
I am unable to conceive that the people of America, in their present temper,
or under any circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and
every second year repeat the choice of, sixty-five or a hundred men who
would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. I
am unable to conceive that the State legislatures, which must feel so many
motives to watch, and which possess so many means of counteracting, the
federal legislature, would fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of
the latter against the liberties of their common constituents. I am equally
unable to conceive that there are at this time, or can be in any short time, in
the United States, any sixty-five or a hundred men capable of
recommending themselves to the choice of the people at large, who would
either desire or dare, within the short space of two years, to betray the
solemn trust committed to them. What change of circumstances, time, and a
fuller population of our country may produce, requires a prophetic spirit to
declare, which makes no part of my pretensions. But judging from the
circumstances now before us, and from the probable state of them within a
moderate period of time, I must pronounce that the liberties of America
cannot be unsafe in the number of hands proposed by the federal
Constitution.
From what quarter can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign
gold? If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and enable
them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it happened that we
are at this time a free and independent nation? The Congress which
conducted us through the Revolution was a less numerous body than their
successors will be; they were not chosen by, nor responsible to, their
fellowcitizens at large; though appointed from year to year, and recallable at
pleasure, they were generally continued for three years, and prior to the
ratification of the federal articles, for a still longer term. They held their
consultations always under the veil of secrecy; they had the sole transaction
of our affairs with foreign nations; through the whole course of the war they
had the fate of their country more in their hands than it is to be hoped will
ever be the case with our future representatives; and from the greatness of
the prize at stake, and the eagerness of the party which lost it, it may well
be supposed that the use of other means than force would not have been
scrupled. Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not
betrayed; nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular ever
suffered, even from the whispers of calumny.
Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the federal
government? But where are the means to be found by the President, or the
Senate, or both? Their emoluments of office, it is to be presumed, will not,
and without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives cannot,
more than suffice for very different purposes; their private fortunes, as they
must all be American citizens, cannot possibly be sources of danger. The
only means, then, which they can possess, will be in the dispensation of
appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests her charge? Sometimes we are
told that this fund of corruption is to be exhausted by the President in
subduing the virtue of the Senate. Now, the fidelity of the other House is to
be the victim. The improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious
combination of the several members of government, standing on as
different foundations as republican principles will well admit, and at the
same time accountable to the society over which they are placed, ought
alone to quiet this apprehension. But, fortunately, the Constitution has
provided a still further safeguard. The members of the Congress are
rendered ineligible to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the
emoluments may be increased, during the term of their election. No offices
therefore can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become
vacant by ordinary casualties: and to suppose that these would be sufficient
to purchase the guardians of the people, selected by the people themselves,
is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and to
substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all
reasoning must be vain. The sincere friends of liberty, who give themselves
up to the extravagancies of this passion, are not aware of the injury they do
their own cause. As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which
requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other
qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and
confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these
qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which
have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful
likenesses of the human character, the inference would be, that there is not
sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than
the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring
one another.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 56. The Same Subject
Continued (The Total Number of the House of
Representatives)
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, February 16, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE SECOND charge against the House of Representatives is, that it
will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its
constituents.
As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed
number of representatives with the great extent of the United States, the
number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests, without
taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will distinguish
the Congress from other legislative bodies, the best answer that can be
given to it will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities.
It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be
acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this
principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to
which the authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a
variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the
compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due
performance of the legislative trust. In determining the extent of
information required in the exercise of a particular authority, recourse then
must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority.
What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those which are of most
importance, and which seem most to require local knowledge, are
commerce, taxation, and the militia.
A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, as has been
elsewhere remarked; but as far as this information relates to the laws and
local situation of each individual State, a very few representatives would be
very sufficient vehicles of it to the federal councils.
Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties which will be involved
in the regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark is applicable to
this object. As far as it may consist of internal collections, a more diffusive
knowledge of the circumstances of the State may be necessary. But will not
this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men,
diffusively elected within the State? Divide the largest State into ten or
twelve districts, and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local
interests in either, which will not be within the knowledge of the
representative of the district. Besides this source of information, the laws of
the State, framed by representatives from every part of it, will be almost of
themselves a sufficient guide. In every State there have been made, and
must continue to be made, regulations on this subject which will, in many
cases, leave little more to be done by the federal legislature, than to review
the different laws, and reduce them in one general act. A skillful individual
in his closet with all the local codes before him, might compile a law on
some subjects of taxation for the whole union, without any aid from oral
information, and it may be expected that whenever internal taxes may be
necessary, and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the
States, the more simple objects will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the
facility which will be given to this branch of federal legislation by the
assistance of the State codes, we need only suppose for a moment that this
or any other State were divided into a number of parts, each having and
exercising within itself a power of local legislation. Is it not evident that a
degree of local information and preparatory labor would be found in the
several volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the
labors of the general legislature, and render a much smaller number of
members sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive great advantage
from another circumstance. The representatives of each State will not only
bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a local
knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably in all cases have
been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the State
legislature, where all the local information and interests of the State are
assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few
hands into the legislature of the United States.
(The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater
force to the case of the militia. For however different the rules of discipline
may be in different States, they are the same throughout each particular
State; and depend on circumstances which can differ but little in different
parts of the same State.)(E1)
(With regard to the regulation of the militia, there are scarcely any
circumstances in reference to which local knowledge can be said to be
necessary. The general face of the country, whether mountainous or level,
most fit for the operations of infantry or cavalry, is almost the only
consideration of this nature that can occur. The art of war teaches general
principles of organization, movement, and discipline, which apply
universally.)(E1)
The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used, to prove
the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives, does not in any
respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the
extensive information which the representatives ought to possess, and the
time that might be necessary for acquiring it. This information, so far as it
may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult, not by a
difference of laws and local circumstances within a single State, but of
those among different States. Taking each State by itself, its laws are the
same, and its interests but little diversified. A few men, therefore, will
possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them.
Were the interests and affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and
uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of
them in every other, and the whole State might be competently represented
by a single member taken from any part of it. On a comparison of the
different States together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in
many other circumstances connected with the objects of federal legislation,
with all of which the federal representatives ought to have some
acquaintance. Whilst a few representatives, therefore, from each State, may
bring with them a due knowledge of their own State, every representative
will have much information to acquire concerning all the other States. The
changes of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative situation of
the different States, will have an assimilating effect. The effect of time on
the internal affairs of the States, taken singly, will be just the contrary. At
present some of the States are little more than a society of husbandmen.
Few of them have made much progress in those branches of industry which
give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation. These, however,
will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population, and will
require, on the part of each State, a fuller representation. The foresight of
the convention has accordingly taken care that the progress of population
may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of
the government.
The experience of Great Britain, which presents to mankind so many
political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and which has
been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries, corroborates the
result of the reflections which we have just made. The number of
inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot be stated
at less than eight millions. The representatives of these eight millions in the
House of Commons amount to five hundred and fifty-eight. Of this number,
one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixty-four persons, and one half,
by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three persons.(1) It cannot be
supposed that the half thus elected, and who do not even reside among the
people at large, can add any thing either to the security of the people against
the government, or to the knowledge of their circumstances and interests in
the legislative councils. On the contrary, it is notorious, that they are more
frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive magistrate,
than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. They might
therefore, with great propriety, be considered as something more than a
mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation. We will,
however, consider them in this light alone, and will not extend the
deduction to a considerable number of others, who do not reside among
their constitutents, are very faintly connected with them, and have very little
particular knowledge of their affairs. With all these concessions, two
hundred and seventy-nine persons only will be the depository of the safety,
interest, and happiness of eight millions that is to say, there will be one
representative only to maintain the rights and explain the situation of
TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY
constitutents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of executive
influence, and extending its authority to every object of legislation within a
nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated.
Yet it is very certain, not only that a valuable portion of freedom has been
preserved under all these circumstances, but that the defects in the British
code are chargeable, in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the
legislature concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this
case the weight which is due to it, and comparing it with that of the House
of Representatives as above explained it seems to give the fullest assurance,
that a representative for every THIRTY THOUSAND INHABITANTS will
render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which
will be confided to it.
PUBLIUS
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FEDERALIST No. 57. The Alleged Tendency of
the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of
the Many Considered in Connection with
Representation.
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 19, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE THIRD charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will
be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the
mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of
the many to the aggrandizement of the few.
Of all the objections which have been framed against the federal
Constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordinary. Whilst the objection
itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy, the principle of it strikes at
the very root of republican government.
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain
for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to
pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the
most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to
hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the
characteristic policy of republican government. The means relied on in this
form of government for preventing their degeneracy are numerous and
various. The most effectual one, is such a limitation of the term of
appointments as will maintain a proper responsibility to the people.
Let me now ask what circumstance there is in the constitution of the
House of Representatives that violates the principles of republican
government, or favors the elevation of the few on the ruins of the many?
Let me ask whether every circumstance is not, on the contrary, strictly
conformable to these principles, and scrupulously impartial to the rights and
pretensions of every class and description of citizens?
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich,
more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty
heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and
unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of
the United States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every
State of electing the corresponding branch of the legislature of the State.
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit
may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No
qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is
permitted to fetter the judgement or disappoint the inclination of the people.
If we consider the situation of the men on whom the free suffrages of
their fellow-citizens may confer the representative trust, we shall find it
involving every security which can be devised or desired for their fidelity to
their constituents.
In the first place, as they will have been distinguished by the preference
of their fellow-citizens, we are to presume that in general they will be
somewhat distinguished also by those qualities which entitle them to it, and
which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to the nature of their
engagements.
In the second place, they will enter into the public service under
circumstances which cannot fail to produce a temporary affection at least to
their constituents. There is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honor, of
favor, of esteem, and of confidence, which, apart from all considerations of
interest, is some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns. Ingratitude is a
common topic of declamation against human nature; and it must be
confessed that instances of it are but too frequent and flagrant, both in
public and in private life. But the universal and extreme indignation which
it inspires is itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary
sentiment.
In the third place, those ties which bind the representative to his
constituents are strengthened by motives of a more selfish nature. His pride
and vanity attach him to a form of government which favors his pretensions
and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions. Whatever hopes or
projects might be entertained by a few aspiring characters, it must generally
happen that a great proportion of the men deriving their advancement from
their influence with the people, would have more to hope from a
preservation of the favor, than from innovations in the government
subversive of the authority of the people.
All these securities, however, would be found very insufficient without
the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the fourth place, the House of
Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual
recollection of their dependence on the people. Before the sentiments
impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by
the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment
when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and
when they must descend to the level from which they were raised; there
forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have
established their title to a renewal of it.
I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of
Representatives, restraining them from oppressive measures, that they can
make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their
friends, as well as on the great mass of the society. This has always been
deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect the
rulers and the people together. It creates between them that communion of
interests and sympathy of sentiments, of which few governments have
furnished examples; but without which every government degenerates into
tyranny. If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives from
making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of
the society? I answer: the genius of the whole system; the nature of just and
constitutional laws; and above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which
actuates the people of America—a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in
return is nourished by it.
If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not
obligatory on the legislature, as well as on the people, the people will be
prepared to tolerate any thing but liberty.
Such will be the relation between the House of Representatives and their
constituents. Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords by
which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of
the people. It is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the
caprice and wickedness of man. But are they not all that government will
admit, and that human prudence can devise? Are they not the genuine and
the characteristic means by which republican government provides for the
liberty and happiness of the people? Are they not the identical means on
which every State government in the Union relies for the attainment of
these important ends? What then are we to understand by the objection
which this paper has combated? What are we to say to the men who profess
the most flaming zeal for republican government, yet boldly impeach the
fundamental principle of it; who pretend to be champions for the right and
the capacity of the people to choose their own rulers, yet maintain that they
will prefer those only who will immediately and infallibly betray the trust
committed to them?
Were the objection to be read by one who had not seen the mode
prescribed by the Constitution for the choice of representatives, he could
suppose nothing less than that some unreasonable qualification of property
was annexed to the right of suffrage; or that the right of eligibility was
limited to persons of particular families or fortunes; or at least that the mode
prescribed by the State constitutions was in some respect or other, very
grossly departed from. We have seen how far such a supposition would err,
as to the two first points. Nor would it, in fact, be less erroneous as to the
last. The only difference discoverable between the two cases is, that each
representative of the United States will be elected by five or six thousand
citizens; whilst in the individual States, the election of a representative is
left to about as many hundreds. Will it be pretended that this difference is
sufficient to justify an attachment to the State governments, and an
abhorrence to the federal government? If this be the point on which the
objection turns, it deserves to be examined.
Is it supported by REASON? This cannot be said, without maintaining
that five or six thousand citizens are less capable of choosing a fit
representative, or more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one, than five or
six hundred. Reason, on the contrary, assures us, that as in so great a
number a fit representative would be most likely to be found, so the choice
would be less likely to be diverted from him by the intrigues of the
ambitious or the ambitious or the bribes of the rich.
Is the CONSEQUENCE from this doctrine admissible? If we say that
five or six hundred citizens are as many as can jointly exercise their right of
suffrage, must we not deprive the people of the immediate choice of their
public servants, in every instance where the administration of the
government does not require as many of them as will amount to one for that
number of citizens?
Is the doctrine warranted by FACTS? It was shown in the last paper, that
the real representation in the British House of Commons very little exceeds
the proportion of one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. Besides a
variety of powerful causes not existing here, and which favor in that
country the pretensions of rank and wealth, no person is eligible as a
representative of a county, unless he possess real estate of the clear value of
six hundred pounds sterling per year; nor of a city or borough, unless he
possess a like estate of half that annual value. To this qualification on the
part of the county representatives is added another on the part of the county
electors, which restrains the right of suffrage to persons having a freehold
estate of the annual value of more than twenty pounds sterling, according to
the present rate of money. Notwithstanding these unfavorable
circumstances, and notwithstanding some very unequal laws in the British
code, it cannot be said that the representatives of the nation have elevated
the few on the ruins of the many.
But we need not resort to foreign experience on this subject. Our own is
explicit and decisive. The districts in New Hampshire in which the senators
are chosen immediately by the people, are nearly as large as will be
necessary for her representatives in the Congress. Those of Massachusetts
are larger than will be necessary for that purpose; and those of New York
still more so. In the last State the members of Assembly for the cities and
counties of New York and Albany are elected by very nearly as many voters
as will be entitled to a representative in the Congress, calculating on the
number of sixty-five representatives only. It makes no difference that in
these senatorial districts and counties a number of representatives are voted
for by each elector at the same time. If the same electors at the same time
are capable of choosing four or five representatives, they cannot be
incapable of choosing one. Pennsylvania is an additional example. Some of
her counties, which elect her State representatives, are almost as large as her
districts will be by which her federal representatives will be elected. The
city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between fifty and sixty thousand
souls. It will therefore form nearly two districts for the choice of federal
representatives. It forms, however, but one county, in which every elector
votes for each of its representatives in the State legislature. And what may
appear to be still more directly to our purpose, the whole city actually elects
a SINGLE MEMBER for the executive council. This is the case in all the
other counties of the State.
Are not these facts the most satisfactory proofs of the fallacy which has
been employed against the branch of the federal government under
consideration? Has it appeared on trial that the senators of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and New York, or the executive council of Pennsylvania, or
the members of the Assembly in the two last States, have betrayed any
peculiar disposition to sacrifice the many to the few, or are in any respect
less worthy of their places than the representatives and magistrates
appointed in other States by very small divisions of the people?
But there are cases of a stronger complexion than any which I have yet
quoted. One branch of the legislature of Connecticut is so constituted that
each member of it is elected by the whole State. So is the governor of that
State, of Massachusetts, and of this State, and the president of New
Hampshire. I leave every man to decide whether the result of any one of
these experiments can be said to countenance a suspicion, that a diffusive
mode of choosing representatives of the people tends to elevate traitors and
to undermine the public liberty.
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MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am
to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will
not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may
demand.
It has been admitted, that this objection, if well supported, would have
great weight. The following observations will show that, like most other
objections against the Constitution, it can only proceed from a partial view
of the subject, or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures every
object which is beheld.
1. Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that the
federal Constitution will not suffer by a comparison with the State
constitutions, in the security provided for a gradual augmentation of the
number of representatives. The number which is to prevail in the first
instance is declared to be temporary. Its duration is limited to the short term
of three years.
Within every successive term of ten years a census of inhabitants is to be
repeated. The unequivocal objects of these regulations are, first, to readjust,
from time to time, the apportionment of representatives to the number of
inhabitants, under the single exception that each State shall have one
representative at least; secondly, to augment the number of representatives
at the same periods, under the sole limitation that the whole number shall
not exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. If we review the
constitutions of the several States, we shall find that some of them contain
no determinate regulations on this subject, that others correspond pretty
much on this point with the federal Constitution, and that the most effectual
security in any of them is resolvable into a mere directory provision.
2. As far as experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual increase
of representatives under the State constitutions has at least kept pace with
that of the constituents, and it appears that the former have been as ready to
concur in such measures as the latter have been to call for them.
3. There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution which insures a
watchful attention in a majority both of the people and of their
representatives to a constitutional augmentation of the latter. The peculiarity
lies in this, that one branch of the legislature is a representation of citizens,
the other of the States: in the former, consequently, the larger States will
have most weight; in the latter, the advantage will be in favor of the smaller
States. From this circumstance it may with certainty be inferred that the
larger States will be strenuous advocates for increasing the number and
weight of that part of the legislature in which their influence predominates.
And it so happens that four only of the largest will have a majority of the
whole votes in the House of Representatives. Should the representatives or
people, therefore, of the smaller States oppose at any time a reasonable
addition of members, a coalition of a very few States will be sufficient to
overrule the opposition; a coalition which, notwithstanding the rivalship
and local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary occasions, would
not fail to take place, when not merely prompted by common interest, but
justified by equity and the principles of the Constitution.
It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would be prompted by like
motives to an adverse coalition; and as their concurrence would be
indispensable, the just and constitutional views of the other branch might be
defeated. This is the difficulty which has probably created the most serious
apprehensions in the jealous friends of a numerous representation.
Fortunately it is among the difficulties which, existing only in appearance,
vanish on a close and accurate inspection. The following reflections will, if
I mistake not, be admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory on this point.
Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two
houses on all legislative subjects, except the originating of money bills, it
cannot be doubted that the House, composed of the greater number of
members, when supported by the more powerful States, and speaking the
known and determined sense of a majority of the people, will have no small
advantage in a question depending on the comparative firmness of the two
houses.
This advantage must be increased by the consciousness, felt by the same
side of being supported in its demands by right, by reason, and by the
Constitution; and the consciousness, on the opposite side, of contending
against the force of all these solemn considerations.
It is farther to be considered, that in the gradation between the smallest
and largest States, there are several, which, though most likely in general to
arrange themselves among the former are too little removed in extent and
population from the latter, to second an opposition to their just and
legitimate pretensions. Hence it is by no means certain that a majority of
votes, even in the Senate, would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in
the number of representatives.
It will not be looking too far to add, that the senators from all the new
States may be gained over to the just views of the House of
Representatives, by an expedient too obvious to be overlooked. As these
States will, for a great length of time, advance in population with peculiar
rapidity, they will be interested in frequent reapportionments of the
representatives to the number of inhabitants. The large States, therefore,
who will prevail in the House of Representatives, will have nothing to do
but to make reapportionments and augmentations mutually conditions of
each other; and the senators from all the most growing States will be bound
to contend for the latter, by the interest which their States will feel in the
former.
These considerations seem to afford ample security on this subject, and
ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been indulged
with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should all be insufficient to
subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States, or their predominant
influence in the councils of the Senate, a constitutional and infallible
resource still remains with the larger States, by which they will be able at
all times to accomplish their just purposes. The House of Representatives
cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the
support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse—that powerful
instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution,
an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the
sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems
to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the
government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the
most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm
the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every
grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.
But will not the House of Representatives be as much interested as the
Senate in maintaining the government in its proper functions, and will they
not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation on the
pliancy of the Senate? Or, if such a trial of firmness between the two
branches were hazarded, would not the one be as likely first to yield as the
other? These questions will create no difficulty with those who reflect that
in all cases the smaller the number, and the more permanent and
conspicuous the station, of men in power, the stronger must be the interest
which they will individually feel in whatever concerns the government.
Those who represent the dignity of their country in the eyes of other
nations, will be particularly sensible to every prospect of public danger, or
of dishonorable stagnation in public affairs. To those causes we are to
ascribe the continual triumph of the British House of Commons over the
other branches of the government, whenever the engine of a money bill has
been employed. An absolute inflexibility on the side of the latter, although
it could not have failed to involve every department of the state in the
general confusion, has neither been apprehended nor experienced. The
utmost degree of firmness that can be displayed by the federal Senate or
President, will not be more than equal to a resistance in which they will be
supported by constitutional and patriotic principles.
In this review of the Constitution of the House of Representatives, I have
passed over the circumstances of economy, which, in the present state of
affairs, might have had some effect in lessening the temporary number of
representatives, and a disregard of which would probably have been as rich
a theme of declamation against the Constitution as has been shown by the
smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any remarks on the difficulty
which might be found, under present circumstances, in engaging in the
federal service a large number of such characters as the people will
probably elect. One observation, however, I must be permitted to add on
this subject as claiming, in my judgment, a very serious attention. It is, that
in all legislative assemblies the greater the number composing them may
be, the fewer will be the men who will in fact direct their proceedings. In
the first place, the more numerous an assembly may be, of whatever
characters composed, the greater is known to be the ascendency of passion
over reason. In the next place, the larger the number, the greater will be the
proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities. Now,
it is precisely on characters of this description that the eloquence and
address of the few are known to act with all their force. In the ancient
republics, where the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single
orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a
sway as if a sceptre had been placed in his single hand. On the same
principle, the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be
rendered, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective
meetings of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion
the slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than
in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain
limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few.
Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, AFTER
SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR THE PURPOSES OF
SAFETY, OF LOCAL INFORMATION, AND OF DIFFUSIVE
SYMPATHY WITH THE WHOLE SOCIETY, they will counteract their
own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of
the government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it
will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and
often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.
As connected with the objection against the number of representatives,
may properly be here noticed, that which has been suggested against the
number made competent for legislative business. It has been said that more
than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum; and in particular
cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That
some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution, cannot be
denied. It might have been an additional shield to some particular interests,
and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures. But these
considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale.
In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be
passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free
government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that
would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority. Were the
defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an interested minority might
take advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the
general weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable
indulgences. Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of
secessions; a practice which has shown itself even in States where a
majority only is required; a practice subversive of all the principles of order
and regular government; a practice which leads more directly to public
convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than any other which has
yet been displayed among us.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 59. Concerning the Power of
Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
From the New York Packet. Friday, February 22, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider, in this place, that
provision of the Constitution which authorizes the national legislature to
regulate, in the last resort, the election of its own members. It is in these
words: "The TIMES, PLACES, and MANNER of holding elections for
senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the
legislature thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by law, make or alter
SUCH REGULATIONS, except as to the PLACES of choosing senators."
(1) This provision has not only been declaimed against by those who
condemn the Constitution in the gross, but it has been censured by those
who have objected with less latitude and greater moderation; and, in one
instance it has been thought exceptionable by a gentleman who has declared
himself the advocate of every other part of the system.
I am greatly mistaken, notwithstanding, if there be any article in the
whole plan more completely defensible than this. Its propriety rests upon
the evidence of this plain proposition, that EVERY GOVERNMENT
OUGHT TO CONTAIN IN ITSELF THE MEANS OF ITS OWN
PRESERVATION. Every just reasoner will, at first sight, approve an
adherence to this rule, in the work of the convention; and will disapprove
every deviation from it which may not appear to have been dictated by the
necessity of incorporating into the work some particular ingredient, with
which a rigid conformity to the rule was incompatible. Even in this case,
though he may acquiesce in the necessity, yet he will not cease to regard
and to regret a departure from so fundamental a principle, as a portion of
imperfection in the system which may prove the seed of future weakness,
and perhaps anarchy.
It will not be alleged, that an election law could have been framed and
inserted in the Constitution, which would have been always applicable to
every probable change in the situation of the country; and it will therefore
not be denied, that a discretionary power over elections ought to exist
somewhere. It will, I presume, be as readily conceded, that there were only
three ways in which this power could have been reasonably modified and
disposed: that it must either have been lodged wholly in the national
legislature, or wholly in the State legislatures, or primarily in the latter and
ultimately in the former. The last mode has, with reason, been preferred by
the convention. They have submitted the regulation of elections for the
federal government, in the first instance, to the local administrations; which,
in ordinary cases, and when no improper views prevail, may be both more
convenient and more satisfactory; but they have reserved to the national
authority a right to interpose, whenever extraordinary circumstances might
render that interposition necessary to its safety.
Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive power of regulating
elections for the national government, in the hands of the State legislatures,
would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy. They could
at any moment annihilate it, by neglecting to provide for the choice of
persons to administer its affairs. It is to little purpose to say, that a neglect
or omission of this kind would not be likely to take place. The
constitutional possibility of the thing, without an equivalent for the risk, is
an unanswerable objection. Nor has any satisfactory reason been yet
assigned for incurring that risk. The extravagant surmises of a distempered
jealousy can never be dignified with that character. If we are in a humor to
presume abuses of power, it is as fair to presume them on the part of the
State governments as on the part of the general government. And as it is
more consonant to the rules of a just theory, to trust the Union with the care
of its own existence, than to transfer that care to any other hands, if abuses
of power are to be hazarded on the one side or on the other, it is more
rational to hazard them where the power would naturally be placed, than
where it would unnaturally be placed.
Suppose an article had been introduced into the Constitution,
empowering the United States to regulate the elections for the particular
States, would any man have hesitated to condemn it, both as an
unwarrantable transposition of power, and as a premeditated engine for the
destruction of the State governments? The violation of principle, in this
case, would have required no comment; and, to an unbiased observer, it will
not be less apparent in the project of subjecting the existence of the national
government, in a similar respect, to the pleasure of the State governments.
An impartial view of the matter cannot fail to result in a conviction, that
each, as far as possible, ought to depend on itself for its own preservation.
As an objection to this position, it may be remarked that the constitution
of the national Senate would involve, in its full extent, the danger which it
is suggested might flow from an exclusive power in the State legislatures to
regulate the federal elections. It may be alleged, that by declining the
appointment of Senators, they might at any time give a fatal blow to the
Union; and from this it may be inferred, that as its existence would be thus
rendered dependent upon them in so essential a point, there can be no
objection to intrusting them with it in the particular case under
consideration. The interest of each State, it may be added, to maintain its
representation in the national councils, would be a complete security against
an abuse of the trust.
This argument, though specious, will not, upon examination, be found
solid. It is certainly true that the State legislatures, by forbearing the
appointment of senators, may destroy the national government. But it will
not follow that, because they have a power to do this in one instance, they
ought to have it in every other. There are cases in which the pernicious
tendency of such a power may be far more decisive, without any motive
equally cogent with that which must have regulated the conduct of the
convention in respect to the formation of the Senate, to recommend their
admission into the system. So far as that construction may expose the Union
to the possibility of injury from the State legislatures, it is an evil; but it is
an evil which could not have been avoided without excluding the States, in
their political capacities, wholly from a place in the organization of the
national government. If this had been done, it would doubtless have been
interpreted into an entire dereliction of the federal principle; and would
certainly have deprived the State governments of that absolute safeguard
which they will enjoy under this provision. But however wise it may have
been to have submitted in this instance to an inconvenience, for the
attainment of a necessary advantage or a greater good, no inference can be
drawn from thence to favor an accumulation of the evil, where no necessity
urges, nor any greater good invites.
It may be easily discerned also that the national government would run a
much greater risk from a power in the State legislatures over the elections
of its House of Representatives, than from their power of appointing the
members of its Senate. The senators are to be chosen for the period of six
years; there is to be a rotation, by which the seats of a third part of them are
to be vacated and replenished every two years; and no State is to be entitled
to more than two senators; a quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen
members. The joint result of these circumstances would be, that a
temporary combination of a few States to intermit the appointment of
senators, could neither annul the existence nor impair the activity of the
body; and it is not from a general and permanent combination of the States
that we can have any thing to fear. The first might proceed from sinister
designs in the leading members of a few of the State legislatures; the last
would suppose a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body of the
people, which will either never exist at all, or will, in all probability,
proceed from an experience of the inaptitude of the general government to
the advancement of their happiness in which event no good citizen could
desire its continuance.
But with regard to the federal House of Representatives, there is intended
to be a general election of members once in two years. If the State
legislatures were to be invested with an exclusive power of regulating these
elections, every period of making them would be a delicate crisis in the
national situation, which might issue in a dissolution of the Union, if the
leaders of a few of the most important States should have entered into a
previous conspiracy to prevent an election.
I shall not deny, that there is a degree of weight in the observation, that
the interests of each State, to be represented in the federal councils, will be
a security against the abuse of a power over its elections in the hands of the
State legislatures. But the security will not be considered as complete, by
those who attend to the force of an obvious distinction between the interest
of the people in the public felicity, and the interest of their local rulers in the
power and consequence of their offices. The people of America may be
warmly attached to the government of the Union, at times when the
particular rulers of particular States, stimulated by the natural rivalship of
power, and by the hopes of personal aggrandizement, and supported by a
strong faction in each of those States, may be in a very opposite temper.
This diversity of sentiment between a majority of the people, and the
individuals who have the greatest credit in their councils, is exemplified in
some of the States at the present moment, on the present question. The
scheme of separate confederacies, which will always multiply the chances
of ambition, will be a never failing bait to all such influential characters in
the State administrations as are capable of preferring their own emolument
and advancement to the public weal. With so effectual a weapon in their
hands as the exclusive power of regulating elections for the national
government, a combination of a few such men, in a few of the most
considerable States, where the temptation will always be the strongest,
might accomplish the destruction of the Union, by seizing the opportunity
of some casual dissatisfaction among the people (and which perhaps they
may themselves have excited), to discontinue the choice of members for the
federal House of Representatives. It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm
union of this country, under an efficient government, will probably be an
increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation of Europe; and that
enterprises to subvert it will sometimes originate in the intrigues of foreign
powers, and will seldom fail to be patronized and abetted by some of them.
Its preservation, therefore ought in no case that can be avoided, to be
committed to the guardianship of any but those whose situation will
uniformly beget an immediate interest in the faithful and vigilant
performance of the trust.
PUBLIUS
1. 1st clause, 4th section, of the 1st article.
FEDERALIST No. 60. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to
Regulate the Election of Members)
From The Independent Journal. Saturday, February 23, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
WE HAVE seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the
federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State
legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other side;
that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to
the Union itself. It is not pretended, that this right would ever be used for
the exclusion of any State from its share in the representation. The interest
of all would, in this respect at least, be the security of all. But it is alleged,
that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of
some favorite class of men in exclusion of others, by confining the places of
election to particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens
at large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions, this seems
to be the most chimerical. On the one hand, no rational calculation of
probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition which a conduct
so violent and extraordinary would imply, could ever find its way into the
national councils; and on the other, it may be concluded with certainty, that
if so improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into them, it would
display itself in a form altogether different and far more decisive.
The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from this
single reflection, that it could never be made without causing an immediate
revolt of the great body of the people, headed and directed by the State
governments. It is not difficult to conceive that this characteristic right of
freedom may, in certain turbulent and factious seasons, be violated, in
respect to a particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbearing
majority; but that so fundamental a privilege, in a country so situated and
enlightened, should be invaded to the prejudice of the great mass of the
people, by the deliberate policy of the government, without occasioning a
popular revolution, is altogether inconceivable and incredible.
In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations of a more
precise nature, which forbid all apprehension on the subject. The
dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose the national
government, and still more in the manner in which they will be brought into
action in its various branches, must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of
views in any partial scheme of elections. There is sufficient diversity in the
state of property, in the genius, manners, and habits of the people of the
different parts of the Union, to occasion a material diversity of disposition
in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society.
And though an intimate intercourse under the same government will
promote a gradual assimilation in some of these respects, yet there are
causes, as well physical as moral, which may, in a greater or less degree,
permanently nourish different propensities and inclinations in this respect.
But the circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in
the matter, will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several
component parts of the government. The House of Representatives being to
be elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State legislatures,
the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the people, there would
be little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches
in a predilection for any particular class of electors.
As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of "time and
manner," which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the national
government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit which will direct the
choice of its members. The collective sense of the State legislatures can
never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of that sort; a
consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination
apprehended would never be attempted. For what inducement could the
Senate have to concur in a preference in which itself would not be
included? Or to what purpose would it be established, in reference to one
branch of the legislature, if it could not be extended to the other? The
composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the other. And
we can never suppose that it would embrace the appointments to the Senate,
unless we can at the same time suppose the voluntary co-operation of the
State legislatures. If we make the latter supposition, it then becomes
immaterial where the power in question is placed—whether in their hands
or in those of the Union.
But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the national
councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different
departments of industry, or between the different kinds of property, or
between the different degrees of property? Will it lean in favor of the landed
interest, or the moneyed interest, or the mercantile interest, or the
manufacturing interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the
adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of "the wealthy
and the well-born," to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the
society?
If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned in
any particular description of industry or property, I presume it will readily
be admitted, that the competition for it will lie between landed men and
merchants. And I scruple not to affirm, that it is infinitely less likely that
either of them should gain an ascendant in the national councils, than that
the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local councils.
The inference will be, that a conduct tending to give an undue preference to
either is much less to be dreaded from the former than from the latter.
The several States are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and
commerce. In most, if not all of them, agriculture is predominant. In a few
of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire, and in most of them
has a considerable share of influence. In proportion as either prevails, it will
be conveyed into the national representation; and for the very reason, that
this will be an emanation from a greater variety of interests, and in much
more various proportions, than are to be found in any single State, it will be
much less apt to espouse either of them with a decided partiality, than the
representation of any single State.
In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, where the rules
of an equal representation obtain, the landed interest must, upon the whole,
preponderate in the government. As long as this interest prevails in most of
the State legislatures, so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority
in the national Senate, which will generally be a faithful copy of the
majorities of those assemblies. It cannot therefore be presumed, that a
sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will ever be a favorite object
of this branch of the federal legislature. In applying thus particularly to the
Senate a general observation suggested by the situation of the country, I am
governed by the consideration, that the credulous votaries of State power
cannot, upon their own principles, suspect, that the State legislatures would
be warped from their duty by any external influence. But in reality the same
situation must have the same effect, in the primitive composition at least of
the federal House of Representatives: an improper bias towards the
mercantile class is as little to be expected from this quarter as from the
other.
In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it may
be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in the national government,
which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the federal
administration to the landed class? As there is little likelihood that the
supposition of such a bias will have any terrors for those who would be
immediately injured by it, a labored answer to this question will be
dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark, first, that for the reasons
elsewhere assigned, it is less likely that any decided partiality should
prevail in the councils of the Union than in those of any of its members.
Secondly, that there would be no temptation to violate the Constitution in
favor of the landed class, because that class would, in the natural course of
things, enjoy as great a preponderancy as itself could desire. And thirdly,
that men accustomed to investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a
large scale, must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce, to be
inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result from the entire
exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a share in
the management of them. The importance of commerce, in the view of
revenue alone, must effectually guard it against the enmity of a body which
would be continually importuned in its favor, by the urgent calls of public
necessity.
I the rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a preference
founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of industry and
property, because, as far as I understand the meaning of the objectors, they
contemplate a discrimination of another kind. They appear to have in view,
as the objects of the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us, those
whom they designate by the description of "the wealthy and the well-born."
These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious pre-eminence over the rest of
their fellow-citizens. At one time, however, their elevation is to be a
necessary consequence of the smallness of the representative body; at
another time it is to be effected by depriving the people at large of the
opportunity of exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of that body.
But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to
be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference? Are
"the wealthy and the well-born," as they are called, confined to particular
spots in the several States? Have they, by some miraculous instinct or
foresight, set apart in each of them a common place of residence? Are they
only to be met with in the towns or cities? Or are they, on the contrary,
scattered over the face of the country as avarice or chance may have
happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors? If the latter is
the case, (as every intelligent man knows it to be,(1)) is it not evident that
the policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be
as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other
account? The truth is, that there is no method of securing to the rich the
preference apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either
for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power
to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority would be
expressly restricted to the regulation of the TIMES, the PLACES, the
MANNER of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose
or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and
fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature.
Let it, however, be admitted, for argument sake, that the expedient
suggested might be successful; and let it at the same time be equally taken
for granted that all the scruples which a sense of duty or an apprehension of
the danger of the experiment might inspire, were overcome in the breasts of
the national rulers, still I imagine it will hardly be pretended that they could
ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution without the aid of a
military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the
people. The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object has
been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers; but that
the futility of the objection under consideration may appear in the strongest
light, it shall be conceded for a moment that such a force might exist, and
the national government shall be supposed to be in the actual possession of
it. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition to invade the essential
rights of the community, and with the means of gratifying that disposition,
is it presumable that the persons who were actuated by it would amuse
themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a
preference to a favorite class of men? Would they not be likely to prefer a
conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement? Would
they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one
decisive act of usurpation, than to trust to precarious expedients which, in
spite of all the precautions that might accompany them, might terminate in
the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors? Would they not fear that
citizens, not less tenacious than conscious of their rights, would flock from
the remote extremes of their respective States to the places of election, to
overthrow their tyrants, and to substitute men who would be disposed to
avenge the violated majesty of the people?
PUBLIUS
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FEDERALIST No. 61. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to
Regulate the Election of Members)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 26, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections,
contained in the plan of the convention, when pressed in argument, will
sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this qualification,
however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration, that all
elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided. This, say
they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse of the power. A
declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless; so far as it
would have had the effect of quieting apprehensions, it might not have been
undesirable. But it would, in fact, have afforded little or no additional
security against the danger apprehended; and the want of it will never be
considered, by an impartial and judicious examiner, as a serious, still less as
an insuperable, objection to the plan. The different views taken of the
subject in the two preceding papers must be sufficient to satisfy all
dispassionate and discerning men, that if the public liberty should ever be
the victim of the ambition of the national rulers, the power under
examination, at least, will be guiltless of the sacrifice.
If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only, would exercise it
in a careful inspection of the several State constitutions, they would find
little less room for disquietude and alarm, from the latitude which most of
them allow in respect to elections, than from the latitude which is proposed
to be allowed to the national government in the same respect. A review of
their situation, in this particular, would tend greatly to remove any ill
impressions which may remain in regard to this matter. But as that view
would lead into long and tedious details, I shall content myself with the
single example of the State in which I write. The constitution of New York
makes no other provision for LOCALITY of elections, than that the
members of the Assembly shall be elected in the COUNTIES; those of the
Senate, in the great districts into which the State is or may be divided: these
at present are four in number, and comprehend each from two to six
counties. It may readily be perceived that it would not be more difficult to
the legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New
York, by confining elections to particular places, than for the legislature of
the United States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the Union, by the
like expedient. Suppose, for instance, the city of Albany was to be
appointed the sole place of election for the county and district of which it is
a part, would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become the only
electors of the members both of the Senate and Assembly for that county
and district? Can we imagine that the electors who reside in the remote
subdivisions of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, etc., or in any
part of the county of Montgomery, would take the trouble to come to the
city of Albany, to give their votes for members of the Assembly or Senate,
sooner than they would repair to the city of New York, to participate in the
choice of the members of the federal House of Representatives? The
alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a
privilege under the existing laws, which afford every facility to it, furnishes
a ready answer to this question. And, abstracted from any experience on the
subject, we can be at no loss to determine, that when the place of election is
at an INCONVENIENT DISTANCE from the elector, the effect upon his
conduct will be the same whether that distance be twenty miles or twenty
thousand miles. Hence it must appear, that objections to the particular
modification of the federal power of regulating elections will, in substance,
apply with equal force to the modification of the like power in the
constitution of this State; and for this reason it will be impossible to acquit
the one, and to condemn the other. A similar comparison would lead to the
same conclusion in respect to the constitutions of most of the other States.
If it should be said that defects in the State constitutions furnish no
apology for those which are to be found in the plan proposed, I answer, that
as the former have never been thought chargeable with inattention to the
security of liberty, where the imputations thrown on the latter can be shown
to be applicable to them also, the presumption is that they are rather the
cavilling refinements of a predetermined opposition, than the well-founded
inferences of a candid research after truth. To those who are disposed to
consider, as innocent omissions in the State constitutions, what they regard
as unpardonable blemishes in the plan of the convention, nothing can be
said; or at most, they can only be asked to assign some substantial reason
why the representatives of the people in a single State should be more
impregnable to the lust of power, or other sinister motives, than the
representatives of the people of the United States? If they cannot do this,
they ought at least to prove to us that it is easier to subvert the liberties of
three millions of people, with the advantage of local governments to head
their opposition, than of two hundred thousand people who are destitute of
that advantage. And in relation to the point immediately under
consideration, they ought to convince us that it is less probable that a
predominant faction in a single State should, in order to maintain its
superiority, incline to a preference of a particular class of electors, than that
a similar spirit should take possession of the representatives of thirteen
States, spread over a vast region, and in several respects distinguishable
from each other by a diversity of local circumstances, prejudices, and
interests.
Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindication of the
provision in question, on the ground of theoretic propriety, on that of the
danger of placing the power elsewhere, and on that of the safety of placing
it in the manner proposed. But there remains to be mentioned a positive
advantage which will result from this disposition, and which could not as
well have been obtained from any other: I allude to the circumstance of
uniformity in the time of elections for the federal House of Representatives.
It is more than possible that this uniformity may be found by experience to
be of great importance to the public welfare, both as a security against the
perpetuation of the same spirit in the body, and as a cure for the diseases of
faction. If each State may choose its own time of election, it is possible
there may be at least as many different periods as there are months in the
year. The times of election in the several States, as they are now established
for local purposes, vary between extremes as wide as March and November.
The consequence of this diversity would be that there could never happen a
total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time. If an improper spirit
of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse
itself into the new members, as they come forward in succession. The mass
would be likely to remain nearly the same, assimilating constantly to itself
its gradual accretions. There is a contagion in example which few men have
sufficient force of mind to resist. I am inclined to think that treble the
duration in office, with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the
same time, might be less formidable to liberty than one third of that
duration subject to gradual and successive alterations.
Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less requisite for executing
the idea of a regular rotation in the Senate, and for conveniently assembling
the legislature at a stated period in each year.
It may be asked, Why, then, could not a time have been fixed in the
Constitution? As the most zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention
in this State are, in general, not less zealous admirers of the constitution of
the State, the question may be retorted, and it may be asked, Why was not a
time for the like purpose fixed in the constitution of this State? No better
answer can be given than that it was a matter which might safely be
entrusted to legislative discretion; and that if a time had been appointed, it
might, upon experiment, have been found less convenient than some other
time. The same answer may be given to the question put on the other side.
And it may be added that the supposed danger of a gradual change being
merely speculative, it would have been hardly advisable upon that
speculation to establish, as a fundamental point, what would deprive several
States of the convenience of having the elections for their own governments
and for the national government at the same epochs.
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MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and
answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter
next on the examination of the Senate. The heads into which this member of
the government may be considered are: I. The qualification of senators; II.
The appointment of them by the State legislatures; III. The equality of
representation in the Senate; IV. The number of senators, and the term for
which they are to be elected; V. The powers vested in the Senate.
I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of
representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a longer period of
citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a
representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a
citizen nine years; as seven years are required for the latter. The propriety of
these distinctions is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust, which,
requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires at
the same time that the senator should have reached a period of life most
likely to supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in
transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not
thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign
birth and education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent
mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and
talents may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate
and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign
influence on the national councils.
II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by
the State legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been
devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which has been
proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with the public
opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select
appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in the
formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the
former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems.
III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which,
being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions
of the large and the small States, does not call for much discussion. If
indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one
nation, every district ought to have a PROPORTIONAL share in the
government, and that among independent and sovereign States, bound
together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to
have an EQUAL share in the common councils, it does not appear to be
without some reason that in a compound republic, partaking both of the
national and federal character, the government ought to be founded on a
mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is
superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the Constitution
which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but "of a spirit
of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of
our political situation rendered indispensable." A common government,
with powers equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more
loudly by the political situation, of America. A government founded on
principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to
be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the former,
lies between the proposed government and a government still more
objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence must be to
embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation of
the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the
advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice.
In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each State
is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty
remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that
residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to
the large than to the small States; since they are not less solicitous to guard,
by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States
into one simple republic.
Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the
Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of
legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the
concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the
States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation
may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the
peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be
more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of
the other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the
larger States will always be able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat
unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the
faculty and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our
governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the
Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in
contemplation.
IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their appointment, come
next to be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both of
these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are to be
answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain these, it will be necessary to
review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of
such an institution.
First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a
less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may
forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their
important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the
legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first,
must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the
security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in
schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one
would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear
principles, and now so well understood in the United States, that it would be
more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the
improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the
dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish
them from each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due
harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of
republican government.
Second. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity
of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and
violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and
pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without
number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the
history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, need
not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a body which is to correct
this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be
less numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and
consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable
duration.
Third. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of due
acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is not possible
that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a private
nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent
motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws,
the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left
wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of
their legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small
share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on the
blunders of our governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads
rather than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all
the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our
voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many
impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against each preceding
session; so many admonitions to the people, of the value of those aids
which may be expected from a well-constituted senate?
A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of
government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of
the means by which that object can be best attained. Some governments are
deficient in both these qualities; most governments are deficient in the first.
I scruple not to assert, that in American governments too little attention has
been paid to the last. The federal Constitution avoids this error; and what
merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases
the security for the first.
Fourth. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid
succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, in
the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the
government. Every new election in the States is found to change one half of
the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change of
opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a
continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of
prudence and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private
life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in national
transactions.
To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a
volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a
source of innumerable others.
In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations,
and all the advantages connected with national character. An individual who
is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs
without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all prudent people, as a speedy
victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may
pity him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his; and not a
few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. One
nation is to another what one individual is to another; with this melancholy
distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent emotions
than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage
from the indiscretions of each other. Every nation, consequently, whose
affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss
which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of their wiser
neighbors. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to
America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is held in
no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that
she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her
fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs.
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It
poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people,
that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so
voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be
understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or
undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-
day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of
action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?
Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it gives
to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious
and uninformed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning
commerce or revenue, or in any way affecting the value of the different
species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change,
and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by
the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a state
of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the
FEW, not for the MANY.
In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable
government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps every
useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend on a
continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard
his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows not but that his
plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer
or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any
particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance that
his preparatory labors and advances will not render him a victim to an
inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement or laudable
enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of
national policy.
But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment and
reverence which steals into the hearts of the people, towards a political
system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many
of their flattering hopes. No government, any more than an individual, will
long be respected without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable,
without possessing a certain portion of order and stability.
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MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a
due sense of national character. Without a select and stable member of the
government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an
unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already
mentioned, but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the
opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit,
than it is to obtain, its respect and confidence.
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every
government for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the merits of
any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it
should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable
policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national
councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the
presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide
that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character
with foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have
avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance,
been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to
the unbiased part of mankind?
Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is evident
that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable
body. It can only be found in a number so small that a sensible degree of the
praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual;
or in an assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and
consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the
reputation and prosperity of the community. The half-yearly representatives
of Rhode Island would probably have been little affected in their
deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that State, by arguments drawn
from the light in which such measures would be viewed by foreign nations,
or even by the sister States; whilst it can scarcely be doubted that if the
concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary, a regard to
national character alone would have prevented the calamities under which
that misguided people is now laboring.
I add, as a SIXTH defect the want, in some important cases, of a due
responsibility in the government to the people, arising from that frequency
of elections which in other cases produces this responsibility. This remark
will, perhaps, appear not only new, but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be
acknowledged, when explained, to be as undeniable as it is important.
Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to objects
within the power of the responsible party, and in order to be effectual, must
relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment
can be formed by the constituents. The objects of government may be
divided into two general classes: the one depending on measures which
have singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depending on a
succession of well-chosen and well-connected measures, which have a
gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. The importance of the latter
description to the collective and permanent welfare of every country, needs
no explanation. And yet it is evident that an assembly elected for so short a
term as to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of
measures, on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not
to be answerable for the final result, any more than a steward or tenant,
engaged for one year, could be justly made to answer for places or
improvements which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen
years. Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the SHARE of influence
which their annual assemblies may respectively have on events resulting
from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult to
preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a NUMEROUS body,
for such acts of the body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable
operation on its constituents.
The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the
legislative department, which, having sufficient permanency to provide for
such objects as require a continued attention, and a train of measures, may
be justly and effectually answerable for the attainment of those objects.
Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the
necessity of a well-constructed Senate only as they relate to the
representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by prejudice or
corrupted by flattery as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add,
that such an institution may be sometimes necessary as a defense to the
people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and
deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually
will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers;
so there are particular moments in public affairs when the people,
stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled
by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures
which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and
condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of
some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the
misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against
themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over
the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have
often escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard
against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have
escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the
hemlock on one day and statues on the next.
It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive region
cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of a small district, be subject to the
infection of violent passions, or to the danger of combining in pursuit of
unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a distinction of peculiar
importance. I have, on the contrary, endeavored in a former paper to show,
that it is one of the principal recommendations of a confederated republic.
At the same time, this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding
the use of auxiliary precautions. It may even be remarked, that the same
extended situation, which will exempt the people of America from some of
the dangers incident to lesser republics, will expose them to the
inconveniency of remaining for a longer time under the influence of those
misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested men may
succeed in distributing among them.
It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to recollect that
history informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate. Sparta,
Rome, and Carthage are, in fact, the only states to whom that character can
be applied. In each of the two first there was a senate for life. The
constitution of the senate in the last is less known. Circumstantial evidence
makes it probable that it was not different in this particular from the two
others. It is at least certain, that it had some quality or other which rendered
it an anchor against popular fluctuations; and that a smaller council, drawn
out of the senate, was appointed not only for life, but filled up vacancies
itself. These examples, though as unfit for the imitation, as they are
repugnant to the genius, of America, are, notwithstanding, when compared
with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other ancient republics, very
instructive proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend
stability with liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which
distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well ancient
as modern; and which render extreme circumspection necessary, in
reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing due weight to
this consideration, it may still be maintained, that there are many points of
similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention.
Many of the defects, as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a
senatorial institution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently
elected by the people, and to the people themselves. There are others
peculiar to the former, which require the control of such an institution. The
people can never wilfully betray their own interests; but they may possibly
be betrayed by the representatives of the people; and the danger will be
evidently greater where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of
one body of men, than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar
bodies is required in every public act.
The difference most relied on, between the American and other republics,
consists in the principle of representation; which is the pivot on which the
former move, and which is supposed to have been unknown to the latter, or
at least to the ancient part of them. The use which has been made of this
difference, in reasonings contained in former papers, will have shown that I
am disposed neither to deny its existence nor to undervalue its importance. I
feel the less restraint, therefore, in observing, that the position concerning
the ignorance of the ancient governments on the subject of representation, is
by no means precisely true in the latitude commonly given to it. Without
entering into a disquisition which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a
few known facts, in support of what I advance.
In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive functions
were performed, not by the people themselves, but by officers elected by
the people, and REPRESENTING the people in their EXECUTIVE
capacity.
Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine Archons,
annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE AT LARGE. The degree of power
delegated to them seems to be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to that
period, we find an assembly, first of four, and afterwards of six hundred
members, annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE; and PARTIALLY
representing them in their LEGISLATIVE capacity, since they were not
only associated with the people in the function of making laws, but had the
exclusive right of originating legislative propositions to the people. The
senate of Carthage, also, whatever might be its power, or the duration of its
appointment, appears to have been ELECTIVE by the suffrages of the
people. Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all the popular
governments of antiquity.
Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the
Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in numbers, but annually ELECTED BY
THE WHOLE BODY OF THE PEOPLE, and considered as the
REPRESENTATIVES of the people, almost in their PLENIPOTENTIARY
capacity. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually ELECTED BY THE
PEOPLE, and have been considered by some authors as an institution
analogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference only, that in the
election of that representative body the right of suffrage was communicated
to a part only of the people.
From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that
the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients nor
wholly overlooked in their political constitutions. The true distinction
between these and the American governments, lies IN THE TOTAL
EXCLUSION OF THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITY,
from any share in the LATTER, and not in the TOTAL EXCLUSION OF
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE from the administration of
the FORMER. The distinction, however, thus qualified, must be admitted to
leave a most advantageous superiority in favor of the United States. But to
insure to this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it
from the other advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be
believed, that any form of representative government could have succeeded
within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.
In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illustrated by
examples, and enforced by our own experience, the jealous adversary of the
Constitution will probably content himself with repeating, that a senate
appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of six years,
must gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and
finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.
To this general answer, the general reply ought to be sufficient, that
liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses
of power; that there are numerous instances of the former as well as of the
latter; and that the former, rather than the latter, are apparently most to be
apprehended by the United States. But a more particular reply may be
given.
Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed,
must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the State legislatures;
must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and must finally corrupt
the people at large. It is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted
before it can attempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the
State legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the periodical
change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole body. Without
exerting the means of corruption with equal success on the House of
Representatives, the opposition of that coequal branch of the government
would inevitably defeat the attempt; and without corrupting the people
themselves, a succession of new representatives would speedily restore all
things to their pristine order. Is there any man who can seriously persuade
himself that the proposed Senate can, by any possible means within the
compass of human address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition,
through all these obstructions?
If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is pronounced by
experience. The constitution of Maryland furnishes the most apposite
example. The Senate of that State is elected, as the federal Senate will be,
indirectly by the people, and for a term less by one year only than the
federal Senate. It is distinguished, also, by the remarkable prerogative of
filling up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment, and, at the
same time, is not under the control of any such rotation as is provided for
the federal Senate. There are some other lesser distinctions, which would
expose the former to colorable objections, that do not lie against the latter.
If the federal Senate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been
so loudly proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this
time to have been betrayed by the Senate of Maryland, but no such
symptoms have appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained
by men of the same description with those who view with terror the
correspondent part of the federal Constitution, have been gradually
extinguished by the progress of the experiment; and the Maryland
constitution is daily deriving, from the salutary operation of this part of it, a
reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by that of any State in
the Union.
But if anything could silence the jealousies on this subject, it ought to be
the British example. The Senate there instead of being elected for a term of
six years, and of being unconfined to particular families or fortunes, is an
hereditary assembly of opulent nobles. The House of Representatives,
instead of being elected for two years, and by the whole body of the people,
is elected for seven years, and, in very great proportion, by a very small
proportion of the people. Here, unquestionably, ought to be seen in full
display the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny which are at some future
period to be exemplified in the United States. Unfortunately, however, for
the anti-federal argument, the British history informs us that this hereditary
assembly has not been able to defend itself against the continual
encroachments of the House of Representatives; and that it no sooner lost
the support of the monarch, than it was actually crushed by the weight of
the popular branch.
As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its examples support
the reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta, the Ephori, the annual
representatives of the people, were found an overmatch for the senate for
life, continually gained on its authority and finally drew all power into their
own hands. The Tribunes of Rome, who were the representatives of the
people, prevailed, it is well known, in almost every contest with the senate
for life, and in the end gained the most complete triumph over it. The fact is
the more remarkable, as unanimity was required in every act of the
Tribunes, even after their number was augmented to ten. It proves the
irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free government, which has
the people on its side. To these examples might be added that of Carthage,
whose senate, according to the testimony of Polybius, instead of drawing all
power into its vortex, had, at the commencement of the second Punic War,
lost almost the whole of its original portion.
Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of facts,
that the federal Senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual
usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body, we are warranted in
believing, that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which
the foresight of man cannot guard against, the House of Representatives,
with the people on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the
Constitution to its primitive form and principles. Against the force of the
immediate representatives of the people, nothing will be able to maintain
even the constitutional authority of the Senate, but such a display of
enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide with
that branch of the legislature the affections and support of the entire body of
the people themselves.
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JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons,
and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their censures to such
things only in either as are worthy of blame. Unless on this principle, it is
difficult to explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed
Constitution in the aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most
unexceptionable articles in it.
The second section gives power to the President, "BY AND WITH THE
ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, TO MAKE TREATIES,
PROVIDED TWO THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR."
The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates
to war, peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a
mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the highest security that it
will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and in the
manner most conducive to the public good. The convention appears to have
been attentive to both these points: they have directed the President to be
chosen by select bodies of electors, to be deputed by the people for that
express purpose; and they have committed the appointment of senators to
the State legislatures. This mode has, in such cases, vastly the advantage of
elections by the people in their collective capacity, where the activity of
party zeal, taking the advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, and the
hopes and fears of the unwary and interested, often places men in office by
the votes of a small proportion of the electors.
As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the State
legislatures who appoint the senators, will in general be composed of the
most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that
their attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have
become the most distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom
the people perceive just grounds for confidence. The Constitution manifests
very particular attention to this object. By excluding men under thirty-five
from the first office, and those under thirty from the second, it confines the
electors to men of whom the people have had time to form a judgment, and
with respect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those
brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism, which, like transient
meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the observation be well
founded, that wise kings will always be served by able ministers, it is fair to
argue, that as an assembly of select electors possess, in a greater degree
than kings, the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men
and characters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of
discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally results from
these considerations is this, that the President and senators so chosen will
always be of the number of those who best understand our national
interests, whether considered in relation to the several States or to foreign
nations, who are best able to promote those interests, and whose reputation
for integrity inspires and merits confidence. With such men the power of
making treaties may be safely lodged.
Although the absolute necessity of system, in the conduct of any
business, is universally known and acknowledged, yet the high importance
of it in national affairs has not yet become sufficiently impressed on the
public mind. They who wish to commit the power under consideration to a
popular assembly, composed of members constantly coming and going in
quick succession, seem not to recollect that such a body must necessarily be
inadequate to the attainment of those great objects, which require to be
steadily contemplated in all their relations and circumstances, and which
can only be approached and achieved by measures which not only talents,
but also exact information, and often much time, are necessary to concert
and to execute. It was wise, therefore, in the convention to provide, not only
that the power of making treaties should be committed to able and honest
men, but also that they should continue in place a sufficient time to become
perfectly acquainted with our national concerns, and to form and introduce
a system for the management of them. The duration prescribed is such as
will give them an opportunity of greatly extending their political
information, and of rendering their accumulating experience more and more
beneficial to their country. Nor has the convention discovered less prudence
in providing for the frequent elections of senators in such a way as to
obviate the inconvenience of periodically transferring those great affairs
entirely to new men; for by leaving a considerable residue of the old ones in
place, uniformity and order, as well as a constant succession of official
information will be preserved.
There are a few who will not admit that the affairs of trade and
navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously formed and steadily
pursued; and that both our treaties and our laws should correspond with and
be made to promote it. It is of much consequence that this correspondence
and conformity be carefully maintained; and they who assent to the truth of
this position will see and confess that it is well provided for by making
concurrence of the Senate necessary both to treaties and to laws.
It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but
that perfect SECRECY and immediate DESPATCH are sometimes
requisite. These are cases where the most useful intelligence may be
obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of
discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they
are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are
many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the President,
but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a
large popular Assembly. The convention have done well, therefore, in so
disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the President must,
in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be
able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence
may suggest.
They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men, must have
perceived that there are tides in them; tides very irregular in their duration,
strength, and direction, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same
manner or measure. To discern and to profit by these tides in national affairs
is the business of those who preside over them; and they who have had
much experience on this head inform us, that there frequently are occasions
when days, nay, even when hours, are precious. The loss of a battle, the
death of a prince, the removal of a minister, or other circumstances
intervening to change the present posture and aspect of affairs, may turn the
most favorable tide into a course opposite to our wishes. As in the field, so
in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized as they pass, and they who
preside in either should be left in capacity to improve them. So often and so
essentially have we heretofore suffered from the want of secrecy and
despatch, that the Constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if no
attention had been paid to those objects. Those matters which in
negotiations usually require the most secrecy and the most despatch, are
those preparatory and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important
in a national view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the
objects of the negotiation. For these, the President will find no difficulty to
provide; and should any circumstance occur which requires the advice and
consent of the Senate, he may at any time convene them. Thus we see that
the Constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every
advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity, and
deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and despatch
on the other.
But to this plan, as to most others that have ever appeared, objections are
contrived and urged.
Some are displeased with it, not on account of any errors or defects in it,
but because, as the treaties, when made, are to have the force of laws, they
should be made only by men invested with legislative authority. These
gentlemen seem not to consider that the judgments of our courts, and the
commissions constitutionally given by our governor, are as valid and as
binding on all persons whom they concern, as the laws passed by our
legislature. All constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in
the judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if
they proceeded from the legislature; and therefore, whatever name be given
to the power of making treaties, or however obligatory they may be when
made, certain it is, that the people may, with much propriety, commit the
power to a distinct body from the legislature, the executive, or the judicial.
It surely does not follow, that because they have given the power of making
laws to the legislature, that therefore they should likewise give them the
power to do every other act of sovereignty by which the citizens are to be
bound and affected.
Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode
proposed, are averse to their being the SUPREME laws of the land. They
insist, and profess to believe, that treaties like acts of assembly, should be
repealable at pleasure. This idea seems to be new and peculiar to this
country, but new errors, as well as new truths, often appear. These
gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another name for a
bargain, and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would make
any bargain with us, which should be binding on them ABSOLUTELY, but
on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it.
They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them; and it will
not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel them; but
still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the
contracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that as the consent of
both was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to
alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in the
least extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as
far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts now, as they will be at any
future period, or under any form of government.
However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet when like bile in the
natural, it abounds too much in the body politic, the eyes of both become
very liable to be deceived by the delusive appearances which that malady
casts on surrounding objects. From this cause, probably, proceed the fears
and apprehensions of some, that the President and Senate may make treaties
without an equal eye to the interests of all the States. Others suspect that
two thirds will oppress the remaining third, and ask whether those
gentlemen are made sufficiently responsible for their conduct; whether, if
they act corruptly, they can be punished; and if they make disadvantageous
treaties, how are we to get rid of those treaties?
As all the States are equally represented in the Senate, and by men the
most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their constituents,
they will all have an equal degree of influence in that body, especially while
they continue to be careful in appointing proper persons, and to insist on
their punctual attendance. In proportion as the United States assume a
national form and a national character, so will the good of the whole be
more and more an object of attention, and the government must be a weak
one indeed, if it should forget that the good of the whole can only be
promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts or members which
compose the whole. It will not be in the power of the President and Senate
to make any treaties by which they and their families and estates will not be
equally bound and affected with the rest of the community; and, having no
private interests distinct from that of the nation, they will be under no
temptations to neglect the latter.
As to corruption, the case is not supposable. He must either have been
very unfortunate in his intercourse with the world, or possess a heart very
susceptible of such impressions, who can think it probable that the
President and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of such
unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross and too invidious to be entertained.
But in such a case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us
would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the law of
nations.
With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to conceive how it could
be increased. Every consideration that can influence the human mind, such
as honor, oaths, reputations, conscience, the love of country, and family
affections and attachments, afford security for their fidelity. In short, as the
Constitution has taken the utmost care that they shall be men of talents and
integrity, we have reason to be persuaded that the treaties they make will be
as advantageous as, all circumstances considered, could be made; and so far
as the fear of punishment and disgrace can operate, that motive to good
behavior is amply afforded by the article on the subject of impeachments.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the
Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the
executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a
court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the
executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most
properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will,
therefore, conclude this head with a view of the judicial character of the
Senate.
A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not
more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly
elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed
from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or
violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar
propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries
done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this
reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and
to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In
many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will
enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or
on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that
the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties,
than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.
The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns the
political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the
administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The difficulty of
placing it rightly, in a government resting entirely on the basis of periodical
elections, will as readily be perceived, when it is considered that the most
conspicuous characters in it will, from that circumstance, be too often the
leaders or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction, and
on this account, can hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality
towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.
The convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit depositary of
this important trust. Those who can best discern the intrinsic difficulty of
the thing, will be least hasty in condemning that opinion, and will be most
inclined to allow due weight to the arguments which may be supposed to
have produced it.
What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution itself? Is it not
designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public
men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the inquisitors for
the nation as the representatives of the nation themselves? It is not disputed
that the power of originating the inquiry, or, in other words, of preferring
the impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands of one branch of the
legislative body. Will not the reasons which indicate the propriety of this
arrangement strongly plead for an admission of the other branch of that
body to a share of the inquiry? The model from which the idea of this
institution has been borrowed, pointed out that course to the convention. In
Great Britain it is the province of the House of Commons to prefer the
impeachment, and of the House of Lords to decide upon it. Several of the
State constitutions have followed the example. As well the latter, as the
former, seem to have regarded the practice of impeachments as a bridle in
the hands of the legislative body upon the executive servants of the
government. Is not this the true light in which it ought to be regarded?
Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal
sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other body would
be likely to feel CONFIDENCE ENOUGH IN ITS OWN SITUATION, to
preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an
INDIVIDUAL accused, and the REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE,
HIS ACCUSERS?
Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as answering this
description? It is much to be doubted, whether the members of that tribunal
would at all times be endowed with so eminent a portion of fortitude, as
would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task; and it is still more
to be doubted, whether they would possess the degree of credit and
authority, which might, on certain occasions, be indispensable towards
reconciling the people to a decision that should happen to clash with an
accusation brought by their immediate representatives. A deficiency in the
first, would be fatal to the accused; in the last, dangerous to the public
tranquillity. The hazard in both these respects, could only be avoided, if at
all, by rendering that tribunal more numerous than would consist with a
reasonable attention to economy. The necessity of a numerous court for the
trial of impeachments, is equally dictated by the nature of the proceeding.
This can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation of
the offense by the prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the judges, as
in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in favor of personal
security. There will be no jury to stand between the judges who are to
pronounce the sentence of the law, and the party who is to receive or suffer
it. The awful discretion which a court of impeachments must necessarily
have, to doom to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most
distinguished characters of the community, forbids the commitment of the
trust to a small number of persons.
These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize a conclusion, that
the Supreme Court would have been an improper substitute for the Senate,
as a court of impeachments. There remains a further consideration, which
will not a little strengthen this conclusion. It is this: The punishment which
may be the consequence of conviction upon impeachment, is not to
terminate the chastisement of the offender. After having been sentenced to a
perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors and
emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution and
punishment in the ordinary course of law. Would it be proper that the
persons who had disposed of his fame, and his most valuable rights as a
citizen in one trial, should, in another trial, for the same offense, be also the
disposers of his life and his fortune? Would there not be the greatest reason
to apprehend, that error, in the first sentence, would be the parent of error in
the second sentence? That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to
overrule the influence of any new lights which might be brought to vary the
complexion of another decision? Those who know anything of human
nature, will not hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative; and
will be at no loss to perceive, that by making the same persons judges in
both cases, those who might happen to be the objects of prosecution would,
in a great measure, be deprived of the double security intended them by a
double trial. The loss of life and estate would often be virtually included in
a sentence which, in its terms, imported nothing more than dismission from
a present, and disqualification for a future, office. It may be said, that the
intervention of a jury, in the second instance, would obviate the danger. But
juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of judges. They are
sometimes induced to find special verdicts, which refer the main question to
the decision of the court. Who would be willing to stake his life and his
estate upon the verdict of a jury acting under the auspices of judges who
had predetermined his guilt?
Would it have been an improvement of the plan, to have united the
Supreme Court with the Senate, in the formation of the court of
impeachments? This union would certainly have been attended with several
advantages; but would they not have been overbalanced by the signal
disadvantage, already stated, arising from the agency of the same judges in
the double prosecution to which the offender would be liable? To a certain
extent, the benefits of that union will be obtained from making the chief
justice of the Supreme Court the president of the court of impeachments, as
is proposed to be done in the plan of the convention; while the
inconveniences of an entire incorporation of the former into the latter will
be substantially avoided. This was perhaps the prudent mean. I forbear to
remark upon the additional pretext for clamor against the judiciary, which
so considerable an augmentation of its authority would have afforded.
Would it have been desirable to have composed the court for the trial of
impeachments, of persons wholly distinct from the other departments of the
government? There are weighty arguments, as well against, as in favor of,
such a plan. To some minds it will not appear a trivial objection, that it
could tend to increase the complexity of the political machine, and to add a
new spring to the government, the utility of which would at best be
questionable. But an objection which will not be thought by any unworthy
of attention, is this: a court formed upon such a plan, would either be
attended with a heavy expense, or might in practice be subject to a variety
of casualties and inconveniences. It must either consist of permanent
officers, stationary at the seat of government, and of course entitled to fixed
and regular stipends, or of certain officers of the State governments to be
called upon whenever an impeachment was actually depending. It will not
be easy to imagine any third mode materially different, which could
rationally be proposed. As the court, for reasons already given, ought to be
numerous, the first scheme will be reprobated by every man who can
compare the extent of the public wants with the means of supplying them.
The second will be espoused with caution by those who will seriously
consider the difficulty of collecting men dispersed over the whole Union;
the injury to the innocent, from the procrastinated determination of the
charges which might be brought against them; the advantage to the guilty,
from the opportunities which delay would afford to intrigue and corruption;
and in some cases the detriment to the State, from the prolonged inaction of
men whose firm and faithful execution of their duty might have exposed
them to the persecution of an intemperate or designing majority in the
House of Representatives. Though this latter supposition may seem harsh,
and might not be likely often to be verified, yet it ought not to be forgotten
that the demon of faction will, at certain seasons, extend his sceptre over all
numerous bodies of men.
But though one or the other of the substitutes which have been examined,
or some other that might be devised, should be thought preferable to the
plan in this respect, reported by the convention, it will not follow that the
Constitution ought for this reason to be rejected. If mankind were to resolve
to agree in no institution of government, until every part of it had been
adjusted to the most exact standard of perfection, society would soon
become a general scene of anarchy, and the world a desert. Where is the
standard of perfection to be found? Who will undertake to unite the
discordant opinions of a whole community, in the same judgment of it; and
to prevail upon one conceited projector to renounce his INFALLIBLE
criterion for the FALLIBLE criterion of his more CONCEITED
NEIGHBOR? To answer the purpose of the adversaries of the Constitution,
they ought to prove, not merely that particular provisions in it are not the
best which might have been imagined, but that the plan upon the whole is
bad and pernicious.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
A REVIEW of the principal objections that have appeared against the
proposed court for the trial of impeachments, will not improbably eradicate
the remains of any unfavorable impressions which may still exist in regard
to this matter.
The FIRST of these objections is, that the provision in question
confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in the same body, in
violation of that important and well-established maxim which requires a
separation between the different departments of power. The true meaning of
this maxim has been discussed and ascertained in another place, and has
been shown to be entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those
departments for special purposes, preserving them, in the main, distinct and
unconnected. This partial intermixture is even, in some cases, not only
proper but necessary to the mutual defense of the several members of the
government against each other. An absolute or qualified negative in the
executive upon the acts of the legislative body, is admitted, by the ablest
adepts in political science, to be an indispensable barrier against the
encroachments of the latter upon the former. And it may, perhaps, with no
less reason be contended, that the powers relating to impeachments are, as
before intimated, an essential check in the hands of that body upon the
encroachments of the executive. The division of them between the two
branches of the legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the
other the right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making the same
persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of
persecution, from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those
branches. As the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate will be requisite to
a condemnation, the security to innocence, from this additional
circumstance, will be as complete as itself can desire.
It is curious to observe, with what vehemence this part of the plan is
assailed, on the principle here taken notice of, by men who profess to
admire, without exception, the constitution of this State; while that
constitution makes the Senate, together with the chancellor and judges of
the Supreme Court, not only a court of impeachments, but the highest
judicatory in the State, in all causes, civil and criminal. The proportion, in
point of numbers, of the chancellor and judges to the senators, is so
inconsiderable, that the judiciary authority of New York, in the last resort,
may, with truth, be said to reside in its Senate. If the plan of the convention
be, in this respect, chargeable with a departure from the celebrated maxim
which has been so often mentioned, and seems to be so little understood,
how much more culpable must be the constitution of New York?(1)
A SECOND objection to the Senate, as a court of impeachments, is, that
it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in that body, tending to
give to the government a countenance too aristocratic. The Senate, it is
observed, is to have concurrent authority with the Executive in the
formation of treaties and in the appointment to offices: if, say the objectors,
to these prerogatives is added that of deciding in all cases of impeachment,
it will give a decided predominancy to senatorial influence. To an objection
so little precise in itself, it is not easy to find a very precise answer. Where
is the measure or criterion to which we can appeal, for determining what
will give the Senate too much, too little, or barely the proper degree of
influence? Will it not be more safe, as well as more simple, to dismiss such
vague and uncertain calculations, to examine each power by itself, and to
decide, on general principles, where it may be deposited with most
advantage and least inconvenience?
If we take this course, it will lead to a more intelligible, if not to a more
certain result. The disposition of the power of making treaties, which has
obtained in the plan of the convention, will, then, if I mistake not, appear to
be fully justified by the considerations stated in a former number, and by
others which will occur under the next head of our inquiries. The
expediency of the junction of the Senate with the Executive, in the power of
appointing to offices, will, I trust, be placed in a light not less satisfactory,
in the disquisitions under the same head. And I flatter myself the
observations in my last paper must have gone no inconsiderable way
towards proving that it was not easy, if practicable, to find a more fit
receptacle for the power of determining impeachments, than that which has
been chosen. If this be truly the case, the hypothetical dread of the too great
weight of the Senate ought to be discarded from our reasonings.
But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been refuted in the remarks
applied to the duration in office prescribed for the senators. It was by them
shown, as well on the credit of historical examples, as from the reason of
the thing, that the most POPULAR branch of every government, partaking
of the republican genius, by being generally the favorite of the people, will
be as generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every other member of
the Government.
But independent of this most active and operative principle, to secure the
equilibrium of the national House of Representatives, the plan of the
convention has provided in its favor several important counterpoises to the
additional authorities to be conferred upon the Senate. The exclusive
privilege of originating money bills will belong to the House of
Representatives. The same house will possess the sole right of instituting
impeachments: is not this a complete counterbalance to that of determining
them? The same house will be the umpire in all elections of the President,
which do not unite the suffrages of a majority of the whole number of
electors; a case which it cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not
frequently, happen. The constant possibility of the thing must be a fruitful
source of influence to that body. The more it is contemplated, the more
important will appear this ultimate though contingent power, of deciding
the competitions of the most illustrious citizens of the Union, for the first
office in it. It would not perhaps be rash to predict, that as a mean of
influence it will be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the
Senate.
A THIRD objection to the Senate as a court of impeachments, is drawn
from the agency they are to have in the appointments to office. It is
imagined that they would be too indulgent judges of the conduct of men, in
whose official creation they had participated. The principle of this objection
would condemn a practice, which is to be seen in all the State governments,
if not in all the governments with which we are acquainted: I mean that of
rendering those who hold offices during pleasure, dependent on the pleasure
of those who appoint them. With equal plausibility might it be alleged in
this case, that the favoritism of the latter would always be an asylum for the
misbehavior of the former. But that practice, in contradiction to this
principle, proceeds upon the presumption, that the responsibility of those
who appoint, for the fitness and competency of the persons on whom they
bestow their choice, and the interest they will have in the respectable and
prosperous administration of affairs, will inspire a sufficient disposition to
dismiss from a share in it all such who, by their conduct, shall have proved
themselves unworthy of the confidence reposed in them. Though facts may
not always correspond with this presumption, yet if it be, in the main, just,
it must destroy the supposition that the Senate, who will merely sanction the
choice of the Executive, should feel a bias, towards the objects of that
choice, strong enough to blind them to the evidences of guilt so
extraordinary, as to have induced the representatives of the nation to
become its accusers.
If any further arguments were necessary to evince the improbability of
such a bias, it might be found in the nature of the agency of the Senate in
the business of appointments. It will be the office of the President to
NOMINATE, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to APPOINT.
There will, of course, be no exertion of CHOICE on the part of the Senate.
They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make
another; but they cannot themselves CHOOSE—they can only ratify or
reject the choice of the President. They might even entertain a preference to
some other person, at the very moment they were assenting to the one
proposed, because there might be no positive ground of opposition to him;
and they could not be sure, if they withheld their assent, that the subsequent
nomination would fall upon their own favorite, or upon any other person in
their estimation more meritorious than the one rejected. Thus it could
hardly happen, that the majority of the Senate would feel any other
complacency towards the object of an appointment than such as the
appearances of merit might inspire, and the proofs of the want of it destroy.
A FOURTH objection to the Senate in the capacity of a court of
impeachments, is derived from its union with the Executive in the power of
making treaties. This, it has been said, would constitute the senators their
own judges, in every case of a corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust.
After having combined with the Executive in betraying the interests of the
nation in a ruinous treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would there be of their
being made to suffer the punishment they would deserve, when they were
themselves to decide upon the accusation brought against them for the
treachery of which they have been guilty?
This objection has been circulated with more earnestness and with
greater show of reason than any other which has appeared against this part
of the plan; and yet I am deceived if it does not rest upon an erroneous
foundation.
The security essentially intended by the Constitution against corruption
and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be sought for in the numbers
and characters of those who are to make them. The JOINT AGENCY of the
Chief Magistrate of the Union, and of two thirds of the members of a body
selected by the collective wisdom of the legislatures of the several States, is
designed to be the pledge for the fidelity of the national councils in this
particular. The convention might with propriety have meditated the
punishment of the Executive, for a deviation from the instructions of the
Senate, or a want of integrity in the conduct of the negotiations committed
to him; they might also have had in view the punishment of a few leading
individuals in the Senate, who should have prostituted their influence in that
body as the mercenary instruments of foreign corruption: but they could
not, with more or with equal propriety, have contemplated the impeachment
and punishment of two thirds of the Senate, consenting to an improper
treaty, than of a majority of that or of the other branch of the national
legislature, consenting to a pernicious or unconstitutional law—a principle
which, I believe, has never been admitted into any government. How, in
fact, could a majority in the House of Representatives impeach themselves?
Not better, it is evident, than two thirds of the Senate might try themselves.
And yet what reason is there, that a majority of the House of
Representatives, sacrificing the interests of the society by an unjust and
tyrannical act of legislation, should escape with impunity, more than two
thirds of the Senate, sacrificing the same interests in an injurious treaty with
a foreign power? The truth is, that in all such cases it is essential to the
freedom and to the necessary independence of the deliberations of the body,
that the members of it should be exempt from punishment for acts done in a
collective capacity; and the security to the society must depend on the care
which is taken to confide the trust to proper hands, to make it their interest
to execute it with fidelity, and to make it as difficult as possible for them to
combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good.
So far as might concern the misbehavior of the Executive in perverting
the instructions or contravening the views of the Senate, we need not be
apprehensive of the want of a disposition in that body to punish the abuse of
their confidence or to vindicate their own authority. We may thus far count
upon their pride, if not upon their virtue. And so far even as might concern
the corruption of leading members, by whose arts and influence the
majority may have been inveigled into measures odious to the community,
if the proofs of that corruption should be satisfactory, the usual propensity
of human nature will warrant us in concluding that there would be
commonly no defect of inclination in the body to divert the public
resentment from themselves by a ready sacrifice of the authors of their
mismanagement and disgrace.
PUBLIUS
1. In that of New Jersey, also, the final judiciary authority is in a branch
of the legislature. In New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and
South Carolina, one branch of the legislature is the court for the trial of
impeachments.
FEDERALIST No. 67. The Executive Department
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 11, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE constitution of the executive department of the proposed
government, claims next our attention.
There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended
with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and there is,
perhaps, none which has been inveighed against with less candor or
criticised with less judgment.
Here the writers against the Constitution seem to have taken pains to
signalize their talent of misrepresentation. Calculating upon the aversion of
the people to monarchy, they have endeavored to enlist all their jealousies
and apprehensions in opposition to the intended President of the United
States; not merely as the embryo, but as the full-grown progeny, of that
detested parent. To establish the pretended affinity, they have not scrupled
to draw resources even from the regions of fiction. The authorities of a
magistrate, in few instances greater, in some instances less, than those of a
governor of New York, have been magnified into more than royal
prerogatives. He has been decorated with attributes superior in dignity and
splendor to those of a king of Great Britain. He has been shown to us with
the diadem sparkling on his brow and the imperial purple flowing in his
train. He has been seated on a throne surrounded with minions and
mistresses, giving audience to the envoys of foreign potentates, in all the
supercilious pomp of majesty. The images of Asiatic despotism and
voluptuousness have scarcely been wanting to crown the exaggerated scene.
We have been taught to tremble at the terrific visages of murdering
janizaries, and to blush at the unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio.
Attempts so extravagant as these to disfigure or, it might rather be said,
to metamorphose the object, render it necessary to take an accurate view of
its real nature and form: in order as well to ascertain its true aspect and
genuine appearance, as to unmask the disingenuity and expose the fallacy
of the counterfeit resemblances which have been so insidiously, as well as
industriously, propagated.
In the execution of this task, there is no man who would not find it an
arduous effort either to behold with moderation, or to treat with seriousness,
the devices, not less weak than wicked, which have been contrived to
pervert the public opinion in relation to the subject. They so far exceed the
usual though unjustifiable licenses of party artifice, that even in a
disposition the most candid and tolerant, they must force the sentiments
which favor an indulgent construction of the conduct of political
adversaries to give place to a voluntary and unreserved indignation. It is
impossible not to bestow the imputation of deliberate imposture and
deception upon the gross pretense of a similitude between a king of Great
Britain and a magistrate of the character marked out for that of the President
of the United States. It is still more impossible to withhold that imputation
from the rash and barefaced expedients which have been employed to give
success to the attempted imposition.
In one instance, which I cite as a sample of the general spirit, the temerity
has proceeded so far as to ascribe to the President of the United States a
power which by the instrument reported is EXPRESSLY allotted to the
Executives of the individual States. I mean the power of filling casual
vacancies in the Senate.
This bold experiment upon the discernment of his countrymen has been
hazarded by a writer who (whatever may be his real merit) has had no
inconsiderable share in the applauses of his party(1); and who, upon this
false and unfounded suggestion, has built a series of observations equally
false and unfounded. Let him now be confronted with the evidence of the
fact, and let him, if he be able, justify or extenuate the shameful outrage he
has offered to the dictates of truth and to the rules of fair dealing.
The second clause of the second section of the second article empowers
the President of the United States "to nominate, and by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other OFFICERS of
United States whose appointments are NOT in the Constitution
OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR, and WHICH SHALL BE
ESTABLISHED BY LAW." Immediately after this clause follows another
in these words: "The President shall have power to fill up all VACANCIES
that may happen DURING THE RECESS OF THE SENATE, by granting
commissions which shall EXPIRE AT THE END OF THEIR NEXT
SESSION." It is from this last provision that the pretended power of the
President to fill vacancies in the Senate has been deduced. A slight attention
to the connection of the clauses, and to the obvious meaning of the terms,
will satisfy us that the deduction is not even colorable.
The first of these two clauses, it is clear, only provides a mode for
appointing such officers, "whose appointments are NOT OTHERWISE
PROVIDED FOR in the Constitution, and which SHALL BE
ESTABLISHED BY LAW"; of course it cannot extend to the appointments
of senators, whose appointments are OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR in the
Constitution(2), and who are ESTABLISHED BY THE CONSTITUTION,
and will not require a future establishment by law. This position will hardly
be contested.
The last of these two clauses, it is equally clear, cannot be understood to
comprehend the power of filling vacancies in the Senate, for the following
reasons: First. The relation in which that clause stands to the other, which
declares the general mode of appointing officers of the United States,
denotes it to be nothing more than a supplement to the other, for the
purpose of establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in cases to
which the general method was inadequate. The ordinary power of
appointment is confined to the President and Senate JOINTLY, and can
therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate; but as it would
have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the
appointment of officers and as vacancies might happen IN THEIR
RECESS, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without
delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the
President, SINGLY, to make temporary appointments "during the recess of
the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their
next session." Second. If this clause is to be considered as supplementary to
the one which precedes, the VACANCIES of which it speaks must be
construed to relate to the "officers" described in the preceding one; and this,
we have seen, excludes from its description the members of the Senate.
Third. The time within which the power is to operate, "during the recess of
the Senate," and the duration of the appointments, "to the end of the next
session" of that body, conspire to elucidate the sense of the provision,
which, if it had been intended to comprehend senators, would naturally
have referred the temporary power of filling vacancies to the recess of the
State legislatures, who are to make the permanent appointments, and not to
the recess of the national Senate, who are to have no concern in those
appointments; and would have extended the duration in office of the
temporary senators to the next session of the legislature of the State, in
whose representation the vacancies had happened, instead of making it to
expire at the end of the ensuing session of the national Senate. The
circumstances of the body authorized to make the permanent appointments
would, of course, have governed the modification of a power which related
to the temporary appointments; and as the national Senate is the body,
whose situation is alone contemplated in the clause upon which the
suggestion under examination has been founded, the vacancies to which it
alludes can only be deemed to respect those officers in whose appointment
that body has a concurrent agency with the President. But last, the first and
second clauses of the third section of the first article, not only obviate all
possibility of doubt, but destroy the pretext of misconception. The former
provides, that "the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen BY THE LEGISLATURE THEREOF for
six years"; and the latter directs, that, "if vacancies in that body should
happen by resignation or otherwise, DURING THE RECESS OF THE
LEGISLATURE OF ANY STATE, the Executive THEREOF may make
temporary appointments until the NEXT MEETING OF THE
LEGISLATURE, which shall then fill such vacancies." Here is an express
power given, in clear and unambiguous terms, to the State Executives, to
fill casual vacancies in the Senate, by temporary appointments; which not
only invalidates the supposition, that the clause before considered could
have been intended to confer that power upon the President of the United
States, but proves that this supposition, destitute as it is even of the merit of
plausibility, must have originated in an intention to deceive the people, too
palpable to be obscured by sophistry, too atrocious to be palliated by
hypocrisy.
I have taken the pains to select this instance of misrepresentation, and to
place it in a clear and strong light, as an unequivocal proof of the
unwarrantable arts which are practiced to prevent a fair and impartial
judgment of the real merits of the Constitution submitted to the
consideration of the people. Nor have I scrupled, in so flagrant a case, to
allow myself a severity of animadversion little congenial with the general
spirit of these papers. I hesitate not to submit it to the decision of any
candid and honest adversary of the proposed government, whether language
can furnish epithets of too much asperity, for so shameless and so prostitute
an attempt to impose on the citizens of America.
PUBLIUS
1. See CATO, No. V.
2. Article I, section 3, clause 1.
FEDERALIST No. 68. The Mode of Electing the
President
From The Independent Journal. Wednesday, March 12, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is
almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped
without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of
approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has
appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the
President is pretty well guarded.(1) I venture somewhat further, and hesitate
not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It
unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be
wished for.(E1)
It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice
of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end
will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any
preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the special
purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.
It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by
men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and
acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious
combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to
govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-
citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the
information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.
It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible
to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election
of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the
administration of the government as the President of the United States. But
the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under
consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief. The
choice of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be
much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent
movements, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object
of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to
assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and
divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which
might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be
convened at one time, in one place.
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle
should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly
adversaries of republican government might naturally have been expected
to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from the
desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils.
How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to
the chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against
all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. They
have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any
preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to
prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an
immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of
persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment.
And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from
situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office.
No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit
under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus without
corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election will
at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient
existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a
satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The
business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a number of
men, requires time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly
to embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any
combinations founded upon motives, which though they could not properly
be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their
duty.
Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive
should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people
themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his
complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his
official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his re-
election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the
society for the single purpose of making the important choice.
All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the
convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of
persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of
such State in the national government, who shall assemble within the State,
and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be
transmitted to the seat of the national government, and the person who may
happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the
President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre
in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be
conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House of
Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five
highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best
qualified for the office.
The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of
President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent
degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue,
and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the
first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different
kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole
Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make
him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the
United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant
probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability
and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of
the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the
executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill
administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the
poet who says:
"For forms of government let fools contest—That which is best
administered is best,"—yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a
good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good
administration.
The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the
President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to the
former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the
latter.
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been
objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been alleged, that it
would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect out of
their own body an officer answering that description. But two
considerations seem to justify the ideas of the convention in this respect.
One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution of
the body, it is necessary that the President should have only a casting vote.
And to take the senator of any State from his seat as senator, to place him in
that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State
from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other
consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a
substitute for the President, in the supreme executive magistracy, all the
reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one,
apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the
other. It is remarkable that in this, as in most other instances, the objection
which is made would lie against the constitution of this State. We have a
Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in the
Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in casualties
similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the
authorities and discharge the duties of the President.
PUBLIUS
1. Vide federal farmer.
E1. Some editions substitute "desired" for "wished for".
FEDERALIST No. 69. The Real Character of the
Executive
From the New York Packet. Friday, March 14, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive,
as they are marked out in the plan of the convention. This will serve to
place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been
made in regard to it.
The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive authority,
with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate. This will
scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any comparison can
be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be a resemblance to the king of
Great Britain, there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the
khan of Tartary, to the Man of the Seven Mountains, or to the governor of
New York.
That magistrate is to be elected for four years; and is to be re-eligible as
often as the people of the United States shall think him worthy of their
confidence. In these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude between
him and a king of Great Britain, who is an hereditary monarch, possessing
the crown as a patrimony descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a
close analogy between him and a governor of New York, who is elected for
three years, and is re-eligible without limitation or intermission. If we
consider how much less time would be requisite for establishing a
dangerous influence in a single State, than for establishing a like influence
throughout the United States, we must conclude that a duration of four
years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is a degree of permanency far
less to be dreaded in that office, than a duration of three years for a
corresponding office in a single State.
The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried,
and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or
misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to
prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the
king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional
tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be
subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this
delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President
of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a
governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of
Maryland and Delaware.
The President of the United States is to have power to return a bill, which
shall have passed the two branches of the legislature, for reconsideration;
and the bill so returned is to become a law, if, upon that reconsideration, it
be approved by two thirds of both houses. The king of Great Britain, on his
part, has an absolute negative upon the acts of the two houses of Parliament.
The disuse of that power for a considerable time past does not affect the
reality of its existence; and is to be ascribed wholly to the crown's having
found the means of substituting influence to authority, or the art of gaining
a majority in one or the other of the two houses, to the necessity of exerting
a prerogative which could seldom be exerted without hazarding some
degree of national agitation. The qualified negative of the President differs
widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign; and tallies
exactly with the revisionary authority of the council of revision of this
State, of which the governor is a constituent part. In this respect the power
of the President would exceed that of the governor of New York, because
the former would possess, singly, what the latter shares with the chancellor
and judges; but it would be precisely the same with that of the governor of
Massachusetts, whose constitution, as to this article, seems to have been the
original from which the convention have copied.
The President is to be the "commander-in-chief of the army and navy of
the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into
the actual service of the United States. He is to have power to grant
reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases
of impeachment; to recommend to the consideration of Congress such
measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; to convene, on
extraordinary occasions, both houses of the legislature, or either of them,
and, in case of disagreement between them with respect to the time of
adjournment, to adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed; and to commission all officers of
the United States." In most of these particulars, the power of the President
will resemble equally that of the king of Great Britain and of the governor
of New York. The most material points of difference are these:—First. The
President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia
of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual
service of the Union. The king of Great Britain and the governor of New
York have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their
several jurisdictions. In this article, therefore, the power of the President
would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor. Second. The
President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United
States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that
of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would
amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy;
while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the
raising and regulating of fleets and armies—all which, by the Constitution
under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.(1) The governor of
New York, on the other hand, is by the constitution of the State vested only
with the command of its militia and navy. But the constitutions of several of
the States expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief, as
well of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those of
New Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this instance,
confer larger powers upon their respective governors, than could be claimed
by a President of the United States. Third. The power of the President, in
respect to pardons, would extend to all cases, except those of impeachment.
The governor of New York may pardon in all cases, even in those of
impeachment, except for treason and murder. Is not the power of the
governor, in this article, on a calculation of political consequences, greater
than that of the President? All conspiracies and plots against the
government, which have not been matured into actual treason, may be
screened from punishment of every kind, by the interposition of the
prerogative of pardoning. If a governor of New York, therefore, should be at
the head of any such conspiracy, until the design had been ripened into
actual hostility he could insure his accomplices and adherents an entire
impunity. A President of the Union, on the other hand, though he may even
pardon treason, when prosecuted in the ordinary course of law, could shelter
no offender, in any degree, from the effects of impeachment and conviction.
Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps be
a greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise against the
public liberty, than the mere prospect of an exemption from death and
confiscation, if the final execution of the design, upon an actual appeal to
arms, should miscarry? Would this last expectation have any influence at
all, when the probability was computed, that the person who was to afford
that exemption might himself be involved in the consequences of the
measure, and might be incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the
desired impunity? The better to judge of this matter, it will be necessary to
recollect, that, by the proposed Constitution, the offense of treason is
limited "to levying war upon the United States, and adhering to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort"; and that by the laws of New York it
is confined within similar bounds. Fourth. The President can only adjourn
the national legislature in the single case of disagreement about the time of
adjournment. The British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the
Parliament. The governor of New York may also prorogue the legislature of
this State for a limited time; a power which, in certain situations, may be
employed to very important purposes.
The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur.
The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative of the
nation in all foreign transactions. He can of his own accord make treaties of
peace, commerce, alliance, and of every other description. It has been
insinuated, that his authority in this respect is not conclusive, and that his
conventions with foreign powers are subject to the revision, and stand in
need of the ratification, of Parliament. But I believe this doctrine was never
heard of, until it was broached upon the present occasion. Every jurist(2) of
that kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its Constitution, knows,
as an established fact, that the prerogative of making treaties exists in the
crown in its utmost plentitude; and that the compacts entered into by the
royal authority have the most complete legal validity and perfection,
independent of any other sanction. The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes
seen employing itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to the
stipulations in a new treaty; and this may have possibly given birth to the
imagination, that its co-operation was necessary to the obligatory efficacy
of the treaty. But this parliamentary interposition proceeds from a different
cause: from the necessity of adjusting a most artificial and intricate system
of revenue and commercial laws, to the changes made in them by the
operation of the treaty; and of adapting new provisions and precautions to
the new state of things, to keep the machine from running into disorder. In
this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended power
of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can
perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch
of the legislature. It must be admitted, that, in this instance, the power of the
federal Executive would exceed that of any State Executive. But this arises
naturally from the sovereign power which relates to treaties. If the
Confederacy were to be dissolved, it would become a question, whether the
Executives of the several States were not solely invested with that delicate
and important prerogative.
The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and other
public ministers. This, though it has been a rich theme of declamation, is
more a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which will be
without consequence in the administration of the government; and it was far
more convenient that it should be arranged in this manner, than that there
should be a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches,
upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though it were merely to take the
place of a departed predecessor.
The President is to nominate, and, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, judges of the
Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the United States established
by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the
Constitution. The king of Great Britain is emphatically and truly styled the
fountain of honor. He not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices.
He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure; and has the disposal of an
immense number of church preferments. There is evidently a great
inferiority in the power of the President, in this particular, to that of the
British king; nor is it equal to that of the governor of New York, if we are to
interpret the meaning of the constitution of the State by the practice which
has obtained under it. The power of appointment is with us lodged in a
council, composed of the governor and four members of the Senate, chosen
by the Assembly. The governor claims, and has frequently exercised, the
right of nomination, and is entitled to a casting vote in the appointment. If
he really has the right of nominating, his authority is in this respect equal to
that of the President, and exceeds it in the article of the casting vote. In the
national government, if the Senate should be divided, no appointment could
be made; in the government of New York, if the council should be divided,
the governor can turn the scale, and confirm his own nomination.(3) If we
compare the publicity which must necessarily attend the mode of
appointment by the President and an entire branch of the national
legislature, with the privacy in the mode of appointment by the governor of
New York, closeted in a secret apartment with at most four, and frequently
with only two persons; and if we at the same time consider how much more
easy it must be to influence the small number of which a council of
appointment consists, than the considerable number of which the national
Senate would consist, we cannot hesitate to pronounce that the power of the
chief magistrate of this State, in the disposition of offices, must, in practice,
be greatly superior to that of the Chief Magistrate of the Union.
Hence it appears that, except as to the concurrent authority of the
President in the article of treaties, it would be difficult to determine whether
that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than the
Governor of New York. And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is
no pretense for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the
king of Great Britain. But to render the contrast in this respect still more
striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of
dissimilitude into a closer group.
The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the
people for four years; the king of Great Britain is a perpetual and hereditary
prince. The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace;
the person of the other is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a
qualified negative upon the acts of the legislative body; the other has an
absolute negative. The one would have a right to command the military and
naval forces of the nation; the other, in addition to this right, possesses that
of declaring war, and of raising and regulating fleets and armies by his own
authority. The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the
legislature in the formation of treaties; the other is the sole possessor of the
power of making treaties. The one would have a like concurrent authority in
appointing to offices; the other is the sole author of all appointments. The
one can confer no privileges whatever; the other can make denizens of
aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with all the rights
incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rules concerning the
commerce or currency of the nation; the other is in several respects the
arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can establish markets and fairs,
can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time,
can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin.
The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the supreme
head and governor of the national church! What answer shall we give to
those who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other?
The same that ought to be given to those who tell us that a government, the
whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective and periodical
servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism.
PUBLIUS
1. A writer in a Pennsylvania paper, under the signature of TAMONY,
has asserted that the king of Great Britain owes his prerogative as
commander-in-chief to an annual mutiny bill. The truth is, on the contrary,
that his prerogative, in this respect, is immemorial, and was only disputed,
"contrary to all reason and precedent," as Blackstone vol. i., page 262,
expresses it, by the Long Parliament of Charles I. but by the statute the 13th
of Charles II., chap. 6, it was declared to be in the king alone, for that the
sole supreme government and command of the militia within his Majesty's
realms and dominions, and of all forces by sea and land, and of all forts and
places of strength, EVER WAS AND IS the undoubted right of his Majesty
and his royal predecessors, kings and queens of England, and that both or
either house of Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same.
2. Vide Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol I., p. 257.
3. Candor, however, demands an acknowledgment that I do not think the
claim of the governor to a right of nomination well founded. Yet it is always
justifiable to reason from the practice of a government, till its propriety has
been constitutionally questioned. And independent of this claim, when we
take into view the other considerations, and pursue them through all their
consequences, we shall be inclined to draw much the same conclusion.

FEDERALIST No. 70. The Executive Department
Further Considered
From The Independent Journal. Saturday, March 15, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous
Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The
enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope
that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its
truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own
principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of
good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the
laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed
combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to
the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of
faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman history,
knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute
power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator, as well against
the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the
seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the
existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies
who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.
There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on
this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government.
A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a
government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice,
a bad government.
Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the
necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire, what are
the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined
with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense?
And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been
reported by the convention?
The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity;
secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly,
competent powers.
The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are, first,
a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility.
Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for
the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views, have
declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. They
have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary
qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to
power in a single hand, while they have, with equal propriety, considered
the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to
conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and
interests.
That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity,
secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one
man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater
number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be
diminished.
This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in
two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it
ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and co-
operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of the first, the
two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall find
examples in the constitutions of several of the States. New York and New
Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the
executive authority wholly to single men.(1) Both these methods of
destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but the votaries
of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not
to equal, to similar objections, and may in most lights be examined in
conjunction.
The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head.
As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be enamoured
of plurality in the Executive. We have seen that the Achaeans, on an
experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman
history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the
dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes, who
were at times substituted for the Consuls. But it gives us no specimens of
any peculiar advantages derived to the state from the circumstance of the
plurality of those magistrates. That the dissensions between them were not
more frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert to
the singular position in which the republic was almost continually placed,
and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, and
pursued by the Consuls, of making a division of the government between
them. The patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for
the preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who
were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by
the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order.
In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the republic had
considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established
custom with the Consuls to divide the administration between themselves
by lot—one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs,
the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. This expedient
must, no doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions and
rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the republic.
But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching ourselves
purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much
greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the Executive,
under any modification whatever.
Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or
pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public
trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority,
there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From
either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are
apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability,
weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of those whom
they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive
magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might
impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government, in the
most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might
split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions,
adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the
magistracy.
Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in
planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they
dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove,
opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-
love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives
of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been resolved
upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have
too many opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths
this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of
society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of
individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their
caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public
may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this
despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the human character.
Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the
source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of
the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce
them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too that they may be
most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an
evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in
that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct
salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve
to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the
opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it
punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the
disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. Here, they are
pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They
serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to
which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They
constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most
necessary ingredients in its composition—vigor and expedition, and this
without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the
energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing
would be to be apprehended from its plurality.
It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight
to the first case supposed—that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal
dignity and authority a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to
form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with
considerable weight to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made
constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. An
artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the
whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere
diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the
exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and
dilatoriness.
(But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and
which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to
conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds—to
censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two,
especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act
in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted,
than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But
the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in
either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to
determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure,
or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one
to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances,
that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The
circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or
misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of
actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we
may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it
may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may
have been incurred is truly chargeable.)(E1)
(But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and
which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to
conceal faults and destroy responsibility.
Responsibility is of two kinds—to censure and to punishment. The first is
the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in
public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him
unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him
obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds
to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible,
amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the
punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures,
ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity,
and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in
suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to
any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that,
where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and
kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has
been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose
account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.)(E1)
"I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their
opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point."
These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And
who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict
scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a
citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to
be collusion between the parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the
circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was
the precise conduct of any of those parties?
In the single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled with
a council—that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs
of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous appointments to
important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed, have been so
flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing.
When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on
the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged it upon his
nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine, by
whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so
unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I
forbear to descend to particulars.
It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive
tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for
the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public
opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the
censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the
uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, second, the opportunity of
discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they
trust, in order either to their removal from office or to their actual
punishment in cases which admit of it.
In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which
has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for
his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser
in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may
be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this, there
would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department an idea
inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by
the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice
they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of
his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him at his sole
discretion.
But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally
responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British
Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply, but
turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a
substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which
serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good
behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would
greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief
Magistrate himself.
The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained
in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican
jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men
than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to
the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not
counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do
not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in
opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius
pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious," that "the executive power is
more easily confined when it is ONE";(2) that it is far more safe there
should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people;
and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous
than friendly to liberty.
A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought
for in the multiplication of the Executive, is unattainable. Numbers must be
so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of
danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several
individuals must be more formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence
of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands
of so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views being
easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes
more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged
in the hands of one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being
alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who
cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with
others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number,(3) were
more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have
been. No person would think of proposing an Executive much more
numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the
number of the council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an
easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more
to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a
magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally
nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the
instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to his
faults.
I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if
the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed
at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from
their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the
catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of
equivocal utility. I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the
Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the States,
who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the
executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features of
our constitution.
PUBLIUS
1. New York has no council except for the single purpose of appointing
to offices; New Jersey has a council whom the governor may consult. But I
think, from the terms of the constitution, their resolutions do not bind him.
2. De Lolme.
3. Ten.
E1. Two versions of these paragraphs appear in different editions.
FEDERALIST No. 71. The Duration in Office of
the Executive
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 18, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
DURATION in office has been mentioned as the second requisite to the
energy of the Executive authority. This has relation to two objects: to the
personal firmness of the executive magistrate, in the employment of his
constitutional powers; and to the stability of the system of administration
which may have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to the first, it
must be evident, that the longer the duration in office, the greater will be the
probability of obtaining so important an advantage. It is a general principle
of human nature, that a man will be interested in whatever he possesses, in
proportion to the firmness or precariousness of the tenure by which he holds
it; will be less attached to what he holds by a momentary or uncertain title,
than to what he enjoys by a durable or certain title; and, of course, will be
willing to risk more for the sake of the one, than for the sake of the other.
This remark is not less applicable to a political privilege, or honor, or trust,
than to any article of ordinary property. The inference from it is, that a man
acting in the capacity of chief magistrate, under a consciousness that in a
very short time he MUST lay down his office, will be apt to feel himself too
little interested in it to hazard any material censure or perplexity, from the
independent exertion of his powers, or from encountering the ill-humors,
however transient, which may happen to prevail, either in a considerable
part of the society itself, or even in a predominant faction in the legislative
body. If the case should only be, that he MIGHT lay it down, unless
continued by a new choice, and if he should be desirous of being continued,
his wishes, conspiring with his fears, would tend still more powerfully to
corrupt his integrity, or debase his fortitude. In either case, feebleness and
irresolution must be the characteristics of the station.
There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy of the
Executive to a prevailing current, either in the community or in the
legislature, as its best recommendation. But such men entertain very crude
notions, as well of the purposes for which government was instituted, as of
the true means by which the public happiness may be promoted. The
republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community
should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of
their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every
sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people
may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their
interests. It is a just observation, that the people commonly INTEND the
PUBLIC GOOD. This often applies to their very errors. But their good
sense would despise the adulator who should pretend that they always
REASON RIGHT about the MEANS of promoting it. They know from
experience that they sometimes err; and the wonder is that they so seldom
err as they do, beset, as they continually are, by the wiles of parasites and
sycophants, by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate, by
the artifices of men who possess their confidence more than they deserve it,
and of those who seek to possess rather than to deserve it. When occasions
present themselves, in which the interests of the people are at variance with
their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to
be the guardians of those interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in
order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection.
Instances might be cited in which a conduct of this kind has saved the
people from very fatal consequences of their own mistakes, and has
procured lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men who had courage
and magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril of their displeasure.
But however inclined we might be to insist upon an unbounded
complaisance in the Executive to the inclinations of the people, we can with
no propriety contend for a like complaisance to the humors of the
legislature. The latter may sometimes stand in opposition to the former, and
at other times the people may be entirely neutral. In either supposition, it is
certainly desirable that the Executive should be in a situation to dare to act
his own opinion with vigor and decision.
The same rule which teaches the propriety of a partition between the
various branches of power, teaches us likewise that this partition ought to be
so contrived as to render the one independent of the other. To what purpose
separate the executive or the judiciary from the legislative, if both the
executive and the judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute
devotion of the legislative? Such a separation must be merely nominal, and
incapable of producing the ends for which it was established. It is one thing
to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on the legislative
body. The first comports with, the last violates, the fundamental principles
of good government; and, whatever may be the forms of the Constitution,
unites all power in the same hands. The tendency of the legislative authority
to absorb every other, has been fully displayed and illustrated by examples
in some preceding numbers. In governments purely republican, this
tendency is almost irresistible. The representatives of the people, in a
popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that they are the people
themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience and disgust at the
least sign of opposition from any other quarter; as if the exercise of its
rights, by either the executive or judiciary, were a breach of their privilege
and an outrage to their dignity. They often appear disposed to exert an
imperious control over the other departments; and as they commonly have
the people on their side, they always act with such momentum as to make it
very difficult for the other members of the government to maintain the
balance of the Constitution.
It may perhaps be asked, how the shortness of the duration in office can
affect the independence of the Executive on the legislature, unless the one
were possessed of the power of appointing or displacing the other. One
answer to this inquiry may be drawn from the principle already remarked
that is, from the slender interest a man is apt to take in a short-lived
advantage, and the little inducement it affords him to expose himself, on
account of it, to any considerable inconvenience or hazard. Another answer,
perhaps more obvious, though not more conclusive, will result from the
consideration of the influence of the legislative body over the people; which
might be employed to prevent the re-election of a man who, by an upright
resistance to any sinister project of that body, should have made himself
obnoxious to its resentment.
It may be asked also, whether a duration of four years would answer the
end proposed; and if it would not, whether a less period, which would at
least be recommended by greater security against ambitious designs, would
not, for that reason, be preferable to a longer period, which was, at the same
time, too short for the purpose of inspiring the desired firmness and
independence of the magistrate.
It cannot be affirmed, that a duration of four years, or any other limited
duration, would completely answer the end proposed; but it would
contribute towards it in a degree which would have a material influence
upon the spirit and character of the government. Between the
commencement and termination of such a period, there would always be a
considerable interval, in which the prospect of annihilation would be
sufficiently remote, not to have an improper effect upon the conduct of a
man indued with a tolerable portion of fortitude; and in which he might
reasonably promise himself, that there would be time enough before it
arrived, to make the community sensible of the propriety of the measures he
might incline to pursue. Though it be probable that, as he approached the
moment when the public were, by a new election, to signify their sense of
his conduct, his confidence, and with it his firmness, would decline; yet
both the one and the other would derive support from the opportunities
which his previous continuance in the station had afforded him, of
establishing himself in the esteem and good-will of his constituents. He
might, then, hazard with safety, in proportion to the proofs he had given of
his wisdom and integrity, and to the title he had acquired to the respect and
attachment of his fellow-citizens. As, on the one hand, a duration of four
years will contribute to the firmness of the Executive in a sufficient degree
to render it a very valuable ingredient in the composition; so, on the other, it
is not enough to justify any alarm for the public liberty. If a British House
of Commons, from the most feeble beginnings, FROM THE MERE
POWER OF ASSENTING OR DISAGREEING TO THE IMPOSITION
OF A NEW TAX, have, by rapid strides, reduced the prerogatives of the
crown and the privileges of the nobility within the limits they conceived to
be compatible with the principles of a free government, while they raised
themselves to the rank and consequence of a coequal branch of the
legislature; if they have been able, in one instance, to abolish both the
royalty and the aristocracy, and to overturn all the ancient establishments, as
well in the Church as State; if they have been able, on a recent occasion, to
make the monarch tremble at the prospect of an innovation(1) attempted by
them, what would be to be feared from an elective magistrate of four years'
duration, with the confined authorities of a President of the United States?
What, but that he might be unequal to the task which the Constitution
assigns him? I shall only add, that if his duration be such as to leave a doubt
of his firmness, that doubt is inconsistent with a jealousy of his
encroachments.
PUBLIUS
1. This was the case with respect to Mr. Fox's India bill, which was
carried in the House of Commons, and rejected in the House of Lords, to
the entire satisfaction, as it is said, of the people.
FEDERALIST No. 72. The Same Subject
Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive
Considered.
From The Independent Journal. Wednesday, March 19, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all
the operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive, or
judiciary; but in its most usual, and perhaps its most precise signification. it
is limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the
executive department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the
preparatory plans of finance, the application and disbursement of the public
moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature, the
arrangement of the army and navy, the directions of the operations of war—
these, and other matters of a like nature, constitute what seems to be most
properly understood by the administration of government. The persons,
therefore, to whose immediate management these different matters are
committed, ought to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the chief
magistrate, and on this account, they ought to derive their offices from his
appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to his
superintendence. This view of the subject will at once suggest to us the
intimate connection between the duration of the executive magistrate in
office and the stability of the system of administration. To reverse and undo
what has been done by a predecessor, is very often considered by a
successor as the best proof he can give of his own capacity and desert; and
in addition to this propensity, where the alteration has been the result of
public choice, the person substituted is warranted in supposing that the
dismission of his predecessor has proceeded from a dislike to his measures;
and that the less he resembles him, the more he will recommend himself to
the favor of his constituents. These considerations, and the influence of
personal confidences and attachments, would be likely to induce every new
President to promote a change of men to fill the subordinate stations; and
these causes together could not fail to occasion a disgraceful and ruinous
mutability in the administration of the government.
With a positive duration of considerable extent, I connect the
circumstance of re-eligibility. The first is necessary to give to the officer
himself the inclination and the resolution to act his part well, and to the
community time and leisure to observe the tendency of his measures, and
thence to form an experimental estimate of their merits. The last is
necessary to enable the people, when they see reason to approve of his
conduct, to continue him in his station, in order to prolong the utility of his
talents and virtues, and to secure to the government the advantage of
permanency in a wise system of administration.
Nothing appears more plausible at first sight, nor more ill-founded upon
close inspection, than a scheme which in relation to the present point has
had some respectable advocates—I mean that of continuing the chief
magistrate in office for a certain time, and then excluding him from it,
either for a limited period or forever after. This exclusion, whether
temporary or perpetual, would have nearly the same effects, and these
effects would be for the most part rather pernicious than salutary.
One ill effect of the exclusion would be a diminution of the inducements
to good behavior. There are few men who would not feel much less zeal in
the discharge of a duty when they were conscious that the advantages of the
station with which it was connected must be relinquished at a determinate
period, than when they were permitted to entertain a hope of obtaining, by
meriting, a continuance of them. This position will not be disputed so long
as it is admitted that the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives
of human conduct; or that the best security for the fidelity of mankind is to
make their interests coincide with their duty. Even the love of fame, the
ruling passion of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and
undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit, requiring
considerable time to mature and perfect them, if he could flatter himself
with the prospect of being allowed to finish what he had begun, would, on
the contrary, deter him from the undertaking, when he foresaw that he must
quit the scene before he could accomplish the work, and must commit that,
together with his own reputation, to hands which might be unequal or
unfriendly to the task. The most to be expected from the generality of men,
in such a situation, is the negative merit of not doing harm, instead of the
positive merit of doing good.
Another ill effect of the exclusion would be the temptation to sordid
views, to peculation, and, in some instances, to usurpation. An avaricious
man, who might happen to fill the office, looking forward to a time when he
must at all events yield up the emoluments he enjoyed, would feel a
propensity, not easy to be resisted by such a man, to make the best use of
the opportunity he enjoyed while it lasted, and might not scruple to have
recourse to the most corrupt expedients to make the harvest as abundant as
it was transitory; though the same man, probably, with a different prospect
before him, might content himself with the regular perquisites of his
situation, and might even be unwilling to risk the consequences of an abuse
of his opportunities. His avarice might be a guard upon his avarice. Add to
this that the same man might be vain or ambitious, as well as avaricious.
And if he could expect to prolong his honors by his good conduct, he might
hesitate to sacrifice his appetite for them to his appetite for gain. But with
the prospect before him of approaching an inevitable annihilation, his
avarice would be likely to get the victory over his caution, his vanity, or his
ambition.
An ambitious man, too, when he found himself seated on the summit of
his country's honors, when he looked forward to the time at which he must
descend from the exalted eminence for ever, and reflected that no exertion
of merit on his part could save him from the unwelcome reverse; such a
man, in such a situation, would be much more violently tempted to embrace
a favorable conjuncture for attempting the prolongation of his power, at
every personal hazard, than if he had the probability of answering the same
end by doing his duty.
Would it promote the peace of the community, or the stability of the
government to have half a dozen men who had had credit enough to be
raised to the seat of the supreme magistracy, wandering among the people
like discontented ghosts, and sighing for a place which they were destined
never more to possess?
A third ill effect of the exclusion would be, the depriving the community
of the advantage of the experience gained by the chief magistrate in the
exercise of his office. That experience is the parent of wisdom, is an adage
the truth of which is recognized by the wisest as well as the simplest of
mankind. What more desirable or more essential than this quality in the
governors of nations? Where more desirable or more essential than in the
first magistrate of a nation? Can it be wise to put this desirable and essential
quality under the ban of the Constitution, and to declare that the moment it
is acquired, its possessor shall be compelled to abandon the station in which
it was acquired, and to which it is adapted? This, nevertheless, is the precise
import of all those regulations which exclude men from serving their
country, by the choice of their fellowcitizens, after they have by a course of
service fitted themselves for doing it with a greater degree of utility.
A fourth ill effect of the exclusion would be the banishing men from
stations in which, in certain emergencies of the state, their presence might
be of the greatest moment to the public interest or safety. There is no nation
which has not, at one period or another, experienced an absolute necessity
of the services of particular men in particular situations; perhaps it would
not be too strong to say, to the preservation of its political existence. How
unwise, therefore, must be every such self-denying ordinance as serves to
prohibit a nation from making use of its own citizens in the manner best
suited to its exigencies and circumstances! Without supposing the personal
essentiality of the man, it is evident that a change of the chief magistrate, at
the breaking out of a war, or at any similar crisis, for another, even of equal
merit, would at all times be detrimental to the community, inasmuch as it
would substitute inexperience to experience, and would tend to unhinge and
set afloat the already settled train of the administration.
A fifth ill effect of the exclusion would be, that it would operate as a
constitutional interdiction of stability in the administration. By necessitating
a change of men, in the first office of the nation, it would necessitate a
mutability of measures. It is not generally to be expected, that men will vary
and measures remain uniform. The contrary is the usual course of things.
And we need not be apprehensive that there will be too much stability,
while there is even the option of changing; nor need we desire to prohibit
the people from continuing their confidence where they think it may be
safely placed, and where, by constancy on their part, they may obviate the
fatal inconveniences of fluctuating councils and a variable policy.
These are some of the disadvantages which would flow from the
principle of exclusion. They apply most forcibly to the scheme of a
perpetual exclusion; but when we consider that even a partial exclusion
would always render the readmission of the person a remote and precarious
object, the observations which have been made will apply nearly as fully to
one case as to the other.
What are the advantages promised to counterbalance these
disadvantages? They are represented to be: 1st, greater independence in the
magistrate; 2d, greater security to the people. Unless the exclusion be
perpetual, there will be no pretense to infer the first advantage. But even in
that case, may he have no object beyond his present station, to which he
may sacrifice his independence? May he have no connections, no friends,
for whom he may sacrifice it? May he not be less willing by a firm conduct,
to make personal enemies, when he acts under the impression that a time is
fast approaching, on the arrival of which he not only MAY, but MUST, be
exposed to their resentments, upon an equal, perhaps upon an inferior,
footing? It is not an easy point to determine whether his independence
would be most promoted or impaired by such an arrangement.
As to the second supposed advantage, there is still greater reason to
entertain doubts concerning it. If the exclusion were to be perpetual, a man
of irregular ambition, of whom alone there could be reason in any case to
entertain apprehension, would, with infinite reluctance, yield to the
necessity of taking his leave forever of a post in which his passion for
power and pre-eminence had acquired the force of habit. And if he had been
fortunate or adroit enough to conciliate the good-will of the people, he
might induce them to consider as a very odious and unjustifiable restraint
upon themselves, a provision which was calculated to debar them of the
right of giving a fresh proof of their attachment to a favorite. There may be
conceived circumstances in which this disgust of the people, seconding the
thwarted ambition of such a favorite, might occasion greater danger to
liberty, than could ever reasonably be dreaded from the possibility of a
perpetuation in office, by the voluntary suffrages of the community,
exercising a constitutional privilege.
There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the people to
continue in office men who had entitled themselves, in their opinion, to
approbation and confidence; the advantages of which are at best speculative




FEDERALIST No. 73. The Provision For The
Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
From the New York Packet. Friday, March 21, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the executive
authority, is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident that, without
proper attention to this article, the separation of the executive from the
legislative department would be merely nominal and nugatory. The
legislature, with a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments of
the Chief Magistrate, could render him as obsequious to their will as they
might think proper to make him. They might, in most cases, either reduce
him by famine, or tempt him by largesses, to surrender at discretion his
judgment to their inclinations. These expressions, taken in all the latitude of
the terms, would no doubt convey more than is intended. There are men
who could neither be distressed nor won into a sacrifice of their duty; but
this stern virtue is the growth of few soils; and in the main it will be found
that a power over a man's support is a power over his will. If it were
necessary to confirm so plain a truth by facts, examples would not be
wanting, even in this country, of the intimidation or seduction of the
Executive by the terrors or allurements of the pecuniary arrangements of the
legislative body.
It is not easy, therefore, to commend too highly the judicious attention
which has been paid to this subject in the proposed Constitution. It is there
provided that "The President of the United States shall, at stated times,
receive for his services a compensation which shall neither be increased nor
diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected; and he
shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United
States, or any of them." It is impossible to imagine any provision which
would have been more eligible than this. The legislature, on the
appointment of a President, is once for all to declare what shall be the
compensation for his services during the time for which he shall have been
elected. This done, they will have no power to alter it, either by increase or
diminution, till a new period of service by a new election commences. They
can neither weaken his fortitude by operating on his necessities, nor corrupt
his integrity by appealing to his avarice. Neither the Union, nor any of its
members, will be at liberty to give, nor will he be at liberty to receive, any
other emolument than that which may have been determined by the first act.
He can, of course, have no pecuniary inducement to renounce or desert the
independence intended for him by the Constitution.
The last of the requisites to energy, which have been enumerated, are
competent powers. Let us proceed to consider those which are proposed to
be vested in the President of the United States.
The first thing that offers itself to our observation, is the qualified
negative of the President upon the acts or resolutions of the two houses of
the legislature; or, in other words, his power of returning all bills with
objections, to have the effect of preventing their becoming laws, unless they
should afterwards be ratified by two thirds of each of the component
members of the legislative body.
The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights,
and to absorb the powers, of the other departments, has been already
suggested and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation
of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon; and the necessity
of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defense, has been
inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable principles results the
propriety of a negative, either absolute or qualified, in the Executive, upon
the acts of the legislative branches. Without the one or the other, the former
would be absolutely unable to defend himself against the depredations of
the latter. He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive
resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the
other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be
blended in the same hands. If even no propensity had ever discovered itself
in the legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive, the rules of just
reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us, that the one
ought not to be left to the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a
constitutional and effectual power of self-defense.
But the power in question has a further use. It not only serves as a shield
to the Executive, but it furnishes an additional security against the enaction
of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body,
calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction,
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may
happen to influence a majority of that body.
The propriety of a negative has, upon some occasions, been combated by
an observation, that it was not to be presumed a single man would possess
more virtue and wisdom than a number of men; and that unless this
presumption should be entertained, it would be improper to give the
executive magistrate any species of control over the legislative body.
But this observation, when examined, will appear rather specious than
solid. The propriety of the thing does not turn upon the supposition of
superior wisdom or virtue in the Executive, but upon the supposition that
the legislature will not be infallible; that the love of power may sometimes
betray it into a disposition to encroach upon the rights of other members of
the government; that a spirit of faction may sometimes pervert its
deliberations; that impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into
measures which itself, on maturer reflexion, would condemn. The primary
inducement to conferring the power in question upon the Executive is, to
enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances
in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste,
inadvertence, or design. The oftener the measure is brought under
examination, the greater the diversity in the situations of those who are to
examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which flow from
want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which proceed from the
contagion of some common passion or interest. It is far less probable, that
culpable views of any kind should infect all the parts of the government at
the same moment and in relation to the same object, than that they should
by turns govern and mislead every one of them.
It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes
that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well as
to the other. But this objection will have little weight with those who can
properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the
laws, which form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our
governments. They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the
excess of law-making, and to keep things in the same state in which they
happen to be at any given period, as much more likely to do good than
harm; because it is favorable to greater stability in the system of legislation.
The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will
be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad
ones.
Nor is this all. The superior weight and influence of the legislative body
in a free government, and the hazard to the Executive in a trial of strength
with that body, afford a satisfactory security that the negative would
generally be employed with great caution; and there would oftener be room
for a charge of timidity than of rashness in the exercise of it. A king of
Great Britain, with all his train of sovereign attributes, and with all the
influence he draws from a thousand sources, would, at this day, hesitate to
put a negative upon the joint resolutions of the two houses of Parliament.
He would not fail to exert the utmost resources of that influence to strangle
a measure disagreeable to him, in its progress to the throne, to avoid being
reduced to the dilemma of permitting it to take effect, or of risking the
displeasure of the nation by an opposition to the sense of the legislative
body. Nor is it probable, that he would ultimately venture to exert his
prerogatives, but in a case of manifest propriety, or extreme necessity. All
well-informed men in that kingdom will accede to the justness of this
remark. A very considerable period has elapsed since the negative of the
crown has been exercised.
If a magistrate so powerful and so well fortified as a British monarch,
would have scruples about the exercise of the power under consideration,
how much greater caution may be reasonably expected in a President of the
United States, clothed for the short period of four years with the executive
authority of a government wholly and purely republican?
It is evident that there would be greater danger of his not using his power
when necessary, than of his using it too often, or too much. An argument,
indeed, against its expediency, has been drawn from this very source. It has
been represented, on this account, as a power odious in appearance, useless
in practice. But it will not follow, that because it might be rarely exercised,
it would never be exercised. In the case for which it is chiefly designed, that
of an immediate attack upon the constitutional rights of the Executive, or in
a case in which the public good was evidently and palpably sacrificed, a
man of tolerable firmness would avail himself of his constitutional means of
defense, and would listen to the admonitions of duty and responsibility. In
the former supposition, his fortitude would be stimulated by his immediate
interest in the power of his office; in the latter, by the probability of the
sanction of his constituents, who, though they would naturally incline to the
legislative body in a doubtful case, would hardly suffer their partiality to
delude them in a very plain case. I speak now with an eye to a magistrate
possessing only a common share of firmness. There are men who, under
any circumstances, will have the courage to do their duty at every hazard.
But the convention have pursued a mean in this business, which will both
facilitate the exercise of the power vested in this respect in the executive
magistrate, and make its efficacy to depend on the sense of a considerable
part of the legislative body. Instead of an absolute negative, it is proposed to
give the Executive the qualified negative already described. This is a power
which would be much more readily exercised than the other. A man who
might be afraid to defeat a law by his single VETO, might not scruple to
return it for reconsideration; subject to being finally rejected only in the
event of more than one third of each house concurring in the sufficiency of
his objections. He would be encouraged by the reflection, that if his
opposition should prevail, it would embark in it a very respectable
proportion of the legislative body, whose influence would be united with his
in supporting the propriety of his conduct in the public opinion. A direct
and categorical negative has something in the appearance of it more harsh,
and more apt to irritate, than the mere suggestion of argumentative
objections to be approved or disapproved by those to whom they are
addressed. In proportion as it would be less apt to offend, it would be more
apt to be exercised; and for this very reason, it may in practice be found
more effectual. It is to be hoped that it will not often happen that improper
views will govern so large a proportion as two thirds of both branches of the
legislature at the same time; and this, too, in spite of the counterposing
weight of the Executive. It is at any rate far less probable that this should be
the case, than that such views should taint the resolutions and conduct of a
bare majority. A power of this nature in the Executive, will often have a
silent and unperceived, though forcible, operation. When men, engaged in
unjustifiable pursuits, are aware that obstructions may come from a quarter
which they cannot control, they will often be restrained by the bare
apprehension of opposition, from doing what they would with eagerness
rush into, if no such external impediments were to be feared.
This qualified negative, as has been elsewhere remarked, is in this State
vested in a council, consisting of the governor, with the chancellor and
judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of them. It has been freely
employed upon a variety of occasions, and frequently with success. And its
utility has become so apparent, that persons who, in compiling the
Constitution, were violent opposers of it, have from experience become its
declared admirers.(1)
I have in another place remarked, that the convention, in the formation of
this part of their plan, had departed from the model of the constitution of
this State, in favor of that of Massachusetts. Two strong reasons may be
imagined for this preference. One is that the judges, who are to be the
interpreters of the law, might receive an improper bias, from having given a
previous opinion in their revisionary capacities; the other is that by being
often associated with the Executive, they might be induced to embark too
far in the political views of that magistrate, and thus a dangerous
combination might by degrees be cemented between the executive and
judiciary departments. It is impossible to keep the judges too distinct from
every other avocation than that of expounding the laws. It is peculiarly
dangerous to place them in a situation to be either corrupted or influenced
by the Executive.
PUBLIUS
1. Mr. Abraham Yates, a warm opponent of the plan of the convention is
of this number.

FEDERALIST No. 74. The Command of the
Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning
Power of the Executive.
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 25, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE President of the United States is to be "commander-in-chief of the
army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States
when called into the actual service of the United States." The propriety of
this provision is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant
to the precedents of the State constitutions in general, that little need be said
to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have, in other respects,
coupled the chief magistrate with a council, have for the most part
concentrated the military authority in him alone. Of all the cares or
concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands
those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.
The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the
power of directing and employing the common strength, forms a usual and
essential part in the definition of the executive authority.
"The President may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal
officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to
the duties of their respective officers." This I consider as a mere redundancy
in the plan, as the right for which it provides would result of itself from the
office.
He is also to be authorized to grant "reprieves and pardons for offenses
against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." Humanity and
good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning
should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of
every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy
access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a
countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense of responsibility is
always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred that a
single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives
which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to
yield to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its
vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his
sole fiat, would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of
being accused of weakness or connivance, would beget equal
circumspection, though of a different kind. On the other hand, as men
generally derive confidence from their numbers, they might often
encourage each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to
the apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected
clemency. On these accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible
dispenser of the mercy of government, than a body of men.
The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the President has, if
I mistake not, been only contested in relation to the crime of treason. This,
it has been urged, ought to have depended upon the assent of one, or both,
of the branches of the legislative body. I shall not deny that there are strong
reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of that
body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime levelled at the immediate being
of the society, when the laws have once ascertained the guilt of the offender,
there seems a fitness in referring the expediency of an act of mercy towards
him to the judgment of the legislature. And this ought the rather to be the
case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought not
to be entirely excluded. But there are also strong objections to such a plan.
It is not to be doubted, that a single man of prudence and good sense is
better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives which may
plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous
body whatever. It deserves particular attention, that treason will often be
connected with seditions which embrace a large proportion of the
community; as lately happened in Massachusetts. In every such case, we
might expect to see the representation of the people tainted with the same
spirit which had given birth to the offense. And when parties were pretty
equally matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers of the
condemned person, availing itself of the good-nature and weakness of
others, might frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example
was necessary. On the other hand, when the sedition had proceeded from
causes which had inflamed the resentments of the major party, they might
often be found obstinate and inexorable, when policy demanded a conduct
of forbearance and clemency. But the principal argument for reposing the
power of pardoning in this case to the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of
insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well-
timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity
of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may
never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of convening
the legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its
sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the
golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be
fatal. If it should be observed, that a discretionary power, with a view to
such contingencies, might be occasionally conferred upon the President, it
may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable, whether, in a
limited Constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the
second place, that it would generally be impolitic beforehand to take any
step which might hold out the prospect of impunity. A proceeding of this
kind, out of the usual course, would be likely to be construed into an
argument of timidity or of weakness, and would have a tendency to
embolden guilt.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 75. The Treaty-Making Power
of the Executive
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, March 26, 1788
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE President is to have power, "by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present
concur." Though this provision has been assailed, on different grounds, with
no small degree of vehemence, I scruple not to declare my firm persuasion,
that it is one of the best digested and most unexceptionable parts of the
plan. One ground of objection is the trite topic of the intermixture of
powers; some contending that the President ought alone to possess the
power of making treaties; others, that it ought to have been exclusively
deposited in the Senate. Another source of objection is derived from the
small number of persons by whom a treaty may be made. Of those who
espouse this objection, a part are of opinion that the House of
Representatives ought to have been associated in the business, while
another part seem to think that nothing more was necessary than to have
substituted two thirds of all the members of the Senate, to two thirds of the
members present. As I flatter myself the observations made in a preceding
number upon this part of the plan must have sufficed to place it, to a
discerning eye, in a very favorable light, I shall here content myself with
offering only some supplementary remarks, principally with a view to the
objections which have been just stated.
With regard to the intermixture of powers, I shall rely upon the
explanations already given in other places, of the true sense of the rule upon
which that objection is founded; and shall take it for granted, as an
inference from them, that the union of the Executive with the Senate, in the
article of treaties, is no infringement of that rule. I venture to add, that the
particular nature of the power of making treaties indicates a peculiar
propriety in that union. Though several writers on the subject of
government place that power in the class of executive authorities, yet this is
evidently an arbitrary disposition; for if we attend carefully to its operation,
it will be found to partake more of the legislative than of the executive
character, though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition of
either of them. The essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws, or,
in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society; while the
execution of the laws, and the employment of the common strength, either
for this purpose or for the common defense, seem to comprise all the
functions of the executive magistrate. The power of making treaties is,
plainly, neither the one nor the other. It relates neither to the execution of
the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new ones; and still less to an
exertion of the common strength. Its objects are CONTRACTS with foreign
nations, which have the force of law, but derive it from the obligations of
good faith. They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but
agreements between sovereign and sovereign. The power in question seems
therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong, properly, neither to
the legislative nor to the executive. The qualities elsewhere detailed as
indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations, point out the
Executive as the most fit agent in those transactions; while the vast
importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly
for the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the
office of making them.
However proper or safe it may be in governments where the executive
magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the entire power of
making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper to intrust that
power to an elective magistrate of four years' duration. It has been
remarked, upon another occasion, and the remark is unquestionably just,
that an hereditary monarch, though often the oppressor of his people, has
personally too much stake in the government to be in any material danger of
being corrupted by foreign powers. But a man raised from the station of a
private citizen to the rank of chief magistrate, possessed of a moderate or
slender fortune, and looking forward to a period not very remote when he
may probably be obliged to return to the station from which he was taken,
might sometimes be under temptations to sacrifice his duty to his interest,
which it would require superlative virtue to withstand. An avaricious man
might be tempted to betray the interests of the state to the acquisition of
wealth. An ambitious man might make his own aggrandizement, by the aid
of a foreign power, the price of his treachery to his constituents. The history
of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue
which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and
momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of
the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as
would be a President of the United States.
To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the Senate alone, would
have been to relinquish the benefits of the constitutional agency of the
President in the conduct of foreign negotiations. It is true that the Senate
would, in that case, have the option of employing him in this capacity, but
they would also have the option of letting it alone, and pique or cabal might
induce the latter rather than the former. Besides this, the ministerial servant
of the Senate could not be expected to enjoy the confidence and respect of
foreign powers in the same degree with the constitutional representatives of
the nation, and, of course, would not be able to act with an equal degree of
weight or efficacy. While the Union would, from this cause, lose a
considerable advantage in the management of its external concerns, the
people would lose the additional security which would result from the co-
operation of the Executive. Though it would be imprudent to confide in him
solely so important a trust, yet it cannot be doubted that his participation
would materially add to the safety of the society. It must indeed be clear to
a demonstration that the joint possession of the power in question, by the
President and Senate, would afford a greater prospect of security, than the
separate possession of it by either of them. And whoever has maturely
weighed the circumstances which must concur in the appointment of a
President, will be satisfied that the office will always bid fair to be filled by
men of such characters as to render their concurrence in the formation of
treaties peculiarly desirable, as well on the score of wisdom, as on that of
integrity.
The remarks made in a former number, which have been alluded to in
another part of this paper, will apply with conclusive force against the
admission of the House of Representatives to a share in the formation of
treaties. The fluctuating and, taking its future increase into the account, the
multitudinous composition of that body, forbid us to expect in it those
qualities which are essential to the proper execution of such a trust.
Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and
systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to
national character; decision, secrecy, and despatch, are incompatible with
the genius of a body so variable and so numerous. The very complication of
the business, by introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many
different bodies, would of itself afford a solid objection. The greater
frequency of the calls upon the House of Representatives, and the greater
length of time which it would often be necessary to keep them together
when convened, to obtain their sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty,
would be a source of so great inconvenience and expense as alone ought to
condemn the project.
The only objection which remains to be canvassed, is that which would
substitute the proportion of two thirds of all the members composing the
senatorial body, to that of two thirds of the members present. It has been
shown, under the second head of our inquiries, that all provisions which
require more than the majority of any body to its resolutions, have a direct
tendency to embarrass the operations of the government, and an indirect
one to subject the sense of the majority to that of the minority. This
consideration seems sufficient to determine our opinion, that the convention
have gone as far in the endeavor to secure the advantage of numbers in the
formation of treaties as could have been reconciled either with the activity
of the public councils or with a reasonable regard to the major sense of the
community. If two thirds of the whole number of members had been
required, it would, in many cases, from the non-attendance of a part,
amount in practice to a necessity of unanimity. And the history of every
political establishment in which this principle has prevailed, is a history of
impotence, perplexity, and disorder. Proofs of this position might be
adduced from the examples of the Roman Tribuneship, the Polish Diet, and
the States-General of the Netherlands, did not an example at home render
foreign precedents unnecessary.
To require a fixed proportion of the whole body would not, in all
probability, contribute to the advantages of a numerous agency, better then
merely to require a proportion of the attending members. The former, by
making a determinate number at all times requisite to a resolution,
diminishes the motives to punctual attendance. The latter, by making the
capacity of the body to depend on a proportion which may be varied by the
absence or presence of a single member, has the contrary effect. And as, by
promoting punctuality, it tends to keep the body complete, there is great
likelihood that its resolutions would generally be dictated by as great a
number in this case as in the other; while there would be much fewer
occasions of delay. It ought not to be forgotten that, under the existing
Confederation, two members may, and usually do, represent a State;
whence it happens that Congress, who now are solely invested with all the
powers of the Union, rarely consist of a greater number of persons than
would compose the intended Senate. If we add to this, that as the members
vote by States, and that where there is only a single member present from a
State, his vote is lost, it will justify a supposition that the active voices in
the Senate, where the members are to vote individually, would rarely fall
short in number of the active voices in the existing Congress. When, in
addition to these considerations, we take into view the co-operation of the
President, we shall not hesitate to infer that the people of America would
have greater security against an improper use of the power of making
treaties, under the new Constitution, than they now enjoy under the
Confederation. And when we proceed still one step further, and look
forward to the probable augmentation of the Senate, by the erection of new
States, we shall not only perceive ample ground of confidence in the
sufficiency of the members to whose agency that power will be intrusted,
but we shall probably be led to conclude that a body more numerous than
the Senate would be likely to become, would be very little fit for the proper
discharge of the trust.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE President is "to nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. But
the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as
they think proper, in the President alone, or in the courts of law, or in the
heads of departments. The President shall have power to fill up all
vacancies which may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting
commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session."
It has been observed in a former paper, that "the true test of a good
government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration."
If the justness of this observation be admitted, the mode of appointing the
officers of the United States contained in the foregoing clauses, must, when
examined, be allowed to be entitled to particular commendation. It is not
easy to conceive a plan better calculated than this to promote a judicious
choice of men for filling the offices of the Union; and it will not need proof,
that on this point must essentially depend the character of its administration.
It will be agreed on all hands, that the power of appointment, in ordinary
cases, ought to be modified in one of three ways. It ought either to be vested
in a single man, or in a select assembly of a moderate number; or in a single
man, with the concurrence of such an assembly. The exercise of it by the
people at large will be readily admitted to be impracticable; as waiving
every other consideration, it would leave them little time to do anything
else. When, therefore, mention is made in the subsequent reasonings of an
assembly or body of men, what is said must be understood to relate to a
select body or assembly, of the description already given. The people
collectively, from their number and from their dispersed situation, cannot be
regulated in their movements by that systematic spirit of cabal and intrigue,
which will be urged as the chief objections to reposing the power in
question in a body of men.
Those who have themselves reflected upon the subject, or who have
attended to the observations made in other parts of these papers, in relation
to the appointment of the President, will, I presume, agree to the position,
that there would always be great probability of having the place supplied by
a man of abilities, at least respectable. Premising this, I proceed to lay it
down as a rule, that one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and
estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of
men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment.
The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a
livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He will, on this
account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to
investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to
prefer with impartiality the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to
them. He will have fewer personal attachments to gratify, than a body of
men who may each be supposed to have an equal number; and will be so
much the less liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of
affection. A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be
distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests,
which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body.
There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions of mankind as personal
considerations whether they relate to ourselves or to others, who are to be
the objects of our choice or preference. Hence, in every exercise of the
power of appointing to offices, by an assembly of men, we must expect to
see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities
and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who
compose the assembly. The choice which may at any time happen to be
made under such circumstances, will of course be the result either of a
victory gained by one party over the other, or of a compromise between the
parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often
out of sight. In the first, the qualifications best adapted to uniting the
suffrages of the party, will be more considered than those which fit the
person for the station. In the last, the coalition will commonly turn upon
some interested equivalent: "Give us the man we wish for this office, and
you shall have the one you wish for that." This will be the usual condition
of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public
service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party
negotiations.
The truth of the principles here advanced seems to have been felt by the
most intelligent of those who have found fault with the provision made, in
this respect, by the convention. They contend that the President ought solely
to have been authorized to make the appointments under the federal
government. But it is easy to show, that every advantage to be expected
from such an arrangement would, in substance, be derived from the power
of nomination, which is proposed to be conferred upon him; while several
disadvantages which might attend the absolute power of appointment in the
hands of that officer would be avoided. In the act of nomination, his
judgment alone would be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to
point out the man who, with the approbation of the Senate, should fill an
office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make the
final appointment. There can, in this view, be no difference between
nominating and appointing. The same motives which would influence a
proper discharge of his duty in one case, would exist in the other. And as no
man could be appointed but on his previous nomination, every man who
might be appointed would be, in fact, his choice.
But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might, yet this
could only be to make place for another nomination by himself. The person
ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference, though perhaps
not in the first degree. It is also not very probable that his nomination would
often be overruled. The Senate could not be tempted, by the preference they
might feel to another, to reject the one proposed; because they could not
assure themselves, that the person they might wish would be brought
forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination. They could not even
be certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any degree
more acceptable to them; and as their dissent might cast a kind of stigma
upon the individual rejected, and might have the appearance of a reflection
upon the judgment of the chief magistrate, it is not likely that their sanction
would often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for
the refusal.
To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I answer,
that the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in
general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of
favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the
appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family
connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity. In
addition to this, it would be an efficacious source of stability in the
administration.
It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had himself the sole
disposition of offices, would be governed much more by his private
inclinations and interests, than when he was bound to submit the propriety
of his choice to the discussion and determination of a different and
independent body, and that body an entire branch of the legislature. The
possibility of rejection would be a strong motive to care in proposing. The
danger to his own reputation, and, in the case of an elective magistrate, to
his political existence, from betraying a spirit of favoritism, or an
unbecoming pursuit of popularity, to the observation of a body whose
opinion would have great weight in forming that of the public, could not
fail to operate as a barrier to the one and to the other. He would be both
ashamed and afraid to bring forward, for the most distinguished or lucrative
stations, candidates who had no other merit than that of coming from the
same State to which he particularly belonged, or of being in some way or
other personally allied to him, or of possessing the necessary insignificance
and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure.
To this reasoning it has been objected that the President, by the influence
of the power of nomination, may secure the complaisance of the Senate to
his views. This supposition of universal venalty in human nature is little
less an error in political reasoning, than the supposition of universal
rectitude. The institution of delegated power implies, that there is a portion
of virtue and honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation
of confidence; and experience justifies the theory. It has been found to exist
in the most corrupt periods of the most corrupt governments. The venalty of
the British House of Commons has been long a topic of accusation against
that body, in the country to which they belong as well as in this; and it
cannot be doubted that the charge is, to a considerable extent, well founded.
But it is as little to be doubted, that there is always a large proportion of the
body, which consists of independent and public-spirited men, who have an
influential weight in the councils of the nation. Hence it is (the present reign
not excepted) that the sense of that body is often seen to control the
inclinations of the monarch, both with regard to men and to measures.
Though it might therefore be allowable to suppose that the Executive might
occasionally influence some individuals in the Senate, yet the supposition,
that he could in general purchase the integrity of the whole body, would be
forced and improbable. A man disposed to view human nature as it is,
without either flattering its virtues or exaggerating its vices, will see
sufficient ground of confidence in the probity of the Senate, to rest satisfied,
not only that it will be impracticable to the Executive to corrupt or seduce a
majority of its members, but that the necessity of its co-operation, in the
business of appointments, will be a considerable and salutary restraint upon
the conduct of that magistrate. Nor is the integrity of the Senate the only
reliance. The Constitution has provided some important guards against the
danger of executive influence upon the legislative body: it declares that "No
senator or representative shall during the time for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil office under the United States, which shall have been
created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such
time; and no person, holding any office under the United States, shall be a
member of either house during his continuance in office."
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the
co-operation of the Senate, in the business of appointments, that it would
contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body
would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A change of the Chief
Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or so general a
revolution in the officers of the government as might be expected, if he
were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station had given
satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new President would be
restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable to
him, by the apprehension that a discountenance of the Senate might
frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself.
Those who can best estimate the value of a steady administration, will be
most disposed to prize a provision which connects the official existence of
public men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body which, from
the greater permanency of its own composition, will in all probability be
less subject to inconstancy than any other member of the government.
To this union of the Senate with the President, in the article of
appointments, it has in some cases been suggested that it would serve to
give the President an undue influence over the Senate, and in others that it
would have an opposite tendency—a strong proof that neither suggestion is
true.
To state the first in its proper form, is to refute it. It amounts to this: the
President would have an improper influence over the Senate, because the
Senate would have the power of restraining him. This is an absurdity in
terms. It cannot admit of a doubt that the entire power of appointment
would enable him much more effectually to establish a dangerous empire
over that body, than a mere power of nomination subject to their control.
Let us take a view of the converse of the proposition: "the Senate would
influence the Executive." As I have had occasion to remark in several other
instances, the indistinctness of the objection forbids a precise answer. In
what manner is this influence to be exerted? In relation to what objects?
The power of influencing a person, in the sense in which it is here used,
must imply a power of conferring a benefit upon him. How could the
Senate confer a benefit upon the President by the manner of employing
their right of negative upon his nominations? If it be said they might
sometimes gratify him by an acquiescence in a favorite choice, when public
motives might dictate a different conduct, I answer, that the instances in
which the President could be personally interested in the result, would be
too few to admit of his being materially affected by the compliances of the
Senate. The POWER which can originate the disposition of honors and
emoluments, is more likely to attract than to be attracted by the POWER
which can merely obstruct their course. If by influencing the President be
meant restraining him, this is precisely what must have been intended. And
it has been shown that the restraint would be salutary, at the same time that
it would not be such as to destroy a single advantage to be looked for from
the uncontrolled agency of that Magistrate. The right of nomination would
produce all the (good, without the ill.)(E1) (good of that of appointment,
and would in a great measure avoid its evils.)(E1)
Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment of the officers of the
proposed government with that which is established by the constitution of
this State, a decided preference must be given to the former. In that plan the
power of nomination is unequivocally vested in the Executive. And as there
would be a necessity for submitting each nomination to the judgment of an
entire branch of the legislature, the circumstances attending an appointment,
from the mode of conducting it, would naturally become matters of
notoriety; and the public would be at no loss to determine what part had
been performed by the different actors. The blame of a bad nomination
would fall upon the President singly and absolutely. The censure of
rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the Senate; aggravated
by the consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of the
Executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the Executive for
nominating, and the Senate for approving, would participate, though in
different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.
The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of appointment in this
State. The council of appointment consists of from three to five persons, of
whom the governor is always one. This small body, shut up in a private
apartment, impenetrable to the public eye, proceed to the execution of the
trust committed to them. It is known that the governor claims the right of
nomination, upon the strength of some ambiguous expressions in the
constitution; but it is not known to what extent, or in what manner he
exercises it; nor upon what occasions he is contradicted or opposed. The
censure of a bad appointment, on account of the uncertainty of its author,
and for want of a determinate object, has neither poignancy nor duration.
And while an unbounded field for cabal and intrigue lies open, all idea of
responsibility is lost. The most that the public can know, is that the
governor claims the right of nomination; that two out of the inconsiderable
number of four men can too often be managed without much difficulty; that
if some of the members of a particular council should happen to be of an
uncomplying character, it is frequently not impossible to get rid of their
opposition by regulating the times of meeting in such a manner as to render
their attendance inconvenient; and that from whatever cause it may proceed,
a great number of very improper appointments are from time to time made.
Whether a governor of this State avails himself of the ascendant he must
necessarily have, in this delicate and important part of the administration, to
prefer to offices men who are best qualified for them, or whether he
prostitutes that advantage to the advancement of persons whose chief merit
is their implicit devotion to his will, and to the support of a despicable and
dangerous system of personal influence, are questions which, unfortunately
for the community, can only be the subjects of speculation and conjecture.
Every mere council of appointment, however constituted, will be a
conclave, in which cabal and intrigue will have their full scope. Their
number, without an unwarrantable increase of expense, cannot be large
enough to preclude a facility of combination. And as each member will
have his friends and connections to provide for, the desire of mutual
gratification will beget a scandalous bartering of votes and bargaining for
places. The private attachments of one man might easily be satisfied; but to
satisfy the private attachments of a dozen, or of twenty men, would
occasion a monopoly of all the principal employments of the government in
a few families, and would lead more directly to an aristocracy or an
oligarchy than any measure that could be contrived. If, to avoid an
accumulation of offices, there was to be a frequent change in the persons
who were to compose the council, this would involve the mischiefs of a
mutable administration in their full extent. Such a council would also be
more liable to executive influence than the Senate, because they would be
fewer in number, and would act less immediately under the public
inspection. Such a council, in fine, as a substitute for the plan of the
convention, would be productive of an increase of expense, a multiplication
of the evils which spring from favoritism and intrigue in the distribution of
public honors, a decrease of stability in the administration of the
government, and a diminution of the security against an undue influence of
the Executive. And yet such a council has been warmly contended for as an
essential amendment in the proposed Constitution.
I could not with propriety conclude my observations on the subject of
appointments without taking notice of a scheme for which there have
appeared some, though but few advocates; I mean that of uniting the House
of Representatives in the power of making them. I shall, however, do little
more than mention it, as I cannot imagine that it is likely to gain the
countenance of any considerable part of the community. A body so
fluctuating and at the same time so numerous, can never be deemed proper
for the exercise of that power. Its unfitness will appear manifest to all, when
it is recollected that in half a century it may consist of three or four hundred
persons. All the advantages of the stability, both of the Executive and of the
Senate, would be defeated by this union, and infinite delays and
embarrassments would be occasioned. The example of most of the States in
their local constitutions encourages us to reprobate the idea.
The only remaining powers of the Executive are comprehended in giving
information to Congress of the state of the Union; in recommending to their
consideration such measures as he shall judge expedient; in convening
them, or either branch, upon extraordinary occasions; in adjourning them
when they cannot themselves agree upon the time of adjournment; in
receiving ambassadors and other public ministers; in faithfully executing
the laws; and in commissioning all the officers of the United States.
Except some cavils about the power of convening either house of the
legislature, and that of receiving ambassadors, no objection has been made
to this class of authorities; nor could they possibly admit of any. It required,
indeed, an insatiable avidity for censure to invent exceptions to the parts
which have been excepted to. In regard to the power of convening either
house of the legislature, I shall barely remark, that in respect to the Senate
at least, we can readily discover a good reason for it. AS this body has a
concurrent power with the Executive in the article of treaties, it might often
be necessary to call it together with a view to this object, when it would be
unnecessary and improper to convene the House of Representatives. As to
the reception of ambassadors, what I have said in a former paper will
furnish a sufficient answer.
We have now completed a survey of the structure and powers of the
executive department, which, I have endeavored to show, combines, as far
as republican principles will admit, all the requisites to energy. The
remaining inquiry is: Does it also combine the requisites to safety, in a
republican sense—a due dependence on the people, a due responsibility?
The answer to this question has been anticipated in the investigation of its
other characteristics, and is satisfactorily deducible from these
circumstances; from the election of the President once in four years by
persons immediately chosen by the people for that purpose; and from his
being at all times liable to impeachment, trial, dismission from office,
incapacity to serve in any other, and to forfeiture of life and estate by
subsequent prosecution in the common course of law. But these
precautions, great as they are, are not the only ones which the plan of the
convention has provided in favor of the public security. In the only
instances in which the abuse of the executive authority was materially to be
feared, the Chief Magistrate of the United States would, by that plan, be
subjected to the control of a branch of the legislative body. What more
could be desired by an enlightened and reasonable people?
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
WE PROCEED now to an examination of the judiciary department of the
proposed government.
In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the utility and
necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less
necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged, as the propriety of
the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which have
been raised being relative to the manner of constituting it, and to its extent.
To these points, therefore, our observations shall be confined.
The manner of constituting it seems to embrace these several objects: 1st.
The mode of appointing the judges. 2d. The tenure by which they are to
hold their places. 3d. The partition of the judiciary authority between
different courts, and their relations to each other.
First. As to the mode of appointing the judges; this is the same with that
of appointing the officers of the Union in general, and has been so fully
discussed in the two last numbers, that nothing can be said here which
would not be useless repetition.
Second. As to the tenure by which the judges are to hold their places; this
chiefly concerns their duration in office; the provisions for their support; the
precautions for their responsibility.
According to the plan of the convention, all judges who may be
appointed by the United States are to hold their offices during good
behavior; which is conformable to the most approved of the State
constitutions and among the rest, to that of this State. Its propriety having
been drawn into question by the adversaries of that plan, is no light
symptom of the rage for objection, which disorders their imaginations and
judgments. The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of
the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern
improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy it is an
excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less
excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative
body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government,
to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must
perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other,
the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least
in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the
honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only
commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights
of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the
strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but
merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive
arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences.
It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest
of the three departments of power(1); that it can never attack with success
either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to
defend itself against their attacks. It equally proves, that though individual
oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the
general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I
mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the
legislature and the Executive. For I agree, that "there is no liberty, if the
power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers."(2) And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing
to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from its
union with either of the other departments; that as all the effects of such a
union must ensue from a dependence of the former on the latter,
notwithstanding a nominal and apparent separation; that as, from the natural
feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered,
awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate branches; and that as nothing can
contribute so much to its firmness and independence as permanency in
office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable
ingredient in its constitution, and, in a great measure, as the citadel of the
public justice and the public security.
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential
in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which
contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for
instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and
the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way
than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.
Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would
amount to nothing.
Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce
legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from
an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary
to the legislative power. It is urged that the authority which can declare the
acts of another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts
may be declared void. As this doctrine is of great importance in all the
American constitutions, a brief discussion of the ground on which it rests
cannot be unacceptable.
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every
act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under
which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the
Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy
is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the
representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that
men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not
authorize, but what they forbid.
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional
judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is
conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot
be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any
particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed,
that the Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people
to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to
suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between
the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the
latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the
laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in
fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any
particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen
to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the
superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in
other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the
intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the
judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the
people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature,
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in
the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than
the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws,
rather than by those which are not fundamental.
This exercise of judicial discretion, in determining between two
contradictory laws, is exemplified in a familiar instance. It not uncommonly
happens, that there are two statutes existing at one time, clashing in whole
or in part with each other, and neither of them containing any repealing
clause or expression. In such a case, it is the province of the courts to
liquidate and fix their meaning and operation. So far as they can, by any fair
construction, be reconciled to each other, reason and law conspire to dictate
that this should be done; where this is impracticable, it becomes a matter of
necessity to give effect to one, in exclusion of the other. The rule which has
obtained in the courts for determining their relative validity is, that the last
in order of time shall be preferred to the first. But this is a mere rule of
construction, not derived from any positive law, but from the nature and
reason of the thing. It is a rule not enjoined upon the courts by legislative
provision, but adopted by themselves, as consonant to truth and propriety,
for the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the law. They thought it
reasonable, that between the interfering acts of an EQUAL authority, that
which was the last indication of its will should have the preference.
But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate
authority, of an original and derivative power, the nature and reason of the
thing indicate the converse of that rule as proper to be followed. They teach
us that the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act
of an inferior and subordinate authority; and that accordingly, whenever a
particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the
judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former.
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a
repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional
intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen in the case of two
contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon
any single statute. The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they
should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the
consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of
the legislative body. The observation, if it prove any thing, would prove that
there ought to be no judges distinct from that body.
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a
limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration
will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices,
since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in
the judges which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous
a duty.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular
conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and
which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion
dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community. Though I trust the friends of the proposed
Constitution will never concur with its enemies,(3) in questioning that
fundamental principle of republican government, which admits the right of
the people to alter or abolish the established Constitution, whenever they
find it inconsistent with their happiness, yet it is not to be inferred from this
principle, that the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary
inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents,
incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution, would, on that
account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions; or that the courts
would be under a greater obligation to connive at infractions in this shape,
than when they had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative
body. Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled
or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively,
as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge, of their
sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to
such an act. But it is easy to see, that it would require an uncommon portion
of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the
Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the
major voice of the community.
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that the
independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the
effects of occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no
farther than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of
citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial
magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity and confining the
operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the immediate
mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check
upon the legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to
the success of iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of
the courts, are in a manner compelled, by the very motives of the injustice
they meditate, to qualify their attempts. This is a circumstance calculated to
have more influence upon the character of our governments, than but few
may be aware of. The benefits of the integrity and moderation of the
judiciary have already been felt in more States than one; and though they
may have displeased those whose sinister expectations they may have
disappointed, they must have commanded the esteem and applause of all
the virtuous and disinterested. Considerate men, of every description, ought
to prize whatever will tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts: as
no man can be sure that he may not be to-morrow the victim of a spirit of
injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day. And every man must now
feel, that the inevitable tendency of such a spirit is to sap the foundations of
public and private confidence, and to introduce in its stead universal distrust
and distress.
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution,
and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of
justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by
a temporary commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or
by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their
necessary independence. If the power of making them was committed either
to the Executive or legislature, there would be danger of an improper
complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an
unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people, or to
persons chosen by them for the special purpose, there would be too great a
disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be
consulted but the Constitution and the laws.
There is yet a further and a weightier reason for the permanency of the
judicial offices, which is deducible from the nature of the qualifications
they require. It has been frequently remarked, with great propriety, that a
voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily
connected with the advantages of a free government. To avoid an arbitrary
discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down
by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty
in every particular case that comes before them; and it will readily be
conceived from the variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and
wickedness of mankind, that the records of those precedents must
unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and
laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them. Hence it is, that
there can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the
laws to qualify them for the stations of judges. And making the proper
deductions for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be
still smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite
knowledge. These considerations apprise us, that the government can have
no great option between fit character; and that a temporary duration in
office, which would naturally discourage such characters from quitting a
lucrative line of practice to accept a seat on the bench, would have a
tendency to throw the administration of justice into hands less able, and less
well qualified, to conduct it with utility and dignity. In the present
circumstances of this country, and in those in which it is likely to be for a
long time to come, the disadvantages on this score would be greater than
they may at first sight appear; but it must be confessed, that they are far
inferior to those which present themselves under the other aspects of the
subject.
Upon the whole, there can be no room to doubt that the convention acted
wisely in copying from the models of those constitutions which have
established good behavior as the tenure of their judicial offices, in point of
duration; and that so far from being blamable on this account, their plan
would have been inexcusably defective, if it had wanted this important
feature of good government. The experience of Great Britain affords an
illustrious comment on the excellence of the institution.
PUBLIUS
1. The celebrated Montesquieu, speaking of them, says: "Of the three
powers above mentioned, the judiciary is next to nothing."—Spirit of Laws.
Vol. I, page 186.
2. Idem, page 181.
3. Vide Protest of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania,
Martin's Speech, etc.
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To the People of the State of New York:
NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the
independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. The
remark made in relation to the President is equally applicable here. In the
general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts
to a power over his will. And we can never hope to see realized in practice,
the complete separation of the judicial from the legislative power, in any
system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on the
occasional grants of the latter. The enlightened friends to good government
in every State, have seen cause to lament the want of precise and explicit
precautions in the State constitutions on this head. Some of these indeed
have declared that permanent(1) salaries should be established for the
judges; but the experiment has in some instances shown that such
expressions are not sufficiently definite to preclude legislative evasions.
Something still more positive and unequivocal has been evinced to be
requisite. The plan of the convention accordingly has provided that the
judges of the United States "shall at stated times receive for their services a
compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office."
This, all circumstances considered, is the most eligible provision that
could have been devised. It will readily be understood that the fluctuations
in the value of money and in the state of society rendered a fixed rate of
compensation in the Constitution inadmissible. What might be extravagant
to-day, might in half a century become penurious and inadequate. It was
therefore necessary to leave it to the discretion of the legislature to vary its
provisions in conformity to the variations in circumstances, yet under such
restrictions as to put it out of the power of that body to change the condition
of the individual for the worse. A man may then be sure of the ground upon
which he stands, and can never be deterred from his duty by the
apprehension of being placed in a less eligible situation. The clause which
has been quoted combines both advantages. The salaries of judicial officers
may from time to time be altered, as occasion shall require, yet so as never
to lessen the allowance with which any particular judge comes into office,
in respect to him. It will be observed that a difference has been made by the
convention between the compensation of the President and of the judges,
That of the former can neither be increased nor diminished; that of the latter
can only not be diminished. This probably arose from the difference in the
duration of the respective offices. As the President is to be elected for no
more than four years, it can rarely happen that an adequate salary, fixed at
the commencement of that period, will not continue to be such to its end.
But with regard to the judges, who, if they behave properly, will be secured
in their places for life, it may well happen, especially in the early stages of
the government, that a stipend, which would be very sufficient at their first
appointment, would become too small in the progress of their service.
This provision for the support of the judges bears every mark of prudence
and efficacy; and it may be safely affirmed that, together with the
permanent tenure of their offices, it affords a better prospect of their
independence than is discoverable in the constitutions of any of the States
in regard to their own judges.
The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the article
respecting impeachments. They are liable to be impeached for malconduct
by the House of Representatives, and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted,
may be dismissed from office, and disqualified for holding any other. This
is the only provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary
independence of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find in
our own Constitution in respect to our own judges.
The want of a provision for removing the judges on account of inability
has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate men will be sensible
that such a provision would either not be practiced upon or would be more
liable to abuse than calculated to answer any good purpose. The
mensuration of the faculties of the mind has, I believe, no place in the
catalogue of known arts. An attempt to fix the boundary between the
regions of ability and inability, would much oftener give scope to personal
and party attachments and enmities than advance the interests of justice or
the public good. The result, except in the case of insanity, must for the most
part be arbitrary; and insanity, without any formal or express provision, may
be safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualification.
The constitution of New York, to avoid investigations that must forever
be vague and dangerous, has taken a particular age as the criterion of
inability. No man can be a judge beyond sixty. I believe there are few at
present who do not disapprove of this provision. There is no station, in
relation to which it is less proper than to that of a judge. The deliberating
and comparing faculties generally preserve their strength much beyond that
period in men who survive it; and when, in addition to this circumstance,
we consider how few there are who outlive the season of intellectual vigor,
and how improbable it is that any considerable portion of the bench,
whether more or less numerous, should be in such a situation at the same
time, we shall be ready to conclude that limitations of this sort have little to
recommend them. In a republic, where fortunes are not affluent, and
pensions not expedient, the dismission of men from stations in which they
have served their country long and usefully, on which they depend for
subsistence, and from which it will be too late to resort to any other
occupation for a livelihood, ought to have some better apology to humanity
than is to be found in the imaginary danger of a superannuated bench.
PUBLIUS
1. Vide Constitution of Massachusetts, Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 13.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
TO JUDGE with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal judicature,
it will be necessary to consider, in the first place, what are its proper
objects.
It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the judiciary authority of
the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions of cases: 1st, to all
those which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance
of their just and constitutional powers of legislation; 2d, to all those which
concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles
of Union; 3d, to all those in which the United States are a party; 4th, to all
those which involve the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they
relate to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, or to
that between the States themselves; 5th, to all those which originate on the
high seas, and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; and, lastly, to all
those in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and
unbiased.
The first point depends upon this obvious consideration, that there ought
always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional
provisions. What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of
the State legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the
observance of them? The States, by the plan of the convention, are
prohibited from doing a variety of things, some of which are incompatible
with the interests of the Union, and others with the principles of good
government. The imposition of duties on imported articles, and the
emission of paper money, are specimens of each kind. No man of sense will
believe, that such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded, without
some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions
of them. This power must either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an
authority in the federal courts to overrule such as might be in manifest
contravention of the articles of Union. There is no third course that I can
imagine. The latter appears to have been thought by the convention
preferable to the former, and, I presume, will be most agreeable to the
States.
As to the second point, it is impossible, by any argument or comment, to
make it clearer than it is in itself. If there are such things as political
axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a government being
coextensive with its legislative, may be ranked among the number. The
mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws,
decides the question. Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over
the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government,
from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.
Still less need be said in regard to the third point. Controversies between
the nation and its members or citizens, can only be properly referred to the
national tribunals. Any other plan would be contrary to reason, to
precedent, and to decorum.
The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that the peace of the
WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The Union will
undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its
members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be
accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or perversion
of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with
reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal
judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of
other countries are concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation
of the public faith, than to the security of the public tranquillity. A
distinction may perhaps be imagined between cases arising upon treaties
and the laws of nations and those which may stand merely on the footing of
the municipal law. The former kind may be supposed proper for the federal
jurisdiction, the latter for that of the States. But it is at least problematical,
whether an unjust sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of
controversy was wholly relative to the lex loci, would not, if unredressed,
be an aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one which violated the
stipulations of a treaty or the general law of nations. And a still greater
objection to the distinction would result from the immense difficulty, if not
impossibility, of a practical discrimination between the cases of one
complexion and those of the other. So great a proportion of the cases in
which foreigners are parties, involve national questions, that it is by far
most safe and most expedient to refer all those in which they are concerned
to the national tribunals.
The power of determining causes between two States, between one State
and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of different States, is
perhaps not less essential to the peace of the Union than that which has
been just examined. History gives us a horrid picture of the dissensions and
private wars which distracted and desolated Germany prior to the institution
of the Imperial Chamber by Maximilian, towards the close of the fifteenth
century; and informs us, at the same time, of the vast influence of that
institution in appeasing the disorders and establishing the tranquillity of the
empire. This was a court invested with authority to decide finally all
differences among the members of the Germanic body.
A method of terminating territorial disputes between the States, under the
authority of the federal head, was not unattended to, even in the imperfect
system by which they have been hitherto held together. But there are many
other sources, besides interfering claims of boundary, from which
bickerings and animosities may spring up among the members of the
Union. To some of these we have been witnesses in the course of our past
experience. It will readily be conjectured that I allude to the fraudulent laws
which have been passed in too many of the States. And though the proposed
Constitution establishes particular guards against the repetition of those
instances which have heretofore made their appearance, yet it is warrantable
to apprehend that the spirit which produced them will assume new shapes,
that could not be foreseen nor specifically provided against. Whatever
practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States,
are proper objects of federal superintendence and control.
It may be esteemed the basis of the Union, that "the citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several States." And if it be a just principle that every government ought to
possess the means of executing its own provisions by its own authority, it
will follow, that in order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of
privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be
entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one
State or its citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens. To secure
the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and
subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed to that
tribunal which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial
between the different States and their citizens, and which, owing its official
existence to the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to
the principles on which it is founded.
The fifth point will demand little animadversion. The most bigoted
idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a disposition to deny the
national judiciary the cognizances of maritime causes. These so generally
depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of
foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are relative to the
public peace. The most important part of them are, by the present
Confederation, submitted to federal jurisdiction.
The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases in which
the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No
man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in
respect to which he has the least interest or bias. This principle has no
inconsiderable weight in designating the federal courts as the proper
tribunals for the determination of controversies between different States and
their citizens. And it ought to have the same operation in regard to some
cases between citizens of the same State. Claims to land under grants of
different States, founded upon adverse pretensions of boundary, are of this
description. The courts of neither of the granting States could be expected
to be unbiased. The laws may have even prejudged the question, and tied
the courts down to decisions in favor of the grants of the State to which they
belonged. And even where this had not been done, it would be natural that
the judges, as men, should feel a strong predilection to the claims of their
own government.
Having thus laid down and discussed the principles which ought to
regulate the constitution of the federal judiciary, we will proceed to test, by
these principles, the particular powers of which, according to the plan of the
convention, it is to be composed. It is to comprehend "all cases in law and
equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United
States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States;
between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different
States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands and grants of
different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign
states, citizens, and subjects." This constitutes the entire mass of the judicial
authority of the Union. Let us now review it in detail. It is, then, to extend:
First. To all cases in law and equity, arising under the Constitution and
the laws of the United States. This corresponds with the two first classes of
causes, which have been enumerated, as proper for the jurisdiction of the
United States. It has been asked, what is meant by "cases arising under the
Constitution," in contradiction from those "arising under the laws of the
United States"? The difference has been already explained. All the
restrictions upon the authority of the State legislatures furnish examples of
it. They are not, for instance, to emit paper money; but the interdiction
results from the Constitution, and will have no connection with any law of
the United States. Should paper money, notwithstanding, be emited, the
controversies concerning it would be cases arising under the Constitution
and not the laws of the United States, in the ordinary signification of the
terms. This may serve as a sample of the whole.
It has also been asked, what need of the word "equity". What equitable
causes can grow out of the Constitution and laws of the United States?
There is hardly a subject of litigation between individuals, which may not
involve those ingredients of fraud, accident, trust, or hardship, which would
render the matter an object of equitable rather than of legal jurisdiction, as
the distinction is known and established in several of the States. It is the
peculiar province, for instance, of a court of equity to relieve against what
are called hard bargains: these are contracts in which, though there may
have been no direct fraud or deceit, sufficient to invalidate them in a court
of law, yet there may have been some undue and unconscionable advantage
taken of the necessities or misfortunes of one of the parties, which a court
of equity would not tolerate. In such cases, where foreigners were
concerned on either side, it would be impossible for the federal judicatories
to do justice without an equitable as well as a legal jurisdiction. Agreements
to convey lands claimed under the grants of different States, may afford
another example of the necessity of an equitable jurisdiction in the federal
courts. This reasoning may not be so palpable in those States where the
formal and technical distinction between LAW and EQUITY is not
maintained, as in this State, where it is exemplified by every day's practice.
The judiciary authority of the Union is to extend:
Second. To treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States, and to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls. These belong to the fourth class of the enumerated
cases, as they have an evident connection with the preservation of the
national peace.
Third. To cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. These form,
altogether, the fifth of the enumerated classes of causes proper for the
cognizance of the national courts.
Fourth. To controversies to which the United States shall be a party.
These constitute the third of those classes.
Fifth. To controversies between two or more States; between a State and
citizens of another State; between citizens of different States. These belong
to the fourth of those classes, and partake, in some measure, of the nature of
the last.
Sixth. To cases between the citizens of the same State, claiming lands
under grants of different States. These fall within the last class, and are the
only instances in which the proposed Constitution directly contemplates the
cognizance of disputes between the citizens of the same State.
Seventh. To cases between a State and the citizens thereof, and foreign
States, citizens, or subjects. These have been already explained to belong to
the fourth of the enumerated classes, and have been shown to be, in a
peculiar manner, the proper subjects of the national judicature.
From this review of the particular powers of the federal judiciary, as
marked out in the Constitution, it appears that they are all conformable to
the principles which ought to have governed the structure of that
department, and which were necessary to the perfection of the system. If
some partial inconveniences should appear to be connected with the
incorporation of any of them into the plan, it ought to be recollected that the
national legislature will have ample authority to make such exceptions, and
to prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or remove
these inconveniences. The possibility of particular mischiefs can never be
viewed, by a wellinformed mind, as a solid objection to a general principle,
which is calculated to avoid general mischiefs and to obtain general
advantages.
PUBLIUS
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
LET US now return to the partition of the judiciary authority between
different courts, and their relations to each other.
"The judicial power of the United States is" (by the plan of the
convention) "to be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts
as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish."(1)
That there ought to be one court of supreme and final jurisdiction, is a
proposition which is not likely to be contested. The reasons for it have been
assigned in another place, and are too obvious to need repetition. The only
question that seems to have been raised concerning it, is, whether it ought to
be a distinct body or a branch of the legislature. The same contradiction is
observable in regard to this matter which has been remarked in several
other cases. The very men who object to the Senate as a court of
impeachments, on the ground of an improper intermixture of powers,
advocate, by implication at least, the propriety of vesting the ultimate
decision of all causes, in the whole or in a part of the legislative body.
The arguments, or rather suggestions, upon which this charge is founded,
are to this effect: "The authority of the proposed Supreme Court of the
United States, which is to be a separate and independent body, will be
superior to that of the legislature. The power of construing the laws
according to the spirit of the Constitution, will enable that court to mould
them into whatever shape it may think proper; especially as its decisions
will not be in any manner subject to the revision or correction of the
legislative body. This is as unprecedented as it is dangerous. In Britain, the
judicial power, in the last resort, resides in the House of Lords, which is a
branch of the legislature; and this part of the British government has been
imitated in the State constitutions in general. The Parliament of Great
Britain, and the legislatures of the several States, can at any time rectify, by
law, the exceptionable decisions of their respective courts. But the errors
and usurpations of the Supreme Court of the United States will be
uncontrollable and remediless." This, upon examination, will be found to be
made up altogether of false reasoning upon misconceived fact.
In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan under consideration
which directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws according
to the spirit of the Constitution, or which gives them any greater latitude in
this respect than may be claimed by the courts of every State. I admit,
however, that the Constitution ought to be the standard of construction for
the laws, and that wherever there is an evident opposition, the laws ought to
give place to the Constitution. But this doctrine is not deducible from any
circumstance peculiar to the plan of the convention, but from the general
theory of a limited Constitution; and as far as it is true, is equally applicable
to most, if not to all the State governments. There can be no objection,
therefore, on this account, to the federal judicature which will not lie
against the local judicatures in general, and which will not serve to
condemn every constitution that attempts to set bounds to legislative
discretion.
But perhaps the force of the objection may be thought to consist in the
particular organization of the Supreme Court; in its being composed of a
distinct body of magistrates, instead of being one of the branches of the
legislature, as in the government of Great Britain and that of the State. To
insist upon this point, the authors of the objection must renounce the
meaning they have labored to annex to the celebrated maxim, requiring a
separation of the departments of power. It shall, nevertheless, be conceded
to them, agreeably to the interpretation given to that maxim in the course of
these papers, that it is not violated by vesting the ultimate power of judging
in a PART of the legislative body. But though this be not an absolute
violation of that excellent rule, yet it verges so nearly upon it, as on this
account alone to be less eligible than the mode preferred by the convention.
From a body which had even a partial agency in passing bad laws, we could
rarely expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in the application.
The same spirit which had operated in making them, would be too apt in
interpreting them; still less could it be expected that men who had infringed
the Constitution in the character of legislators, would be disposed to repair
the breach in the character of judges. Nor is this all. Every reason which
recommends the tenure of good behavior for judicial offices, militates
against placing the judiciary power, in the last resort, in a body composed of
men chosen for a limited period. There is an absurdity in referring the
determination of causes, in the first instance, to judges of permanent
standing; in the last, to those of a temporary and mutable constitution. And
there is a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men, selected
for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study, to the
revision and control of men who, for want of the same advantage, cannot
but be deficient in that knowledge. The members of the legislature will
rarely be chosen with a view to those qualifications which fit men for the
stations of judges; and as, on this account, there will be great reason to
apprehend all the ill consequences of defective information, so, on account
of the natural propensity of such bodies to party divisions, there will be no
less reason to fear that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the
fountains of justice. The habit of being continually marshalled on opposite
sides will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law and of equity.
These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those States who
have committed the judicial power, in the last resort, not to a part of the
legislature, but to distinct and independent bodies of men. Contrary to the
supposition of those who have represented the plan of the convention, in
this respect, as novel and unprecedented, it is but a copy of the constitutions
of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; and the preference
which has been given to those models is highly to be commended.
It is not true, in the second place, that the Parliament of Great Britain, or
the legislatures of the particular States, can rectify the exceptionable
decisions of their respective courts, in any other sense than might be done
by a future legislature of the United States. The theory, neither of the
British, nor the State constitutions, authorizes the revisal of a judicial
sentence by a legislative act. Nor is there any thing in the proposed
Constitution, more than in either of them, by which it is forbidden. In the
former, as well as in the latter, the impropriety of the thing, on the general
principles of law and reason, is the sole obstacle. A legislature, without
exceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination once made in a
particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases. This is
the principle, and it applies in all its consequences, exactly in the same
manner and extent, to the State governments, as to the national government
now under consideration. Not the least difference can be pointed out in any
view of the subject.
It may in the last place be observed that the supposed danger of judiciary
encroachments on the legislative authority, which has been upon many
occasions reiterated, is in reality a phantom. Particular misconstructions and
contraventions of the will of the legislature may now and then happen; but
they can never be so extensive as to amount to an inconvenience, or in any
sensible degree to affect the order of the political system. This may be
inferred with certainty, from the general nature of the judicial power, from
the objects to which it relates, from the manner in which it is exercised,
from its comparative weakness, and from its total incapacity to support its
usurpations by force. And the inference is greatly fortified by the
consideration of the important constitutional check which the power of
instituting impeachments in one part of the legislative body, and of
determining upon them in the other, would give to that body upon the
members of the judicial department. This is alone a complete security.
There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate
usurpations on the authority of the legislature, would hazard the united
resentment of the body intrusted with it, while this body was possessed of
the means of punishing their presumption, by degrading them from their
stations. While this ought to remove all apprehensions on the subject, it
affords, at the same time, a cogent argument for constituting the Senate a
court for the trial of impeachments.
Having now examined, and, I trust, removed the objections to the distinct
and independent organization of the Supreme Court, I proceed to consider
the propriety of the power of constituting inferior courts,(2) and the
relations which will subsist between these and the former.
The power of constituting inferior courts is evidently calculated to
obviate the necessity of having recourse to the Supreme Court in every case
of federal cognizance. It is intended to enable the national government to
institute or authorize, in each State or district of the United States, a tribunal
competent to the determination of matters of national jurisdiction within its
limits.
But why, it is asked, might not the same purpose have been accomplished
by the instrumentality of the State courts? This admits of different answers.
Though the fitness and competency of those courts should be allowed in the
utmost latitude, yet the substance of the power in question may still be
regarded as a necessary part of the plan, if it were only to empower the
national legislature to commit to them the cognizance of causes arising out
of the national Constitution. To confer the power of determining such
causes upon the existing courts of the several States, would perhaps be as
much "to constitute tribunals," as to create new courts with the like power.
But ought not a more direct and explicit provision to have been made in
favor of the State courts? There are, in my opinion, substantial reasons
against such a provision: the most discerning cannot foresee how far the
prevalency of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for
the jurisdiction of national causes; whilst every man may discover, that
courts constituted like those of some of the States would be improper
channels of the judicial authority of the Union. State judges, holding their
offices during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too little independent
to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of the national laws. And if
there was a necessity for confiding the original cognizance of causes arising
under those laws to them there would be a correspondent necessity for
leaving the door of appeal as wide as possible. In proportion to the grounds
of confidence in, or distrust of, the subordinate tribunals, ought to be the
facility or difficulty of appeals. And well satisfied as I am of the propriety
of the appellate jurisdiction, in the several classes of causes to which it is
extended by the plan of the convention. I should consider every thing
calculated to give, in practice, an unrestrained course to appeals, as a source
of public and private inconvenience.
I am not sure, but that it will be found highly expedient and useful, to
divide the United States into four or five or half a dozen districts; and to
institute a federal court in each district, in lieu of one in every State. The
judges of these courts, with the aid of the State judges, may hold circuits for
the trial of causes in the several parts of the respective districts. Justice
through them may be administered with ease and despatch; and appeals
may be safely circumscribed within a narrow compass. This plan appears to
me at present the most eligible of any that could be adopted; and in order to
it, it is necessary that the power of constituting inferior courts should exist
in the full extent in which it is to be found in the proposed Constitution.
These reasons seem sufficient to satisfy a candid mind, that the want of
such a power would have been a great defect in the plan. Let us now
examine in what manner the judicial authority is to be distributed between
the supreme and the inferior courts of the Union.
The Supreme Court is to be invested with original jurisdiction, only "in
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those
in which A STATE shall be a party." Public ministers of every class are the
immediate representatives of their sovereigns. All questions in which they
are concerned are so directly connected with the public peace, that, as well
for the preservation of this, as out of respect to the sovereignties they
represent, it is both expedient and proper that such questions should be
submitted in the first instance to the highest judicatory of the nation.
Though consuls have not in strictness a diplomatic character, yet as they are
the public agents of the nations to which they belong, the same observation
is in a great measure applicable to them. In cases in which a State might
happen to be a party, it would ill suit its dignity to be turned over to an
inferior tribunal.
Though it may rather be a digression from the immediate subject of this
paper, I shall take occasion to mention here a supposition which has excited
some alarm upon very mistaken grounds. It has been suggested that an
assignment of the public securities of one State to the citizens of another,
would enable them to prosecute that State in the federal courts for the
amount of those securities; a suggestion which the following considerations
prove to be without foundation.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent. This is the general sense, and the general
practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union.
Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the
convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger intimated must be
merely ideal. The circumstances which are necessary to produce an
alienation of State sovereignty were discussed in considering the article of
taxation, and need not be repeated here. A recurrence to the principles there
established will satisfy us, that there is no color to pretend that the State
governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the
privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every
constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. The
contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the
conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force.
They confer no right of action, independent of the sovereign will. To what
purpose would it be to authorize suits against States for the debts they owe?
How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident, it could not be done
without waging war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the
federal courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a pre-existing
right of the State governments, a power which would involve such a
consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.
Let us resume the train of our observations. We have seen that the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be confined to two classes
of causes, and those of a nature rarely to occur. In all other cases of federal
cognizance, the original jurisdiction would appertain to the inferior
tribunals; and the Supreme Court would have nothing more than an
appellate jurisdiction, "with such exceptions and under such regulations as
the Congress shall make."
The propriety of this appellate jurisdiction has been scarcely called in
question in regard to matters of law; but the clamors have been loud against
it as applied to matters of fact. Some well-intentioned men in this State,
deriving their notions from the language and forms which obtain in our
courts, have been induced to consider it as an implied supersedure of the
trial by jury, in favor of the civil-law mode of trial, which prevails in our
courts of admiralty, probate, and chancery. A technical sense has been
affixed to the term "appellate," which, in our law parlance, is commonly
used in reference to appeals in the course of the civil law. But if I am not
misinformed, the same meaning would not be given to it in any part of New
England. There an appeal from one jury to another, is familiar both in
language and practice, and is even a matter of course, until there have been
two verdicts on one side. The word "appellate," therefore, will not be
understood in the same sense in New England as in New York, which
shows the impropriety of a technical interpretation derived from the
jurisprudence of any particular State. The expression, taken in the abstract,
denotes nothing more than the power of one tribunal to review the
proceedings of another, either as to the law or fact, or both. The mode of
doing it may depend on ancient custom or legislative provision (in a new
government it must depend on the latter), and may be with or without the
aid of a jury, as may be judged advisable. If, therefore, the re-examination
of a fact once determined by a jury, should in any case be admitted under
the proposed Constitution, it may be so regulated as to be done by a second
jury, either by remanding the cause to the court below for a second trial of
the fact, or by directing an issue immediately out of the Supreme Court.
But it does not follow that the re-examination of a fact once ascertained
by a jury, will be permitted in the Supreme Court. Why may not it be said,
with the strictest propriety, when a writ of error is brought from an inferior
to a superior court of law in this State, that the latter has jurisdiction of the
fact as well as the law? It is true it cannot institute a new inquiry concerning
the fact, but it takes cognizance of it as it appears upon the record, and
pronounces the law arising upon it.(3) This is jurisdiction of both fact and
law; nor is it even possible to separate them. Though the common-law
courts of this State ascertain disputed facts by a jury, yet they
unquestionably have jurisdiction of both fact and law; and accordingly
when the former is agreed in the pleadings, they have no recourse to a jury,
but proceed at once to judgment. I contend, therefore, on this ground, that
the expressions, "appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact," do not
necessarily imply a re-examination in the Supreme Court of facts decided
by juries in the inferior courts.
The following train of ideas may well be imagined to have influenced the
convention, in relation to this particular provision. The appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (it may have been argued) will extend to
causes determinable in different modes, some in the course of the
COMMON LAW, others in the course of the CIVIL LAW. In the former,
the revision of the law only will be, generally speaking, the proper province
of the Supreme Court; in the latter, the re-examination of the fact is
agreeable to usage, and in some cases, of which prize causes are an
example, might be essential to the preservation of the public peace. It is
therefore necessary that the appellate jurisdiction should, in certain cases,
extend in the broadest sense to matters of fact. It will not answer to make an
express exception of cases which shall have been originally tried by a jury,
because in the courts of some of the States all causes are tried in this
mode(4); and such an exception would preclude the revision of matters of
fact, as well where it might be proper, as where it might be improper. To
avoid all inconveniencies, it will be safest to declare generally, that the
Supreme Court shall possess appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact,
and that this jurisdiction shall be subject to such exceptions and regulations
as the national legislature may prescribe. This will enable the government
to modify it in such a manner as will best answer the ends of public justice
and security.
This view of the matter, at any rate, puts it out of all doubt that the
supposed abolition of the trial by jury, by the operation of this provision, is
fallacious and untrue. The legislature of the United States would certainly
have full power to provide, that in appeals to the Supreme Court there
should be no re-examination of facts where they had been tried in the
original causes by juries. This would certainly be an authorized exception;
but if, for the reason already intimated, it should be thought too extensive, it
might be qualified with a limitation to such causes only as are determinable
at common law in that mode of trial.
The amount of the observations hitherto made on the authority of the
judicial department is this: that it has been carefully restricted to those
causes which are manifestly proper for the cognizance of the national
judicature; that in the partition of this authority a very small portion of
original jurisdiction has been preserved to the Supreme Court, and the rest
consigned to the subordinate tribunals; that the Supreme Court will possess
an appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, in all the cases referred to
them, both subject to any exceptions and regulations which may be thought
advisable; that this appellate jurisdiction does, in no case, abolish the trial
by jury; and that an ordinary degree of prudence and integrity in the
national councils will insure us solid advantages from the establishment of
the proposed judiciary, without exposing us to any of the inconveniences
which have been predicted from that source.
PUBLIUS
1. Article 3, Sec. 1.
2. This power has been absurdly represented as intended to abolish all the
county courts in the several States, which are commonly called inferior
courts. But the expressions of the Constitution are, to constitute "tribunals
INFERIOR TO THE SUPREME COURT"; and the evident design of the
provision is to enable the institution of local courts, subordinate to the
Supreme, either in States or larger districts. It is ridiculous to imagine that
county courts were in contemplation.
3. This word is composed of JUS and DICTIO, juris dictio or a speaking
and pronouncing of the law.
4. I hold that the States will have concurrent jurisdiction with the
subordinate federal judicatories, in many cases of federal cognizance, as
will be explained in my next paper.
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To the People of the State of New York:
THE erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may
distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and
nicety; and these may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from the
establishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial
incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties. 'Tis time only that can
mature and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all
the parts, and can adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consistent
WHOLE.
Such questions, accordingly, have arisen upon the plan proposed by the
convention, and particularly concerning the judiciary department. The
principal of these respect the situation of the State courts in regard to those
causes which are to be submitted to federal jurisdiction. Is this to be
exclusive, or are those courts to possess a concurrent jurisdiction? If the
latter, in what relation will they stand to the national tribunals? These are
inquiries which we meet with in the mouths of men of sense, and which are
certainly entitled to attention.
The principles established in a former paper(1) teach us that the States
will retain all pre-existing authorities which may not be exclusively
delegated to the federal head; and that this exclusive delegation can only
exist in one of three cases: where an exclusive authority is, in express terms,
granted to the Union; or where a particular authority is granted to the
Union, and the exercise of a like authority is prohibited to the States; or
where an authority is granted to the Union, with which a similar authority in
the States would be utterly incompatible. Though these principles may not
apply with the same force to the judiciary as to the legislative power, yet I
am inclined to think that they are, in the main, just with respect to the
former, as well as the latter. And under this impression, I shall lay it down
as a rule, that the State courts will retain the jurisdiction they now have,
unless it appears to be taken away in one of the enumerated modes.
The only thing in the proposed Constitution, which wears the appearance
of confining the causes of federal cognizance to the federal courts, is
contained in this passage: "THE JUDICIAL POWER of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the
Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish." This might either be
construed to signify, that the supreme and subordinate courts of the Union
should alone have the power of deciding those causes to which their
authority is to extend; or simply to denote, that the organs of the national
judiciary should be one Supreme Court, and as many subordinate courts as
Congress should think proper to appoint; or in other words, that the United
States should exercise the judicial power with which they are to be invested,
through one supreme tribunal, and a certain number of inferior ones, to be
instituted by them. The first excludes, the last admits, the concurrent
jurisdiction of the State tribunals; and as the first would amount to an
alienation of State power by implication, the last appears to me the most
natural and the most defensible construction.
But this doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is only clearly applicable to
those descriptions of causes of which the State courts have previous
cognizance. It is not equally evident in relation to cases which may grow
out of, and be peculiar to, the Constitution to be established; for not to
allow the State courts a right of jurisdiction in such cases, can hardly be
considered as the abridgment of a pre-existing authority. I mean not
therefore to contend that the United States, in the course of legislation upon
the objects intrusted to their direction, may not commit the decision of
causes arising upon a particular regulation to the federal courts solely, if
such a measure should be deemed expedient; but I hold that the State courts
will be divested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction, further than may
relate to an appeal; and I am even of opinion that in every case in which
they were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the national
legislature, they will of course take cognizance of the causes to which those
acts may give birth. This I infer from the nature of judiciary power, and
from the general genius of the system. The judiciary power of every
government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in civil cases
lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction,
though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part
of the globe. Those of Japan, not less than of New York, may furnish the
objects of legal discussion to our courts. When in addition to this we
consider the State governments and the national governments, as they truly
are, in the light of kindred systems, and as parts of ONE WHOLE, the
inference seems to be conclusive, that the State courts would have a
concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the Union,
where it was not expressly prohibited.
Here another question occurs: What relation would subsist between the
national and State courts in these instances of concurrent jurisdiction? I
answer, that an appeal would certainly lie from the latter, to the Supreme
Court of the United States. The Constitution in direct terms gives an
appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in all the enumerated cases of
federal cognizance in which it is not to have an original one, without a
single expression to confine its operation to the inferior federal courts. The
objects of appeal, not the tribunals from which it is to be made, are alone
contemplated. From this circumstance, and from the reason of the thing, it
ought to be construed to extend to the State tribunals. Either this must be
the case, or the local courts must be excluded from a concurrent jurisdiction
in matters of national concern, else the judiciary authority of the Union may
be eluded at the pleasure of every plaintiff or prosecutor. Neither of these
consequences ought, without evident necessity, to be involved; the latter
would be entirely inadmissible, as it would defeat some of the most
important and avowed purposes of the proposed government, and would
essentially embarrass its measures. Nor do I perceive any foundation for
such a supposition. Agreeably to the remark already made, the national and
State systems are to be regarded as ONE WHOLE. The courts of the latter
will of course be natural auxiliaries to the execution of the laws of the
Union, and an appeal from them will as naturally lie to that tribunal which
is destined to unite and assimilate the principles of national justice and the
rules of national decisions. The evident aim of the plan of the convention is,
that all the causes of the specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons,
receive their original or final determination in the courts of the Union. To
confine, therefore, the general expressions giving appellate jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court, to appeals from the subordinate federal courts, instead
of allowing their extension to the State courts, would be to abridge the
latitude of the terms, in subversion of the intent, contrary to every sound
rule of interpretation.
But could an appeal be made to lie from the State courts to the
subordinate federal judicatories? This is another of the questions which
have been raised, and of greater difficulty than the former. The following
considerations countenance the affirmative. The plan of the convention, in
the first place, authorizes the national legislature "to constitute tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court."(2) It declares, in the next place, that "the
JUDICIAL POWER of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress shall ordain and establish";
and it then proceeds to enumerate the cases to which this judicial power
shall extend. It afterwards divides the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court into
original and appellate, but gives no definition of that of the subordinate
courts. The only outlines described for them, are that they shall be "inferior
to the Supreme Court," and that they shall not exceed the specified limits of
the federal judiciary. Whether their authority shall be original or appellate,
or both, is not declared. All this seems to be left to the discretion of the
legislature. And this being the case, I perceive at present no impediment to
the establishment of an appeal from the State courts to the subordinate
national tribunals; and many advantages attending the power of doing it
may be imagined. It would diminish the motives to the multiplication of
federal courts, and would admit of arrangements calculated to contract the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The State tribunals may then be
left with a more entire charge of federal causes; and appeals, in most cases
in which they may be deemed proper, instead of being carried to the




2. Sec. 8, Art. 1.
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To the People of the State of New York:
THE objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with most
success in this State, and perhaps in several of the other States, is that
relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury in civil
cases. The disingenuous form in which this objection is usually stated has
been repeatedly adverted to and exposed, but continues to be pursued in all
the conversations and writings of the opponents of the plan. The mere
silence of the Constitution in regard to civil causes, is represented as an
abolition of the trial by jury, and the declamations to which it has afforded a
pretext are artfully calculated to induce a persuasion that this pretended
abolition is complete and universal, extending not only to every species of
civil, but even to criminal causes. To argue with respect to the latter would,
however, be as vain and fruitless as to attempt the serious proof of the
existence of matter, or to demonstrate any of those propositions which, by
their own internal evidence, force conviction, when expressed in language
adapted to convey their meaning.
With regard to civil causes, subtleties almost too contemptible for
refutation have been employed to countenance the surmise that a thing
which is only not provided for, is entirely abolished. Every man of
discernment must at once perceive the wide difference between silence and
abolition. But as the inventors of this fallacy have attempted to support it by
certain legal maxims of interpretation, which they have perverted from their
true meaning, it may not be wholly useless to explore the ground they have
taken.
The maxims on which they rely are of this nature: "A specification of
particulars is an exclusion of generals"; or, "The expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another." Hence, say they, as the Constitution has
established the trial by jury in criminal cases, and is silent in respect to
civil, this silence is an implied prohibition of trial by jury in regard to the
latter.
The rules of legal interpretation are rules of common sense, adopted by
the courts in the construction of the laws. The true test, therefore, of a just
application of them is its conformity to the source from which they are
derived. This being the case, let me ask if it is consistent with common-
sense to suppose that a provision obliging the legislative power to commit
the trial of criminal causes to juries, is a privation of its right to authorize or
permit that mode of trial in other cases? Is it natural to suppose, that a
command to do one thing is a prohibition to the doing of another, which
there was a previous power to do, and which is not incompatible with the
thing commanded to be done? If such a supposition would be unnatural and
unreasonable, it cannot be rational to maintain that an injunction of the trial
by jury in certain cases is an interdiction of it in others.
A power to constitute courts is a power to prescribe the mode of trial; and
consequently, if nothing was said in the Constitution on the subject of
juries, the legislature would be at liberty either to adopt that institution or to
let it alone. This discretion, in regard to criminal causes, is abridged by the
express injunction of trial by jury in all such cases; but it is, of course, left
at large in relation to civil causes, there being a total silence on this head.
The specification of an obligation to try all criminal causes in a particular
mode, excludes indeed the obligation or necessity of employing the same
mode in civil causes, but does not abridge the power of the legislature to
exercise that mode if it should be thought proper. The pretense, therefore,
that the national legislature would not be at full liberty to submit all the
civil causes of federal cognizance to the determination of juries, is a
pretense destitute of all just foundation.
From these observations this conclusion results: that the trial by jury in
civil cases would not be abolished; and that the use attempted to be made of
the maxims which have been quoted, is contrary to reason and common-
sense, and therefore not admissible. Even if these maxims had a precise
technical sense, corresponding with the idea of those who employ them
upon the present occasion, which, however, is not the case, they would still
be inapplicable to a constitution of government. In relation to such a
subject, the natural and obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any
technical rules, is the true criterion of construction.
Having now seen that the maxims relied upon will not bear the use made
of them, let us endeavor to ascertain their proper use and true meaning. This
will be best done by examples. The plan of the convention declares that the
power of Congress, or, in other words, of the national legislature, shall
extend to certain enumerated cases. This specification of particulars
evidently excludes all pretension to a general legislative authority, because
an affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd, as well as useless,
if a general authority was intended.
In like manner the judicial authority of the federal judicatures is declared
by the Constitution to comprehend certain cases particularly specified. The
expression of those cases marks the precise limits, beyond which the federal
courts cannot extend their jurisdiction, because the objects of their
cognizance being enumerated, the specification would be nugatory if it did
not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority.
These examples are sufficient to elucidate the maxims which have been
mentioned, and to designate the manner in which they should be used. But
that there may be no misapprehensions upon this subject, I shall add one
case more, to demonstrate the proper use of these maxims, and the abuse
which has been made of them.
Let us suppose that by the laws of this State a married woman was
incapable of conveying her estate, and that the legislature, considering this
as an evil, should enact that she might dispose of her property by deed
executed in the presence of a magistrate. In such a case there can be no
doubt but the specification would amount to an exclusion of any other mode
of conveyance, because the woman having no previous power to alienate
her property, the specification determines the particular mode which she is,
for that purpose, to avail herself of. But let us further suppose that in a
subsequent part of the same act it should be declared that no woman should
dispose of any estate of a determinate value without the consent of three of
her nearest relations, signified by their signing the deed; could it be inferred
from this regulation that a married woman might not procure the
approbation of her relations to a deed for conveying property of inferior
value? The position is too absurd to merit a refutation, and yet this is
precisely the position which those must establish who contend that the trial
by juries in civil cases is abolished, because it is expressly provided for in
cases of a criminal nature.
From these observations it must appear unquestionably true, that trial by
jury is in no case abolished by the proposed Constitution, and it is equally
true, that in those controversies between individuals in which the great body
of the people are likely to be interested, that institution will remain
precisely in the same situation in which it is placed by the State
constitutions, and will be in no degree altered or influenced by the adoption
of the plan under consideration. The foundation of this assertion is, that the
national judiciary will have no cognizance of them, and of course they will
remain determinable as heretofore by the State courts only, and in the
manner which the State constitutions and laws prescribe. All land causes,
except where claims under the grants of different States come into question,
and all other controversies between the citizens of the same State, unless
where they depend upon positive violations of the articles of union, by acts
of the State legislatures, will belong exclusively to the jurisdiction of the
State tribunals. Add to this, that admiralty causes, and almost all those
which are of equity jurisdiction, are determinable under our own
government without the intervention of a jury, and the inference from the
whole will be, that this institution, as it exists with us at present, cannot
possibly be affected to any great extent by the proposed alteration in our
system of government.
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if
there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it
as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very
palladium of free government. For my own part, the more the operation of
the institution has fallen under my observation, the more reason I have
discovered for holding it in high estimation; and it would be altogether
superfluous to examine to what extent it deserves to be esteemed useful or
essential in a representative republic, or how much more merit it may be
entitled to, as a defense against the oppressions of an hereditary monarch,
than as a barrier to the tyranny of popular magistrates in a popular
government. Discussions of this kind would be more curious than
beneficial, as all are satisfied of the utility of the institution, and of its
friendly aspect to liberty. But I must acknowledge that I cannot readily
discern the inseparable connection between the existence of liberty, and the
trial by jury in civil cases. Arbitrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of
prosecuting pretended offenses, and arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary
convictions, have ever appeared to me to be the great engines of judicial
despotism; and these have all relation to criminal proceedings. The trial by
jury in criminal cases, aided by the habeas corpus act, seems therefore to be
alone concerned in the question. And both of these are provided for, in the
most ample manner, in the plan of the convention.
It has been observed, that trial by jury is a safeguard against an
oppressive exercise of the power of taxation. This observation deserves to
be canvassed.
It is evident that it can have no influence upon the legislature, in regard to
the amount of taxes to be laid, to the objects upon which they are to be
imposed, or to the rule by which they are to be apportioned. If it can have
any influence, therefore, it must be upon the mode of collection, and the
conduct of the officers intrusted with the execution of the revenue laws.
As to the mode of collection in this State, under our own Constitution,
the trial by jury is in most cases out of use. The taxes are usually levied by
the more summary proceeding of distress and sale, as in cases of rent. And
it is acknowledged on all hands, that this is essential to the efficacy of the
revenue laws. The dilatory course of a trial at law to recover the taxes
imposed on individuals, would neither suit the exigencies of the public nor
promote the convenience of the citizens. It would often occasion an
accumulation of costs, more burdensome than the original sum of the tax to
be levied.
And as to the conduct of the officers of the revenue, the provision in
favor of trial by jury in criminal cases, will afford the security aimed at.
Wilful abuses of a public authority, to the oppression of the subject, and
every species of official extortion, are offenses against the government, for
which the persons who commit them may be indicted and punished
according to the circumstances of the case.
The excellence of the trial by jury in civil cases appears to depend on
circumstances foreign to the preservation of liberty. The strongest argument
in its favor is, that it is a security against corruption. As there is always
more time and better opportunity to tamper with a standing body of
magistrates than with a jury summoned for the occasion, there is room to
suppose that a corrupt influence would more easily find its way to the
former than to the latter. The force of this consideration is, however,
diminished by others. The sheriff, who is the summoner of ordinary juries,
and the clerks of courts, who have the nomination of special juries, are
themselves standing officers, and, acting individually, may be supposed
more accessible to the touch of corruption than the judges, who are a
collective body. It is not difficult to see, that it would be in the power of
those officers to select jurors who would serve the purpose of the party as
well as a corrupted bench. In the next place, it may fairly be supposed, that
there would be less difficulty in gaining some of the jurors promiscuously
taken from the public mass, than in gaining men who had been chosen by
the government for their probity and good character. But making every
deduction for these considerations, the trial by jury must still be a valuable
check upon corruption. It greatly multiplies the impediments to its success.
As matters now stand, it would be necessary to corrupt both court and jury;
for where the jury have gone evidently wrong, the court will generally grant
a new trial, and it would be in most cases of little use to practice upon the
jury, unless the court could be likewise gained. Here then is a double
security; and it will readily be perceived that this complicated agency tends
to preserve the purity of both institutions. By increasing the obstacles to
success, it discourages attempts to seduce the integrity of either. The
temptations to prostitution which the judges might have to surmount, must
certainly be much fewer, while the co-operation of a jury is necessary, than
they might be, if they had themselves the exclusive determination of all
causes.
Notwithstanding, therefore, the doubts I have expressed, as to the
essentiality of trial by jury in civil cases to liberty, I admit that it is in most
cases, under proper regulations, an excellent method of determining
questions of property; and that on this account alone it would be entitled to
a constitutional provision in its favor if it were possible to fix the limits
within which it ought to be comprehended. There is, however, in all cases,
great difficulty in this; and men not blinded by enthusiasm must be sensible
that in a federal government, which is a composition of societies whose
ideas and institutions in relation to the matter materially vary from each
other, that difficulty must be not a little augmented. For my own part, at
every new view I take of the subject, I become more convinced of the
reality of the obstacles which, we are authoritatively informed, prevented
the insertion of a provision on this head in the plan of the convention.
The great difference between the limits of the jury trial in different States
is not generally understood; and as it must have considerable influence on
the sentence we ought to pass upon the omission complained of in regard to
this point, an explanation of it is necessary. In this State, our judicial
establishments resemble, more nearly than in any other, those of Great
Britain. We have courts of common law, courts of probates (analogous in
certain matters to the spiritual courts in England), a court of admiralty and a
court of chancery. In the courts of common law only, the trial by jury
prevails, and this with some exceptions. In all the others a single judge
presides, and proceeds in general either according to the course of the canon
or civil law, without the aid of a jury.(1) In New Jersey, there is a court of
chancery which proceeds like ours, but neither courts of admiralty nor of
probates, in the sense in which these last are established with us. In that
State the courts of common law have the cognizance of those causes which
with us are determinable in the courts of admiralty and of probates, and of
course the jury trial is more extensive in New Jersey than in New York. In
Pennsylvania, this is perhaps still more the case, for there is no court of
chancery in that State, and its common-law courts have equity jurisdiction.
It has a court of admiralty, but none of probates, at least on the plan of ours.
Delaware has in these respects imitated Pennsylvania. Maryland approaches
more nearly to New York, as does also Virginia, except that the latter has a
plurality of chancellors. North Carolina bears most affinity to Pennsylvania;
South Carolina to Virginia. I believe, however, that in some of those States
which have distinct courts of admiralty, the causes depending in them are
triable by juries. In Georgia there are none but common-law courts, and an
appeal of course lies from the verdict of one jury to another, which is called
a special jury, and for which a particular mode of appointment is marked
out. In Connecticut, they have no distinct courts either of chancery or of
admiralty, and their courts of probates have no jurisdiction of causes. Their
common-law courts have admiralty and, to a certain extent, equity
jurisdiction. In cases of importance, their General Assembly is the only
court of chancery. In Connecticut, therefore, the trial by jury extends in
practice further than in any other State yet mentioned. Rhode Island is, I
believe, in this particular, pretty much in the situation of Connecticut.
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, in regard to the blending of law, equity,
and admiralty jurisdictions, are in a similar predicament. In the four Eastern
States, the trial by jury not only stands upon a broader foundation than in
the other States, but it is attended with a peculiarity unknown, in its full
extent, to any of them. There is an appeal of course from one jury to
another, till there have been two verdicts out of three on one side.
From this sketch it appears that there is a material diversity, as well in the
modification as in the extent of the institution of trial by jury in civil cases,
in the several States; and from this fact these obvious reflections flow: first,
that no general rule could have been fixed upon by the convention which
would have corresponded with the circumstances of all the States; and
secondly, that more or at least as much might have been hazarded by taking
the system of any one State for a standard, as by omitting a provision
altogether and leaving the matter, as has been done, to legislative
regulation.
The propositions which have been made for supplying the omission have
rather served to illustrate than to obviate the difficulty of the thing. The
minority of Pennsylvania have proposed this mode of expression for the
purpose—"Trial by jury shall be as heretofore"—and this I maintain would
be senseless and nugatory. The United States, in their united or collective
capacity, are the OBJECT to which all general provisions in the
Constitution must necessarily be construed to refer. Now it is evident that
though trial by jury, with various limitations, is known in each State
individually, yet in the United States, as such, it is at this time altogether
unknown, because the present federal government has no judiciary power
whatever; and consequently there is no proper antecedent or previous
establishment to which the term heretofore could relate. It would therefore
be destitute of a precise meaning, and inoperative from its uncertainty.
As, on the one hand, the form of the provision would not fulfil the intent
of its proposers, so, on the other, if I apprehend that intent rightly, it would
be in itself inexpedient. I presume it to be, that causes in the federal courts
should be tried by jury, if, in the State where the courts sat, that mode of
trial would obtain in a similar case in the State courts; that is to say,
admiralty causes should be tried in Connecticut by a jury, in New York
without one. The capricious operation of so dissimilar a method of trial in
the same cases, under the same government, is of itself sufficient to
indispose every wellregulated judgment towards it. Whether the cause
should be tried with or without a jury, would depend, in a great number of
cases, on the accidental situation of the court and parties.
But this is not, in my estimation, the greatest objection. I feel a deep and
deliberate conviction that there are many cases in which the trial by jury is
an ineligible one. I think it so particularly in cases which concern the public
peace with foreign nations—that is, in most cases where the question turns
wholly on the laws of nations. Of this nature, among others, are all prize
causes. Juries cannot be supposed competent to investigations that require a
thorough knowledge of the laws and usages of nations; and they will
sometimes be under the influence of impressions which will not suffer them
to pay sufficient regard to those considerations of public policy which ought
to guide their inquiries. There would of course be always danger that the
rights of other nations might be infringed by their decisions, so as to afford
occasions of reprisal and war. Though the proper province of juries be to
determine matters of fact, yet in most cases legal consequences are
complicated with fact in such a manner as to render a separation
impracticable.
It will add great weight to this remark, in relation to prize causes, to
mention that the method of determining them has been thought worthy of
particular regulation in various treaties between different powers of Europe,
and that, pursuant to such treaties, they are determinable in Great Britain, in
the last resort, before the king himself, in his privy council, where the fact,
as well as the law, undergoes a re-examination. This alone demonstrates the
impolicy of inserting a fundamental provision in the Constitution which
would make the State systems a standard for the national government in the
article under consideration, and the danger of encumbering the government
with any constitutional provisions the propriety of which is not
indisputable.
My convictions are equally strong that great advantages result from the
separation of the equity from the law jurisdiction, and that the causes which
belong to the former would be improperly committed to juries. The great
and primary use of a court of equity is to give relief in extraordinary cases,
which are exceptions(2) to general rules. To unite the jurisdiction of such
cases with the ordinary jurisdiction, must have a tendency to unsettle the
general rules, and to subject every case that arises to a special
determination; while a separation of the one from the other has the contrary
effect of rendering one a sentinel over the other, and of keeping each within
the expedient limits. Besides this, the circumstances that constitute cases
proper for courts of equity are in many instances so nice and intricate, that
they are incompatible with the genius of trials by jury. They require often
such long, deliberate, and critical investigation as would be impracticable to
men called from their occupations, and obliged to decide before they were
permitted to return to them. The simplicity and expedition which form the
distinguishing characters of this mode of trial require that the matter to be
decided should be reduced to some single and obvious point; while the
litigations usual in chancery frequently comprehend a long train of minute
and independent particulars.
It is true that the separation of the equity from the legal jurisdiction is
peculiar to the English system of jurisprudence: which is the model that has
been followed in several of the States. But it is equally true that the trial by
jury has been unknown in every case in which they have been united. And
the separation is essential to the preservation of that institution in its pristine
purity. The nature of a court of equity will readily permit the extension of
its jurisdiction to matters of law; but it is not a little to be suspected, that the
attempt to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of law to matters of equity
will not only be unproductive of the advantages which may be derived from
courts of chancery, on the plan upon which they are established in this
State, but will tend gradually to change the nature of the courts of law, and
to undermine the trial by jury, by introducing questions too complicated for
a decision in that mode.
These appeared to be conclusive reasons against incorporating the
systems of all the States, in the formation of the national judiciary,
according to what may be conjectured to have been the attempt of the
Pennsylvania minority. Let us now examine how far the proposition of
Massachusetts is calculated to remedy the supposed defect.
It is in this form: "In civil actions between citizens of different States,
every issue of fact, arising in actions at common law, may be tried by a jury
if the parties, or either of them request it."
This, at best, is a proposition confined to one description of causes; and
the inference is fair, either that the Massachusetts convention considered
that as the only class of federal causes, in which the trial by jury would be
proper; or that if desirous of a more extensive provision, they found it
impracticable to devise one which would properly answer the end. If the
first, the omission of a regulation respecting so partial an object can never
be considered as a material imperfection in the system. If the last, it affords
a strong corroboration of the extreme difficulty of the thing.
But this is not all: if we advert to the observations already made
respecting the courts that subsist in the several States of the Union, and the
different powers exercised by them, it will appear that there are no
expressions more vague and indeterminate than those which have been
employed to characterize that species of causes which it is intended shall be
entitled to a trial by jury. In this State, the boundaries between actions at
common law and actions of equitable jurisdiction, are ascertained in
conformity to the rules which prevail in England upon that subject. In many
of the other States the boundaries are less precise. In some of them every
cause is to be tried in a court of common law, and upon that foundation
every action may be considered as an action at common law, to be
determined by a jury, if the parties, or either of them, choose it. Hence the
same irregularity and confusion would be introduced by a compliance with
this proposition, that I have already noticed as resulting from the regulation
proposed by the Pennsylvania minority. In one State a cause would receive
its determination from a jury, if the parties, or either of them, requested it;
but in another State, a cause exactly similar to the other, must be decided
without the intervention of a jury, because the State judicatories varied as to
common-law jurisdiction.
It is obvious, therefore, that the Massachusetts proposition, upon this
subject cannot operate as a general regulation, until some uniform plan,
with respect to the limits of common-law and equitable jurisdictions, shall
be adopted by the different States. To devise a plan of that kind is a task
arduous in itself, and which it would require much time and reflection to
mature. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to suggest any
general regulation that would be acceptable to all the States in the Union, or
that would perfectly quadrate with the several State institutions.
It may be asked, Why could not a reference have been made to the
constitution of this State, taking that, which is allowed by me to be a good
one, as a standard for the United States? I answer that it is not very probable
the other States would entertain the same opinion of our institutions as we
do ourselves. It is natural to suppose that they are hitherto more attached to
their own, and that each would struggle for the preference. If the plan of
taking one State as a model for the whole had been thought of in the
convention, it is to be presumed that the adoption of it in that body would
have been rendered difficult by the predilection of each representation in
favor of its own government; and it must be uncertain which of the States
would have been taken as the model. It has been shown that many of them
would be improper ones. And I leave it to conjecture, whether, under all
circumstances, it is most likely that New York, or some other State, would
have been preferred. But admit that a judicious selection could have been
effected in the convention, still there would have been great danger of
jealousy and disgust in the other States, at the partiality which had been
shown to the institutions of one. The enemies of the plan would have been
furnished with a fine pretext for raising a host of local prejudices against it,
which perhaps might have hazarded, in no inconsiderable degree, its final
establishment.
To avoid the embarrassments of a definition of the cases which the trial
by jury ought to embrace, it is sometimes suggested by men of enthusiastic
tempers, that a provision might have been inserted for establishing it in all
cases whatsoever. For this I believe, no precedent is to be found in any
member of the Union; and the considerations which have been stated in
discussing the proposition of the minority of Pennsylvania, must satisfy
every sober mind that the establishment of the trial by jury in all cases
would have been an unpardonable error in the plan.
In short, the more it is considered the more arduous will appear the task
of fashioning a provision in such a form as not to express too little to
answer the purpose, or too much to be advisable; or which might not have
opened other sources of opposition to the great and essential object of
introducing a firm national government.
I cannot but persuade myself, on the other hand, that the different lights
in which the subject has been placed in the course of these observations,
will go far towards removing in candid minds the apprehensions they may
have entertained on the point. They have tended to show that the security of
liberty is materially concerned only in the trial by jury in criminal cases,
which is provided for in the most ample manner in the plan of the
convention; that even in far the greatest proportion of civil cases, and those
in which the great body of the community is interested, that mode of trial
will remain in its full force, as established in the State constitutions,
untouched and unaffected by the plan of the convention; that it is in no case
abolished(3) by that plan; and that there are great if not insurmountable
difficulties in the way of making any precise and proper provision for it in a
Constitution for the United States.
The best judges of the matter will be the least anxious for a constitutional
establishment of the trial by jury in civil cases, and will be the most ready
to admit that the changes which are continually happening in the affairs of
society may render a different mode of determining questions of property
preferable in many cases in which that mode of trial now prevails. For my
part, I acknowledge myself to be convinced that even in this State it might
be advantageously extended to some cases to which it does not at present
apply, and might as advantageously be abridged in others. It is conceded by
all reasonable men that it ought not to obtain in all cases. The examples of
innovations which contract its ancient limits, as well in these States as in
Great Britain, afford a strong presumption that its former extent has been
found inconvenient, and give room to suppose that future experience may
discover the propriety and utility of other exceptions. I suspect it to be
impossible in the nature of the thing to fix the salutary point at which the
operation of the institution ought to stop, and this is with me a strong
argument for leaving the matter to the discretion of the legislature.
This is now clearly understood to be the case in Great Britain, and it is
equally so in the State of Connecticut; and yet it may be safely affirmed that
more numerous encroachments have been made upon the trial by jury in
this State since the Revolution, though provided for by a positive article of
our constitution, than has happened in the same time either in Connecticut
or Great Britain. It may be added that these encroachments have generally
originated with the men who endeavor to persuade the people they are the
warmest defenders of popular liberty, but who have rarely suffered
constitutional obstacles to arrest them in a favorite career. The truth is that
the general GENIUS of a government is all that can be substantially relied
upon for permanent effects. Particular provisions, though not altogether
useless, have far less virtue and efficacy than are commonly ascribed to
them; and the want of them will never be, with men of sound discernment, a
decisive objection to any plan which exhibits the leading characters of a
good government.
It certainly sounds not a little harsh and extraordinary to affirm that there
is no security for liberty in a Constitution which expressly establishes the
trial by jury in criminal cases, because it does not do it in civil also; while it
is a notorious fact that Connecticut, which has been always regarded as the
most popular State in the Union, can boast of no constitutional provision for
either.
PUBLIUS
1. It has been erroneously insinuated with regard to the court of chancery,
that this court generally tries disputed facts by a jury. The truth is, that
references to a jury in that court rarely happen, and are in no case necessary
but where the validity of a devise of land comes into question.
2. It is true that the principles by which that relief is governed are now
reduced to a regular system; but it is not the less true that they are in the
main applicable to SPECIAL circumstances, which form exceptions to
general rules.
3. Vide No. 81, in which the supposition of its being abolished by the
appellate jurisdiction in matters of fact being vested in the Supreme Court,
is examined and refuted.
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HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IN THE course of the foregoing review of the Constitution, I have taken
notice of, and endeavored to answer most of the objections which have
appeared against it. There, however, remain a few which either did not fall
naturally under any particular head or were forgotten in their proper places.
These shall now be discussed; but as the subject has been drawn into great
length, I shall so far consult brevity as to comprise all my observations on
these miscellaneous points in a single paper.
The most considerable of the remaining objections is that the plan of the
convention contains no bill of rights. Among other answers given to this, it
has been upon different occasions remarked that the constitutions of several
of the States are in a similar predicament. I add that New York is of the
number. And yet the opposers of the new system, in this State, who profess
an unlimited admiration for its constitution, are among the most intemperate
partisans of a bill of rights. To justify their zeal in this matter, they allege
two things: one is that, though the constitution of New York has no bill of
rights prefixed to it, yet it contains, in the body of it, various provisions in
favor of particular privileges and rights, which, in substance amount to the
same thing; the other is, that the Constitution adopts, in their full extent, the
common and statute law of Great Britain, by which many other rights, not
expressed in it, are equally secured.
To the first I answer, that the Constitution proposed by the convention
contains, as well as the constitution of this State, a number of such
provisions.
Independent of those which relate to the structure of the government, we
find the following: Article 1, section 3, clause 7—"Judgment in cases of
impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under
the United States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and
subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law."
Section 9, of the same article, clause 2—"The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it." Clause 3—"No bill of attainder
or ex-post-facto law shall be passed." Clause 7—"No title of nobility shall
be granted by the United States; and no person holding any office of profit
or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of
any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any
king, prince, or foreign state." Article 3, section 2, clause 3—"The trial of
all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial
shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed;
but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or
places as the Congress may by law have directed." Section 3, of the same
article—"Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war
against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.
No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court." And clause
3, of the same section—"The Congress shall have power to declare the
punishment of treason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of
blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted."
It may well be a question, whether these are not, upon the whole, of equal
importance with any which are to be found in the constitution of this State.
The establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the prohibition of ex post
facto laws, and of TITLES OF NOBILITY, to which we have no
corresponding provision in our Constitution, are perhaps greater securities
to liberty and republicanism than any it contains. The creation of crimes
after the commission of the fact, or, in other words, the subjecting of men to
punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no
law, and the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the
favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny. The observations of
the judicious Blackstone,(1) in reference to the latter, are well worthy of
recital: "To bereave a man of life, (says he) or by violence to confiscate his
estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of
despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the
whole nation; but confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to
jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less
striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government."
And as a remedy for this fatal evil he is everywhere peculiarly emphatical
in his encomiums on the habeas corpus act, which in one place he calls "the
BULWARK of the British Constitution."(2)
Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of
titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated the corner-stone of
republican government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never be
serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the people.
To the second that is, to the pretended establishment of the common and
state law by the Constitution, I answer, that they are expressly made subject
"to such alterations and provisions as the legislature shall from time to time
make concerning the same." They are therefore at any moment liable to
repeal by the ordinary legislative power, and of course have no
constitutional sanction. The only use of the declaration was to recognize the
ancient law and to remove doubts which might have been occasioned by the
Revolution. This consequently can be considered as no part of a declaration
of rights, which under our constitutions must be intended as limitations of
the power of the government itself.
It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their
origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgements of
prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to
the prince. Such was MAGNA CHARTA, obtained by the barons, sword in
hand, from King John. Such were the subsequent confirmations of that
charter by succeeding princes. Such was the Petition of Right assented to by
Charles I., in the beginning of his reign. Such, also, was the Declaration of
Right presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in
1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an act of parliament called the
Bill of Rights. It is evident, therefore, that, according to their primitive
signification, they have no application to constitutions professedly founded
upon the power of the people, and executed by their immediate
representatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the people surrender
nothing; and as they retain every thing they have no need of particular
reservations. "WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America." Here is a better
recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which make
the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights, and which would
sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of
government.
But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a
Constitution like that under consideration, which is merely intended to
regulate the general political interests of the nation, than to a constitution
which has the regulation of every species of personal and private concerns.
If, therefore, the loud clamors against the plan of the convention, on this
score, are well founded, no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the
constitution of this State. But the truth is, that both of them contain all
which, in relation to their objects, is reasonably to be desired.
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent
in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed
Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various
exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a
colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that
things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance,
should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no
power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend
that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that
it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming
that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the
Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against
the abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the provision
against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that
a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to be
vested in the national government. This may serve as a specimen of the
numerous handles which would be given to the doctrine of constructive
powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of rights.
On the subject of the liberty of the press, as much as has been said, I
cannot forbear adding a remark or two: in the first place, I observe, that
there is not a syllable concerning it in the constitution of this State; in the
next, I contend, that whatever has been said about it in that of any other
State, amounts to nothing. What signifies a declaration, that "the liberty of
the press shall be inviolably preserved"? What is the liberty of the press?
Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude
for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its
security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution
respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general
spirit of the people and of the government.(3) And here, after all, as is
intimated upon another occasion, must we seek for the only solid basis of
all our rights.
There remains but one other view of this matter to conclude the point.
The truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that the Constitution
is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF
RIGHTS. The several bills of rights in Great Britain form its Constitution,
and conversely the constitution of each State is its bill of rights. And the
proposed Constitution, if adopted, will be the bill of rights of the Union. Is
it one object of a bill of rights to declare and specify the political privileges
of the citizens in the structure and administration of the government? This
is done in the most ample and precise manner in the plan of the convention;
comprehending various precautions for the public security, which are not to
be found in any of the State constitutions. Is another object of a bill of
rights to define certain immunities and modes of proceeding, which are
relative to personal and private concerns? This we have seen has also been
attended to, in a variety of cases, in the same plan. Adverting therefore to
the substantial meaning of a bill of rights, it is absurd to allege that it is not
to be found in the work of the convention. It may be said that it does not go
far enough, though it will not be easy to make this appear; but it can with no
propriety be contended that there is no such thing. It certainly must be
immaterial what mode is observed as to the order of declaring the rights of
the citizens, if they are to be found in any part of the instrument which
establishes the government. And hence it must be apparent, that much of
what has been said on this subject rests merely on verbal and nominal
distinctions, entirely foreign from the substance of the thing.
Another objection which has been made, and which, from the frequency
of its repetition, it is to be presumed is relied on, is of this nature: "It is
improper (say the objectors) to confer such large powers, as are proposed,
upon the national government, because the seat of that government must of
necessity be too remote from many of the States to admit of a proper
knowledge on the part of the constituent, of the conduct of the
representative body." This argument, if it proves any thing, proves that there
ought to be no general government whatever. For the powers which, it
seems to be agreed on all hands, ought to be vested in the Union, cannot be
safely intrusted to a body which is not under every requisite control. But
there are satisfactory reasons to show that the objection is in reality not well
founded. There is in most of the arguments which relate to distance a
palpable illusion of the imagination. What are the sources of information by
which the people in Montgomery County must regulate their judgment of
the conduct of their representatives in the State legislature? Of personal
observation they can have no benefit. This is confined to the citizens on the
spot. They must therefore depend on the information of intelligent men, in
whom they confide; and how must these men obtain their information?
Evidently from the complexion of public measures, from the public prints,
from correspondences with their representatives, and with other persons
who reside at the place of their deliberations. This does not apply to
Montgomery County only, but to all the counties at any considerable
distance from the seat of government.
It is equally evident that the same sources of information would be open
to the people in relation to the conduct of their representatives in the general
government, and the impediments to a prompt communication which
distance may be supposed to create, will be overbalanced by the effects of
the vigilance of the State governments. The executive and legislative bodies
of each State will be so many sentinels over the persons employed in every
department of the national administration; and as it will be in their power to
adopt and pursue a regular and effectual system of intelligence, they can
never be at a loss to know the behavior of those who represent their
constituents in the national councils, and can readily communicate the same
knowledge to the people. Their disposition to apprise the community of
whatever may prejudice its interests from another quarter, may be relied
upon, if it were only from the rivalship of power. And we may conclude
with the fullest assurance that the people, through that channel, will be
better informed of the conduct of their national representatives, than they
can be by any means they now possess of that of their State representatives.
It ought also to be remembered that the citizens who inhabit the country
at and near the seat of government will, in all questions that affect the
general liberty and prosperity, have the same interest with those who are at
a distance, and that they will stand ready to sound the alarm when
necessary, and to point out the actors in any pernicious project. The public
papers will be expeditious messengers of intelligence to the most remote
inhabitants of the Union.
Among the many curious objections which have appeared against the
proposed Constitution, the most extraordinary and the least colorable is
derived from the want of some provision respecting the debts due to the
United States. This has been represented as a tacit relinquishment of those
debts, and as a wicked contrivance to screen public defaulters. The
newspapers have teemed with the most inflammatory railings on this head;
yet there is nothing clearer than that the suggestion is entirely void of
foundation, the offspring of extreme ignorance or extreme dishonesty. In
addition to the remarks I have made upon the subject in another place, I
shall only observe that as it is a plain dictate of common-sense, so it is also
an established doctrine of political law, that "States neither lose any of their
rights, nor are discharged from any of their obligations, by a change in the
form of their civil government."(4)
The last objection of any consequence, which I at present recollect, turns
upon the article of expense. If it were even true, that the adoption of the
proposed government would occasion a considerable increase of expense, it
would be an objection that ought to have no weight against the plan.
The great bulk of the citizens of America are with reason convinced, that
Union is the basis of their political happiness. Men of sense of all parties
now, with few exceptions, agree that it cannot be preserved under the
present system, nor without radical alterations; that new and extensive
powers ought to be granted to the national head, and that these require a
different organization of the federal government—a single body being an
unsafe depositary of such ample authorities. In conceding all this, the
question of expense must be given up; for it is impossible, with any degree
of safety, to narrow the foundation upon which the system is to stand. The
two branches of the legislature are, in the first instance, to consist of only
sixty-five persons, which is the same number of which Congress, under the
existing Confederation, may be composed. It is true that this number is
intended to be increased; but this is to keep pace with the progress of the
population and resources of the country. It is evident that a less number
would, even in the first instance, have been unsafe, and that a continuance
of the present number would, in a more advanced stage of population, be a
very inadequate representation of the people.
Whence is the dreaded augmentation of expense to spring? One source
indicated, is the multiplication of offices under the new government. Let us
examine this a little.
It is evident that the principal departments of the administration under the
present government, are the same which will be required under the new.
There are now a Secretary of War, a Secretary of Foreign Affairs, a
Secretary for Domestic Affairs, a Board of Treasury, consisting of three
persons, a Treasurer, assistants, clerks, etc. These officers are indispensable
under any system, and will suffice under the new as well as the old. As to
ambassadors and other ministers and agents in foreign countries, the
proposed Constitution can make no other difference than to render their
characters, where they reside, more respectable, and their services more
useful. As to persons to be employed in the collection of the revenues, it is
unquestionably true that these will form a very considerable addition to the
number of federal officers; but it will not follow that this will occasion an
increase of public expense. It will be in most cases nothing more than an
exchange of State for national officers. In the collection of all duties, for
instance, the persons employed will be wholly of the latter description. The
States individually will stand in no need of any for this purpose. What
difference can it make in point of expense to pay officers of the customs
appointed by the State or by the United States? There is no good reason to
suppose that either the number or the salaries of the latter will be greater
than those of the former.
Where then are we to seek for those additional articles of expense which
are to swell the account to the enormous size that has been represented to
us? The chief item which occurs to me respects the support of the judges of
the United States. I do not add the President, because there is now a
president of Congress, whose expenses may not be far, if any thing, short of
those which will be incurred on account of the President of the United
States. The support of the judges will clearly be an extra expense, but to
what extent will depend on the particular plan which may be adopted in
regard to this matter. But upon no reasonable plan can it amount to a sum
which will be an object of material consequence.
Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any extra expense that
may attend the establishment of the proposed government. The first thing
which presents itself is that a great part of the business which now keeps
Congress sitting through the year will be transacted by the President. Even
the management of foreign negotiations will naturally devolve upon him,
according to general principles concerted with the Senate, and subject to
their final concurrence. Hence it is evident that a portion of the year will
suffice for the session of both the Senate and the House of Representatives;
we may suppose about a fourth for the latter and a third, or perhaps half, for
the former. The extra business of treaties and appointments may give this
extra occupation to the Senate. From this circumstance we may infer that,
until the House of Representatives shall be increased greatly beyond its
present number, there will be a considerable saving of expense from the
difference between the constant session of the present and the temporary
session of the future Congress.
But there is another circumstance of great importance in the view of
economy. The business of the United States has hitherto occupied the State
legislatures, as well as Congress. The latter has made requisitions which the
former have had to provide for. Hence it has happened that the sessions of
the State legislatures have been protracted greatly beyond what was
necessary for the execution of the mere local business of the States. More
than half their time has been frequently employed in matters which related
to the United States. Now the members who compose the legislatures of the
several States amount to two thousand and upwards, which number has
hitherto performed what under the new system will be done in the first
instance by sixty-five persons, and probably at no future period by above a
fourth or fifth of that number. The Congress under the proposed
government will do all the business of the United States themselves,
without the intervention of the State legislatures, who thenceforth will have
only to attend to the affairs of their particular States, and will not have to sit
in any proportion as long as they have heretofore done. This difference in
the time of the sessions of the State legislatures will be clear gain, and will
alone form an article of saving, which may be regarded as an equivalent for
any additional objects of expense that may be occasioned by the adoption of
the new system.
The result from these observations is that the sources of additional
expense from the establishment of the proposed Constitution are much
fewer than may have been imagined; that they are counterbalanced by
considerable objects of saving; and that while it is questionable on which
side the scale will preponderate, it is certain that a government less
expensive would be incompetent to the purposes of the Union.
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To the People of the State of New York:
ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers,
announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for
discussion two points: "the analogy of the proposed government to your
own State constitution," and "the additional security which its adoption will
afford to republican government, to liberty, and to property." But these
heads have been so fully anticipated and exhausted in the progress of the
work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do any thing more than
repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been heretofore said, which the
advanced stage of the question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire
to forbid.
It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the convention to the
act which organizes the government of this State holds, not less with regard
to many of the supposed defects, than to the real excellences of the former.
Among the pretended defects are the re-eligibility of the Executive, the
want of a council, the omission of a formal bill of rights, the omission of a
provision respecting the liberty of the press. These and several others which
have been noted in the course of our inquiries are as much chargeable on
the existing constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the Union;
and a man must have slender pretensions to consistency, who can rail at the
latter for imperfections which he finds no difficulty in excusing in the
former. Nor indeed can there be a better proof of the insincerity and
affectation of some of the zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention
among us, who profess to be the devoted admirers of the government under
which they live, than the fury with which they have attacked that plan, for
matters in regard to which our own constitution is equally or perhaps more
vulnerable.
The additional securities to republican government, to liberty and to
property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under consideration,
consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation of the Union will
impose on local factions and insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful
individuals in single States, who may acquire credit and influence enough,
from leaders and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in the
diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the dissolution of
the Confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the prevention of extensive
military establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars between
the States in a disunited situation; in the express guaranty of a republican
form of government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles
of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition of those practices
on the part of the State governments which have undermined the
foundations of property and credit, have planted mutual distrust in the
breasts of all classes of citizens, and have occasioned an almost universal
prostration of morals.
Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to myself;
with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust at least you will
admit that I have not failed in the assurance I gave you respecting the spirit
with which my endeavors should be conducted. I have addressed myself
purely to your judgments, and have studiously avoided those asperities
which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which
have been not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the
opponents of the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against the
liberties of the people, which has been indiscriminately brought against the
advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton and too malignant, not
to excite the indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a
refutation of the calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung
upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great, have been such as to inspire
the disgust of all sensible men. And the unwarrantable concealments and
misrepresentations which have been in various ways practiced to keep the
truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobation
of all honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may have
occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I did not
intend; it is certain that I have frequently felt a struggle between sensibility
and moderation; and if the former has in some instances prevailed, it must
be my excuse that it has been neither often nor much.
Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of these
papers, the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily vindicated
from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has not been shown to
be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary to the public safety and
prosperity. Every man is bound to answer these questions to himself,
according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and to act
agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his judgment. This is a duty
from which nothing can give him a dispensation. 'T is one that he is called
upon, nay, constrained by all the obligations that form the bands of society,
to discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial motive, no particular
interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or prejudice, will justify
to himself, to his country, or to his posterity, an improper election of the
part he is to act. Let him beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let him
reflect that the object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest
of the community, but the very existence of the nation; and let him
remember that a majority of America has already given its sanction to the
plan which he is to approve or reject.
I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the arguments
which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and that I am
unable to discern any real force in those by which it has been opposed. I am
persuaded that it is the best which our political situation, habits, and
opinions will admit, and superior to any the revolution has produced.
Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has not a claim
to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small triumph to its
enemies. "Why," say they, "should we adopt an imperfect thing? Why not
amend it and make it perfect before it is irrevocably established?" This may
be plausible enough, but it is only plausible. In the first place I remark, that
the extent of these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. They have
been stated as amounting to an admission that the plan is radically
defective, and that without material alterations the rights and the interests of
the community cannot be safely confided to it. This, as far as I have
understood the meaning of those who make the concessions, is an entire
perversion of their sense. No advocate of the measure can be found, who
will not declare as his sentiment, that the system, though it may not be
perfect in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the
present views and circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an
one as promises every species of security which a reasonable people can
desire.
I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme of
imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national affairs, and to
expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive experiments, in the
chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect work
from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all collective bodies
must necessarily be a compound, as well of the errors and prejudices, as of
the good sense and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed.
The compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in a common
bond of amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as many
dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection spring from such
materials?
The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately published in
this city,(1) are unanswerable to show the utter improbability of assembling
a new convention, under circumstances in any degree so favorable to a
happy issue, as those in which the late convention met, deliberated, and
concluded. I will not repeat the arguments there used, as I presume the
production itself has had an extensive circulation. It is certainly well worthy
the perusal of every friend to his country. There is, however, one point of
light in which the subject of amendments still remains to be considered, and
in which it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to
conclude without first taking a survey of it in this aspect.
It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it will be far
more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to the
Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the present plan, it
becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must undergo a new
decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout the Union,
it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen States. If, on the
contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be ratified by all the States
as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine States.
Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to nine(2) in favor of subsequent
amendment, rather than of the original adoption of an entire system.
This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must inevitably
consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen independent States
are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. We may of
course expect to see, in any body of men charged with its original
formation, very different combinations of the parts upon different points.
Many of those who form a majority on one question, may become the
minority on a second, and an association dissimilar to either may constitute
the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging all
the particulars which are to compose the whole, in such a manner as to
satisfy all the parties to the compact; and hence, also, an immense
multiplication of difficulties and casualties in obtaining the collective assent
to a final act. The degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio
to the number of particulars and the number of parties.
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be a
single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would then
be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any other
point—no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite number would at once
bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or
rather ten States, were united in the desire of a particular amendment, that
amendment must infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no
comparison between the facility of affecting an amendment, and that of
establishing in the first instance a complete Constitution.
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been
urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the national
government will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the
authority of which they were once possessed. For my own part I
acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon
mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the
organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on this
account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just stated. I also
think there is little weight in it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty
of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any rate, independent of calculations
upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my opinion
constantly impose on the national rulers the necessity of a spirit of
accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their constituents. But
there is yet a further consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of a
doubt, that the observation is futile. It is this that the national rulers,
whenever nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the
fifth article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged "on the application of
the legislatures of two thirds of the States (which at present amount to
nine), to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be valid,
to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the
legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by conventions in three fourths
thereof." The words of this article are peremptory. The Congress "shall call
a convention." Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that
body. And of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to a
change vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite
two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which
may affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such
difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the general
liberty or security of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition of
the State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the
national authority.
If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am myself
deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those rare instances in
which a political truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical
demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same light with me,
however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the propriety
of a previous adoption, as the most direct road to their own object.
The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the
Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to the truth of
the following observations of a writer equally solid and ingenious: "To
balance a large state or society (says he), whether monarchical or
republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human
genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and
reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work;
EXPERIENCE must guide their labor; TIME must bring it to perfection,
and the FEELING of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they
inevitably fall into in their first trials and experiments."(3) These judicious
reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers of the
Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding anarchy,
civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps
the military despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what
they are not likely to obtain, but from TIME and EXPERIENCE. It may be
in me a defect of political fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot
entertain an equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a
longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A NATION,
without a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle.
The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the
voluntary consent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY, to the completion of
which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to no rules of
prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an enterprise, upon
seven out of the thirteen States, and after having passed over so
considerable a part of the ground, to recommence the course. I dread the
more the consequences of new attempts, because I know that POWERFUL
INDIVIDUALS, in this and in other States, are enemies to a general
national government in every possible shape.
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Antifederalist No. 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION: A 
DANGEROUS PLAN OF BENEFIT ONLY TO THE 
"ARISTOCRATICK COMBINATION" 
From The Boston Gazette and Country Journal, November 26, 1787. 
I am pleased to see a spirit of inquiry burst the band of constraint upon the subject of the NEW 
PLAN for consolidating the governments of the United States, as recommended by the late 
Convention. If it is suitable to the GENIUS and HABITS of the citizens of these states, it will 
bear the strictest scrutiny. The PEOPLE are the grand inquest who have a RIGHT to judge of its 
merits. The hideous daemon of Aristocracy has hitherto had so much influence as to bar the 
channels of investigation, preclude the people from inquiry and extinguish every spark of liberal 
information of its qualities. At length the luminary of intelligence begins to beam its effulgent 
rays upon this important production; the deceptive mists cast before the eyes of the people by the 
delusive machinations of its INTERESTED advocates begins to dissipate, as darkness flies 
before the burning taper; and I dare venture to predict, that in spite of those mercenary 
dectaimers, the plan will have a candid and complete examination. Those furious zealots who are 
for cramming it down the throats of the people, without allowing them either time or opportunity 
to scan or weigh it in the balance of their understandings, bear the same marks in their features as 
those who have been long wishing to erect an aristocracy in THIS COMMONWEALTH [of 
Massachusetts]. Their menacing cry is for a RIGID government, it matters little to them of what 
kind, provided it answers THAT description. As the plan now offered comes something near 
their wishes, and is the most consonant to their views of any they can hope for, they come boldly 
forward and DEMAND its adoption. They brand with infamy every man who is not as 
determined and zealous in its favor as themselves. They cry aloud the whole must be swallowed 
or none at all, thinking thereby to preclude any amendment; they are afraid of having it abated of 
its present RIGID aspect. They have strived to overawe or seduce printers to stifle and obstruct a 
free discussion, and have endeavored to hasten it to a decision before the people can duty reflect 
upon its properties. In order to deceive them, they incessantly declare that none can discover any 
defect in the system but bankrupts who wish no government, and officers of the present 
government who fear to lose a part of their power. These zealous partisans may injure their own 
cause, and endanger the public tranquility by impeding a proper inquiry; the people may suspect 
the WHOLE to be a dangerous plan, from such COVERED and DESIGNING schemes to 
enforce it upon them. Compulsive or treacherous measures to establish any government 
whatever, will always excite jealousy among a free people: better remain single and alone, than 
blindly adopt whatever a few individuals shall demand, be they ever so wise. I had rather be a 
free citizen of the small republic of Massachusetts, than an oppressed subject of the great 
American empire. Let all act understandingly or not at all. If we can confederate upon terms that 
wilt secure to us our liberties, it is an object highly desirable, because of its additional security to 
the whole. If the proposed plan proves such an one, I hope it will be adopted, but if it will 
endanger our liberties as it stands, let it be amended; in order to which it must and ought to be 
open to inspection and free inquiry. The inundation of abuse that has been thrown out upon the 
heads of those who have had any doubts of its universal good qualities, have been so redundant, 
that it may not be improper to scan the characters of its most strenuous advocates. It will first be 
allowed that many undesigning citizens may wish its adoption from the best motives, but these 
are modest and silent, when compared to the greater number, who endeavor to suppress all 
attempts for investigation. These violent partisans are for having the people gulp down the gilded 
pill blindfolded, whole, and without any qualification whatever. These consist generally, of the 
NOBLE order of C[incinnatu]s, holders of public securities, men of great wealth and 
expectations of public office, B[an]k[er]s and L[aw]y[er]s: these with their train of dependents 
form the Aristocratick combination. The Lawyers in particular, keep up an incessant declamation 
for its adoption; like greedy gudgeons they long to satiate their voracious stomachs with the 
golden bait. The numerous tribunals to be erected by the new plan of consolidated empire, will 
find employment for ten times their present numbers; these are the LOAVES AND FISHES for 
which they hunger. They will probably find it suited to THEIR HABITS, if not to the HABITS 
OF THE PEOPLE. There may be reasons for having but few of them in the State Convention, 
lest THEIR '0@' INTEREST should be too strongly considered. The time draws near for the 
choice of Delegates. I hope my fellow-citizens will look well to the characters of their 
preference, and remember the Old Patriots of 75; they have never led them astray, nor need they 
fear to try them on this momentous occasion.
A FEDERALIST
Antifederalist No. 2 "WE HAVE BEEN TOLD OF PHANTOMS"
This essay is an excerpted from a speech of William Grayson, June 11, 1788, in Jonathan Elliot 
(ed.), The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution.......
(Philadelphia, 1876) 5 vols., III, 274-79.
The adoption of this government will not meliorate our own particular system. I beg leave to 
consider the circumstances of the Union antecedent to the meeting of the Convention at 
Philadelphia. We have been told of phantoms and ideal dangers to lead us into measures which 
will, in my opinion, be the ruin of our country. If the existence of those dangers cannot be 
proved, if there be no apprehension of wars, if there be no rumors of wars, it will place the 
subject in a different light, and plainly evince to the world that there cannot be any reason for 
adopting measures which we apprehend to be ruinous and destructive. When this state [Virginia] 
proposed that the general government should be improved, Massachusetts was just recovered 
from a rebellion which had brought the republic to the brink of destruction from a rebellion 
which was crushed by that federal government which is now so much contemned and abhorred. 
A vote of that august body for fifteen hundred men, aided by the exertions of the state, silenced 
all opposition, and shortly restored the public tranquility. Massachusetts was satisfied that these 
internal commotions were so happily settled, and was unwilling to risk any similar distresses by 
theoretic experiments. Were the Eastern States willing to enter into this measure? Were they 
willing to accede to the proposal of Virginia? In what manner was it received? Connecticut 
revolted at the idea. The Eastern States, sir, were unwilling to recommend a meeting of a 
convention. They were well aware of the dangers of revolutions and changes. Why was every 
effort used, and such uncommon pains taken, to bring it about? This would have been 
unnecessary, had it been approved of by the people. Was Pennsylvania disposed for the reception 
of this project of reformation? No, sir. She was even unwilling to amend her revenue laws, so as 
to make the five per centum operative. She was satisfied with things as they were. There was no 
complaint, that ever I heard of, from any other part of the Union, except Virginia. This being the 
case among ourselves, what dangers were there to be apprehended from foreign nations? It will 
be easily shown that dangers from that quarter were absolutely imaginary. Was not France 
friendly? Unequivocally so. She was devising new regulations of commerce for our advantage. 
Did she harass us with applications for her money? Is it likely that France will quarrel with us? Is 
it not reasonable to suppose that she will be more desirous than ever to cling, after losing the 
Dutch republic, to her best ally? How are the Dutch? We owe them money, it is true; and are 
they not willing that we should owe them more? Mr. [John] Adams applied to them for a new 
loan to the poor, despised Confederation. They readily granted it. The Dutch have a fellow-
feeling for us. They were in the same situation with ourselves.
I believe that the money which the Dutch borrowed of Henry IV is not yet paid. How did they 
pass Queen Elizabeth's loan? At a very considerable discount. They took advantage of the 
weakness and necessities of James I, and made their own terms with that contemptible monarch. 
Loans from nations are not like loans from private men. Nations lend money, and grant 
assistance, to one another, from views of national interest-France was willing to pluck the fairest 
feather out of the British crown. This was her object in aiding us. She will not quarrel with us on 
pecuniary considerations. Congress considered it in this point of view; for when a proposition 
was made to make it a debt of private persons, it was rejected without hesitation. That 
respectable body wisely considered, that, while we remained their debtors in so considerable a 
degree, they would not be inattentive to our interest.
With respect to Spain, she is friendly in a high degree. I wish to know by whose interposition 
was the treaty with Morocco made. Was it not by that of the king of Spain? Several predatory 
nations disturbed us, on going into the Mediterranean. The influence of Charles III at the Barbary 
court, and four thousand pounds, procured as good a treaty with Morocco as could be expected. 
But I acknowledge it is not of any consequence, since the Algerines and people of Tunis have not 
entered into similar measures. We have nothing to fear from Spain; and, were she hostile, she 
could never be formidable to this country. Her strength is so scattered, that she never can be 
dangerous to us either in peace or war. As to Portugal, we have a treaty with her, which may be 
very advantageous, though it be not yet ratified.
The domestic debt is diminished by considerable sales of western lands to Cutler, Sergeant, and 
Company; to Simms; and to Royal, Flint, and Company. The board of treasury is authorized to 
sell in Europe, or any where else, the residue of those lands.
An act of Congress has passed, to adjust the public debts between the individual states and the 
United States.
Was our trade in a despicable situation? I shall say nothing of what did not come under my own 
observation. When I was in Congress, sixteen vessels had had sea letters in the East India trade, 
and two hundred vessels entered and cleared out, in the French West India Islands, in one year.
I must confess that public credit has suffered, and that our public creditors have been ill used. 
This was owing to a fault at the head-quarters-to Congress themselves-in not selling the western 
lands at an earlier period. If requisitions have not been complied with, it must be owing to 
Congress, who might have put the unpopular debts on the back lands. Commutation is abhorrent 
to New England ideas. Speculation is abhorrent to the Eastern States. Those inconveniences have 
resulted from the bad policy of Congress.
There are certain modes of governing the people which will succeed. There are others which will 
not. The idea of consolidation is abhorrent to the people of this country. How were the 
sentiments of the people before the meeting of the Convention at Philadelphia? They had only 
one object in view. Their ideas reached no farther than to give the general government the five 
per centum impost, and the regulation of trade. When it was agitated in Congress, in a committee 
of the whole, this was all that was asked, or was deemed necessary. Since that period, their views 
have extended much farther. Horrors have been greatly magnified since the rising of the 
Convention.
We are now told by the honorable gentleman (Governor Randolph) that we shall have wars and 
rumors of wars, that every calamity is to attend us, and that we shall be ruined and disunited 
forever, unless we adopt this Constitution. Pennsylvania and Maryland are to fall upon us from 
the north, like the Goths and Vandals of old; the Algerines, whose flat-sided vessels never came 
farther than Madeira, are to fill the Chesapeake with mighty fleets, and to attack us on our front; 
the Indians are to invade us with numerous armies on our rear, in order to convert our cleared 
lands into hunting- grounds; and the Carolinians, from the south, (mounted on alligators, I 
presume,) are to come and destroy our cornfields, and eat up our little children! These, sir, are 
the mighty dangers which await us if we reject dangers which are merely imaginary, and 
ludicrous in the extreme! Are we to be destroyed by Maryland and Pennsylvania? What will 
democratic states make war for, and how long since have they imbibed a hostile spirit?
But the generality are to attack us. Will they attack us after violating their faith in the first 
Union? Will they not violate their faith if they do not take us into their confederacy? Have they 
not agreed, by the old Confederation, that the Union shall be perpetual, and that no alteration 
should take place without the consent of Congress, and the confirmation of the legislatures of 
every state? I cannot think that there is such depravity in mankind as that, after violating public 
faith so flagrantly, they should make war upon us, also, for not following their example.
The large states have divided the back lands among themselves, and have given as much as they 
thought proper to the generality. For the fear of disunion, we are told that we ought to take 
measures which we otherwise should not. Disunion is impossible. The Eastern States hold the 
fisheries, which are their cornfields, by a hair. They have a dispute with the British government 
about their limits at this moment. Is not a general and strong government necessary for their 
interest? If ever nations had inducements to peace, the Eastern States now have. New York and 
Pennsylvania anxiously look forward for the fur trade. How can they obtain it but by union? Can 
the western posts be got or retained without union? How are the little states inclined? They are 
not likely to disunite. Their weakness will prevent them from quarrelling. Little men are seldom 
fond of quarrelling among giants. Is there not a strong inducement to union, while the British are 
on one side and the Spaniards on the other? Thank Heaven, we have a Carthage of our own . . .
But what would I do on the present occasion to remedy the existing defects of the present 
Confederation? There are two opinions prevailing in the world-the one, that mankind can only be 
governed by force; the other, that they are capable of freedom and a good government. Under a 
supposition that mankind can govern themselves, I would recommend that the present 
Confederation should be amended. Give Congress the regulation of commerce. Infuse new 
strength and spirit into the state governments; for, when the component parts are strong, it will 
give energy to the government, although it be otherwise weak....
Apportion the public debts in such a manner as to throw the unpopular ones on the back lands. 
Call only for requisitions for the foreign interest and aid them by loans. Keep on so till the 
American character be marked with some certain features. We are yet too young to know what 
we are fit for. The continual migration of people from Europe, and the settlement of new 
countries on our western frontiers, are strong arguments against making new experiments now in 
government. When these things are removed, we can with greater prospect of success, devise
changes. We ought to consider, as Montesquieu says, whether the construction of the 
government be suitable to the genius and disposition of the people, as well as a variety of other 
circumstances.
Antifederalist No. 3 NEW CONSTITUTION CREATES A 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; WILL NOT ABATE FOREIGN 
INFLUENCE; DANGERS OF CIVIL WAR AND DESPOTISM 
Like the nome de plume "Publius" used by pro Constitution writers in the Federalist Papers, 
several Antifederalists signed their writings "A FARMER." While the occupation of the writers 
may not have coincided with the name given, the arguments against consolodating power in the 
hands of a central government were widely read. The following was published in the Maryland 
Gazette and Baltimore Advertiser, March 7, 1788. The true identity of the author is unknown.
There are but two modes by which men are connected in society, the one which operates on 
individuals, this always has been, and ought still to be called, national government; the other 
which binds States and governments together (not corporations, for there is no considerable 
nation on earth, despotic, monarchical, or republican, that does not contain many subordinate 
corporations with various constitutions) this last has heretofore been denominated a league or 
confederacy. The term federalists is therefore improperly applied to themselves, by the friends 
and supporters of the proposed constitution. This abuse of language does not help the cause; 
every degree of imposition serves only to irritate, but can never convince. They are national men, 
and their opponents, or at least a great majority of them, are federal, in the only true and strict 
sense of the word. 
Whether any form of national government is preferable for the Americans, to a league or 
confederacy, is a previous question we must first make up our minds upon.... 
That a national government will add to the dignity and increase the splendor of the United States 
abroad, can admit of no doubt: it is essentially requisite for both. That it will render government, 
and officers of government, more dignified at home is equally certain. That these objects are 
more suited to the manners, if not [the] genius and disposition of our people is, I fear, also true. 
That it is requisite in order to keep us at peace among ourselves, is doubtful. That it is necessary, 
to prevent foreigners from dividing us, or interfering in our government, I deny positively; and, 
after all, I have strong doubts whether all its advantages are not more specious than solid. We are 
vain, like other nations. We wish to make a noise in the world; and feel hurt that Europeans are 
not so attentive to America in peace, as they were to America in war. We are also, no doubt, 
desirous of cutting a figure in history. Should we not reflect, that quiet is happiness? That content 
and pomp are incompatible? I have either read or heard this truth, which the Americans should 
never forget: That the silence of historians is the surest record of the happiness of a people. The 
Swiss have been four hundred years the envy of mankind, and there is yet scarcely an history of 
their nation. What is history, but a disgusting and painful detail of the butcheries of conquerors, 
and the woeful calamities of the conquered? Many of us are proud, and are frequently 
disappointed that office confers neither respect or difference. No man of merit can ever be 
disgraced by office. A rogue in office may be feared in some governments-he will be respected 
in none. After all, what we call respect and difference only arise from contrast of situation, as 
most of our ideas come by comparison and relation. Where the people are free there can be no 
great contrast or distinction among honest citizens in or out of office. In proportion as the people 
lose their freedom, every gradation of distinction, between the Governors and governed obtains, 
until the former become masters, and the latter become slaves. In all governments virtue will 
command reverence. The divine Cato knew every Roman citizen by name, and never assumed 
any preeminence; yet Cato found, and his memory will find, respect and reverence in the bosoms 
of mankind, until this world returns into that nothing, from whence Omnipotence called it. That 
the people are not at present disposed for, and are actually incapable of, governments of 
simplicity and equal rights, I can no longer doubt. But whose fault is it? We make them bad, by 
bad governments, and then abuse and despise them for being so. Our people are capable of being 
made anything that human nature was or is capable of, if we would only have a little patience 
and give them good and wholesome institutions; but I see none such and very little prospect of 
such. Alas! I see nothing in my fellow-citizens, that will permit my still fostering the delusion, 
that they are now capable of sustaining the weight of SELF-GOVERNMENT: a burden to which 
Greek and Roman shoulders proved unequal. The honor of supporting the dignity of the human 
character, seems reserved to the hardy Helvetians alone. If the body of the people will not govern 
themselves, and govern themselves well too, the consequence is unavoidable-a FEW will, and 
must govern them. Then it is that government becomes truly a government by force only, where 
men relinquish part of their natural rights to secure the rest, instead of an union of will and force, 
to protect all their natural rights, which ought to be the foundation of every rightful social 
compact. 
Whether national government will be productive of internal peace, is too uncertain to admit of 
decided opinion. I only hazard a conjecture when I say, that our state disputes, in a confederacy, 
would be disputes of levity and passion, which would subside before injury. The people being 
free, government having no right to them, but they to government, they would separate and 
divide as interest or inclination prompted-as they do at this day, and always have done, in 
Switzerland. In a national government, unless cautiously and fortunately administered, the 
disputes will be the deep-rooted differences of interest, where part of the empire must be injured 
by the operation of general law; and then should the sword of government be once drawn (which 
Heaven avert) I fear it will not be sheathed, until we have waded through that series of 
desolation, which France, Spain, and the other great kingdoms of the world have suffered, in 
order to bring so many separate States into uniformity, of government and law; in which event 
the legislative power can only be entrusted to one man (as it is with them) who can have no local 
attachments, partial interests, or private views to gratify. 
That a national government will prevent the influence or danger of foreign intrigue, or secure us 
from invasion, is in my judgment directly the reverse of the truth. The only foreign, or at least 
evil foreign influence, must be obtained through corruption. Where the government is lodged in 
the body of the people, as in Switzerland, they can never be corrupted; for no prince, or people, 
can have resources enough to corrupt the majority of a nation; and if they could, the play is not 
worth the candle. The facility of corruption is increased in proportion as power tends by 
representation or delegation, to a concentration in the hands of a few. . . . 
As to any nation attacking a number of confederated independent republics ... it is not to be 
expected, more especially as the wealth of the empire is there universally diffused, and will not 
be collected into any one overgrown, luxurious and effeminate capital to become a lure to the 
enterprizing ambitious. That extensive empire is a misfortune to be deprecated, will not now be 
disputed. The balance of power has long engaged the attention of all the European world, in 
order to avoid the horrid evils of a general government. The same government pervading a vast 
extent of territory, terrifies the minds of individuals into meanness and submission. All human 
authority, however organized, must have confined limits, or insolence and oppression will prove 
the offspring of its grandeur, and the difficulty or rather impossibility of escape prevents 
resistance. Gibbon relates that some Roman Knights who had offended government in Rome 
were taken up in Asia, in a very few days after. It was the extensive territory of the Roman 
republic that produced a Sylla, a Marius, a Caligula, a Nero, and an Elagabalus. In small 
independent States contiguous to each other, the people run away and leave despotism to reek its 
vengeance on itself; and thus it is that moderation becomes with them, the law of self-
preservation. These and such reasons founded on the eternal and immutable nature of things have 
long caused and will continue to cause much difference of sentiment throughout our wide 
extensive territories. From our divided and dispersed situation, and from the natural moderation 
of the American character, it has hitherto proved a warfare of argument and reason. 
A FARMER
Antifederalist No. 4 FOREIGN WARS, CIVIL WARS, AND 
INDIAN WARS - THREE BUGBEARS 
Patrick Henry was a somewhat the antithesis to James Madison of Federalist note. While every 
bit as emotional a writer, Henry (who penned the well remembered "Give Me Liberty of Give 
Me Death" phrase) opposed the new Constitution for many reasons. He delivered long speeches 
to the Virginia Ratification convention June 5, 7, and 9, 1788. The following is taken from 
Elliot's Debates, 111, 46, 48, 141-42, 150-56. 
If we recollect, on last Saturday, I made some observations on some of those dangers which 
these gentlemen would fain persuade us hang over the citizens of this commonwealth [Virginia] 
to induce us to change the government, and adopt the new plan. Unless there be great and awful 
dangers, the change is dangerous, and the experiment ought not to be made. In estimating the 
magnitude of these dangers, we are obliged to take a most serious view of them--to see them, to 
handle them, and to be familiar with them. It is not sufficient to feign mere imaginary dangers; 
there must be a dreadful reality. The great question between us is: Does that reality exist? These 
dangers are partially attributed to bad laws, execrated by the community at large. It is said the 
people wish to change the government. I should be happy to meet them on that ground. Should 
the people wish to change it, we should be innocent of the dangers. It is a fact that the people do 
not wish to change their government. How am I to prove it? It will rest on my bare assertion, 
unless supported by an internal conviction in men's breasts. My poor say-so is a mere nonentity. 
But, sir, I am persuaded that four fifths of the people of Virginia must have amendments to the 
new plan, to reconcile them to a change of their government. It is a slippery foundation for the 
people to rest their political salvation on my or their assertions. No government can flourish 
unless it be founded on the affection of the people. Unless gentlemen can be sure that this new 
system is founded on that ground, they ought to stop their career.
I will not repeat what the gentlemen say-I will mention one thing. There is a dispute between us 
and the Spaniards about the right of navigating the Mississippi ... Seven states wished to 
relinquish this river to them. The six Southern states opposed it. Seven states not being sufficient 
to convey it away, it remains now ours.... 
There is no danger of a dismemberment of our country, unless a Constitution be adopted which 
will enable the government to plant enemies on our backs. By the Confederation, the rights of 
territory are secured. No treaty can be made without the consent of nine states. While the consent 
of nine states is necessary to the cession of territory, you are safe. If it be put in the power of a 
less number, you will most infallibly lose the Mississippi. As long as we can preserve our 
unalienable rights, we are in safety. This new Constitution will involve in its operation the loss of 
the navigation of that valuable river. 
The honorable gentleman [either James Madison or Edmund Randolph], cannot be ignorant of 
the Spanish transactions [the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations]. A treaty had been nearly entered into 
with Spain, to relinquish that navigation. That relinquishment would absolutely have taken place, 
had the consent of seven states been sufficient ... This new government, I conceive, will enable 
those states who have already discovered their inclination that way, to give away this river....
We are threatened with danger [according to some,] for the non-payment of our debt due to 
France. We have information come from an illustrious citizen of Virginia, who is now in Paris, 
which disproves the suggestions of such danger. This citizen has not been in the airy regions of 
theoretic speculation-our ambassador [Thomas Jefferson] is this worthy citizen. The ambassador 
of the United States of America is not so despised as the honorable gentleman would make us 
believe. A servant of a republic is as much respected as that of a monarch. The honorable 
gentleman tells us that hostile fleets are to be sent to make reprisals upon us. Our ambassador 
tells you that the king of France has taken into consideration to enter into commercial 
regulations, on reciprocal terms, with us, which will be of peculiar advantage to us. Does this 
look like hostility? I might go farther. I might say, not from public authority, but good 
information, that his opinion is, that you reject this government. His character and abilities are in 
the highest estimation; he is well acquainted, in every respect, with this country; equally so with 
the policy of the European nations. Let us follow the sage advice of this common friend of our 
happiness. 
It is little usual for nations to send armies to collect debts. The house of Bourbon, that great 
friend of America, will never attack her for her unwilling delay of payment. Give me leave to 
say, that Europe is too much engaged about objects of greater importance, to attend to us. On that 
great theatre of the world, the little American matters vanish. Do you believe that the mighty 
monarch of France, beholding the greatest scenes that ever engaged the attention of a prince of 
that country, will divert himself from those important objects, and now call for a settlement of 
accounts with America? This proceeding is not warranted by good sense. The friendly 
disposition to us, and the actual situation of France, render the idea of danger from that quarter 
absurd. Would this countryman of ours be fond of advising us to a measure which he knew to be 
dangerous? And can it be reasonably supposed that he can be ignorant of any premeditated 
hostility against this country? The honorable gentleman may suspect the account; but I will do 
our friend the justice to say, that he would warn us of any danger from France. 
Do you suppose the Spanish monarch will risk a contest with the United States, when his feeble 
colonies are exposed to them? Every advance the people make to the westward, makes them 
tremble for Mexico and Peru. Despised as we are among ourselves, under our present 
government, we are terrible to that monarchy. If this be not a fact, it is generally said so. 
We are, in the next place, frightened by dangers from Holland. We must change our government 
to escape the wrath of that republic. Holland groans under a government like this new one. A 
stadtholder, sir, a Dutch president, has brought on that country miseries which will not permit 
them to collect debts with fleets or armies ... This President will bring miseries on us like those 
of Holland. Such is the condition of European affairs, that it would be unsafe for them to send 
fleets or armies to collect debts. 
But here, sir, they make a transition to objects of another kind. We are presented with dangers of 
a very uncommon nature. I am not acquainted with the arts of painting. Some gentlemen have a 
peculiar talent for them. They are practised with great ingenuity on this occasion. As a 
counterpart to what we have already been intimidated with, we are told that some lands have 
been sold, which cannot be found; and that this will bring war on this country. Here the picture 
will not stand examination. Can it be supposed, if a few land speculators and jobbers have 
violated the principles of probity, that it will involve this country in war? Is there no redress to be 
otherwise obtained, even admitting the delinquents and sufferers to be numerous? When 
gentlemen are thus driven to produce imaginary dangers, to induce this Convention to assent to 
this change, I am sure it will not be uncandid to say that the change itself is really dangerous. 
Then the Maryland compact is broken, and will produce perilous consequences. I see nothing 
very terrible in this. The adoption of the new system will not remove the evil. Will they forfeit 
good neighborhood with us, because the compact is broken? Then the disputes concerning the 
Carolina line are to involve us in dangers. A strip of land running from the westward of the 
Alleghany to the Mississippi, is the subject of this pretended dispute. I do not know the length or 
breadth of this disputed spot. Have they not regularly confirmed our right to it, and relinquished 
all claims to it? I can venture to pledge that the people of Carolina will never disturb us. . . . 
Then, sir, comes Pennsylvania, in terrible array. Pennsylvania is to go in conflict with Virginia. 
Pennsylvania has been a good neighbor heretofore. She is federal- -something terrible--Virginia 
cannot look her in the face. If we sufficiently attend to the actual situation of things, we shall 
conclude that Pennsylvania will do what we do. A number of that country are strongly opposed 
to it. Many of them have lately been convinced of its fatal tendency. They are disgorged of their 
federalism. . . . Place yourselves in their situation; would you fight your neighbors for 
considering this great and awful matter? . . . Whatever may be the disposition of the aristocratical 
politicians of that country, I know there are friends of human nature in that state. If so, they will 
never make war on those who make professions of what they are attached to themselves. 
As to the danger arising from borderers, it is mutual and reciprocal. If it be dangerous for 
Virginia, it is equally so for them. It will be their true interest to be united with us. The danger of 
our being their enemies will be a prevailing argument in our favor. It will be as powerful to 
admit us into the Union, as a vote of adoption, without previous amendments, could possibly be. 
Then the savage Indians are to destroy us. We cannot look them in the face. The danger is here 
divided; they are as terrible to the other states as to us. But, sir, it is well known that we have 
nothing to fear from them. Our back settlers are considerably stronger than they. Their 
superiority increases daily. Suppose the states to be confederated all around us; what we want in 
numbers, we shall make up otherwise. Our compact situation and natural strength will secure us. 
But, to avoid all dangers, we must take shelter under the federal government. Nothing gives a 
decided importance but this federal government. You will sip sorrow, according to the vulgar 
phrase, if you want any other security than the laws of Virginia.... 
Where is the danger? If, sir, there was any, I would recur to the American spirit to defend us; that 
spirit which has enabled us to surmount the greatest difficulties--to that illustrious spirit I address 
my most fervent prayer to prevent our adopting a system destructive to liberty. Let not gentlemen 
be told that it is not safe to reject this government. Wherefore is it not safe? We are told there are 
dangers, but those dangers are ideal; they cannot be demonstrated.... 
The Confederation, this despised government, merits, in my opinion, the highest encomium--it 
carried us through a long and dangerous war; it rendered us victorious in that bloody conflict 
with a powerful nation; it has secured us a territory greater than any European monarch 
possesses--and shall a government which has been thus strong and vigorous, be accused of 
imbecility, and abandoned for want of energy? Consider what you are about to do before you 
part with the government. Take longer time in reckoning things; revolutions like this have 
happened in almost every country in Europe; similar examples are to be found in ancient Greece 
and ancient Rome- -instances of the people losing their liberty by their own carelessness and the 
ambition of a few. We are cautioned . . . against faction and turbulence. I acknowledge that 
licentiousness is dangerous, and that it ought to be provided against. I acknowledge, also, the 
new form of government may effectually prevent it. Yet there is another thing it will as 
effectually do- -it will oppress and ruin the people. 
Antifederalist No. 5 SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND - A CASE IN 
POINT 
The ongoing Federalist essays appeared from October of 1787 to May of 1788. Rebuttals 
(Antifederalist in nature) to Federalist writers seldom were published. This selection was an 
answer to Publius [John Jay] Federalist No. 5. This article by "AN OBSERVER," was printed in 
The New-York Journal and was reprinted in the [Boston] American Herald on December 3, 
1787. 
A writer, under the signature Publius or The Federalist, No. V, in the Daily Advertiser, and in the 
New York Packet, with a view of proving the advantages which, he says, will be derived by the 
states if the new constitution is adopted, has given extracts of a letter from Queen Anne to the 
Scotch parliament, on the subject of a union between Scotland and England. 
I would beg leave to remark, that Publius has been very unfortunate in selecting these extracts as 
a case in point, to convince the people of America of the benefits they would derive from a 
union, under such a government as would be effected by the new system. It is a certainty, that 
when the union was the subject of debate in the Scottish legislature, some of their most sensible 
and disinterested nobles, as well as commoners! (who were not corrupted by English gold), 
violently opposed the union, and predicted that the people of Scotland would, in fact, derive no 
advantages from a consolidation of government with England; but, on the contrary, they would 
bear a great proportion of her debt, and furnish large bodies of men to assist in her wars with 
France, with whom, before the union, Scotland was at all times on terms of the most cordial 
amity. It was also predicted that the representation in the parliament of Great Britain, particularly 
in the house of commons, was too small; forty-five members being very far from the proportion 
of Scotland, when its extent and numbers were duly considered; and that even they, being so 
few, might (or at least a majority of them might) at all times be immediately under the influence 
of the English ministry; and, of course, very little of their attention would be given to the true 
interest of their constituents, especially if they came in competition with the prospects of views 
of the ministry. How far these predictions have been verified I believe it will not require much 
trouble to prove. It must be obvious to everyone, the least acquainted with English history, that 
since the union of the two nations the great body of the people in Scotland are in a much worse 
situation now, than they would be, were they a separate nation. This will be fully illustrated by
attending to the great emigrations which are made to America. For if the people could have but a 
common support at home, it is unreasonable to suppose that such large numbers would quit their 
country, break from the tender ties of kindred and friendship and trust themselves on a dangerous 
voyage across a vast ocean, to a country of which they can know but very little except by 
common report. I will only further remark, that it is not about two or three years since a member 
of the British parliament (I believe Mr. Dempster) gave a most pathetic description of the 
sufferings of the commonalty of Scotland, particularly on the sea coast, and endeavored to call 
the attention of parliament to their distresses, and afford them some relief by encouraging their 
fisheries. It deserves also to be remembered, that the people of Scotland, in the late war between 
France and Great Britain, petitioned to have arms and ammunition supplied them by their general 
government, for their defense, alleging that they were incapable of defending themselves and 
their property from an invasion unless they were assisted by government. It is a truth that their 
petitions were disregarded, and reasons were assigned, that it would be dangerous to entrust them 
with the means of defense, as they would then have it in their power to break the union. From 
this representation of the situation of Scotland, surely no one can draw any conclusion that this 
country would derive happiness or security from a government which would, in reality, give the 
people but the mere name of being free. For if the representation, stipulated by the constitution, 
framed by the late convention, be attentively and dispassionately considered, it must be obvious 
to every disinterested observer (besides many other weighty objections which will present 
themselves to view), that the number is not, by any means, adequate to the present inhabitants of 
this extensive continent, much less to those it will contain at a future period. 
I observe that the writer above mentioned, takes great pains to show the disadvantages which 
would result from three or four distinct confederacies of these states. I must confess that I have 
not seen, in any of the pieces published against the proposed constitution, any thing which gives 
the most distant idea that their writers are in favor of such governments; but it is clear these 
objections arise from a consolidation not affording security for the liberties of their country, and 
from hence it must evidently appear, that the design of Publius, in artfully holding up to public 
view [the bugbear of] such confederacies, can be with no other intention than wilfully to deceive 
his fellow citizens. I am confident it must be, and that it is, the sincere wish of every true friend 
to the United States, that there should be a confederated national government, but that it should 
be one which would have a control over national and external matters only, and not interfere 
with the internal regulations and police of the different states in the union. Such a government, 
while it would give us respectability abroad, would not encroach upon, or subvert our liberties at 
home. 
AN OBSERVER
Antifederalist No. 6 THE HOBGOBLINS OF ANARCHY AND 
DISSENSIONS AMONG THE STATES 
One of largest series of Antifederalist essays was penned under the pseudonym "CENTINEL." 
The Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer ran this 24 essay series between October 5, 1787 and 
November 24, 1788. 
Some historians feel most of the "Centinel" letters were written by Samuel Bryan, and a few by 
Eleazer Oswald, owner of the Independent Gazetteer. A more recent study by Charles Page 
Smith, James Wilson, Founding Father (Chapel Hill, 1956), refrains from making such theory 
This selection is from the eleventh letter of "Centinel," appearing in the Independent Gazetteer 
on January 16, 1788. 
The evils of anarchy have been portrayed with all the imagery of language in the growing colors 
of eloquence; the affrighted mind is thence led to clasp the new Constitution as the instrument of 
deliverance, as the only avenue to safety and happiness. To avoid the possible and transitory 
evils of one extreme, it is seduced into the certain and permanent misery necessarily attendant on 
the other. A state of anarchy from its very nature can never be of long continuance; the greater its 
violence the shorter the duration. Order and security are immediately sought by the distracted 
people beneath the shelter of equal laws and the salutary restraints of regular government; and if 
this be not attainable, absolute power is assumed by the one, or a few, who shall be the most 
enterprising and successful. If anarchy, therefore, were the inevitable consequence of rejecting 
the new Constitution, it would be infinitely better to incur it, for even then there would be at least 
the chance of a good government rising out of licentiousness. But to rush at once into despotism 
because there is a bare possibility of anarchy ensuing from the rejection, or from what is yet 
more visionary, the small delay that would be occasioned by a revision and correction of the 
proposed system of government is so superlatively weak, so fatally blind, that it is astonishing 
any person of common understanding should suffer such an imposition to have the least 
influence on his judgment; still more astonishing that so flimsy and deceptive a doctrine should 
make converts among the enlightened freemen of America, who have so long enjoyed the 
blessings of liberty. But when I view among such converts men otherwise pre-eminent it raises a 
blush for the weakness of humanity that these, her brightest ornaments, should be so dimsighted 
to what is self-evident to most men, that such imbecility of judgment should appear where so 
much perfection was looked for. This ought to teach us to depend more on our own judgment 
and the nature of the case than upon the opinions of the greatest and best of men, who, from 
constitutional infirmities or particular situations, may sometimes view an object through a 
delusive medium; but the opinions of great men are more frequently the dictates of ambition or 
private interest. 
The source of the apprehensions of this so much dreaded anarchy would upon investigation be 
found to arise from the artful suggestions of designing men, and not from a rational probability 
grounded on the actual state of affairs. The least reflection is sufficient to detect the fallacy to 
show that there is no one circumstance to justify the prediction of such an event. On the contrary 
a short time will evince, to the utter dismay and confusion of the conspirators, that a 
perseverance in cramming down their scheme of power upon the freemen of this State 
[Pennsylvania] will inevitably produce an anarchy destructive of their darling domination, and 
may kindle a flame prejudicial to their safety. They should be cautious not to trespass too far on 
the forbearance of freemen when wresting their dearest concerns, but prudently retreat from the 
gathering storm. 
The other specter that has been raised to terrify and alarm the people out of the exercise of their 
judgment on this great occasion, is the dread of our splitting into separate confederacies or 
republics, that might become rival powers and consequently liable to mutual wars from the usual 
motives of contention. This is an event still more improbable than the foregoing. It is a 
presumption unwarranted, either by the situation of affairs, or the sentiments of the people; no 
disposition leading to it exists; the advocates of the new constitution seem to view such a 
separation with horror, and its opponents are strenuously contending for a confederation that 
shall embrace all America under its comprehensive and salutary protection. This hobgoblin 
appears to have sprung from the deranged brain of Publius, [The Federalist] a New York writer, 
who, mistaking sound for argument, has with Herculean labor accumulated myriads of 
unmeaning sentences, and mechanically endeavored to force conviction by a torrent of misplaced 
words. He might have spared his readers the fatigue of wading through his long-winded 
disquisitions on the direful effects of the contentions of inimical states, as totally inapplicable to 
the subject he was professedly treating; this writer has devoted much time, and wasted more 
paper in combating chimeras of his own creation. However, for the sake of argument, I will 
admit that the necessary consequence of rejecting or delaying the establishment of the new 
constitution would be the dissolution of the union, and the institution of even rival and inimical 
republics; yet ought such an apprehension, if well founded, to drive us into the fangs of 
despotism? Infinitely preferable would be occasional wars to such an event. The former, 
although a severe scourge, is transient in its continuance, and in its operation partial, but a small 
proportion of the community are exposed to its greatest horrors, and yet fewer experience its 
greatest evils; the latter is permanent and universal misery, without remission or exemption. As 
passing clouds obscure for a time the splendor of the sun, so do wars interrupt the welfare of 
mankind; but despotism is a settled gloom that totally extinguishes happiness. Not a ray of 
comfort can penetrate to cheer the dejected mind; the goad of power with unabating rigor insists 
upon the utmost exaction; like a merciless taskmaster, [it] is continually inflicting the lash, and is 
never satiated with the feast of unfeeling domination, or the most abject servility. 
The celebrated Lord Kaims, whose disquisitions of human nature evidence extraordinary 
strength of judgment and depth of investigation, says that a continual civil war, which is the most 
destructive and horrible scene of human discord, is preferable to the uniformity of wretchedness 
and misery attendant upon despotism; of all possible evils, as I observed in my first number, this 
is the worst and the most to be dreaded. 
I congratulate my fellow citizens that a good government, the greatest earthly blessing, may be 
so easily obtained, that our circumstances are so favorable, that nothing but the folly of the 
conspirators can produce anarchy or civil war, which would presently terminate in their 
destruction and the permanent harmony of the state, alone interrupted by their ambitious 
machinations. 
CENTINEL
Antifederalist No. 7 ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
WILL LEAD TO CIVIL WAR 
"PHILANTHROPOS," (an anonymous Virginia Antifederalist) appeared in The Virginia Journal 
and Alexandria Advertiser, December 6, 1787, writing his version of history under the proposed 
new Constitution. 
The time in which the constitution or government of a nation undergoes any particular change, is 
always interesting and critical. Enemies are vigilant, allies are in suspense, friends hesitating 
between hope and fear; and all men are in eager expectation to see what such a change may 
produce. But the state of our affairs at present, is of such moment, as even to arouse the dead ... 
[A certain defender of the Constitution has stated that objections to it] are more calculated to 
alarm the fears of the people than to answer any valuable end. Was that the case, as it is not, will 
any man in his sober senses say, that the least infringement or appearance of infringement on our 
liberty -that liberty which has lately cost so much blood and treasure, together with anxious days 
and sleepless nights-ought not both to rouse our fears and awaken our jealousy? ... The new 
constitution in its present form is calculated to produce despotism, thraldom and confusion, and 
if the United States do swallow it, they will find it a bolus, that will create convulsions to their 
utmost extremities. Were they mine enemies, the worst imprecation I could devise would be, 
may they adopt it. For tyranny, where it has been chained (as for a few years past) is always 
more cursed, and sticks its teeth in deeper than before. Were Col. [George] Mason's objections 
obviated, the improvement would be very considerable, though even then, not so complete as 
might be. The Congress's having power without control-to borrow money on the credit of the 
United States; their having power to appoint their own salaries, and their being paid out of the 
treasury of the United States, thereby, in some measure, rendering them independent of the 
individual states; their being judges of the qualification and election of their own members, by 
which means they can get men to suit any purpose; together with Col. Mason's wise and 
judicious objections-are grievances, the very idea of which is enough to make every honest 
citizen exclaim in the language of Cato, 0 Liberty, 0 my country! Our present constitution, with a 
few additional powers to Congress, seems better calculated to preserve the rights and defend the 
liberties of our citizens, than the one proposed, without proper amendments. Let us therefore, for 
once, show our judgment and solidity by continuing it, and prove the opinion to be erroneous, 
that levity and fickleness are not only the foibles of our tempers, but the reigning principles in 
these states. There are men amongst us, of such dissatisfied tempers, that place them in Heaven, 
they would find something to blame; and so restless and self- sufficient, that they must be 
eternally reforming the state. But the misfortune is, they always leave affairs worse than they 
find them. A change of government is at all times dangerous, but at present may be fatal, without 
the utmost caution, just after emerging out of a tedious and expensive war. Feeble in our nature, 
and complicated in our form, we are little able to bear the rough Posting of civil dissensions 
which are likely to ensue. Even now, discontent and opposition distract our councils. Division
and despondency affect our people. Is it then a time to alter our government, that government 
which even now totters on its foundation, and will, without tender care, produce ruin by its fall? 
Beware my countrymen! Our enemies- -uncontrolled as they are in their ambitious schemes, 
fretted with losses, and perplexed with disappointments-will exert their whole power and policy 
to increase and continue our confusion. And while we are destroying one another, they will be 
repairing their losses, and ruining our trade. 
Of all the plagues that infest a nation, a civil war is the worst. Famine is severe, pestilence is 
dreadful; but in these, though men die, they die in peace. The father expires without the guilt of 
the son; and the son, if he survives, enjoys the inheritance of his father. Cities may be thinned, 
but they neither plundered nor burnt. But when a civil war is kindled, there is then forth no 
security of property nor protection from any law. Life and fortune become precarious. And all 
that is dear to men is at the discretion of profligate soldiery, doubly licentious on such an 
occasion. Cities are exhausted by heavy contributions, or sacked because they cannot answer 
exorbitant demand. Countries are eaten up by the parties they favor, and ravaged by the one they 
oppose. Fathers and sons, sheath their swords in anothers bowels in the field, and their wives and 
daughters are exposed to rudeness and lust of ruffians at home. And when the sword has decided 
quarrel, the scene is closed with banishments, forfeitures, and barbarous executions that entail 
distress on children then unborn. May Heaven avert the dreadful catastrophe! In the most limited 
governments, what wranglings, animosities, factions, partiality, and all other evils that tend to 
embroil a nation and weaken a state, are constantly practised by legislators. What then may we 
expect if the new constitution be adopted as it now stands? The great will struggle for power, 
honor and wealth; the poor become a prey to avarice, insolence and oppression. And while some 
are studying to supplant their neighbors, and others striving to keep their stations, one villain will 
wink at the oppression of another, the people be fleeced, and the public business neglected. From 
despotism and tyranny good Lord deliver us.
Antifederalist No. 8 "THE POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS OF 
SENDING TROOPS FOR SUPPRESSING INSURRECTIONS 
WILL ALWAYS ENABLE THEM TO STIFLE THE FIRST 
STRUGGLES OF FREEDOM" 
"A FEDERAL REPUBLICAN" (from Virginia) had his `letter to the editor' appear in The 
Norfolk and Portsmouth Register March 5, 1788.
.... By the Articles of Confederation, the congress of the United State was vested with powers for 
conducting the common concerns of the continent. They had the sole and exclusive right and 
power of determining on peace and war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into 
treaties and alliances; and of pointing out the respective quotas of men and men which each state 
should furnish. But it was expressly provided that the money to be supplied by each state should 
be raised by the authority and direction of the legislature thereof-- thus reserving to the states the 
important privilege of levying taxes upon their citizens in such manner as might be most 
conformable to their peculiar circumstances and form of government. With powers thus 
constituted was congress enabled to unite the general exertions of the continent in the cause of 
liberty and to carry us triumphantly through a long and bloody war. It was not until sometime 
after peace and a glorious independence had been established that defects were discovered in that 
system of federal government which had procured to us those blessings. It was then perceived 
that the Articles of Confederation were inadequate to the purposes of the union; and it was 
particularly suggested as necessary to vest in congress the further power of exclusively 
regulating the commerce of the United States, as well to enable us, by a system more uniform, to 
counteract the policy of foreign nations, as for other important reasons. Upon this principle, a 
general convention of the United States was proposed to be held, and deputies were accordingly 
appointed by twelve of the states charged with power to revise, alter, and amend the Articles of 
Confederation. When these deputies met, instead of confining themselves to the powers with 
which they were entrusted, they pronounced all amendments to the Articles of Confederation 
wholly impracticable; and with a spirit of amity and concession truly remarkable proceeded to 
form a government entirely new, and totally different in its principles and its organization. 
Instead of a congress whose members could serve but three years out of six-and then to return to 
a level with their fellow citizens; and who were liable at all times, whenever the states might 
deem it necessary, to be recalled-- Congress, by this new constitution, will be composed of a 
body whose members during the time they are appointed to serve, can receive no check from 
their constituents. Instead of the powers formerly granted to congress of ascertaining each state's 
quota of men and money-to be raised by the legislatures of the different states in such a mode as 
they might think proper- -congress, by this new government, will be invested with the formidable 
powers of raising armies, and lending money, totally independent of the different states. They 
will moreover, have the power of leading troops among you in order to suppress those struggles 
which may sometimes happen among a free people, and which tyranny will impiously brand 
with the name of sedition. On one day the state collector will call on you for your proportion of 
those taxes which have been laid on you by the general assembly, where you are fully and 
adequately represented; on the next will come the Continental collector to demand from you 
those taxes which shall be levied by the continental congress, where the whole state of Virginia 
will be represented by only ten men! Thus shall we imprudently confer on so small a number the 
very important power of taking our money out of our pockets, and of levying taxes without 
control-a right which the wisdom of our state constitution will, in vain, have confided to the most 
numerous branch of the legislature. Should the sheriff or state collector in any manner aggrieve 
you either in person or property, these sacred rights are amply secured by the most solemn 
compact. Beside, the arm of government is always at hand to shield you from his injustice and 
oppression. But if a Continental collector, in the execution of his office, should invade your 
freedom (according to this new government, which has expressly declared itself paramount to all 
state laws and constitutions) the state of which you are a citizen will have no authority to afford 
you relief. A continental court may, indeed, be established in the state, and it may be urged that 
you will find a remedy here; but, my fellow citizens, let me ask, what protection this will afford 
you against the insults or rapacity of a continental officer, when he will have it in his power to 
appeal to the seat of congress perhaps at several hundred miles distance, and by this means 
oblige you to expend hundreds of pounds in obtaining redress for twenty shillings unjustly 
extorted? Thus will you be necessarily compelled either to make a bold effort to extricate 
yourselves from these grievous and oppressive extortions, or you will be fatigued by fruitless 
attempts into the quiet and peaceable surrender of those rights, for which the blood of your 
fellow citizens has been shed in vain. But the latter will, no doubt, be the melancholy fate of a 
people once inspired with the love of liberty, as the power vested in congress of sending troops 
for suppressing insurrections will always enable them to stifle the first struggles of freedom.
A FEDERAL REPUBLICAN
Antifederalist No. 9 A CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT IS A 
TYRANNY 
"MONTEZUMA," regarded as a Pennsylvanian, wrote this essay which showed up in the 
Independent Gazetteer on October 17, 1787.
We the Aristocratic party of the United States, lamenting the many inconveniences to which the 
late confederation subjected the well-born, the better kind of people, bringing them down to the 
level of the rabble-and holding in utter detestation that frontispiece to every bill of rights, "that 
all men are born equal"-beg leave (for the purpose of drawing a line between such as we think 
were ordained to govern, and such as were made to bear the weight of government without 
having any share in its administration) to submit to our Friends in the first class for their 
inspection, the following defense of our monarchical, aristocratical democracy.
lst. As a majority of all societies consist of men who (though totally incapable of thinking or 
acting in governmental matters) are more readily led than driven, we have thought meet to 
indulge them in something like a democracy in the new constitution, which part we have 
designated by the popular name of the House of Representatives. But to guard against every 
possible danger from this lower house, we have subjected every bill they bring forward, to the 
double negative of our upper house and president. Nor have we allowed the populace the right to 
elect their representatives annually . . . lest this body should be too much under the influence and 
control of their constituents, and thereby prove the "weatherboard of our grand edifice, to show 
the shiftings of every fashionable gale,"-for we have not yet to learn that little else is wanting to 
aristocratize the most democratical representative than to make him somewhat independent of his 
political creators. We have taken away that rotation of appointment which has so long perplexed 
us-that grand engine of popular influence. Every man is eligible into our government from time 
to time for life. This will have a two-fold good effect. First, it prevents the representatives from 
mixing with the lower class, and imbibing their foolish sentiments, with which they would have 
come charged on re-election. 
2d. They will from the perpetuality of office be under our eye, and in a short time will think and 
act like us, independently of popular whims and prejudices. For the assertion "that evil 
communications corrupt good manners," is not more true than its reverse. We have allowed this 
house the power to impeach, but we have tenaciously reserved the right to try. We hope 
gentlemen, you will see the policy of this clause-for what matters it who accuses, if the accused 
is tried by his friends. In fine, this plebian house will have little power, and that little be rightly 
shaped by our house of gentlemen, who will have a very extensive influence-from their being 
chosen out of the genteeler class ... It is true, every third senatorial seat is to be vacated 
duennually, but two-thirds of this influential body will remain in office, and be ready to direct or 
(if necessary) bring over to the good old way, the young members, if the old ones should not be 
returned. And whereas many of our brethren, from a laudable desire to support their rank in life 
above the commonalty, have not only deranged their finances, but subjected their persons to 
indecent treatment (as being arrested for debt, etc.) we have framed a privilege clause, by which 
they may laugh at the fools who trusted them. But we have given out, that this clause was 
provided, only that the members might be able without interruption, to deliberate on the 
important business of their country. 
We have frequently endeavored to effect in our respective states, the happy discrimination which 
pervades this system; but finding we could not bring the states into it individually, we have 
determined ... and have taken pains to leave the legislature of each free and independent state, as 
they now call themselves, in such a situation that they will eventually be absorbed by our grand 
continental vortex, or dwindle into petty corporations, and have power over little else than 
yoaking hogs or determining the width of cart wheels. But (aware that an intention to annihilate 
state legislatures, would be objected to our favorite scheme) we have made their existence (as a 
board of electors) necessary to ours. This furnishes us and our advocates with a fine answer to 
any clamors that may be raised on this subject. We have so interwoven continental and state 
legislatures that they cannot exist separately; whereas we in truth only leave them the power of 
electing us, for what can a provincial legislature do when we possess the exclusive regulation of 
external and internal commerce, excise, duties, imposts, post-offices and roads; when we and we 
alone, have the power to wage war, make peace, coin money (if we can get bullion) if not, 
borrow money, organize the militia and call them forth to execute our decrees, and crush 
insurrections assisted by a noble body of veterans subject to our nod, which we have the power 
of raising and keeping even in the time of peace. What have we to fear from state legislatures or 
even from states, when we are armed with such powers, with a president at our head? (A name 
we thought proper to adopt in conformity to the prejudices of a silly people who are so foolishly 
fond of a Republican government, that we were obliged to accommodate in names and forms to 
them, in order more effectually to secure the substance of our proposed plan; but we all know 
that Cromwell was a King, with the title of Protector). I repeat it, what have we to fear armed 
with such powers, with a president at our head who is captain- -general of the army, navy and 
militia of the United States, who can make and unmake treaties, appoint and commission 
ambassadors and other ministers, who can grant or refuse reprieves or pardons, who can make 
judges of the supreme and other continental courts-in short, who will be the source, the fountain 
of honor, profit and power, whose influence like the rays of the sun, will diffuse itself far and 
wide, will exhale all democratical vapors and break the clouds of popular insurrection? But again 
gentlemen, our judicial power is a strong work, a masked battery, few people see the guns we 
can and will ere long play off from it. For the judicial power embraces every question which can 
arise in law or equity, under this constitution and under the laws of "the United States" (which 
laws will be, you know, the supreme laws of the land). This power extends to all cases, affecting 
ambassadors or other public ministers, "and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies 
between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of 
different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under grants of different 
States; and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects." 
Now, can a question arise in the colonial courts, which the ingenuity or sophistry of an able 
lawyer may not bring within one or other of the above cases? Certainly not. Then our court will 
have original or appellate jurisdiction in all cases-and if so, how fallen are state judicatures-and 
must not every provincial law yield to our supreme flat? Our constitution answers yes. . . . And 
finally we shall entrench ourselves so as to laugh at the cabals of the commonalty. A few 
regiments will do at first; it must be spread abroad that they are absolutely necessary to defend 
the frontiers. Now a regiment and then a legion must be added quietly; by and by a frigate or two 
must be built, still taking care to intimate that they are essential to the support of our revenue 
laws and to prevent smuggling. We have said nothing about a bill of rights, for we viewed it as 
an eternal clog upon our designs, as a lock chain to the wheels of government-though, by the 
way, as we have not insisted on rotation in our offices, the simile of a wheel is ill. We have for 
some time considered the freedom of the press as a great evil-it spreads information, and begets a 
licentiousness in the people which needs the rein more than the spur; besides, a daring printer 
may expose the plans of government and lessen the consequence of our president and senate-for 
these and many other reasons we have said nothing with respect to the "right of the people to 
speak and publish their sentiments" or about their "palladiums of liberty" and such stuff. We do 
not much like that sturdy privilege of the people-the right to demand the writ of habeas corpus. 
We have therefore reserved the power of refusing it in cases of rebellion, and you know we are 
the judges of what is rebellion.... Our friends we find have been assiduous in representing our 
federal calamities, until at length the people at large-frightened by the gloomy picture on one 
side, and allured by the prophecies of some of our fanciful and visionary adherents on the other-
are ready to accept and confirm our proposed government without the delay or forms of 
examination--which was the more to be wished, as they are wholly unfit to investigate the 
principles or pronounce on the merit of so exquisite a system. Impressed with a conviction that 
this constitution is calculated to restrain the influence and power of the LOWER CLASS-to draw 
that discrimination we have so long sought after; to secure to our friends privileges and offices, 
which were not to be ... [obtained] under the former government, because they were in common; 
to take the burden of legislation and attendance on public business off the commonalty, who will 
be much better able thereby to prosecute with effect their private business; to destroy that 
political thirteen headed monster, the state sovereignties; to check the licentiousness of the 
people by making it dangerous to speak or publish daring or tumultuary sentiments; to enforce 
obedience to laws by a strong executive, aided by military pensioners; and finally to promote the 
public and private interests of the better kind of people-we submit it to your judgment to take 
such measures for its adoption as you in your wisdom may think fit. 
Signed by unanimous order of the lords spiritual and temporal. 
MONTEZUMA
Antifederalist No. 10 ON THE PRESERVATION OF PARTIES, 
PUBLIC LIBERTY DEPENDS 
This essay follows a theme similar to Federalist No. 10, and appeared in the Maryland Gazette 
and Baltimore Advertiser, March 18, 1788.
The opposite qualities of the first confederation were rather caused by than the cause of two 
parties, which from its first existence began and have continued their operations, I believe, 
unknown to their country and almost unknown to themselves-as really but few men have the 
capacity or resolution to develop the secret causes which influence their daily conduct. The old 
Congress was a national government and an union of States, both brought into one political 
body, as these opposite powers-I do not mean parties were so exactly blended and very nearly 
balanced, like every artificial, operative machine where action is equal to reaction. It stood 
perfectly still. It would not move at all. Those who were merely confederal in their views, were 
for dividing the public debt. Those who were for national government, were for increasing of it. 
Those who thought any national government would be destructive to the liberties of America . . . 
assisted those who thought it our only safety-to put everything as wrong as possible. Requisitions 
were made, which every body knew it was impossible to comply with. Either in 82 or 83, ten 
millions of hard dollars, if not thirteen, were called into the continental treasury, when there 
could not be half that sum in the whole tract of territory between Nova-Scotia and Florida. The 
States neglected them in despair. The public honor was tarnished, and our governments abused 
by their servants and best friends. In fine, it became a cant word things are not yet bad enough to 
mend. However, as [a] great part of the important objects of society were entrusted to this 
mongrel species of general government, the sentiment of pushing it forward became general 
throughout America, and the late Convention met at Philadelphia under the uniform impression, 
that such was the desire of their constituents. But even then the advantages and disadvantages of 
national government operated so strongly, although silently, on each individual, that the conflict 
was nearly equal. A third or middle opinion, which always arises in such cases, broke off and 
took the lead-the national party [thus] assisted, pursued steadily their object- the federal party 
dropped off, one by one, and finally, when the middle party came to view the offspring which 
they had given birth to, and in a great measure reared, several of them immediately disowned the 
child. Such has been hitherto the progress of party; or rather of the human mind dispassionately 
contemplating our separate and relative situation, and aiming at that perfect completion of social 
happiness and grandeur, which perhaps can be combined only in ideas. Every description of men 
entertain the same wishes (excepting perhaps a few very bad men of each)-they forever will 
differ about the mode of accomplishment-and some must be permitted to doubt the practicability.
As our citizens are now apprized of the progress of parties or political opinions on the continent, 
it is fit they should also be informed of the present state, force and designs of each, in order that 
they may form their decisions with safety to the public and themselves-this shall be given with 
all the precision and impartiality the author is capable of. 
America is at present divided into three classes or descriptions of men, and in a few years there 
will be but two. 
[First]. The first class comprehends all those men of fortune and reputation who stepped forward 
in the late revolution, from opposition to the administration, rather than the government of Great 
Britain. All those aristocrats whose pride disdains equal law. Many men of very large fortune, 
who entertain real or imaginary fears for the security of property. Those young men, who have 
sacrificed their time and their talents to public service, without any prospect of an adequate 
pecuniary or honorary reward. All your people of fashion and pleasure who are corrupted by the 
dissipation of the French, English and American armies; and a love of European manners and 
luxury. The public creditors of the continent, whose interest has been heretofore sacrificed by 
their friends, in order to retain their services on this occasion. A large majority of the mercantile 
people, which is at present a very unformed and consequently dangerous interest. Our old native 
merchants have been almost universally ruined by the receipt of their debts in paper during the 
war, and the payment in hard money of what they owed their British correspondents since peace. 
Those who are not bankrupts, have generally retired and given place to a set of young men, who 
conducting themselves as rashly as ignorantly, have embarrassed their affairs and lay the blame 
on the government, and who are really unacquainted with the true mercantile interest of the 
country-which is perplexed from circumstances rather temporary than permanent. The foreign 
merchants are generally not to be trusted with influence in our government-- they are most of 
them birds of passage. Some, perhaps British emissaries increasing and rejoicing in our political 
mistakes, and even those who have settled among us with an intention to fix themselves and their 
posterity in our soil, have brought with them more foreign prejudices than wealth. Time must 
elapse before the mercantile interest will be so organized as to govern themselves, much less 
others, with propriety. And lastly, to this class I suppose we may ultimately add the tory interest, 
with the exception of very many respectable characters, who reflect with a gratification mixed 
with disdain, that those principles are now become fashionable for which they have been 
persecuted and hunted down-which, although by no means so formidable as is generally 
imagined, is still considerable. They are at present wavering. They are generally, though with 
very many exceptions, openly for the proposed, but secretly against any American government. 
A burnt child dreads the fire. But should they see any fair prospect of confusion arise, these 
gentry will be off at any moment for these five and twenty years to come. Ultimately, should the 
administration promise stability to the new government, they may be counted on as the Janizaries 
of power, ready to efface all suspicion by the violence of their zeal. 
In general, all these various people would prefer a government, as nearly copied after that of 
Great Britain, as our circumstances will permit. Some would strain these circumstances. Others 
still retain a deep rooted jealousy of the executive branch and strong republican prejudices as 
they are called. Finally, this class contains more aggregate wisdom and moral virtue than both 
the other two together. It commands nearly two thirds of the property and almost one half the 
numbers of America, and has at present, become almost irresistible from the name of the truly 
great and amiable man who it has been said, is disposed to patronize it, and from the influence 
which it has over the second class. This [first] class is nearly at the height of their power; they 
must decline or moderate, or another revolution will ensue, for the opinion of America is 
becoming daily more unfavorable to those radical changes which high-toned government 
requires. A conflict would terminate in the destruction of this class, or the liberties of their 
country. May the Guardian Angel of America prevent both! 
[Second]. The second class is composed of those descriptions of men who are certainly more 
numerous with us than in any other part of the globe. First, those men who are so wise as to 
discover that their ancestors and indeed all the rest of mankind were and are fools. We have a 
vast overproportion of these great men, who, when you tell them that from the earliest period at 
which mankind devoted their attention to social happiness, it has been their uniform judgment, 
that a government over governments cannot exist- -that is two governments operating on the 
same individual-assume the smile of confidence, and tell you of two people travelling the same 
road-of a perfect and precise division of the duties of the individual. Still, however, the political 
apothegm is as old as the proverb-That no man can serve two masters-and whoever will run their 
noddles against old proverbs will be sure to break them, however hard they may be. And if they 
broke only their own, all would be right; but it is very horrible to reflect that all our numskulls 
must be cracked in concert. Second. The trimmers, who from sympathetic indecision are always 
united with, and when not regularly employed, always fight under the banners of these great 
men, These people are forever at market, and when parties are nearly equally divided, they get 
very well paid for their services. Thirdly. The indolent, that is almost every second man of 
independent fortune you meet with in America-these are quite easy, and can live under any 
government. If men can be said to live, who scarcely breathe; and if breathing was attended with 
any bodily exertion, would give up their small portion of life in despair. These men do not swim 
with the stream as the trimmers do, but are dragged like mud at the bottom. As they have no 
other weight than their tat flesh, they are hardly worth mentioning when we speak of the 
sentiments and opinions of America. As this second class never can include any of the yeomanry 
of the union, who never affect superior wisdom, and can have no interests but the public good, it 
can be only said to exist at the birth of government, and as soon as the first and third classes 
become more decided in their views, this will divide with each and dissipate like a mist, or sink 
down into what are called moderate men, and become the tools and instruments of others. These 
people are prevented by a cloud from having any view; and if they are not virtuous, they at least 
preserve the appearance, which in this world amounts to the same thing. 
[Third]. At the head of the third class appear the old rigid republicans, who although few in 
number, are still formidable. Reverence will follow these men in spite of detraction, as long as 
wisdom and virtue are esteemed among mankind. They are joined by the true democrats, who are 
in general fanatics and enthusiasts, and some few sensible, charming madmen. A decided 
majority of the yeomanry of America will, for a length of years, be ready to support these two 
descriptions of men. But as this last class is forced to act as a residuary legatee, and receive all 
the trash and filth, it is in some measure disgraced and its influence weakened. 3dly. The 
freebooters and plunderers, who infest all countries and ours perhaps as little as any other 
whatever. These men have that natural antipathy to any kind or sort of government, that a rogue 
has to a halter. In number they are few indeed such characters are the offspring of dissipation and 
want, and there is not that country in the world where so much real property is shared so equally 
among so few citizens, for where property is as easily acquired by fair means, very few indeed 
will resort to foul. Lastly, by the poor mob, infoelix pecus!l The property of whoever will feed 
them and take care of them-let them be spared. Let the burden of taxation sit lightly on their 
shoulders. But alas! This is not their fate. It is here that government forever falls with all its 
weight. It is here that the proposed government will press where it should scarcely be felt. . . . 
In this [third] class may be counted men of the greatest mental powers and of as sublime virtue 
as any in America. They at present command nearly one-third of the property and above half the 
numbers of the United States, and in either event they must continue to increase in influence by 
great desertions from both the other classes. . . . If the [proposed] government is not adopted, 
theirs will be the prevalent opinion. The object of this class either is or will be purely federal-an 
union of independent States, not a government of individuals. And should the proposed federal 
plan fail, from the obstinacy of those who will listen to no conditional amendments, although 
such as they cannot disapprove; or should it ultimately in its execution upon a fair trial, 
disappoint the wishes and expectations of our country-[then] an union purely federal is what the 
reasonable and dispassionate patriots of America must bend their views to. My countrymen, 
preserve your jealousy-reject suspicion, it is the fiend that destroys public and private happiness. 
I know some weak, but very few if any wicked men in public confidence. And learn this most 
difficult and necessary lesson: That on the preservation of parties, public liberty depends. 
Whenever men are unanimous on great public questions, whenever there is but one party, 
freedom ceases and despotism commences. The object of a free and wise people should be so to 
balance parties, that from the weakness of all you may be governed by the moderation of the 
combined judgments of the whole, not tyrannized over by the blind passions of a few 
individuals. 
A FARMER
Antifederalist No. 11 UNRESTRICTED POWER OVER 
COMMERCE SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT 
Scholars regard James Winthrop of Cambridge, Mass. to be the "Agrippa" who contributed the 
series to The Massachusetts Gazette from November 23, 1787 to February 5, 1788. This is a 
compilation of excerpts from "Agrippa's" letters of December 14, 18, 25, and 28, 1787, taken 
from Ford, Essays, pp. 70-73, 76-77, 79-81.
It has been proved, by indisputable evidence, that power is not the grand principle of union 
among the parts of a very extensive empire; and that when this principle is pushed beyond the 
degree necessary for rendering justice between man and man, it debases the character of 
individuals, and renders them less secure in their persons and property. Civil liberty consists in 
the consciousness of that security, and is best guarded by political liberty, which is the share that 
every citizen has in the government. Accordingly all our accounts agree, that in those empires 
which are commonly called despotic, and which comprehend by far the greatest part of the 
world, the government is most fluctuating, and property least secure. In those countries insults 
are borne by the sovereign, which, if offered to one of our governors, would fill us with horror, 
and we should think the government dissolving. 
The common conclusion from this reasoning is an exceedingly unfair one, that we must then 
separate, and form distinct confederacies. This would be true if there was no principle to 
substitute in the room of power. Fortunately there is one. This is commerce. All the states have 
local advantages, and in a considerable degree separate interests. They are, therefore, in a 
situation to supply each other's wants. Carolina, for instance, is inhabited by planters, while 
Massachusetts is more engaged in commerce and manufactures. Congress has the power of 
deciding their differences. The most friendly intercourse may therefore be established between 
them. A diversity of produce, wants and interests, produces commerce; and commerce, where 
there is a common, equal and moderate authority to preside, produces friendship. 
The same principles apply to the connection with the new settlers in the west. Many supplies 
they want, for which they must look to the older settlements, and the greatness of their crops 
enables them to make payments. Here, then, we have a bond of -union which applies to all parts 
of the empire, and would continue to operate if the empire comprehended all America. 
We are now, in the strictest sense of the terms, a federal republic. Each part has within its own 
limits the sovereignty over its citizens, while some of the general concerns are committed to 
Congress. The complaints of the deficiency of the Congressional powers are confined to two 
articles. They are not able to raise a revenue by taxation, and they have not a complete regulation 
of the intercourse between us and foreigners. For each of these complaints there is some 
foundation, but not enough to justify the clamor which has been raised. . . . 
The second article of complaint against the present confederation . . . is that Congress has not the 
sole power to regulate the intercourse between us and foreigners. Such a power extends not only 
to war and peace, but to trade and naturalization. This last article ought never to be given them; 
for though most of the states may be willing for certain reasons to receive foreigners as citizens, 
yet reasons of equal weight may induce other states, differently circumstanced, to keep their 
blood pure. Pennsylvania has chosen to receive all that would come there. Let any indifferent 
person judge whether that state in point of morals, education, [or] energy, is equal to any of the 
eastern states; the small state of Rhode Island only excepted. Pennsylvania in the course of a 
century has acquired her present extent and population at the expense of religion and good 
morals. The eastern states have, by keeping separate from the foreign mixtures, acquired their 
present greatness in the course of a century and an half, and have preserved their religion and 
morals. They have also preserved that manly virtue which is equally fitted for rendering them 
respectable in war, and industrious in peace. 
The remaining power for peace and trade might perhaps be safely lodged with Congress under 
some limitations. Three restrictions appear to me to be essentially necessary to preserve that 
equality of rights to the states, which it is the object of the state governments to secure to each 
citizen. 1st. It ought not to be in the power of Congress, either by treaty or otherwise, to alienate 
part of any state without the consent of the legislature. 2nd. They ought not to be able, by treaty 
or other law, to give any legal preference to one part above another. 3rd. They ought to be 
restrained from creating any monopolies.... 
The idea of consolidation is further kept up in the right given to regulate trade. Though this 
power under certain limitations would be a proper one for the department of Congress, it is in 
this system carried much too far, and much farther than is necessary. This is, without exception, 
the most commercial state upon the continent. Our extensive coasts, cold climate, small estates, 
and equality of rights, with a variety of subordinate and concurring circumstances, place us in 
this respect at the head of the Union. We must, therefore, be indulged if a point which so nearly 
relates to our welfare be rigidly examined. The new constitution not only prohibits vessels, 
bound from one state to another, from paying any duties, but even from entering and clearing. 
The only use of such a regulation is, to keep each state in complete ignorance of its own 
resources. It certainly is no hardship to enter and clear at the custom house, and the expense is 
too small to be an object. 
The unlimited right to regulate trade, includes the right of granting exclusive charters. This, in all 
old countries, is considered as one principal branch of prerogative. We find hardly a country in 
Europe which has not felt the ill effects of such a power. Holland has carried the exercise of it 
farther than any other state, and the reason why that country has felt less evil from it is, that the 
territory is very small, and they have drawn large revenues from their colonies in the East and 
West Indies. In this respect, the whole country is to be considered as a trading company, having 
exclusive privileges. The colonies are large in proportion to the parent state; so that, upon the 
whole, the latter may gain by such a system. We are also to take into consideration the industry 
which the genius of a free government inspires. But in the British islands all these circumstances 
together have not prevented them from being injured by the monopolies created there. 
Individuals have been enriched, but the country at large has been hurt. Some valuable branches 
of trade being granted to companies, who transact their business in London, that city is, perhaps, 
the place of the greatest trade in the world. But Ireland, under such influence, suffers 
exceedingly, and is impoverished; and Scotland is a mere by-word. Bristol, the second city in 
England, ranks not much above this town [Boston] in population. These things must be 
accounted for by the incorporation of trading companies; and if they are felt so severely in 
countries of small extent, they will operate with tenfold severity upon us, who inhabit an 
immense tract; and living towards one extreme of an extensive empire, shall feel the evil, 
without retaining that influence in government, which may enable us to procure redress. There 
ought, then, to have been inserted a restraining clause which might prevent the Congress from 
making any such grant, because they consequentially defeat the trade of the out-ports, and are 
also injurious to the general commerce, by enhancing prices and destroying that rivalship which 
is the great stimulus to industry. . . . 
There cannot be a doubt, that, while the trade of this continent remains free, the activity of our 
countrymen will secure their full share. AR the estimates for the present year, let them be made 
by what party they may, suppose the balance of trade to be largely in our favor. The credit of our 
merchants is, therefore, fully established in foreign countries. This is a sufficient proof, that 
when business is unshackled, it will find out that channel which is most friendly to its course. 
We ought, therefore, to be exceedingly cautious about diverting or restraining it. Every day 
produces fresh proofs, that people, under the immediate pressure of difficulties, do not, at first 
glance, discover the proper relief. The last year, a desire to get rid of embarrassments induced 
many honest people to agree to a tender act, and many others, of a different description, to 
obstruct the courts of justice. Both these methods only increased the evil they were intended to 
cure. Experience has since shown that, instead of trying to lesson an evil by altering the present 
course of things, that every endeavor should have been applied to facilitate the course of law, and 
thus to encourage a mutual confidence among the citizens, which increases the resources of them 
all, and renders easy the payment of debts. By this means one does not grow rich at the expense 
of another, but all are benefited. The case is the same with the States. Pennsylvania, with one 
port and a large territory, is less favorably situated for trade than Massachusetts, which has an 
extensive coast in proportion to its limits of jurisdiction. Accordingly a much larger proportion 
of our people are engaged in maritime affairs. We ought therefore to be particularly attentive to 
securing so great an interest. It is vain to tell us that we ought to overlook local interests. It is 
only by protecting local concerns that the interest of the whole is preserved. No man when he 
enters into society does it from a view to promote the good of others, but he does it for his own 
good. All men having the same view are bound equally to promote the welfare of the whole. To 
recur then to such a principle as that local interests must be disregarded, is requiring of one man 
to do more than another, and is subverting the foundation of a free government. The 
Philadelphians would be shocked with a proposition to place the seat of general government and 
the unlimited right to regulate trade in Massachusetts. There can be no greater reason for our 
surrendering the preference to them. Such sacrifices, however we may delude ourselves with the 
form of words, always originate in folly, and not in generosity.
AGRIPPA
Antifederalist No. 12 HOW WILL THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
RAISE MONEY? 
"CINCINNATUS" is an Antifederalist writer. In this essay, from an Address to a Meeting of the 
Citizens of Philadelphia, the writer responds to James Wilson's statements about Congress' 
powers to tax under the Constitution. It appeared in the November 29 and December 6, 1787, 
New-York Journal, as reprinted from a Philadelphia newspaper. 
On the subject of taxation, in which powers are to be given so largely by the new constitution, 
you [James Wilson of Pennsylvania] lull our fears of abuse by venturing to predict "that the great 
revenue of the United States must, and always will, be raised by impost"-and you elevate our 
hopes by holding out, "the reviving and supporting the national credit." If you have any other 
plan for this, than by raising money upon the people to pay the interest of the national debt, your 
ingenuity will deserve our thanks. Supposing however, that raising money is necessary to 
payment of the interest, and such a payment [is] requisite to support the credit of the union-let us 
see how much will be necessary for that end, and how far the impost will supply what we want. 
The arrearages of French and Spanish interest amount now to--1,500,000 dollars; Interest and 
installments of do. for 1788--850,227; Support of government; and its departments, for 1788--
500,000; Arrears and anticipations of 1787-- 300,000; Interest of domestic debt-- 500,000 {total} 
4,650,227 [3,650,227] 
The new Congress then, supposing it to get into operation towards October, 1788, will have to 
provide for this sum, and for the additional sum of 3,000,000 at least for the ensuing year; which 
together will make the sum of 7,650,227 [6,650,227]. 
Now let us see how the impost will answer this. Congress have furnished us with their estimate 
of the produce of the whole imports of America at five per cent and that is 800,000 dollars. There 
will remain to provide for, by other taxes, 6,850,227 [5,850,227]. 
We know too, that our imports diminish yearly, and from the nature of things must continue to 
diminish; and consequently that the above estimate of the produce of the impost, will in all 
probability fall much short of the supposed sum. But even without this, it must appear that you 
[were] either intentionally misleading your hearers, or [were] very little acquainted with the 
subject when you ventured to predict that the great revenue of the United States would always 
flow from the impost. The estimate above is from the publications of Congress, and I presume is 
right. But the sum stated, necessary to be raised by the new government, in order to answer the 
expectations they have raised, is not all. The state debts, independent of what each owes to the 
United States, amount to about 30,000,000 dollars; the annual interest of this is 1,000,000. 
It will be expected that the new government will provide for this also; and such expectation is 
founded, not only on the promise you hold forth, of its reviving and supporting public credit 
among us, but also on this unavoidable principle of justice-that is, the new government takes 
away the impost, and other substantial taxes, from the produce of which the several states paid 
the interest of their debt, or funded the paper with which they paid it. The new government must 
find ways and means of supplying that deficiency, . . . in hard money, for . . . paper . . . cannot 
[be used] without a violation of the principles it boasts. The sum then which it must annually 
raise in specie, after the first year, cannot be less than 4,800,000. At present there is not one half 
of this sum in specie raised in all the states. And yet the complaints of intolerable taxes has 
produced one rebellion and will be mainly operative in the adoption of your constitution. How 
you will get this sum is inconceivable and yet get it you must, or lose all credit. With magnificent 
promises you have bought golden opinions of all sorts of people, and with gold you must answer 
them, . . . 
To satisfy [our fellow citizens] more fully on the subject of the revenue, that is to be raised upon 
them, in order to give enormous fortunes to the jobbers in public securities, I shall lay before 
them a proposition to Congress, from Mr. Robert Morris, when superintendent of finance. It is 
dated, I think,' the 29th of June, 1782, and is in these words: 
[1 say, I think, because by accident the month is erased in the note I have, and I have not access 
to public papers which would enable me to supply the defect.] 
"The requisition of a five per cent impost, made on the 3d of February, 1781, has not yet been 
complied with by the state of Rhode Island, but as there is reason to believe, that their 
compliance is not far off, this revenue may be considered as already granted. It will, however, be 
very inadequate to the purposes intended. If goods be imported, and prizes introduced to the 
amount of twelve millions annually, the five per cent would be six hundred thousand, from 
which at least one sixth must be deducted, as well for the cost of collection as for the various 
defalcations which will necessarily happen, and which it is unnecessary to enumerate. It is not 
safe therefore, to estimate this revenue at more than half a million of dollars; for though it may 
produce more, yet probably it will not produce so much. It was in consequence of this, that on 
the 27th day of February last, I took the liberty to submit the propriety of asking the states for a 
land tax of one dollar for every hundred acres of land-a poll-tax of one dollar on all freemen, and 
all male slaves, between sixteen and sixty, excepting such as are in the federal army, or by 
wounds or otherwise rendered unfit for service-and an excise of one eighth of a dollar, on all 
distilled spiritous liquors. Each of these may be estimated at half a million; and should the 
product be equal to the estimation, the sum total of revenues for funding the public debts, would 
be equal to two millions." 
You will readily perceive, Mr. Wilson, that there is a vast difference between your prediction and 
your friend's proposition. Give me leave to say, sir, that it was not discreet, in you, to speak upon 
finance without instructions from this great financier. Since, independent of its delusive effect 
upon your audience, it may excite his jealousy, lest you should have a secret design of rivalling 
him in the expected office of superintendent under the new constitution. It is true, there is no real 
foundation for it; but then you know jealousy makes the food it feeds on. A quarrel between two 
such able and honest friends to the United States, would, I am persuaded, be felt as a public 
calamity. I beseech you then to be very tender upon this point in your next harangue. And if four 
months' study will not furnish you with sufficient discretion, we will indulge you with six. 
It may be said, that let the government be what it may, the sums I have stated must be raised, and 
the same difficulties exist. This is not altogether true. For first, we are now in the way of paying 
the interest of the domestic debt, with paper, which under the new system is utterly reprobated. 
This makes a difference between the specie to be raised of 1,800,000 dollars per annum. If the 
new government raises this sum in specie on the people, it will certainly support public credit, 
but it will overwhelm the people. It will give immense fortunes to the speculators; but it will 
grind the poor to dust. Besides, the present government is now redeeming the principal of the 
domestic debt by the sale of western lands. But let the full interest be paid in specie, and who 
will part with the principal for those lands? A principal, which having been generally purchased 
for two shillings and six pence on the pound, will yield to the holders two hundred and forty per 
cent. This paper system therefore, though in general an evil, is in this instance attended with the 
great benefit of enabling the public to cancel a debt upon easy terms, which has been swelled to 
its enormous size, by as enormous impositions. And the new government, by promising too 
much, will involve itself in a disreputable breach of faith. . . . 
The present government promises nothing; the intended government, everything. From the 
present government little is expected; from the intended one, much. Because it is conceived that 
to the latter much is given; to the former, little. And yet the inability of the people to pay what is 
required in specie, remaining the same, the funds of the one will not much exceed those of the 
other. The public creditors are easy with the present government from a conviction of its inability 
[to pay]. They will be urgent with the new one from an opinion, that as is promised, so it can and 
will perform every thing. Whether the change will be for our prosperity and honor, is yet to be 
tried. Perhaps it will be found, that the supposed want of power in Congress to levy taxes is, at 
present a veil happily thrown over the inability of the people; and that the large powers given to 
the new government will, to every one, expose the nakedness of our land. Certain it is, that if the 
expectations which are grafted on the gift of those plenary powers, are not answered, our credit 
will be irretrievably ruined. 
CINCINNATUS
Antifederalist No. 13 THE EXPENSE OF THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT 
Part 1: From The Feeeman's Oracle and New Hampshire Advertiser, January 11, 1788, by "A 
FARMER"
Part 2: An unsigned essay from The Connecticut Journal, October 17, 1787. 
. . . . Great complaint has been made, that Congress [under the Articles] has been too liberal in 
their grants of salaries to individuals, and I think not without just cause. For if I am rightly 
informed, there have been men whose salaries have been fifteen hundred dollars per year, and 
some of them did not do business at any rate, that the sum they negotiated would amount to their 
yearly salary. And some men [are] now in office, at twenty five hundred dollars per year, who I 
think would have been glad to have set down at one hundred pounds a year before the war, and 
would have done as much or more business. The truth is, when you carry a man's salary beyond 
what decency requires, he immediately becomes a man of consequence, and does little or no 
business at all. Let us cast our eyes around us, in the other departments-the judges of the superior 
court have but about one hundred pounds salary a year. The judges of the courts of common 
pleas, on an average, not more than sixty dollars per year. The ministers of the gospel-a very 
valuable set of men, who have done honor to themselves, and rendered great service to their 
country, in completing the revolution-have salaries but from sixty to an hundred pounds a year in 
general. The contrast is striking. I heartily wish that all ranks of men among us, ministers of the 
gospel as well as others, would turn their attention toward the Constitution they may be more 
concerned in the event than they at present think of. 
Rouse up, my friends, a matter of infinite importance is before you on the carpet, soon to be 
decided in your convention: The New Constitution. Seize the happy moment. Secure to 
yourselves and your posterity the jewel Liberty, which has cost you so much blood and treasure, 
by a well regulated Bill of Rights, from the encroachments of men in power. For if Congress will 
do these things in the dry tree when their power is small, what won't they do when they have all 
the resources of the United States at their command? They are the servants of the public. You 
have an undoubted right to set their wages, or at least to say, thus far you and those under you 
may go and no further. This would in the end ease Congress of a great deal of trouble, as it 
would put a stop to the impertinence of individuals in asking large salaries. I would say that the 
wages of a Representative in Congress do not exceed five dollars per day; a Senator not to 
exceed six; and the President seven per day, with an allowance for his table. And that the wages 
of no person employed in the United States exceed the daily pay of a Representative in Congress, 
but be paid according to their service, not exceeding that sum. Perhaps it may be said that money 
may depreciate, or appreciate. Let a price current be taken when this Constitution is completed, 
of the produce of each state, and let that be the general standard. 
My friends and countrymen, let us pause for a moment and consider. We are not driven to such 
great straits as to be obliged to swallow down every potion offered us by wholesale, or else die 
immediately by our disease. We can form a Constitution at our leisure; and guard and secure it 
on all sides. We are paying off our state debt, and the interest on the domestic, as fast as 
Congress call upon us for it. As to the foreign debt, they have the promise of more interest from 
us than they can get anywhere else, and we shall be able to pay them both interest and principal 
shortly. But it is said they win declare war against us if we don't pay them immediately. 
Common sense will teach them better. We live at too great a distance, and are too hardy and 
robust a people, for them to make money out of us in that way. 
But it is said, the trading towns are fond of this Constitution. Let us consider how they stand, 
including their interest. 
lst. The merchant wishes to have it adopted, that trade might be regulated. 2dly. Another set of 
men wishes to have it adopted, that the idea of paper money might be annihilated. 3dly. Another 
class of men wish to have it take place, that the public might be enabled to pay off the foreign 
debt, and appear respectable abroad among the nations. So do I, with all my heart. But in neither 
of these cases do I wish to see it adopted without being guarded on all sides with a Magna 
Charta, or a Bill of Rights, as a bulwark to our liberties. Again, another class of men wish to 
have it adopted, so that the public chest might be furnished with money to pay the interest on 
their securities, which they purchased of the poor soldiers at two shillings on the pound. I wish 
the soldiers were now the holders of those securites they fought so hard for. However, as the 
public finances were such that they could not be paid off as they became due, and they have 
carried them to market, and sold them as the boy did his top-we must pay them to the holders. 
But we need not be in a hurry about it; certificates will do for that. Consider, my friends, you are 
the persons who must live and die by this Constitution. A merchant or mechanic may dispose of 
his goods, or pack them up in trunks and remove to another clime in the course of a few months. 
But you cannot shoulder your lands, or dispose of them when you please. It therefore behooves 
you to rouse up, and turn your most serious and critical attention to this Constitution. . . . 
A FARMER
. . A large representation has ever been esteemed by the best whigs in Great Britain the best 
barrier against bribery and corruption. And yet we find a British king, having the disposition of 
all places, civil and military, and an immense revenue SQUEEZED out of the very mouths of his 
wretched subjects, is able to corrupt the parliament, to vote him any supplies he demands, to 
support armies, to defend the prerogatives of his crown, and carry fire and sword by his fleets 
and armies; to desolate whole provinces in the eastern world, to aggrandize himself, and satisfy 
the avarice of his tyrannical subjects. 
No wonder our American ambassador, struck with the brilliancy of the British court [John 
Adams], where everything around St. James's wears the appearance of wealth, ease and plenty, 
should imagine a three branched legislature only can produce these effects, and make the 
subjects happy, should write a book in favor of such a government, and send it over for the 
illumination of this western world. If this is the sole fruit of his embassy, America will not 
canonize him for a saint on account of his services, when they have experienced the 
consequences of such a kind of government as be has planned out. In order to have formed a 
right judgment, he should have looked into the ditches which serve for graves for many of the 
human race-under hedges which serve as dreary habitations for the living; into the cottages of the 
poor and miserable, and critically examine with how much parsimony the mechanics, the day 
laborers, cottagers and villagers live in order to support their high pampered lords-before he had 
wrote a book to persuade his country to pursue the same road to greatness, splendor and glory, 
and have reflected in his own mind, whether he could wish to see that country which gave him 
birth reduced to the same situation.... 
Now I submit it to the good sense of the people of these states, whether it is prudent we should 
make so liberal and extensive a grant of power and property to any body of men in these United 
States, before they have ever informed the public, the amount of the public debt, or what the 
annual expenses of the federal government is, or will be. It is now almost five years since the 
peace. Congress has employed thirteen commissioners, at 1500 dollars per annum, as I am 
informed, to settle the public accounts, and we know now no more what the national debt is, than 
at the first moment of their appointment. Nor do we know any more what is the amount of the 
annual expenses of the federal government, than we do of the empire of China. To grant 
therefore such an ample power of taxation, and the right of soil, to the amount of millions, upon 
the recommendation of this honorable Convention, without either knowing the amount of the 
national debt, or the annual expenses of government, would not argue, in my opinion, the highest 
degree of prudence. 
Antifederalist No. 14 EXTENT OF TERRITORY UNDER 
CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT TOO LARGE TO PRESERVE 
LIBERTY OR PROTECT PROPERTY 
George Clinton, Governor of New York, was an adversary of the Constitution. He composed 
several letters under the nome de plume "CATO." This essay is from the third letter of "Cato," 
The New-York Journal of October 25, 1787. 
. . . The recital, or premises on which the new form of government is erected, declares a 
consolidation or union of all the thirteen parts, or states, into one great whole, under the form of 
the United States, for all the various and important purposes therein set forth. But whoever 
seriously considers the immense extent of territory comprehended within the limits of the United 
States, together with the variety of its climates, productions, and commerce, the difference of 
extent, and number of inhabitants in all; the dissimilitude of interest, morals, and politics, in 
almost every one, will receive it as an intuitive truth, that a consolidated republican form of 
government therein, can never form a perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, 
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to you and your posterity, for to 
these objects it must be directed. This unkindred legislature therefore, composed of interests 
opposite and dissimilar in their nature, will in its exercise, emphatically be like a house divided 
against itself. 
The governments of Europe have taken their limits and form from adventitious circumstances, 
and nothing can be argued on the motive of agreement from them; but these adventitious 
political principles have nevertheless produced effects that have attracted the attention of 
philosophy, which have established axioms in the science of politics therefrom, as irrefragable as 
any in Euclid. It is natural, says Montesquieu, to a republic to have only a small territory, 
otherwise it cannot long subsist: in a large one, there are men of large fortunes, and consequently 
of less moderation; there are too great deposits to trust in the hands of a single subject, an 
ambitious person soon becomes sensible that he may be happy, great, and glorious by oppressing 
his fellow citizens, and that he might raise himself to grandeur, on the ruins of his country. In 
large republics, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views, in a small one, the interest of 
the public is easily perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; 
abuses have a less extent, and of course are less protected. He also shows you, that the duration 
of the republic of Sparta was owing to its having continued with the same extent of territory after 
all its wars; and that the ambition of Athens and Lacedemon to command and direct the union, 
lost them their liberties, and gave them a monarchy. 
From this picture, what can you promise yourselves, on the score of consolidation of the United 
States into one government? Impracticability in the just exercise of it, your freedom insecure, 
even this form of government limited in its continuance, the employments of your country 
disposed of to the opulent, to whose contumely you will continually be an object. You must risk 
much, by indispensably placing trusts of the greatest magnitude, into the hands of individuals 
whose ambition for power, and aggrandizement, will oppress and grind you. Where, from the 
vast extent of your territory, and the complication of interests, the science of government will 
become intricate and perplexed, and too mysterious for you to understand and observe; and by 
which you are to be conducted into a monarchy, either limited or despotic; the latter, Mr. Locke 
remarks, is a government derived from neither nature nor compact. 
Political liberty, the great Montesquieu again observes, consists in security, or at least in the 
opinion we have of security; and this security, therefore, or the opinion, is best obtained in 
moderate governments, where the mildness of the laws, and the equality of the manners, beget a 
confidence in the people, which produces this security, or the opinion. This moderation in 
governments depends in a great measure on their limits, connected with their political 
distribution. 
The extent of many of the states of the Union, is at this time almost too great for the 
superintendence of a republican form of government, and must one day or other revolve into 
more vigorous ones, or by separation be reduced into smaller and more useful, as well as 
moderate ones. You have already observed the feeble efforts of Massachusetts against their 
insurgents; with what difficulty did they quell that insurrection; and is not the province of Maine 
at this moment on the eve of separation from her? The reason of these things is, that for the 
security of the property of the community-in which expressive term Mr. Locke makes life, 
liberty, and estate, to consist the wheels of a republic are necessarily slow in their operation. 
Hence, in large free republics, the evil sometimes is not only begun, but almost completed, 
before they are in a situation to turn the current into a contrary progression. The extremes are 
also too remote from the usual seat of government, and the laws, therefore, too feeble to afford 
protection to all its parts, and insure domestic tranquility without the aid of another principle. If, 
therefore, this state [New York], and that of North Carolina, had an army under their control, 
they never would have lost Vermont, and Frankland, nor the state of Massachusetts suffered an 
insurrection, or the dismemberment of her fairest district; but the exercise of a principle which 
would have prevented these things, if we may believe the experience of ages, would have ended 
in the destruction of their liberties. 
Will this consolidated republic, if established, in its exercise beget such confidence and 
compliance, among the citizens of these states, as to do without the aid of a standing army? I 
deny that it will. The malcontents in each state, who will not be a few, nor the least important, 
will be exciting factions against it. The fear of a dismemberment of some of its parts, and the 
necessity to enforce the execution Of revenue laws (a fruitful source of oppression) on the 
extremes and in the other districts of the government, will incidentally and necessarily require a 
permanent force, to be kept on foot. Will not political security, and even the opinion of it, be 
extinguished? Can mildness and moderation exist in a government where the primary incident in 
its exercise must be force? Will not violence destroy confidence, and can equality subsist where 
the extent, policy, and practice of it will naturally lead to make odious distinctions among 
citizens? 
The people who may compose this national legislature from the southern states, in which, from 
the mildness of the climate, the fertility of the soil, and the value of its productions, wealth is 
rapidly acquired, and where the same causes naturally lead to luxury, dissipation, and a passion 
for aristocratic distinction; where slavery is encouraged, and liberty of course less respected and 
protected; who know not what it is to acquire property by their own toil, nor to economize with 
the savings of industry-will these men, therefore, be as tenacious of the liberties and interests of 
the more northern states, where freedom, independence, industry, equality and frugality are 
natural to the climate and soil, as men who are your own citizens, legislating in your own state, 
under your inspection, and whose manners and fortunes bear a more equal resemblance to your 
own? 
It may be suggested, in answer to this, that whoever is a citizen of one state is a citizen of each, 
and that therefore he will be as interested in the happiness and interest of all, as the one he is 
delegated from. But the argument is fallacious, and, whoever has attended to the history of 
mankind, and the principles which bind them together as parents, citizens, or men, will readily 
perceive it. These principles are, in their exercise, like a pebble cast on the calm surface of a 
river-the circles begin in the center, and are small, active and forcible, but as they depart from 
that point, they lose their force, and vanish into calmness. 
The strongest principle of union resides within our domestic walls. The ties of the parent exceed 
that of any other. As we depart from home, the next general principle of union is amongst 
citizens of the same state, where acquaintance, habits, and fortunes, nourish affection, and 
attachment. Enlarge the circle still further, and, as citizens of different states, though we 
acknowledge the same national denomination, we lose in the ties of acquaintance, habits, and 
fortunes, and thus by degrees we lessen in our attachments, till, at length, we no more than 
acknowledge a sameness of species. Is it, therefore, from certainty like this, reasonable to 
believe, that inhabitants of Georgia, or New Hampshire, will have the same obligations towards 
you as your own, and preside over your lives, liberties, and property, with the same care and 
attachment? Intuitive reason answers in the negative. . . . 
CATO
Antifederalist No. 15 RHODE ISLAND IS RIGHT! 
This essay appeared in The Massachusetts Gazette, December 7, 1787, as reprinted From The 
Freeman's Journal; (Or, The North-American Intelligencer?) 
The abuse which has been thrown upon the state of Rhode Island seems to be greatly unmerited. 
Popular favor is variable, and those who are now despised and insulted may soon change 
situations with the present idols of the people. Rhode Island has out done even Pennsylvania in 
the glorious work of freeing the Negroes in this country, without which the patriotism of some 
states appears ridiculous. The General Assembly of the state of Rhode Island has prevented the 
further importation of Negroes, and have made a law by which all blacks born in that state after 
March, 1784, are absolutely and at once free. 
They have fully complied with the recommendations of Congress in regard to the late treaty of 
peace with Great Britain, and have passed an act declaring it to be the law of the land. They have 
never refused their quota of taxes demanded by Congress, excepting the five per cent impost, 
which they considered as a dangerous tax, and for which at present there is perhaps no great 
necessity, as the western territory, of which a part has very lately been sold at a considerable 
price, may soon produce an immense revenue; and, in the interim, Congress may raise in the old 
manner the taxes which shall be found necessary for the support of the government. 
The state of Rhode Island refused to send delegates to the Federal Convention, and the event has 
manifested that their refusal was a happy one as the new constitution, which the Convention has 
proposed to us, is an elective monarchy, which is proverbially the worst government. This new 
government would have been supported at a vast expense, by which our taxes-the right of which 
is solely vested in Congress, (a circumstance which manifests that the various states of the union 
will be merely corporations) -- would be doubled or trebled. The liberty of the press is not 
stipulated for, and therefore may be invaded at pleasure. The supreme continental court is to 
have, almost in every case, "appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact," which signifies, if 
there is any meaning in words, the setting aside the trial by jury. Congress will have the power of 
guaranteeing to every state a right to import Negroes for twenty one years, by which some of the 
states, who have now declined that iniquitous traffic, may re-enter into it-for the private laws of 
every state are to submit to the superior jurisdiction of Congress. A standing army is to be kept 
on foot, by which the vicious, the sycophantick, and the time- serving will be exalted, and the 
brave, the patriotic, and the virtuous will be depressed. 
The writer, therefore, thinks it the part of wisdom to abide, like the state of Rhode Island, by the 
old articles of confederation, which, if re-examined with attention, we shall find worthy of great 
regard; that we should give high praise to the manly and public spirited sixteen members, who 
lately seceded from our house of Assembly [in Pennsylvania]; and that we should all impress 
with great care, this truth on our minds-That it is very easy to change a free government into an 
arbitrary one, but that it is very difficult to convert tyranny into freedom. 
Antifederalist No. 16 EUROPEANS ADMIRE AND 
FEDERALISTS DECRY THE PRESENT SYSTEM
"ALFRED" defended the Articles of Confederation, taken from The New-York Journal, 
December 25, 1787 as reprinted from the [Philadelphia] Independent Gazetteer. 
To the real PATRIOTS of America: . . . America is now free. She now enjoys a greater portion 
of political liberty than any other country under heaven. How long she may continue so depends 
entirely upon her own caution and wisdom. If she would look to herself more, and to Europe 
less, I am persuaded it would tend to promote her felicity. She possesses all the advantages 
which characterize a rich country-rich within herself, she ought less to regard the politics, the 
manufactures, and the interests of distant nations. 
When I look to our situation-climate, extent, soil, and its productions, rivers, ports; when I find I 
can at this time purchase grain, bread, meat, and other necessaries of life at as reasonable a rate 
as in any country; when I see we are sending great quantities of tobacco, wheat and flour to 
England and other parts of the globe beyond the Atlantic; when I get on the other side of the 
western mountains, and see an extensive country, which for its multitude of rivers and fertility of 
soil is equal, if not superior, to any other whatever when I see these things, I cannot be brought to 
believe that America is in that deplorable ruined condition which some designing politicians 
represent; or that we are in a state of anarchy beyond redemption, unless we adopt, without any 
addition or amendment, the new constitution proposed by the late convention; a constitution 
which, in my humble opinion, contains the seeds and scions of slavery and despotism. When the 
volume of American constitutions [by John Adams] first made its appearance in Europe, we find 
some of the most eminent political writers of the present age, and the reviewers of literature, full 
of admiration and declaring they had never before seen so much good sense, freedom, and real 
wisdom in one publication. Our good friend Dr. [Richard] Price was charmed, and almost 
prophesied the near approach of the happy days of the millennium. We have lived under these 
constitutions; and, after the experience of a few years, some among us are ready to trample them 
under their feet, though they have been esteemed, even by our enemies, as "pearls of great price." 
Let us not, ye lovers of freedom, be rash and hasty. Perhaps the real evils we labor under do not 
arise from these systems. There may be other causes to which our misfortunes may be properly 
attributed. Read the American constitutions, and you will find our essential rights and privileges 
well guarded and secured. May not our manners be the source of our national evils? May not our 
attachment to foreign trade increase them? Have we not acted imprudently in exporting almost 
all our gold and silver for foreign luxuries? It is now acknowledged that we have not a sufficient 
quantity of the precious metals to answer the various purposes of government and commerce; 
and without a breach of charity, it may be said, that this deficiency arises from the want of public 
virtue, in preferring private interest to every other consideration. 
If the states had in any tolerable degree been able to answer the requisitions of Congress-if the 
continental treasury had been so far assisted, as to have enabled us to pay the interest of our 
foreign debt-possibly we should have heard little, very little about a new system of government. 
It is a just observation that in modern times money does everything. If a government can 
command this unum necessarium from a certain revenue, it may be considered as wealthy and 
respectable; if not, it will lose its dignity, become inefficient and contemptible. But cannot we 
regulate our finances and lay the foundations for a permanent and certain revenue, without 
undoing all that we have done, without making an entire new government? The most wise and 
philosophic characters have bestowed on our old systems the highest encomiums. Are we sure 
this new political phenomenon will not fail? If it should fail, is there not a great probability, that 
our last state will be worse than the first? Orators may declaim on the badness of the times as 
long as they please, but I must tell them that the want of public virtue, and the want of money, 
are two of the principal sources of our grievances; and if we are -under the pressure of these 
wants, it ought to teach us frugality-to adopt a frugal administration of public affairs.... 
ALFRED
Antifederalist No. 17 FEDERALIST POWER WILL 
ULTIMATELY SUBVERT STATE AUTHORITY 
The "necessary and proper" clause has, from the beginning, been a thorn in the side of those 
seeking to reduce federal power, but its attack by Brutus served to call attention to it, leaving a 
paper trail of intent verifying its purpose was not to give Congress anything the Constitution 
"forgot," but rather to show two additional tests for any legislation Congress should attempt: to 
wit--that the intended actions would be both necessary AND proper to executing powers given 
under clauses 1-17 of Article I Section 8. This is the fameous BRUTUS. 
This [new] government is to possess absolute and uncontrollable powers, legislative, executive 
and judicial, with respect to every object to which it extends, for by the last clause of section 
eighth, article first, it is declared, that the Congress shall have power "to make all laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other 
powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department 
or office thereof." And by the sixth article, it is declared, "that this Constitution, and the laws of 
the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and the treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and 
the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or law of any State 
to the contrary notwithstanding." It appears from these articles, that there is no need of any 
intervention of the State governments, between the Congress and the people, to execute any one 
power vested in the general government, and that the Constitution and laws of every State are 
nullified and declared void, so far as they are or shall be inconsistent with this Constitution, or 
the laws made in pursuance of it, or with treaties made under the authority of the United States. 
The government, then, so far as it extends, is a complete one, and not a confederation. It is as 
much one complete government as that of New York or Massachusetts; has as absolute and 
perfect powers to make and execute all laws, to appoint officers, institute courts, declare 
offenses, and annex penalties, with respect to every object to which it extends, as any other in the 
world. So far, therefore, as its powers reach, all ideas of confederation are given up and lost. It is 
true this government is limited to certain objects, or to speak more properly, some small degree 
of power is still left to the States; but a little attention to the powers vested in the general 
government, will convince every candid man, that if it is capable of being executed, all that is 
reserved for the individual States must very soon be annihilated, except so far as they are barely 
necessary to the organization of the general government. The powers of the general legislature 
extend to every case that is of the least importance-there is nothing valuable to human nature, 
nothing dear to freemen, but what is within its power. It has the authority to make laws which 
will affect the lives, the liberty, and property of every man in the United States; nor can the 
Constitution or laws of any State, in any way prevent or impede the full and complete execution 
of every power given. The legislative power is competent to lay taxes, duties, imposts, and 
excises;-there is no limitation to this power, unless it be said that the clause which directs the use 
to which those taxes and duties shall be applied, may be said to be a limitation. But this is no 
restriction of the power at all, for by this clause they are to be applied to pay the debts and 
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but the legislature 
have authority to contract debts at their discretion; they are the sole judges of what is necessary 
to provide for the common defense, and they only are to determine what is for the general 
welfare. This power, therefore, is neither more nor less than a power to lay and collect taxes, 
imposts, and excises, at their pleasure; not only the power to lay taxes unlimited as to the amount 
they may require, but it is perfect and absolute to raise ;hem in any mode they please. No State 
legislature, or any power in the State governments, have any more to do in carrying this into 
effect than the authority of one State has to do with that of another. In the business, therefore, of 
laying and collecting taxes, the idea of confederation is totally lost, and that of one entire 
republic is embraced. It is proper here to remark, that the authority to lay and collect taxes is the 
most important of any power that can be granted; it connects with it almost all other powers, or 
at least will in process of time draw all others after it; it is the great mean of protection, security, 
and defense, in a good government, and the great engine of oppression and tyranny in a bad one. 
This cannot fail of being the case, if we consider the contracted limits which are set by this 
Constitution, to the State governments, on this article of raising money. No State can emit paper 
money, lay any duties or imposts, on imports, or exports, but by consent of the Congress; and 
then the net produce shall be for the benefit of the United States. The only means, therefore, left 
for any State to support its government and discharge its debts, is by direct taxation; and the 
United States have also power to lay and collect taxes, in any way they please. Everyone who 
has thought on the subject, must be convinced that but small sums of money can he collected in 
any country, by direct tax; when the federal government begins to exercise the right of taxation 
in all its parts, the legislatures of the several states will find it impossible to raise monies to 
support their governments. Without money they cannot be supported, and they must dwindle 
away, and, as before observed, their powers be absorbed in that of the general government. 
It might be here shown, that the power in the federal legislature, to raise and support armies at 
pleasure, as well in peace as in war, and their control over the militia, tend not only to a 
consolidation of the government, but the destruction of liberty. I shall not, however, dwell upon 
these, as a few observations upon the judicial power of this government, in addition to the 
preceding, will fully evince the truth of the position. 
The judicial power of the United States is to be vested in a supreme court, and in such inferior 
courts as Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The powers of these courts are 
very extensive; their jurisdiction comprehends all civil causes, except such as arise between 
citizens of the same State; and it extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the 
Constitution. One inferior court must be established, I presume, in each State, at least, with the 
necessary executive officers appendant thereto. It is easy to see, that in the common course of 
things, these courts will eclipse the dignity, and take away from the respectability, of the State 
courts. These courts will be, in themselves, totally independent of the States, deriving their 
authority from the United States, and receiving from them fixed salaries; and in the course of 
human events it is to be expected that they will swallow up all the powers of the courts in the 
respective States. 
How far the clause in the eighth section of the first article may operate to do away with all idea 
of confederated States, and to effect an entire consolidation of the whole into one general 
government, it is impossible to say. The powers given by this article are very general and 
comprehensive, and it may receive a construction to justify the passing almost any law. A power 
to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution all powers 
vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or any department or officer 
thereof, is a power very comprehensive and definite, and may, for aught I know, be exercised in 
such manner as entirely to abolish the State legislatures. Suppose the legislature of a State should 
pass a law to raise money to support their government and pay the State debt; may the Congress 
repeal this law, because it may prevent the collection of a tax which they may think proper and 
necessary to lay, to provide for the general welfare of the United States? For all laws made, in 
pursuance of this Constitution, are the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of the different States to the contrary 
notwithstanding. By such a law, the government of a particular State might be overturned at one 
stroke, and thereby be deprived of every means of its support. 
It is not meant, by stating this case, to insinuate that the Constitution would warrant a law of this 
kind! Or unnecessarily to alarm the fears of the people, by suggesting that the Federal legislature 
would be more likely to pass the limits assigned them by the Constitution, than that of an 
individual State, further than they are less responsible to the people. But what is meant is, that 
the legislature of the United States are vested with the great and uncontrollable powers of laying 
and collecting taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; of regulating trade, raising and supporting 
armies, organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, instituting courts, and other general 
powers; and are by this clause invested with the power of making all laws, proper and necessary, 
for carrying all these into execution; and they may so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate 
all the State governments, and reduce this country to one single government. And if they may do 
it, it is pretty certain they will; for it will be found that the power retained by individual States, 
small as it is, will be a clog upon the wheels of the government of the United States; the latter, 
therefore, will be naturally inclined to remove it out of the way. Besides, it is a truth confirmed 
by the unerring experience of ages, that every man, and every body of men, invested with power, 
are ever disposed to increase it, and to acquire a superiority over everything that stands in their 
way. This disposition, which is implanted in human nature, will operate in the Federal legislature 
to lessen and ultimately to subvert the State authority, and having such advantages, will most 
certainly succeed, if the Federal government succeeds at all. It must be very evident, then, that 
what this Constitution wants of being a complete consolidation of the several parts of the union 
into one complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and executive powers, 
to all intents and purposes, it will necessarily acquire in its exercise in operation. 
BRUTUS
Antifederalist No. 18-20 WHAT DOES HISTORY TEACH? 
(PART 1) 
"AN OLD WHIG," taken from The Massachusetts Gazette, November 27, 1787, as reprinted 
from the [Philadelphia] Independent Gazetteer.
. . . . By the proposed constitution, every law, before it passes, is to undergo repeated revisions; 
and the constitution of every state in the union provide for the revision of the most trifling laws, 
either by their passing through different houses of assembly and senate, or by requiring them to 
be published for the consideration of the people. Why then is a constitution which affects all the 
inhabitants of the United States-which is to be the foundation of all laws and the source of 
misery or happiness to one- quarter of the globe-why is this to be so hastily adopted or rejected, 
that it cannot admit of a revision? If a law to regulate highways requires to be leisurely 
considered and undergo the examination of different bodies of men, one after another, before it 
be passed, why is it that the framing of a constitution for the government of a great people-a 
work which has been justly considered as the greatest effort of human genius, and which from 
the beginning of the world has so often baffled the skill of the wisest men in every age-shall be 
considered as a thing to be thrown out, in the first shape which it may happen to assume? Where 
is the impracticability of a revision? Cannot the same power which called the late convention call 
another? Are not the people still their own masters? If, when the several state conventions come 
to consider this constitution, they should not approve of it, in its present form, they may easily 
apply to congress and state their objections. Congress may as easily direct the calling another 
convention, as they did the calling the last. The plan may then be reconsidered, deliberately 
received and corrected, so as to meet the approbation of every friend to his country. A few 
months only will be necessary for this purpose; and if we consider the magnitude of the object, 
we shall deem it well worth a little time and attention. It is Much better to pause and reflect 
before hand, than to repent when it is too late; when no peaceable remedy will be left us, and 
unanimity will be forever banished. The struggles of the people against a bad government, when 
it is once fixed, afford but a gloomy picture in the annals of mankind, They are often 
unfortunate; they are always destructive of private and public happiness; but the peaceable 
consent of a people to establish a free and effective government is one of the most glorious 
objects that is ever exhibited on the theater of human affairs. Some, I know, have objected that 
another convention will not be likely to agree upon anything-I am far however from being of that 
opinion. The public voice calls so loudly for a new constitution that I have no doubt we shall 
have one of some sort. My only fear is that the impatience of the people will lead them to accept 
the first that is offered them without examining whether it is right or wrong. And after all, if a 
new convention cannot agree upon any amendments in the constitution, which is at present 
proposed, we can still adopt this in its present form; and all further opposition being vain, it is to 
be hoped we shall be unanimous in endeavouring to make the best of it. The experiment is at 
least worth trying, and I shall be much astonished, if a new convention called together for the 
purpose of revising the proposed constitution, do not greatly reform it ...
It is beyond a doubt that the new federal constitution, if adopted, will in a great measure destroy, 
if it does not totally annihilate, the separate governments of the several states. We shall, in effect, 
become one great republic. Every measure of any importance will be continental. What will be 
the consequence of this? One thing is evident-that no republic of so great magnitude ever did or 
ever can exist. But a few years elapsed, from the time in which ancient Rome extended her 
dominions beyond the bounds of Italy, until the downfall of her republic. And all political writers 
agree, that a republican government can exist only in a narrow territory. But a confederacy of 
different republics has, in many instances, existed and flourished for a long time together. The 
celebrated Helvetian league, which exists at this moment in full vigor, and with unimpaired 
strength, while its origin may be traced to the confines of antiquity, is one among many examples 
on this head; and at the same time furnishes an eminent proof of how much less importance it is, 
that the constituent parts of a confederacy of republics may be rightly framed, than it is that the 
confederacy itself should be rightly organized. For hardly any two of the Swiss cantons have the 
same form of government, and they are almost equally divided in their religious principles, 
which have so often rent asunder the firmest establishments. A confederacy of republics must be 
the establishment in America, or we must cease altogether to retain the republican form of 
government. From the moment we become one great republic, either in form or substance, the 
period is very shortly removed when we shall sink first into monarchy, and then into despotism. . 
. . If the men who at different times have been entrusted to form plans of government for the 
world, had been really actuated by no other motives than the public good, the condition of human 
nature in all ages would have been widely different from that which has been exhibited to us in 
history. In this country perhaps we are possessed of more than our share of political virtue. If we 
will exercise a little patience and bestow our best endeavors on the business, I do not think it 
impossible, that we may yet form a federal constitution much superior to any form of 
government which has ever existed in the world. But whenever this important work shall be 
accomplished, I venture to pronounce that it will not be done without a careful attention to the 
Framing of a bill of rights. . . . 
In different nations, we find different grants or reservations of privileges appealed to in the 
struggles between the rulers and the people; many of which, in the different nations of Europe, 
have long since been swallowed up and lost by time, or destroyed by the arbitrary hand of power. 
In England, we find the people, with the barons at their head, exacting a solemn resignation of 
their rights from King John, in their celebrated magna charta, which was many times renewed in 
Parliament during the reigns of his successors. The petition of rights was afterwards consented to 
by Charles I and contained a declaration of the liberties of the people. The habeas corpus act, 
after the restoration of Charles 11, the bill of rights, which was obtained of the Prince and 
Princess of Orange, on their accession to the throne, and the act of settlement, at the accession of 
the Hanover family-are other instances to show the care and watchfulness of that nation to 
improve every Opportunity, of the reign of a weak prince or the revolution in their government, 
to obtain the most explicit declarations in favor of their liberties. In like manner the people of 
this country, at the revolution, having all power in their own hands, in forming the constitutions 
of the several states, took care to secure themselves, by bills of rights, so as to prevent as far as 
possible the encroachments of their future rulers upon the rights of the people. Some of these 
rights are said to be unalienable, such as the rights of conscience. Yet even these have been often 
invaded, where they have not been carefully secured, by express and solemn bills and 
declarations in their favor. 
Before we establish a government, whose acts will be the supreme law of the land, and whose 
power will extend to almost every case without exception, we ought carefully to guard ourselves 
by a bill of rights, against the invasion of those liberties which it is essential for us to retain, 
which it is of no real use for government to deprive us of; but which, in the course of human 
events, have been too often insulted with all the wantonness of an idle barbarity. 
AN OLD WHIG
Antifederalist No. 18-20 WHAT DOES HISTORY TEACH? 
(PART II) 
"A NEWPORT MAN," wrote this wit which appeared in The Newport Mercury, March 17, 
1788.
. . . - I perceive in your last [issue a] piece signed "A Rhode-Island Man," it seems wrote with an 
air of confidence and triumph; he speaks of reason and reasoning-I wish he had known or 
practised some of that reasoning he so much pretends to; his essay had been much shorter. We 
are told in this piece, as well as others on the same side, that an ability given to British subjects 
to recover their debts in this country will be one of the blessings of a new government, by 
inducing the British to abandon the frontiers, or be left without excuse. But the British have no 
other reason for holding the posts, after the time named in the treaty for their evacuation, than the 
last reason of Kings, that is, their guns. And giving them the treasure of the United States is a 
very unlikely means of removing that. If the British subject met with legal impediments to the 
recovery of his debts in this country, for [the] British government to have put the same stop on 
our citizens would have been a proper, an ample retaliation. But there is nothing within the 
compass of possibility of which I am not perfectly sure, that I am more fully persuaded of than I 
am, that the British will never relinquish the posts in question until compelled by force; because 
no nation pays less regard to the faith of treaties than the British. Witness their conduct to the 
French in 1755, when they took a very great number of men of war and merchant ships before 
war was declared, because the French had built some forts on the south side of an imaginary line 
in the wilds of America; and again, the violation of the articles by which the people of Boston 
resigned their arms; and the violation of the capitulation of Charles Town. Again we are told that 
Congress has no credit with foreigners, because they have no power to fulfill their engagements. 
And this we are told, with a boldness exceeded by nothing but its falsehood, perhaps in the same 
paper that announces to the world the loan of a million of Holland gilders-if I mistake not the 
sum; a sum equal to 250,000 Spanish Dollars-and all this done by the procurement of that very 
Congress whose insignificancy and want of power had been constantly proclaimed for two or 
three years before. The Dutch are the most cautious people on earth, and it is reasonable to 
suppose they were abundantly persuaded of the permanency and efficacy of our government by 
their risking so much money on it. 
We are told that so long as we withhold this power from Congress we shall be a weak, despised 
people. We were long contending for Independence, and now we are in a passion to be rid of it. 
But let us attempt to reason on this subject, and see to which side that will lead us. Reason is 
truly defined, in all cases short of mathematical demonstration, to be a supposing that the like 
causes will produce the like effects. Let us proceed by this rule. The Swiss Cantons for a hundred 
years have remained separate Independent States, consequently without any controlling power. 
Even the little Republic of St. Marino, containing perhaps but little more ground than the town of 
Newport, and about five thousand inhabitants, surrounded by powerful and ambitious neighbors, 
has kept its freedom and independence these thirteen hundred years, and is mentioned by 
travellers as a very enlightened and happy people. If these small republics, in the neighborhood 
of the warlike and intriguing Courts of Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, have kept their freedom and 
original form of government, is it not reasonable to suppose that the same good sense and love of 
freedom, on this side the Atlantic, will secure us from all attempt within and without. And the 
only internal discord that has happened in Switzerland was on a religious account, and a supreme 
controlling power is no security against this, as appears by what happened in Ireland in the time 
of Charles the First, and in France in the time of Henry the Fourth. It seems rational in a case of 
this importance to consult the opinion of the ablest men, and to whom can we better appeal than 
to J. J. Rousseau, a republican by birth and education-one of the most exalted geniuses and one 
of the greatest writers of his age, or perhaps any age; a man the most disinterested and 
benevolent towards mankind; a man the most industrious in the acquisition of knowledge and 
information, by travel, conversation, reading, and thinking; and one who has wrote a Volume on 
Government entitled the Social Contract, wherein he inculcates, that the people should examine 
and determine every public act themselves. His words are, that "every law that the people have 
not ratified in person, is void; it is no law. The people of England think they are free. They are 
much mistaken. They are never so but during the election of members of Parliament. As soon as 
they are elected, they are slaves, they are nothing. And by the use they make of their liberty 
during the short moments they possess it, they well deserve to lose it." This is far from advising 
that thirty thousand souls should resign their judgments and wishes entirely to one man for two 
years-to a man, who, perhaps, may go from home sincere and patriotic but by the time he has 
dined in pomp for a week with the wealthy citizens of New York or Philadelphia, will have lost 
all his rigid ideas of economy and equality. He becomes fascinated with the elegancies and 
luxuries of wealth. . . . Objects and intimations like these soon change the champion for the 
people to an advocate for power; and the people, finding themselves thus basely betrayed, cry 
that virtue is but a name. We are not sure that men have more virtue at this time and place than 
they had in England in the time of George the Second. Let anyone look into the history of those 
times, and see with what boldness men changed sides and deserted the people in pursuit of profit 
and power. If to take up the cross and renounce the pomps and vanities of this sinful world is a 
hard lesson for divines, 'tis much harder for politicians. A Cincinnatus, a Cato, a Fabricius, and a 
Washington, are rarely to be found. We are told that the Trustees of our powers and freedom, 
being mostly married men, and all of them inhabitants and proprietors of the country, is an ample 
security against an abuse of power. Whether human nature be less corrupt than formerly I will 
not determine-but this I know: that Julius Caesar, Oliver Cromwell, and the nobles of Venice, 
were natives and inhabitants of the countries whose power they usurped and drenched in blood. 
Again, our country is compared to a ship of which we are all passengers, and, from thence 'tis 
gravely concluded that no officer can ever betray or abuse his trust. But that men will sacrifice 
the public to their private interest, is a saying too well known to need repeating. And the 
instances of designed shipwrecks, and ships run away with by a combination of masters, 
supercargoes, and part owners, is so great that nothing can equal them but those instances in
which pretended patriots and politicians have raised themselves and families to power and 
greatness, by destroying that freedom and those laws they were chosen to defend. 
If it were necessary to cite more precedents to prove that the people ought not to trust or remove 
their power any further from them, the little Republic of Lucca may be mentioned-which, 
surrounded by the Dukedom of Tuscany, has existed under its present constitution about five 
hundred years, and as Mr. Addison says, is for the extent of its dominion the richest and best 
peopled of all the States of Italy. And he says further that "the whole administration of the 
government passes into different hands every two months." This is very far from confirming the 
doctrine of choosing those officers for two years who were before chosen for one. The want of a 
decisive, efficient power is much talked of by the discontented, and that we are in danger of 
being conquered by the intrigues of European powers. But it has already been shown that we 
have delegated a more decisive power to our Congress than is granted by the Republic Swiss 
Cantons to their General Diet. These Republics have enjoyed peace some hundreds of years; 
while those governments which possess this decisive, efficient power, so much aimed at, are as 
often as twenty or thirty years, drawing their men from the plough and loom to be shot at and cut 
each other's throats for the honor of their respective nations. And by how much further we are 
from Europe than the Swiss Cantons with their allies, and Lucca and St. Marino are from France, 
Prussia, and Austria, by so much less are we in danger of being conquered than those republics 
which have existed, some earlier than others, but the youngest of them one hundred and thirty 
years, without being conquered. As for the United Provinces of Holland, they are but nominal 
Republics; their Stadtholder, very much like our intended President, making them in reality a 
monarchy, and subject to all its calamities. But supposing that the present constitution, penned 
by the ablest men, four or five years in completion, and its adoption considered as the happiest 
event-supposing, I say, the present Constitution destroyed, can a new one be ratified with more 
solemnity, agreed to in stronger or more binding terms? What security can be given that in seven 
years hence, another Convention shall not be called to frame a third Constitution? And as ancient 
Greece counted by olympiads, and monarchies by their Kings' reigns, we shall date in the first, 
second, or third year, of the seventh, eighth, or ninth Constitution. 
In treating this subject I have not presumed to advise, and have intruded but few comments. I 
have mentioned the state of those countries which most resemble our own and leave to the 
natural sense of the reader to make his own conclusions. The malcontents, the lovers of novelty, 
delight much in allegory. Should I be indulged a few words in that way, I should not compare the 
new Constitution to a house. I should fetch my simile from the country and compare it to 
Siberian Wheat (otherwise called Siberian cheat) which is known to have been the most praised, 
the most dear, the most worthless, and most short-lived thing that was ever adopted. But if the 
free men of this continent are weary of that power and freedom they have so dearly bought and 
so shortly enjoyed- the power of judging and determining what laws are most wholesome; what 
taxes are requisite and sufficient-I say, if the people are tired of these privileges, now is the time 
to part with them forever. Much more might be said to show the bitterness and mischief 
contained in this gilded pill, but being fond of brevity, I shall rely on the good sense of the public 
to keep themselves out of the trap, and sign myself in plain English. 
A NEWPORT MAN
Antifederalist No. 21 WHY THE ARTICLES FAILED 
This essay is composed of excerpts from "CENTINEL" letters appearing in the (Philadelphia) 
Independent Gazetteer, October 5 and November 30, 1787.
That the present confederation is inadequate to the objects of the union, seems to be universally 
allowed. The only question is, what additional powers are wanting to give due energy to the 
federal government? We should, however, be careful, in forming our opinion on this subject, not 
to impute the temporary and extraordinary difficulties that have hitherto impeded the execution 
of the confederation, to defects in the system itself. For years past, the harpies of power have 
been industriously inculcating the idea that all our difficulties proceed from the impotency of 
Congress, and have at length succeeded to give to this sentiment almost universal currency and 
belief. The devastations, losses and burdens occasioned by the late war; the excessive 
importations of foreign merchandise and luxuries, which have drained the country of its specie 
and involved it in debt, are all overlooked, and the inadequacy of the powers of the present 
confederation is erroneously supposed to be the only cause of our difficulties. Hence persons of 
every description are revelling in the anticipation of the halcyon days consequent on the 
establishment of the new constitution. What gross deception and fatal delusion! Although very 
considerable benefit might be derived from strengthening the hands of Congress, so as to enable 
them to regulate commerce, and counteract the adverse restrictions of other nations, which would 
meet with the concurrence of all persons; yet this benefit is accompanied in the new constitution 
with the scourge of despotic power. . . . 
Taxation is in every government a very delicate and difficult subject. Hence it has been the 
policy of all wise statesmen, as far as circumstances permitted, to lead the people by small 
beginnings and almost imperceptible degrees, into the habits of taxation. Where the contrary 
conduct has been pursued, it has ever failed of full success, not unfrequently proving the ruin of 
the projectors. The imposing of a burdensome tax at once on a people, without the usual 
gradations, is the severest test that any government can be put to; despotism itself has often 
proved unequal to the attempt. Under this conviction, let us take a review of our situation before 
and since the revolution. From the first settlement of this country until the commencement of the 
late war, the taxes were so light and trivial as to be scarcely felt by the people. When we engaged 
in the expensive contest with Great Britain, the Congress, sensible of the difficulty of levying the 
monies necessary to its support, by direct taxation, had resource to an anticipation of the public 
resources, by emitting bills of credit, and thus postponed the necessity of taxation for several 
years. This means was pursued to a most ruinous length. But about the year 80 or 81, it was 
wholly exhausted, the bills of credit had suffered such a depreciation from the excessive 
quantities in circulation, that they ceased to be useful as a medium. The country at this period 
was very much impoverished and exhausted; commerce had been suspended for near six years; 
the husbandman, for want of a market, limited his crops to his own subsistence; the frequent calls 
of the militia and long continuance in actual service, the devastations of the enemy, the 
subsistence of our own armies, the evils of the depreciation of the paper money, which fell 
chiefly upon the patriotic and virtuous part of the community, had all concurred to produce great 
distress throughout America. In this situation of affairs, we still had the same powerful enemy to 
contend with, who had even more numerous and better appointed armies in the field than at any 
former time. Our allies were applied to in this exigency, but the pecuniary assistance that we 
could procure from them was soon exhausted. The only resource now remaining was to obtain by 
direct taxation, the moneys necessary for our defense. The history of mankind does not furnish a 
similar instance of an attempt to levy such enormous taxes at once, nor of a people so wholly 
unprepared and uninured to them-the lamp of sacred liberty must indeed have burned with 
unsullied lustre, every sordid principle of the mind must have been then extinct, when the people 
not only submitted to the grievous impositions, but cheerfully exerted themselves to comply with 
the calls of their country. Their abilities, however, were not equal to furnish the necessary sums-
indeed, the requisition of the year 1782, amounted to the whole income of their farms and other 
property, including the means of their subsistence. Perhaps the strained exertions of two years 
would not have sufficed to the discharge of this requisition. How then can we impute the 
difficulties of the people to a due compliance with the requisitions of Congress, to a defect in the 
confederation? Any government, however energetic, in similar circumstances, would have 
experienced the same fate. If we review the proceedings of the States, we shall find that they 
gave every sanction and authority to the requisitions of Congress that their laws could confer, 
that they attempted to collect the sums called for in the same manner as is proposed to be done in 
future by the general government, instead of the State legislatures.... 
The wheels of the general government having been thus clogged, and the arrearages of taxes still 
accumulating, it may be asked what prospect is there of the government resuming its proper tone, 
-unless more compulsory powers are granted? To this it may be answered, that the produce of 
imposts on commerce, which all agree to vest in Congress, together with the immense tracts of 
land at their disposal, will rapidly lessen and eventually discharge the present encumbrances. 
When this takes place, the mode by requisition will be found perfectly adequate to the 
extraordinary exigencies of the union. Congress have lately sold land to the amount of eight 
millions of dollars, which is a considerable portion of the whole debt. 
It is to be lamented that the interested and designing have availed themselves so successfully of 
the present crisis, and under the specious pretence of having discovered a panacea for all the ills 
of the people, they are about establishing a system of government, that will prove more 
destructive to them than the wooden horse filled with soldiers did in ancient times to the city of 
Troy. This horse was introduced by their hostile enemy the Grecians, by a prostitution of the 
sacred rites of their religion; in like manner, my fellow citizens, are aspiring despots among 
yourselves prostituting the name of a Washington to cloak their designs upon your liberties. 
I would ask how was the proposed Constitution to have showered down those treasures upon 
every class of citizens, as has been so industriously inculcated and so fondly believed by some? 
Would it have been by the addition of numerous and expensive establishments? By doubling our 
judiciaries, instituting federal courts in every county of every state? By a superb presidential 
court? By a large standing army? In short, by putting it in the power of the future government to 
levy money at pleasure, and placing this government so independent of the people as to enable 
the administration to gratify every corrupt passion of the mind, to riot on your spoils, without 
check or control? 
A transfer to Congress of the power of imposing imposts on commerce, the unlimited regulation 
of trade, and to make treaties, I believe is all that is wanting to render America as prosperous as 
it is in the power of any form of government to render her; this properly understood would meet 
the views of all the honest and well meaning. 
What gave birth to the late continental Convention? Was it not the situation of our commerce, 
which lay at the mercy of every foreign power, who, from motives of interest or enmity, could 
restrict and control it without risking a retaliation on the part of America, as Congress was 
impotent on this subject? Such indeed was the case with respect to Britain, whose hostile 
regulations gave such a stab to our navigation as to threaten its annihilation, it became the 
interest of even the American merchant to give a preference to foreign bottoms; hence the 
distress of our seamen, shipwrights, and every mechanic art dependent on navigation. 
By these regulations too, we were limited in markets for our produce; our vessels were excluded 
from their West India islands; many of our staple commodities were denied entrance in Britain. 
Hence the husbandman were distressed by the demand for their crops being lessened and their 
prices reduced. This is the source to which may be traced every evil we experience, that can be 
relieved by a more energetic government. Recollect the language of complaint for years past; 
compare the recommendations of Congress, founded on such complaints, pointing out the 
remedy; examine the reasons assigned by the different states for appointing delegates to the late 
Convention; view the powers vested in that body-they all harmonize in the sentiment, that the 
due regulation of trade and navigation was the anxious wish of every class of citizens, was the 
great object of calling the Convention. 
This object being provided for by the Constitution proposed by the general Convention, people 
overlooked and were not sensible of the needless sacrifice they were making for it. Allowing for 
a moment that it would be possible for trade to flourish under a despotic government, of what 
avail would be a prosperous state of commerce, when the produce of it would be at the absolute 
disposal of an arbitrary unchecked general government, who may levy at pleasure the most 
oppressive taxes; who may destroy every principle of freedom; who may even destroy the 
privilege of complaining.... 
After so recent a triumph over British despots, after such torrents of blood and treasure have 
been spent, after involving ourselves in the distresses of an arduous war, and incurring such a 
debt, for the express purpose of asserting the rights of humanity, it is truly astonishing that a set 
of men among ourselves should have had the effrontery to attempt the destruction of our 
liberties. But in this enlightened age, to dupe the people by the arts they are practising, is still 
more extraordinary. . . 
CENTINEL
Antifederalist No. 22 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
SIMPLY REQUIRES AMENDMENTS, PARTICULARLY FOR 
COMMERCIAL POWER AND JUDICIAL POWER; 
CONSTITUTION GOES TOO FAR 
Benjamin Austin of Massachusetts, used the pen-name "CANDIDUS." Taken from two letters 
by "Candidus" which appeared in the [Boston] Independent Chronicle, December 6 and 20, 
1787.
.... Many people are sanguine for the Constitution, because they apprehend our commerce will be 
benefited. I would advise those persons to distinguish between the evils that arise from 
extraneous causes and our private imprudencies, and those that arise from our government. It 
does not appear that the embarrassments of our trade will be removed by the adoption of this 
Constitution. The powers of Europe do not lay any extraordinary duties on our oil, fish, or 
tobacco, because of our government; neither do they discourage our ship building on this 
account. I would ask what motive would induce Britain to repeal the duties on our oil, or France 
on our fish, if we should adopt the proposed Constitution? Those nations laid these duties to 
promote their own fishery, etc., and let us adopt what mode of government we please, they will 
pursue their own politics respecting our imports and exports, unless we can check them by some 
commercial regulations. 
But it may be said, that such commercial regulations will take place after we have adopted the 
Constitution, and that the northern states would then become carriers for the southern. The great 
question then is, whether it is necessary in order to obtain these purposes, for every state to give 
up their whole power of legislation and taxation, and become an unwieldy republic, when it is 
probable the important object of our commerce could be effected by a uniform navigation act, 
giving Congress full power to regulate the whole commerce of the States? This power Congress 
have often said was sufficient to answer all their purposes. The circular letter from the Boston 
merchants and others, was urgent on this subject. Also the navigation act of this state 
[Massachusetts], was adopted upon similar principles, and . . . was declared by our Minister in 
England, to be the most effectual plan to promote our navigation, provided it had been adopted 
by the whole confederacy. 
But it may be said, this regulation of commerce, without energy to enforce a compliance, is quite 
ideal. Coercion with some persons seems the principal object, but I believe we have more to 
expect from the affections of the people, than from an armed body of men. Provided a uniform 
commercial system was adopted, and each State felt its agreeable operations, we should have but 
little occasion to exercise force. But however, as power is thought necessary to raise an army, if 
required, to carry into effect any federal measure, I am willing to place it, where it is likely to be 
used with the utmost caution. This power I am willing to place among the confederated States, to 
be exercised when two thirds of them in their legislative capacities shall say the common good 
requires it. But to trust this power in the hands of a few men delegated for two, four and six 
years, is complimenting the ambition of human nature too highly, to risk the tranquility of these 
States on their absolute determination. Certain characters now on the stage, we have reason to 
venerate, but though this country is now blessed with a Washington, Franklin, Hancock and 
Adams, yet posterity may have reason to rue the day when their political welfare depends on the 
decision of men who may fill the places of these worthies.... 
The advocates for the Constitution, have always assumed an advantage by saying, that their 
opposers have never offered any plan as a substitute; the following outlines are therefore 
submitted, not as originating from an individual, but as copied from former resolutions of 
Congress, and united with some parts of the Constitution proposed by the respectable 
convention. This being the case, I presume it will not be invalidated by the cant term of 
antifederalism. 
lst. That the Legislature of each state, empower Congress to frame a navigation act, to operate 
uniformly throughout the states; receiving to Congress all necessary powers to regulate our 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. The 
revenue arising from the impost to be subject to their appropriations, "to enable them to fulfill 
their public engagements with foreign creditors." 
2nd. That the Legislature of each state, instruct their delegates in Congress, to frame a treaty of 
AMITY for the purposes of discharging each state's proportion of the public debt, either foreign 
or domestic, and to enforce (if necessary) their immediate payment. Each state obligating 
themselves in the treaty of amity, to furnish (whenever required by Congress) a proportionate 
number of the Militia who are ever to be well organized and disciplined, for the purposes of 
repelling any invasion; suppressing any insurrection; or reducing any delinquent state within the 
confederacy, to a compliance with the federal treaty of commerce and amity. Such assistance to 
be furnished by the Supreme Executive of each state, on the application of Congress. The troops 
in cases of invasion to be under the command of the Supreme Executive of the state immediately 
in danger; but in cases of insurrection, and when employed against any delinquent state in the 
confederacy, the troops to be under the command of Congress. 
3d. That such states as did not join the confederacy of commerce and amity, should be 
considered as aliens; and any goods brought from such state into any of the confederated states, 
together with their vessels, should be subject to heavy extra duties. 
4th. The treaty of amity, agreed to by the several states, should expressly declare that no State 
(without the consent of Congress) should enter into any treaty, alliances, or confederacy; grant 
letters of marque and reprisal; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of 
debts; pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law, or impair the obligations of contracts; 
engage in war, or declare peace. 
5th. A Supreme Judicial Court to be constituted for the following federal purposes-to extend to 
all treaties made previous to, or which shall be made under the authority of the confederacy; all 
cases affecting Ambassadors, and other public Ministers and Consuls; controversies between two 
or more states; and between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different 
states; to define and punish piracies, and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses 
against the law of nations. 
6th. That it be recommended to Congress, that the said navigation act, and treaty of amity, be 
sent to the Legislatures (or people) of the several states, for their assenting to, and ratifying the 
same. 
7th. A regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures, of all public monies, 
should be published from time to time. 
The above plan it is humbly conceived-secures the internal government of the several states; 
promotes the commerce of the whole union; preserves a due degree of energy; lays restraints on 
aliens; secures the several states against invasions and insurrection by a MILITIA, rather than a 
STANDING ARMY; checks all ex post facto laws; cements the states by certain federal 
restrictions; confines the judiciary powers to national matters; and provides for the public 
information of receipts and expenditures. In a word, it places us in a complete federal state. 
The resolves of Congress, 18th April, 1783, "recommends to the several States, to invest them 
with powers to levy for the use of the United States, certain duties upon goods, imported from 
any foreign port, island or plantation;" which measures is declared by them, "to be a system more 
free, from well founded exception, and is better calculated to receive the approbation of the 
several States, than any other, that the wisdom of Congress could devise; and if adopted, would 
enable them to fulfill their public engagements with their foreign creditors.". . . . 
Should we adopt this plan, no extraordinary expenses would arise, and Congress having but one 
object to attend, every commercial regulation would be uniformly adopted; the duties of impost 
and excise, would operate equally throughout the states; our ship building and carrying trade, 
would claim their immediate attention; and in consequence thereof, our agriculture, trade and 
manufactures would revive and flourish. No acts of legislation, independent of this great 
business, would disaffect one State against the other; but the whole, . . . in one Federal System of 
commerce, would serve to remove all local attachments, and establish our navigation upon a 
most extensive basis. The powers of Europe, would be alarmed at our Union, and would fear lest 
we should retaliate on them by laying restrictions on their trade.... 
These states, by the blessing of Heaven, are now in a very tranquil state. This government, in 
particular, has produced an instance of ENERGY, in suppressing a late rebellion, which no 
absolute monarchy can boast. And notwithstanding the insinuations of a "small party," who are 
ever branding the PEOPLE with the most opprobrious epithets-representing them as aiming to 
level all distinctions; emit paper money; encourage the rebellion-yet the present General Court, 
the voice of that body, whom they have endeavored to stigmatize, have steadily pursued 
measures foreign from the suggestions of such revilers. And the public credit has been constantly 
appreciating since the present Administration. 
Let us then be cautious how we disturb this general harmony. Every exertion is now making, by 
the people, to discharge their taxes. Industry and frugality prevail. Our commerce is every day 
increasing by the enterprise of our merchants. And above all, the PEOPLE of the several states 
are convinced of the necessity of adopting some Federal Commercial Plan.... 
CANDIDUS
Antifederalist No. 23 CERTAIN POWERS NECESSARY FOR 
THE COMMON DEFENSE, CAN AND SHOULD BE LIMITED 
In Federalist No. 23, Alexander Hamilton spoke of the necessity for an energetic government. 
"BRUTUS" replied.
Taken from the 7th and 8th essays of "Brutus" in The New-York Journal, January 3 and 10, 
1788.
In a confederated government, where the powers are divided between the general and the state 
government, it is essential . . . that the revenues of the country, without which no government can 
exist, should be divided between them, and so apportioned to each, as to answer their respective 
exigencies, as far as human wisdom can effect such a division and apportionment.... 
No such allotment is made in this constitution, but every source of revenue is under the control 
of Congress; it therefore follows, that if this system is intended to be a complex and not a simple, 
a confederate and not an entire consolidated government, it contains in it the sure seeds of its 
own dissolution. One of two things must happen. Either the new constitution will become a mere 
nudum pactum, and all the authority of the rulers under it be cried down, as has happened to the 
present confederacy. Or the authority of the individual states will be totally supplanted, and they 
will retain the mere form without any of the powers of government. To one or the other of these 
issues, I think, this new government, if it is adopted, will advance with great celerity. 
It is said, I know, that such a separation of the sources of revenue, cannot be made without 
endangering the public safety-"unless (says a writer) [Alexander Hamilton] it can be shown that 
the circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate 
limits; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be 
admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to 
provide for the defense and protection of the community, etc."(1)
(1 Federalist, No. 23.) 
The pretended demonstration of this writer will instantly vanish, when it is considered, that the 
protection and defense of the community is not intended to be entrusted solely into the hands of 
the general government, and by his own confession it ought not to be. It is true this system 
commits to the general government the protection and defense of the community against foreign 
force and invasion, against piracies and felonies on the high seas, and against insurrection among 
ourselves. They are also authorized to provide for the administration of justice in certain matters 
of a general concern, and in some that I think are not so. But it ought to be left to the state 
governments to provide for the protection and defense of the citizen against the hand of private 
violence, and the wrongs done or attempted by individuals to each other. Protection and defense 
against the murderer, the robber, the thief, the cheat, and the unjust person, is to be derived from 
the respective state governments. The just way of reasoning therefore on this subject is this, the 
general government is to provide for the protection and defense of the community against foreign 
attacks, etc. They therefore ought to have authority sufficient to effect this, so far as is consistent 
with the providing for our internal protection and defense. The state governments are entrusted 
with the care of administering justice among its citizens, and the management of other internal 
concerns; they ought therefore to retain power adequate to that end. The preservation of internal 
peace and good order, and the due administration of law and justice, ought to be the first care of 
every government. The happiness of a people depends infinitely more on this than it does upon 
all that glory and respect which nations acquire by the most brilliant martial achievements. And I 
believe history will furnish but few examples of nations who have duly attended to these, who 
have been subdued by foreign invaders. If a proper respect and submission to the laws prevailed 
over all orders of men in our country; and if a spirit of public and private justice, economy, and 
industry influenced the people, we need not be under any apprehensions but what they would be 
ready to repel any invasion that might be made on the country. And more than this, I would not 
wish from them. A defensive war is the only one I think justifiable. I do not make these 
observations to prove, that a government ought not to be authorised to provide for the protection 
and defense of a country against external enemies, but to show that this is not the most 
important, much less the only object of their care. 
The European governments are almost all of them framed, and administered with a view to arms, 
and war, as that in which their chief glory consists. They mistake the end of government. It was 
designed to save men's lives, not to destroy them. We ought to furnish the world with an example 
of a great people, who in their civil institutions hold chiefly in view, the attainment of virtue, and 
happiness among ourselves. Let the monarchs in Europe share among them the glory of 
depopulating countries, and butchering thousands of their innocent citizens, to revenge private 
quarrels, or to punish an insult offered to a wife, a mistress, or a favorite. I envy them not the 
honor, and I pray heaven this country may never be ambitious of it. The czar Peter the great, 
acquired great glory by his arms; but all this was nothing, compared with the true glory which he 
obtained, by civilizing his rude and barbarous subjects, diffusing among them knowledge, and 
establishing and cultivating the arts of life. By the former he desolated countries, and drenched 
the earth with human blood; by the latter he softened the ferocious nature of his people, and 
pointed them to the means of human happiness. The most important end of government then, is 
the proper direction of its internal police, and economy; this is the province of the state 
governments, and it is evident, and is indeed admitted, that these ought to be under their control. 
Is it not then preposterous, and in the highest degree absurd, when the state governments are 
vested with powers so essential to the peace and good order of society, to take from them the 
means of their own preservation? 
The idea that the powers of congress in respect to revenue ought to be unlimited, because 'the 
circumstances which may affect the public safety are not reducible to certain determinate limits' 
is novel, as it relates to the government of the United States. The inconveniencies which resulted 
from the feebleness of the present confederation was discerned, and felt soon after its adoption. It 
was soon discovered, that a power to require money, without either the authority or means to 
enforce a collection of it, could not be relied upon either to provide for the common defense, 
discharge the national debt, or for support of government. Congress therefore, as early as 
February 1781, recommended to the states to invest them with a power to levy an impost of :five 
per cent ad valorem, on all imported goods, as a fund to be appropriated to discharge the debts 
already contracted, or which should hereafter be contracted for the support of the war, to be 
continued until the debts should be fully and finally discharged. There is not the most distant 
idea held out in this act, that an unlimited power to collect taxes, duties and excises was 
necessary to be vested in the United States, and yet this was a time of the most pressing danger 
and distress. The idea then was, that if certain definite funds were assigned to the union, which 
were certain in their natures, productive, and easy of collection, it would enable them to answer 
their engagements, and provide for their defense, and the impost of five per cent was fixed upon 
for the purpose. 
This same subject was revived in the winter and spring of 1783, and after a long consideration of 
the subject, many schemes were proposed. The result was, a recommendation of the revenue 
system of April 1783; this system does not suggest an idea that it was necessary to grant the 
United States unlimited authority in matters of revenue. A variety of amendments were proposed 
to this system, some of which are upon the journals of Congress, but it does not appear that any 
of them proposed to invest the general government with discretionary power to raise money. On 
the contrary, all of them limit them to certain definite objects, and fix the bounds over which 
they could not pass. This recommendation was passed at the conclusion of the war, and was 
founded on an estimate of the whole national debt. It was computed, that one million and an half 
of dollars, in addition to the impost, was a sufficient sum to pay the annual interest of the debt, 
and gradually to abolish the principal. Events have proved that their estimate was sufficiently 
liberal, as the domestic debt appears upon its being adjusted to be less than it was computed; and 
since this period a considerable portion of the principal of the domestic debt has been discharged 
by the sale of the western lands. It has been constantly urged by Congress, and by individuals, 
ever since, until lately, that had this revenue been appropriated by the states, as it was 
recommended, it would have been adequate to every exigency of the union. Now indeed it is 
insisted, that all the treasures of the country are to be under the control of that body, whom we 
are to appoint to provide for our protection and defense against foreign enemies. The debts of the 
several states, and the support of the governments of them are to trust to fortune and accident. If 
the union should not have occasion for all the money they can raise, they will leave a portion for 
the state, but this must be a matter of mere grace and favor. Doctrines like these would not have 
been listened to by any state in the union, at a time when we were pressed on every side by a 
powerful enemy, and were called upon to make greater exertions than we have any reason to 
expect we shall ever be again. . . . 
I may be asked to point out the sources, from which the general government could derive a 
sufficient revenue, to answer the demands of the union. ... There is one source of revenue, which 
it is agreed, the general government ought to have the sole control of. This is an impost upon all 
goods imported from foreign countries. This would, of itself, be very productive, and would be 
collected with ease and certainty. It will be a fund too, constantly increasing, for our commerce 
will grow with the productions of the country. And these, together with our consumption of 
foreign goods, wilt increase with our population. It is said, that the impost will not produce a 
sufficient sum to satisfy the demands of the general government; perhaps it would not.... My own 
opinion is, that the objects from which the general government should have authority to raise a 
revenue, should be of such a nature, that the tax should be raised by simple laws, with few 
officers, with certainty and expedition, and with the least interference with the internal police of 
the states. Of this nature is the impost on imported goods. And it appears to me that a duty on 
exports, would also be of this nature. Therefore, for ought I can discover, this would be the best 
source of revenue to grant the general government. I know neither the Congress nor the state 
legislatures will have authority under the new constitution to raise a revenue in this way. But I 
cannot perceive the reason of the restriction. It appears to me evident, that a tax on articles 
exported, would be as nearly equal as any that we can expect to lay, and it certainly would be 
collected with more ease and less expense than any direct tax. I do not however, contend for this 
mode; it may be liable to well founded objections that have not occurred to me. But this I do 
contend for, that some mode is practicable, and that limits must be marked between the general 
government, and the states on this head, or if they be not, either the Congress in the exercise of 
this power, will deprive the state legislatures of the means of their existence, or the states by 
resisting the constitutional authority of the general government, will render it nugatory.... 
The next powers vested by this Constitution in the general government, which we shall consider, 
are those which authorize them to "borrow money on the credit of the United States, and to raise 
and support armies." I take these two together and connect them with the power to lay and 
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, because their extent, and the danger that will arise 
from the exercise of these powers, cannot be fully understood, unless they are viewed in relation 
to each other. 
The power to borrow money is general and unlimited, and the clause so often before referred to, 
authorizes the passing [of] any laws proper and necessary to carry this into execution. Under this 
authority, Congress may mortgage any or all the revenues of the union, as a fund to loan money 
upon; and it is probable, in this way, they may borrow of foreign nations, a principal sum, the 
interest of which will be equal to the annual revenues of the country. By this means, they may 
create a national debt, so large, as to exceed the ability of the country ever to sink. I can scarcely 
contemplate a greater calamity that could befall this country, than to be loaded with a debt 
exceeding their ability ever to discharge. If this be a just remark, it is unwise and improvident to 
vest in the general government a power to borrow at discretion, without any limitation or 
restriction. 
It may possibly happen that the safety and welfare of the country may require, that money be 
borrowed, and it is proper when such a necessity arises that the power should be exercised by the 
general government. But it certainly ought never to be exercised, but on the most urgent 
occasions, and then we should not borrow of foreigners if we could possibly avoid it. 
The constitution should therefore have so restricted the exercise of this power as to have 
rendered it very difficult for the government to practice it. The present confederation requires the 
assent of nine states to exercise this, and a number of other important powers of the confederacy. 
It would certainly have been a wise provision in this constitution, to have made it necessary that 
two thirds of the members should assent to borrowing money. When the necessity was 
indispensable, this assent would always be given, and in no other cause ought it to be. 
The power to raise armies is indefinite and unlimited, and authorises the raising [of] forces, as 
well in peace as in war. Whether the clause which empowers the Congress to pass all laws which 
are proper and necessary, to carry this into execution, will not authorise them to impress men for 
the army, is a question well worthy [of] consideration. If the general legislature deem it for the 
general welfare to raise a body of troops, and they cannot be procured by voluntary enlistments, 
it seems evident, that it will be proper and necessary to effect it, that men be impressed from the 
militia to make up the deficiency. 
These powers taken in connection, amount to this: that the general government have unlimited 
authority and control over all the wealth and all the force of the union. The advocates for this 
scheme, would favor the world with a new discovery, if they would show, what kind of freedom 
or independency is left to the state governments, when they cannot command any part of the 
property or of the force of the country, but at the will of the Congress. It seems to me as absurd, 
as it would be to say, that I was free and independent, when I had conveyed all my property to
another, and was tenant to him, and had beside, given an indenture of myself to serve him during 
life. . . . 
Antifederalist No. 24 OBJECTIONS TO A STANDING ARMY 
(PART I) 
BRUTUS
The first essay is taken from the ninth letter of "BRUTUS" which appeared in The New-York 
Journal, January 17, 1788.
. . . . Standing armies are dangerous to the liberties of a people. . . . [If] necessary, the truth of the 
position might be confirmed by the history of almost every nation in the world. A cloud of the 
most illustrious patriots of every age and country, where freedom has been enjoyed, might be 
adduced as witnesses in support of the sentiment. But I presume it would be useless, to enter into 
a labored argument, to prove to the people of America, a position which has so long and so 
generally been received by them as a kind of axiom. 
Some of the advocates for this new system controvert this sentiment, as they do almost every 
other that has been maintained by the best writers on free government. Others, though they will 
not expressly deny, that standing armies in times of peace are dangerous, yet join with these in 
maintaining, that it is proper the general government should be vested with the power to do it. I 
shall now proceed to examine the arguments they adduce in support of their opinions. 
A writer, in favor of this system, treats this objection as a ridiculous one. He supposes it would 
be as proper to provide against the introduction of Turkish Janizaries, or against making the 
Alcoran a rule of faith.' 
{1 A citizen of America [Noah Webster], An Examination Into the Leading Principles of the 
Federal Constitution proposed by the late Convention held at Philadelphia. With Answers to the 
Principal Objections Raised Against the System (Philadelphia, 1787), reprinted in Ford (ed.), 
Pamphlets pp. 29-65.} 
From the positive, and dogmatic manner, in which this author delivers his opinions, and answers 
objections made to his sentiments-one would conclude, that he was some pedantic pedagogue 
who had been accustomed to deliver his dogmas to pupils, who always placed implicit faith in 
what he delivered. 
But, why is this provision so ridiculous? Because, says this author, it is unnecessary. But, why is 
it unnecessary? Because, "the principles and habits, as well as the power of the Americans are 
directly opposed to standing armies; and there is as little necessity to guard against them by 
positive constitutions, as to prohibit the establishment of the Mahometan religion." It is admitted 
then, that a standing army in time of peace is an evil. I ask then, why should this government be 
authorised to do evil? If the principles and habits of the people of this country are opposed to 
standing armies in time of peace, if they do not contribute to the public good, but would 
endanger the public liberty and happiness, why should the government be vested with the power? 
No reason can be given, why rulers should be authorised to do, what, if done, would oppose the 
principles and habits of the people, and endanger the public safety; but there is every reason in 
the world, that they should be prohibited from the exercise of such a power. But this author 
supposes, that no danger is to be apprehended from the exercise of this power, because if armies 
are kept up, it will be by the people themselves, and therefore, to provide against it would be as 
absurd as for a man to "pass a law in his family, that no troops should be quartered in his family 
by his consent." This reasoning supposes, that the general government is to be exercised by the 
people of America themselves. But such an idea is groundless and absurd. There is surely a 
distinction between the people and their rulers, even when the latter are representatives of the 
former. They certainly are not identically the same, and it cannot be disputed, but it may and 
often does happen, that they do not possess the same sentiments or pursue the same interests. I 
think I have shown [in a previous paper] that as this government is constructed, there is little 
reason to expect, that the interest of the people and their rulers will be the same. 
Besides, if the habits and sentiments of the people of America are to be relied upon, as the sole 
security against the encroachment of their rulers, all restrictions in constitutions are unnecessary; 
nothing more is requisite, than to declare who shall be authorized to exercise the powers of 
government, and about this we need not be very careful-for the habits and principles of the 
people will oppose every abuse of power. This I suppose to be the sentiments of this author, as it 
seems to be of many of the advocates of this new system. An opinion like this, is as directly 
opposed to the principles and habits of the people of America, as it is to the sentiments of every 
writer of reputation on the science of government, and repugnant to the principles of reason and 
common sense. 
The idea that there is no danger of the establishment of a standing army, under the new 
constitution, is without foundation. 
It is a well known fact, that a number of those who had an agency in producing this system, and 
many of those who it is probable will have a principal share in the administration of the 
government under it, if it is adopted, are avowedly in favor of standing armies. It is a language 
common among them, "That no people can be kept in order, unless the government have an army 
to awe them into obedience; it is necessary to support the dignity of government, to have a 
military establishment. And there will not be wanting a variety of plausible reasons to justify the 
raising one, drawn from the danger we are in from the Indians on our frontiers, or from the 
European provinces in our neighborhood. If to this we add, that an army will afford a decent 
support, and agreeable employment to the young men of many families, who are too indolent to 
follow occupations that will require care and industry, and too poor to live without doing any 
business, we can have little reason to doubt but that we shall have a large standing army as soon 
as this government can find money to pay them, and perhaps sooner. 
A writer, who is the boast of the advocates of this new constitution, has taken great pains to 
show, that this power was proper and necessary to be vested in the general government. 
He sets out with calling in question the candor and integrity of those who advance the objection; 
and with insinuating, that it is their intention to mislead the people, by alarming their passions, 
rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their understandings. 
The man who reproves another for a fault, should be careful that he himself be not guilty of it. 
How far this writer has manifested a spirit of candor, and has pursued fair reasoning on this 
subject, the impartial public will judge, when his arguments pass before them in review. 
He first attempts to show, that this objection is futile and disingenuous, because the power to 
keep up standing armies, in time of peace, is vested, under the present government, in the 
legislature of every state in the union, except two. Now this is so far from being true, that it is 
expressly declared by the present articles of confederation, that no body of forces "Shall be kept 
up by any state, in time of peace, except such number only, as in the judgment of the United 
States in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the 
defence of such state." Now, was it candid and ingenuous to endeavour to persuade the public, 
that the general government had no other power than your own legislature have on this head; 
when the truth is, your legislature have no authority to raise and keep up any forces? 
He next tells us, that the power given by this constitution, on this head, is similar to that which 
Congress possess under the present confederation. As little ingenuity is manifested in this 
representation as in that of the former. 
I shall not undertake to inquire whether or not Congress are vested with a power to keep up a 
standing army in time of peace; it has been a subject warmly debated in Congress, more than 
once, since the peace; and one of the most respectable states in the union, were so fully 
convinced that they had no such power, that they expressly instructed their delegates to enter a 
solemn protest against it on the journals of Congress, should they attempt to exercise it. 
But should it be admitted that they have the power, there is such a striking dissimilarity between 
the restrictions under which the present Congress can exercise it, and that of the proposed 
government, that the comparison will serve rather to show the impropriety of vesting the 
proposed government with the power, than of justifying it. 
It is acknowledged by this writer, that the powers of Congress, under the present confederation, 
amount to little more than that of recommending. If they determine to raise troops, they are 
obliged to effect it through the authority of the state legislatures. This will, in the first instance, 
be a most powerful restraint upon them, against ordering troops to be raised. But if they should 
vote an army, contrary to the opinion and wishes of the people, the legislatures of the respective 
states would not raise them. Besides, the present Congress hold their places at the wilt and 
pleasure of the legislatures of the states who send them, and no troops can be raised, but by the 
assent of nine states out of the thirteen. Compare the power proposed to be lodged in the 
legislature on this head, under this constitution, with that vested in the present Congress, and 
every person of the least discernment, whose understanding is not totally blinded by prejudice, 
will perceive, that they bear no analogy to each other. Under the present confederation, the 
representatives of nine states, out of thirteen, must assent to the raising of troops, or they cannot 
be levied. Under the proposed constitution, a less number than the representatives of two states, 
in the house of representatives, and the representatives of three states and an half in the senate, 
with the assent of the president, may raise any number of troops they please. The present 
Congress are restrained from an undue exercise of this power; from this consideration, they 
know the state legislatures, through whose authority it must be carried into effect, would not 
comply with the requisition for the purpose, [if] it was evidently opposed to the public good. The 
proposed constitution authorizes the legislature to carry their determinations into execution, 
without intervention of any other body between them and the people. The Congress under the 
present form are amenable to, and removable by, the legislatures of the respective states, and are 
chosen for one year only. The proposed constitution does not make the members of the 
legislature accountable to, or removable by the state legislatures at all; and they are chosen, the 
one house for six, and the other for two years; and cannot be removed until their time of service 
is expired, let them conduct ever so badly. The public will judge, from the above comparison, 
how just a claim this writer has to that candor he asserts to possess. In the mean time, to 
convince him, and the advocates for this system, that I possess some share of candor, I pledge 
myself to give up all opposition to it, on the head of standing armies, if the power to raise them 
be restricted as it is in the present confederation; and I believe I may safely answer, not only for 
myself, but for all who make the objection, that they will [not] be satisfied with less. 
Antifederalist No. 25 OBJECTIONS TO A STANDING ARMY 
(PART II) 
From the tenth letter of "BRUTUS" appearing in The New-York Journal, January 24, 1788. 
The liberties of a people are in danger from a large standing army, not only because the rulers 
may employ them for the purposes of supporting themselves in any usurpations of power, which 
they may see proper to exercise; but there is great hazard, that an army will subvert the forms of 
the government, under whose authority they are raised, and establish one [rule] according to the 
pleasure of their leaders. 
We are informed, in the faithful pages of history, of such events frequently happening. Two 
instances have been mentioned in a former paper. They are so remarkable, that they are worthy 
of the most careful attention of every lover of freedom. They are taken from the history of the 
two most powerful nations that have ever existed in the world; and who are the most renowned, 
for the freedom they enjoyed, and the excellency of their constitutions-I mean Rome and Britain. 
In the first, the liberties of the commonwealth were destroyed, and the constitution over-turned, 
by an army, led by Julius Caesar, who was appointed to the command by the constitutional 
authority of that commonwealth. He changed it from a free republic, whose fame ... is still 
celebrated by all the world, into that of the most absolute despotism. A standing army effected 
this change, and a standing army supported it through a succession of ages, which are marked in 
the annals of history with the most horrid cruelties, bloodshed, and carnage-the most devilish, 
beastly, and unnatural vices, that ever punished or disgraced human nature. 
The same army, that in Britain, vindicated the liberties of that people from the encroachments 
and despotism of a tyrant king, assisted Cromwell, their General, in wresting from the people 
that liberty they had so dearly earned. 
You may be told, these instances will not apply to our case. But those who would persuade you 
to believe this, either mean to deceive you, or have not themselves considered the subject. 
I firmly believe, no country in the world had ever a more patriotic army, than the one which so 
ably served this country in the late war. But had the General who commanded them been 
possessed of the spirit of a Julius Caesar or a Cromwell, the liberties of this country . - . [might 
have] in all probability terminated with the war. Or bad they been maintained, [they] might have 
cost more blood and treasure than was expended in the conflict with Great Britain. When an 
anonymous writer addressed the officers of the army at the close of the war, advising them not to 
part with their arms, until justice was done them-the effect it had is well known. It affected them 
like an electric shock. He wrote like Caesar; and had the commander in chief, and a few more 
officers of rank, countenanced the measure, the desperate resolution. . . [might have] been taken, 
to refuse to disband. What the consequences of such a determination would have been, heaven 
only knows. The army were in the full vigor of health and spirits, in the habit of discipline, and 
possessed of all our military stores and apparatus. They would have acquired great accessions of 
strength from the country. Those who were disgusted at our republican forms of government (for 
such there then were, of high rank among us) would have lent them all their aid. We should in all 
probability have seen a constitution and laws dictated to us, at the head of an army, and at the 
point of a bayonet, and the liberties for which we had so severely struggled, snatched from us in 
a moment. It remains a secret, yet to be revealed, whether this measure was not suggested, or at 
least countenanced, by some, who have bad great influence in producing the present system. 
Fortunately indeed for this country, it had at the head of the army, a patriot as well as a general; 
and many of our principal officers had not abandoned the characters of citizens, by assuming that 
of soldiers; and therefore, the scheme proved abortive. But are we to expect, that this will always 
be the case? Are we so much better than the people of other ages and of other countries, that the 
same allurements of power and greatness, which led them aside from their duty, will have no 
influence upon men in our country? Such an idea is wild and extravagant. Had we indulged such 
a delusion, enough has appeared in a little time past, to convince the most credulous, that the 
passion for pomp, power, and greatness, works as powerfully in the hearts of many of our better 
sort, as it ever did in any country under heaven. Were the same opportunity again to offer, we 
should very probably be grossly disappointed, if we made dependence, that all who then rejected 
the overture, would do it again. 
From these remarks, it appears, that the evils to be feared from a large standing army in time of 
peace, do not arise solely from the apprehension, that the rulers may employ them for the 
purpose of promoting their own ambitious views; but that equal, and perhaps greater danger, is to 
be apprehended from their overturning the constitutional powers of the government, and 
assuming the power to dictate any form they please. 
The advocates for power, in support of this right in the proposed government, urge that a 
restraint upon the discretion of the legislatures, in respect to military establishments in time of 
peace, would be improper to be imposed, because they say, it will be necessary to maintain small 
garrisons on the frontiers, to guard against the depredations of the Indians, and to be prepared to 
repel any encroachments or invasions that may be made by Spain or Britain. 
The amount of this argument stripped of the abundant verbiages with which the author has 
dressed it, is this: 
It will probably be necessary to keep up a small body of troops to garrison a few posts, which it 
will be necessary to maintain, in order to guard against the sudden encroachments of the Indians, 
or of the Spaniards and British; and therefore, the general government ought to be invested with 
power to raise and keep up a standing army in time of peace, without restraint, at their discretion. 
I confess, I cannot perceive that the conclusion follows from the premises. Logicians say, it is 
not good reasoning to infer a general conclusion from particular premises. Though I am not 
much of a logician, it seems to me, this argument is very like that species of reasoning. 
When the patriots in the parliament in Great Britain, contended with such force of argument, and 
all the powers of eloquence, against keeping up standing armies in time of peace, it is obvious 
they never entertained an idea, that small garrisons on their frontiers, or in the neighborhood of 
powers from whom they were in danger of encroachments, or guards to take care of public 
arsenals, would thereby be prohibited. 
The advocates for this power further urge that it is necessary, because it may, and probably will 
happen, that circumstances will render it requisite to raise an army to be prepared to repel attacks 
of an enemy, before a formal declaration of war, which in modern times has fallen into disuse. If 
the constitution prohibited the raising an army, until a war actually commenced, it would deprive 
the government of the power of providing for the defense of the country, until the enemy were 
within our territory. If the restriction is not to extend to the raising armies in cases of emergency, 
but only to the keeping them up, this would leave the matter to the discretion of the legislature, 
and they might, under the pretence that there was danger of an invasion, keep up the army as 
long as they judged proper-and hence it is inferred, that the legislature should have authority to 
raise and keep up an army without any restriction. But from these premises nothing more will 
follow than this: that the legislature should not be so restrained, as to put it out of their power to 
raise an army, when such exigencies as are instanced shall arise. But it does not thence follow, 
that the government should be empowered to raise and maintain standing armies at their 
discretion as well in peace as in war. If indeed, it is impossible to vest the general government 
with the power of raising troops to garrison the frontier posts, to guard arsenals, or to be prepared 
to repel an attack, when we saw a power preparing to make one, without giving them a general 
and indefinite authority to raise and keep up armies, without any restriction or qualification, then 
this reasoning might have weight; but this has not been proved nor can it be. 
It is admitted that to prohibit the general government from keeping up standing armies, while yet 
they were authorised to raise them in case of exigency, would be an insufficient guard against the 
danger. A discretion of such latitude would give room to elude the force of the provision. 
It is also admitted that an absolute prohibition against raising troops, except in cases of actual 
war, would be improper; because it will be requisite to raise and support a small number of 
troops to garrison the important frontier posts, and to guard arsenals; and it may happen, that the 
danger of an attack from a foreign power may be so imminent, as to render it highly proper we 
should raise an army, in order to be prepared to resist them. But to raise and keep up forces for 
such purposes and on such occasions, is not included in the idea of keeping up standing armies in 
times of peace. 
It is a thing very practicable to give the government sufficient authority to provide for these 
cases, and at the same time to provide a reasonable and competent security against the evil of a 
standing army-a clause to the following purpose would answer the end: 
As standing armies in time of peace arc dangerous to liberty, and have often been the means of 
overturning the best constitutions of government, no standing army, or troops of any description 
whatsoever, shall be raised or kept up by the legislature, except so many as shall be necessary for 
guards to the arsenals of the United States, or for garrisons to such posts on the frontiers, as it 
shall be deemed absolutely necessary to hold, to secure the inhabitants, and facilitate the trade 
with the Indians: unless when the United States are threatened with an attack or invasion from 
some foreign power, in which case the legislature shall be authorised to raise an army to be 
prepared to repel the attack; provided that no troops whatsoever shall be raised in time of peace, 
without the assent of two thirds of the members, composing both houses of the legislature. 
A clause similar to this would afford sufficient latitude to the legislature to raise troops in all 
cases that were really necessary, and at the same time competent security against the 
establishment of that dangerous engine of despotism, a standing army. 
The same writer who advances the arguments I have noticed, makes a number of other 
observations with a view to prove that the power to raise and keep up armies ought to be 
discretionary in the general legislature. Some of them are curious. He instances the raising of 
troops in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, to show the necessity of keeping a standing army in 
time of peace; the least reflection must convince every candid mind that both these cases are 
totally foreign to his purpose. Massachusetts raised a body of troops for six months, at the 
expiration of which they were to disband ... ; this looks very little like a standing army. But 
beside, was that commonwealth in a state of peace at that time? So far from it, that they were in 
the most violent commotions and contests, and their legislature had formally declared that an 
unnatural rebellion existed within the state. The situation of Pennsylvania was similar; a number 
of armed men had levied war against the authority of the state and openly avowed their intention 
of withdrawing their allegiance from it. To what purpose examples are brought, of states raising 
troops for short periods in times of war or insurrections, on a question concerning the propriety 
of keeping up standing armies in times of peace, the public must judge. 
It is further said, that no danger can arise from this power being lodged in the hands of the 
general government, because the legislatures will be a check upon them, to prevent their abusing 
it. 
This is offered, as what force there is in it will hereafter receive a more particular examination. 
At present, I shall only remark, that it is difficult to conceive how the state legislatures can, in 
any case, hold a check over the general legislature, in a constitutional way. The latter has, in 
every instance to which their powers extend, complete control over the former. The state 
legislatures can, in no case-by law, resolution, or otherwise of right, prevent or impede the 
general government, from enacting any law, or executing it, which this constitution authorizes 
them to enact or execute. If then the state legislatures check the general legislature, it must be by 
exciting the people to resist constitutional laws. In this way every individual, or every body of 
men, may check any government, in proportion to the influence they may have over the body of 
the people. But such kinds of checks as these, though they sometimes correct the abuses of 
government, [more) often destroy all government. 
It is further said, that no danger is to be apprehended from the exercise of this power, because it 
is lodged in the hands of representatives of the people. If they abuse it, it is in the power of the 
people to remove them, and choose others who will pursue their interests.... That it is unwise in 
any people, to authorize their rulers to do, what, if done, would prove injurious-I have, in some 
former numbers, shown. . . . The representation in the proposed government will be a mere 
shadow without the substance. I am so confident that I am well founded in this opinion, that I am 
persuaded if it was to be adopted or rejected, upon a fair discussion of its merits without taking 
into contemplation circumstances extraneous to it, as reasons for its adoption, nineteen-
twentieths of the sensible men in the union would reject it on this account alone; unless its 
powers were confined to much fewer objects than it embraces. 
BRUTUS
Antifederalist No. 26 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT (PART I) 
"A FARMER AND PLANTER" had his work printed in The Maryland Journal, and Baltimore 
Advertiser, April 1, 1788. 
The time is nearly at hand, when you are called upon to render up that glorious liberty you 
obtained, by resisting the tyranny and oppression of George the Third, King of England, and his 
ministers. The first Monday in April is the day appointed by our assembly, for you to meet and 
choose delegates in each county, to take into consideration the new Federal Government, and 
either adopt or refuse it. Let me entreat you, my fellows, to consider well what you are about. 
Read the said constitution, and consider it well before you act. I have done so, and can find that 
we are to receive but little good, and a great deal of evil. Aristocracy, or government in the hands 
of a very few nobles, or RICH MEN, is therein concealed in the most artful wrote plan that ever 
was formed to entrap a free people. The contrivers of it have so completely entrapped you, and 
laid their plans so sure and secretly, that they have only left you to do one of two things-that is 
either to receive or refuse it. And in order to bring you into their snare, you may daily read new 
pieces published in the newspapers, in favor of this new government; and should a writer dare to 
publish any piece against it, he is immediately abused and vilified. 
Look round you and observe well the RICH MEN, who are to be your only rulers, lords and 
masters in future! Are they not all for it? Yes! Ought not this to put you on your guard? Does not 
riches beget power, and power, oppression and tyranny? 
I am told that four of the richest men in Ann-Arundel County [Maryland], have offered 
themselves candidates to serve in the convention, who are all in favor of the new Federal 
Government. Let me beg of you to reflect a moment on the danger you run. If you choose these 
men, or others like them, they certainly will do everything in their power to adopt the new 
government. Should they succeed, your liberty is gone forever; and you will then be nothing 
better than a strong ass crouching down between two burdens. The new form of government 
gives Congress liberty at any time, by their laws, to alter the state laws, and the time, places and 
manner of holding elections for representatives. By this clause they may command, by their 
laws, the people of Maryland to go to Georgia, and the people of Georgia to go to Boston, to 
choose their representatives. Congress, or our future lords and masters, are to have power to lay 
and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. Excise is a new thing in America, and few country 
farmers and planters know the meaning of it. But it is not so in Old England, where I have seen 
the effects of it, and felt the smart. It is there a duty, or tax, laid upon almost every necessary of 
life and convenience, and a great number of other articles. The excise on salt in the year 1762, to 
the best of my recollection, in England, was 4s. sterling per bushel, for all that was made use of 
in families; and the price of salt per bushel about 6s. sterling, and the excise 4s.6d. on every 
gallon of rum made use of. If a private family make their own soap, candles, beer, cider, etc., 
they pay an excise duty on them. And if they neglect calling in an excise officer at the time of 
making these things, they are liable to grievous fines and forfeitures, besides a long train of evils 
and inconveniences attending this detestable excise-to enumerate particularly would fill a 
volume. The excise officers have power to enter your houses at all times, by night or day, and if
you refuse them entrance, they can, under pretense of searching for exciseable goods, that the 
duty has not been paid on, break open your doors, chests, trunks, desks, boxes, and rummage 
your houses from bottom to top. Nay, they often search the clothes, petticoats and pockets of 
ladies or gentlemen (particularly when they are coming from on board an East-India ship), and if 
they find any the least article that you cannot prove the duty to be paid on, seize it and carry it 
away with them; who are the very scum and refuse of mankind, who value not their oaths, and 
will break them for a shilling. This is their true character in England, and I speak from 
experience, for I have had the opportunity of putting their virtue to the test, and saw two of them 
break their oath for one guinea, and a third for one shilling's worth of punch. What do you think 
of a law to let loose such a set of vile officers among you! Do you expect the Congress excise-
officers will be any better-if God, in his anger, should think it proper to punish us for our 
ignorance, and sins of ingratitude to him, after carrying us through the late war, and giving us 
liberty, and now so tamely to give it up by adopting this aristocratical government? 
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be 
included within this union according to their respective numbers. This seems to imply, that we 
shall be taxed by the poll again, which is contrary to our Bill of Rights. But it is possible that the 
rich men, who are the great land holders, will tax us in this manner, which will exempt them 
from paying assessments on their great bodies of land in the old and new parts of the United 
States; many of them having but few taxable by the poll. Our great Lords and Masters are to lay 
taxes, raise and support armies, provide a navy, and may appropriate money for two years, call 
forth the militia to execute their laws, suppress insurrections, and the President is to have the 
command of the militia. Now, my countrymen, I would ask you, why are all these things directed 
and put into their power? Why, I conceive, they are to keep you in a good humor; and if you 
should, at any time, think you are imposed upon by Congress and your great Lords and Masters, 
and refuse or delay to pay your taxes, or do anything that they shall think proper to order you to 
do, they can, and I have not a doubt but they will, send the militia of Pennsylvania, Boston, or 
any other state or place, to cut your throats, ravage and destroy your plantations, drive away your 
cattle and horses, abuse your wives, kill your infants, and ravish your daughters, and live in free 
quarters, until you get into a good humor, and pay all that they may think proper to ask of you, 
and you become good and faithful servants and slaves.1 Such things have been done, and I have 
no doubt will be done again, if you consent to the adoption of this new Federal Government. You 
labored under many hardships while the British tyrannized over you! You fought, conquered and 
gained your liberty-then keep it, I pray you, as a precious jewel. Trust it not out of your own 
hands; be assured, if you do, you will never more regain it. The train is laid, the match is on fire, 
and they only wait for yourselves to put it to the train, to blow up all your liberty and 
commonwealth governments, and introduce aristocracy and monarchy, and despotism will 
follow of course in a few years. Four-years President will be in time a King for life; and after 
him, his son, or he that has the greatest power among them, will be King also. View your danger, 
and find out good men to represent you in convention-men of your own profession and station in 
life; men who will not adopt this destructive and diabolical form of a federal government. There 
are many among you that will not be led by the nose by rich men, and would scorn a bribe. Rich 
men can live easy under any government, be it ever so tyrannical. They come in for a great share 
of the tyranny, because they are the ministers of tyrants, and always engross the places of honor 
and profit, while the greater part of the common people are led by the nose, and played about by 
these very men, for the destruction of themselves and their class. Be wise, be virtuous, and catch 
the precious moment as it passes, to refuse this newfangled federal government, and extricate 
yourselves and posterity from tyranny, oppression, aristocratical or monarchical government. . . . 
A FARMER AND PLANTER
1 See the history of the confederate Grecian states-also the history of England, for the massacre 
of the people in the valley of Glenco, in the time of William the Third. [Note by "A Farmer and 
Planter".] 
Antifederalist No. 27 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT (PART II) 
"JOHN HUMBLE's," following piece was published in the Independent Gazetteer, October 29, 
1787. 
The humble address of the low-born of the United States of America, to their fellow slaves 
scattered throughout the world-greeting: 
Whereas it hath been represented unto us that a most dreadful disease hath for these five years 
last past infected, preyed upon and almost ruined the government and people of this our country; 
and of this malady we ourselves have had perfect demonstration, not mentally, but bodily, 
through every one of the five senses. For although our sensations in regard to the mind be not 
just so nice as those of the well born, yet our feeling, through the medium of the plow, the hoe 
and the grubbing ax, is as acute as any nobleman's in the world. And, whereas, a number of 
skillful physicians having met together at Philadelphia last summer, for the purpose of exploring, 
and, if possible, removing the cause of this direful disease, have, through the assistance of John 
Adams, Esq., in the profundity of their great political knowledge, found out and discovered that 
nothing but a new government, consisting of three different branches, namely, king, lords, and 
commons or, in the American language, President, Senate and Representatives-can save this, our 
country, from inevitable destruction. And, whereas, it has been reported that several of our low-
born brethren have had the horrid audacity to think for themselves in regard to this new system 
of government, and, dreadful thought! have wickedly begun to doubt concerning the perfection 
of this evangelical constitution, which our political doctors have declared to be a panacea, which 
(by inspiration) they know will infallibly heal every distemper in the confederation, and finally 
terminate in the salvation of America. 
Now we the low born, that is, all the people of the United States, except 600 thereabouts, well 
born, do by this our humble address, declare and most solemnly engage, that we will allow and 
admit the said 600 well born, immediately to establish and confirm this most noble, most 
excellent and truly divine constitution. And we further declare that without any equivocation or 
mental reservation whatever we will support and maintain the same according to the best of our 
power, and after the manner and custom of all other slaves in foreign countries, namely by the 
sweat and toil of our body. Nor will we at any future period of time ever attempt to complain of 
this our royal government, let the consequences be what they may. 
And although it appears to us that a standing army, composed of the purgings of the jails of 
Great Britain, Ireland and Germany, shall be employed in collecting the revenues of this our king 
and government, yet, we again in the most solemn manner declare, that we will abide by our 
present determination of non- resistance and passive obedience-so that we shall not dare to 
molest or disturb those military gentlemen in the service of our royal government. And (which is 
not improbable) should any one of those soldiers when employed on duty in collecting the taxes, 
strike off the arm (with his sword) of one of our fellow slaves, we will conceive our case 
remarkably fortunate if he leaves the other arm on. And moreover, because we are aware that 
many of our fellow slaves shall be unable to pay their taxes, and this incapacity of theirs is a just 
cause of impeachment of treason; wherefore in such cases we will use our utmost endeavors, in 
conjunction with the standing army, to bring such atrocious offenders before our federal judges, 
who shall have power, without jury or trial, to order the said miscreants for immediate execution; 
nor will we think their sentence severe unless after being hanged they are also to be both 
beheaded and quartered. And finally we shall henceforth and forever leave all power, authority 
and dominion over our persons and properties in the hands of the well born, who were designed 
by Providence to govern. And in regard to the liberty of the press, we renounce all claim to it 
forever more, Amen; and we shall in future be perfectly contented if our tongues be left us to lick 
the feet of our well born masters. 
Done on behalf of three millions of low-born American slaves. 
JOHN HUMBLE, Secretary
Antifederalist No. 28 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT (PART III) 
This essay was published in either the (Philadelphia) Freeman's Journal; or, The North-American 
Intelligencer, January 16, 1788.
The Congress under the new Constitution have the power "of organizing, arming and 
disciplining the militia, and of governing them when in the service of the United States, giving to 
the separate States the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia 
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." Let us inquire why they have assumed this 
great power. Was it to strengthen the power which is now lodged in your hands, and relying 
upon you and you solely for aid and support to the civil power in the execution of all the laws of 
the new Congress? Is this probable? Does the complexion of this new plan countenance such a 
supposition? When they unprecedently claim the power of raising and supporting armies, do they 
tell you for what purposes they are to be raised? How they are to be employed? How many they 
are to consist of, and where to be stationed? Is this power fettered with any one of those 
restrictions, which will show they depend upon the militia, and not upon this infernal engine of 
oppression to execute their civil laws? The nature of the demand in itself contradicts such a 
supposition, and forces you to believe that it is for none of these causes-but rather for the purpose 
of consolidating and finally destroying your strength, as your respective governments are to be 
destroyed. They well know the impolicy of putting or keeping arms in the hands of a nervous 
people, at a distance from the seat of a government, upon whom they mean to exercise the 
powers granted in that government. They have no idea of calling upon or trusting to the party 
aggrieved to support and enforce their own grievances, (notwithstanding they may select and 
subject them to as strict subordination as regular troops) unless they have a standing army to 
back and compel the execution of their orders. It is asserted by the most respectable writers upon 
government, that a well regulated militia, composed of the yeomanry of the country, have ever 
been considered as the bulwark of a free people. Tyrants have never placed any confidence on a 
militia composed of freemen. Experience has taught them that a standing body of regular forces, 
whenever they can be completely introduced, are always efficacious in enforcing their edicts, 
however arbitrary; and slaves by profession themselves, are "nothing loth" to break down the 
barriers of freedom with a gout. No, my fellow citizens, this plainly shows they do not mean to 
depend upon the citizens of the States alone to enforce their powers. They mean to lean upon 
something more substantial and summary. They have left the appointment of officers in the 
breasts of the several States; but this appears to me an insult rather than a privilege, for what 
avails this right if they at their pleasure may arm or disarm all or any part of the freemen of the 
United States, so that when their army is sufficiently numerous, they may put it out of the power 
of the freemen militia of America to assert and defend their liberties, however they might be 
encroached upon by Congress. Does any, after reading this provision for a regular standing army, 
suppose that they intended to apply to the militia in all cases, and to pay particular attention to 
making them the bulwark of this continent? And would they not be equal to such an 
undertaking? Are they not abundantly able to give security and stability to your government as 
long as it is free? Are they not the only proper persons to do it? Are they not the most respectable 
body of yeomanry in that character upon earth? Have they not been engaged in some of the most 
brilliant actions in America, and more than once decided the fate of princes? In short, do they not 
preclude the necessity of any standing army whatsoever, unless in case of invasion? And in that 
case it would be time enough to raise them, for no free government under heaven, with a well 
disciplined militia, was ever yet subdued by mercenary troops.
The advocates at the present day, for a standing army in the new Congress, pretend it is 
necessary for the respectability of government. I defy them to produce an instance in any 
country, in the Old or New World, where they have not finally done away the liberties of the 
people. Every writer upon government-- Locke, Sidney, Hampden, and a list of others have 
uniformly asserted, that standing armies are a solecism in any government; that no nation ever 
supported them, that did not resort to, rely upon, and finally become a prey to them. No western 
historians have yet been hardy enough to advance principles that look a different way. What 
historians have asserted, all the Grecian republics have verified. They are brought up to 
obedience and unconditional submission; with arms in their bands, they are taught to feel the 
weight of rigid discipline; they are excluded from the enjoyments which liberty gives to its 
votaries; they, in consequence, hate and envy the rest of the community in which they are placed, 
and indulge a malignant pleasure in destroying those privileges to which they never can be 
admitted. "Without a standing army," (says the Marquis of Beccaria), "in every society there is 
an effort constantly tending to confer on one part the height and to reduce the other to the 
extreme of weakness, and this is of itself sufficient to employ the people's attention." There is no 
instance of any government being reduced to a confirmed tyranny without military oppression. 
And the first policy of tyrants has been to annihilate all other means of national activity and 
defense, when they feared opposition, and to rely solely upon standing troops. Repeated were the 
trials, before the sovereigns of Europe dared to introduce them upon any pretext whatever; and 
the whole record of the transactions of mankind cannot furnish an instance, (unless the proposed 
constitution may be called part of that record) where the motives which caused that 
establishment were not completely disguised. Peisistratus in Greece, and Dionysius in Syracuse, 
Charles in France, and Henry in England, all cloaked their villainous intentions under an idea of 
raising a small body as a guard for their persons; and Spain could not succeed in the same 
nefarious plan, until thro' the influence of an ambitious priest (who have in all countries and in 
all ages, even at this day, encouraged and preached up arbitrary power) they obtained it. "Caesar, 
who first attacked the commonwealth with mines, very soon opened his batteries." 
Notwithstanding all these objections to this engine of oppression, which are made by the most 
experienced men, and confirmed by every country where the rays of freedom ever extended-yet 
in America, which has hitherto been her favorite abode; in this civilized territory, where property 
is so valuable, and men are found with feelings that win not patiently submit to arbitrary control; 
in this western region, where, my fellow countrymen, it is confessedly proper that you should 
associate and dwell in society from choice and reflection, and not be kept together by force and 
fear-you are modestly requested to engraft into the component parts of your constitution a 
Standing Army, without any qualifying restraints whatever, certainly to exist somewhere in the 
bowels of your country in time of peace. It is very true that Lawyer [James] Wilson-member of 
the Federal Convention, and who we may suppose breathes in some measure the spirit of that 
body-tells you it is for the purpose of forming cantonments upon your frontiers, and for the 
dignity and safety of your country, as it respects foreign nations. No man that loves his country 
could object to their being raised for the first of these causes, but for the last it cannot be 
necessary. God has so separated us by an extensive ocean from the rest of mankind; he hath so 
liberally endowed us with privileges, and so abundantly taught us to esteem them precious, it 
would be impossible while we retain our integrity, and advert to first principles, for any nation 
whatever to subdue us. We have succeeded in our opposition to the most powerful people upon 
the globe; and the wound that America received in the struggle, where is it? As speedily healed 
as the track in the ocean is buried by the succeeding wave. It has scarcely stopped her progress, 
and our private dissensions only, at this moment, tarnish the lustre of the most illustrious infant 
nation under heaven.
You cannot help suspecting this gentleman [James Wilson], when he goes on to tell you "that 
standing armies in time of peace have always been a topic of popular declamation, but Europe 
hath found them necessary to maintain the appearance of strength in a season of the most 
profound tranquility." This shows you his opinion-and that he, as one of the Convention, was for 
unequivocally establishing them in time of peace; and to object to them, is a mere popular 
declamation. But I will not, my countrymen-I cannot believe you to be of the same sentiment. 
Where is the standing army in the world that, like the musket they make use of, hath been in time 
of peace brightened and burnished for the sake only of maintaining an appearance of strength, 
without being put to a different use-without having had a pernicious influence upon the morals, 
the habits, and the sentiments of society, and finally, taking a chief part in executing its laws? . . .
If tyranny is at all feared, the tyranny of the many is to be guarded against MORE than that of a 
single person. The Athenians found by sad experience, that 30 tyrants were thirty times worse 
than one. A bad aristocracy is thirty times worse than a bad monarchy, allowing each to have a 
standing army as unrestricted as in the proposed constitution. 
If the people are not in general disposed to execute the powers of government, it is time to 
suspect there is something wrong in that government; and rather than employ a standing army, 
they had better have another. For, in my humble opinion, it is yet much too early to set it down 
for a fact, that mankind cannot be governed but by force.
Antifederalist No. 29 OBJECTIONS TO NATIONAL CONTROL 
OF THE MILITIA 
"A DEMOCRATIC FEDERALIST," appeared in "the Pennsylvania Packet," October 23, 1787; 
following #29, #30 is excerpted from THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE 
MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR 
CONSTITUENTS, December 12, 1787.
Hume, an aristocratical writer, has candidly confessed that an army is a moral distemper in a 
government, of which it must at last inevitably perish (2d Burgh, 349); and the Earl of Oxford 
(Oxford the friend of France and the Pretender, the attainted Oxford), said in the British 
parliament, in a speech on the mutiny bill, that, "While he had breath he would speak for the 
liberties of his country, and against courts martial and a standing army in peace, as dangerous to 
the Constitution." (Ibid., page 455.) Such were the speeches even of the enemies of liberty when 
Britain had yet a right to be called free. But, says Mr. [James] Wilson, "It is necessary to 
maintain the appearance of strength even in times of the most profound tranquillity." And what is 
this more than a threadbare hackneyed argument, which has been answered over and over in 
different ages, and does not deserve even the smallest consideration? Had we a standing army 
when the British invaded our peaceful shores? Was it a standing army that gained the battles of 
Lexington and Bunker Hill, and took the ill-fated Burgoyne? Is not a well- regulated militia 
sufficient for every purpose of internal defense? And which of you, my fellow citizens, is afraid 
of any invasion from foreign powers that our brave militia would not be able immediately to 
repel?
Mr. Wilson says, that he does not know of any nation in the world which has not found it 
necessary to maintain the appearance of strength in a season of the most profound tranquillity. If 
by this equivocal assertion he has meant to say that there is no nation in the world without a 
standing army in time of peace, he has been mistaken. I need only adduce the example of 
Switzerland, which, like us, is a republic, whose thirteen cantons, like our thirteen States, are 
under a federal government, and which besides is surrounded by the most powerful nations in 
Europe, all jealous of its liberty and prosperity. And yet that nation has preserved its freedom for 
many ages, with the sole help of a militia, and has never been known to have a standing army, 
except when in actual war. Why should we not follow so glorious an example; and are we less 
able to defend our liberty without an army, than that brave but small nation which, with its 
militia alone has hitherto defied all Europe? 
A DEMOCRATIC FEDERALIST
The framers of this constitution appear to have been . . . sensible that no dependence could be 
placed on the people for their support; but on the contrary, that the government must be executed 
by force. They have therefore made a provision for this purpose in a permanent standing army 
and a militia that may be objected to as strict discipline and government. 
A standing army in the hands of a government placed so independent of the people, may be made 
a fatal instrument to overturn the public liberties; it may be employed to enforce the collection of 
the most oppressive taxes; and to carry into execution the most arbitrary measures. An ambitious 
man who may have the army at his devotion, may step up into the throne, and seize upon 
absolute power. 
The absolute unqualified command that Congress have over the militia may be made 
instrumental to the destruction of all liberty both public and private; whether of a personal, civil 
or religious nature.
First, the personal liberty of every man, probably from sixteen to sixty years of age, may be 
destroyed by the power Congress have in organizing and governing of the militia. As militia they 
may be subjected to fines to any amount, levied in a military manner; they may be subjected to 
corporal punishments of the most disgraceful and humiliating kind; and to death itself, by the 
sentence of a court martial. To this our young men will be more immediately subjected, as a 
select militia, composed of them, will best answer the purposes of government. 
Secondly, the rights of conscience may be violated, as there is no exemption of those persons 
who are conscientiously scrupulous of hearing arms. These compose a respectable proportion of 
the community in the State [Pennsylvania]. This is the more remarkable, because even when the 
distresses of the late war and the evident disaffection of many citizens of that description 
inflamed our passions, and when every person who was obliged to risk his own life must have 
been exasperated against such as on any account kept back from the common danger, yet even
then, when outrage and violence might have been expected, the rights of conscience were held 
sacred. 
At this momentous crisis, the framers of our State Constitution made the most express and 
decided declaration and stipulations in favor of the rights of conscience; but now, when no 
necessity exists, those dearest rights of men are left insecure. 
Thirdly, the absolute command of Congress over the militia may be destructive of public liberty; 
for under the guidance of an arbitrary government, they may be made the unwilling instruments 
of tyranny. The militia of Pennsylvania may be marched to New England or Virginia to quell an 
insurrection occasioned by the most galling oppression, and aided by the standing army, they 
will no doubt be successful in subduing their liberty and independency. But in so doing, although 
the magnanimity of their minds will be extinguished, yet the meaner passions of resentment and 
revenge will be increased, and these in turn will be the ready and obedient instruments of 
despotism to enslave the others; and that with an irritated vengeance. Thus may the militia be 
made the instruments of crushing the last efforts of expiring liberty, of riveting the chains of 
despotism on their fellow-citizens, and on one another. This power can be exercised not only 
without violating the Constitution, but in strict conformity with it; it is calculated for this express 
purpose, and will doubtless be executed accordingly.
As this government will not enjoy the confidence of the people, but be executed by force, it will 
be a very expensive and burdensome government. The standing army must be numerous, and as 
a further support, it wilt be the policy of this government to multiply officers in every 
department; judges, collectors, tax-gatherers, excisemen and the whole host of revenue officers, 
will swarm over the land, devouring the hard earnings of the industrious like the locusts of old, 
impoverishing and desolating all before them. . . 
Antifederalist No. 30-31 A VIRGINIA ANTIFEDERALIST ON 
THE ISSUE OF TAXATION
From The Freeman's Journal; or, The North-American Intelligencer, October 31, 1787.
. . . . It has been the language, since the peace, of the most virtuous and discerning men in 
America, that the powers vested in Congress were inadequate to the procuring of the benefits that 
should result from the union. It was found that our national character was sinking in the opinion 
of foreign nations, and that the selfish views of some of the states were likely to become the 
source of dangerous jealousy. The requisitions of Congress were set at naught; the government, 
that represented the union, had not a shilling in its treasury to enable it to pay off the federal 
debts, nor had it any method within its power to alter its situation. It could make treaties of
commerce, but could not enforce the observance of them; and it was felt that we were suffering 
from the restrictions of foreign nations, who seeing the want of energy in our federal 
constitution, and the unlikelihood of cooperation in thirteen separate legislatures, had shackled 
our commerce, without any dread of recrimination on our part. To obviate these grievances, it 
was I believe the general opinion, that new powers should be vested in Congress to enable it, in 
the amplest manner, to regulate the commerce, to lay and collect duties on the imports of the 
United States. Delegates were appointed by most of them, for those purposes, to a convention to 
be held at Annapolis in the September before last. A few of them met, and without waiting for 
the others, who were coming on, they dissolved the convention-after resolving among 
themselves, that the powers vested in them were not sufficiently extensive; and that they would 
apply to the legislatures of the several states, which they represented, to appoint members to 
another convention, with powers to new model the federal constitution. This, indeed, it has now 
done in the most unequivocal manner; nor has it stopped here, for it has fairly annihilated the 
constitution of each individual state. It has proposed to you a high prerogative government, 
which, like Aaron's serpent, is to swallow up the rest. This is what the thinking people in 
America were apprehensive of. They knew how difficult it is to hit the golden mean, how natural 
the transition is from one extreme to another-from anarchy to tyranny, from the inconvenient 
laxity of thirteen separate governments to the too sharp and grinding one, before which our 
sovereignty, as a state, was to vanish.
In Art. I, Sect. 8, of the proposed constitution, it is said, "Congress shall have power to lay and 
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." Are you then, Virginians, about to abandon your 
country to the depredations of excisemen, and the pressure of excise laws? Did it ever enter the 
mind of any one of you, that you could live to see the day, that any other government but the 
General Assembly of Virginia should have power of direct taxation in this state? How few of you 
ever expected to see excise laws, those instruments of tyranny, in force in your country? But who 
could imagine, that any man but a Virginian, were they found to be necessary, would ever have a 
voice towards enacting them? That any tribunal, but the courts of Virginia, would be allowed to 
take cognizance of disputes between her citizens and their tax gatherers and excisemen? And 
that, if ever it should be found necessary to curse this land with these hateful excisemen, any one, 
but a fellow citizen, should be entrusted with that office?
For my part, I cannot discover the necessity there was of allowing Congress to subject us to 
excise laws, unless-that considering the extensiveness of the single republic into which this 
constitution would collect all the others, and the well known difficulty of governing large 
republics with harmony and ease-it was thought expedient to bit our mouths with massive curbs, 
to break us, bridled with excise laws and managed by excisemen, into an uniform, sober pace, 
and thus, gradually, tame the troublesome mettle of freemen. This necessity could not, surely, 
arise from the desire of furnishing Congress with a sufficient revenue to enable it to exercise the 
prerogatives which every friend to America would wish to see vested in it. As it would, by 
unanimous consent, have the management of the impost, it could increase it to any amount, and 
this would fall sufficiently uniform on every one, according to his ability. Or, were this not found 
sufficient, could not the deficiency be made up by requisitions to the states? Could it not have 
been made an article of the federal constitution, that, if any of them refused their quota, Congress 
may be allowed to make it up by an increase of the impost on that particular state so refusing? 
This would, surely, be a sufficient security to Congress, that their requisitions would be 
punctually complied with.
In any dispute between you and the revenue officers and excisemen of Congress, it is true that it 
is provided the trial shall be in the first instance within the state, though before a federal tribunal. 
It is said in par. 3, sect. 2, art. 3, "The trial of all crimes except in cases of impeachments shall be 
by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the crime shall be committed." But what 
does this avail, when an appeal will lie against you to the supreme federal court. In the paragraph 
preceding the one just now quoted, it is said, "In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have 
appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as 
the Congress shall make." But where is this Supreme Court to sit? Will it not be where Congress 
shall fix its residence? Thither then you will be carried for trial. Who are to be your jury? Is there 
any provision made that you shall have a Venire from your county, or even from your state, as 
they please to call it? Not You are to be tried within the territory of Congress, and Congress itself 
is to be a party. You are to be deprived of the benefit of a jury from your vicinage, that boast and 
birthright of a freeman.
Should it not at least have been provided, that those revenue officers and excisemen-against 
whom free governments have always justly entertained a jealousy-should be citizens of the state? 
Was it inadmissible that they should be endued with the bowels of fellow citizens? Are we not to 
expect that New England will now send us revenue officers instead of onions and apples? When 
you observe that the few places already under Congress in this state are in the hands of strangers, 
you will own that my suspicion is not without some foundation. And if the first cause of it be 
required, those who have served in Congress can tell you that the New England delegates to that 
assembly have always stood by each other, and have formed a firm phalanx, which the southern 
delegates have not; that, on the contrary, the maneuvers of the former have been commonly 
engaged, with success, in dividing the latter against each other.
CATO UTICENSIS
Antifederalist No. 32 FEDERAL TAXATION AND THE 
DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED POWERS (PART I) 
A powerful rebuttal of Hamilton, the logic of Brutus can be found in a supreme Court decision of 
1819, McCulloch v. Maryland. Taken from "Brutus" fifth essay, The New-York Journal of 
December 13, 1787.
This constitution considers the people of the several states as one body corporate, and is intended 
as an original compact; it will therefore dissolve all contracts which may be inconsistent with it. 
This not only results from its nature, but is expressly declared in the 6th article of it. The design 
of the constitution is expressed in the preamble, to be, "in order to form a more perfect union, to 
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the 
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity." These are the 
ends this government is to accomplish, and for which it is invested with certain powers; among 
these is the power "to make all laws which are necessary and proper for carrying into execution 
the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the 
United States, or in any department or officer thereof." It is a rule in construing a law to consider 
the objects the legislature had in view in passing it, and to give it such an explanation as to 
promote their intention. The same rule will apply in explaining a constitution. The great objects 
then are declared in this preamble in general and indefinite terms to be to provide for the 
common welfare, and an express power being vested in the legislature to make all laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested in the general 
government. The inference is natural that the legislature will have an authority to make all laws 
which they shall judge necessary for the common safety, and to promote the general welfare. 
This amounts to a power to make laws at discretion. No terms can be found more indefinite than 
these, and it is obvious, that the legislature alone must judge what laws are proper and necessary 
for the purpose. It may be said, that this way of explaining the constitution, is torturing and 
making it speak what it never intended. This is far from my intention, and I shall not even insist 
upon this implied power, but join issue with those who say we are to collect the idea of the 
powers given from the express words of the clauses granting them; and it will not be difficult to 
show that the same authority is expressly given which is supposed to be implied in the foregoing 
paragraphs.
In the lst article, 8th section, it is declared, "that Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense, and 
general welfare of the United States." In the preamble, the intent of the constitution, among other 
things, is declared to be to provide for the common defense, and promote the general welfare, 
and in this clause the power is in express words given to Congress "to provide for the common 
defense, and general welfare." And in the last paragraph of the same section there is an express 
authority to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution this 
power. It is therefore evident, that the legislature under this constitution may pass any law which 
they may think proper. It is true the 9th section restrains their power with respect to certain 
subjects. But these restrictions are very limited, some of them improper, some unimportant, and 
others not easily understood, as I shall hereafter show. It has been urged that the meaning I give 
to this part of the constitution is not the true one, that the intent of it is to confer on the legislature 
the power to lay and collect taxes, etc., in order to provide for the common defense and general 
welfare. To this I would reply, that the meaning and intent of the constitution is to be collected 
from the words of it, and I submit to the public, whether the construction I have given it is not 
the most natural and easy. But admitting the contrary opinion to prevail, I shall nevertheless, be 
able to show, that the same powers are substantially vested in the general government, by several 
other articles in the constitution. It invests the legislature with authority to lay and collect taxes, 
duties, imposts and excises, in order to provide for the common defense, and promote the general 
welfare, and to pass all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying this power into 
effect. To comprehend the extent of this authority, it will be requisite to examine 
1st. What is included in this power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises. 
2nd. What is implied in the authority, to pass all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying this power into execution. 
3rd. What limitation, if any, is set to the exercise of this power by the constitution. 
First. To detail the particulars comprehended in the general terms, taxes, duties, imposts and 
excises, would require a volume, instead of a single piece in a newspaper. Indeed it would be a 
task far beyond my ability, and to which no one can be competent, unless possessed of a mind 
capable of comprehending every possible source of revenue; for they extend to every possible 
way of raising money, whether by direct or indirect taxation. Under this clause may be imposed a 
poll tax, a land tax, a tax on houses and buildings, on windows and fireplaces, on cattle and on 
all kinds of personal property. It extends to duties on all kinds of goods to any amount, to 
tonnage and poundage on vessels, to duties on written instruments, newspapers, almanacks, and 
books. It comprehends an excise on all kinds of liquors, spirits, wines, cider, beer, etc., and 
indeed takes in duty or excise on every necessary or conveniency of life, whether of foreign or 
home growth or manufactory. In short, we can have no conception of any way in which a 
government can raise money from the people, but what is included in one or other of these 
general terms. We may say then that this clause commits to the hands of the general legislature 
every conceivable source of revenue within the United States, Not only are these terms very 
comprehensive, and extend to a vast number of objects, but the power to lay and collect has great 
latitude; it will lead to the passing a vast number of laws, which may affect the personal rights of 
the citizens of the states, expose their property to fines and confiscation, and put their lives in 
jeopardy. It opens a door to the appointment of a swarm of revenue and excise collectors to prey 
upon the honest and industrious part of the community, [and] eat up their substance. . . . 
Second. We will next inquire into what is implied in the authority to pass all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper to carry this power into execution. 
It is, perhaps, utterly impossible fully to define this power. The authority granted in the first 
clause can only be understood in its full extent, by descending to all the particular cases in which 
a revenue can be raised; the number and variety of these cases are so endless, and as it were 
infinite, that no man living has, as yet, been able to reckon them up. The greatest geniuses in the 
world have been for ages employed in the research, and when mankind had supposed that the 
subject was exhausted they have been astonished with the refined improvements that have been 
made in modern times ' and especially in the English nation on the subject. If then the objects of 
this power cannot be comprehended, how is it possible to understand the extent of that power 
which can pass all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying it into executions It is 
truly incomprehensible. A case cannot be conceived of, which is not included in this power. It is 
well known that the subject of revenue is the most difficult and extensive in the science of 
government. It requires the greatest talents of a statesman, and the most numerous and exact 
provisions of the legislature. The command of the revenues 'Of a state gives the command of 
every thing in it. He that has the purse will have the sword, and they that have both, have 
everything; so that the legislature having every source from which money can be drawn under 
their direction, with a right to make all laws necessary and proper for drawing forth all the 
resource of the country, would have, in fact, all power. 
Were I to enter into the detail, it would be easy to show how this power in its operation, would 
totally destroy all the powers of the individual states. But this is not necessary for those who will 
think for themselves, and it will be useless to such as take things upon trust; nothing will awaken 
them to reflection, until the iron hand of oppression compel them to it. 
I shall only remark, that this power, given to the federal legislature, directly annihilates all the 
powers of the state legislatures. There cannot be a greater solecism in politics than to talk of 
power in a government, without the command of any revenue. It is as absurd as to talk of an 
animal without blood, or the subsistence of one without food. Now the general government 
having in their control every possible source of revenue, and authority to pass any law they may 
deem necessary to draw them forth, or to facilitate their collection, no source of revenue is 
therefore left in the hands 'Of any state. Should any state attempt to raise money by law, the 
general government may repeal or arrest it in the execution, for all their laws will be the supreme 
law of the land. If then any one can be weak enough to believe that a government can exist 
without having the authority to raise money to pay a door-keeper to their assembly, he may 
believe that the state government can exist, should this new constitution take place.
It is agreed by most of the advocates of this new system, that the government which is proper for 
the United States should be a confederated one; that the respective states ought to retain a portion 
of their sovereignty, and that they should preserve not only the forms of their legislatures, but 
also the power to conduct certain internal concerns. How far the powers to be retained by the 
states are to extend, is the question; we need not spend much time on this subject, as it respects 
this constitution, for a government without power to raise money is one only in name. It is clear 
that the legislatures of the respective states must be altogether dependent on the will of the 
general legislature, for the means of supporting their government. The legislatureof the United 
States will have a right to exhaust every source of revenue in every state, and to annul all laws of 
the states which may stand in the way of effecting it; unless therefore we can suppose the state 
governments can exist without money to support the officers who execute them, we must 
conclude they will exist no longer than the general legislatures choose they should. Indeed the 
idea of any government existing, in any respect, as an independent one, without any means of 
support in their own hands, is an absurdity. If therefore, this constitution has in view, what many 
of its framers and advocates say it has, to secure and guarantee to the separate states the exercise 
of certain powers of government, it certainly ought to have left in their hands some sources of 
revenue. It should have marked the line in which the general government should have raised 
money, and set bounds over which they should not pass, leaving to the separate states other 
means to raise supplies for the support of their governments, and to discharge their respective 
debts. To this it is objected, that the general government ought to have power competent to the 
purposes of the union; they are to provide for the common defense, to pay the debts of the United 
States, support foreign ministers, and the civil establishment of the union, and to do these they 
ought to have authority to raise money adequate to the purpose. On this I observe, that the state 
governments have also contracted debts; they require money to support their civil officers; . . . if 
they give to the general government a power to raise money in every way in which it can 
possibly be raised, with . . . a control over the state legislatures as to prohibit them, whenever the 
general legislature may think proper, from raising any money, (the states will fail]. It is again 
objected that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to draw the line of distinction between the 
powers of the general and state governments on this subject. The first, it is said, must have the 
power to raise the money necessary for the purposes of the union; if they are limited to certain 
objects the revenue may fall short of a sufficiency for the public exigencies; they must therefore 
have discretionary power. The line may be easily and accurately drawn between the powers of 
the two governments on this head. The distinction between external and internal taxes, is not a 
novel one in this country. It is a plain one, and easily understood. The first includes impost duties 
on all imported goods; this species of taxes it is proper should be laid by the general government; 
many reasons might be urged to show that no danger is to be apprehended from their exercise of 
it. They may be collected in few places, and from few hands with certainty and expedition. But 
few officers are necessary to be employed in collecting them, and there is no danger of 
oppression in laying them, because if they are laid higher than trade will bear, the merchants will 
cease importing, or smuggle their goods. We have therefore sufficient security, arising from the 
nature of the thing, against burdensome, and intolerable impositions from this kind of tax. The 
case is far otherwise with regard to direct taxes; these include poll taxes, land taxes, excises, 
duties on written instruments, on everything we eat, drink, or wear; they take hold of every 
species of property, and come home to every man's house and pocket. These are often so 
oppressive, as to grind the face of the poor, and render the lives of the common people a burden 
to them. The great and only security the people can have against oppression from this kind of 
taxes, must rest in their representatives. If they are sufficiently numerous to be well informed of 
the circumstances, . . . and have a proper regard for the people, they will be secure. The general 
legislature, as I have shown in a former paper, will not be thus qualified,' and therefore, on this 
account, ought not to exercise the power of direct taxation. If the power of laying imposts will 
not be sufficient, some other specific mode of raising a revenue should have been assigned the 
general government; many may be suggested in which their power may be accurately defined 
and limited, and it would be much better to give them authority to lay and collect a duty on 
exports, not to exceed a certain rate per cent, than to have surrendered every kind of resource that 
the country has, to the complete abolition of the state governments, and which will introduce 
such an infinite number of laws and ordinances, fines and penalties, courts, and judges, 
collectors, and excisemen, that when a man can number them, he may enumerate the stars of 
Heaven. 
BRUTUS
Antifederalist No. 33 FEDERAL TAXATION AND THE 
DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED POWERS (PART II) 
The Federalist writers apparently never responded to "BRUTUS." The following "Brutus" article 
was extracted from his sixth essay, The New-York Journal of December 27, 1787.
.... The general government is to be vested with authority to levy and collect taxes, duties, and 
excises; the separate states have also power to impose taxes, duties, and excises, except that they 
cannot lay duties on exports and imports without the consent of Congress. Here then the two 
governments have concurrent jurisdiction; both may lay impositions of this kind. But then the 
general government have superadded to this power, authority to make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying the foregoing power into execution. Suppose then that both 
governments should lay taxes, duties, and excises, and it should fall so heavy on the people that 
they would be unable, or be so burdensome that they would refuse to pay them both would it not 
be necessary that the general legislature should suspend the collection of the state tax? It 
certainly would. For, if the people could not, or would not pay both, they must be discharged 
from the tax to the state, or the tax to the general government could not be collected. The 
conclusion therefore is inevitable, that the respective state governments will not have the power 
to raise one shilling in any way, but by the permission of the Congress. I presume no one will 
pretend that the states can exercise legislative authority, or administer justice among their 
citizens for any length of time, without being able to raise a sufficiency to pay those who 
administer their governments.
If this be true, and if the states can raise money only by permission of the general government, it 
follows that the state governments will be dependent on the will of the general government for 
their existence. 
What will render this power in Congress effectual and sure in its operation is that the government 
will have complete judicial and executive authority to carry all their laws into effect, which will 
be paramount to the judicial and executive authority of the individual states: in vain therefore 
will be all interference of the legislatures, courts, or magistrates of any of the states on the 
subject; for they will be subordinate to the general government, and engaged by oath to support 
it, and will be constitutionally bound to submit to their decisions. 
The general legislature will be empowered to lay any tax they choose, to annex any penalties 
they please to the breach of their revenue laws; and to appoint as many officers as they may think 
proper to collect the taxes. They will have authority to farm the revenues and to vest the farmer 
general, with his subalterns, with plenary powers to collect them, in any way which to them may 
appear eligible, And the courts of law which they will be authorized to institute, will have 
cognizance of every case arising under the revenue laws, [and] the conduct of all the officers 
employed in collecting them; and the officers of these courts will execute their judgments. There 
is no way, therefore, of avoiding the destruction of the state governments, whenever the 
Congress please to do it, unless the people rise up, and, with a strong hand, resist and prevent the 
execution of constitutional laws. The fear of this will, it is presumed, restrain the general 
government for some time, within proper bounds; but it will not be many years before they will 
have a revenue, and force, at their command, which will place them above any apprehensions on 
that score.
How far the power to lay and collect duties and excises, may operate to dissolve the state 
governments, and oppress the people, it is impossible to say. It would assist us much in forming 
a just opinion on this head, to consider the various objects to which this kind of taxes extend, in 
European nations, and the infinity of laws they have passed respecting them. Perhaps, it leisure 
will permit, this may be essayed in some future paper. 
It was observed in my last number, that the power to lay and collect duties and excises, would 
invest the Congress with authority to impose a duty and excise on every necessary and 
convenience of life. As the principal object of the government, in laying a duty or excise, will be, 
to raise money, it is obvious, that they will fix on such articles as are of the most general use and 
consumption; because, unless great quantities of the article, on which the duty is laid, is used, the 
revenue cannot be considerable. We may therefore presume, that the articles which will be the 
object of this species of taxes will be either the real necessaries of life; or if not those, such as 
from custom and habit are esteemed so. I will single out a few of the productions of our own 
country, which may, and probably will, be of the number.
Cider is an article that most probably will be one of those on which an excise will be laid,
because it is one, which this country produces in great abundance, which is in very general use, 
is consumed in great quantities, and which may be said not to be a real necessary of life. An 
excise on this would raise a large sum of money in the United States. How would the power, to 
lay and collect an excise on cider, and to pass all laws proper and necessary to carry it into 
execution, operate in its exercise? It might be necessary, in order to collect the excise on cider, to 
grant to one man, in each county, an exclusive right of building and keeping cider-mills, and 
oblige him to give bonds and security for payment of the excise; or, if this was not done, it might 
be necessary to license the mills, which are to make this liquor, and to take from them security, 
to account for the excise, or, if otherwise, a great number of officers must be employed, to take 
account of the cider made, and to collect the duties on it.
Porter, ale, and all kinds of malt- liquors, are articles that would probably be subject also to an 
excise. It would be necessary, in order to collect such an excise, to regulate the manufactory of 
these, that the quantity made might be ascertained, or other wise security could not be had for the 
payment of the excise, Every brewery must then be licensed, and officers appointed, to take 
account of its product, and to secure the payment of the duty, or excise, before it is sold. Many 
other articles might be named, which would be objects of this species of taxation, but I refrain 
from enumerating them. It will probably be said, by those who advocate this system, that the 
observations already made on this head, are calculated only to inflame the minds of the people, 
with the apprehension of dangers merely imaginary; that there is not the least reason to 
apprehend the general legislature will exercise their power in this manner. To this I would only 
say, that these kinds of taxes exist in Great Britain, and are severely felt. The excise on cider and 
perry, was imposed in that nation a few years ago, and it is in the memory of everyone, who read 
the history of the transaction, what great tumults it occasioned. 
This power, exercised without limitation, will introduce itself into every corner of the city, and 
country-it will wait upon the ladies at their toilet, and will not leave them in any of their 
domestic concerns; it will accompany them to the ball, the play, and assembly; it will go with 
them when they visit, and will, on all occasions, sit beside them in their carriages, nor will it 
desert them even at church; it will enter the house of every gentleman, watch over his cellar, wait 
upon his cook in the kitchen, follow the servants into the parlor, preside over the table, and note 
down all he eats or drinks; it will attend him to his bedchamber, and watch him while he sleeps; 
it will take cognizance of the professional man in his office, or his study; it will watch the 
merchant in the counting-house, or in his store; it will follow the mechanic to his shop, and in his 
work, and will haunt him in his family, and in his bed; it will be a constant companion of the 
industrious farmer in all his labor, it will be with him in the house, and in the field, observe the 
toil of his hands, and the sweat of his brow; it will penetrate into the most obscure cottage; and 
finally, it will light upon the head of every person in the United States. To all these different 
classes of people, and in all these circumstances, in which it will attend them, the language in 
which it will address them, will be GIVE! GIVE! A power that has such latitude, which reaches 
every person in the community in every conceivable circumstance, and lays hold of every 
species of property they possess, and which has no bounds set to it, but the discretion of those 
who exercise it-I say, such a power must necessarily, from its very nature, swallow up all the 
power of the state governments. I shall add but one other observation on this head, which is this: 
It appears to me a solecism, for two men, or bodies of men, to have unlimited power respecting
the same object. It contradicts the ... maxim, which saith, "no man can serve two masters," the 
one power or the other must prevail, or else they will destroy each other, and neither of them 
effect their purpose. It may be compared to two mechanic powers, acting upon the same body in 
opposite directions, the consequence would be, if the powers were equal, the body would remain 
in a state of rest, or if the force of the one was superior to that of the other, the stronger would 
prevail, and overcome the resistance of the weaker. But it is said, by some of the advocates of 
this system, that "the idea that Congress can levy taxes at pleasure is false, and the suggestion 
wholly unsupported. The preamble to the constitution is declaratory of the purposes of the [our] 
union, and the assumption of any power not necessary to establish justice, etc., provide for the 
common defense, etc., will be unconstitutional.
. . . Besides, in the very clause which gives the power of levying duties and taxes, the purposes to 
which the money shall be appropriated are specified, viz., to pay the debts and provide for the 
common defense and general welfare."' I would ask those, who reason thus, to define what ideas 
are included under the terms, to provide for the common defense and general welfare? Are these 
terms definite, and will they be understood in the same manner, and to apply to the same cases 
by everyone? No one will pretend they will. It will then be matter of opinion, what tends to the 
general welfare; and the Congress will be the only judges in the matter. To provide for the 
general welfare, is an abstract proposition, which mankind differ in the explanation of, as much 
as they do on any political or moral proposition that can be proposed; the most opposite 
measures may be pursued by different parties, and both may profess, that they have in view the 
general welfare and both sides may be honest in their professions, or both may have sinister 
views. Those who advocate this new constitution declare, they are influenced by a regard to the 
general welfare; those who oppose it, declare they are moved by the same principle; and I have 
no doubt but a number on both sides are honest in their professions; and yet nothing is more 
certain than this, that to adopt this constitution, and not to adopt it, cannot both of them be 
promotive of the general welfare. 
It is absurd to say, that the power of Congress is limited by these general expressions "to provide 
for the common safety, and general welfare," as it would be to say, that it would be limited, had 
the constitution said they should have power to lay taxes, etc. at will and pleasure. Were this 
authority given, it might be said, that under it the legislature could not do injustice, or pursue any 
measures, but such as were calculated to promote the public good, and happiness. For every man, 
rulers as well as others, are bound by the immutable laws of God and reason, always to will what 
is right. It is certainly right and fit, that the governors of every people should provide for the 
common defense and general welfare; every government, therefore, in the world, even the 
greatest despot, is limited in the exercise of his power. But however just this reasoning may be, it 
would be found, in practice, a most pitiful restriction. The government would always say, their 
measures were designed and calculated to promote the public good; and there being no judge 
between them and the people, the rulers themselves must, and would always, judge for 
themselves. 
There are others of the favorers of this system, who admit, that the power of the Congress under 
it, with respect to revenue, will exist without limitation, and contend, that so it ought to be. 
It is said, the power "to raise armies; to build and equip fleets; . . . [and] to provide for their 
support, . . . ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or define the 
extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means 
which may be necessary to satisfy them." 
This, it is said, "is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own 
evidence along with it.... It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal; the means ought to 
be proportioned to the end; the persons, from whose agency the attainment of any end is 
expected, ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained." 
This same writer insinuates, that the opponents to the plan promulgated by the convention, 
manifests a want of candor, in objecting to the extent of the powers proposed to be vested in this 
government; because he asserts, with an air of confidence, that the powers ought to be unlimited 
as to the object to which they extend; and that this position, if not self-evident, is at least clearly 
demonstrated by the foregoing mode of reasoning. But with submission to this author's better 
judgment, I humbly conceive his reasoning will appear, upon examination, more specious than 
solid. The means, says the gentleman, ought to be proportioned to the end. Admit the proposition 
to be true, it is then necessary to inquire, what is the end of the government of the United States, 
in order to draw any just conclusions from it. Is this end simply to preserve the general 
government, and to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the union only? 
Certainly not. For beside this, the state governments are to be supported, and provision made for 
the managing such of their internal concerns as are allotted to them. It is admitted "that the 
circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound instead of a simple, a 
confederate instead of a sole, government," that the objects of each ought to be pointed out, and 
that each ought to possess ample authority to execute the powers committed to them. The 
government then, being complex in its nature, the end it has in view is so also; and it is as 
necessary that the state governments should possess the means to attain the end expected from 
them, as for the general government. Neither the general government nor the state governments 
ought to be vested with all the powers proper to be exercised for promoting the ends of 
government. The powers are divided between them-certain ends are to be attained by the one, 
and certain ends by the other; and these, taken together, include all the ends of good government. 
This being the case, the conclusion follows, that each should be furnished with the means, to 
attain the ends, to which they are designed. 
To apply this reasoning to the case of revenue, the general government is charged with the care 
of providing for the payment of the debts of the United States, supporting the general 
government, and providing for the defense of the union. To obtain these ends, they should be 
furnished with means. But does it thence follow, that they should command all the revenues of 
the United States? Most certainly it does not. For if so, it will follow, that no means will be left 
to attain other ends, as necessary to the happiness of the country, as those committed to their 
care. The individual states have debts to discharge; their legislatures and executives are to be 
supported, and provision is to be made for the administration of justice in the respective states. 
For these objects the general government has no authority to provide; nor is it proper it should. It 
is clear then, that the states should have the command of such revenues, as to answer the ends 
they have to obtain. To say, that "the circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are 
infinite,"" and from hence to infer, that all the sources of revenue in the states should be yielded 
to the general government, is not conclusive reasoning: for the Congress are authorized only to 
control in general concerns, and not regulate local and internal ones. . . The peace and happiness 
of a community is as intimately connected with the prudent direction of their domestic affairs, 
and the due administration of justice among themselves, as with a competent provision for their 
defense against foreign invaders, and indeed more so. 
Upon the whole, I conceive, that there cannot be a clearer position than this, that the state 
governments ought to have an uncontrollable power to raise a revenue, adequate to the 
exigencies of their governments; and, I presume, no such power is left them by this constitution. 
BRUTUS
Antifederalist No. 34 THE PROBLEM OF CONCURRENT 
TAXATION 
The following speech by Patrick Henry was delivered to the Virginia ratifying convention, June 
5, 1788. 
I never will give up the power of direct taxation but for a scourge. I am willing to give it 
conditionally; that is, after non-compliance with requisitions. I will do more, sir, and what I hope 
will convince the most skeptical man that I am a lover of the American Union-that, in case 
Virginia shall not make punctual payment, the control of our custom-houses, and the whole 
regulation of trade, shall be given to Congress, and that Virginia shall depend on Congress even 
for passports, till Virginia shall have paid the last farthing, and furnished the last soldier. Nay, 
sir, there is another alternative to which I would consent; even that they should strike us out of 
the Union, and take away from us all federal privileges, till we comply with federal requisitions: 
but let it depend upon our own pleasure to pay our money in the most easy manner for our 
people. Were all the states, more terrible than the mother country, to join against us, I hope 
Virginia could defend herself; but, sir, the dissolution of the Union is most abhorrent to my 
mind. The first thing I have at heart is American liberty; the second thing is American union; and 
I hope the people of Virginia will endeavor to preserve that union. The increasing population of 
the Southern States is far greater than that of New England; consequently, in a short time, they 
will be far more numerous than the people of that country. Consider this, and you will find this 
state more particularly interested to support American liberty, and not bind our posterity by an 
improvident relinquishment of our rights. I would give the best security for a punctual 
compliance with requisitions; but I beseech gentlemen, at all hazards, not to give up this 
unlimited power of taxation. . . . 
In this scheme of energetic government, the people will find two sets of taxgatherers-the state 
and the federal sheriffs. This, it seems to me, will produce such dreadful oppression as the people 
cannot possibly bear. The federal sheriff may commit what oppression, make what distresses, he 
pleases, and ruin you with impunity; for how are you to tie his hands? Have you any sufficiently 
decided means of preventing him from sucking your blood by speculations, commissions, and 
fees? Thus thousands of your people will be most shamefully robbed: our state sheriffs, those 
unfeeling blood-suckers, have, under the watchful eye of our legislature, committed the most 
horrid and barbarous ravages on our people. It has required the most constant vigilance of the 
legislature to keep them from totally ruining the people; a repeated succession of laws has been 
made to suppress their iniquitous speculations and cruel extortions; and as often has their 
nefarious ingenuity devised methods of evading the force of those laws: in the struggle they have 
generally triumphed over the legislature. It is a fact that lands have been sold for five shillings, 
which were worth one hundred pounds: if sheriffs, thus immediately under the eye of our state 
legislature and judiciary, have dared to commit these outrages, what would they not have done if 
their masters had been at Philadelphia or New York? If they perpetrate the most unwarrantable 
outrage on your person or property, you cannot get redress on this side of Philadelphia or New 
York; and how can you get it there? If your domestic avocations could permit you to go thither, 
there you must appeal to judges sworn to support this Constitution, in opposition to that of any 
state, and who may also be inclined to favor their own officers. When these harpies are aided by 
excisemen, who may search, at any time, your houses, and most secret recesses, will the people 
bear it? If you think so, you differ from me. Where I thought there was a possibility of such 
mischiefs, I would grant power with a niggardly hand; and here there is a strong probability that 
these oppressions shall actually happen. I may be told that it is safe to err on that side, because 
such regulations may be made by Congress as shall restrain these officers, and because laws are 
made by our representatives, and judged by righteous judges: but, Sir, as these regulations may 
be made, so they may not; and many reasons there are to induce a belief that they will not, I shall 
therefore be an infidel on that point till the day of my death. 
Antifederalist No. 35 FEDERAL TAXING POWER MUST BE 
RESTRAINED 
George Mason of Virginia opposed the Constitution because it lacked a Bill of Rights, and 
centralized powers further than he felt it necessary. Mason delivered the following speech before 
the Virginia ratifying convention, June 4, 1788. 
Mr. Chairman, whether the Constitution be good or bad, the present clause [Article 1, Section 2] 
clearly discovers that it is a national government, and no longer a Confederation. I mean that 
clause which gives the first hint of the general government laying direct taxes. The assumption of 
this power of laying direct taxes does, of itself, entirely change the confederation of the states 
into one consolidated government. This power, being at discretion, unconfined, and without any 
kind of control, must carry every thing before it. The very idea of converting what was formerly 
a confederation to a consolidated government is totally subversive of every principle which has 
hitherto governed us. This power is calculated to annihilate totally the state governments. Will 
the people of this great community [Virginia] submit to be individually taxed by two different 
and distinct powers? Will they suffer themselves to be doubly harassed? These two concurrent 
powers cannot exist long together; the one will destroy the other. The general government being 
paramount to, and in every respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter must 
give way to the former.... 
Requisitions [under the Articles of Confederation] have been often refused, sometimes from an 
impossibility of complying with them; often from that great variety of circumstances which 
retards the collection of moneys; and perhaps sometimes from a wilful design of procrastinating. 
But why shall we give up to the national government this power, so dangerous in its nature, and 
for which its members will not have sufficient information? Is it not well known that what would 
be a proper tax in one state would be grievous in another? The gentleman who has favored us 
with a eulogium in favor of this system [Wilson C. Nicholas], must, after all the encomiums he 
has been pleased to bestow upon it, acknowledge that our federal representatives must be 
unacquainted with the situation of their constituents. Sixty-five members cannot possibly know 
the situation and circumstances of all the inhabitants of this immense continent. When a certain 
sum comes to be taxed, and the mode of levying to be fixed, they will lay the tax on that article 
which will be most productive and easiest in the collection, without consulting the real 
circumstances or convenience of a country, with which, in fact, they cannot be sufficiently
acquainted. 
The mode of levying taxes is of the utmost consequence; and yet here it is to be determined by 
those who have neither knowledge of our situation, nor a common interest with us, nor a fellow-
feeling for us. The subject of taxation differs in three fourths, nay, I might say with truth, in four 
fifths of the states. If we trust the national government with an effectual way of raising the 
necessary sums, it is sufficient: everything we do further is trusting the happiness and rights of 
the people. Why, then, should we give up this dangerous power of individual taxation? Why 
leave the manner of laying taxes to those who, in the nature of things, cannot be acquainted with 
the situation of those on whom they are to impose them, when it can be done by those who are 
well acquainted with it? If, instead of giving this oppressive power, we give them such an 
effectual alternative as will answer the purpose, without encountering the evil and danger that 
might arise from it, then I would cheerfully acquiesce; and would it not be far more eligible? I 
candidly acknowledge the inefficacy of the Confederation; but requisitions have been made 
which were impossible to be complied with- requisitions for more gold and silver than were in 
the United States. If we give the general government the power of demanding their quotas of the 
states, with an alternative of laying direct taxes in case of non-compliance, then the mischief 
would be avoided. And the certainty of this conditional power would, in all human probability,
prevent the application, and the sums necessary for the Union would be then laid by the states, 
by those who know how it can best be raised, by those who have a fellow-feeling for us. Give me 
leave to say, that the sum raised one way with convenience and case, would be very oppressive 
another way. Why, then, not leave this power to be exercised by those who know the mode most 
convenient for the inhabitants, and not by those who must necessarily apportion it in such 
manner as shall be oppressive? . . . An indispensable amendment . . . is, that Congress shall not 
exercise the power of raising direct taxes till the states shall have refused to comply with the 
requisitions of Congress. On this condition it may be granted; but I see no reason to grant it 
unconditionally, as the states can raise the taxes with more case, and lay them on the inhabitants 
with more propriety, than it is possible for the general government to do. If Congress hath this 
power without control, the taxes will be laid by those who have no fellow- feeling or 
acquaintance with the people. This is my objection to the article now under consideration. It is a 
very great and important one. I therefore beg gentlemen to consider it. Should this power be 
restrained, I shall withdraw my objections to this part of the Constitution; but as it stands, it is an 
objection so strong in my mind, that its amendment is with me a sine qua non of its adoption. I 
wish for such amendments, and such only, as are necessary to secure the dearest rights of the 
people.... 
Antifederalist No. 36 REPRESENTATION AND INTERNAL 
TAXATION
Richard Henry Lee was arguably the best known Antifederalist writer. His pamphlets were 
widely distributed and reprinted in newspapers. Antifederalist Papers # 36/37 are excerpts from 
his first pamphlet. Antifederalist Nos. 41, 42, 43, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 63, 69, 76-77 are taken from 
his second pamphlet.
A power to lay and collect taxes at discretion, is, in itself, of very great importance. By means of 
taxes, the government may command the whole or any part of the subject's property. Taxes may 
be of various kinds; but there is a strong distinction between external and internal taxes. External 
taxes are import duties, which are laid on imported goods; they may usually be collected in a few 
seaport towns, and of a few individuals, though ultimately paid by the consumer; a few officers 
can collect them, and they can be carried no higher than trade will bear, or smuggling permit-that 
in the very nature of commerce, bounds are set to them. But internal taxes, as poll and land taxes, 
excises, duties on all written instruments, etc., may fix themselves on every person and species 
of property in the community; they may be carried to any lengths, and in proportion as they are 
extended, numerous officers must be employed to assess them, and to enforce the collection of 
them. In the United Netherlands the general government has complete powers, as to external 
taxation; but as to internal taxes, it makes requisitions on the provinces. Internal taxation in this 
country is more important, as the country is so very extensive As many assessors and collectors 
of federal taxes will be above three hundred miles from the seat of the federal government, as 
will be less. Besides, to lay and collect taxes, in this extensive country, must require a great 
number of congressional ordinances, immediately operating upon the body of the people; these 
must continually interfere with the state laws, and thereby produce disorder and general 
dissatisfaction, till the one system of laws or the other, operating on the same subjects, shall be 
abolished. These ordinances alone, to say nothing of those respecting the militia, coin, 
commerce, federal judiciary, etc., will probably soon defeat the operations of the state laws and 
governments. 
Should the general government think it politic, as some administration (if not all) probably will, 
to look for a support in a system of influence, the government will take every occasion to 
multiply laws, and officers to execute them, considering these as so many necessary props for its 
own support. Should this system of policy be adopted, taxes more productive than the impost 
duties will, probably, be wanted to support the government, and to discharge foreign demands, 
without leaving anything for the domestic creditors. The internal sources of taxation then must 
be called into operation, and internal tax laws and federal assessors and collectors spread over 
this immense country. All these circumstances considered, is it wise, prudent, or safe, to vest the 
powers of laying and collecting internal taxes in the general government, while imperfectly 
organized and inadequate? And to trust to amending it hereafter, and making it adequate to this 
purpose? It is not only unsafe but absurd to lodge power in a government before it is fitted to 
receive it. It is confessed that this power and representation ought to go together. Why give the 
power first? Why give the power to the few, who, when possessed of it, may have address 
enough to prevent the increase of representation? Why not keep the power, and, when necessary, 
amend the constitution, and add to its other parts this power, and a proper increase of 
representation at the same time? Then men who may want the power will be under strong 
inducements to let in the people, by their representatives, into the government, to hold their due 
proportion of this power. If a proper representation be impracticable, then we shall see this 
power resting in the states, where it at present ought to be, and not inconsiderately given up. 
When I recollect how lately congress, conventions, legislatures, and people contended in the 
cause of liberty, and carefully weighed the importance of taxation, I can scarcely believe we are 
serious in proposing to vest the powers of laying and collecting internal taxes in a government so 
imperfectly organized for such purposes. Should the United States be taxed by a house of 
representatives of two hundred members, which would be about fifteen members for 
Connecticut, twenty-five for Massachusetts, etc., still the middle and lower classes of people 
could have no great share, in fact, in taxation. I am aware it is said, that the representation 
proposed by the new constitution is sufficiently numerous; it may be for many purposes; but to 
suppose that this branch is sufficiently numerous to guard the rights of the people in the 
administration of the government, in which the purse and sword is placed, seems to argue that we 
have forgot what the true meaning of representation is. . . . 
In considering the practicability of having a full and equal representation of the people from all 
parts of the union, not only distances and different opinions, customs and views, common in 
extensive tracts of country, are to be taken into view, but many differences peculiar to Eastern, 
Middle, and Southern States. These differences are not so perceivable among the members of 
congress, and men of general information in the states, as among the men who would properly 
form the democratic branch. The Eastern states are very democratic, and composed chiefly of 
moderate freeholders; they have but few rich men and no slaves; the Southern states are 
composed chiefly of rich planters and slaves; they have but few moderate freeholders, and the 
prevailing influence in them is generally a dissipated aristocracy. The Middle states partake 
partly of the Eastern and partly of the Southern character. . . . I have no idea that the interests, 
feelings, and opinions of three or four millions of people, especially touching internal taxation,
can be collected in such a house. In the nature of things, nine times in ten, men of the elevated 
classes in the community only can be chosen.... 
I am sensible also, that it is said that congress will not attempt to lay and collect internal taxes; 
that it is necessary for them to have the power, though it cannot probably be exercised. I admit 
that it is not probable that any prudent congress will attempt to lay and collect internal taxes, 
especially direct taxes: but this only proves, that the power would be improperly lodged in 
congress, and that it might be abused by imprudent and designing men. 
I have heard several gentlemen, to get rid of objections to this part of the constitution, attempt to 
construe the powers relative to direct taxes, as those who object to it would have them; as to 
these, it is said, that congress will only have power to make requisitions, leaving it to the states to 
lay and collect them. I see but very little color for this construction, and the attempt only proves 
that this part of the plan cannot be defended. By this plan there can be no doubt, but that the 
powers of congress will be complete as to all kinds of taxes whatever. Further, as to internal 
taxes, the state governments will have concurrent powers with the general government, and both 
may tax the same objects in the same year; and the objection that the general government may 
suspend a state tax, as a necessary measure for the promoting the collection of a federal tax, is 
not without foundation. 
THE FEDERAL FARMER
Antifederalist No. 37 FACTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION
.... To have a just idea of the government before us, and to show that a consolidated one is the 
object in view, it is necessary not only to examine the plan, but also its history, and the politics of 
its particular friends. 
The confederation was formed when great confidence was placed in the voluntary exertions of 
individuals, and of the respective states; and the framers of it, to guard against usurpation, so 
limited, and checked the powers, that, in many respects, they are inadequate to the exigencies of 
the union. We find, therefore, members of congress urging alterations in the federal system 
almost as soon as it was adopted. It was early proposed to vest congress with powers to levy an 
impost, to regulate trade, etc., but such was known to be the caution of the states in parting with 
power, that the vestment even of these, was proposed to be under several checks and limitations. 
During the war, the general confusion, and the introduction of paper money, infused in the minds 
of the people vague ideas respecting government and credit. We expected too much from the 
return of peace, and of course we have been disappointed. Our governments have been new and 
unsettled; and several legislatures, by making tender, suspension, and paper money laws, have 
given just cause of uneasiness to creditors. By these and other causes, several orders of men in 
the community have been prepared, by degrees, for a change of government. And this very abuse 
of power in the legislatures, which in some cases has been charged upon the democratic part of 
the community, has furnished aristocratical men with those very weapons, and those very means, 
with which, in great measure, they are rapidly effecting their favorite object. And should an 
oppressive government be the consequence of the proposed change, posterity may reproach not 
only a few overbearing, unprincipled men, but those parties in the states which have misused 
their powers. 
The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money, and tender laws, has prepared many 
honest men for changes in government, which otherwise they would not have thought of-when 
by the evils, on the one hand, and by the secret instigations of artful men, on the other, the minds 
of men were become sufficiently uneasy, a bold step was taken, which is usually followed by a 
revolution, or a civil war. A general convention for mere commercial purposes was moved for-
the authors of this measure saw that the people's attention was turned solely to the amendment of 
the federal system; and that, had the idea of a total change been started, probably no state would 
have appointed members to the convention. The idea of destroying ultimately, the state 
government, and forming one consolidated system, could not have been admitted-a convention, 
therefore, merely for vesting in congress power to regulate trade was proposed. This was 
pleasing to the commercial towns; and the landed people had little or no concern about it. In 
September, 1786, a few men from the middle states met at Annapolis, and hastily proposed a 
convention to be held in May, 1787, for the purpose, generally, of amending the confederation. 
This was done before the delegates of Massachusetts, and of the other states arrived-still not a 
word was said about destroying the old constitution, and making a new one. The states still 
unsuspecting, and not aware that they were passing the Rubicon, appointed members to the new 
convention, for the sole and express purpose of revising and amending the confederation-and, 
probably, not one man in ten thousand in the United States, till within these ten or twelve days, 
had an idea that the old ship was to be destroyed, and be put to the alternative of embarking in 
the new ship presented, or of being left in danger of sinking. The States, I believe, universally 
supposed the convention would report alterations in the confederation, which would pass an 
examination in congress, and after being agreed to there, would be confirmed by all the 
legislatures, or be rejected. Virginia made a very respectable appointment, and placed at the head 
of it the first man in America. In this appointment there was a mixture of political characters; but 
Pennsylvania appointed principally those men who are esteemed aristocratical. Here the favorite 
moment for changing the government was evidently discerned by a few men, who seized it with 
address. Ten other states appointed, and tho' they chose men principally connected with 
commerce and the judicial department yet they appointed many good republican characters. Had 
they all attended we should now see, I am persuaded, a better system presented. The 
nonattendance of eight or nine men, who were appointed members of the convention, I shall ever 
consider as a very unfortunate event to the United States. Had they attended, I am pretty clear 
that the result of the convention would not have had that strong tendency to aristocracy now 
discernible in every part of the plan. There would not have been so great an accumulation of 
powers, especially as to the internal police of this country in a few hands as the constitution 
reported proposes to vest in them-the young visionary men, and the consolidating aristocracy, 
would have been more restrained than they have been. Eleven states met in the convention, and 
after four months close attention presented the new constitution, to be adopted or rejected by the 
people. The uneasy and fickle part of the community may be prepared to receive any form of 
government; but I presume the enlightened and substantial part will give any constitution 
presented for their adoption a candid and thorough examination.... We shall view the convention 
with proper respect-and, at the same time, that we reflect there were men of abilities and integrity 
in it, we must recollect how disproportionately the democratic and aristocratic parts of the 
community were represented. Perhaps the judicious friends and opposers of the new constitution 
will agree, that it is best to let it rely solely on its own merits, or be condemned for its own 
defects. . . . 
This subject of consolidating the states is new. And because forty or fifty men have agreed in a 
system, to suppose the good sense of this country, an enlightened nation, must adopt it without 
examination, and though in a state of profound peace, without endeavoring to amend those parts 
they perceive are defective, dangerous to freedom, and destructive of the valuable principles of 
republican government -is truly humiliating. It is true there may be danger in delay; but there is 
danger in adopting the system in its present form. 
And I see the danger in either case will arise principally from the conduct and views of two very 
unprincipled parties in the United States-two fires, between which the honest and substantial 
people have long found themselves situated. One party is composed of little insurgents, men in 
debt, who want no law, and who want a share of the property of others; these are called revellers, 
Shayites, etc. The other party is composed of a few, but more dangerous men, with their servile 
dependents; these avariciously grasp at all power and property; you may discover in all the 
actions of these men, an evident dislike to free and equal government, and they will go 
systematically to work to change, essentially, the forms of government in this country; these are 
called aristocrats, monarchists, etc. Between these two parties is the weight of the community; 
the men of middling property, men not in debt on the one hand, and men, on the other, content 
with republican governments, and not aiming at immense fortunes, offices, and power. In 1786, 
the little insurgents, the revellers, came forth, invaded the rights of others, and attempted to 
establish governments according to their wills. Their movements evidently gave encouragement 
to the other party, which, in 1787, has taken the political field, and with its fashionable 
dependents, and the tongue and the pen, is endeavoring to establish in a great haste, a politer kind 
of government. These two parties, which will probably be opposed or united as it may suit their 
interests and views, are really insignificant, compared with the solid, free, and independent part 
of the community. It is not my intention to suggest, that either of these parties, and the real 
friends of the proposed constitution, are the same men. The fact is, these aristocrats support and 
hasten the adoption of the proposed constitution, merely because they think it is a stepping stone 
to their favorite object. I think I am well founded in this idea. I think the general politics of these 
men support it, as well as the common observation among them: That the proffered plan is the 
best that can be got at present, it will do for a few years, and lead to something better. The 
sensible and judicious part of the community will carefully weigh all these circumstances; they 
will view the late convention as a respectable body of men-America probably never will see an 
assembly of men, of a like number, more respectable. But the members of the convention met 
without knowing the sentiments of one man in ten thousand in these states respecting the new 
ground taken. Their doings are but the first attempts in the most important scene ever opened. 
Though each individual in the state conventions will not, probably, be so respectable as each 
individual in the federal convention, yet as the state conventions will probably consist of fifteen 
hundred or two thousand men of abilities, and versed in the science of government, collected 
from all parts of the community and from all orders of men, it must be acknowledged that the 
weight of respectability will be in them. In them will be collected the solid sense and the real 
political character of the country. Being revisers of the subject, they will possess peculiar 
advantages. To say that these conventions ought not to attempt, coolly and deliberately, the 
revision of the system, or that they cannot amend it, is very foolish or very assuming. . . . 
THE FEDERAL FARMER
Antifederalist No. 38 SOME REACTIONS TO FEDERALIST 
ARGUMENTS
This was an essay by "BRUTUS JUNIOR" which appeared in The New-York Journal on 
November 8, 1787. Two articles by "A COUNTRYMAN" were written by DeWitt Clinton, and 
appeared also in the New York Journal on January 10 and February 14, 1788. 
I have read with a degree of attention several publications which have lately appeared in favor of 
the new Constitution; and as far as I am able to discern, the arguments (if they can be so termed) 
of most weight, which are urged in its favor, may be reduced to the two following: 
1st. That the men who formed it, were wise and experienced; that they were an illustrious band 
of patriots, and had the happiness of their country at heart; that they were four months 
deliberating on the subject, and therefore, it must be a perfect system. 
2nd. That if the system be not received, this country will be without any government, and of 
consequence, will be reduced to a state of anarchy and confusion, and involved in bloodshed and 
carnage; and in the end, a government will be imposed upon us, not the result of reason and 
reflection, but of force and usurpation. 
As I do not find ' that either Cato or the Centinel, Brutus, or the Old Whig, or any other writer 
against this constitution, have undertaken a particular refutation of this new species of reasoning, 
I take the liberty of offering to the public, through the channel of your paper, the few following 
animadversions on the subject; and, the rather, because I have discovered, that some of my 
fellow citizens have been imposed upon by it. 
With respect to the first,-it will be readily perceived that it precludes all investigation of the 
merits of the proposed constitution, and leads to an adoption of the plan without inquiring 
whether it be good or bad. For if we are to infer the perfection of this system from the characters 
and abilities of the men who formed it, we may as well determine to accept it without any 
inquiry as with. A number of persons in this [New York] as well as the other states, have, upon 
this principle, determined to submit to it without even reading or knowing its contents. 
But supposing the premises from which this conclusion is drawn to be just, it then becomes 
essential in order to give validity to the argument, to inquire into the characters of those who 
composed this body, that we may determine whether we can be justified in placing such 
unbounded confidence in them. 
It is an invidious task, to call in question the characters of individuals, especially of such as are 
placed in illustrious stations. But when we are required implicitly to submit our opinions to those 
of others, from a consideration that they are so wise and good as not to be liable to err, and that 
too in an affair which involves in it the happiness of ourselves and our posterity, every honest 
man will justify a decent investigation of characters in plain language. 
It is readily admitted that many individuals who composed this body were men of the first talents 
and integrity in the union. It is at the same time, well known to every man, who is but moderately 
acquainted with the characters of the members, that many of them are possessed of high 
aristocratic ideas, and the most sovereign contempt of the common people; that not a few were 
strongly disposed in favor of monarchy; that there were some of no small talents and of great 
influence, of consummate cunning and masters of intrigue, whom the war found poor or in 
embarrassed circumstances, and left with princely fortunes acquired in public employment. . . . 
that there were others who were young, ardent, and ambitious, who wished for a government 
corresponding with their feelings, while they were destitute of experience ... in political 
researches; that there were not a few who were gaping for posts of honor and emolument-these 
we find exulting in the idea of a change which will divert places of honor, influence and 
emolument, into a different channel, where the confidence of the people will not be necessary to 
their acquirement. It is not to be wondered at, that an assembly thus composed should produce a 
system liable to well founded objections, and which will require very essential alterations. We 
are told by one of themselves (Mr. [James] Wilson of Philadelphia) the plan was [a] matter of 
accommodation, and it is not unreasonable to suppose, that in this accommodation, principles 
might be introduced which would render the liberties of the people very insecure. 
I confess I think it of no importance what are the characters of the framers of this government, 
and therefore should not have called them in question, if they had not been so often urged in 
print, and in conversation, in its favor. It ought to rest on its own intrinsic merit. If it is good, it is 
capable of being vindicated; if it is bad, it ought not to be supported. It is degrading to a freeman, 
and humiliating to a rational one, to pin his faith on the sleeve of any man, or body of men, in an 
affair of such momentous importance. 
In answer to the second argument, I deny that we are in immediate danger of anarchy and 
commotions. Nothing but the passions of wicked and ambitious men will put us in the least 
danger on this head. Those who are anxious to precipitate a measure will always tell us that the 
present is the critical moment; now is the time, the crisis is arrived, and the present minute must 
be seized. Tyrants have always made use of this plea; but nothing in our circumstances can 
justify it. 
The country is in profound peace, and we are not threatened by invasions from any quarter. The 
governments of the respective states are in the full exercise of their powers; and the lives, the 
liberty, and property of individuals are protected. All present exigencies are answered by them. It 
is true, the regulation of trade and a competent provision for the payment of the interest of the 
public debt is wanting; but no immediate commotion will arise from these; time may be taken for 
calm discussion and deliberate conclusions. Individuals are just recovering from the losses and 
embarrassment sustained by the late war. Industry and frugality are taking their station, and 
banishing from the community, idleness and prodigality. Individuals are lessening their private 
debts, and several millions of the public debt is discharged by the sale of the western territory. 
There is no reason, therefore, why we should precipitately and rashly adopt a system, which is 
imperfect or insecure. We may securely deliberate and propose amendments and alterations. I 
know it is said we cannot change for the worse; but if we act the part of wise men, we shall take 
care that we change for the better. It will be labor lost, if after all our pains we are in no better 
circumstances than we were before. 
I have seen enough to convince me very fully, that the new constitution is a very bad one, and a 
hundred-fold worse than our present government. And I do not perceive that any of the writers in 
favor of it (although some of them use a vast many fine words, and show a great deal of learning) 
are able to remove any of the objections which are made against it. Mr. [James] Wilson, indeed, 
speaks very highly of it, but we have only his word for its goodness; and nothing is more natural 
than for a mother to speak well of her own bantling, however ordinary it may be. He seems, 
however, to be pretty honest in one thing-where he says, "It is the nature of man to pursue his 
own interest, in preference to the public good"'-for they tell me he is a lawyer, and his interest 
then makes him for the new government, for it will be a noble thing for lawyers. Besides, he 
appears to have an eye to some high place under it, since he speaks with great pleasure of the 
places of honor and emolument being diverted to a new channel by this change of system. As to 
Mr. Publius [The Federalist], I have read a great many of his papers, and I really cannot find out 
what he would be at. He seems to me as if he was going to write a history, so I have concluded to 
wait and buy one of his books, when they come out. The only thing I can understand from him, 
as far as I have read, is that it is better to be united than divided-that a great many people are 
stronger than a few-and that Scotland is better off since the union with England than before. And 
I think, he proves too, very clearly, that the fewer nations there are in the world, the fewer 
disputes [there] will be about the law of nations-and the greater number that are joined in one 
government, the abler will they be to raise ships and soldiers, and the less need for fighting. But I 
do not learn that any body denies these matters, or that they have any thin- to do with the new 
constitution, Indeed I am at a loss to know, whether Mr. Publius means to persuade us to return 
back to the old government, and make ourselves as happy as Scotland has by its union, or to 
accept of the new constitution, and get all the world to join with us, so as to make one large 
government. It would certainly, if what he says is true, be very convenient for Nova-Scotia and 
Canada, and, for ought I know, his advice will have great weight with them. I have also read 
several other of the pieces, which appear to be wrote by some other little authors, and by people 
of little consequence, though they seem to think themselves men of importance, and take upon 
them grand names such as . . . Caesar,' . . . Now Mr. Caesar do[es] not depend so much on 
reasoning as upon bullying. He abuses the people very much, and if he spoke in our 
neighborhood as impudently as he writes in the newspapers, I question whether he would come 
off with whole bones. From the manner he talks of the people, he certainly cannot be one of them 
himself. I imagine he has lately come over from some old country, where they are all Lords and 
no common people. If so, it would be as well for him to go back again as to meddle himself with 
our business, since he holds such a bad opinion of us. 
A COUNTRYMAN
The Federalist, as be terms himself, or Publius, puts one in mind of some of the gentlemen of the 
long robe, when hard pushed, in a bad cause, with a rich client. They frequently say a great deal 
which does not apply; but yet, if it will not convince the judge nor jury, may, perhaps, help to 
make them forget some part of the evidence, embarrass their opponent, and make the audience 
stare, besides increasing the practice. 
A COUNTRYMAN
Antifederalist No. 39 APPEARANCE AND REALITY-THE 
FORM IS FEDERAL; THE EFFECT IS NATIONAL
The following excerpt is from the essays of "A FARMER." It appeared in the Philadelphia 
Independent Gazetteer on April 15 and 22, 1788 
. . . . The Freeman, in his second number, after mentioning in a very delusory manner diverse 
powers which remain with the states, says we shall find many other instances under the 
constitution which require or imply the existence or continuance of the sovereignty and severalty 
of the states. He, as well as all the advocates of the new system, take as their strong ground the 
election of senators by the state legislatures, and the special representation of the states in the 
federal senate, to prove that internal sovereignty still remains with the States. Therefore they say 
that the new system is so far from annihilating the state governments, that it secures them, that it 
cannot exist without them, that the existence of the one is essential to the existence of the other. 
It is true that this particular partakes strongly of that mystery which is characteristic of the 
system itself. But if I demonstrate that this particular, so far from implying the continuance of the 
state sovereignties, proves in the clearest manner the want of it, I hope the other particular 
powers will not be necessary to dwell upon. 
The State legislatures do not choose senators by legislative or sovereign authority, but by a 
power of ministerial agency as mere electors or boards of appointment. They have no power to 
direct the senators how or what duties they shall perform; they have neither power to censure the 
senators, nor to supersede them for misconduct. It is not the power of choosing to office merely 
that designates sovereignty, or else corporations who appoint their own officers and make their 
own by-laws, or the heads of department who choose the officers under them, such as 
commanders of armies, etc., may be called sovereigns, because they can name men to office 
whom they cannot dismiss therefrom. The exercise of sovereignty does not consist in choosing 
masters, such as the senators would be, who, when chosen, would be beyond control, but in the 
power of dismissing, impeaching, or the like, those to whom authority is delegated. The power of 
instructing or superseding of delegates to Congress under the existing confederation has never 
been complained of, although the necessary rotation of members of Congress has often been 
censured for restraining the state sovereignties too much in the objects of their choice. As well 
may the electors who are to vote for the president under the new constitution, be said to be 
vested with the sovereignty, as the State legislatures in the act of choosing senators. The senators 
are not even dependent on the States for their wages, but in conjunction with the federal 
representatives establish their own wages. The senators do not vote by States, but as individuals. 
The representatives also vote as individuals, representing people in a consolidated or national 
government; they judge upon their own elections, and, with the Senate, have the power of 
regulating elections in time, place and manner, which is in other words to say, that they have the 
power of elections absolutely vested in them. 
That the State governments have certain ministerial and convenient powers continued to them is 
not denied, and in the exercise of which they may support, but cannot control the general 
government, nor protect their own citizens from the exertion of civil or military tyranny-and this 
ministerial power will continue with the States as long as two- thirds of Congress shall think 
their agency necessary. But even this will be no longer than two-thirds of Congress shall think 
proper to propose, and use the influence of which they would be so largely possessed to remove 
it. 
But these powers of which the Freeman gives us such a profuse detail, and in describing which 
be repeats the same powers with only varying the terms, such as the powers of officering and 
training the militia, appointing State officers, and governing in a number of internal cases, do not 
any of them separately, nor all taken together, amount to independent sovereignty. They are 
powers of mere ministerial agency, which may, and in many nations of Europe are or have been 
vested, as before observed, in heads of departments, hereditary vassals of the crown, or in 
corporations; but not that kind of independent sovereignty which can constitute a member of a 
federal republic, which can enable a State to exist within itself if the general government should 
cease. 
I have often wondered how any writer of sense could have the confidence to avow, or could 
suppose the people to be ignorant enough to believe that, when a State is deprived of the power 
not only of standing armies (this the members of a confederacy ought to be), but of commanding 
its own militia, regulating its elections, directing or superseding its representatives, or paying 
them their wages; who is, moreover, deprived of the command of any property, I mean source of 
revenue or taxation, or what amounts to the same thing, who may enact laws for raising revenue, 
but who may have these laws rendered nugatory, and the execution thereof superseded by the 
laws of Congress. [sic] This is not a strained construction, but the natural operation of the powers 
of Congress under the new constitution; for every object of revenues, every source of taxation, is 
vested in the general government. Even the power of making inspection laws, which, for obvious 
conveniency, is left with the several States, will be unproductive of the smallest revenue to the 
State governments; for, if any should arise, it is to be paid over to the officers of Congress. 
Besides, the words "to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the 
foregoing powers," etc., give, without doubt, the power of repelling or forbidding the execution 
of any tax law whatever, that may interfere with or impede the exercise of the general taxing 
power, and it would not be possible that two taxing powers should be exercised on the same 
sources of taxation without interfering with each other. May not the exercise of this power of 
Congress, when they think proper, operate not only to destroy those ministerial powers which are 
left with the States, but even the very forms? May they not forbid the state legislatures to levy a 
shilling to pay themselves, or those whom they employ, days' wages? 
The State governments may contract for making roads (except post-roads), erecting bridges, 
cutting canals, or any other object of public importance; but when the contract is performed or 
the work done, may not Congress constitutionally prevent the payment? Certainly; they may do 
all this and much more, and no man would have a right to charge them with breaking the law of 
their appointment. It is an established maxim, that wherever the whole power of the revenue or 
taxation is vested, there virtually is the whole effective, influential, sovereign power, let the 
forms be what they may. By this armies are procured, by this every other controlling guard is 
defeated. Every balance or check in government is only so far effective as it has a control over 
the revenue. 
The State governments are not only destitute of all sovereign command of, or control over, the 
revenue or any part of it, but they are divested of the power of commanding or prescribing the 
duties, wages, or punishments of their own militia, or of protecting their life, property or 
characters from the rigors of martial law. The power of making treason laws is both a power and 
an important defense of sovereignty; it is relative to and inseparable from it; to convince the 
States that they are consolidated into one national government, this power is wholly to be 
assumed by the general government. All the prerogatives, all the essential characteristics of 
sovereignty, both of the internal and external kind, are vested in the general government, and 
consequently the several States would not be possessed of any essential power or effective guard 
of sovereignty. Thus I apprehend, it is evident that the consolidation of the States into one 
national government (in contra- distinction from a confederacy) would be the necessary 
consequence of the establishment of the new constitution, and the intention of its framers-and 
that consequently the State sovereignties would be eventually annihilated, though the forms may 
long remain as expensive and burdensome remembrances of what they were in the days when 
(although laboring under many disadvantages) they emancipated this country from foreign 
tyranny, humbled the pride and tarnished the glory of royalty, and erected a triumphant standard 
to liberty and independence. 
A FARMER
Antifederalist No. 40 ON THE MOTIVATIONS AND 
AUTHORITY OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 
Anti-Federalist #40 is a compilation of articles.
It was a common saying among many sensible men in Great Britain and Ireland, in the time of 
the war, that they doubted whether the great men of America, who had taken an active part in 
favor of independence, were influenced by pure patriotism; that it was not the love of their 
country they had so much at heart, as their own private, interest; that a thirst after dominion and 
power, and not to protect the oppressed from the oppressor, was the great operative principle that 
induced these men to oppose Britain so strenuously. This seemingly illiberal sentiment was, 
however, generally denied by the well-hearted and unsuspecting friends of American liberty in 
Europe, who could not suppose that men would engage in so noble a cause thro' such base 
motives. But alas! The truth of the sentiment is now indisputably confirmed; facts are stubborn 
things, and these set the matter beyond controversy. The new constitution and the conduct of its 
despotic advocates, show that these men's doubts were really well founded. Unparalleled 
duplicity! That men should oppose tyranny under a pretence of patriotism, that they might 
themselves become the tyrants. How does such villainy disgrace human nature! Ah, my fellow 
citizens, you have been strangely deceived indeed; when the wealthy of your own country 
assisted you to expel the foreign tyrant, only with a view to substitute themselves in his stead. . . 
But the members of the Federal Convention were men w e been all tried in the field of action, 
say some; they have fought for American liberty. Then the more to their shame be it said; curse 
on the villain who protects virgin innocence only with a view that he may himself become the 
ravisher; so that if the assertion were true, it only turns to their disgrace; but as it happens it is 
not truth, or at least only so in part. This was a scheme taken by the despots and their sycophants 
to bias the public mind in favor of the constitution. For the convention was composed of a 
variety of characters: ambitious men, Jesuits, tories, lawyers, etc., formed the majority, whose 
similitude to each other, consisted only in their determination to lord it over their fellow citizens; 
like the rays that converging from every direction meet in a point, their sentiments and 
deliberations concentered in tyranny alone; they were unanimous in forming a government that 
should raise the fortunes and respectability of the well born few, and oppress the plebeians. 
PHILADELPHIENSIS
Does our soil produce no more Washington's? Is there none who would oppose the attempt to 
establish a government by force? Can we not call from the fields, the counters, the bar, and 
mechanics' shops, any more Generals? Is our soil exhausted? And does any one suppose that the 
Americans, like the Romans, will submit to an army merely because they have conquered a 
foreign enemy? . . . 
AN AMERICAN
I revere the characters of some of the gentlemen that composed the convention at Philadelphia, 
yet I think they were human, and subject to imposition and error, as well as the rest of mankind. 
You lost eight or ten years of your lives and labor by the last war, and you were left at last with 
your debts and encumbrances on you, and numbers of you were soon after the close of it, sued 
and harassed for them. Your persons have been put into a loathsome prison, and others of you 
have had your property sold for taxes, and sometimes for one tenth of its former and actual value 
and you now pay very grievous and heavy taxes, double and treble what you paid before the war; 
and should you adopt this new government, your taxes will be great, increased to support their . . 
. servants and retainers, who will be multiplied upon you to keep you in obedience, and collect 
their duties, taxes, impositions, and excises. Some of you may say the rich men were virtuous in 
the last war; yes, my countrymen, they had reason then to be so! Our liberty then was in dispute 
with a mighty and powerful tyrant, and it was for their interest to promote and carry on the 
opposition, as long as they could stay at home and send the common people into the field to fight 
their battles. After the war began, they could not with decency recede, for the sword and enemy 
were at the very entrance of their gates. The case is greatly altered now; you conquered the 
enemy, and the rich men now think to subdue you by their wiles and arts, or make you, or 
persuade you, to do it yourselves. Their aim, I perceive, is now to destroy that liberty which you 
set up as a reward for the blood and treasure you expended in the pursuit of and establishment of 
it. They well know that open force will not succeed at this time, and have chosen a safer method, 
by offering you a plan of a new Federal Government, contrived with great art, and shaded with 
obscurity, and recommended to you to adopt; which if you do, their scheme is completed, the 
yoke is -fixed on your necks, and you will be undone, perhaps for ever, and your boasted liberty 
is but a sound, Farewell! Be wise, be watchful, guard yourselves against the dangers that are 
concealed in this plan of a new Federal Government. 
A FARMER AND PLANTER
Make the best of this new government-say it is composed of any thing but inspiration-you ought 
to be extremely cautious, watchful, jealous of your liberty; for, instead of securing your rights, 
you may lose them forever. If a wrong step be now made, the republic may be lost forever. If this 
new government will not come up to the expectation of the people, and they shall be 
disappointed, their liberty will be lost, and tyranny must and will arise. I repeat it again, and I 
beg gentlemen to consider, that a wrong step, made now, will plunge us into misery, and our 
republic will be lost. It will be necessary for this [Virginia Ratifying] Convention to have a 
faithful historical detail of the facts that preceded the session of the federal Convention, and the 
reasons that actuated its members in proposing an entire alteration of government, and to 
demonstrate the dangers that awaited us. If they were of such awful magnitude as to warrant a 
proposal so extremely perilous as this, I must assert, that this Convention has an absolute right to 
a thorough discovery of every circumstance relative to this great event. And here I would make 
this inquiry of those worthy characters who composed a part of the late federal Convention. I am 
sure they were fully impressed with the necessity of forming a great consolidated government, 
instead of a confederation. That this is a consolidated government is demonstrably clear; and the 
danger of such a government is, to my mind, very striking. I have the highest veneration for 
those gentlemen; but, sir, give me leave to demand: What right had they to say, We, the people? 
My political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to ask: 
Who authorized them to speak the language of, We, the people, instead of, We, the states? States 
are the characteristics and the soul of a confederation. If the states be not the agents of this 
compact, it must be one great, consolidated, national government, of the people of all the states. I 
have the highest respect for those gentlemen who formed the Convention, and, were some of 
them not here, I would express some testimonial of esteem for them. America had, on a former 
occasion, put the utmost confidence in them-a confidence which was well placed; and I am sure, 
sir, I would give up any thing to them; I would cheerfully confide in them as my representatives. 
But, sir, on this great occasion, I would demand the cause of their conduct. Even from that 
illustrious man who saved us by his valor, I would have a reason for his conduct. . . . That they 
exceeded their power is perfectly clear. . . . The federal Convention ought to have amended the 
old system; for this purpose they were solely delegated; the object of their mission extended to 
no other consideration. You must, therefore, forgive the solicitation of one unworthy member to 
know what danger could have arisen under the present Confederation, and what are the causes of 
this proposal to change our government. 
PATRICK HENRY
What then are we to think of the motives and designs of those men who are urging the implicit 
and immediate adoption of the proposed government; are they fearful, that if you exercise your 
good sense and discernment, you will discover the masqued aristocracy, that they are attempting 
to smuggle upon you under the suspicious garb of republicanism? When we find that the 
principal agents in this business are the very men who fabricated the form of government, it 
certainly ought to be conclusive evidence of their invidious design to deprive us of our liberties. 
The circumstances attending this matter, are such as should in a peculiar manner excite your 
suspicion; it might not be useless to take a review of some of them. 
In many of the states, particularly in this [Pennsylvania] and the northern states, there are 
aristocratic juntos of the well-horn few, who have been zealously endeavoring since the 
establishment of their constitutions, to humble that offensive upstart, equal liberty; but all their 
efforts were unavailing, the ill-bred churl obstinately kept his assumed station. . . . 
A comparison of the authority under which the convention acted, and their form of government, 
will show that they have despised their delegated power, and assumed sovereignty; that they 
have entirely annihilated the old confederation, and the particular governments of the several 
States, and instead thereof have established one general government that is to pervade the union; 
constituted on the most unequal principles, destitute of accountability to its constituents, and as 
despotic in its nature, as the Venetian aristocracy; a government that will give full scope to the 
magnificent designs of the well-horn, a government where tyranny may glut its vengeance on the 
low-born, unchecked by an odious bill of rights. . . ; and yet as a blind upon the understandings 
of the people, they have continued the forms of the particular governments, and termed the 
whole a confederation of the United States, pursuant to the sentiments of that profound, but 
corrupt politician Machiavel, who advises any one who would change the constitution of a state 
to keep as much as possible to the old forms; for then the people seeing the same officers, the 
same formalities, courts of justice and other outward appearances, are insensible of the alteration, 
and believe themselves in possession of their old government. Thus Caesar, when he seized the 
Roman liberties, caused himself to be chosen dictator (which was an ancient office), continued 
the senate, the consuls, the tribunes, the censors, and all other offices and forms of the 
commonwealth; and yet changed Rome from the most free, to the most tyrannical government in 
the world. . . . 
The late convention, in the majesty of its assumed omnipotence, have not even condescended to 
submit the plan of the new government to the confederation of the people, the true source of 
authority; but have called upon them by their several constitutions, to 'assent to and ratify' in 
toto, what they have been pleased to decree; just as the grand monarch of France requires the 
parliament of Paris to register his edicts without revision or alteration, which is necessary 
previous to their execution. . . . 
If you are in doubt about the nature and principles of the proposed government, view the conduct 
of its authors and patrons: that affords the best explanation, the most striking comment. 
The evil genius of darkness presided at its birth, it came forth under the veil of mystery, its true 
features being carefully concealed, and every deceptive art has been and is practicing to have this 
spurious brat received as the genuine offspring of heaven-born liberty. So fearful are its patrons 
that you should discern the imposition, that they have hurried on its adoption, with the greatest 
precipitation. . . 
After so recent a triumph over British despots, after such torrents of blood and treasure have 
been spent, after involving ourselves in the distresses of an arduous war, and incurring such a 
debt for the express purpose of asserting the rights of humanity; it is truly astonishing that a set 
of men among ourselves should have the effrontery to attempt the destruction of our liberties. 
But in this enlightened age to hope to dupe the people by the arts they are practicing is still more 
extraordinary. . . 
The advocates of this plan have artfully attempted to veil over the true nature and principles of it 
with the names of those respectable characters that by consummate cunning and address they 
have prevailed upon to sign it; and what ought to convince the people of the deception and excite 
their apprehensions, is that with every advantage which education, the science of government 
and of law, the knowledge of history and superior talents and endowments, furnish the authors 
and advocates of this plan with, they have from its publication exerted all their power and 
influence to prevent all discussion of the subject, and when this could not be prevented they have 
constantly avoided the ground of argument and recurred to declamation, sophistry and personal 
abuse, but principally relied upon the magic of names. . . . Emboldened by the sanction of the 
august name of a Washington, that they have prostituted to their purpose, they have presumed to 
overleap the usual gradations to absolute power, and have attempted to seize at once upon the 
supremacy of dominion. 
CENTINEL
. . . Another thing they tell us, that the constitution must be good, from the characters which 
composed the Convention that framed it. It is graced with the names of a Washington and a 
Franklin. Illustrious names, we know-worthy characters in civil society. Yet we cannot suppose 
them to be infallible guides; neither yet that a man must necessarily incur guilt to himself merely 
by dissenting from them in opinion. We cannot think the noble general has the same ideas with 
ourselves, with regard to the rules of right and wrong. We cannot think he acts a very consistent 
part, or did through the whole of the contest with Great Britain. Notwithstanding he wielded the 
sword in defense of American liberty, yet at the same time was, and is to this day, living upon 
the labors of several hundreds of miserable Africans, as free born as himself; and some of them 
very likely, descended from parents who, in point of property and dignity in their own country, 
might cope with any man in America. We do not conceive we are to be overborne by the weight 
of any names, however revered. "ALL MEN ARE BORN FREE AND EQUAL"...... 
THE YEOMANRY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Antifederalist No. 41-43 (Part I) Richard Henry Lee "THE 
QUANTITY OF POWER THE UNION MUST POSSESS IS ONE 
THING; THE MODE OF EXERCISING THE POWERS GIVEN IS 
QUITE A DIFFERENT CONSIDERATION" 
Taken from "THE FEDERAL FARMER,"
. . . . A federal republic in itself supposes state or local governments to exist, as the body or 
props, on which the federal bead rests, and that it cannot remain a moment after they cease. In 
erecting the federal government, and always in its councils, each state must be known as a 
sovereign body. But in erecting this government, I conceive, the legislature of the state, by the 
expressed or implied assent of the people, or the people of the state, under the direction of the 
government of it, may accede to the federal compact. Nor do I conceive it to be necessarily a part 
of a confederacy of states, that each have an equal voice in the general councils. A confederated 
republic being organized, each state must retain powers for managing its internal police, and all 
delegate to the union power to manage general concerns. The quantity of power the union must 
possess is one thing; the mode of exercising the powers given is quite a different consideration-
and it is the mode of exercising them, that makes one of the essential distinctions between one 
entire or consolidated government, and a federal republic. That is, however the government may 
be organized, if the laws of the union, in most important concerns, as in levying and collecting 
taxes, raising troops, etc., operate immediately upon the persons and property of individuals, and 
not on states, extend to organizing the militia, etc., the government, as to its administration, as to 
making and executing laws, is not federal, but consolidated. To illustrate my idea: the union 
makes a requisition, and assigns to each state its quota of men or monies wanted; each state, by 
its own laws and officers, in its own way, furnishes its quota. Here the state governments stand 
between the union and individuals; the laws of the union operate only on states, as such, and 
federally. Here nothing can be done without the meetings of the state legislatures. But in the 
other case the union, though the state legislatures should not meet for years together, proceeds 
immediately by its own laws and officers to levy and collect monies of individuals, to enlist men, 
form armies, etc. Here the laws of the union operate immediately on the body of the people, on 
persons and property. In the same manner the laws of one entire consolidated government 
operate. These two modes are very distinct, and in their operation and consequences have 
directly opposite tendencies.... I am not for depending wholly on requisitions. Since the peace, 
and till the convention reported, the wisest men in the United States generally supposed that 
certain limited funds would answer the purposes of the union. And though the states are by no 
means in so good a condition as I wish they were, yet, I think, I may very safely affirm, they are 
in a better condition than they would be had congress always possessed the powers of taxation 
now contended for. The fact is admitted, that our federal government does not possess sufficient 
powers to give life and vigor to the political system; and that we experience disappointments, 
and several inconveniences. But we ought carefully to distinguish those which are merely the 
consequences of a severe and tedious war, from those which arise from defects in the federal 
system. There has been an entire revolution in the United States within thirteen years, and the 
least we can compute the waste of labor and property at, during that period, by the war, is three 
hundred millions of dollars. Our people are like a man just recovering from a severe fit of 
sickness. It was the war that disturbed the course of commerce introduced floods of paper 
money, the stagnation of credit, and threw many valuable men out of steady business. From these 
sources our greatest evils arise. Men of knowledge and reflection must perceive it. But then, have 
we not done more in three or four years past, in repairing the injuries of the war, by repairing 
houses and estates, restoring industry, frugality, the fisheries, manufactures, etc., and thereby 
laying the foundation of good government, and of individual and political happiness, than any 
people ever did in a like time? We must judge from a view of the country and facts, and not from 
foreign newspapers, or our own, which are printed chiefly in the commercial towns, where 
imprudent living, imprudent importations, and many unexpected disappointments, have produced 
a despondency, and a disposition to view everything on the dark side. Some of the evils we feel, 
all will agree, ought to be imputed to the defective administration of the governments. 
From these and various considerations, I am very clearly of opinion that the evils we sustain 
merely on account of the defects of the confederation, ar but as a feather in the balance against a 
mountain, compared with those which would infallibly be the result of the loss of general liberty, 
and that happiness men enjoy under a frugal, free, and mild government. 
Heretofore we do not seem to have seen danger any where, but in giving power to congress, and 
now no where but in congress wanting powers; and without examining the extent of the evils to 
be remedied, by one step we ar for giving up to congress almost all powers of any importance 
without limitation. The defects of the confederation are extravagantly magnified, an every 
species of pain we feel imputed to them; and hence it is inferred, the must be a total change of 
the principles, as well as forms of government And in the main point, touching the federal 
powers, we rest all on a logical inference, totally inconsistent with experience and sound political 
reasoning. 
It is said, that as the federal head must make peace and war, and provide for the common 
defense, it ought to possess all powers necessary to that end. That powers unlimited, as to the 
purse and sword, to raise men and monies and form the militia, are necessary to that end; and 
therefore, the federal head ought to possess them. This reasoning is far more specious than solid. 
It is necessary that these powers so exist in the body politic, as to be called into exercise 
whenever necessary for the public safety. But it is by no means true that the man, or congress of 
men, whose duty it more immediately is to provide for the common defense, ought to possess 
them without limitation. But clear it is, that if such men, or congress, be not in a situation to hold 
them without danger to liberty, he or they ought not to possess them. It has long been thought to 
be a well founded position, that the purse and sword ought not to be placed in the same hands in 
a free government. Our wise ancestors have carefully separated them-placed the sword in the 
hands of their king, even under considerable limitations, and the purse in the hands of the 
commons alone. Yet the king makes peace and war, and it is his duty to provide for the common 
defense of the nation. This authority at least goeth thus far-that a nation, well versed in the 
science of government, does not conceive it to be necessary or expedient for the man entrusted 
with the common defense and general tranquility, to possess unlimitedly the power in question, 
or even in any considerable degree. Could he, whose duty it is t defend the public, possess in 
himself independently, all the means of doing it consistent with the public good, it might be 
convenient. But the people o England know that their liberties and happiness would be in 
infinitely great danger from the king's unlimited possession of these powers, than from al 
external enemies and internal commotions to which they might be exposed Therefore, though 
they have made it his duty to guard the empire, yet the have wisely placed in other hands, the 
hands of their representatives, the power to deal out and control the means. In Holland their high 
mightiness must provide for the common defense, but for the means they depend in considerable 
degree upon requisitions made on the state or local assemblies Reason and facts evince, that 
however convenient it might be for an executive magistrate, or federal head, more immediately 
charged with the national defense and safety, solely, directly, and independently to possess all 
the means, yet such magistrate or head never ought to possess them if thereby the public liberties 
shall be endangered. The powers in question never have been, by nations wise and free, 
deposited, nor can they ever be, with safety, any where out of the principal members of the 
national system. Where these form one entire government, as in Great Britain, they are separated 
and lodged in the principal members of it. But in a federal republic, there is quite a different 
organization; the people form this kind of government, generally, because their territories are too 
extensive to admit of their assembling in one legislature, or of executing the laws on free 
principles under one entire government. They Convene in their local assemblies, for local 
purposes, and for managing their internal concerns, and unite their states under a federal head for 
general purposes. It is the essential characteristic of a confederated republic, that this head be 
dependent on, and kept within limited bounds by the local governments; and it is because, in 
these alone, in fact, the people can be substantially assembled or represented. It is, therefore, we 
very universally see, in this kind of government, the congressional powers placed in a few hands, 
and accordingly limited, and specifically enumerated; and the local assemblies strong and well 
guarded, and composed of numerous members. Wise men will always place the controlling 
power where the people are substantially collected by their representatives. By the proposed 
system the federal head will possess, without limitation, almost every species of power that can, 
in its exercise, tend to change the government, or to endanger liberty; while in it, I think it has 
been fully shown, the people will have but the shadow of representation, and but the shadow of 
security for their rights and liberties. In a confederated republic, the division of representation, 
etc., in its nature, requires a correspondent division and deposit of powers, relative to taxes and 
military concerns. And I think the plan offered stands quite alone, in confounding the principles 
of governments in themselves totally distinct. I wish not to exculpate the states for their improper 
neglects in not paying their quotas of requisitions. But, in applying the remedy, we must be 
governed by reason and facts. It will not be denied that the people have a right to change the 
government when the majority choose it, if not restrained by some existing compact; that they 
have a right to displace their rulers, and consequently to determine when their measures are 
reasonable or not; and that they have a right, at any time, to put a stop to those measures they 
may deem prejudicial to them, by such forms and negatives as they may see fit to provide. From 
all these, and many other well founded considerations, I need not mention, a question arises, 
what powers shall there be delegated to the federal head, to insure safety, as well as energy, in 
the government? I think there is a safe and proper medium pointed out by experience, by reason, 
and facts. When we have organized the government, we ought to give power to the union, so far 
only as experience and present circumstances shall direct, with a reasonable regard to time to 
come. Should future circumstances, contrary to our expectations, require that further powers be 
transferred to the union, we can do it far more easily, than get back those we may now 
imprudently give. The system proposed is untried. Candid advocates and opposers admit, that it 
is in a degree, a mere experiment, and that its organization is weak and imperfect. Surely then, 
the safe ground is cautiously to vest power in it, and when we are sure we have given enough for 
ordinary exigencies, to be extremely careful how we delegate powers, which, in common cases, 
must necessarily be useless or abused, and of very uncertain effect in uncommon ones. By giving 
the union power to regulate commerce, and to levy and collect taxes by imposts, we give it an 
extensive authority, and permanent productive funds, I believe quite as adequate to present 
demands of the union, as excises and direct taxes can be made to the present demands of the 
separate states. The state governments are now about four times as expensive as that of the 
union; and their several state debts added together, are nearly as large as that of the union. Our 
impost duties since the peace have been almost as productive as the other sources of taxation, 
and when under one general system of regulations, the probability is that those duties will be 
very considerably increased. Indeed the representation proposed will hardly justify giving to 
congress unlimited powers to raise taxes by imposts, in addition to the other powers the union 
must necessarily have. It is said, that if congress possess only authority to raise taxes by imposts, 
trade probably will be overburdened with taxes, and the taxes of the union be found inadequate 
to any uncommon exigencies. To this we may observe, that trade generally finds its own level, 
and will naturally and necessarily heave off any undue burdens laid upon it. Further, if congress 
alone possess the impost, and also unlimited power to raise monies by excises and direct taxes, 
there must be much more danger that two taxing powers, the union and states, will carry excises 
and direct taxes to an unreasonable extent, especially as these have not the natural boundaries 
taxes on trade have. However, it is not my object to propose to exclude congress from raising 
monies by internal taxes, except in strict conformity to the federal plan; that is, by the agency of 
the state governments in all cases, except where a state shall neglect, for an unreasonable time, to 
pay its quota of a requisition; and never where so many of the state legislatures as represent a 
majority of the people, shall formally determine an excise law or requisition is improper, in their 
next session after the same be laid before them. We ought always to recollect that the evil to be 
guarded against is found by our own experience, and the experience of others, to be mere neglect 
in the states to pay their quotas; and power in the union to levy and collect the neglecting states' 
quotas with interest, is fully adequate to the evil. By this federal plan, with this exception 
mentioned, we secure the means of collecting the taxes by the usual process of law, and avoid 
the evil of attempting to compel or coerce a state; and we avoid also a circumstance, which never 
yet could be, and I am fully confident never can be, admitted in a free federal republic-I mean a 
permanent and continued system of tax laws of the union, executed in the bowels of the states by 
many thousand officers, dependent as to the assessing and collecting federal taxes solely upon 
the union. On every principle, then, we ought to provide that the union render an exact account 
of all monies raised by imposts and other taxes whenever monies shall be wanted for the 
purposes of the union beyond the proceeds of the impost duties; requisitions shall be made on the 
states for the monies so wanted; and that the power of laying and collecting shall never be 
exercised, except in cases where a state shall neglect, a given time, to pay its quota. This mode 
seems to be strongly pointed out by the reason of the case, and spirit of the government; and I 
believe, there is no instance to be found in a federal republic, where the congressional powers 
ever extended generally to collecting monies by direct taxes or excises. Creating all these 
restrictions, still the powers of the union in matters of taxation will be too unlimited; further 
checks, in my mind, are indispensably necessary. Nor do I conceive, that as full a representation 
as is practicable in the federal government, will afford sufficient security. The strength of the 
government, and the confidence of the people, must be collected principally in the local 
assemblies. . . . A government possessed of more power than its constituent parts will justify, 
will not only probably abuse it, but be unequal to bear its own burden; it may as soon be 
destroyed by the pressure of power, as languish and perish for want of it. 
There are two ways further of raising checks, and guarding against -undue combinations and 
influence in a federal system. The first is-in levying taxes, raising and keeping up armies, in 
building navies, in forming plans for the militia, and in appropriating monies for the support of 
the military-to require the attendance of a large proportion of the federal representatives, as two-
thirds or three-fourths of them; and in passing laws, in these important cases, to require the 
consent of two-thirds or three- fourths of the members present. The second is, by requiring that 
certain important laws of the federal head-as a requisition or a law for raising monies by excise-
shall be laid before the state legislatures, and if disapproved of by a given number of them, say 
by as many of them as represent a majority of the people, the law shall have no effect. Whether it 
would be advisable to adopt both, or either of these checks, I will not undertake to determine. We 
have seen them both exist in confederated republics. The first exists substantially in the 
confederation, and will exist in some measure in the plan proposed, as in choosing a president by 
the house, or in expelling members; in the senate, in making treaties, and in deciding on
impeachments; and in the whole, in altering the constitution. The last exists in the United 
Netherlands, but in a much greater extent. The first is founded on this principle, that these 
important measures may, sometimes, be adopted by a bare quorum of members, perhaps from a 
few states, and that a bare majority of the federal representatives may frequently be of the 
aristocracy, or some particular interests, connections, or parties in the community, and governed 
by motives, views, and inclinations not compatible with the general interest. The last is founded 
on this principle, that the people will be substantially represented, only in their state or local 
assemblies; that their principal security must be found in them; and that, therefore, they ought to 
have ultimately a constitutional control over such interesting measures. 
THE FEDERAL FARMER
Antifederalist No. 41-43 (Part II) (Richard Henry Lee) 
"THE QUANTITY OF POWER THE UNION MUST POSSESS IS 
ONE THING; THE MODE OF EXERCISING THE POWERS 
GIVEN IS QUITE A DIFFERENT CONSIDERATION" 
. . . In the present state of mankind, and of conducting war, the government of every nation must 
have power to raise and keep up regular troops. The question is, how shall this power be lodged? 
In an entire government, as in Great-Britain, where the people assemble by their representatives 
in one legislature, there is no difficulty; it is of course properly lodged in that legislature. But in a 
confederated republic, where the organization consists of a federal head, and local governments, 
there is no one part in which it can be solely, and safely lodged. By Art. 1., Sect. 8., "congress 
shall have power to raise and support armies," etc. By Art. I., Sect. 10., "no state, without the 
consent of congress, shall keep troops, or ships of war, in time of peace." It seems fit the union 
should direct the raising of troops, and the union may do it in two ways: by requisitions on the 
states, or by direct taxes. The first is most conformable to the federal plan, and safest; and it may 
be improved, by giving the union power, by its own laws and officers, to raise the state's quota 
that may neglect, and to charge it with the expense; and by giving a fixed quorum of the state 
legislatures power to disapprove the requisition. There would be less danger in this power to 
raise troops, could the state governments keep a proper control over the purse and over the 
militia. But after all the precautions we can take, without evidently fettering the union too much, 
we must give a large accumulation of powers to it, in these and other respects. There is one 
check, which, I think may be added with great propriety-that is, no land forces shall be kept up, 
but by legislative acts annually passed by congress, and no appropriation of monies for their 
support shall be for a longer term than one year. This is the constitutional practice in Great 
Britain, and the reasons for such checks in the United States appear to be much stronger. We 
may also require that these acts be passed by a special majority, as before mentioned. There is 
another mode still more guarded, and which seems to be founded in the true spirit of a federal 
system: it seems proper to divide those powers we can with safety, lodge them in no one member 
of the government alone; yet substantially to preserve their use, and to insure duration to the 
government by modifying the exercise of them-it is to empower congress to raise troops by 
direct levies, not exceeding a given number, say 2000 in time of peace, and 12,000 in a time of 
war, and for such further troops as may be wanted, to raise them by requisitions qualified ,as 
before mentioned. By the above recited clause no state shall keep troops, etc., in time of peace-
this clearly implies it may do it in time of war. This must be on the principle that the union 
cannot defend all parts of the republic, and suggests an idea very repugnant to the general 
tendency of the system proposed, which is to disarm the state governments. A state in a long war 
may collect forces sufficient to take the field against the neighboring states. This clause was 
copied from the confederation, in which it was of more importance than in the plan proposed, 
because under this the separate states, probably, will have but small revenues. 
By Article I., section 8., congress shall have power to establish uniform laws on the subject of 
bankruptcies throughout the United States. It is to be observed, that the separate states have ever 
been in possession of the power, and in the use of it, of making bankrupt-laws, militia laws, and 
laws in some other cases, respecting which, the new constitution, when adopted, will give the 
union power to legislate, etc. But no words are used by the constitution to exclude the 
jurisdiction of the several states, and whether they will be excluded or not, or whether they and 
the union will have concurrent jurisdiction or not, must be determined by inference, and from the 
nature of the subject. If the power, for instance, to make uniform laws on the subject of 
bankruptcies, is in its nature indivisible, or incapable of being exercised by two legislatures 
independently, or by one in aid of the other, then the states are excluded, and cannot legislate at 
all on the subject, even though the union should neglect or find it impracticable to establish 
uniform bankrupt laws. How far the union will find it practicable to do this, time only can fully 
determine. When we consider the extent of the country, and the very different ideas of the 
different parts in it, respecting credit, and the mode of making men's property liable for paying 
their debts, we may, I think with some degree of certainty, conclude that the union never will be 
able to establish such laws. But if practicable, it does not appear to me, on further reflection, that 
the union ought to have the power. It does not appear to me to be a power properly incidental to 
a federal head, and, I believe, no one ever possessed it. It is a power that will immediately and 
extensively interfere with the internal police of the separate states, especially with their 
administering justice among their own citizens. By giving this power to the union, we greatly 
extend the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, as all questions arising on bankrupt laws, being 
laws of the union . . .-[indeed], almost all civil causes-may be drawn into those courts. We must 
be sensible how cautious we ought to be in extending unnecessarily the jurisdiction of those 
courts for reasons I need not repeat. This article of power too, will considerably increase, in the 
hands of the union, an accumulation of powers, some of a federal and some of an unfederal 
nature, [already] too large without it. The constitution provides that congress shall have the sole 
and exclusive government of what is called the federal city, a place not exceeding ten miles 
square, and of all places ceded for forts, dock-yards, etc. I believe this is a novel kind of 
provision in a federal republic; it is repugnant to the spirit of such a government, and must be 
founded in an apprehension of a hostile disposition between the federal head and the state 
governments. And it is not improbable that the sudden retreat of congress from Philadelphia first 
gave rise to it. With this apprehension, we provide, the government of the union shall have 
secluded places, cities, and castles of defense, which no state laws whatever shall invade. When 
we attentively examine this provision in all its consequences, it opens to view scenes almost 
without bounds. A federal, or rather a national city, ten miles square, containing a hundred 
square miles, is about four times as large as London; and for forts, magazines, arsenals, dock 
yards, and other needful buildings, congress may possess a number of places or towns in each 
state. It is true, congress cannot have them unless the state legislatures cede them; but when once 
ceded, they never can be recovered. And though the general temper of the legislatures may be 
averse to such cessions, yet many opportunities and advantages may be taken of particular times 
and circumstances of complying assemblies, and of particular parties, to obtain them. it is not 
improbable, that some considerable towns or places, in some intemperate moments, or 
influenced by anti-republican principles, will petition to be ceded for the purposes mentioned in 
the provision. There are men, and even towns, in the best republics, which are often fond of 
withdrawing from the government of them, whenever occasion shall present. The case is still 
stronger. If the provision in question holds out allurements to attempt to withdraw, the people of 
a state must ever be subject to state as well as federal taxes; but the federal city and places will 
be subject only to the latter, and to them by no fixed proportion. Nor of the taxes raised in them, 
can the separate states demand any account of congress. These doors opened for withdrawing 
from the state governments entirely, may, on other accounts, be very alluring and pleasing to 
those anti- republican men who prefer a place under the wings of courts. 
If a federal town be necessary for the residence of congress and the public officers, it ought to be 
a small one, and the government of it fixed on republican and common law principles, carefully 
enumerated and established by the constitution. it is true, the states, when they shall cede places, 
may stipulate that the laws and government of congress in them shall always be formed on such 
principles. But it is easy to discern, that the stipulations of a state, or of the inhabitants of the 
place ceded, can be of but little avail against the power and gradual encroachments of the union. 
The principles ought to be established by the federal constitution, to which all states are parties; 
but in no event can there be any need of so large a city and places for forts, etc., totally exempted 
from the laws and jurisdictions of the state governments. If I understand the constitution, the 
laws of congress, constitutionally made, will have complete and supreme jurisdiction to all 
federal purposes, on every inch of ground in the United States, and exclusive jurisdiction on the 
high seas, and this by the highest authority, the consent of the people. Suppose ten acres at West-
Point shall be used as a fort of the union, or a sea port town as a dockyard: the laws of the union, 
in those places, respecting the navy, forces of the union, and all federal objects, must prevail, be 
noticed by all judges and officers, and executed accordingly. And I can discern no one reason for 
excluding from these places, the operation of state laws, as to mere state purpose for instance, for 
the collection of state taxes in them; recovering debts; deciding questions of property arising 
within them on state laws; punishing, by state laws, theft, trespasses, and offenses committed in 
them by mere citizens against the state law. 
The city, and all the places in which the union shall have this exclusive jurisdiction, will be 
immediately under one entire government, that of the federal head, and be no part of any state, 
and consequently no part of the United States. The inhabitants of the federal city and places, will 
be as much exempt from the laws and control of the state governments, as the people of Canada 
or Nova Scotia will be. Neither the laws of the states respecting taxes, the militia, crimes of 
property, will extend to them; nor is there a single stipulation in the constitution, that the 
inhabitants of this city, and these places, shall be governed by laws founded on principles of 
freedom. All questions, civil and criminal, arising on the laws of these places, which must be the 
laws of congress, must be decided in the federal courts; and also, all questions that may, by such 
judicial fictions as these courts may consider reasonable, be supposed to arise within this city, or 
any of these places, may be brought into these courts. By a very common legal fiction, any 
personal contract may be supposed to have been made in any place. A contract made in Georgia 
may be supposed to have been made in the federal city; the courts will admit the fiction. . . . 
Every suit in which an inhabitant of a federal district may be a party, of course may be instituted 
in the federal courts; also, every suit in which it may be alleged and not denied, that a party in it 
is an inhabitant of such a district; also, every suit to which a foreign state or subject, the union, a 
state, citizens of different states in fact, or by reasonable legal fictions, may be a party or parties. 
And thus, by means of bankrupt laws, federal districts, etc., almost all judicial business, I 
apprehend may be carried into the federal courts, without essentially departing from the usual 
course of judicial proceedings. The courts in Great Britain have acquired their powers, and 
extended very greatly their jurisdictions by such :fiction and suppositions as I have mentioned. 
The constitution, in these points, certainly involves in it principles, and almost hidden cases, 
which may unfold and in time exhibit consequences we hardly think of. The power of 
naturalization, when viewed in connection with the judicial powers and cases, is, in my mind, of 
very doubtful extent. By the constitution itself, the citizens of each state will be naturalized 
citizens of every state, to the general purposes of instituting suits, claiming the benefits of the 
laws, etc. And in order to give the federal courts jurisdiction of an action, between citizens of the 
same state, in common acceptation-may not a court allow the plaintiff to say, he is a citizen of 
one state, and the defendant a citizen of another without carrying legal fictions so far, by any 
means, as they have been carried by the courts of King's Bench and Exchequer, in order to bring 
causes within their cognizance? Further, the federal city and districts, will be totally distinct from 
any state, and a citizen of a state will not of course be subject of any of them. And to avail 
himself of the privileges and immunities of them, must he not be naturalized by congress in 
them? And may not congress make any proportion of the citizens of the states naturalized 
subjects of the federal city and districts, and thereby entitle them to sue or defend, in all cases, in 
the federal courts? I have my doubts, and many sensible men, I find, have their doubts, on these 
points. And we ought to observe, they must be settled in the courts of law, by their rules, 
distinctions, and fictions. To avoid many of these intricacies and difficulties, and to avoid the 
undue and unnecessary extension of the federal judicial powers, it appears to me that no federal 
districts ought to be allowed, and no federal city or town-except perhaps a small town, in which 
the government shall be republican, but in which congress shall have no jurisdiction over the 
inhabitants of the states. Can the union want, in such a town, any thing more than a right to the 
soil to which it may set its buildings, and extensive jurisdiction over the federal buildings, and 
property, its own members, officers, and servants in it? As to all federal objects, the union will 
have complete jurisdiction over them of course any where, and every where. I still think that no 
actions ought to be allowed to be brought in the federal courts, between citizens of different 
states; at least, unless the cause be of very considerable importance. And that no action against a 
state government, by any citizen or foreigner, ought to be allowed; and no action, in which a 
foreign subject is party, at least, unless it be of very considerable importance, ought to be 
instituted in federal courts. I confess, I can see no reason whatever, for a foreigner, or for citizens 
of different states, carrying sixpenny causes into the federal courts. I think the state courts will be 
found by experience, to be bottomed on better principles, and to administer justice better than the 
federal courts. The difficulties and dangers I have supposed will result from so large a federal 
city, and federal districts, from the extension of the federal judicial powers, etc. are not, I 
conceive, merely possible, but probable. I think pernicious political consequences will follow 
from them, and from the federal city especially, for very obvious reasons, a few of which I will 
mention. 
We must observe that the citizens of a state will be subject to state as well as federal taxes, and 
the inhabitants of the federal city and districts only to such taxes as congress may lay. We are not 
to suppose all our people are attached to free government, and the principles of the common law, 
but that many thousands of them will prefer a city governed not on republican principles. This 
city, and the government of it, must indubitably take their tone from the characters of the men, 
who from the nature of its situation and institution must collect there. This city will not be 
established for productive labor, for mercantile, or mechanic industry; but for the residence of 
government, its officers and attendants. If hereafter it should ever become a place of trade and 
industry, [yet] in the early periods of its existence, when its laws and government must receive 
their fixed tone, it must be a mere court, with its appendages-the executive, congress, the law 
courts, gentlemen of fortune and pleasure, with all the officers, attendants, suitors, expectants 
and dependents on the whole. However brilliant and honorable this collection may be, if we 
expect it will have any sincere attachments to simple and frugal republicanism, to that liberty and 
mild government, which is dear to the laborious part of a free people, we must assuredly deceive 
ourselves. This early collection will draw to it men from all parts of the country, of a like 
political description. We see them looking towards the place already. 
Such a city, or town, containing a hundred square miles, must soon be the great, the visible, and 
dazzling centre, the mistress of fashions, and the fountain of politics. There may be a free or 
shackled press in this city, and the streams which may issue from it may over flow the country, 
and they will be poisonous or pure, as the fountain may be corrupt or not. But not to dwell on a 
subject that must give pain to the virtuous friends of freedom, I will only add, can a free and 
enlightened people create a common head so extensive, so prone to corruption and slavery, as 
this city probably will be, when they have it in their power to form one pure and chaste, frugal 
and republican? 
THE FEDERAL FARMER
Antifederalist No. 44 WHAT CONGRESS CAN DO; WHAT A 
STATE CAN NOT
"DELIBERATOR" appeared in The Freeman's Journal; or, The North-American Intelligencer, 
February 20, 1788. 
A writer in the Pennsylvania Packet, under the signature of A Freeman, has lately entered the 
lists as another champion for the proposed constitution. Particularly he has endeavored to show 
that our apprehensions of this plan of government being a consolidation of the United States into 
one government, and not a confederacy of sovereign independent states, is entirely groundless; 
and it must be acknowledged that he has advocated this cause with as much show of reason, 
perhaps, as the subject will admit. 
The words states, several states, and united states are, he observes, frequently mentioned in the 
constitution. And this is an argument that their separate sovereignty and independence cannot be 
endangered! He has enumerated a variety of matters which, he says, congress cannot do; and 
which the states, in their individual capacity, must or may do, and thence infers their sovereignty 
and independence. In some of these, however, I apprehend he is a little mistaken. 
1. "Congress cannot train the militia." This is not strictly true. For by the 1st Article they are 
empowered "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining" them; and tho' the respective 
states are said to have the authority of training the militia, it must be "according to the discipline 
prescribed by Congress." In this business, therefore, they will be no other than subalterns under 
Congress, to execute their orders; which, if they shall neglect to do, Congress will have 
constitutional powers to provide for, by any other means they shall think proper. They shall have 
power to declare what description of persons shall compose the militia; to appoint the stated 
times and places for exercising them; to compel personal attendance, whether when called for 
into actual service, or on other occasions, under what penalties they shall think proper, without 
regard to scruples of conscience or any other consideration. Their executive officer may march 
and countermarch them from one extremity of the state to the other-and all this without so much 
as consulting the legislature of the particular states to which they belong! Where then is that 
boasted security against the annihilation of the state governments, arising from "the powerful 
military support" they will have from their militia? 
2. "Congress cannot enact laws for the inspection of the produce of the country." Neither is this 
strictly true. Their power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several 
states, and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying this power (among 
others vested in them by the constitution) into execution," most certainly extends to the enacting 
of inspection laws. The particular states may indeed propose such laws to them; but it is 
expressly declared, in the lst article, that "all such laws shall be subject to the revision and 
control of the Congress." 
3. "The several states can prohibit or impose duties on the importation of slaves into their own 
ports." Nay, not even this can they do, "without the consent of Congress," as is expressly 
declared in the close of the lst article. The duty which Congress may, and it is probable will lay 
on the importation of slaves, will form a branch of their revenue. But this impost, as well as all 
others, "must be uniform throughout the United States." Congress therefore cannot consent that 
one state should impose an additional duty on this article of commerce, unless all other states 
should do the same; and it is not very likely that some of the states will ever ask this favor. 
4. "Congress cannot interfere with the opening of rivers and canals; the making or regulation of 
roads, except post roads; building bridges; erecting ferries; building lighthouses, etc." In one 
case, which may very frequently happen, this proposition also fails. For if the river, canal, road, 
bridge, ferry, etc., be common to two states, or a matter in which they may be both concerned, 
and consequently must both concur, then the interference and consent of Congress becomes 
absolutely necessary, since it is declared in the constitution that "no state shall, without the 
consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact with another state." 
5. "The elections of the President, Vice President, senators and representatives are exclusively in 
the hands of the states-even as to filling vacancies." This, in one important part, is not true. For, 
by the 2d article, "in case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, 
or inability to discharge the duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice 
President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, etc., both of the 
President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as president, and such officer 
shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a president shall be elected." But no 
such election is provided for by the constitution, till the return of the periodical election at the 
expiration of the four years for which the former president was chosen. And thus may the great 
powers of this supreme magistrate of the United States be exercised, for years together, by a man 
who, perhaps, never had one vote of the people for any office of government in his life. 
6. "Congress cannot interfere with the constitution of any state." This has been often said, but 
alas, with how little truth-since it is declared in the 6th article that "this constitution and the laws 
of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties, etc., shall be the 
supreme law of the land, and every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or 
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." 
But, sir, in order to form a proper judgment of the probable effects of this plan of general 
government on the sovereignties of the several states, it is necessary also to take a view of what 
Congress may, constitutionally, do and of what the states may not do. This matter, however, the 
above writer has thought proper to pass over in silence. I would therefore beg leave in some 
measure, to supply this omission; and if in anything I should appear to be mistaken I hope he will 
take the same liberty with me that I have done with him-he will correct my mistake. 
1. Congress may, even in time of peace, raise an army of 100,000 men, whom they may canton 
through the several states, and billet out on the inhabitants, in order to serve as necessary 
instruments in executing their decrees. 
2. Upon the inhabitants of any state proving refractory to the will of Congress, or upon any other 
pretense whatsoever, Congress may can out even all the militia of as many states as they think 
proper, and keep them in actual service, without pay, as long as they please, subject to the utmost 
rigor of military discipline, corporal punishment, and death itself not excepted. 
3. Congress may levy and collect a capitation or poll tax, to what amount they shall think proper; 
of which the poorest taxable in the state must pay as much as the richest. 
4. Congress may, under the sanction of that clause in the constitution which empowers them to 
regulate commerce, authorize the importation of slaves, even into those states where this 
iniquitous trade is or may be prohibited by their laws or constitutions. 
5. Congress may, under the sanction of that clause which empowers them to lay and collect 
duties (as distinct from imposts and excises) impose so heavy a stamp duty on newspapers and 
other periodical publications, as shall effectually prevent all necessary information to the people 
through these useful channels of intelligence. 
6. Congress may, by imposing a duty on foreigners coming into the country, check the progress 
of its population. And after a few years they may prohibit altogether, not only the emigration of 
foreigners into our country, but also that of our own citizens to any other country. 
7. Congress may withhold, as long as they think proper, all information respecting their 
proceedings from the people. 
8. Congress may order the elections for members of their own body, in the several states, to be 
held at what times, in what places, and in what manner they shall think proper. Thus, in 
Pennsylvania, they may order the elections to be held in the middle of winter, at the city of 
Philadelphia; by which means the inhabitants of nine-tenths of the state will be effectually (tho' 
constitutionally) deprived of the exercise of their right of suffrage. 
9. Congress may, in their courts of judicature, abolish trial by jury in civil cases altogether; and 
even in criminal cases, trial by a jury of the vicinage is not secured by the constitution. A crime 
committed at Fort Pitt may be tried by a jury of the citizens of Philadelphia. 
10. Congress may, if they shall think it for the "general welfare," establish an uniformity in 
religion throughout the United States. Such establishments have been thought necessary, and 
have accordingly taken place in almost all the other countries in the world, and will no doubt be 
thought equally necessary in this. 
11. Though I believe it is not generally so understood, yet certain it is, that Congress may emit 
paper money, and even make it a legal tender throughout the United States; and, what is still 
worse, may, after it shall have depreciated in the hands of the people, call it in by taxes, at any 
rate of depreciation (compared with gold and silver) which they may think proper. For though no 
state can emit bills of credit, or pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, yet the 
Congress themselves are under no constitutional restraints on these points. 
12. The number of representatives which shall compose the principal branch of Congress is so 
small as to occasion general complaint. Congress, however, have no power to increase the 
number of representatives, but may reduce it even to one fifth part of the present arrangement. 
13. On the other hand, no state can call forth its militia even to suppress any insurrection or 
domestic violence which may take place among its own citizens. This power is, by the 
constitution, vested in Congress. 
14. No state can compel one of its own citizens to pay a debt due to a citizen of a neighboring 
state. Thus a Jersey-man will be unable to recover the price of a turkey sold in the Philadelphia 
market, if the purchaser shall be inclined to dispute, without commencing an action in one of the 
federal courts. 
15. No state can encourage its own manufactures either by prohibiting or even laying a duty on 
the importation of foreign articles. 
16. No state can give relief to insolvent debtors, however distressing their situation may be, since 
Congress will have the exclusive right of establishing uniform laws on the subject of 
bankruptcies throughout the United States; and the particular states are expressly prohibited from 
passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. 
DELIBERATOR
Antifederalist No. 45 POWERS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
DANGEROUS TO STATE GOVERNMENTS; NEW YORK AS AN 
EXAMPLE 
Robert Yates, a delegate to the 1787 convention from New York, left on July 10, 1787. He 
became an Antifederalist leader. Under the nome de plume "Sydney" he wrote in the New York 
Daily Patriotic Register, June 13 and 14, 1788. 
TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 
Although a variety of objections to the proposed new constitution for the government of the 
United States have been laid before the public by men of the best abilities, I am led to believe 
that representing it in a point of view which has escaped their observation may be of use, that is, 
by comparing it with the constitution of the State of New York. 
The following contrast is therefore submitted to the public, to show in what instances the powers 
of the state government will be either totally or partially absorbed, and enable us to determine 
whether the remaining powers will, from those kind of pillars, be capable of supporting the 
mutilated fabric of a government which even the advocates for the new constitution admit excels 
"the boasted models of Greece or Rome, and those of all other nations, in having precisely 
marked out the power of the government and the rights of the people." 
It may be proper to premise that the pressure of necessity and distress (and not corruption) had a 
principal tendency to induce the adoption of the state constitutions and the existing 
confederation; that power was even then vested in the rulers with the greatest caution; and that, 
as from every circumstance we have reason to infer that the Dew constitution does not originate 
from a pure source, we ought deliberately to trace the extent and tendency of the trust we are 
about to repose, under the conviction that a reassumption of that trust will at least be difficult, if 
not impracticable. If we take a retrospective view of the measures of Congress. . . . we can 
scarcely entertain a doubt but that a plan has long since been framed to subvert the 
confederation; that that plan has been matured with the most persevering industry and unremitted 
attention; and that the objects expressed in the preamble to the constitution, that is "to promote 
the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," were 
merely the ostensible, and not the real reasons of its framers. . . 
The state governments are considered in . . . [the new constitution] as mere dependencies, 
existing solely by its toleration, and possessing powers of which they may be deprived whenever 
the general government is disposed so to do. If then the powers of the state governments are to 
be totally absorbed, in which all agree, and only differ as to the mode-whether it will be effected 
by a rapid progression, or by as certain, but slower, operations-what is to limit the oppression of 
the general government? Where are the rights, which are declared to be incapable of violation? 
And what security have people against the wanton oppression of unprincipled governors? No 
constitutional redress is pointed out, and no express declaration is contained in it, to limit the 
boundaries of their rulers. Beside which the mode and period of their being elected tends to take 
away their responsibility to the people over whom they may, by the power of the purse and the 
sword, domineer at discretion. Nor is there a power on earth to tell them, What dost thou? or, 
Why dost thou so? I shall now proceed to compare the constitution of the state of New York with 
the proposed federal government, distinguishing the paragraphs in the former, which are 
rendered nugatory by the latter; those which are in a great measure enervated, and such as are in 
the discretion of the general government to permit or not.... 
1 & 37
The 1st "Ordains, determines, and declares that no authority shall on any pretence whatever be 
exercised over the people or the members of this State, but such as shall be derived from and 
granted by them." 
The 37th, "That no purchases or contracts for the sale of lands with or of the Indians within the 
limits of this state, shall be binding on the Indians, or deemed valid, unless made under the 
authority and with the consent of the legislature of this state." 
. . . What have we reasonably to expect will be their conduct [i.e., the new national government] 
when possessed of the powers "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several states, and with the Indian tribes," when they are armed with legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers, and their laws the supreme laws of the land. And when the states are prohibited, 
without the consent of Congress, to lay any "imposts or duties on imports," and if they do they 
shall be for the use of the Treasury of the United States-and all such laws subject to the revision 
and control of Congress. 
It is . . . evident that this state, by adopting the new government, will enervate their legislative 
rights, and totally surrender into the hands of Congress the management and regulation of the 
Indian trade to an improper government, and the traders to be fleeced by iniquitous impositions, 
operating at one and the same time as a monopoly and a poll-tax. . . . 
The 2nd provides "that the supreme legislative power within this state shall be vested in two 
separate and distinct bodies of men, the one to be called the assembly, and the other to be called 
the senate of the state of New York, who together shall form the legislature." 
The 3rd provides against laws that may be hastily and inadvertently passed, inconsistent with the 
spirit of the constitution and the public good, and that "the governor, the chancellor and judges of 
the supreme court, shall revise all bills about to be passed into laws, by the legislature." 
The 9th provides "that the assembly shall be the judge of their own members, and enjoy the same 
privileges, and proceed in doing business in like manner as the assembly of the colony of New 
York of right formerly did." 
The 12th provides "that the senate shall, in like manner, be judges of their own members," etc. 
The 31st describes even the style of laws-that the style of alt laws shall be as follows: "Be it 
enacted by the people of the state of New York represented in senate and assembly," and that all 
writs and proceedings shall run in the name of the people of the state of New York, and tested in 
the name of the chancellor or the chief judge from whence they shall issue. 
The powers vested in the legislature of this state by these paragraphs will be weakened, for the 
proposed new government declares that "all legislative powers therein granted shall be vested in 
a congress of the United States, which shall consist of a senate and a house of representatives," 
and it further prescribes, that "this constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be 
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shalt be made under the authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be 
bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding; 
and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of 
the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this 
constitution." 
Those who are full of faith, suppose that the words "in pursuance thereof" are restrictive, but if 
they reflect a moment and take into consideration the comprehensive expressions of the 
instrument, they will find that their restrictive construction is unavailing, and this is evidenced by 
1st art., 8th sect., where this government has a power "to lay and collect all taxes, duties, imposts 
and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the 
United States," and also "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution the foregoing powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United 
States, or in any department or office thereof." 
. . . . To conclude my observation on this head, it appears to me as impossible that these powers 
in the state constitution and those in the general government can exist and operate together, as it 
would be for a man to serve two masters whose interests clash, and secure the approbation of 
both. Can there at the same time and place be and operate two supreme legislatures, executives, 
and judicials? Will a "guarantee of a republican form of government to every state in the union" 
be of any avail, or secure the establishment and retention of state rights? 
If this guarantee had remained, as it was first reported by the committee of the whole house, to 
wit, "that a republican constitution, and its existing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each state by 
the United States," it would have been substantial; but the changing the word constitution into 
the word form bears no favorable appearance. . . . 
13, 35, 41
By the 13th paragraph "no member of this State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the 
rights or privileges secured to the subjects of the State by the constitution, unless by the law of 
the land, or judgment of its peers." 
The 35th adopts, under certain exceptions and modifications, the common law of England, the 
statute law of England and Great Britain, and the acts of the legislature of the colony, which 
together formed the law on the 19th of April, 1775. 
The 41st provides "that the trial by jury remain inviolate forever; that no acts of attainder shall be 
passed by the legislature of this State for crimes other than those committed before the 
termination of the present war. And that the legislature shall at no time hereafter institute any 
new courts but such as shall proceed according to the course of the common law. 
There can be no doubt that if the new government be adopted in all its latitude, every one of 
these paragraphs will become a dead letter. Nor will it solve any difficulties, if the United States 
guarantee "to every state in the union a republican form of government;" we may be allowed the 
form and not the substance, and that it was so intended will appear from the changing the word 
constitution to the word form and the omission of the words, and its existing laws. And I do not 
even think it uncharitable to suppose that it was designedly done; but whether it was so or not, by 
leaving out these words the jurisprudence of each state is left to the mercy of the new 
government.... 
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 40
The 17th orders "That the supreme executive power and authority of this State shall be vested in 
a governor." 
By the 18th he is commander- in-chief of the militia and admiral of the navy of the State; may 
grant pardons to all persons convicted of crimes; he may suspend the execution of the sentence in 
treason or murder. 
By the 19th paragraph he is to see that the laws and resolutions of the legislature be faithfully 
executed. 
The 20th and 21st paragraphs give the lieutenant-governor, on the death, resignation, removal 
from office, or impeachment of the governor, all the powers of a governor. 
By the 27th he [the Governor] is president of the council of appointment, and has a casting vote 
and the commissioning of all officers. 
The 40th paragraph orders that the militia at all times, both in peace and war, shall be armed and 
disciplined, and kept in readiness; in what manner the Quakers shall be excused; and that a 
magazine of warlike stores be forever kept at the expense of the State, and by act of the 
legislature, established, maintained, and continued in every county in the State. 
Whoever considers the following powers vested in the [national] government, and compares 
them with the above, must readily perceive they are either all enervated or annihilated. 
By the 1st art., 8th sec., 15th, 16th and 17th clauses, Congress will be empowered to call forth 
the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; to provide 
for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, for the governing such part of them as may be 
employed in the service of the United States, and for the erection of forts, magazines, etc. 
And by the 2nd art., 2nd sec., "The president shall be commander- in-chief of the army and navy 
of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into actual service of the 
United States. . . . except in cases of impeachment." 
And by the 6th art., "The members of the several state legislatures, and all the executive and 
judicial officers; both of the United States, and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or 
affirmation to support the constitution." 
Can this oath be taken by those who have already taken one under the constitution of this state? 
... From these powers lodged in Congress and the powers vested in the states, it is clear that there 
must be a government within a government; two legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The 
power of raising an army in time of peace, and to command the militia, will give the president 
ample means to enforce the supreme laws of the land. . . . 
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This paragraph provides "that it shalt be in the discretion of the legislature to naturalize all such 
persons and in such manner as they shall think proper." 
The 1st art., 8th sec., 4th clause, give to the new government power to establish a uniform rule of 
naturalization. And by the 4th art., 2nd sec., "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states," whereby the clause is rendered 
entirely nugatory. 
From this contrast it appears that the general government, when completely organized, will 
absorb all those powers of the state which the framers of its constitution had declared should be 
only exercised by the representatives of the people of the state; that the burdens and expense of 
supporting a state establishment will be perpetuated; but its operations to ensure or contribute to 
any essential measures promotive of the happiness of the people may be totally prostrated, the 
general government arrogating to itself the right of interfering in the most minute objects of 
internal police, and the most trifling domestic concerns of every state, by possessing a power of 
passing laws "to provide for the general welfare of the United States," which may affect life, 
liberty and property in every modification they may think expedient, unchecked by cautionary 
reservations, and unrestrained by a declaration of any of those rights which the wisdom and 
prudence of America in the year 1776 held ought to be at all events protected from violation. 
In a word, the new constitution will prove finally to dissolve all the power of the several state 
legislatures, and destroy the rights and liberties of the people; for the power of the first will be all 
in all, and of the latter a mere shadow and form without substance, and if adopted we may (in 
imitation of the Carthagenians) say, Delenda vit America. 
SYDNEY
Antifederalist No. 46 "WHERE THEN IS THE RESTRAINT?"
This essay by "AN OLD WHIG" (see AFP #'s Nos. 18-20, 49, 50, and 70) appeared in the 
Maryland Gazette and Baltimore Advertiser on Nov. 2, 1788. 
Let us look to the first article of the proposed new constitution, which treats of the legislative 
powers of Congress; and to the eighth section, which pretends to define those powers. We find 
here that the Congress in its legislative capacity, shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, 
duties, and excises; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to fix the rule for naturalization and 
the laws of bankruptcy; to coin money; to punish counterfeiters; to establish post offices and post 
roads; to secure copy rights to authors; to constitute tribunals; to define and punish piracies; to 
declare war; to raise and support armies; to provide and support a navy; to call forth the militia; 
to organize, arm and discipline the militia; to exercise absolute power over a district ten miles 
square, independent of all the State legislatures, and to be alike absolute over all forts, 
magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings thereunto belonging. This is a short 
abstract of the powers given to Congress. These powers are very extensive, but I shall not stay at 
present to inquire whether these express powers were necessary to be given to Congress? 
Whether they are too great or too small? 
My object is to consider that undefined, unbounded and immense power which is comprised in 
the following clause - "And to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the 
government of the United States; or in any department or offices thereof." Under such a clause as 
this, can anything be said to be reserved and kept back from Congress? Can it be said that the 
Congress have no power but what is expressed? "To make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper" - or, in other words, to make all such laws which the Congress shall think necessary and 
proper - for who shalt judge for the legislature what is necessary and proper? Who shall set 
themselves above the sovereign? What inferior legislature shall set itself above the supreme 
legislature? To me it appears that no other power on earth can dictate to them, or control them, 
unless by force; and force, either internal or external, is one of those calamities which every good 
man would wish his country at all times to be delivered from. This generation in America have 
seen enough of war, and its usual concomitants, to prevent all of us from wishing to see any 
more of it-all except those who make a trade of war. But to the question - without force what can 
restrain the Congress from making such laws as they please? What limits are there to their 
authority? I fear none at all. For surely it cannot be justly said that they have no power but what 
is expressly given to them, when by the very terms of their creation they are vested with the 
powers of making laws in all cases -necessary and proper; when from the nature of their power, 
they must necessarily be the judges what laws are necessary and proper. 
The British act of Parliament, declaring the power of Parliament to make laws to bind America 
in all cases whatsoever, was not more extensive. For it is as true as a maxim, that even the British 
Parliament neither could nor would pass any law in any case in which they did not either deem it 
necessary and proper to make such a law, or pretend to deem it so. And in such cases it is not of 
a farthing consequence whether they really are of opinion that the law is necessary and proper, or 
only pretend to think so, for who can overrule their pretensions? No one; unless we had a Bill of 
Rights, to which we might appeal and under which we might contend against any assumption of 
undue power, and appeal to the judicial branch of the government to protect us by their 
judgments. This reasoning, I fear, is but too just. And yet, if any man should doubt the truth of it, 
let me ask him one other question: What is the meaning of the latter part of the clause which 
vests the Congress with the authority of making all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution all other powers (besides the foregoing powers vested, etc., etc.)? Was it 
thought that the foregoing powers might perhaps admit of some restraint, in their construction as 
to what was necessary and proper to carry them into execution? Or was it deemed right to add 
still further that they should not be restrained to the powers already named? Besides the powers 
already mentioned, other powers may be assumed hereafter as contained by implication in this 
constitution. The Congress shall judge of what is necessary and proper in all these cases, and in 
all other cases-in short, in all cases whatsoever. 
Where then is the restraint? How are Congress bound down to the powers expressly given? What 
is reserved, or can be reserved? Yet even this is not all. As if it were determined that no doubt 
should remain, by the sixth article of the Constitution it is declared that "this Constitution and the 
laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shalt be the supreme law of the 
land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitutions or laws 
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." The Congress are therefore vested with the 
supreme legislative power, without control. In giving such immense, such unlimited powers, was 
there no necessity of a Bill of Rights, to secure to the people their liberties? 
Is it not evident that we are left wholly dependent on the wisdom and virtue of the men who shall 
from time to time be the members of Congress? And who shall be able to say seven years hence, 
the members of Congress will be wise and good men, or of the contrary character? 
Antifederalist No. 47 "BALANCE" OF DEPARTMENTS NOT 
ACHIEVED UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION
This essay is made up of of excerpts from "CENTINEL's," letters of October 5 and 24, 1787. 
Taken from The Independent Gazetteer, 
I am fearful that the principles of government inculcated in Mr. [John] Adams' treatise [Defence 
of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America], and enforced in the 
numerous essays and paragraphs in the newspapers, have misled some well designing members 
of the late Convention. But it will appear in the sequel, that the construction of the proposed plan 
of government is infinitely more extravagant. 
I have been anxiously expecting that some enlightened patriot would, ere this, have taken up the 
pen to expose the futility, and counteract the baneful tendency of such principles. Mr. Adams' 
sine qua non of a good government is three balancing powers; whose repelling qualities are to 
produce an equilibrium of interests, and thereby promote the happiness of the whole community. 
He asserts that the administrators of every government, will ever be actuated by views of private 
interest and ambition, to the prejudice of the public good; that therefore the only effectual 
method to secure the rights of the people and promote their welfare, is to create an opposition of 
interests between the members of two distinct bodies, in the exercise of the powers of 
government, and balanced by those of a third. This hypothesis supposes human wisdom 
competent to the task of instituting three co-equal orders in government, and a corresponding 
weight in the community to enable them respectively to exercise their several parts, and whose 
views and interests should be so distinct as to prevent a coalition of any two of them for the 
destruction of the third. Mr. Adams, although he has traced the constitution of every form of 
government that ever existed, as far as history affords materials, has not been able to adduce a 
single instance of such a government. He indeed says that the British constitution is such in 
theory, but this is rather a confirmation that his principles are chimerical and not to be reduced to 
practice. If such an organization of power were practicable, how long would it continue? Not a 
day-for there is so great a disparity in the talents, wisdom and industry of mankind, that the scale 
would presently preponderate to one or the other body, and with every accession of power the 
means of further increase would be greatly extended. The state of society in England is much 
more favorable to such a scheme of government than that of America. There they have a 
powerful hereditary nobility, and real distinctions of rank and interests; but even there, for want 
of that perfect equality of power and distinction of interests in the three orders of government, 
they exist but in name. The only operative and efficient check upon the conduct of 
administration, is the sense of the people at large. 
Suppose a government could be formed and supported on such principles, would it answer the 
great purposes of civil society? If the administrators of every government are actuated by views 
of private interest and ambition, how is the welfare and happiness of the community to be the 
result of such jarring adverse interests? 
Therefore, as different orders in government will not produce the good of the whole, we must 
recur to other principles. I believe it will be found that the form of government, which holds 
those entrusted with power in the greatest responsibility to their constituents, the best calculated 
for freemen. A republican, or free government, can only exist where the body of the people are 
virtuous, and where property is pretty equally divided. In such a government the people are the 
sovereign and their sense or opinion is the criterion of every public measure. For when this 
ceases to be the case, the nature of the government is changed, and an aristocracy, monarchy or 
despotism will rise on its ruin. The highest responsibility is to be attained in a simple structure of 
government, for the great body of the people never steadily attend to the operations of 
government, and for want of due information are liable to be imposed on. If you complicate the 
plan by various orders, the people will be perplexed and divided in their sentiment about the 
source of abuses or misconduct; some will impute it to the senate, others to the house of 
representatives, and so on, that the interposition of the people may be rendered imperfect or 
perhaps wholly abortive. But if, imitating the constitution of Pennsylvania, you vest all the 
legislative power in one body of men (separating the executive and judicial) elected for a short 
period, and necessarily excluded by rotation from permanency, and guarded from precipitancy 
and surprise by delays imposed on its proceedings, you will create the most perfect 
responsibility. For then, whenever the people feel a grievance, they cannot mistake the authors, 
and will apply the remedy with certainty and effect, discarding them at the next election. This tie 
of responsibility will obviate all the dangers apprehended from a single legislature, and will the 
best secure the rights of the people. 
Having premised this much, I shall now proceed to the examination of the proposed plan of 
government, and I trust, shall make it appear to the meanest capacity, that it has none of the 
essential requisites of a free government; that it is neither founded on those balancing restraining 
powers, recommended by Mr. Adams and attempted in the British constitution, or possessed of 
that responsibility to its constituents, which, in my opinion, is the only effectual security for the 
liberties and happiness of the people. But on the contrary, that it is a most daring attempt to 
establish a despotic aristocracy among freemen, that the world has ever witnessed.... 
Thus we see, the house of representatives are on the part of the people to balance the senate, who 
I suppose will be composed of the better sort, the well born, etc. The number of the 
representatives (being only one for every 30,000 inhabitants) appears to be too few, either to 
communicate the requisite information of the wants, local circumstances and sentiments of so 
extensive an empire, or to prevent corruption and undue influence, in the exercise of such great 
powers; the term for which they are to be chosen, too long to preserve a due dependence and 
accountability to their constituents; and the mode and places of their election not sufficiently 
ascertained, for as Congress have the control over both, they may govern the choice, by ordering 
the representatives of a whole State, to be elected in one place, and that too may be the most 
inconvenient. 
The senate, the great efficient body in this plan of government, is constituted on the most 
unequal principles. The smallest State in the Union has equal weight with the great States of 
Virginia, Massachusetts, or Pennsylvania. The senate, besides its legislative functions, has a very 
considerable share in the executive; none of the principal appointments to office can be made 
without its advice and consent. The terin and mode of its appointment will lead to permanency. 
The members are chosen for six years, the mode is under the control of Congress, and as there is 
no exclusion by rotation, they may be continued for life, which, from their extensive means of 
influence, would follow of course. The President, who would be a mere pageant of State, unless 
he coincides with the views of the senate, would either become the bead of the aristocratic junto 
in that body, or its minion; besides, their influence being the most predominant, could the best 
secure his re-election to office. And from his power of granting pardons, he might screen from 
punishment the most treasonable attempts on the liberties of the people, when instigated by the 
senate.... 
Mr. [James] Wilson asserts that never was charge made with less reason, than that which predicts 
the institution of a baneful aristocracy in the federal Senate.' In my first number, I stated that this 
body would be a very unequal representation of the several States, that the members being 
appointed for the long term of six years, and there being no exclusion by rotation, they might be 
continued for life, which would follow of course from their extensive means of influence, and 
that possessing a considerable share in the executive as well as the legislative, it would become a 
permanent aristocracy, and swallow up the other orders in the government. 
That these fears are not imaginary, a knowledge of the history of other nations, where the powers 
of government have been injudiciously placed, will fully demonstrate. Mr. Wilson says, "the 
senate branches into two characters; the one legislative and the other executive. In its legislative 
character it can effect no purpose, without the co-operation of the house of representatives, and 
in its executive character it can accomplish no object without the concurrence of the president. 
Thus fettered, I do not know any act which the senate can of itself perform, and such dependence 
necessarily precludes every idea of influence and superiority." This I confess is very specious, 
but experience demonstrates that checks in government, unless accompanied with adequate 
power and independently placed, prove merely nominal, and will be inoperative. Is it probable, 
that the President of the United States, limited as he is in power, and dependent on the will of the 
senate, in appointments to office, will either have the firmness or inclination to exercise his 
prerogative of a conditional control upon the proceedings of that body, however injurious they 
may be to the public welfare? It will be his interest to coincide with the views of the senate, and 
thus become the head of the aristocratic junto. The king of England is a constituent part in the 
legislature, but although an hereditary monarch, in possession of the whole executive power, 
including the unrestrained appointment to offices, and an immense revenue, enjoys but in name 
the prerogative of a negative upon the parliament. Even the king of England, circumstanced as he 
is, has not dared to exercise it for near a century past. The check of the house of representatives 
upon the senate will likewise be rendered nugatory for want of due weight in the democratic 
branch, and from their constitution they may become so independent of the people as to be 
indifferent of its interests. Nay, as Congress would have the control over the mode and place of 
their election, by ordering the representatives of a whole state to be elected at one place, and that 
too the most inconvenient, the ruling powers may govern the choice, and thus the house of 
representatives may be composed of the creatures of the senate. Still the semblance of checks 
may remain, but without operation. 
This mixture of the legislative and executive moreover highly tends to corruption. The chief 
improvement in government, in modern times, has been the complete separation of the great 
distinctions of power; placing the legislative in different hands from those which hold the 
executive; and again severing the judicial part from the ordinary administrative. "When the 
legislative and executive powers (says Montesquieu) are united in the same person or in the same 
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty." 
CENTINEL
Antifederalist No. Antifederalist No. 48 NO SEPARATION 
OF DEPARTMENTS RESULTS IN NO RESPONSIBILITY
"LEONIDAS," from London, obviously did not understand Article II Section I of the proposed 
new Constitution. But his works were welcomed in the London Times, and either The Freeman's 
Journal, or The North-American Intelligencer on July 30, 1788. 
In the new constitution for the future government of the thirteen United States of America, the 
President and Senate have all the executive and two thirds of the Legislative power. 
This is a material deviation from those principles of the English constitution, for which they 
fought with us; and in all good governments it should be a fundamental maxim, that, to give a 
proper balance to the political system, the different branches of the legislature should be 
unconnected, and the legislative and executive powers should be separate. By the new 
constitution of America this union of the executive and legislative bodies operates in the most 
weighty matters of the state. They jointly make all treaties; they jointly appoint all officers civil 
and military; and, they jointly try all impeachments, either of their own members, or the officers 
appointed by themselves. 
In this formidable combination of power, there is no responsibility. And where there is power 
without responsibility, how can there be liberty? 
The president of the United States is elected for four years, and each of the thirteen states has one 
vote at his election; which vote is not of the people, but of electors two degrees from the people. 
The senate is a body of six years duration; and as in the choice of presidents, the largest state has 
but one vote, so it is in the choice of senators. Now this shows, that responsibility is as little to be 
apprehended from amenability to constituents, as from the terror of impeachment; for to the 
members of the senate it is clear, that trial by impeachment is nothing but parade. 
From such an union in governments, it requires no great depth of political knowledge to 
prophesy, that monarchy or aristocracy must be generated, and perhaps of the most grievous 
kind. The only check in favor of the democratic principle is the house of representatives; but its 
smallness of number, and great comparative disparity of power, render that house of little effect 
to promote good or restrain bad government. 
The power given to this ill- constructed senate is, to judge of what may be for the general 
welfare; and such engagements, when made the acts of Congress, become the supreme laws of 
the land. 
This is a power co-extensive with every possible object of human legislation. Yet there is no 
restraint, no charter of rights, no residuum of human privileges, not intended to be given up to 
society. The rights of conscience, the freedom of the press, and trial by jury, are at the mercy of 
this senate. Trial by jury has been already materially injured. The trial in criminal cases is not by 
twelve men of the vicinage, or of the county, but of the state; and the states are from fifty to 
seven hundred miles in extent! In criminal cases this new system says, the trial shall be by jury. 
On civil cases it is silent. There it is fair to infer, that as in criminal cases it has been materially 
impaired, in civil cases it may be altogether omitted. But it is in truth, strongly discountenanced 
in civil cases; for this new system gives the supreme court in matters of appeal, jurisdiction both 
of law and fact. 
This being the beginning of American freedom, it is very clear the ending will be slavery, for it 
cannot be denied that this constitution is, in its first principles, highly and dangerously 
oligarchical; and it is every where agreed, that a government administered by a few, is, of all 
governments, the worst. 
LEONIDAS
Antifederalist No. 49 ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 
(PART I)
The following essay is in two parts: the first is by "MASSACHUSETTENSIS," and is reprinted 
from The Massachusetts Gazette of January 29, 1788; the second part was written by "AN OLD 
WHIG," and is taken from The New-York Journal of November 27, 1787. 
That the new constitution cannot make a union of states, but only of individuals, and purposes 
the beginning of one new society, one new government in all matters, is evident from these 
considerations, viz: It marks no line of distinction between separate state matters, and what 
would of right come under the control of the powers ordained in a union of states. To say that no 
line could be drawn, is giving me the argument. For what can be more absurd than to say, that 
states are united where a general power is established that extends to all objects of government, 
i.e., all that exist among the people who make the compact? And is it not clear that Congress 
have the right (by the constitution), to make general laws for proving all acts, records, 
proceedings, and the effect thereof, in what are now called the states? Is it possible after this that 
any state act can exist, or any public business be done, without the direction and sanction of 
Congress, or by virtue of some subordinate authority? If not, how in the nature of things can 
there be a union of states? Does not the uniting of states, as states, necessarily imply the 
existence of separate state powers? 
Again, the constitution makes no consistent, adequate provision for amendments to be made to it 
by states, as states. Not they who drew up the amendments (should any be made), but they who 
ratify them, must be considered as making them. Three fourths of the legislatures of the several 
states, as they are now called, may ratify amendments-that is, if Congress see fit, but not without. 
Where is then any independent state authority recognized in the plan? And if there is no 
independent state authority, how can there be a union of states? But is it not a question of 
importance why the states in their present capacity, cannot ratify the original? I mean, why the 
legislatures of the several states cannot do this business? I wish to be informed where to find the 
regular exercise and legal sanction of state power, if the legislative authority of the state is set 
aside. Have the people some other constitutional means by which they can give their united voice 
in state affairs? This leads me to observe, that should the new constitution be received as it 
stands, it can never be proved that it originated from any proper state authority; because there is 
no such authority recognized either in the form of it, or in the mode fixed upon for its 
ratification. It says, "We the people of the United States," etc., make this constitution; but does 
this phrase, "We the people of the United States," prove that the people are acting in state 
character, or that the several states must of necessity exist with separate governments? Who that 
understands the subject will believe either? ... 
The plan does not acknowledge any constitutional state authority as necessary in the ratification 
of it. This work is to be done by a mere convention, only in consequence of mere 
recommendation; which does by no means amount to a proper state act. As no state act can exist 
independent of the supreme authority of the state, and this authority is out of the question in the 
ratification of the new constitution, it clearly follows that the ratifying of it, by a mere 
convention, is no proper state business. To conclude, the people may make the original, but the 
people have no right to alter it. Congress may order this matter just as they please, and 
consequently have whom they please elected for governors or representatives, not of the states 
but of the people; and not of the people as men but as property. . . . 
MASSACHUSETTENSIS
It appears to me that I was mistaken in supposing that we could so very easily make trial of this 
constitution, and again change it at our pleasure. The conventions of the several states cannot 
propose any alterations-they are only to give their assent and ratification. And after the 
constitution is once ratified, it must remain fixed until two thirds of both the houses of Congress 
shall deem it necessary to propose amendments; or the legislatures of two thirds of the several 
states shall make application to Congress for the calling a convention for proposing amendments 
- which amendments shall not be valid until they are ratified by the legislatures of three fourths 
of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of 
ratification may be proposed by Congress. This appears to me to be only a cunning way of 
saying that no alteration shall ever be made; so that whether it is a good constitution or a bad 
constitution, it will remain forever unamended. Lycurgus, when he promulgated his laws to the 
Spartans, made them swear that they would make no alterations in them until he should return 
from a journey which he was then about to undertake. He chose never to return, and therefore no 
alteration could be made in his laws. The people were made to believe that they could make trial 
of his laws for a few months or years, during his absence, and as soon as he returned they could 
continue to observe them or reject at pleasure. Thus this celebrated republic was in reality 
established by a trick. In like manner the proposed constitution holds out a prospect of being 
subject to be changed if it be found necessary or convenient to change it; but the conditions upon 
which an alteration can take place, are such as in all probability will never exist. The 
consequence will be that when the constitution is once established it never can be altered or 
amended without some violent convulsion or civil war. 
The conditions, I say, upon which any alterations can take place, appear to me to be such as 
never will exist. Two thirds of both houses of congress, or the legislatures of two thirds of the 
states, must agree in desiring a convention to be called. This will probably never happen. But if it 
should happen, then the convention may agree to the amendments or not, as they think right; and 
after all three fourths of the states must ratify the amendments. Before all this labyrinth can be 
traced to a conclusion, ages will revolve, and perhaps the great principles upon which our late 
glorious revolution was founded, will be totally forgotten. If the principles of liberty are not 
firmly fixed and established in the present constitution, in vain may we hope for retrieving them 
hereafter. People once possessed of power are always loathe to part with it; and we shall never 
find two thirds of a Congress voting or proposing anything which shall derogate from their own 
authority and importance, or agreeing to give back to the people any part of those privileges 
which they have once parted with-so far from it, that the greater occasion there may be for a 
reformation, the less likelihood will there be of accomplishing it. The greater the abuse of power, 
the more obstinately is it always persisted in. As to any expectation of two thirds of the 
legislatures concurring in such a request, it is if possible still more remote. The legislatures of the 
states will be but forms and shadows, and it will be the height of arrogance and presumption in 
them, to turn their thoughts to such high subjects. After this constitution is once established, it is 
too evident that we shall be obliged to fill up the offices of assemblymen and councillors, as we 
do those of constables, by appointing men to serve whether they will or not, and fining them if 
they refuse. The members thus appointed, as soon as they can hurry through a law or two for 
repairing highways, or impounding cattle, will conclude the business of their sessions as 
suddenly as possible, that they may return to their own business. Their heads will not be 
perplexed with the great affairs of state. We need not expect two thirds of them ever to interfere 
in so momentous a question as that of calling a continental convention. The different legislatures 
will have no communication with one another, from the time of the new constitution being 
ratified to the end of the world. Congress will be the great focus of power as well as the great and 
only medium of communication from one state to another. The great and the wise and the mighty 
will be in possession of places and offices; they will oppose all changes in favor of liberty; they 
will steadily pursue the acquisition of more and more power to themselves and their adherents.... 
AN OLD WHIG
Antifederalist No. 50 ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 
(PART II)
Antifederalists sought a second constitutional convention immediately after conclusion of the 
first. This essay by "AN OLD WHIG," is from either The Freeman's Journal or The North-
American Intelligencer, of November 28, 1787. 
It is true that the Continental Convention have directed their proposed constitution to be laid 
before a Convention of Delegates to be chosen in each state "for their assent and ratification," 
which seems to preclude the idea of any power in the several Conventions of proposing any 
alterations; or, indeed, even of rejecting the plan proposed if they should disapprove of it. Still, 
however, the question recurs, what authority the late Convention had to bind the people of the 
United States to any particular form of government, or to forbid them to adopt such form of 
government, as they should think fit. I know it is a language frequent in the mouths of some 
heaven-born Phaetons among us-who, like the son of Apollo, think themselves entitled to guide 
the chariot of the sun-that common people have no right to judge of the affairs of government; 
that they are not fit for it; that they should leave these matters to their superiors. This, however, 
is not the language of men of real understanding, even among the advocates for the proposed 
Constitution; but these still recognize the authority of the people, and will admit, at least in 
words, that the people have a right to be consulted. Then I ask, if the people in the different states 
have a right to be consulted in the new form of continental government, what authority could the 
late Convention have to preclude them from proposing amendments to the plan they should 
offer? Had the Convention any right to bind the people to the form of government they should 
propose? Let us consider this matter. 
The late Convention were chosen by the General Assembly of each state. They had the sanction 
of Congress. For what? To consider what alterations were necessary to be made in the articles of 
Confederation. What have they done? They have made a new Constitution for the United States. 
I will not say that in doing so they have exceeded their authority; but, on the other hand, I trust 
that no man of understanding among them will pretend to say that anything they did, or could do, 
was of the least avail to lessen the right of the people to judge for themselves in the last resort. 
This right is perhaps unalienable; but, at all events, there is no pretense for saying that this right 
was ever meant to be surrendered up into the hands of the late Continental Convention. The 
people have an undoubted right to judge of every part of the government which is offered to 
them. No power on earth has a right to preclude them; and they may exercise this choice either 
by themselves or their delegates legally chosen in the state Convention. I venture to say that no 
man, reasoning upon Revolution principles, can possibly controvert this right. 
Indeed, very few go so far as to controvert the right of the people to propose amendments. But 
we are told the thing is impracticable; that if we begin to propose amendments there will be no 
end to them; that the several states will never agree in their amendments; that we shall never 
unite in any plan; that if we reject this, we shall either have a worse one or none at all; that we 
ought therefore to adopt this at once without alteration or amendment. Now, these are very kind 
gentlemen who insist upon doing so much good for us, whether we will or not. Idiots and 
maniacs ought certainly to be restrained from doing themselves mischief, and ought to be 
compelled to that which is for their own good. Whether the people of America are to be 
considered in this light and treated accordingly, is a question which deserves, perhaps, more 
consideration than it has yet received. A contest between the patients and their doctors, which are 
mad or which are fools, might possibly be a very unhappy one. I hope at least that we shall be 
able to settle this important business without so preposterous a dispute. What then would you 
have us do, it may be asked? Would you have us adopt the proposed constitution or reject it? The 
method I would propose is this: 
1. Let the conventions of each state, as they meet, after considering the proposed constitution, 
state their objections and propose their amendments. So far from these objections and 
amendments clashing with each other in irreconcilable discord, as it has too often been suggested 
they would do, that from what has been hitherto published in the different states in opposition to 
the proposed constitution we have a right to expect that they will harmonize in a very great 
degree. The reason I say so is that about the same time, in very different parts of the continent, 
the very same objections have been made, and the very same alterations proposed by different 
writers, who I verily believe know nothing at all of each other and were very far from acting by a 
premeditated concert; and that others who have not appeared as writers in the newspapers in the 
different states, have appeared to act and speak in perfect unison with those objections and 
amendments, particularly in the article of a bill of rights; that in short, the very same sentiments 
seem to have been echoed from the different parts of the continent by the opposers of the 
proposed constitution. And these sentiments have been very little contradicted by its friends, 
otherwise than by suggesting their fears that by opposing the constitution at present proposed, we 
might be disappointed of any federal government, or receive a worse one than the present. It 
would be a most delightful surprise to find ourselves all of one opinion at last. And I cannot 
forbear hoping that when we come fairly to compare our sentiments, we shalt find ourselves 
much more nearly agreed, than in the hurry and surprise in which we have been involved on this 
subject, we ever suffered ourselves to imagine. 
2. When the conventions have stated these objections and amendments, let them transmit them to 
congress, and adjourn, praying that congress will direct another convention to be called from the 
different states, to consider of these objections and amendments, and pledging themselves to 
abide by whatever decision shall be made by such future convention on the subject whether it be 
to amend the proposed constitution or to reject any alterations, and ratify it as it stands. 
3. If a new convention of the United States should meet, and revise the proposed constitution, let 
us agree to abide by their decision. It is past a doubt that every good citizen of America pants for 
an efficient federal government. T have no doubt we shall concur at last in some plan of 
continental government, even if many people could imagine exceptions to it. But if the 
exceptions which are made at present shall be maturely considered, and even be pronounced by 
our future representatives as of no importance (which I trust they will not), even in that case I 
have no doubt that almost every man will give up his own private opinion and concur in that 
decision. 
4. If, by any means, another continental convention should fail to meet, then let the conventions 
of the several states again assemble and at last decide the great solemn question, whether we 
shall adopt the constitution now proposed or reject it. And whenever it becomes necessary to 
decide upon this point one, at least, who from the beginning has been invariably anxious for the 
liberty and independence of this country, will concur in adopting and supporting this 
constitution, rather than none; though, I confess, I could easily imagine some other form of 
confederation which I should think better entitled to my hearty approbation, and indeed I am not 
afraid of a worse. 
AN OLD WHIG
Antifederalist No. 51 DO CHECKS AND BALANCES REALLY 
SECURE THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE?
This satire is from a pamphlet of "ARISTOCROTIS," The Government of Nature Delineated; Or 
An Exact Picture of the New Federal Constitution (Carlisle, PA, 1788) 
The present is an active period. Europe is in a ferment breaking their constitutions; America is in 
a similar state, making a constitution. For this valuable purpose a convention was appointed, 
consisting of such as excelled in wisdom and knowledge, who met in Philadelphia last May. For 
my own part, I was so smitten with the character of the members, that I had assented to their 
production, while it was yet in embryo. And I make no doubt but every good republican did so 
too. But how great was my surprise, when it appeared with such a venerable train of names 
annexed to its tail, to find some of the people under different signatures-such as Centinel, Old 
Whig, Brutus, etc. - daring to oppose it, and that too with barefaced arguments, obstinate reason 
and stubborn truth. This is certainly a piece of the most extravagant impudence to presume to 
contradict the collected wisdom of the United States; or to suppose a body, who engrossed the 
whole wisdom of the continent, was capable of erring. I expected the superior character of the 
convention would have secured it from profane sallies of a plebeian's pen; and its inherent 
infallibility debarred the interference of impertinent reason or truth. It was too great an act of 
condescension to permit the people, by their state conventions, "to assent and ratify," what the 
grand convention prescribed to them; but to inquire into its principles, or investigate its 
properties, was a presumption too daring to escape resentment. Such licentious conduct practised 
by the people, is a striking proof of our feeble governments, and calls aloud for the pruning 
knife, i.e., the establishment of some proper plan of discipline. This the convention, in the depth 
of their united wisdom hath prescribed, which when established, will certainly put a stop to the 
growing evil. A consciousness of this, is, no doubt, the cause which stimulates the people to 
oppose it with so much vehemence. They deprecate the idea of being confined within their 
proper sphere; they cannot endure the thought of being obliged to mind their own business, and 
leave the affairs of government to those whom nature hath destined to rule. I say nature, for it is 
a fundamental principle, as clear as an axiom, that nature hath placed proper degrees and 
subordinations amongst mankind and ordained a few(1) to rule, and many to obey. I am not 
obliged to prove this principle because it would be madness in the extreme to attempt to prove a 
self- evident truth. 
(1) If any person is so stupidly dull as not to discern who these few are, I would refer such to 
nature herself for information. Let them observe her ways and be wise. Let them mark those men 
whom she hath endued with the necessary qualifications of authority; such as the dictatorial air, 
the magisterial voice, the imperious tone, the haughty countenance, the lofty look, the majestic 
mien. Let them consider those whom she hath taught to command with authority, but comply 
with disgust; to be fond of sway, but impatient of control; to consider themselves as Gods, and 
all the rest of mankind as two legged brutes. Now it is evident that the possessors of these divine 
qualities must have been ordained by nature to dominion and empire; for it would be blasphemy 
against her supreme highness to suppose that she confers her gifts in vain. Fortune hath also 
distinguished those upon whom nature hath imprinted the lineaments of authority. She hath 
heaped her favors and lavished her gifts upon those very persons whom nature delighteth to 
honor. Indeed, instinct hath taught those men that authority is their natural right, and therefore 
they grasp at it with an eagerness bordering on rapacity. 
But with all due submission to the infallible wisdom of the grand convention, let me presume to 
examine whether they have not, in the new plan of government, inviolably adhered to this 
supreme principle. . . . 
In article first, section first, of the new plan, it is declared that "all legislative powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate"-very 
right, quite agreeable to nature and House of Representatives"-not quite so right. This is a 
palpable compliance with the humors and corrupt practices of the times. But what follows in 
section 2 is still worse: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen 
every second year by the people of the several states." This is a most dangerous power, and must 
soon produce fatal and pernicious consequences, were it not circumscribed and poised by proper 
checks and balances. But in this is displayed the unparalleled sagacity of the august convention: 
that when such bulwarks of prejudice surrounded the evil, so as to render it both difficult and 
dangerous to attack it by assault and storm, they have invested and barricaded it so closely as 
will certainly deprive it of its baneful influence and prevent its usual encroachments. They have 
likewise stationed their miners and sappers so judiciously, that they will certainly, in process of 
time, entirely reduce and demolish this obnoxious practice of popular election. There is a small 
thrust given to it in the body of the conveyance itself. The term of holding elections is every two 
years; this is much better than the detestable mode of annual elections, so fatal to energy. 
However, if nothing more than this were done, it would still remain an insupportable 
inconvenience. But in section 4 it is provided that congress by law may alter and make such 
regulations with respect to the times, places, and manner of holding elections, as to them seemeth 
fit and proper. This is certainly a very salutary provision, most excellently adapted to 
counterbalance the great and apparently dangerous concessions made to the plebeians in the first 
and second sections. With such a prudent restriction as this they are quite harmless: no evil can 
arise from them if congress have only the sagacity and fortitude to avail themselves of the power 
they possess by this section. For when the stated term (for which the primary members was 
elected) is nigh expired, congress may appoint [the] next election to be held in one place in each 
state; and so as not to give the rabble needless disgust, they may appoint the most central place 
for that purpose. They can never be at a loss for an ostensible reason to vary and shift from place 
to place until they may fix it at any extremity of the state it suits. This will be the business of the 
senate, to observe the particular places in each state, where their influence is most extensive, and 
where the inhabitants are most obsequious to the will of their superiors, and there appoint the 
elections to be held. By this means, such members will be returned to the house of 
representatives (as it is called) as the president and senate shall be pleased to recommend; and 
they no doubt will recommend such gentlemen only as are distinguished by some peculiar 
federal feature-so that unanimity and concord will shine conspicuous through every branch of 
government. This section is ingeniously calculated, and must have been intended by the 
convention, to exterminate electioneering entirely. For by putting the time of election in the 
hands of congress they have thereby given them a power to perpetuate themselves when they 
shall find it safe and convenient to make the experiment. For though a preceding clause says, 
"that representatives shall be chosen for two years, and senators for six years," yet this clause 
being subsequent annuls the former, and puts it in the power of congress, (when some favorable 
juncture intervenes) to alter the time to four and twelve years. This cannot be deemed an 
unconstitutional stretch of power, for the constitution in express terms puts the time of holding 
elections in their power, and certainly they are the proper judges when to exert that power. Thus 
by doubling the period from time to time, its extent will soon be rendered coeval with the life of 
man. And it is but a very short and easy transition from this to hereditary succession, which is 
most agreeable to the institutions of nature, who in all her works, hath ordained the descendant of 
every species of beings to succeed its immediate progenitor, in the same actions, ends and order. 
The indefatigable laborious ass never aspires to the honors, nor assumes the employment of the 
sprightly warlike steed, nor does he ever pretend that it is his right to succeed him in all his 
offices and dignities, because he bears some resemblance to the defunct in his figure and nature. 
The llama, though useful enough for the purposes for which he was intended by nature, is every 
way incompetent to perform the offices of the elephant; nor does he ever pretend to usurp his 
elevated station. Every species of beings, animate and inanimate, seem fully satisfied with the 
station assigned them by nature. But perverse, obstinate man, he alone spurns at her institutions, 
and inverts her order.' He alone repines at his situation, and endeavors to usurp the station of his 
superiors. But this digression has led me from the subject in hand. . . . 
(2) This is only to be understood of the inferior class of mankind. The superior order have 
aspiring feelings given them by nature, such as ambition, emulation, etc., which makes it their 
duty to persevere in the pursuit of gratifying these refined passions. 
The next object that presents itself is the power which the new constitution gives to congress to 
regulate the manner of elections. The common practice of voting at present is by ballot. By this 
mode it is impossible for a gentleman to know how he is served by his dependent, who may be 
possessed of a vote. Therefore this mode must be speedily altered for that viva voce, which will 
secure to a rich man all the votes of his numerous dependents and friends and their dependents. 
By this means he may command any office in the gift of the people, which he pleases to set up 
for. This will answer a good end while electioneering exists; and will likewise contribute 
something towards its destruction. A government founded agreeable to nature must be entirely 
independent; that is, it must be beyond the reach of annoyance or control from every power on 
earth, Now in order to render it thus, several things are necessary. 
The next object that presents itself is the power which the new constitution gives to congress to 
regulate the manner of elections. The common practice of voting at present is by ballot. By this 
mode it is impossible for a gentleman to know how he is served by his dependent, who may be 
possessed of a vote. Therefore this mode must be speedily altered for that viva voce, which will 
secure to a rich man all the votes of his numerous dependents and friends and their dependents. 
By this means he may command any office in the gift of the people, which he pleases to set up 
for. This will answer a good end while electioneering exists; and will likewise contribute 
something towards its destruction. A government founded agreeable to nature must be entirely 
independent; that is, it must be beyond the reach of annoyance or control from every power on 
earth, Now in order to render it thus, several things are necessary. 
2dly. It will create and diffuse a spirit of industry among the people. They will then be obliged to 
labor for money to pay their taxes. There will be no trifling from time to time, as is done now. 
The new government will have energy sufficient to compel immediate payment. 
3dly. This will make the people attend to their own business, and not be dabbling in politics -
things they are entirely ignorant of; nor is it proper they should understand. But it is very 
probable that the exercise of this power may be opposed by the refractory plebeians, who (such 
is the perverseness of their natures) often refuse to comply with what is manifestly for their 
advantage. But to prevent all inconvenience from this quarter the congress have power to raise 
and support armies. This is the second thing necessary to render government independent. The 
creatures who compose these armies are a species of animals, wholly at the disposal of 
government; what others call their natural rights they resign into the hands of their superiors-
even the right of self-preservation (so precious to all other beings) they entirely surrender, and 
put their very lives in the power of their masters. Having no rights of their own to care for, they 
become naturally jealous and envious of those possessed by others. They are therefore proper 
instruments in the hands of government to divest the people of their usurped rights. But the 
capital business of these armies will be to assist the collectors of taxes, imposts, and excise, in 
raising the revenue; and this they will perform with the greatest alacrity, as it is by this they are 
supported; but for this they would be in a great measure useless; and without this they could not 
exist. . . . 
From these remarks, I think it is evident, that the grand convention hath dexterously provided for 
the removal of every thing that hath ever operated as a restraint upon government in any place or 
age of the world. But perhaps some weak heads may think that the constitution itself will be a 
check upon the new congress. But this I deny, for the convention has so happily worded 
themselves, that every part of this constitution either bears double meaning, or no meaning at all; 
and if any concessions are made to the people in one place, it is effectually cancelled in another-
so that in fact this constitution is much better and gives more scope to the rulers than they durst 
safely take if there was no constitution at all. For then the people might contend that the power 
was inherent in them, and that they had made some implied reserves in the original grant. But 
now they cannot, for every thing is expressly given away to government in this plan. Perhaps 
some people may think that power which the house of representatives possesses, of impeaching 
the officers of government, will be a restraint upon them. But this entirely vanishes, when it is 
considered that the senate hath the principal say in appointing these officers, and that they are the 
sole judges of all impeachments. Now it would be absurd to suppose that they would remove 
their own servants for performing their secret orders. . . . For the interest of rulers and the ruled 
will then be two distinct things. The mode of electing the president is another excellent 
regulation, most wisely calculated to render him the obsequious machine of congress. He is to be 
chosen by electors appointed in such manner as the state legislators shall direct. But then the 
highest in votes cannot be president, without he has the majority of all the electors; and if none 
have this majority, then the congress is to choose the president out of the five highest on the 
return. By this means the congress will always have the making of the president after the first 
election. So that if the reigning president pleases his masters, he need be under no apprehensions 
of being turned out for any severities used to the people, for though the congress may not have 
influence enough to procure him the majority of the votes of the electoral college, yet they will 
always be able to prevent any other from having such a majority; and to have him returned 
among the five highest, so that they may have the appointing of him themselves. All these wise 
regulations, prove to a demonstration, that the grand convention was infallible. The congress 
having thus disentangled themselves from all popular checks and choices, and being supported 
by a well disciplined army and active militia, will certainly command dread and respect abroad, 
obedience and submission at home. They will then look down with awful dignity and 
tremendous majesty from the pinnacle of glory to which fortune has raised them upon the 
insignificant creatures, their subjects, whom they have reduced to that state of vassalage and 
servile submission, for which they were primarily destined by nature. America will then be great 
amongst the nations(3) and princess amongst the provinces. Her fleets will cover the deserts of 
the ocean and convert it into a popular city; and her invincible armies overturn the thrones of 
princes. The glory of Britain (4) shall fall like lightning before her puissant arm; when she 
ariseth to shake the nations, and take vengeance on all who dare oppose her. O! thou most 
venerable and august congress! with what astonishing ideas my mind is ravished! when I 
contemplate thy rising grandeur, and anticipate thy future glory! Happy thy servants! happy thy 
vassals! and happy thy slaves, which fit under the shade of thy omnipotent authority, and behold 
the glory of thy majesty! for such a state who would not part with ideal blessings of liberty? who 
would not cheerfully resign the nominal advantages of freedom? the dazzling splendor of 
Assyrian, Persian, Macedonian and Roman greatness will then be totally eclipsed by the radiant 
blaze of this glorious western luminary! These beautiful expressions, aristocracy, and oligarchy, 
upon which the popular odium hath fixed derision and contempt, will then resume their natural 
emphasis; their genuine signification will be perfectly understood, and no more perverted or 
abused. 
ARISTOCROTIS
(3) That is, if we may credit the prognostications with which our federal news-papers and 
pamphlets daily teem. 
(4) Britain once the supreme ruler of this country, but her authority was rejected. Not, as a great 
many believe, because her claims were tyrannical and oppressive, but because her dominion 
excluded those from monopolizing the government into their own hands, whom nature had 
qualified to rule. It is certainly no more than the natural right of rulers "to bind their subjects, in 
all cases whatsoever." This power is perfectly synonymous with that clause in the constitution 
which invests congress with power to make all laws which shall be "necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers," etc., and that which says "the 
constitution, laws, and treaties of congress shall be the supreme law of the land; any thing in the 
constitutions or laws of any of the states to the contrary notwithstanding." But nothing less 
would satisfy Britain, than a power to bind the natural rulers as well as subjects. 
Antifederalist No. 52 ON THE GUARANTEE OF 
CONGRESSIONAL BIENNIAL ELECTIONS
The following essay was signed by Consider Arms, Malichi Maynard, and Samuel Field. It was 
taken from The Hampshire Gazette of April 9, 1788. 
We the subscribers being of the number, who did not assent to the ratification of the federal 
constitution, under consideration in the late state convention, held at Boston, to which we were 
called by the suffrages of the corporations to which we respectively belong-beg leave, through 
the channel of your paper, to lay before the public in general, and our constituents in particular, 
the reasons of our dissent, and the principles which governed us in our decision of this important 
question. 
Fully convinced, ever since the late revolution, of the necessity of a firm, energetic government, 
we should have rejoiced in an opportunity to have given our assent to such a one; and should in 
the present case, most cordially have done it, could we at the same time been happy to have seen 
the liberties of the people and the rights of mankind properly guarded and secured. We conceive 
that the very notion of government carries along with it the idea of justice and equity, and that 
the whole design of instituting government in the world, was to preserve men's properties from 
rapine, and their bodies from violence and bloodshed. 
These propositions being established, we conceive must of necessity produce the following 
consequence: That every constitution or system, which does not quadrate with this original 
design, is not government, but in fact a subversion of it. 
Having premised thus much, we proceed to mention some things in this constitution to which we 
object, and to enter into an inquiry, whether, and how far they coincide with those simple and 
original notions of government before mentioned. 
In the first place, as direct taxes are to be apportioned according to the numbers in each state, and 
as Massachusetts has none in it but what are declared free men, so the whole, blacks as well as 
whites, must be numbered; this must therefore operate against us, as two-fifths of the slaves in 
the southern states are to be left out of the numeration. Consequently, three Massachusetts 
infants will increase the tax equal to five sturdy full-grown Negroes of theirs, who work every 
day in the week for their masters, saving the Sabbath, upon which they are allowed to get 
something for their own support. We can see no justice in this way of apportioning taxes. Neither 
can we see any good reason why this was consented to on the part of our delegates. 
We suppose it next to impossible that every individual in this vast continental union, should have 
his wish with regard to every single article composing a frame of government. And therefore, 
although we think it More agreeable to the principles of republicanism, that elections should be 
annual, yet as the elections in our own state government are so, we did not view it so dangerous 
to the liberties of the people, that we should have rejected the constitution merely on account of 
the biennial elections of the representatives-had we been sure that the people have any security 
even of this. But this we could not find. For although it is said, that "the House of 
Representatives shall be chosen every second year, by the people of the several states," etc., and 
that "the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof," yet all this is wholely superseded by a 
subsequent provision, which empowers Congress at any time to enact a law, whereby such 
regulations may be altered, except as to the places of choosing senators. Here we conceive the 
people may be very materially injured, and in time reduced to a state of as abject vassalage as 
any people were under the control of the most mercenary despot that ever tarnished the pages of 
history. The depravity of human nature, illustrated by examples from history, will warrant us to 
say, it may be possible, if not probable, that the congress may be composed of men, who will 
wish to burden and oppress the people. In such case, will not their inventions be fruitful enough 
to devise occasions for postponing the elections? And if they can do this once, they can twice; if 
they can twice, they can thrice, so by degrees render themselves absolute and perpetual. Or, if 
they choose, they have another expedient. They can alter the place of holding elections. They can 
say, whatever the legislature of this state may order to the contrary, that all the elections of our 
representatives shall be made at Mechias, or at Williamstown. Consequently, nine- tenths of the 
people will never vote. And if this should be thought a measure favorable to their reelection, or 
the election of some tool for their mercenary purposes, we doubt not it will be thus ordered. But 
says the advocates for the constitution, "it is not likely this will ever happen; we are not to expect 
our rulers will ever proceed to a wanton exercise of the powers given them." But what reason 
have we more than past ages, to expect that we shall be blessed with impeccable rulers? We
think not any. Although it has been said that every generation grows wiser and wiser, yet we 
have no reason to think they grow better and better. And therefore the probability lies upon the 
dark side. Does not the experience of past ages leach, that men have generally exercised all the 
powers they had given them, and even have usurped upon them, in order to accomplish their own 
sinister and avaricious designs, whenever they thought they could do it with impunity? This we 
presume will not be denied. And it appeared to us that the arguments made use of by the favorers 
of the constitution, in the late convention at Boston, proceeded upon the plan of righteousness in 
those who are to rule over us, by virtue of this new form of government. But these arguments, we 
confess, could have no weight with us, while we judge them to be founded altogether upon a 
slippery perhaps. 
We are sensible, that in order to the due administration of government, it is necessary that certain 
powers should be delegated to the rulers from the people. At the same time, we think they ought 
carefully to guard against giving so much as will enable those rulers, by that means, at once, or 
even in process of time, to render themselves absolute and despotic. This we think is the case 
with the form of government lately submitted to our consideration. We could not, therefore, 
acting uprightly, consulting our own good and the good of our constituents, give our assent unto 
it. We could not then and we still cannot see, that because people are many times guilty of crimes 
and deserving of punishment, that it from thence follows the authority ought to have power to 
punish them when they are not guilty, or to punish the innocent with the guilty without 
discrimination, which amounts to the same thing. But this we think in fact to be the case as to 
this federal constitution. For the congress, whether they have provocation or not, can at any time 
order the elections in any or all the states to be conducted in such manner as wholely to defeat 
and render entirely nugatory the intention of those elections, and convert that which was 
considered and intended to be the palladium of the liberties of the people-the grand bulwark 
against any invasion upon them-into a formidable engine, by which to overthrow them all, and 
thus involve them in the depth of misery and distress. But it was pled by some of the ablest 
advocates of the constitution, that if congress should exercise such powers to the prejudice of the 
people (and they did not deny but they could if they should be disposed) they (the people) would 
not suffer it. They would have recourse to the ultima ratio, the dernier resort of the oppressed-the 
sword. 
But it appeared to us a piece of superlative incongruity indeed, that the people, whilst in the full 
and indefeasible possession of their liberties and privileges, should be so very profuse, so very 
liberal in the disposal of them, as consequently to place themselves in a predicament miserable to 
an extreme. So wretched indeed, that they may at once be reduced to the sad alternative of 
yielding themselves vassals into the hands of a venal and corrupt administration, whose only 
wish may be to aggrandize themselves and families-to wallow in luxury and every species of 
dissipation, and riot upon the spoils of the community; or take up the sword and involve their 
country in all the horrors of a civil war-the consequences of which, we think, we may venture to 
augur will more firmly rivet their shackles and end in the entailment of vassalage to their 
posterity. We think this by no means can fall within the description of government before 
mentioned. Neither can we think these suggestions merely chimerical, or that they proceed from 
an overheated enthusiasm in favor of republicanism; neither yet from an illplaced detestation of 
aristocracy; but from the apparent danger the people are in by establishing this constitution. 
When we take a forward view of the proposed congress-seated in the federal city, ten miles 
square, fortified and replenished with all kinds of military stores and every implement; with a 
navy at command on one side, and a land army on the other-we say, when we view them thus 
possessed of the sword in one hand and the purse strings of the people in the other, we can see no 
security left for them in the enjoyment of their liberties, but what may proceed from the bare 
possibility that this supreme authority of the nation may be possessed of virtue and integrity 
sufficient to influence them in the administration of equal justice and equity among those whom 
they shall govern. But why should we voluntarily choose to trust our all upon so precarious a 
tenure as this? We confess it gives us pain to anticipate the future scene: a scene presenting to 
view miseries so complicated and extreme, that it may be part of the charms of eloquence to 




Antifederalist No. 53 A PLEA FOR THE RIGHT OF RECALL
"AMICUS" appeared in the Columbian Herald, August 28, 1788. 
Some time before a Convention of the United States was held, I mentioned in a paragraph which 
was published in one of the Charlestown papers, that it would be acting wisely in the formation 
of a constitution for a free government, to enact, that the electors should recall their 
representatives when they thought proper, although they should be chosen for a certain term of 
years; as a right to appoint (where the right of appointing originates with the appointees) implies 
a right to recall. As the persons appointed are meant to act for the benefit of the appointees, as 
well as themselves, they, if they mean to act for their mutual benefit, can have no objection to a 
proposal of this kind. But if they have any sinister designs, they will certainly oppose it, 
foreseeing that their electors will displace them as soon as they begin to act contrary to their 
interest. I am therefore glad to find that the state of New York has proposed an amendment of 
this kind to the federal constitution, viz: That the legislatures of the respective states may recall 
their senators, or either of them, and elect others in their stead, to serve the remainder of the time 
for which the senators so recalled were appointed. I wish this had been extended to the 
representatives in both houses, as it is as prudent to have a check over the members of one house 
as of the other. 
Some persons as object to this amendment, in fact say, that it is safer to give a man an 
irrevocable power of attorney, than a revocable one; and that it is right to let a representative ruin 
us, rather than recall him and put a real friend of his country, and a truly honest man in his place, 
who would rather suffer ten thousand deaths than injure his country, or sully his honor and 
reputation. Such persons seem to say, that power ought not to originate with the people (which is 
the wish, I fear, of some among us); and also that we are not safe in trusting our own legislature 
with the power of recalling such senators as will not abide by such instructions - as shall be 
either given them, when chosen, or sent to them afterwards, by the legislature of this or any other 
state, or by the electors that chose them, although they should have met together in a body for the 
purpose of instructing or sending them instructions on a matter on which the salvation of the 
state depends. That we should insist on the amendment respecting this matter taking place, which 
the state of New York has proposed, appears to me to be absolutely necessary, the security of 
each state may be almost said to rest on it. For my own part, I would rather that this amendment 
should take place and give the new government unlimited powers to act for the public good, than 
give them limited powers, and at the same time put it out of our power, for a certain term of 
years, to recall our representatives, although we saw they were exceeding their powers, and were 
bent on making us miserable and themselves, by means of a standing army-a perpetual and 
absolute government. For power is a very intoxicating thing, and has made many a man do 
unwarrantable actions, which before he was invested with it, he had no thoughts of doing. I hope 
by what I have said I shall not be thought to cast even the shadow of a reflection on the 
principles of either of the members of the federal convention-it is far from being my intention. I 
wish for nothing more than a good government and a constitution under which our liberties will 
be perfectly safe. To preserve which, I think the wisest conduct will be to keep the staff of power 
in our own hands as much as possible, and not wantonly and inconsiderately give up a greater 
share of our liberties with a view of contributing to the public good, than what the necessity of 
the case requires. 
For our own sakes we shall keep in power those persons whose conduct pleases us as long as we 
can, and shall perhaps sometimes wish (when we meet with a person of an extra worthy 
character and abilities) that we could keep him in power for life. On the other hand, we shall 
dismiss from our employ as soon as possible, such persons as do not consult our interest and will 
not follow our instructions. For there are, I fear, a few persons among us, so wise in their own 
eyes, that they would if they could, pursue their own will and inclinations, in opposition to the 
instructions of their constituents. In so doing, they may perhaps, once in a hundred times, act for 
the interest of those they represent, more than if they followed the instructions given them. But I 
wish that we would never suffer any person to continue our representative that obeyed not our 
instructions, unless something unforeseen and unknown by us turned up, which he knew would 
alter our sentiments, if we were made acquainted with it; and which would make his complying 
with our will highly imprudent. In every government matter, on which our representatives were 
not instructed, we should leave them to act agreeable to their own judgment; on which account 
we should always choose men of integrity, honor and abilities to represent us. But when we did 
instruct them, as they are our representatives and agents, we should insist on their acting and 
voting conformable to our directions. But as they would each of them be a member of the 
community, they should have a right to deliver to the houses of representatives of which they 
were members, their own private sentiments so that if their private sentiments contained cogent 
reasons for acting contrary to the instructions given them-the other members of said houses who 
would not be bound by said instructions, would be guided by them; in which case, that would 
take place which would be most for the public good, which ought to be the wish of all of us. 
AMICUS
Antifederalist No. 54 APPORTIONMENT AND SLAVERY: 
NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN VIEWS
This four part essay shows both northern and southern dissatisfaction with "the Great 
Compromise" 
The first is taken from the third essay of "BRUTUS." 
The second: from the speeches of Rawlins Lowndes to the South Carolina ratifying convention 
on January 16, 17, and 18, 1788. 
The third: from the sixth essay by "CATO." 
The fourth: from an essay by "A GEORGIAN," appearing in The Gazette of the State of Georgia 
on November 15, 1787. 
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States, which may be 
included in this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by 
adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, 
and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons." What a strange and 
unnecessary accumulation of words are here used to conceal from the public eye what might 
have been expressed in the following concise manner: Representatives are to be proportioned 
among the States respectively, according to the number of freemen and slaves inhabiting them, 
counting five slaves for three freemen. 
"In a free State," says the celebrated Montesquieu, "every man, who is supposed to be a free 
agent, ought to be concerned in his own government, therefore the legislature should reside in 
the whole body of the people, or their representatives." But it has never been alleged that those 
who are not free agents can, upon any rational principle, have anything to do in government, 
either by themselves or others. If they have no share in government, why is the number of 
members in the assembly to be increased on their account? Is it because in some of the States, a 
considerable part of the property of the inhabitants consists in a number of their fellow-men, who 
are held in bondage, in defiance of every idea of benevolence, justice and religion, and contrary 
to all the principles of liberty which have been publicly avowed in the late Glorious Revolution? 
If this be a just ground for representation, the horses in some of the States, and the oxen in 
others, ought to be represented-for a great share of property in some of them consists in these 
animals; and they have as much control over their own actions as these poor unhappy creatures, 
who are intended to be described in the above recited clause, by the words, "all other persons." 
By this mode of apportionment, the representatives of the different parts of the Union will be 
extremely unequal; in some of the Southern States the slaves are nearly equal in number to the 
free men; and for all these slaves they will be entitled to a proportionate share in the legislature; 
this will give them an unreasonable weight in the government, which can derive no additional 
strength, protection, nor defense from the slaves, but the contrary. Why, then, should they be 
represented? What adds to the evil is, that these States are to be permitted to continue the 
inhuman traffic of importing slaves until the year 1808-and for every cargo of these unhappy 
people which unfeeling, unprincipled, barbarous and avaricious wretches may tear from their 
country, friends and tender connections, and bring into those States, they are to be rewarded by 
having an increase of members in the General Assembly.... 
BRUTUS
. . . . six of the Eastern States formed a majority in the House of Representatives. In the 
enumeration he passed Rhode Island, and included Pennsylvania. Now, was it consonant with 
reason, with wisdom, with policy, to suppose, in a legislature where a majority of persons sat 
whose interests were greatly different from ours, that we had the smallest chance of receiving 
adequate advantages? Certainly not. He believed the gentlemen that went from this state, to 
represent us in Convention, possessed as much integrity, and stood as high in point of character, 
as any gentlemen that could have been selected; and he also believed that they had done every 
thing in their power to procure for us a proportionate share in this new government; but the very 
little they had gained proved what we may expect in future-that the interest of the Northern 
States would so predominate as to divest us of any pretensions to the title of a republic. In the 
first place, what cause was there for jealousy of our importing Negroes? Why confine us to 
twenty years, or rather why limit us at all? For his part, he thought this trade could be justified on 
the principles of religion, humanity, and justice; for certainly to translate a set of human beings 
from a bad country to a better, was fulfilling every part of these principles. But they don't like 
our slaves, because they have none themselves, and therefore want to exclude us from this great 
advantage. Why should the Southern States allow of this, without the consent of nine states? . . . 
We had a law prohibiting the importation of Negroes for three years, a law he greatly approved 
of; but there was no reason offered why the Southern States might not find it necessary to alter 
their conduct, and open their ports. 
Without Negroes, this state would degenerate into one of the most contemptible in the Union; 
and he cited an expression that fell from General Pinckney on a former debate, that whilst there 
remained one acre of swampland in South Carolina, he should raise his voice against restricting 
the importation of Negroes. Even in granting the importation for twenty years, care had been 
taken to make us pay for this indulgence, each negro being liable, on importation, to pay a duty 
not exceeding ten dollars; and, in addition to this, they were liable to a capitation tax. Negroes 
were our wealth, our only natural resource; yet behold how our kind friends in the north were 
determined soon to tie up our hands, and drain us of what we had! The Eastern States drew their 
means of subsistence, in a great measure, from their shipping; and, on that head, they had been 
particularly careful not to allow of any burdens: they were not to pay tonnage or duties; no, not 
even the form of clearing out: all ports were free and open to them! Why, then, call this a 
reciprocal bargain, which took all from one party, to bestow it on the other! 
Major [Pierce] BUTLER observed, that they were to pay five per cent impost. 
This, Mr. LOWNDES proved, must fall upon the consumer. They are to be the carriers; and, we 
being the consumers, therefore all expenses would fall upon us. A great number of gentlemen 
were captivated with this new Constitution, because those who were in debt would be compelled 
to pay; others pleased themselves with the reflection that no more confiscation laws would be 
passed; but those were small advantages, in proportion to the evils that might be apprehended 
from the laws that might be passed by Congress, whenever there was a majority of 
representatives from the Eastern States, who were governed by prejudices and ideas extremely 
different from ours. . . . 
Great stress was laid on the admirable checks which guarded us, under the new Constitution, 
from the encroachments of tyranny; but too many checks in a political machine must produce the 
same mischief as in a mechanical one-that of throwing all into confusion. But supposing we 
considered ourselves so much aggrieved as to reduce us to the necessity of insisting on redress, 
what probability had we of relief? Very little indeed. In the revolving on misfortune, some little 
gleams of comfort resulted from a hope of being able to resort to an impartial tribunal for 
redress; but pray what reason was there for expectancy that, in Congress, the interest of five 
Southern States would be considered in a preferable point of view to the nine Eastern ones? 
.... the mode of legislation in the infancy of free communities was by the collective body, and 
this consisted of free persons, or those whose age admitted them to the right of mankind and 
citizenship, whose sex made them capable of protecting the state, and whose birth may be 
denominated Free Born; and no traces can be found that ever women, children, and slaves, or 
those who were not sui juris, in the early days of legislation, met with the free members of the 
community to deliberate on public measures; hence is derived this maxim in free governments, 
that representation ought to bear a proportion to the number of free inhabitants in a community; 
this principle your own state constitution, and others, have observed in the establishment of a 
future census, in order to apportion the representatives, and to increase or diminish the 
representation to the ratio of the increase or diminution of electors. But, what aid can the 
community derive from the assistance women, infants and slaves, in their deliberation, or in their 
defense? What motives, therefore, could the convention have in departing from just and rational 
principle of representation, which is the governing prince of this state and of all America? 
CATO
Article 1, section 2. This section mentions that, within three years after the first meeting of the 
Congress of the United States, an enumeration shall take place, the number of representatives not 
to exceed one member for every 30,000. This article I believe to be inadmissable. First, it affords 
to small a representation, (supposing 48 at the highest calculation) and especially in the southern 
states, their climate, soil, and produce, . . . not being capable of that population as in the northern 
states. Would it not therefore be better to increase the number of representatives, say one 
member for every 20,000 for the states north of Virginia, and one for every 15,000 south of the 
said state, itself included? Or, secondly, divide the states into districts which shall choose the 
representatives, by which every part of a state will have an equal chance, without being liable to 
parties or factions? Should it be said it will increase the expense, it will be money well laid out, 
and the more so if we retain the paying them out of our own bands. And, supposing the voting in 
the house of representatives was continued as heretofore by states, would it not be more equal 
still? At any rate I would strenuously recommend to vote by states, and not individually, as it 
will be accommodating the idea of equality, which should ever be observed in a republican form 
of government. Or, thirdly, if it was in proportion to the quotas of the states, as rated in taxation, 
then the number of members would increase with the proportion of tax, and at that rate there 
would always be an equality in the quota of tax as well as representation; for what chance of 
equality according to the constitution in question, can a state have that has only one or two votes, 
when others have eight or ten, (for it is evident that each representative, as well as senator, is 
meant to have a vote, as it mentions no other mode but in choosing the president), and as it is 
generally allowed that the United States are divided into two natural divisions, the northern as far 
as Virginia, the latter included forms the southern? This produces a wide difference in climate, 
soil, customs, manners of living, and the produce of the land, as well as trade, also in population, 
to which it is well observed the latter is not so favorable as the former, and never can nor will be, 
nature itself being the great obstacle. And when taxation is in agitation, as also many other 
points, it must produce differences in sentiments; and, in such dispute, how is it likely to be 
decided? According to the mode of voting, the number of members north of Virginia the first 
three years is 42, and the southern, Virginia included, 23.... 
Is human nature above self interest? If the northern states do not horde the southern in taxation, it 
would appear then really that they are more disinterested men than we know of. 
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REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? 
(PART I)
Following are four essays by "THE FEDERAL FARMER" 
.... It being impracticable for the people to assemble to make laws, they must elect legislators, 
and assign men to the different departments of the government. In the representative branch we 
must expect chiefly to collect the confidence of the people, and in it to find almost entirely the 
force of persuasion. In forming this branch, therefore, several important considerations must be 
attended to. It must possess abilities to discern the situation of the people and of public affairs, a 
disposition to sympathize with the people, and a capacity and inclination to make laws congenial 
to their circumstances and condition. It must afford security against interest combinations, 
corruption and influence. It must possess the confidence, and have the voluntary support of the 
people. 
I think these positions will not be controverted, nor the one I formerly advanced, that a fair and 
equal representation is that in which the interests, feelings, opinions and views of the people are 
collected, in such manner as they would be were the people all assembled. Having made these 
general observations, I shall proceed to consider further my principal position, viz. that there is 
no substantial representation of the people provided for in a government, in which the most 
essential powers, even as to the internal police of the country, are proposed to be lodged; and to 
propose certain amendments as to the representative branch.... 
The representation is insubstantial and ought to be increased. In matters where there is much 
room for opinion, you will not expect me to establish my positions with mathematical certainty; 
you must only expect my observations to be candid, and such as are well founded in the mind of 
the writer. I am in a field where doctors disagree; and as to genuine representation, though no 
feature in government can be more important, perhaps, no one has been less understood, and no 
one that has received so imperfect a consideration by political writers. The ephori in Sparta, and 
the tribunes in Rome, were but the shadow; the representation in Great Britain is unequal and 
insecure. In America we have done more in establishing this important branch on its true 
principles, than, perhaps, all the world besides. Yet even here, I conceive, that very great 
improvements in representation may be made. In fixing this branch, the situation of the people 
must be surveyed, and the number of representatives and forms of election apportioned to that 
situation. When we find a numerous people settled in a fertile and extensive country, possessing 
equality, and few or none of them oppressed with riches or wants, it ought to be the anxious care 
of the constitution and laws, to arrest them from national depravity, and to preserve them in their 
happy condition. A virtuous people make just laws, and good laws tend to preserve unchanged a 
virtuous people. A virtuous and happy people by laws uncongenial to their characters, may easily 
be gradually changed into servile and depraved creatures. Where the people, or their 
representatives, make the laws, it is probable they will generally be fitted to the national 
character and circumstances, unless the representation be partial, and the imperfect substitute of 
the people. However the people may be electors, if the representation be so formed as to give one 
or more of the natural classes of men in society an undue ascendancy over others, it is imperfect; 
the former will gradually become masters, and the latter slaves. It is the first of all among the 
political balances, to preserve in its proper station each of these classes. We talk of balances in 
the legislature, and among the departments of government; we ought to carry them to the body of 
the people. Since I advanced the idea of balancing the several orders of men in a community, in 
forming a genuine representation, and seen that idea considered as chimerical, I have been 
sensibly struck with a sentence in the Marquis Beccaria's treatise. This sentence was quoted by 
Congress in 1774, and is as follows:-"In every society there is an effort continually tending to 
confer on one part the height of power and happiness, and to reduce the others to the extreme of 
weakness and misery; the intent of good laws is to oppose this effort, and to diffuse their 
influence universally and equally." Add to this Montesquieu's opinion, that "in a free state every 
man, who is supposed to be a free agent, ought to be concerned in his own government: 
therefore, the legislative should reside in the whole body of the people, or their representatives." 
It is extremely clear that these writers had in view the several orders of men in society, which we 
call aristocratical, democratical, mercantile, mechanics etc., and perceived the efforts they are 
constantly, from interested and ambitious views, disposed to make to elevate themselves and 
oppress others. Each order must have a share in the business of legislation actually and 
efficiently. It is deceiving a people to tell them they are electors, and can choose their legislators, 
if they cannot, in the nature of things, choose men from among themselves, and genuinely like 
themselves. I wish you to take another idea along with you. We are not only to balance these 
natural efforts, but we are also to guard against accidental combinations; combinations founded 
in the connections of offices and private interests, both evils which are increased in proportion as 
the number of men, among which the elected must be, are decreased. To set this matter in a 
proper point of view, we must form some general ideas and descriptions of the different classes 
of men, as they may be divided by occupation and politically. The first class is the aristocratical. 
There are three kinds of aristocracy spoken of in this country-the first is a constitutional one, 
which does not exist in the United States in our common acceptation of the word. Montesquieu, 
it is true, observes that where part of the persons in a society, for want of property, age, or moral 
character, are excluded any share in the government, the others, who alone are the constitutional 
electors and elected, form this aristocracy. This, according to him, exists in each of the United 
States, where a considerable number of persons, as all convicted of crimes, under age, or not 
possessed of certain property, are excluded any share in the government. The second is an 
aristocratic faction, a junto of unprincipled men, often distinguished for their wealth or abilities, 
who combine together and make their object their private interests and aggrandizement. The 
existence of this description is merely accidental, but particularly to be guarded against. The 
third is the natural aristocracy; this term we use to designate a respectable order of men, the line 
between whom and the natural democracy is in some degree arbitrary. We may place men on one 
side of this line, which others may place on the other, and in all disputes between the few and the 
many, a considerable number are wavering and uncertain themselves on which side they are, or 
ought to be. In my idea of our natural aristocracy in the United States, I include about four or 
five thousand men; and among these I reckon those who have been placed in the offices of 
governors, of members of Congress, and state senators generally, in the principal officers of the 
army and militia, the superior judges, the most eminent professional men, etc., and men of large 
property. The other persons and orders in the community form the natural democracy; this 
includes in general, the yeomanry, the subordinate officers, civil and military, the fishermen, 
mechanics and traders, many of the merchants and professional men. It is easy to perceive that 
men of these two classes, the aristocratical and democratical, with views equally honest, have 
sentiments widely different, especially respecting public and private expenses, salaries, taxes, 
etc. Men of the first class associate more extensively, have a high sense of honor, possess 
abilities, ambition, and general knowledge; men of the second class are not so much used to 
combining great objects; they possess less ambition, and a larger share of honesty; their 
dependence is principally on middling and small estates, industrious pursuits, and hard labor, 
while that of the former is principally on the emoluments of large estates, and of the chief offices 
of government. Not only the efforts of these two great parties are to be balanced, but other 
interests and parties also, which do not always oppress each other merely for want of power, and 
for fear of the consequences; though they, in fact, mutually depend on each other. Yet such are 
their general views, that the merchants alone would never fail to make laws favorable to 
themselves and oppressive to the farmers. The farmers alone would act on like principles; the 
former would tax the land, the latter the trade. The manufacturers are often disposed to contend 
for monopolies; buyers make every exertion to lower prices; and sellers to raise them. Men who 
live by fees and salaries endeavor to raise them; and the part of the people who pay them, 
endeavor to lower them; the public creditors to augment the taxes, and the people at large to 
lessen them. Thus, in every period of society, and in all the transactions of men, we see parties 
verifying the observation made by the Marquis; and those classes which have not their centinels 
in the government, in proportion to what they have to gain or lose, must infallibly be ruined. 
Efforts among parties are not merely confined to property. They contend for rank and 
distinctions; all their passions in turn are enlisted in political controversies. Men, elevated in 
society, are often disgusted with the changeableness of the democracy, and the latter are often 
agitated with the passions of jealousy and envy. The yeomanry possess a large share of property 
and strength, are nervous and firm in their opinions and habits; the mechanics of towns are 
ardent and changeable-honest and credulous, they are inconsiderable for numbers, weight and 
strength, not always sufficiently stable for supporting free governments; the fishing interest 
partakes partly of the strength and stability of the landed, and partly of the changeableness of the 
mechanic interest. As to merchants and traders, they are our agents in almost all money 
transactions, give activity to government, and possess a considerable share of influence in it. It 
has been observed by an able writer, that frugal industrious merchants are generally advocates 
for liberty. It is an observation, I believe, well founded, that the schools produce but few 
advocates for republican forms of government. Gentlemen of the law, divinity, physic, etc., 
probably form about a fourth part of the people; yet their political influence, perhaps, is equal to 
that of all the other descriptions of men. If we may judge from the appointments to Congress, the 
legal characters will often, in a small representation, be the majority; but the more the 
representatives are increased, the more of the farmers, merchants, etc., will be found to be 
brought into the government. 
These general observations will enable you to discern what I intend by different classes, and the 
general scope of my ideas, when I contend for uniting and balancing their interests, feelings, 
opinions, and views in the legislature. We may not only so unite and balance these as to prevent 
a change in the government by the gradual exaltation of one part to the depression of others, but 
we may derive many other advantages from the combination and full representation. A small 
representation can never be well informed as to the circumstances of the people. The members of 
it must be too far removed from the people, in general, to sympathize with them, and too few to 
communicate with them. A representation must be extremely imperfect where the representatives 
are not circumstanced to make the proper communications to their constituents, and where the 
constituents in turn cannot, with tolerable convenience, make known their wants, circumstances, 
and opinions to their representatives. Where there is but one representative to 30,000 or 40,000 
inhabitants, it appears to me, he can only mix and be acquainted with a few respectable 
characters among his constituents. Even double the general representation, and then there must 
be a very great distance between the representatives and the people in general represented. On 
the proposed plan, the state of Delaware, the city of Philadelphia, the state of Rhode Island, the 
province of Maine, the county of Suffolk in Massachusetts, will have one representative each. 
There can be but little personal knowledge, or but few communications, between him and the 
people at large of either of those districts. It has been observed that mixing only with the 
respectable men, he will get the best information and ideas from them; he will also receive 
impressions favorable to their purposes particularly.... 
Could we get over all our difficulties respecting a balance of interests and party efforts, to raise 
some and oppress others, the want of sympathy, information and intercourse between the 
representatives and the people, an insuperable difficulty will still remain. I mean the constant 
liability of a small number of representatives to private combinations. The tyranny of the one, or 
the licentiousness of the multitude, are, in my mind, but small evils, compared with the factions 
of the few. It is a consideration well worth pursuing, how far this house of representatives will be 
liable to be formed into private juntos, how far influenced by expectations of appointments and 
offices, how far liable to be managed by the president and senate, and how far the people will 
have confidence in them.... 
THE FEDERAL FARMER
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. . . . Why in England have the revolutions always ended in stipulations in favor of general 
liberty, equal laws, and the common rights of the people, and in most other countries in favor 
only of a few influential men? The reasons, in my mind, are obvious. In England the people have 
been substantially represented in many respects; in the other countries it has not been so. Perhaps 
a small degree of attention to a few simple facts will illustrate this. In England, from the 
oppressions of the Norman Kings to the revolution in 1688, during which period of two or three 
hundred years, the English liberties were ascertained and established, the aristocratic part of that 
nation was substantially represented by a very large number of nobles, possessing similar 
interests and feelings with those they represented. The body of the people, about four or five 
millions, then mostly a frugal landed people, were represented by about five hundred 
representatives, taken not from the order of men which formed the aristocracy, but from the body 
of the people, and possessed of the same interests and feelings. De Lolme, speaking of the 
British representation, expressly founds all his reasons on this union; this similitude of interests, 
feelings, views and circumstances. He observes the English have preserved their liberties, 
because they and their leaders or representatives have been strictly united in interests, and in 
contending for general liberty. Here we see a genuine balance founded in the actual state of 
things. The whole community, probably, not more than two-fifths more numerous than we now 
are, were represented by seven or eight hundred men; the barons stipulated with the common 
people, and the king with the whole. Had the legal distinction between lords and commons been 
broken down, and the people of that island been called upon to elect forty-five senators, and one 
hundred and twenty representatives, about the proportion we propose to establish, their whole 
legislature evidently would have been of the natural aristocracy, and the body of the people 
would not have had scarcely a single sincere advocate. Their interests would have been 
neglected, general and equal liberty forgot, and the balance lost. Contests and conciliations, as in 
most other countries, would have been merely among the few, and as it might have been 
necessary to serve their purposes, the people at large would have been flattered or threatened, 
and probably not a single stipulation made in their favor. In Rome the people were miserable, 
though they bad three orders, the consuls, senators, and tribunes, and approved the laws, and all 
for want of a genuine representation. The people were too numerous to assemble, and do any 
thing properly themselves. The voice of a few, the dupes of artifice, was called the voice of the 
people. It is difficult for the people to defend themselves against the arts and intrigues of the 
great, but by selecting a suitable number of men fixed to their interests to represent them, and to 
oppose ministers and senators. . . . [Much] depends on the number of the men selected, and the 
manner of doing it. To be convinced of this, we need only attend to the reason of the case, the 
conduct of the British commons, and of the Roman tribunes. Equal liberty prevails in England, 
because there was a representation of the people, in fact and reality, to establish it. Equal liberty 
never prevailed in Rome because there was but the shadow of a representation. There were 
consuls in Rome annually elected to execute the laws; several hundred senators represented the 
great families; the body of the people annually chose tribunes from among themselves to defend 
them and to secure their rights; I think the number of tribunes annually chosen never exceeded 
ten. This representation, perhaps, was not proportionally so numerous as the representation 
proposed in the new plan; but the difference will not appear to be so great, when it shall be 
recollected, that these tribunes were chosen annually, that the great patrician families were not 
admitted to these offices of tribunes, and that the people of Italy who elected the tribunes were a 
long while, if not always, a small people compared with the people of the United States. What 
was the consequence of this trifling representation? The people of Rome always elected for their 
tribunes men conspicuous for their riches, military commands, professional popularity, etc., great 
commoners, between whom and the noble families there was only the shadowy difference of 
legal distinction. Among all the tribunes the people chose for several centuries, they had scarcely 
five real friends to their interests. These tribunes lived, felt and saw, not like the people, but like 
the great patrician families, like senators and great officers of state, to get into which it was 
evident by their conduct, was their sole object. These tribunes often talked about the rights and 
prerogatives of the people, and that was all; for they never even attempted to establish equal 
liberty. So far from establishing the rights of the people, they suffered the senate, to the 
exclusion of the people, to engross the powers of taxation; those excellent and almost only real 
weapons of defense even the people of England possess. The tribunes obtained that the people 
should be eligible to some of the great offices of state, and marry, if they pleased, into the noble 
families; these were advantages in their nature, confined to a few elevated commoners, and of 
trifling importance to the people at large. Nearly the same observations may be made as to the 
ephori of Sparta. 
We may amuse ourselves with names; but the fact is, men will be governed by the motives and 
temptations that surround their situation. Political evils to be guarded against are in the human 
character, and not in the name of patrician or plebeian. Had the people of Italy, in the early 
period of the republic, selected yearly or biennially, four or five hundred of their best informed 
men, emphatically from among themselves, these representatives would have formed an honest 
respectable assembly, capable of combining in them the views and exertions of the people and 
their respectability would have procured them honest and able leaders, and we should have seen 
equal liberty established. True liberty stands in need of a fostering band,- from the days of Adam 
she has found but one temple to dwell in securely. She has laid the foundation of one, perhaps 
her last in America; whether this is to be completed and have duration, is yet a question. Equal 
liberty never yet found many advocates among the great. It is a disagreeable truth that power 
perverts men's views in a greater degree than public employments inform their understandings. 
They become hardened in certain maxims, and more lost to fellow feelings. Men may always be 
too cautious to commit alarming and glaring iniquities; but they, as well as systems, are liable to 
be corrupted by slow degrees. Junius well observes, we are not only to guard against what men 
will do, but even against what they may do. Men in high public offices are in stations where they 
gradually lose sight of the people, and do not often think of attending to them, except when 
necessary to answer private purposes. 
The body of the people must have this true representative security placed some where in the 
nation. And in the United States, or in any extended empire, I am fully persuaded [it] can be 
placed no where, but in the forms of a federal republic, where we can divide and place it in 
several state or district legislatures, giving the people in these the means of opposing heavy 
internal taxes and oppressive measures in the proper stages. A great empire contains the amities 
and animosities of a world within itself. We are not like the people of England, one people 
compactly settled on a small island, with a great city filled with frugal merchants, serving as a 
common centre of liberty and union. We are dispersed, and it is impracticable for any but the few 
to assemble in one place. The few must be watched, checked, and often resisted. Tyranny has 
ever shown a predilection to be in close amity with them, or the one man. Drive it from kings 
and it flies to senators, to decemviri, to dictators, to tribunes, to popular leaders, to military 
chiefs, etc. 
De Lolme well observes, that in societies, laws which were to be equal to all are soon warped to 
the private interests of the administrators, and made to defend the usurpations of a few. The 
English, who had tasted the sweets of equal laws, were aware of this, and though they restored 
their king, they carefully delegated to parliament the advocates of freedom. 
I have often lately heard it observed that it will do very well for a people to make a constitution 
and ordain that at stated periods they will choose, in a certain manner, a first magistrate, a given 
number of senators and representatives, and let them have all power to do as they please. This 
doctrine, however it may do for a small republic-as Connecticut, for instance, where the people 
may choose so many senators and representatives to assemble in the legislature, [representing] in 
an eminent degree, the interests, the views, feelings, and genuine sentiments of the people 
themselves - can never be admitted in an extensive country. And when this power is lodged in 
the hands of a few, not to limit the few is but one step short of giving absolute power to one man. 
In a numerous representation the abuse of power is a common injury, and has no temptation; 
among the few, the abuse of power may often operate to the private emolument of those who 
abuse it. 
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. . . . But "the people must elect good men." Examine the system-is it practicable for them to 
elect fit and proper representatives where the number is so small? "But the people may choose 
whom they please." This is an observation, I believe, made without due attention to facts and the 
state of the community, To explain my meaning, I will consider the descriptions of men 
commonly presented to the people as candidates for the offices of representatives. We may rank 
them in three classes. 
1. The men who form the natural aristocracy, as before defined. 
2. Popular demagogues-these men also are often politically elevated, so as to be seen by the 
people through the extent of large districts; they often have some abilities, fare] without 
principle, and rise into notice by their noise and arts. 
3. The substantial and respectable part of the democracy- they are a numerous and valuable set of 
men, who discern and judge well, but from being generally silent in public assemblies are often 
overlooked. They are the most substantial and best informed men in the several towns, who 
occasionally fill the middle grades of offices, etc., who hold not a splendid, but respectable rank 
in private concerns. These men are extensively diffused through all the counties, towns and small 
districts in the union; even they, and their immediate connections, are raised above the majority 
of the people, and as representatives are only brought to a level with a more numerous part of the 
community, the middle orders, and a degree nearer the mass of the people. Hence it is, that the 
best practical representation, even in a small state, must be several degrees more aristocratical 
than the body of the people. A representation so formed as to admit but few or none of the third 
class, is in my opinion, not deserving of the name. Even in armies, courts-martial are so formed 
as to admit subaltern officers into them. The true idea is, so to open and enlarge the 
representation as to let in a due proportion of the third class with those of the first. Now, my 
opinion is, that the representation proposed is so small as that ordinarily very few or none of 
them can be elected. And, therefore, after all the parade of words and forms, the government 
must possess the soul of aristocracy, or something worse, the spirit of popular leaders. 
I observed in a former letter, that the state of Delaware, of Rhode Island, the Province of Maine, 
and each of the great counties in Massachusetts, etc., would have one member, and rather more 
than one when the representatives shall be increased to one for each 30,000 inhabitants. In some 
districts the people are more dispersed and unequal than in others. In Delaware they are compact, 
in the Province of Maine dispersed; how can the elections in either of those districts be regulated 
so that a man of the third class can be elected? Exactly the same principles and motives, the same 
uncontrollable circumstances, must govern the elections as in the choice of the governors. Call 
upon the people of either of those districts to choose a governor, and it will probably never 
happen that they will not bestow a major part, or the greatest number, of their votes on some very 
conspicuous or very popular character. A man that is known among a few thousands of people, 
may be quite unknown among thirty or forty thousand. On the whole it appears to me to be 
almost a self- evident position, that when we call on thirty or forty thousand inhabitants to unite 
in giving their votes for one man it will be uniformly impracticable for them to unite in any men, 
except those few who have become eminent for their civil or military rank, or their popular legal 
abilities. It will be found totally impracticable for men in the private walks of life, except in the 
profession of the law, to become conspicuous enough to attract the notice of so many electors 
and have their suffrages. 
But if I am right, it is asked why so many respectable men advocate the adoption of the proposed 
system. Several reasons may be given. Many of our gentlemen are attached to the principles of 
monarchy and aristocracy; they have an aversion to democratic republics. The body of the people 
have acquired large powers and substantial influence by the revolution. In the unsettled state of 
things, their numerous representatives, in some instances, misused their powers, and have 
induced many good men suddenly to adopt ideas unfavorable to such republics, and which ideas 
they will discard on reflection. Without scrutinizing into the particulars of the proposed system, 
we immediately perceive that its general tendency is to collect the powers of government, now in 
the body of the people in reality, and to place them in the higher orders and fewer hands; no 
wonder then that all those of and about these orders are attached to it. They feel there is 
something in this system advantageous to them. On the other hand, the body of the people 
evidently feel there is something wrong and disadvantageous to them. Both descriptions perceive 
there is something tending to bestow on the former the height of power and happiness, and to 
reduce the latter to weakness, insignificance, and misery. The people evidently feel all this 
though they want expressions to convey their ideas. Further, even the respectable part of the 
democracy have never yet been able to distinguish clearly where the fallacy lies. They find there 
are defects in the confederation; they see a system presented; they think something must be done; 
and, while their minds are in suspense, the zealous advocates force a reluctant consent. Nothing 
can be a stronger evidence of the nature of this system, than the general sense of the several 
orders in the community respecting its tendency. The parts taken generally by them proves my 
position, that notwithstanding the parade of words and forms, the government must possess the 
soul of aristocracy. 
Congress, heretofore, have asked for moderate additional powers. The cry was give them-be 
federal. But the proper distinction between the cases that produce this disposition, and the system 
proposed, has not been fairly made and seen in all its consequences. We have seen some of our 
state representations too numerous and without examining a medium we run to the opposite 
extreme. It is true, the proper number of federal representatives, is matter of opinion in some 
degree; but there are extremes which we immediately perceive, and others which we clearly 
discover on examination. We should readily pronounce a representative branch of 15 members 
small in a federal government, having complete powers as to taxes, military matters, commerce, 
the coin, etc. On the other hand, we should readily pronounce a federal representation as 
numerous as those of the several states, consisting of about 1,500 representatives, unwieldy and 
totally improper. It is asked, has not the wisdom of the convention found the medium? Perhaps 
not. The convention was divided on this point of numbers. At least some of its ablest members 
urged, that instead of 65 representatives there ought to be 130 in the first instance. They fixed 
one representative for each 40,000 inhabitants, and at the close of the work, the president 
suggested that the representation appeared to be too small and without debate, it was put at, not 
exceeding one for each 30,000. I mention these facts to show, that the convention went on no 
fixed data. In this extensive country it is difficult to get a representation sufficiently numerous. 
Necessity, I believe, will oblige us to sacrifice in some degree the true genuine principles of 
representation. But this sacrifice ought to be as little as possible. How far we ought to increase 
the representation I will not pretend to say; but that we ought to increase it very considerably, is 
clear-to double it at least, making full allowances for the state representations. And this we may 
evidently do and approach accordingly towards safety and perfection without encountering any 
inconveniences. It is with great difficulty the people can unite these different interests and views 
even tolerably, in the state senators, who are more than twice as numerous as the federal 
representatives, as proposed by the convention; even these senators are considered as so far 
removed from the people, that they are not allowed immediately to hold their purse strings. The 
principal objections made to the increase of the representation are, the expense and difficulty in 
getting the members to attend. The first cannot be important; the last, if founded, is against any 
federal government. As to the expense, I presume the house of representatives will not be in 
sessions more than four months in the year. We find by experience that about two-thirds of the 
members of representative assemblies usually attend; therefore, of the representation proposed 
by the convention, about forty-five members probably will attend. Doubling their number, about 
90 will probably attend. Their pay, in one case, at four dollars a day each (which is putting it 
high enough) will amount to, yearly, 21,600 dollars; in the other case, 43,200 dollars-[a] 
difference [of] 21,600 dollars. Reduce the state representatives from 1,500 down to 1,000 and 
thereby save the attendance of two-thirds of the 500, say three months in a year, at one dollar and 
a quarter a day each [would amount to] 37,125 dollars. Thus we may leave the state 
representations sufficient large, and yet save enough by the reduction nearly to support 
exceeding well the whole federal representation I propose. Surely we -never can be so unwise as 
to sacrifice, essentially, the all- important principles of representation for so small a sum as 
21,600 dollars a year for the United States. A single company of soldiers would cost this sum. It 
is a fact that can easily be shown, that we expend three times this sum every year upon useless 
inferior offices and very trifling concerns. It is also a fact which can be shown that the United 
States in the late war suffered more by a faction in the federal government, then the pay of the 
federal representation will amount to for twenty years. 
As to the attendance-can we be so unwise as to establish an unsafe and inadequate representative 
branch, and give it as a reason, that we believe only a few members will be induced to attend? 
We ought certainly to establish an adequate representative branch, and adopt measures to induce 
an attendance. I believe that a due proportion of 130 or 140 members may be induced to attend. 
There are various reasons for the non-attendance of the members of the present congress; it is to 
be presumed that these will not exist under the new system...
In the second place, it is said the members of congress must return home, and share in the 
burdens they may impose; and, therefore, private motives will induce them to make mild laws, to 
support liberty, and ease the burdens of the people, This brings us to a mere question of interest 
under this head. I think these observations will appear, on examination, altogether fallacious; 
because this individual interest, which may coincide with the rights and interests of the people, 
will be far more than balanced by opposite motives and opposite interests. If, on a fair 
calculation, a man will gain more by measures oppressive to others than he will lose by them, he 
is interested in their adoption. It is true, that those who govern generally, by increasing the public 
burdens, increase their own share of them; but by this increase they may, and often do, increase 
their salaries, fees, and emoluments, in a tenfold proportion, by increasing salaries, forming 
armies and navies, and by making offices. If it shall appear the members of congress will have 
these temptations before them, the argument is on my side. They will view the account, and be 
induced continually to make efforts advantageous to themselves and connections, and oppressive 
to others. 
We must examine facts. Congress, in its present form, have but few offices to dispose of worth 
the attention of the members, or of men of the aristocracy. Yet from 1774 to this time, we find a 
large proportion of those offices assigned to those who were or had been members of congress; 
and though the states choose annually sixty or seventy members, many of them have been 
provided for. But few men are known to congress in this extensive country, and, probably, but 
few will be to the president and senate, except those who have or shall appear as members of 
congress, or those whom the members may bring forward. The states may now choose yearly 
ninety-one members of congress; under the new constitution they will have it in their power to 
choose exactly the same number, perhaps afterwards, one hundred and :fifteen, but these must be 
chosen once in two and six years. So that, in the course of ten years together, not more than two-
thirds so many members of congress will be elected and brought into view, as there now are 
under the confederation in the same term of time. But at least there will be five, if not ten times, 
as many offices and places worthy of the attention of the members, under the new constitution, 
as there are under the confederation. Therefore, we may fairly presume, that a very great 
proportion of the members of congress, especially the influential ones, instead of returning to 
private life, will be provided for with lucrative offices, in the civil or military department; and 
not only the members, but many of their sons, friends, and connections. These offices will be in 
the constitutional disposition of the president and senate, and, corruption out of the question, 
what kind of security can we expect in a representation so many of the members of which may 
rationally feel themselves candidates for these offices? Let common sense decide. It is true, that 
members chosen to offices must leave their seats in congress; and to some few offices they 
cannot be elected till the time shall be expired for which they were elected members. But this 
scarcely will effect the bias arising from the hopes and expectations of office.... 
But it is asked how shall we remedy the evil, so as to complete and perpetuate the temple of 
equal laws and equal liberty? Perhaps we never can do it. Possibly we never may be able to do it 
in this immense country, under any one system of laws however modified. Nevertheless, at 
present, I think the experiment worth making. I feel an aversion to the disunion of the states, and 
to separate confederacies; the states have fought and bled in a common cause, and great dangers 
too may attend these confederacies. I think the system proposed capable of very considerable 
degrees of perfection, if we pursue first principles. I do not think that De Lolme, or any writer I 
have seen, has sufficiently pursued the proper inquiries and efficient means for making 
representation and balances in government more perfect. It is our task to do this in America. Our 
object is equal liberty, and equal laws diffusing their influence among all orders of men. To 
obtain this we must guard against the bias of interest and passions, against interested 
combinations, secret or open. We must aim at a balance of efforts and strength. 
Clear it is, by increasing the representation we lessen the prospects of each member of congress 
being provided for in public offices. We proportionably lessen official influence, and strengthen 
his prospects of becoming a private citizen, subject to the common burdens, without the 
compensation of the emoluments of office. By increasing the representation we make it more 
difficult to corrupt and influence the members. We diffuse them more extensively among the 
body of the people, perfect the balance, multiply information, strengthen the confidence of the 
people, and consequently support the laws on equal and free principles. There are two other 
ways, I think, of obtaining in some degree the security we want; the one is, by excluding more 
extensively the members from being appointed to offices; the other is, by limiting some of their 
powers. These two I shall examine hereafter. 
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It is said that our people have a high sense of freedom, possess power, property, and the strong 
arm; meaning, I presume, that the body of the people can take care of themselves, and awe their 
rulers; and, therefore, particular provision in the constitution for their security may not be 
essential. When I come to examine these observations, they appear to me too trifling and loose to 
deserve a serious answer. 
To palliate for the smallness of the representation, it is observed, that the state governments in 
which the people are fully represented, necessarily form a part of the system. This idea ought to 
be fully examined. We ought to inquire if the convention have made the proper use of these 
essential parts. The state governments then, we are told, will stand between the arbitrary exercise 
of power and the people. True they may, but armless and helpless, perhaps, with the privilege of 
making a noise when hurt. This is no more than individuals may do. Does the constitution 
provide a single check for a single measure by which the state governments can constitutionally 
and regularly check the arbitrary measures of congress? Congress may raise immediately fifty 
thousand men and twenty millions of dollars in taxes, build a navy, model the militia, etc., and 
all this constitutionally. Congress may arm on every point, and the state governments can do no 
more than an individual, by petition to congress, suggest their measures are alarming and not 
right. 
I conceive the position to be undeniable, that the federal government will be principally in the 
hands of the natural aristocracy, and the state governments principally in the hands of the 
democracy, the representatives of the body of the people. These representatives in Great Britain 
hold the purse, and have a negative upon all laws. We must yield to circumstances and depart 
something from this plan, and strike out a new medium so as to give efficacy to the whole 
system, supply the wants of the union, and leave the several states, or the people assembled in 
the state legislatures, the means of defense. 
It has been often mentioned that the objects of congress will be few and national, and require a 
small representation; that the objects of each state will be many and local, and require a 
numerous representation. This circumstance has not the weight of a feather in my mind. It is 
certainly inadvisable to lodge in 65 representatives, and 26 senators, unlimited power to establish 
systems of taxation, armies, navies, model the militia, and to do every thing that may essentially 
tend soon to change, totally, the affairs of the community; and to assemble 1500 state 
representatives, and 160 senators, to make fence laws and laws to regulate the descent and 
conveyance of property, the administration of justice between man and man, to appoint militia 
officers, etc. 
It is not merely the quantity of information I contend for. Two taxing powers may be 
inconvenient; but the point is, congress, like the senate of Rome, will have taxing powers, and 
the people no check. When the power is abused, the people may complain and grow angry, so 
may the state governments; they may remonstrate and counteract, by passing laws to prohibit the 
collection of congressional taxes. But these will be acts of the people, acts of sovereign power, 
the dernier resort unknown to the constitution; acts operating in terrorum, acts of resistance, and 
not the exercise of any constitutional power to stop or check a measure before matured. A check 
properly is the stopping, by one branch in the same legislature, a measure proposed by the other 
in it. In fact the constitution provides for the states no check, properly speaking, upon the 
measures of congress. Congress can immediately enlist soldiers, and apply to the pockets of the 
people. 
These few considerations bring us to the very strong distinction between the plan that operates 
on federal principles, and the plan that operates on consolidated principles. A plan may be 
federal or not as to its organization each state may retain its vote or not; the sovereignty of the 
state may be represented, or the people of it. A plan may be federal or not as to its operation-
federal when it requires men and monies of the states, and the states as such make the laws for 
raising the men and monies; not federal when it leaves the states' governments out of the 
question, and operates immediately upon the persons and property of the citizens. The first is the 
case with the confederation; the second with the new plan. In the first the state governments may 
be [a] check; in the last none at all. . . . 
It is also said that the constitution gives no more power to congress than the confederation, 
respecting money and military matters; that congress under the confederation, may require men 
and monies to any amount, and the states are bound to comply. This is generally true; but, I think 
. . . that the states have well founded checks for securing their liberties. I admit the force of the 
observation that all the federal powers, by the confederation, are lodged in a single assembly. 
However, I think much more may be said in defense of the leading principles of the 
confederation. I do not object to the qualifications of the electors of representatives, and I fully 
agree that the people ought to elect one branch. 
Further, it may be observed, that the present congress is principally an executive body, which 
ought not to be numerous; that the house of representatives will be a mere legislative branch, and 
being the democratic on ought to be numerous. It is one of the greatest advantages of a 
government of different branches, that each branch may be conveniently made conformable to 
the nature of the business assigned it, and all be made conformable to the condition of the several 
orders of the people. After all the possible checks and limitations we can devise, the powers of 
the union must be very extensive; the sovereignty of the nation cannot produce the object in 
view, the defense and tranquility of the whole, without such powers, executive and judicial. I 
dislike the present congress-a single assembly-because it is impossible to fit it to receive those 
powers. The executive and judicial powers, in the nature of things, ought to be lodged in a few 
hands; the legislature in many hands. Therefore, want of safety and unavoidable hasty measures 
out of the question, they never can all be lodged in one assembly properly-it, in its very 
formation, must imply a contradiction. 
In objection to increasing the representation, it has also been observed that it is difficult to 
assemble a hundred men or more without making the tumultuous and a mere mob. Reason and 
experience do not support this observation. The most respectable assemblies we have any 
knowledge of and the wisest, have been those, each of which consisted of several hundred 
members - as the senate of Rome, of Carthage, of Venice, the British Parliament, etc. I think I 
may, without hazarding much, affirm that our more numerous state assemblies and conventions 
have universally discovered more wisdom, and as much order, as the less numerous ones. There 
must be also a very great difference between the characters of two or three hundred men
assembled from a single state, and the characters of that number or half the number assembled 
from all the united states. 
It is added, that on the proposed plan the house of representatives in fifty or a hundred years will 
consist of several hundred members. The plan will begin with sixty-five, and we have no 
certainty that the number ever will increase, for this plain reason-that all that combination of 
interests and influence which has produced this plan, and supported [it] so far, will constantly 
oppose the increase of the representation, knowing that thereby the government will become 
more free and democratic. But admitting, after a few years, there will be a member for each 
30,000 inhabitants, the observation is trifling; the government is in a considerable measure to 
take its tone from its early movements, and by means of a small representation it may in half of 
50 or 100 years, get moved from its basis, or at least so far as to be incapable of ever being 
recovered. We ought, therefore, . . . now to fix the government on proper principles, and fit to 
our present condition. When the representation shall become too numerous, alter it. Or we may 
now make provision, that when the representation shall be increased to a given number, that then 
there shall be one for each given number of inhabitants, etc. 
Another observation is, that congress will have no temptations to do wrong. The men that make 
it must be very uninformed, or suppose they are talking to children. In the first place, the 
members will be governed by all those motives which govern the conduct of men, and have 
before them all the allurements of offices and temptations to establish unequal burdens, before 
described. In the second place, they and their friends, probably, will find it for their interests to 
keep up large armies, navies, salaries, etc., and in laying adequate taxes. In the third place, we 
have no good grounds to presume, from reason or experience, that it will be agreeable to their 
characters or views, that the body of the people should continue to have power effectually to 
interfere in the affairs of government. But it is confidently added, that congress will not have it in 
their power to oppress or enslave the people; that the people will not bear it. It is not supposed 
that congress will act the tyrant immediately, and in the face of daylight. It is not supposed 
congress will adopt important measures without plausible pretenses, especially those which may 
tend to alarm or produce opposition. We are to consider the natural progress of things-that men 
unfriendly to republican equality will go systematically to work, gradually to exclude the body of 
the people from any share in the government, first of the substance, and then of the forms. The 
men who will have these views will not be without their agents and supporters. When we reflect, 
that a few years ago we established democratic republics, and fixed the state governments as the 
barriers between congress and the pickets of the people, what great progress has been made in 
less than seven years to break down those barriers, and essentially to change the principles of our 
governments, even by the armless few-is it chimerical to suppose that in fifteen or twenty years 
to come, that much more can be performed, especially after the adoption of the constitution, 
when the few will be so much better armed with power and influence, to continue the struggle? 
Probably they will be wise enough never to alarm, but gradually prepare the minds of the people 
for one specious change after another, till the final object shall be obtained. Say the advocates, 
these are only possibilities. They are probabilities a wise people ought to guard against; and the 
address made use of to keep the evils out of sight, and the means to prevent them, confirm my 
opinion.
But to obviate all objections to the proposed plan in the last resort, it is said our people will be 
free, so long as they possess the habits of freemen, and when they lose them, they must receive 
some other forms of government. To this I shall only observe, that this is very humiliating 
language, and can, I trust, never suit a manly people who have contended nobly for liberty, and 
declared to the world they will be free. 
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Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist #59, addresses this same topic from an opposing viewpoint. 
This essay was written anonymously by "VOX POPULI," and appeared in The Massachusetts 
Gazette on October 30, 1787. 
. . I beg leave to Jay before the candid public the first clause in the fourth section of the first 
article of the proposed Constitution: 
"The times, places and manner of holding elections, for senators and representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by law, 
make or alter such regulations except as to the places of choosing senators." 
By this clause, the time, place and manner of choosing representatives is wholly at the disposal 
of Congress. 
Why the Convention who formed the proposed Constitution wished to invest Congress with such 
a power, I am by no means capable of saying; or why the good people of this commonwealth 
[Massachusetts] should delegate such a power to them, is no less hard to determine. But as the 
subject is open for discussion, I shall make a little free inquiry into the matter. 
And, first. What national advantage is there to be acquired by giving them such a power? 
The only advantage which I have heard proposed by it is, to prevent a partial representation of 
the several states in Congress; "for if the time, manner and place were left wholly in the hands of 
the state legislatures, it is probable they would not make provision by appointing time, manner 
and place for an election; in which case there could be no election, and consequently the federal 
government weakened." 
But this provision is by no means sufficient to prevent an evil of that nature. For will any 
reasonable man suppose-that when the legislature of any state, who are annually chosen, are so 
corrupt as to break thro' that government which they have formed, and refuse to appoint time, 
place and manner of choosing representatives-I say, can any person suppose, that a state so 
corrupt would not be full as likely to neglect, or even refuse, to choose representatives at the time 
and place and in the manner prescribed by Congress? Surely they would. So it could answer no 
good national purpose on that account; and I have not heard any other national advantage 
proposed thereby. 
We will now proceed, in the next place, to consider why the people of this commonwealth 
should vest Congress with such a power. 
No one proposes that it would be any advantage to the people of this state. Therefore, it must be 
considered as a matter of indifference, except there is an opportunity for its operating to their 
disadvantage-in which case, I conceive it ought to be disapprobated. 
Whether there is danger of its operating to the good people's disadvantage, shall now be the 
subject of our inquiry. 
Supposing Congress should direct, that the representatives of this commonwealth should be 
chosen all in one town, (Boston, for instance) on the first day of March - would not that be a very 
injurious institution to the good people of this commonwealth? Would not there be at least nine-
tenths of the landed interest of this commonwealth entirely unrepresented? Surely one may 
reasonably imagine there would. What, then, would be the case if Congress should think proper 
to direct, that the elections should be held at the north-west, south-west, or north-east part of the 
state, the last day of March? How many electors would there attend the business? And it is a 
little remarkable, that any gentleman should suppose, that Congress could possibly be in any 
measure as good judges of the time, place and manner of elections as the legislatures of the 
several respective states. 
These as objections I could wish to see obviated. And I could wish the public inquiry might 
extend to a consideration, whether or not it would not be more conducive, to prevent a partial 
representation, to invest Congress with power to levy such a fine as they might think proper on 
states not choosing representatives, than by giving them this power of appointing time, manner 
and place. 
It is objected by some, that Congress could not levy, or at least, could not collect, such a fine of a 
delinquent state. If that is the case, Congress could not collect any tax they might think proper to 
levy, nor execute any order whatever; but at any time any state might break through the national 
compact, dissolve the federal constitution, and set the whole structure afloat on the ocean of 
chaos. 
It is, therefore, proposed to the public to consider, whether the said clause in the fourth section of 
the first article can answer the only purposes for which it is said to have been provided, or any 
other which will prove any advantage either to the nation or state. 
VOX POPULI
Antifederalist No. 60 WILL THE CONSTITUTION PROMOTE 
THE INTERESTS OF FAVORITE CLASSES?
John F. Mercer of Maryland was the author of this essay, taken from his testimony to members 
of the ratifying conventions of New York and Virginia, 1788, (From the Etting Collection of the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.) 
We have not that permanent and fixed distinction of ranks or orders of men among us, which 
unalterably separating the interests and views, produces that division in pursuits which is the 
great security of the mixed Government we separated from and which we now seem so anxiously 
to copy. If the new Senate of the United States will be really opposite in their pursuits and views 
from the Representatives, have they not a most dangerous power of interesting foreign nations by 
Treaty [to] support Their views?-for instance, the relinquishment of the navigation of [the]
Mississippi-and yet where Treaties are expressly declared paramount to the Constitutions of the 
several States, and being the supreme law, [the Senate] must of course control the national 
legislature, if not supersede the Constitution of the United States itself. The check of the 
President over a Body, with which he must act in concert-or his influence and power be almost 
annihilated-can prove no great constitutional security. And even the Representative body itself . . 
. are not sufficiently numerous to secure them from corruption. For all governments tend to 
corruption, in proportion as power concentrating in the hands of the few, tenders them objects of 
corruption to Foreign Nations and among themselves. 
For these and many other reasons we are for preserving the rights of the State governments, 
where they must not be necessarily relinquished for the welfare of the Union. And, where so 
relinquished, the line should be definitely drawn. If under the proposed Constitution the States 
exercise any power, it would seem to be at the mercy of the General Government. For it is 
remarkable that the clause securing to them those rights not expressly relinquished in the old 
Confederation, is left out in the new Constitution. And we conceive that there is no power which 
Congress may think necessary to exercise for the general welfare, which they may not assume 
under this Constitution. And this Constitution, and the laws made under it, are declared 
paramount even to the unalienable rights which have heretofore been secured to the citizens of 
these States by their constitutional compacts. . . . 
Moreover those very powers, which are to be expressly vested in the new Congress, are of a 
nature most liable to abuse. They are those which tempt the avarice and ambition of men to a 
violation of the rights of their fellow citizens, and they will be screened under the sanction of an 
undefined and unlimited authority. Against the abuse and improper exercise of these special 
powers, the people have a right to be secured by a sacred Declaration, defining the rights of the 
individual, and limiting by them the extent of the exercise. The people were secured against the 
abuse of those powers by fundamental laws and a Bill of Rights, under the government of Britain 
and under their own Constitution. That government which permits the abuse of power, 
recommends it, and will deservedly experience the tyranny which it authorizes; for the history of 
mankind establishes the truth of this political adage-that in government what may be done will 
be done. 
The most blind admirer of this Constitution must in his heart confess that it is as far inferior to 
the British Constitution, of which it is an imperfect imitation, as darkness is to light. In the 
British Constitution the rights of men, the primary object of the social compact, are fixed on an 
immoveable foundation and clearly defined and ascertained by their Magna Charta, their Petition 
of Rights, their Bill of Rights, and their effective administration by ostensible Ministers secures 
responsibility. In this new Constitution a complicated system sets responsibility at defiance and 
the rights of men neglected and undefined are left at the mercy of events. We vainly plume 
ourselves on the safeguard alone of representation, forgetting that it will be a representation on 
principles inconsistent with true and just representation; that it is but a delusive shadow of 
representation, proffering in theory what can never be fairly reduced to practice. And, after all, 
government by representation (unless confirmed in its views and conduct by the constant 
inspection, immediate superintendence, and frequent interference and control of the people 
themselves on one side, or an hereditary nobility on the other, both of which orders have fixed 
and permanent views) is really only as one of perpetual rapine and confusion. Even with the best 
checks it has failed in all the governments of Europe, of which it was once the basis, except that 
of England. 
When we turn our eyes back to the zones of blood and desolation which we have waded through 
to separate from Great Britain, we behold with manly indignation that our blood and treasure 
have been wasted to establish a government in which the interest of the few is preferred to the 
rights of the many. When we see a government so every way inferior to that we were born under, 
proposed as the reward of our sufferings in an eight years calamitous war, our astonishment is 
only equaled by our resentment. On the conduct of Virginia and New York, two important 
States, the preservation of liberty in a great measure depends. The chief security of a 
Confederacy of Republics was boldly disregarded, and the Confederation violated, by requiring 9 
instead of 13 voices to alter the Constitution. But still the resistance of either of these States in 
the present temper of America (for the late conduct of the party here [Maryland] must open the 
eyes of the people in Massachusetts with respect to the fate of their amendment) will secure all 
that we mean to contend for-the natural and unalienable rights of men in a constitutional manner. 
At the distant appearance of danger to these, we took up arms in the late Revolution. And may 
we never have cause to look back with regret on that period when connected with the Empire of 
Great Britain, we were happy, secure and free. 
Antifederalist No. 61 QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS REGARDING THE 
ELECTION OF CONGRESSMEN
. . . . It is well observed by Montesquieu, that in republican governments the forms of elections 
are fundamental; and that it is an essential part of the social compact, to ascertain by whom, to 
whom, when, and in what manner, suffrages are to be given. Wherever we find the regulation of 
elections have not been carefully fixed by the constitution, or the principles of them, we 
constantly see new legislatures modifying . . . [their] own form, and changing the spirit of the 
government to answer partial purposes. 
By the proposed plan it is -fixed, that the qualifications of the electors of the federal 
representatives shall be the same as those of the electors of state representatives; though these 
vary some in the several states the electors are fixed and designated. 
The qualifications of the representatives are also fixed and designated, and no person under 25 
years of age, not an inhabitant of the state, and not having been seven years a citizen of the 
United States, can be elected. The clear inference is, that all persons 25 years of age, and 
upwards, inhabitants of the state, and having been, at any period or periods, seven years citizens 
of the United States, may be elected representatives. They have a right to be elected by the 
constitution, and the electors have a right to choose them. This is fixing the federal 
representation, as to the elected, on a very broad basis. It can be no objection to the elected, that 
they are Christians, Pagans, Mahometans, or Jews; that they are of any color, rich or poor, 
convict or not. Hence many men may be elected, who cannot be electors. Gentlemen who have 
commented so largely upon the wisdom of the constitution, for excluding from being elected 
young men under a certain age, would have done well to have recollected, that it positively 
makes pagans, convicts, etc., eligible. The people make the constitution; they exclude a few 
persons, by certain descriptions, from being elected, and all not thus excluded are clearly 
admitted. Now a man 25 years old, an inhabitant of the state, and having been a citizen of the 
states seven years, though afterwards convicted, may be elected, because not within any of the 
excluding clauses; the same of a beggar, an absentee, etc. 
The right of the electors, and eligibility of the elected, being fixed by the people, they cannot be 
narrowed by the state legislatures, or congress. It is established, that a man being (among other 
qualifications) an inhabitant of the state, shall be eligible. Now it would be narrowing the right of 
the people to confine them in their choice to a man, an inhabitant of a particular county or district 
in the state. Hence it follows, that neither the state legislatures nor congress can establish district 
elections; that is, divide the state into districts, and confine the electors of each district to the 
choice of a man resident in it. If the electors could be thus limited in one respect, they might in 
another be confined to choose a man of a particular religion, of certain property, etc., and thereby 
half of the persons made eligible by the constitution be excluded. All laws, therefore, for 
regulating elections must be made on the broad basis of the constitution. 
Next, we may observe, that representatives are to be chosen by the people of the state. What is a 
choice by the people of the state? If each given district in it choose one, will that be a choice 
within the meaning of the constitution? Must the choice be by plurality of votes, or a majority? 
In connection with these questions, we must take the 4th Sect., Art I., where it is said the state 
legislatures shall prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding elections; but congress may 
make or alter such regulations. By this clause, I suppose, the electors of different towns and 
districts in the state may be assembled in different places, to give their votes; but when so 
assembled, by another clause they cannot, by congress or the state legislatures, be restrained 
from giving their votes for any man an inhabitant of the state, and qualified as to age, and having 
been a citizen the time required. But I see nothing in the constitution by which to decide, whether 
the choice shall be by a plurality or a majority of votes. This, in my mind, is by far the most 
important question in the business of elections. When we say a representative shall be chosen by 
the people, it seems to imply that he shall be chosen by a majority of them; but states which use 
the same phraseology in this respect, practice both ways. I believe a majority of the states choose 
by pluralities; and, I think it probable, that the federal house of representatives will decide that a 
choice of its members by pluralities is constitutional. A man who has the most votes is chosen in 
Great Britain. It is this, among other things, that gives every man fair play in the game of 
influence and corruption. I believe that not much stress was laid upon the objection that congress 
may assemble the electors at some out of the way place. However, the advocates seem to think 
they obtain a victory of no small glory and importance, when they can show, with some degree 
of color, that the evil is rather a possibility than a probability. . . 
It is easy to perceive that there is an essential difference between elections by pluralities and by 
majorities, between choosing a man in a small or limited district, and choosing a number of men 
promiscuously by the people of a large state. And while we are almost secure of judicious 
unbiased elections by majorities in such districts, we have no security against deceptions, 
influence and corruption in states or large districts in electing by pluralities. When a choice is 
made by a plurality of votes, it is often made by a very small part of the electors, who attend and 
give their votes; when by a majority, never by so few as one half of them. The partialities and 
improprieties attending the former mode may be illustrated by a case that lately happened in one 
of the middle states. Several representatives were to be chosen by a large number of inhabitants 
compactly settled, among whom there were four or five thousand voters. Previous to the time of 
election a number of lists of candidates were published, to divide and distract the voters in 
general. About half a dozen men of some influence, who had a favorite list to carry, met several 
times, fixed their list, and agreed to hand it about among all who could probably be induced to 
adopt it, and to circulate the other lists among their opponents, to divide them. The poll was 
opened, and several hundred electors, suspecting nothing, attended and put in their votes. The list 
of the half dozen was carried, and men were found to be chosen, some of whom were very 
disagreeable to a large majority of the electors. Though several hundred electors voted, men on 
that list were chosen who had only 45, 43, 44, etc., votes each. They had a plurality, that is, more 
than any other persons. The votes generally were scattered, and those who made even a feeble 
combination succeeded in placing highest upon the list several very unthought of and very 
unpopular men. This evil never could have happened in a town where all the voters meet in one 
place, and consider no man as elected unless he have a majority, or more than half of all the 
votes. Clear it is, that the man on whom thus but a small part of the votes are bestowed cannot 
possess the confidence of the people, or have any considerable degree of influence over them. 
But as partial, as liable to secret influence, and corruption as the choice by pluralities may be, I 
think, we cannot avoid it, without essentially increasing the federal representation, and adopting 
the principle of district elections. There is but one case in which the choice by the majority is 
practicable, and that is, where districts are formed of such moderate extent that the electors in 
each can conveniently meet in one place, and at one time, and proceed to the choice of a 
representative; when, if no man have a majority or more than half of all the votes the first time, 
the voters may examine the characters of those brought forward, accommodate, and proceed to 
repeat their votes till some one shall have that majority. This, I believe, cannot be a case under 
the constitution proposed in its present form. To explain my ideas, take Massachusetts, for 
instance. She is entitled to eight representatives. She has 370,000 inhabitants, about 46,000 to 
one representative. If the elections be so held that the electors throughout the state meet in their 
several towns or places, and each elector puts in his vote for eight representatives, the votes of 
the electors will ninety-nine times in a hundred, be so scattered that on collecting the votes from 
the several towns or places, no men will be found, each of whom have a majority of the votes, 
and therefore the election will not be made .... I might add many other observations to evince the 
superiority and solid advantages of proper district elections, and a choice by a majority, and to 
prove that many evils attend the contrary practice. These evils we must encounter as the 
constitution now stands. I see no way to fix elections on a proper footing, and to render tolerably 
equal and secure the federal representation, but by increasing the representation, so as to have 
one representative for each district in which the electors may conveniently meet in one place, and 
at one time, and choose by a majority. Perhaps this might be effected pretty generally, by fixing 
one representative for each twelve thousand inhabitants; dividing, or fixing the principles for 
dividing the states into proper districts; and directing the electors of each district to the choice, 
by a majority, of some men having a permanent interest and residence in it. I speak of a 
representation tolerably equal, etc., because I am still of opinion, that it is impracticable in this 
extensive country to have a federal representation sufficiently democratic, or substantially drawn 
from the body of the people. The principles just mentioned may be the best practical ones we can 
expect to establish. By thus increasing the representation we not only make it more democratical 
and secure, strengthen the confidence of the people in it, and thereby render it more nervous and 
energetic; but it will also enable the people essentially to change, for the better, the principles 
and forms of elections. To provide for the people's wandering throughout the state for a 
representative may sometimes enable them to elect a more brilliant or an abler man, than by 
confining them to districts; but generally this latitude will be used to pernicious purposes, 
especially connected with the choice by plurality-when a man in the remote part of the state, 
perhaps obnoxious at home, but ambitious and intriguing, may be chosen to represent the people 
in another part of the state far distant, and by a small part of them, or by a faction, or by a 
combination of some particular description of men among them. This has been long the case in 
Great Britain; it is the case in several states; nor do I think that such pernicious practices will be 
merely possible in our federal concerns, but highly probable. By establishing district elections, 
we exclude none of the best men from being elected; and we fix what, in my mind, is of far more 
importance than brilliant talents-I mean a sameness, as to residence and interests, between the 
representative and his constituents. And by the election by a majority, he is sure to be the man, 
the choice of more than half of them.... 
THE FEDERAL FARMER
Antifederalist No. 62 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND 
POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART I)
Taken from the 16th essay of "Brutus" from The New York Journal of April 10, 1788. 
The following things may be observed with respect to the constitution of the Senate. 
1st. They are to be elected by the legislatures of the States and not by the people, and each State 
is to be represented by an equal number. 
2d. They are to serve for six years, except that one third of those first chosen are to go out of 
office at the expiration of two years, one third at the expiration of four years, and one third at the 
expiration of six years, after which this rotation is to be preserved, but still every member will 
serve for the term of six years. 
3d. If vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any 
State, the executive is authorised to make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the 
legislature. 
4. No person can be a senator who had not arrived to the age of thirty years, been nine years a 
citizen of the United States, and who is not at the time he is elected an inhabitant of the State for 
which he is elected. 
The apportionment of members of the Senate among the States is not according to numbers, or 
the importance of the States, but is equal. This, on the plan of a consolidated government, is 
unequal and improper; but is proper on the system of confederation - on this principle I approve 
of it. It is indeed the only feature of any importance in the constitution of a confederated 
government. It was obtained after a vigorous struggle of that part of the Convention who were in 
favor of preserving the state governments. It is to be regretted that they were not able to have 
infused other principles into the plan, to have secured the government of the respective states, 
and to have marked with sufficient precision the line between them and the general government. 
The term for which the senate are to be chosen, is in my judgment too long, and no provision 
being made for a rotation will, I conceive, be of dangerous consequence. 
It is difficult to fix the precise period for which the senate should be chosen. It is a matter of 
opinion, and our sentiments on the matter must be formed, by attending to certain principles. 
Some of the duties which are to be performed by the Senate, seem evidently to point out the 
propriety of their term of service being extended beyond the period of that of the assembly. 
Besides, as they are designed to represent the aristocracy of the country, it seems fit they should 
possess more stability, and so continue a longer period then that branch who represent the 
democracy. The business of making treaties and some other which it will be proper to commit to 
the senate, requires that they should have experience, and therefore that they should remain some 
time in office to acquire it. But still it is of equal importance that they should not be so long in 
office as to be likely to forget the hand that formed them, or be insensible of their interests. Men 
long in office are very apt to feel themselves independent; to form and pursue interests separate 
from those who appointed them. And this is more likely to be the case with the senate, as they 
will for the most part of the time be absent from the state they represent, and associate with such 
company as will possess very little of the feelings of the middling class of people. For it is to be 
remembered that there is to be a federal city, and the inhabitants of it will be the great and the 
mighty of the earth. For these reasons I would shorten the term of their service to four years. Six 
years is a long period for a man to be absent from his home; it would have a tendency to wean 
him from his constituents. 
A rotation in the senate would also in my opinion be of great use. It is probable that senators 
once chosen for a state will, as the system now stands, continue in office for life. The office will 
be honorable if not lucrative. The persons who occupy it will probably wish to continue in it, and 
therefore use all their influence and that of their friends to continue in office. Their friends will 
be numerous and powerful, for they will have it in their power to confer great favors-, besides it 
will before long be considered as disgraceful not to be reelected. It will therefore be considered 
as a matter of delicacy to the character of the senator not to return him again. Everybody 
acquainted with public affairs knows how difficult it is to remove from office a person who is 
long been in it. It is seldom done except in cases of gross misconduct. It is rare that want of 
competent ability procures it. To prevent this inconvenience I conceive it would be wise to 
determine, that a senator should not be eligible after he had served for the period assigned by the 
constitution for a certain number of years; perhaps three would be sufficient. A further benefit 
would be derived from such an arrangement; it would give opportunity to bring forward a greater 
number of men to serve their country, and would return those, who had served, to their state, and 
afford them the advantage of becoming better acquainted with the condition and politics of their 
constituents. It further appears to me proper, that the legislatures should retain the right which 
they now hold under the confederation, of recalling their members. It seems an evident dictate of 
reason that when a person authorises another to do a piece of business for him, he should retain 
the power to displace him, when he does not conduct according to his pleasure. This power in the 
state legislatures, under confederation, has not been exercised to the injury of the government, 
nor do I see any danger of its being so exercised under the new system. It may operate much to 
the public benefit. 
These brief remarks are all I shall make on the organization of the senate. The powers with 
which they are invested will require a more minute investigation. 
This body will possess a strange mixture of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, which in 
my opinion will in some cases clash with each other.
1. They are one branch of the legislature, and in this respect will possess equal powers in all 
cases with the house of representatives; for I consider the clause which gives the house of 
representatives the right of originating bills for raising a revenue as merely nominal, seeing the 
senate . . . [has the power] to propose or concur with amendments. 
2. They are a branch of the executive in the appointment of ambassadors and public ministers, 
and in the appointment of all other officers, not otherwise provided for. Whether the forming of 
treaties, in which they are joined with the president, appertains to the legislative or the executive 
part of the government, or to neither, is not material. 
3. They are a part of the judicial, for they form the court of impeachments. 
It has been a long established maxim, that the legislative, executive and judicial departments in 
government should be kept distinct. It is said, I know, that this cannot be done. And therefore 
that this maxim is not just, or at least that it should only extend to certain leading features in a 
government. I admit that this distinction cannot be perfectly preserved. In a due balanced 
government, it is perhaps absolutely necessary to give the executive qualified legislative powers, 
and the legislative or a branch of them judicial powers in the last resort. It may possibly also, in 
some special cases, be advisable to associate the legislature, or a branch of it, with the executive, 
in the exercise of acts of great national importance. But still the maxim is a good one, and a 
separation of these powers should be sought as far as is practicable. I can scarcely imagine that 
any of the advocates of the system will pretend, that it was necessary to accumulate all these 
powers in the senate. There is a propriety in the senate's possessing legislative powers. This is 
the principal end which should be held in view in their appointment. I need not here repeat what 
has so often and ably been advanced on the subject of a division of the legislative power into two 
branches. The arguments in favor of it I think conclusive. But I think it equally evident, that a 
branch of the legislature should not be invested with the power of appointing officers. This 
power in the senate is very improperly lodged for a number of reasons - These shall be detailed 
in a future number. 
BRUTUS
Antifederalist No. 63 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND 
POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART II)
. . . . The senate is an assembly of 26 members, two from each state; though the senators are 
apportioned on the federal plan, they will vote individually. They represent the states, as bodies 
politic, sovereign to certain purposes. The states being sovereign and independent, are all 
considered equal, each with the other in the senate. In this we are governed solely by the ideal 
equalities of sovereignties; the federal and state governments forming one whole, and the state 
governments an essential part, which ought always to be kept distinctly in view, and preserved. I 
feel more disposed, on reflection, to acquiesce in making them the basis of the senate, and 
thereby to make it the interest and duty of the senators to preserve distinct, and to perpetuate the 
respective, sovereignties they shall represent. . . . 
The senate, as a legislative branch, is not large, but as an executive branch quite too numerous. It 
is not to be presumed that we can form a genuine senatorial branch in the United States, a real 
representation of the aristocracy and balance in the legislature, any more than we can form a 
genuine representation of the people. Could we separate the aristocratical and democratical 
interest, compose the senate of the former, and the house of assembly of the latter, they are too 
unequal in the United States to produce a balance. Form them on pure principles, and leave each 
to be supported by its real weight and connections, the senate would be feeble and the house 
powerful. I say, on pure principles; because I make a distinction between a senate that derives its 
weight and influence from a pure source-its numbers and wisdom, its extensive property, its 
extensive and permanent connections -and a senate composed of a few men, possessing small 
property, and small and unstable connections, that derives its weight and influence from a 
corrupt or pernicious source: that is, merely from the power given it by the constitution and laws, 
to dispose of the public offices, and the annexed emoluments, and by those means to interest 
officers, and the hungry expectants of offices, in support of its measures. I wish the proposed 
senate may not partake too much of the latter description. 
To produce a balance and checks, the constitution proposes two branches in the legislature. But 
they are so formed, that the members of both must generally be the same kind of men-men 
having similar interests and views, feelings and connections - men of the same grade in society, 
and who associate on all, occasions (probably, if there be any difference, the senators will be the 
most democratic.) Senators and representatives thus circumstanced, as men, though convened in 
two rooms to make laws, must be governed generally by the same motives and views, and 
therefore pursue the same system of politics. The partitions between the two branches will be 
merely those of the building in which they fit. There will not be found in them any of those 
genuine balances and checks, among the real different interests, and efforts of the several classes 
of men in the community we aim at. Nor can any such balances and checks be formed in the 
present condition of the United States in any considerable degree of perfection. . . 
Though I conclude the senators and representatives will not form in the legislature those balances 
and checks which correspond with the actual state of the people, yet I approve of two branches, 
because we may notwithstanding derive several advantages from them. The senate, from the 
mode of its appointment, will probably be influenced to support the state governments; and, from 
its periods of service will produce stability in legislation, while frequent elections may take place 
in the other branch. There is generally a degree of competition between two assemblies even 
composed of the same kind of men; and by this, and by means of every law passing a revision in 
the second branch, caution, coolness, and deliberation are produced in the business of making 
laws. By means of a democratic branch we may particularly secure personal liberty; and by 
means of a senatorial branch we may particularly protect property. By the division, the house 
becomes the proper body to impeach all officers for misconduct in office, and the senate the 
proper court to try them; and in a country where limited powers must be lodged in the first 
magistrate, the senate, perhaps, may be the most proper body to be found to have a negative upon 
him in making treaties, and managing foreign affairs. 
Though I agree the federal senate, in the form proposed, may be useful to many purposes, and 
that it is not very necessary to alter the organization, modes of appointment, and powers of it in 
several respects; yet, without alterations in others, I sincerely believe it will, in a very few years, 
become the source of the greatest evils. Some of these alterations, I conceive, to be absolutely 
necessary and some of them at least advisable. 
1. By the confederation the members of congress are chosen annually. By Art. 1. Sect. 2. of the 
constitution, the senators shall be chosen for six years. As the period of service must be, in a 
considerable degree, matter of opinion on this head, I shall only make a few observations, to 
explain why I think it more advisable to limit it to three or four years. 
The people of this country have not been accustomed to so long appointments in their state 
governments. They have generally adopted annual elections. The members of the present 
congress are chosen yearly, who, from the nature and multiplicity of their business, ought to be 
chosen for longer periods than the federal senators. Men six years in office absolutely contract 
callous habits, and cease, in too great a degree, to feel their dependence, and for the condition of 
their constituents. Senators continued in offices three or four years, will be in them longer than 
any popular erroneous opinions will probably continue to actuate their electors. Men appointed 
for three or four years will generally be long enough in office to give stability, and amply to 
acquire political information. By a change of legislators, as often as circumstances will permit, 
political knowledge is diffused more extensively among the people, and the attention of the 
electors and elected more constantly kept alive-circumstances of infinite importance in a free 
country. Other reasons might be added, but my subject is too extensive to admit of my dwelling 
upon less material points. 
2. When the confederation was formed, it was considered essentially necessary that the members 
of congress should at any time be recalled by their respective states, when the states should see 
fit, and others be sent in their room. I do not think it is less necessary that this principle should be 
extended to the members of congress under the new constitution, and especially to the senators. I 
have had occasion several times to observe, that let us form a federal constitution as extensively, 
and on the best principles in our power, we must, after all, trust a vast deal to a few men, who, 
far removed from their constituents, will administer the federal government. There is but little 
danger these men will feel too great a degree of dependence. The necessary and important object 
to be attended to, is to make them feel dependent enough. Men elected for several years, several 
hundred miles distant from their states, possessed of very extensive powers, and the means of 
paying themselves, will not, probably, be oppressed with a sense of dependence and 
responsibility. 
The senators will represent sovereignties, which generally have, and always ought to retain, the 
power of recalling their agents. The principle of responsibility is strongly felt in men who are 
liable to be recalled and censured for their misconduct; and, if we may judge from experience, 
the latter will not abuse the power of recalling their members; to possess it will at least be a 
valuable check. It is in the nature of all delegated power, that the constituents should retain the 
right to judge concerning the conduct of their representatives. They must exercise the power, and 
their decision itself, their approving or disapproving that conduct implies a right, a power to 
continue in office, or to remove from it. But whenever the substitute acts under a constitution, 
then it becomes necessary that the power of recalling him be expressed. The reasons for lodging 
a power to recall are stronger, as they respect the senate, than as they respect the representatives. 
The latter will be more frequently elected, and changed of course, and being chosen by the 
people at large, it would be more difficult for the people than for the legislatures to take the 
necessary measures for recalling. But even the people, if the powers will be more beneficial to 
them than injurious, ought to possess it. The people are not apt to wrong a man who is steady and 
true to their interests. They may for a while be misled by party representations, and leave a good 
man out of office unheard; but every recall supposes a deliberate decision, and a fair hearing. 
And no man who believes his conduct proper, and the result of honest views, will be the less 
useful in his public character on account of the examination his actions may be liable to. A man 
conscious of the contrary conduct ought clearly to be restrained by the apprehensions of a trial. I 
repeat it, it is interested combinations and factions we are particularly to guard against in the 
federal government, and all the rational means that can be put into the hands of the people to 
prevent them ought to be provided and furnished for them. Where there is a power to recall, 
trusty sentinels among the people, or in the state legislatures will have a fair opportunity to 
become useful. If the members in congress from the states join in such combinations, or favor 
them, or pursue a pernicious line of conduct, the most attentive among the people or in the state 
legislatures may formally charge them before their constituents. The very apprehensions of such 
constitutional charge may prevent many of the evils mentioned; and the recalling the members of 
a single state, a single senator or representative, may often prevent many more. Nor do 1, at 
present, discover any danger in such proceedings, as every man who shall move for a recall will 
put his reputation at stake, to show he has reasonable grounds for his motion. It is not probable 
such motions will be made unless there be good apparent grounds for succeeding. Nor can the 
charge or motion be anything more than the attack of an individual or individuals unless a 
majority of the constituents shall see cause to go into the inquiry. Further, the circumstances of 
such a power being lodged in the constituents will tend continually to keep up their watchfulness, 
as well as the attention and dependence of the federal senators and representatives. 
3. By the confederation it is provided, that no delegate shall serve more than three years in any 
term of six years; and thus, by the forms of the government a rotation of members is produced. A 
like principle has been adopted in some of the state governments, and also in some ancient and 
modern republics. Whether this exclusion of a man for a given period, after he shall have served 
a given time, ought to be ingrafted into a constitution or not is a question, the proper decision [of 
which] materially depends upon the leading features of the government. Some governments are 
so formed as to produce a sufficient fluctuation and change of members; in the ordinary course 
of elections proper numbers of new members are from time to time brought into the legislature, 
and a proportionate number of old ones go out, mix, and become diffused among the people. 
This is the case with all numerous representative legislatures, the members of which are 
frequently elected, and constantly within the view of their constituents. This is the case with our 
state governments, and in them a constitutional rotation is unimportant. But in a government 
consisting of but a few members, elected for long periods, and far removed from the observation 
of the people, but few changes in the ordinary course of elections take place among the members. 
They become in some measure a fixed body, and often inattentive to the public good, callous, 
selfish, and the fountain of corruption. To prevent these evils, and to force a principle of pure 
animation into the federal government, which will be formed much in this last manner 
mentioned, and to produce attention, activity, and a diffusion of knowledge in the community, 
we ought to establish among others the principle of rotation. Even good men in office, in time, 
imperceptibly lose sight of the people, and gradually fall into measures prejudicial to them. It is 
only a rotation among the members of the federal legislature I shall contend for. Judges and 
officers at the heads of the judicial and executive departments are in a very different situation. 
Their offices and duties require the information and studies of many years for performing them 
in a manner advantageous to the people. These judges and officers must apply their whole time 
to the detail business of their offices, and depend on them for their support. Then, they always 
act under masters or superiors, and may be removed from office for misconduct. They pursue a 
certain round of executive business; their offices must be in all societies confined to a few men, 
because but few can become qualified to fill them. And were they, by annual appointments, open 
to the people at large, they are offices of such a nature as to be of no service to them. They must 
leave these offices in the possession of the few individuals qualified to fill them, or have them 
badly filled. In the judicial and executive departments also, the body of the people possess a 
large share of power and influence, as jurors and subordinate officers, among whom there are 
many and frequent rotations. But in every free country the legislatures are all on a level, and 
legislation becomes partial whenever, in practice, it rests for any considerable time in a few 
hands. It is the true republican principle to diffuse the power of making the laws among the 
people and so to modify the forms of the government as to draw in turn the well informed of 
every class into the legislature. To determine the propriety or impropriety of this rotation, we 
must take the inconveniencies as well as the advantages attending it into view. On the one hand 
by this rotation, we may sometimes exclude good men from being elected. On the other hand, we 
guard against those pernicious connections, which usually grow up among men left to continue 
long periods in office. We increase the number of those who make the laws and return to their 
constituents; and thereby spread information, and preserve a spirit of activity and investigation 
among the people. Hence a balance of interests and exertions are preserved, and the ruinous 
measures of actions rendered more impracticable. I would not urge the principle of rotation, if I 
believed the consequence would be an uninformed federal legislature; but I have no 
apprehension of this in this enlightened country. The members of congress, at any one time, must 
be but very few compared with the respectable well informed men in the United States; and I 
have no idea there will be any want of such men for members of congress, though by a principle 
of rotation the constitution should exclude from being elected for two years those federal 
legislators, who may have served the four years immediately preceding, or any four years in the 
six preceding years. If we may judge from experience and fair calculations, this principle will 
never operate to exclude at any one period a fifteenth part even of those men who have been 
members of congress. Though no man can sit in congress by the confederation more than three 
years in any term of six years, yet not more than three, four, or five men in any one state have 
been made ineligible at any one period. And if a good man happens to be excluded by this 
rotation, it is only for a short time. All things considered, the inconveniencies of the principle 
must be very inconsiderable compared with the many advantages of it. It will generally be 
expedient for a man who has served four years in congress to return home, mix with the people, 
and reside some time with them. This will tend to reinstate him in the interests, feelings, and 
views similar to theirs, and thereby confirm in him the essential qualifications of a legislator. 
Even in point of information, it may be observed, the useful information of legislators is not 
acquired merely in studies in offices, and in meeting to make laws from day to day. They must 
learn the actual situation of the people by being among them, and when they have made laws, 
return home and observe how they operate. Thus occasionally to be among the people, is not 
only necessary to prevent or banish the callous habits and self-interested views of office in 
legislators, but to afford them necessary information, and to render them useful. Another 
valuable end is answered by it, sympathy, and the means of communication between them and 
their constituents, is substantially promoted. So that on every principle legislators, at certain 
periods, ought to live among their constituents. Some men of science are undoubtedly necessary 
in every legislature; but the knowledge, generally, necessary for men who make laws, is a 
knowledge of the common concerns, and particular circumstances of the people. In a republican 
government seats in the legislature are highly honorable. I believe but few do, and surely none 
ought to, consider them as places of profit and permanent support. Were the people always 
properly attentive, they would, at proper periods, call their lawmakers home, by sending others in 
their room. But this is not often the case; and therefore, in making constitutions, when the people 
are attentive, they ought cautiously to provide for those benefits, those advantageous changes in 
the administration of their affairs, which they are often apt to be inattentive to in practice. On the 
whole, to guard against the evils, and to secure the advantages I have mentioned, with the 
greatest degree of certainty, we ought clearly in my opinion, to increase the federal 
representation, to secure elections on proper principles, to establish a right to recall members, 
and a rotation among them. 
THE FEDERAL FARMER
Antifederalist No. 64 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND 
POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART III)
Taken from the New York Journal, Nov. 22, 1787 by "CINCINNATUS" It appears to have been 
written in answer to James Wilson's Antifederalist # 12) 
I come now, sir, to the most exceptionable part of the Constitution-the Senate. In this, as in every 
other part, you [James Wilson of Pennsylvania] are in the line of your profession Law], and on 
that ground assure your fellow citizens, that-"perhaps there never was a charge made with less 
reason, than that which predicts the institution of a baneful aristocracy in the Federal Senate." 
And yet your conscience smote you, sir, at the beginning, and compelled you to prefix a perhaps 
to this strange assertion. The senate, you say, branches into two characters-the one legislative 
and the other executive. This phraseology is quaint, and the position does not state the whole 
truth. I am very sorry, sir, to be so often obliged to reprehend the suppression of information at 
the moment that you stood forth to instruct your fellow citizens, in what they were supposed not 
to understand. In this character, you should have abandoned your professional line, and told 
them, not only the truth, but the whole truth. The whole truth then is, that the same body, called 
the senate, is vested with legislative, executive and judicial powers. The two first you 
acknowledge; the last is conveyed in these words, sec. 3d.: "The Senate shall have the sole power 
to try all impeachments." On this point then we are to come to issue-whether a senate so 
constituted is likely to produce a baneful aristocracy, which will swallow up the democratic 
rights and liberties of the nation. To judge on this question, it is proper to examine minutely into 
the constitution and powers of the senate; and we shall then see with what anxious and subtle 
cunning it is calculated for the proposed purpose. 1st. It is removed from the people, being 
chosen by the legislatures-and exactly in the ratio of their removal from the people do 
aristocratic principles constantly infect the minds of man. 2nd. They endure, two thirds for four, 
and one third for six years, and in proportion to the duration of power, the aristocratic exercise of 
it and attempts to extend it, are invariably observed to increase. 3rd. From the union of the 
executive with the legislative functions, they must necessarily be longer together, or rather 
constantly assembled; and in proportion to their continuance together, they will be able to form 
effectual schemes for extending their own power, and reducing that of the democratic branch. If 
any one would wish to see this more fully illustrated, let him turn to the history of the Decemviri 
in Rome. 4th. Their advice and consent being necessary to the appointment of all the great 
officers of state, both at home and abroad, will enable them to win over any opponents to their 
measures in the house of representatives, and give them the influence which, we see, 
accompanies this power in England; and which, from the nature of man, must follow it every 
where. 5th. The sole power of impeachment being vested in them, they have it in their power to 
control the representative in this democratic right; to screen from punishment, or rather from 
conviction, all high offenders, being their creatures, and to keep in awe all opponents to their 
power in high office. 6th. The union established between them and the vice president, who is 
made one of the corps, and will therefore be highly animated with the aristocratic spirit of it, 
furnishes them a powerful shield against popular suspicion and inquiry, he being the second man 
in the United States who stands highest in the confidence and estimation of the people. And 
lastly, the right of altering or amending money-bills, is a high additional power given them as a 
branch of the legislature, which their analogous branch, in the English parliament, could never 
obtain because it has been guarded by the representatives of the people there, with the most 
strenuous solicitude as one of the vital principles of democratic liberty. 
Is a body so vested with means to soften and seduce-so armed with power to screen or to 
condemn-so fortified against suspicion and inquiry-so largely trusted with legislative powers-so 
independent of and removed from the people-so tempted to abuse and extend these powers-is this 
a body which freemen ought ever to create, or which freemen can ever endure? Or is it not a 
monster in the political creation, which we ought to regard with horror? Shall we thus forget our 
own fetters? Shall we set up the idol, before which we shall soon be obliged, however 
reluctantly, to bow? Shall we consent to see a proud aristocracy erect his domineering crest in 
triumph over our prostrate liberties? 
But we shall yet see more clearly, how highly favored this senate has been, by taking a similar 
view of the representative body. This body is the true representative of the democratic part of the 
system; the shield and defense of the people. . . . Its transcendent and incommunicable power of 
impeachment-that high source of its dignity and control-in which alone the majesty of the people 
feels his sceptre, and bears aloft his fasces-is rendered ineffectual, by its being triable before its 
rival branch, the senate, the patron and prompter of the measures against which it is to sit in 
judgment. It is therefore most manifest, that from the very nature of the constitution the right of 
impeachment apparently given, is really rendered ineffectual. And this is contrived with so much 
art, that to discover it you must bring together various and distant parts of the constitution, or it 
will not strike the examiner, that the same body that advises the executive measures of 
government which are usually the subject of impeachment, are the sole judges on such 
impeachments. They must therefore be both party and judge, and must condemn those who have 
executed what they advised. Could such a monstrous absurdity have escaped men who were not 
determined, at all events, to vest all power in this aristocratic body? Is it not plain, that the senate 
is to be exalted by the humiliation of the democracy? A democracy which, thus bereft of its 
powers, and shorn of its strength, will stand a melancholy monument of popular impotence. . . . 
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same corps," 
[says Montesquieu] "there can be no liberty. Because, it may be feared, that the same monarch or 
senate will make tyrannical laws, that they may execute them tyrannically." I am aware that this 
great man is speaking of a senate being the whole legislature; whereas the one before us is but a 
branch of the proposed legislature. But still the reason applies, inasmuch as the legislative power 
of the senate will enable it to negative all bills that are meant to control the executive; and from 
being secure of preventing any abridgment, they can watch every pliant hour of the 
representative body to promote an enlargement of the executive powers. One thing at least is 
certain, that by making this branch of the legislature participant in the executive, you not only 
prevent the legislature from being a check upon the executive, but you inevitably prevent its 
being checked or controlled by the other branch. 
To the authority of Montesquieu, I shall add that of Mr. De Lolme, whose disquisition on 
government is allowed to be deep, solid, and ingenious. . . . "It is not only necessary," [says he] 
"to take from the legislature the executive power which would exempt them from the laws; but 
they should not have even a hope of being ever able to arrogate to themselves that power." To 
remove this hope from their expectation, it would have been proper, not only to have previously 
laid down, in a declaration of rights, that these powers should be forever separate and 
incommunicable; but the frame of the proposed constitution should have had that separation 
religiously in view, through all its parts. It is manifest this was not the object of its framers; but, 
that on the contrary there is a studied mixture of them in the senate as necessary to erect it into 
that potent aristocracy which it must infallibly produce. In pursuit of this daring object, than 
which no greater calamity can be brought upon the people, another egregious error in 
constitutional principles is committed. I mean that of dividing the executive powers between the 
senate and president. Unless more harmony and less ambition should exist between these two 
executives than ever yet existed between men in power, or than can exist while human nature is 
as it is, this absurd division must be productive of constant contentions for the lead, must clog 
the execution of government to a mischievous, and sometimes to a disgraceful degree; and if 
they should unhappily harmonize in the same objects of ambition, their number and their 
combined power would preclude all fear of that responsibility, which is one of the great 
securities of good, and restraints on bad governments. Upon these principles Mr. DeLolme has 
foreseen that "the effect of a division of the executive power is the establishment of absolute 
power in one of continual contention;" he therefore lays it down, as a general rule . . . "for the 
tranquility of the state it is necessary that the executive power should be in one." I will add, that 
this singlehood of the executive is indispensably necessary to effective execution, as well as to 
the responsibility and rectitude of him to whom it is entrusted. 
By this time I hope it is evident from reason and authority, that in the constitution of the senate 
there is much cunning and little wisdom; that we have much to fear from it, and little to hope, 
and then it must necessarily produce a baneful aristocracy, by which the democratic rights of the 
people will be overwhelmed. 
It was probably upon this principle that a member of the convention, of high and unexceeded 
reputation for wisdom and integrity, is said to have emphatically declared, that he would sooner 
lose his right hand, than put his name to such a constitution. 
CINCINNATUS
Antifederalist No. 65 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND 
POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART IV)
(by Gilbert Livingston and John Lansing delivered on June 24, 1788 to the New York ratifying 
convention) 
Mr. G[ilbert] LIVINGSTON rose, and addressed the chair. 
He, in the first place, considered the importance of the Senate as a branch of the legislature, in 
three points of view:-
First, they would possess legislative powers coextensive with those of the House of 
Representatives except with respect to originating revenue laws; which, however, they would 
have power to reject or amend, as in the case of other bills. Secondly, they would have an 
importance, even exceeding that of the representative house, as they would be composed of a 
smaller number, and possess more firmness and system. Thirdly, their consequence and dignity
would still further transcend those of the other branch, from their longer continuance in office. 
These powers, Mr. Livingston contended, rendered the Senate a dangerous body. 
He went on, in the second place, to enumerate and animadvert on the powers with which they 
were clothed in their judicial capacity, and in their capacity of council to the President, and in the 
forming of treaties. In the last place, as if too much power could not be given to this body, they 
were made, he said, a council of appointment, by whom ambassadors and other officers of state 
were to be appointed. These are the powers, continued he, which are vested in this small body of 
twenty-six men; in some cases, to be exercised by a bare quorum, which is fourteen; a majority 
of which number, again, is eight. What are the checks provided to balance this great mass of 
power? Our present Congress cannot serve longer than three years in six: they are at any time 
subject to recall. These and other checks were considered as necessary at a period which I choose 
to honor with the name of virtuous. Sir, I venerate the spirit with which every thing was done at 
the trying time in which the Confederation was formed. America had then a sufficiency of this 
virtue to resolve to resist perhaps the first nation in the universe, even unto bloodshed. What was 
her aim? Equal liberty and safety. What ideas had she of this equal liberty? Read them in her 
Articles of Confederation. True it is, sir, there are some powers wanted to make this glorious 
compact complete. But, sir, let us be cautious that we do not err more on the other hand, by 
giving power too profusely, when, perhaps, it will be too late to recall it. Consider, sir, the great 
influence which this body, armed at all points, will have. What will be the effect of this? 
Probably a security of their reelection, as long as they please. Indeed, in my view, it will amount 
nearly to an appointment for life. What will be their situation in a federal town? Hallowed 
ground! Nothing so unclean as state laws to enter there, surrounded, as they will be, by an 
impenetrable wall of adamant and gold, the wealth of the whole country flowing into it. [Here a 
member, who did not fully understand, called out to know what WALL the gentleman meant; on 
which be turned, and replied, "A wall of gold-of adamant, which will flow in from all parts of the 
continent." At which flowing metaphor, a great laugh in the house.] The gentleman continued: 
Their attention to their various business will probably require their constant attendance. In this 
Eden will they reside with their families, distant from the observation of the people. In such a 
situation, men are apt to forget their dependence, lose their sympathy, and contract selfish habits. 
Factions are apt to be formed, if the body becomes permanent. The senators will associate only 
with men of their own class, and thus become strangers to the condition of the common people. 
They should not only return, and be obliged to live with the people, but return to their former 
rank of citizenship, both to revive their sense of dependence, and to gain a knowledge of the 
country. This will afford opportunity to bring forward the genius and information of the states, 
and will be a stimulus to acquire political abilities. It will be the means of diffusing a more 
general knowledge of the measures and spirit of the administration. These things will confirm the 
people's confidence in government. When they see those who have been high in office residing 
among them as private citizens, they will feel more forcibly that the government is of their own 
choice. The members of this branch having the idea impressed on their minds, that they are soon 
to return to the level whence the suffrages of the people raised them,-this good effect will follow: 
they will consider their interests as the same with those of their constituents, and that they 
legislate for themselves as well as others. They will not conceive themselves made to receive, 
enjoy, and rule, nor the people solely to earn, pay, and submit. 
Mr. Chairman, I have endeavored, with as much perspicuity and candor as I am master of, 
shortly to state my objections to this clause. I would wish the committee to believe that they are 
not raised for the sake of opposition, but that I am very sincere in my sentiments in this 
important investigation. The Senate, as they are now constituted, have little or no check on them. 
Indeed, sir, too much is put into their hands. When we come to that part of the system which 
points out their powers, it will be the proper time to consider this subject more particularly. 
I think, sir, we must relinquish the idea of safety under this government, if the time for services 
is not further limited, and the power of recall [not] given to the state legislatures. I am 
strengthened in my opinion by an observation made yesterday, by an honorable member from 
New York, to this effect"that there should be no fear of corruption of the members in the House 
of Representatives; especially as they are, in two years, to return to the body of the people." I 
therefore move that the committee adopt the following resolution, as an amendment to this 
clause:-
"Resolved, That no person shall be eligible as a senator for more than six years in any term of 
twelve years, and that it shall be in the power of the legislatures of the several states to recall 
their senators, or either of them, and to elect others in their stead, to serve for the remainder of 
the time for which such senator or senators, so recalled, were appointed." 
Hon. Mr. [John] LANSING. I beg the indulgence of the committee, while I offer some reasons in 
support of the motion just made; in doing which, I shall confine myself to the point, and shall 
hear with attention, and examine with candor, the objections which may be opposed to it. . . 
Sir, I am informed by gentlemen who have been conversant in public affairs, and who have had 
seats in Congress, that there have been, at different times, violent parties in that body-an evil that 
a change of members has contributed, more than any other thing, to remedy. If, therefore, the 
power of recall should be never exercised, if it should have no other force than that of a check to 
the designs of the bad, and to destroy party spirit, certainly no harm, but much good, may result 
from adopting the amendment. If my information be true, there have been parties in Congress 
which would have continued to this day, if the members had not been removed. No 
inconvenience can follow from placing the powers of the Senate on such a foundation as to make 
them feel their dependence. It is only a check calculated to make them more attentive to the 
objects for which they were appointed. Sir, I would ask, Is there no danger that the members of 
the Senate will sacrifice the interest of their state to their own private views? Every man in the 
United States ought to look with anxious concern to that body. Their number is so exceedingly 
small, that they may easily feel their interests distinct from those of the community. This 
smallness of number also renders them subject to a variety of accidents, that may be of the 
highest disadvantage. If one of the members is sick, or if one or both are prevented occasionally 
from attending, who are to take care of the interests of their state? 
Sir, we have frequently observed that deputies have been appointed for certain purposes, who 
have not punctually attended to them, when it was necessary. Their private concerns may often 
require their presence at home. In what manner is this evil to be corrected? The amendment 
provides a remedy. It is the only thing which can give the states a control over the Senate. It will 
be said, there is a power in Congress to compel the attendance of absent members; but will the 
members from the other states be solicitous to compel such attendance, except to answer some 
particular view, or promote some interest of their own? If it be the object of the senators to 
protect the sovereignty of their several states, and if, at any time, it be the design of the other 
states to make encroachments on the sovereignty of any one state, will it be for their interest to 
compel the members from this state to attend, in order to oppose and check them? This would be 
strange policy indeed.... 
Sir, it is true there have been no instances of the success of corruption under the old 
Confederation; and may not this be attributed to the power of recall, which has existed from its 
first formation? It has operated effectually, though silently. It has never been exercised, because 
no great occasion has offered. The power has by no means proved a discouragement to 
individuals, in serving their country. A seat in Congress has always been considered a 
distinguished honor, and a favorite object of ambition. I believe no public station has been 
sought with more avidity. If this power has existed for so many years, and through so many 
scenes of difficulty and danger, without being exerted, may it not be rationally presumed that it 
never will be put in execution, unless the indispensable interest of a state shall require it? I am 
perfectly convinced that, in many emergencies, mutual concessions are necessary and proper; 
and that, in some instances, the smaller interests of the states should be sacrificed to great 
national objects. But when a delegate makes such sacrifices as tend to political destruction or to 
reduce sovereignty to subordination, his state ought to have the power of defeating his design, 
and reverting to the people. It is observed, that the appropriation of money is not in the power of 
the Senate alone; but, sir, the exercise of certain powers, which constitutionally and necessarily 
involve the disposal of money, belongs to the Senate. They have, therefore, a right of disposing 
of the property of the United States. If the Senate declare war, the lower house must furnish the 
supplies. 
It is further objected to this amendment, that it will restrain the people from choosing those who 
are most deserving of their suffrages, and will thus be an abridgment of their rights. I cannot 
suppose this last inference naturally follows. The rights of the people will be best supported by 
checking, at a certain point, the current of popular favor, and preventing the establishment of an 
influence which may leave to elections little more than the form of freedom. The Constitution of 
this state says, that no man shall hold the office of sheriff or coroner beyond a certain period. 
Does any one imagine that the rights of the people are infringed by this provision? The 
gentlemen, in their reasoning on the subject of corruption, seem to set aside experience and to 
consider the Americans as exempt from the common vices and frailties of human nature. It is 
unnecessary to particularize the numerous ways in which public bodies are accessible to 
corruption. The poison always finds a channel, and never wants an object. Scruples would be 
impertinent arguments would be in vain, checks would be useless, if we were certain our rulers 
would be good men; but for the virtuous government is not instituted. Its object is to restrain and 
punish vice; and all free constitutions are for with two views-to deter the governed from crime, 
and the governors from tyranny. 
Antifederalist No. 66 From North Carolina
Mr. JOSEPH TAYLOR objected to the provision made for impeaching. He urged that there 
could be no security from it, as the persons accused were triable by the Senate, who were a part 
of the legislature themselves; that, while men were fallible, the senators were liable to errors, 
especially in a case where they were concerned themselves. . . . 
Mr. [Timothy] BLOODWORTH wished to be informed, whether this sole power of 
impeachment, given to the House of Representatives, deprived the state of the power of 
impeaching any of its members. . . . 
Mr. JOSEPH TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, the objection is very strong. If there be but one body to 
try, where are we? If any tyranny or oppression should arise, how are those who perpetrated such 
oppression to be tried and punished? By a tribunal consisting of the very men who assist in such 
tyranny. Can any tribunal be found, in any community, who will give judgment against their own 
actions? Is it the nature of man to decide against himself? I am obliged to the worthy member 
from New Hanover for assisting me with objections. None can impeach but the representatives; 
and the impeachments are to be determined by the senators, who are one of the branches of 
power which we dread under this Constitution.... the words "sole power of impeachment" were 
so general, and might admit of such a latitude of construction, as to extend to every legislative 
member upon the continent, so as to preclude the representatives of the different states from 
impeaching.... 
Mr. [William] PORTER wished to be informed, if every officer, who was a creature of that 
Constitution, was to be tried by the Senate-whether such officers, and those who had complaints 
against them, were to go from the extreme parts of the continent to the seat of government, to 
adjust disputes. . . . 
Mr. J. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I conceive that, if this Constitution be adopted, we shall have a 
large number of officers in North Carolina under the appointment of Congress. We shall 
undoubtedly, for instance, have a great number of tax-gatherers. If any of these officers shall do 
wrong, when we come to fundamental principles, we find that we have no way to punish them 
but by going to Congress, at an immense distance, whither we must carry our witnesses. Every 
gentlemen must see, in these cases, that oppressions will arise. I conceive that they cannot be 
tried elsewhere. I consider that the Constitution will be explained by the word "sole." If they did 
not mean to retain a general power of impeaching, there was no occasion for saying the "sole 
power." I consider therefore that oppressions will arise. If I am oppressed, I must go to the House 
of Representatives to complain. I consider that, when mankind are about to part with rights, they 
ought only to part with those rights which they can with convenience relinquish, and not such as 
must involve them in distresses.... 
I observe that, when these great men are met in Congress, in consequence of this power, they 
will have the power of appointing all the officers of the United States. My experience in life 
shows me that the friends of the members of the legislature will get the offices. These senators 
and members of the House of Representatives will appoint their friends to all offices. These 
officers will be great men, and they will have numerous deputies under them. The receiver-
general of the taxes of North Carolina must be one of the greatest men in the country. Will he 
come to me for his taxes? No. He will send his deputy, who will have special instructions to 
oppress me. How am I to be redressed? I shall be told that I must go to Congress, to get him 
impeached. This being the case, whom am I to impeach? A friend of the representatives of North 
Carolina. For, unhappily for us, these men will have too much weight for us; they will have 
friends in the government who will be inclined against us, and thus we may be oppressed with 
impunity. 
Antifederalist No. 67 VARIOUS FEARS CONCERNING THE 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
From the "CATO" letters of George Clinton, taken from The New-York Journal of November 8, 
1787. 
I shall begin with observations on the executive branch of this new system; and though it is not 
the first in order, as arranged therein, yet being the chief, is perhaps entitled by the rules of rank 
to the first consideration. The executive power as described in the 2d article, consists of a 
president and vice- president, who are to hold their offices during the term of four years; the 
same article has marked the manner and time of their election, and established the qualifications 
of the president; it also provides against the removal, death, or inability of the president and vice-
president - regulates the salary of the president, delineates his duties and powers; and, lastly, 
declares the causes for which the president and vice-president shall be removed from office. 
Notwithstanding the great learning and abilities of the gentlemen who composed the convention, 
it may be here remarked with deference, that the construction of the first paragraph of the first 
section of the second article is vague and inexplicit, and leaves the mind in doubt as to the 
election of a president and vice-president, after the expiration of the election for the first term of 
four years; in every other case, the election of these great officers is expressly provided for; but 
there is no explicit provision for their election which is to set this political machine in motion; no 
certain and express terms as in your state constitution, that statedly once in every four years, and 
as often as these offices shall become vacant, by expiration or otherwise, as is therein expressed, 
an election shall be held as follows, etc.; this inexplicitness perhaps may lead to an establishment 
for life. 
It is remarked by Montesquieu, in treating of republics, that in all magistracies, the greatness of 
the power must be compensated by the brevity of the duration, and that a longer time than a year 
would be dangerous. It is, therefore, obvious to the least intelligent mind to account why great 
power in the hands of a magistrate, and that power connected with considerable duration, may be 
dangerous to the liberties of a republic. The deposit of vast trusts in the hands of a single 
magistrate enables him in their exercise to create a numerous train of dependents. This tempts his 
ambition, which in a republican magistrate is also remarked, to be pernicious, and the duration of 
his office for any considerable time favors his views, gives him the means and time to perfect 
and execute his designs; he therefore fancies that he may be great and glorious by oppressing his 
fellow citizens, and raising himself to permanent grandeur on the ruins of his country. And here 
it may be necessary to compare the vast and important powers of the president, together with his 
continuance in office, with the foregoing doctrine-his eminent magisterial situation will attach 
many adherents to him, and he will be surrounded by expectants and courtiers. His power of 
nomination and influence on all appointments; the strong posts in each state comprised within his 
superintendence, and garrisoned by troops under his direction; his control over the army, militia, 
and navy; the unrestrained power of granting pardons for treason, which may be used to screen 
from punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby 
prevent a discovery of his own guilt; his duration in office for four years-these, and various other 
principles evidently prove the truth of the position, that if the president is possessed of ambition, 
he has power and time sufficient to ruin his country. 
Though the president, during the sitting of the legislature, is assisted by the senate, yet he is 
without a constitutional council in their recess. He will therefore be unsupported by proper 
information and advice, and will generally be directed by minions and favorites, or a council of 
state will grow out of the principal officers of the great departments, the most dangerous council 
in a free country. . . . The language and the manners of this court will be what distinguishes them 
from the rest of the community, not what assimilates them to it; and in being remarked for a 
behavior that shows they are not meanly born, and in adulation to people of fortune and power. 
The establishment of a vice-president is as unnecessary as it is dangerous. This officer, for want 
of other employment, is made president of the senate, thereby blending the executive and 
legislative powers, besides always giving to some one state, from which he is to come, an unjust 
pre-eminence. 
It is a maxim in republics that the representative of the people should be of their immediate 
choice; but by the manner in which the president is chosen, he arrives to this office at the fourth 
or fifth hand. Nor does the highest vote, in the way he is elected, determine the choice-for it is 
only necessary that he should be taken from the highest of five, who may have a plurality of 
votes. . . . 
And wherein does this president, invested with his powers and prerogatives, essentially differ 
from the king of Great Britain (save as to name, the creation of nobility, and some immaterial 
incidents, the offspring of absurdity and locality)? The direct prerogatives of the president, as 
springing from his political character, are among the following: It is necessary, in order to 
distinguish him from the rest of the community, and enable him to keep, and maintain his court, 
that the compensation for his services, or in other words, his revenue, should be such as to enable 
him to appear with the splendor of a prince. He has the power of receiving ambassadors from, 
and a great influence on their appointments to foreign courts; as also to make treaties, leagues, 
and alliances with foreign states, assisted by the Senate, which when made becomes the supreme 
law of land. He is a constituent part of the legislative power, for every bill which shall pass the 
House of Representatives and Senate is to be presented to him for approbation. If he approves of 
it he is to sign it, if he disapproves he is to return it with objections, which in many cases will 
amount to a complete negative; and in this view he will have a great share in the power of 
making peace, coining money, etc., and all the various objects of legislation, expressed or 
implied in this Constitution. For though it may be asserted that the king of Great Britain has the 
express power of making peace or war, yet he never thinks it prudent to do so without the advice 
of his Parliament, from whom be is to derive his support -and therefore these powers, in both 
president and king, are substantially the same. He is the generalissimo of the nation, and of 
course has the command and control of the army, navy and militia; he is the general conservator 
of the peace of the union-he may pardon all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, and the 
principal fountain of all offices and employments. Will not the exercise of these powers therefore 
tend either to the establishment of a vile and arbitrary aristocracy or monarchy? The safety of the 
people in a republic depends on the share or proportion they have in the government; but 
experience ought to teach you, that when a man is at the head of an elective government invested 
with great powers, and interested in his re-election, in what circle appointments will be made; by 
which means an imperfect aristocracy bordering on monarchy may be established. You must, 
however, my countrymen, beware that the advocates of this new system do not deceive you by a 
fallacious resemblance between it and your own state government [New York] which you so 
much prize; and, if you examine, you will perceive that the chief magistrate of this state is your 
immediate choice, controlled and checked by a just and full representation of the people, 
divested of the prerogative of influencing war and peace, making treaties, receiving and sending 
embassies, and commanding standing armies and navies, which belong to the power of the 
confederation, and will be convinced that this government is no more like a true picture of your 
own than an Angel of Darkness resembles an Angel of Light. 
CATO
Antifederalist No. 68 ON THE MODE OF ELECTING THE 
PRESIDENT
From a speech by William Grayson given to the Virginia ratifying convention on June 18, 1788. 
Mr. [William] GRAYSON. Mr. Chairman, one great objection with me is this: If we advert to..... 
[the] democratical, aristocratical, or executive branch, we shall find their powers are perpetually 
varying and fluctuating throughout the whole. Perhaps the democratic branch would be well 
constructed, were it not for this defect. The executive is still worse, in this respect, than the 
democratic branch. He is to be elected by a number of electors in the country; but the principle is 
changed when no person has a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, or when 
more than one have such a majority, and have an equal number of votes; for then the lower house 
is to vote by states. It is thus changing throughout the whole. It seems rather founded on accident 
than any principle of government I ever heard of. We know that there scarcely ever was an 
election of such an officer without the interposition of foreign powers. Two causes prevail to 
make them intermeddle in such cases:-one is, to preserve the balance of power; the other, to 
preserve their trade. These causes have produced interferences of foreign powers in the election 
of the king of Poland. All the great powers of Europe have interfered in an election which took 
place not very long ago, and would not let the people choose for themselves. We know how 
much the powers of Europe have interfered with Sweden. Since the death of Charles XII, that 
country has been a republican government. Some powers were willing it should be so; some 
were willing her imbecility should continue; others wished the contrary; and at length the court 
of France brought about a revolution, which converted it into an absolute government. Can 
America be free from these interferences? France, after losing Holland, will wish to make 
America entirely her own. Great Britain will wish to increase her influence by a still closer 
connection. It is the interest of Spain, from the contiguity of her possessions in the western 
hemisphere to the United States, to be in an intimate connection with them, and influence their 
deliberations, if possible. I think we have every thing, to apprehend from such interferences. It is 
highly probable the President will be continued in office for life. To gain his favor, they will 
support him. Consider the means of importance he will have by creating officers. If he has a 
good understanding with the Senate, they will join to prevent a discovery of his misdeeds. . . . 
This quadrennial power cannot be justified by ancient history. There is hardly an instance where 
a republic trusted its executive so long with much power; nor is it warranted by modern 
republics. The delegation of power is, in most of them, only for one year. 
When you have a strong democratical and a strong aristocratical branch, you may have a strong 
executive. But when those are weak, the balance will not be preserved, if you give the executive 
extensive powers for so long a time. As this government is organized, it would be dangerous to 
trust the President with such powers. How will you punish him if he abuse his power? Will you 
call him before the Senate? They are his counsellors and partners in crime. Where are your 
checks? We ought to be extremely cautious in this country. If ever the government be changed, it 
will probably be into a despotism. The first object in England was to destroy the monarchy; but 
the aristocratic branch restored him, and of course the government was organized on its ancient 
principles. But were a revolution to happen here, there would be no means of restoring the
government to its former organization. This is a caution to us not to trust extensive powers. I 
have an extreme objection to the mode of his election. I presume the seven Eastern States will 
always elect him. As he is vested with the power of making treaties, and as there is a material 
distinction between the carrying and productive states, the former will be disposed to have him to 
themselves. He will accommodate himself to their interests in forming treaties, and they will 
continue him perpetually in office. Thus mutual interest will lead them reciprocally to support 
one another. It will be a government of a faction, and this observation will apply to every part of 
it; for, having a majority, they may do what they please. I have made an estimate which shows 
with what facility they will be able to reelect him. The number of electors is equal to the number 
of representatives and senators; viz., ninety-one. They are to vote for two persons. They give, 
therefore, one hundred and eighty-two votes. Let there be forty-five votes for four different 
candidates, and two for the President. He is one of the five highest, if he have but two votes, 
which he may easily purchase. In this case, by the 3d clause of the lst section of the 2d article, 
the election is to be by the representatives, according to states. Let New Hampshire be for him,-a 
majority of its . . . . . 
               3   representatives is    2
Rhode Island   1                         1
Connecticut    5                         3
New Jersey     4                         3
Delaware       1                         1
Georgia        3                         2
North Carolina 5                         3
A majority of seven states is      15
Thus the majority of seven states is but
15, while the minority amounts to 50.
The total number of voices (91 electors
and 65 representatives) is . .          156
Voices in favor of the President
are, 2 state electors and 15
representatives .....                    17
  139
So that the President may be reelected by the voices of 17 against 139. 
It may be said that this is an extravagant case, and will never happen. In my opinion, it will often 
happen. A person who is a favorite of Congress, if he gets but two votes of electors, may, by the 
subsequent choice of 15 representatives, be elected President. Surely the possibility of such a 
case ought to be excluded. 
Antifederalist No. 69 THE CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE 
OFFICE
by Richard Henry Lee
The great object is, in a republican government, to guard effectually against perpetuating any 
portion of power, great or small, in the same man or family. This perpetuation of power is totally 
uncongenial to the true spirit of republican governments. On the one hand the first executive 
magistrate ought to remain in office so long as to avoid instability in the execution of the laws; 
on the other, not so long as to enable ]him to take any measures to establish himself. The 
convention, it seems, first agreed that the president should be chosen for seven years, and never 
after to be eligible. Whether seven years is a period too long or not, is rather a matter of opinion; 
but clear it is, that this mode is infinitely preferable to the one finally adopted. When a man shall 
get the chair, who may be reelected from time to time, for life, his greatest object will be to keep 
it; to gain friends and votes, at any rate; to associate some favorite son with himself, to take 
office after him. Whenever he shall have any prospect of continuing the office in himself and 
family, he will spare no artifice, no address, and no exertions, to increase the powers and 
importance of it. The servile supporters of his wishes will be placed in all offices, and tools 
constantly employed to aid his views and sound his praise. A man so situated will have no 
permanent interest in the government to lose, by contests and convulsions in the state; but always 
much to gain, and frequently the seducing and flattering hope of succeeding. If we reason at all 
on the subject, we must irresistibly conclude that this will be the case with nine tenths of the 
presidents. We may have, for the first president, and perhaps, one in a century or two afterwards 
(if the government should withstand the attacks of others) a great and good man, governed by 
superior motives; but these are not events to be calculated upon in the present state of human 
nature. A man chosen to this important office for a limited period and always afterwards 
rendered, by the constitution, ineligible, will be governed by very different considerations. He 
can have no rational hopes or expectations of retaining his office after the expiration of a known 
limited time, or of continuing the office in his family, as by the constitution there must be a 
constant transfer of it from one man to another, and consequently from one family to another. No 
man will wish to be a mere cypher at the bead of the government. The great object of each 
president then will be to render his government a glorious period in the annals of his country. 
When a man constitutionally retires from office, he retires without pain; he is sensible he retires 
because the laws direct it, and not from the success of his rivals, nor with that public 
disapprobation which being left out, when eligible, implies. It is said that a man knowing that at 
a given period he must quit his office, will unjustly attempt to take from the public, and lay in 
store the means of support and splendor in his retirement. There can, I think, be but very little in 
this observation. The same constitution that makes a man eligible for a given period only, ought 
to make no man eligible till he arrive to the age of forty or forty-five years. If he be a man of 
fortune, be will retire with dignity to his estate; if not, he may, like the Roman consuls, and other 
eminent characters in republics, find an honorable support and employment in some respectable 
office. A man who must, at all events, thus leave his office, will have but few or no temptations 
to fill its dependent offices with his tools, or any particular set of men; whereas the man 
constantly looking forward to his future elections, and perhaps, to the aggrandizement of his 
family, will have every inducement before him to fill all places with his own props and 
dependents. As to public monies, the president need handle none of them, and he may always 
rigidly be made to account for every shilling he shall receive. 
On the whole, it would be, in my opinion, almost as well to create a limited monarchy at once, 
and give some family permanent power and interest in the community, and let it have something 
valuable to itself to lose in convulsions in the state, and in attempts of usurpation, as to make a 
first magistrate eligible for life, and to create hopes and expectations in him and his family of 
obtaining what they have not. In the latter case, we actually tempt them to disturb the state, to 
foment struggles and contests, by laying before them the flattering prospect of gaining much 
without risking anything. 
The constitution provides only that the president shall hold his office during the term of four 
years; that, at most, only implies, that one shall be chosen every fourth year. It also provides that 
in case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the president and vice-president, 
congress may declare what officer shall act as president; and that such officers shall act 
accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a president shall be elected. It also provides that 
congress may determine the time of choosing electors, and the day on which they shall give their 
votes. Considering these clauses together, I submit this question-whether in case of a vacancy in 
the office of president, by the removal, death, resignation, or inability of the president and vice 
president, and congress should declare that a certain officer, as secretary of foreign affairs, for 
instance, shall act as president, and suffer such officer to continue several years, or even for his 
life, to act as president, by omitting to appoint the time for choosing electors of another 
president, it would be any breach of the constitution? There appears to me to be an intended 
provision for supplying the office of president-not only for any remaining portion of the four 
years, but in cases of emergency-until another president shall be elected. . . . [But] we do not 
know that it is impossible; we do not know that it is improbable, in case a popular officer should 
thus be declared the acting president, that he might continue for life, and without any violent act, 
but merely by neglects and delays on the part of congress. . . 
THE FEDERAL FARMER
Antifederalist No. 70 THE POWERS AND DANGEROUS 
POTENTIALS OF HIS ELECTED MAJESTY
"AN OLD WHIG's" essay from The New-York Journal of December 11, 1787. 
.... In the first place the office of president of the United States appears to me to be clothed with 
such powers as are dangerous. To be the fountain of all honors in the United States-commander 
in chief of the army, navy, and militia; with the power of making treaties and of granting 
pardons; and to be vested with an authority to put a negative upon all laws, unless two thirds of 
both houses shall persist in enacting it, and put their names down upon calling the yeas and nays 
for that purpose-is in reality to be a king, as much a king as the king of Great Britain, and a king 
too of the worst kind: an elective king. If such powers as these are to be trusted in the hands of 
any man, they ought, for the sake of preserving the peace of the community, at once to be made 
hereditary. Much as I abhor kingly government, yet I venture to pronounce, where kings are 
admitted to rule they should most certainly be vested with hereditary power. The election of a 
king whether it be in America or Poland, will be a scene of horror and confusion; and I am 
perfectly serious when I declare, that, as a friend to my country, I shall despair of any happiness 
in the United States until this office is either reduced to a lower pitch of power, or made 
perpetual and hereditary. When I say that our future president will be as much a king as the king 
of Great Britain, I only ask of my readers to look into the constitution of that country, and then 
tell me what important prerogative the king of Great Britain is entitled to which does not also 
belong to the president during his continuance in office. The king of Great Britain, it is true, can 
create nobility which our president cannot; but our president will have the power of making all 
the great men, which comes to the same thing. All the difference is, that we shall be embroiled in 
contention about the choice of the man, while they are at peace under the security of an 
hereditary succession. To be tumbled headlong from the pinnacle of greatness and be reduced to 
a shadow of departed royalty, is a shock almost too great for human nature to endure. It will cost 
a man many struggles to resign such eminent powers, and ere long, we shall find some one who 
will be very unwilling to part with them. Let us suppose this man to be a favorite with his army, 
and that they are unwilling to part with their beloved commander in chief-or to make the thing 
familiar, let us suppose a future president and commander in chief adored by his army and the 
militia to as great a degree as our late illustrious commander in chief; and we have only to 
suppose one thing more, that this man is without the virtue, the moderation and love of liberty 
which possessed the mind of our late general-and this country will be involved at once in war 
and tyranny. So far is it from its being improbable that the man who shall hereafter be in a 
situation to make the attempt to perpetuate his own power, should want the virtues of General 
Washington, that it is perhaps a chance of one hundred millions to one that the next age will not 
furnish an example of so disinterested a use of great power. We may also suppose, without 
trespassing upon the bounds of probability, that this man may not have the means of supporting, 
in private life, the dignity of his former station; that like Caesar, he may be at once ambitious and 
poor, and deeply involved in debt. Such a man would die a thousand deaths rather than sink from 
the heights of splendor and power, into obscurity and wretchedness. We are certainly about 
giving our president too much or too little; and in the course of less than twenty years we shall 
find that we have given him enough to enable him to take all. It would be infinitely more prudent 
to give him at once as much as would content him, so that we might be able to retain the rest in 
peace, for if once power is seized by violence, not the least fragment of liberty will survive the 
shock. I would therefore advise my countrymen seriously to ask themselves this question: 
Whether they are prepared to receive a king? If they are, to say so at once, and make the kingly 
office hereditary; to frame a constitution that should set bounds to his power, and, as far as 
possible, secure the liberty of the subject. If we are not prepared to receive a king, let us call 
another convention to revise the proposed constitution, and form it anew on the principles of a 
confederacy of free republics; but by no means, under pretense of a republic, to lay the 
foundation for a military government, which is the worst of all tyrannies. 
AN OLD WHIG
Antifederalist No. 71 THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM OF OFFICE
Part 1: Luther Martin, The Genuine Information 
Part 2: An excerpt from the 18th letter of "AGRIPPA" appearing in The Massachusetts Gazette 
on February 5, 1788. 
Part 3: From by "A CUSTOMER" in the Maine Cumberland Gazette, March 13, 1788. 
.... The second article relates to the executive-his mode of election, his powers, and the length of 
time he should continue in office. 
On this subject there was a great diversity of sentiment [at the Philadelphia constitutional 
convention]. Many of the members were desirous that the President should be elected for seven 
years, and not to be eligible a second time. Others proposed that he should not be absolutely 
ineligible, but that he should not be capable of being chosen a second time, until the expiration of 
a certain number of years. The supporters of the above proposition went upon the idea that the 
best security for liberty was a limited duration, and a rotation of office, in the chief executive 
department. 
There was a party who attempted to have the President appointed during good behavior, without 
any limitation as to time; and, not being able to succeed in that attempt, they then endeavored to 
have him reeligible without any restraint. It was objected that the choice of a President to 
continue in office during good behavior, would at once be rendering our system an elective 
monarchy; and that, if the President was to be reeligible without any interval of disqualification, 
it would amount nearly to the same thing, since, from the powers that the President is to enjoy, 
and the interests and influence with which they will be attended, he will be almost absolutely 
certain of being reelected from time to time, as long as he lives. As the propositions were 
reported by the committee of the whole house, the President was to be chosen for seven years, 
and not to be eligible at any time after. In the same manner, the proposition was agreed to in 
Convention; and so it was reported by the committee of detail, although a variety of attempts 
were made to alter that part of the system by those who were of a contrary opinion, in which they 
repeatedly failed; but, sir, by never losing sight of their object, and choosing a proper time for 
their purpose, they succeeded, at length, in obtaining the alteration, which was not made until 
within the last twelve days before the Convention adjourned.... 
Resolved, that the constitution lately proposed for the United States be received only upon the 
following conditions. . . . 
The president shall be chosen annually and shall serve but one year, and shall be chosen 
successively from the different states, changing every year.... 
AGRIPPA
I have one difficulty in my mind respecting our admirable Constitution, which I hope somebody 
will attempt to remove. Art. 3, sect. 1: "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years." Here is no 
declaration that a new one shall be chosen at the expiration of that time. "Congress may 
determine the time of choosing the electors; and the day on which they shall give their votes." 
But suppose they should think it for the public good, after the first election, to appoint the first 
Tuesday of September, in the year two thousand, for the purpose of choosing the second 
President; and by law empower the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court to act as 
President until that time. However disagreeable it might be to the majority of the States, I do not 
see but that they are left without a remedy, provided four States should be satisfied with the 
measure. The President elected is not to receive any other emolument; yet the Chief Justice is not 
disqualified as a Judge. Why did our worthy Chief Justice, at Cambridge the year past, in his 
address to the Grand Jury, call upon them to support "that free and excellent Constitution, which 
it has cost the blood of thousands of our friends and fellow citizens to establish; that Constitution 
which has carefully separated and distinguished the principal departments of power, that they 
might never combine against the liberty of the subject"-if it is not a necessary article in a 
constitution? If necessary in a State constitution, why not in one for the whole people? Was it not 
as easy to have said the President should be chosen every fourth year, as to have said the 
Representatives shall be chosen every second year? The celebrated Mr. King observes that this is 
not a confederation of States-for the style is in the name of the people. Therefore, it appears to 
me, the rights of the people should be as well guarded, on this point, here, as in the constitution 
of a State.... 
A CUSTOMER
Antifederalist No. 72 ON THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE; ON 
REELIGIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
By an anonymous writer "REPUBLICUS," appearing in The Kentucky Gazette on March 1, 
1788. 
. . I go now to Art. 2, Sec. 1, which vest the supreme continental executive power in a president-
in order to the choice of whom, the legislative body of each state is empowered to point out to 
their constituents some mode of choice, or (to save trouble) may choose themselves, a certain 
number of electors, who shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot, for two persons, 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. Or in other 
words, they shall vote for two, one or both of whom they know nothing of. An extraordinary 
refinement this, on the plain simple business of election; and of which the grand convention have 
certainly the honor of being the first inventors; and that for an officer too, of so much importance 
as a president - invested with legislative and executive powers; who is to be commander in chief 
of the army, navy, militia, etc.; grant reprieves and pardons; have a temporary negative on all 
bills and resolves; convene and adjourn both houses of congress; be supreme conservator of 
laws; commission all officers; make treaties; and who is to continue four years, and is only 
removable on conviction of treason or bribery, and triable only by the senate, who are to be his 
own council, whose interest in every instance runs parallel with his own, and who are neither the 
officers of the people, nor accountable to them. 
Is it then become necessary, that a free people should first resign their right of suffrage into other 
hands besides their own, and then, secondly, that they to whom they resign it should be 
compelled to choose men, whose persons, characters, manners, or principles they know nothing 
of? And, after all (excepting some such change as is not likely to happen twice in the same 
century) to intrust Congress with the final decision at last? Is it necessary, is it rational, that the 
sacred rights of mankind should thus dwindle down to Electors of electors, and those again 
electors of other electors? This seems to be degrading them even below the prophetical curse 
denounced by the good old patriarch, on the offspring of his degenerate son: "servant of 
servants". . . 
Again I would ask (considering how prone mankind are to engross power, and then to abuse it) is 
it not probable, at least possible, that the president who is to be vested with all this 
demiomnipotence - who is not chosen by the community; and who consequently, as to them, is 
irresponsible and independent-that he, I say, by a few artful and dependent emissaries in 
Congress, may not only perpetuate his own personal administration, but also make it hereditary? 
By the same means, he may render his suspensive power over the laws as operative and 
permanent as that of G. the 3d over the acts of the British parliament; and under the modest title 
of president, may exercise the combined authority of legislation and execution, in a latitude yet 
unthought of. Upon his being invested with those powers a second or third time, he may acquire 
such enormous influence-as, added to his uncontrollable power over the army, navy, and militia; 
together with his private interest in the officers of all these different departments, who are all to 
be appointed by himself, and so his creatures, in the true political sense of the word; and more 
especially when added to all this, he has the power of forming treaties and alliances, and calling 
them to his assistance-that he may, I say, under all these advantages and almost irresistible 
temptations, on some pretended pique, haughtily and contemptuously, turn our poor lower house 
(the only shadow of liberty we shall have left) out of doors, and give us law at the bayonet's 
point. Or, may not the senate, who are nearly in the same situation, with respect to the people, 
from similar motives and by similar means, erect themselves easily into an oligarchy, towards 
which they have already attempted so large a stride? To one of which channels, or rather to a 
confluence of both, we seem to be fast gliding away; and the moment we arrive at it-farewell 
liberty. . . . 
To conclude, I can think of but one source of right to government, or any branch of it-and that is 
THE PEOPLE. They, and only they, have a right to determine whether they will make laws, or 
execute them, or do both in a collective body, or by a delegated authority. Delegation is a 
positive actual investiture. Therefore if any people are subjected to an authority which they have 
not thus actually chosen-even though they may have tamely submitted to it-yet it is not their 
legitimate government. They are wholly passive, and as far as they are so, are in a state of 
slavery. Thank heaven we are not yet arrived at that state. And while we continue to have sense 
enough to discover and detect, and virtue en(>ugh to detest and oppose every attempt, either of 
force or fraud, either from without or within, to bring us into it, we never will. 
Let us therefore continue united in the cause of rational liberty. Let unity and liberty be our mark 
as well as our motto. For only such an union can secure our freedom; and division will inevitably 
destroy it. Thus a mountain of sand may peace meal [sic] be removed by the feeble hands of a 
child; but if consolidated into a rock, it mocks the united efforts of mankind, and can only fall in 
a general wreck of nature. 
REPUBLICUS
Antifederalist No. 73 DOES THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO
POWER INFRINGE ON THE SEPARATION OF 
DEPARTMENTS?
"WILLIAM PENN," an anonymous writer appeared in the [Philadelphia] Independent Gazetteer 
on January 3, 1788. 
. . . I believe that it is universally agreed upon in this enlightened country, that all power residing 
originally in the people, and being derived from them, they ought to be governed by themselves 
only, or by their immediate representatives. I shall not spend any time in explaining a principle 
so well and so generally understood, but I shall proceed immediately to that which I conceive to 
be the next in order. 
The next principle, without which it must be clear that no free government can ever subsist, is 
the DIVISION OF POWER among those who are charged with the execution of it. It has always 
been the favorite maxim of princes, to divide the people, in order to govern them. It is now time 
that the people should avail themselves of the same maxim, and divide powers among their 
rulers, in order to prevent their abusing it. The application of this great political truth, has long 
been unknown to the world, and yet it is grounded upon a very plain natural principle. If, says 
Montesquieu, the same man, or body of men, is possessed both of the legislative and executive 
power, there is NO LIBERTY, because it may be feared that the same monarch, or the same 
senate, will enact tyrannical laws, in order to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Nothing can 
be clearer, and the natural disposition of man to ambition and power makes it probable that such 
would be the consequence. Suppose for instance, that the same body, which has the power of 
raising money by taxes, is also entrusted with the application of that money, they will very 
probably raise large sums, and apply them to their own private uses. If they are empowered to 
create offices, and appoint the officers, they will take that opportunity of providing for 
themselves, and their friends, and if they have the power of inflicting penalties for offenses, and 
of trying the offenders, there will be no bounds to their tyranny. Liberty therefore can only 
subsist, where the powers of government are properly divided, and where the different 
jurisdictions are inviolably kept distinct and separate. 
(1) I shall illustrate this doctrine by an example. A burgher of a certain borough of Switzerland 
was elected Bailiff, or Chief Magistrate, for one year, according to the constitution of the place. 
Shortly after his appointment, he sent for one of his neighbors, and ordered him to pull off his 
boots. The honest neighbor was astonished, and attempted to remonstrate, but the bailiff was 
determined to exert his authority, and threatened to send him to jail, if he did not yield him an 
immediate obedience. The poor man was forced to comply, for the bailiff was vested with power, 
both legislative and executive. He pulled off his worship's boots, but said to him, "When I am 
appointed bailiff in my turn, you shall pull off my boots and clean them too." 
The first and most natural division of the powers of government are into the legislative and 
executive branches. These two should never be suffered to have the least share of each other's 
jurisdiction, or to intermeddle with it in any manner. For whichever of the two divides its power 
with the other, will certainly be subordinate to it; and if they both have a share of each other's 
authority, they will be in fact but one body. Their interest as well as their powers will be the 
same, and they will combine together against the people. 
It is therefore a political error of the greatest magnitude, to allow the executive power a negative, 
or in fact any kind of control over the proceedings of the legislature. The people of Great Britain 
have been so sensible of this truth, that since the days of William III, no king of England has 
dared to exercise the negative over the acts of the two houses of parliament, to which he is 
clearly entitled by his prerogative. 
This doctrine is not novel in America; it seems on the contrary to be everywhere well understood 
and admitted beyond controversy. In the bills of rights or constitutions of New-Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, North- Carolina and Georgia, it is expressly declared, "That 
the legislative, executive and judicial departments, shall be forever separate and distinct from 
each other." In Pennsylvania and Delaware, they are effectually separated without any particular 
declaration of the principle. In the other states indeed, the executive branch possesses more or 
less of the executive power. And here it must appear singular that the state of Massachusetts-
where the doctrine of a separate jurisdiction is most positively established, and in whose bill of 
rights these remarkable words are to be found, "The executive shall never exercise the legislative 
and judicial powers, or either of them, to the end it may be a government of laws and not of 
men" (sect. 30) -yet in that commonwealth and New-Hampshire, the executive branch, which 
consists of a single magistrate, has more control over the legislature than in any other state. For 
there, if the governor refuses his assent to a bill, it cannot be passed into a law, unless two thirds 
of the house afterwards concur. In New York the same power is given to a Council of Revision, 
consisting of the Governor, the Chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, or any three of 
them, of which the Governor is to be one. In Rhode-Island and Connecticut, whose governments 
were established before the revolution, the Governor has a single vote as a member of the upper 
house, and New Jersey has adopted this part of their constitution. In Georgia the laws are to be 
revised by the Governor and Council, but they can do no more than give their opinion upon 
them. In Maryland the bills are to be signed by the Governor before they can be enacted; and in 
South-Carolina they are to be sealed with the great sea], which is in the Governor's custody. But 
in the first of these states, the constitution prescribes that the Governor shall sign the bills; and in 
the latter, a joint committee of both houses of legislature is to wait upon the chief magistrate to 
receive and return the great seat, which implies that he is bound to deliver it to them, for the 
special purpose of affixing it to the laws of the state. Pennsylvania has proceeded upon a much 
more rational ground, their legislature having a particular seal of their own, and their laws 
requiring only to be signed by the speaker. It in Maryland or South-Carolina a difference should 
ever arise between the legislature and the Governor, and the latter should refuse to sign the laws, 
or to deliver the great seal, the most fatal consequences might ensue. 
Here then we see the great leading principle of the absolute division of the legislative from the 
executive jurisdiction, admitted in almost every one of the American states as a fundamental 
maxim in the politics of a free country. The theory of this general doctrine is everywhere 
established, though a few states have somewhat swerved from it in the practice. From whence we 
must conclude, that even the knowledge and full conviction of a new political truth will not 
always immediately conquer inveterate habits and prejudices. The idea of the negative, which the 
constitution of England gives to the monarch over the proceedings of the other branches of 
parliament, although it has so long become obsolete, has had an effect upon timid minds, and 
upon the minds of those who could not distinguish between the form and spirit of the British 
constitution. They would not grant to the executive branch an absolute negative over the 
legislature, but yet they tried every method to introduce something similar to it. They reprobated 
the doctrine in the most express words, and yet they could not bear to part entirely with it. It is 
curious to observe how many different ways they have endeavored to conciliate truth with 
prejudice. Of those states who have allowed the executive branch to intermeddle with the 
proceedings of the legislature, no two (New Hampshire and Massachusetts excepted) have done 
it exactly in the same manner. They have tried every possible medium, but having lost sight of 
the original principle which they had already established, and which alone could have been their 
safest guide, they groped about in the dark, and could not find any solid ground on which to 
establish a general rule. Like Noah's dove, being once out of the ark of truth, they could not find 
elsewhere a place to rest their feet. 
These facts will no doubt afford an interesting page in the history of the contradictions of the 
human mind. Unfortunately, they do not stand single, and this is not the only instance that we 
find in the constitutions of the different states, of a general principle being expressly declared as 
a part of the natural rights of the citizens, and afterwards being as expressly contradicted in the 
practice. Thus we find it declared in every one of our bills of rights, "that there shall be a perfect 
liberty of conscience, and that no sect shall ever be entitled to a preference over the others." Yet 
in Massachusetts and Maryland, all the officers of government, and in Pennsylvania the members 
of the legislature, are to be of the Christian religion; in New-Jersey, North-Carolina, and 
Georgia, the Protestant, and in Delaware, the trinitarian sects, have an exclusive right to public 
employment; and in South-Carolina the constitution goes so far as to declare the creed of the 
established church. Virginia and New-York are the only states where there is a perfect liberty of 
conscience. I cannot say any thing as to Connecticut and Rhode-Island, as their constitutions are 
silent on the subject, and I have not been informed of their practice. 
Whether these religious restrictions are right or wrong, it is not my intention, nor is it my object 
to examine in the course of these disquisitions. I only meant to show, that in laying down a 
political system it is safer to rely on principles than upon precedents, because the former are -
fixed and immutable, while the latter vary with men, places, times and circumstances. 
WILLIAM PENN
Antifederalist No. 74 THE PRESIDENT AS MILITARY KING
"PHILADELPHIENSIS," who was influenced by Thomas Paine (in "Common Sense), wrote the 
following selection. It is taken from 3 essays which appearing February 6 & 20, and April 9 of 
1788 in either The Freeman's Journal or, The North-American Intelligencer. 
Before martial law is declared to be the supreme law of the land, and your character of free 
citizens be changed to that of the subjects of a military king-which are necessary consequences 
of the adoption of the proposed constitution - let me admonish you in the name of sacred liberty, 
to make a solemn pause. Permit a freeman to address you, and to solicit your attention to a cause 
wherein yourselves and your posterity are concerned. The sun never shone upon a more 
important one. It is the cause of freedom of a whole continent of yourselves and of your fellow 
men. . . . 
A conspiracy against the freedom of America, both deep and dangerous, has been formed by an 
infernal junto of demagogues. Our thirteen free commonwealths are to be consolidated into one 
despotic monarchy. Is not this position obvious? Its evidence is intuitive . . . . Who can deny but 
the president general will be a king to all intents and purposes, and one of the most dangerous 
kind too-a king elected to command a standing army. Thus our laws are to be administered by 
this tyrant; for the whole, or at least the most important part of the executive department is put in 
his hands. 
A quorum of 65 representatives, and of 26 senators, with a king at their head, are to possess 
powers that extend to the lives, the liberties, and property of every citizen of America. This novel 
system of government, were it possible to establish it, would be a compound of monarchy and 
aristocracy, the most accursed that ever the world witnessed. About 50 (these being a quorum) of 
the well born, and a military king, with a standing army devoted to his will, are to have an 
uncontrolled power. . . . 
There is not a tincture of democracy in the proposed constitution, except the nominal elections of 
the president general and the illustrious Congress be supposed to have some color of that nature. 
But this is a mere deception, invented to gull the people into its adoption. Its framers were well 
aware that some appearance of election ought to be observed, especially in regard to the first 
Congress; for without such an appearance there was not the smallest probability of their having it 
organized and set in operation. But let the wheels of this government be once cleverly set in 
motion, and I'll answer for it, that the people shall not be much troubled with future elections, 
especially in choosing their king-the standing army will do that business for them. 
The thoughts of a military officer possessing such powers, as the proposed constitution vests in 
the president general, are sufficient to excite in the mind of a freeman the most alarming 
apprehensions; and ought to rouse him to oppose it at all events. Every freeman of America 
ought to hold up this idea to himself: that he has no superior but God and the laws. But this
tyrant will be so much his superior, that he can at any time he thinks proper, order him out in the 
militia to exercise, and to march when and where he pleases. His officers can wantonly inflict the 
most disgraceful punishment on a peaceable citizen, under pretense of disobedience, or the 
smallest neglect of militia duty. . . . 
The President-general, who is to be our king after this government is established, is vested with 
powers exceeding those of the most despotic monarch we know of in modern times. What a 
handsome return have these men [the authors of the Constitution made to the people of America 
for their confidence! Through the misconduct of these bold conspirators we have lost the most 
glorious opportunity that any country ever had to establish a free system of government. America 
under one purely democratical, would be rendered the happiest and most powerful nation in the 
universe. But under the proposed one composed of an elective king and a standing army, 
officered by his sycophants, the starvelings of the Cincinnati, and an aristocratical Congress of 
the well-born-an iota of happiness, freedom, or national strength cannot exist. What a pitiful 
figure will these ungrateful men make in history; who, for the hopes of obtaining some lucrative 
employment, or of receiving a little more homage from the rest of their fellow creatures, framed 
a system of oppression that must involve in its consequences the misery of their own offspring.... 
Some feeble attempts have been made by the advocates of this system of tyranny, to answer the 
objections made to the smallness of the number of representatives and senators, and the improper 
powers delegated to them. But, as far as I recollect, no one has been found bold enough to stand 
forth in defense of that dangerous and uncontrolled officer, the President-General, or more 
properly, our new King. 
A few pieces under the signature of An American Citizen' were published immediately after the 
Constitution broke the shell, and the hydra made its way from the dark conclave into the open 
light. In the first number the writer, in touching on the President, endeavored to conceal his 
immense powers, by representing the King of Great Britain as possessed of many hereditary 
prerogatives, rights and powers that he was not possessed of; that is, he shows what he is not, but 
neglects to show what he really is. But so flimsy a palliative could scarce escape the censure of 
the most ignorant advocate for such an officer; and since [then] we hear of no further attempts to 
prove the necessity of a King being set over the freemen of America. 
The writer of these essays has clearly proven, that the President is a King to all intents and 
purposes, and at the same time one of the most dangerous kind too - an elective King, the 
commander in chief of a standing army, etc. And to those add, that he has a negative power over 
the proceedings of both branches of the legislature. And to complete his uncontrolled sway, he is 
neither restrained nor assisted by a privy council, which is a novelty in government. I challenge 
the politicians of the whole continent to find in any period of history a monarch more absolute. . . 
. 
PHILADELPHIENSIS
Antifederalist No. 75 A NOTE PROTESTING THE TREATY-
MAKING PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
The following essay was penned anonymously by "HAMPDEN," and it appeared in The 
Pittsburgh Gazette on February 16, 1788. 
.... It may be freely granted, that from a mistaken zeal in favor of that political liberty which was 
so recently purchased at so costly a rate, even good men may give it [the constitution] 
unreasonable opposition; but such men cannot be reasonably charged with sordid personal 
interest as their motive-because it is great and sudden changes which produces opportunities of 
preferment. But that class of men-who either prompted by their own ambition or desperate 
fortunes, are expecting employments under the proposed plan; or those weak and ardent men 
who always expect to be gainers by revolutions, and who are never contented, but always 
hastening from one difficulty to another- may be expected to ascribe every excellence to the 
proposed system, and to urge a thousand reasons for our real or supposed distresses, to induce 
our adopting thereof. Such characters may also be expected to promise us such extravagantly 
flattering advantages to arise from it, as if it was accompanied with such miraculous divine 
energy as divided the Red Sea, and spoke with thunder on Mount Sinai. . . . 
The first clause of the constitution assures us, that the legislative powers shall be vested in a 
Congress, which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives; and in the second clause 
of the second article, it is declared that the president, by and with the consent of the senate, is to 
make treaties. Here the supreme executive magistrate is officially connected with the highest 
branch of the legislature. And in article sixth, clause second, we find that all treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the 
land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of 
any state to the contrary notwithstanding. When we consider the extent of treaties-that in filing 
the tariff of trade, the imposts and port duties generally are or may be fixed by a large 
construction which interested rulers are never at a less to give to any constitutional power-
treaties may be extended to almost every legislative object of the general government. Who is it 
that does not know, that by treaties in Europe the succession and constitution of many sovereign 
states, has been regulated. The partition treaty, and the war of the grand alliance, respecting the 
government of Spain, are well remembered; nor is it long since three neighboring powers 
established a nobleman of that nation upon the throne and regulated and altered the fundamental 
laws of that country, as well as divided the territory thereof, and all this was done by treaty. And 
from this power of making treaties, the house of representatives, which has the best chance of 
possessing virtue, and public confidence, is entirely excluded. Indeed, I see nothing to hinder the 
president and senate, at a convenient crisis, to declare themselves hereditary and supreme, and 
the lower house altogether useless, and to abolish what shadow of the state constitutions remain 
by this power alone; and as the president and senate have all that influence which arises from the 
creating and appointing of all offices and officers, who can doubt but at a proper occasion they 
will succeed in such an attempt? And who can doubt but that men will arise who will attempt it? 
Will the doing so be a more flagrant breach of trust, or a greater degree of violence and perfidy, 
than has already been practised in order to introduce the proposed plan? . . . Of the same kind, 
and full as inconsistent and dangerous, is the first clause of the second article, compared with the 
second clause of the second section. We first find the president fully and absolutely vested with 
the executive power, and presently we find the most important and most influential portion of the 
executive power-e.g., the appointment of all officers-vested in the senate, with whom the 
president only acts as a nominating member. It is on this account that I have said above, that the 
greatest degree of virtue may be expected in the house of representatives; for if any considerable 
part of the executive power be joined with the legislature, it will as surely corrupt that branch 
with which it is combined, as poison will the human body. Therefore, though the small house of 
representatives will consist of the natural aristocracy of the country, as well as the senate, yet not 
being dangerously combined with the executive branch, it has not such certain influential 
inducements to corruption. . . 
It will be asked, no doubt, who is this that dares so boldly to arraign the conduct and censure the 
production of a convention composed of so chosen a band of patriots? To this I answer, that I am 
a freeman, and it is the character of freemen to examine and judge for themselves. They know 
that implicit faith respecting politics is the handmaid to slavery; and that the greatness of those 
names who frame a government, cannot sanctify its faults, nor prevent the evils that result from 
its imperfections. . . . 
With respect to the majority, I do not doubt the testimony of a dignified supporter of the system, 
that they were all, or nearly all, eminent lawyers; but I do doubt the patriotism and political 
virtue of several of the most eminently active of them. But it is not with the men, but with the 
plan to which they gave birth, we have to contend, and to contend with such a degree of 
moderation and firmness, as will best promote political security, shall be the endeavor of 
HAMPDEN
Antifederalist No. 76-77 AN ANTIFEDERALIST VIEW OF 
THE APPOINTING POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
by Richard Henry Lee
. . . . In contemplating the necessary officers of the union, there appear to be six different modes 
in which, in whole or in part, the appointments may be made. 1. by the legislature; 2. by the 
president and the senate; 3. by the president and an executive council; 4. by the president alone; 
5. by the heads of the departments; 6. by the state governments. Among all these, in my opinion, 
there may be an advantageous distribution of the power of appointments. 
In considering the legislators, in relation to the subject before us, two interesting questions 
particularly arise: 1. whether they ought to be eligible to hold any offices whatever during the 
period for which they shall be elected to serve, and even for some time afterwards. 2. how far 
they ought to participate in the power of appointments. As to the first, it is true that legislators in 
foreign countries, or in our state governments, are not generally made ineligible to office. There 
are good reasons for it. In many countries the people have gone on without ever examining the 
principles of government. There have been but few countries in which the legislators have been a 
particular set of men periodically chosen. But the principal reason is, that which operates in the 
several states, viz., the legislators are so frequently chosen, and so numerous, compared with the 
number of offices for which they can reasonably consider themselves as candidates, that the 
chance of any individual member's being chosen, is too small to raise his hopes or expectations, 
or to have any considerable influence upon his conduct. Among the state legislators, one man in 
twenty may be appointed in some committee business, etc., for a month or two; but on a fair 
computation, not one man in a hundred sent to the state legislatures is appointed to any 
permanent office of profit. Directly the reverse of this will evidently be found true in the federal 
administration. Throughout the United States, about four federal senators, and thirty-three 
representatives, averaging the elections, will be chosen in a year. These few men may rationally 
consider themselves as the fairest candidates for a very great number of lucrative offices, which 
must become vacant in the year; and pretty clearly a majority of the federal legislators, if not 
excluded, will be mere expectants for public offices. I need not adduce further arguments to 
establish a position so clear. I need only call to your recollection my observations in a former 
letter, wherein I endeavored to show the fallacy of the argument, that the members must return 
home and mix with the people. It is said, that men are governed by interested motives, and will 
not attend as legislators, unless they can, in common with others, be eligible to offices of honor 
and profit. This will undoubtedly be the case with some men, but I presume only with such men 
as never ought to be chosen legislators in a free country. An opposite principle will influence 
good men. Virtuous patriots, and generous minds, will esteem it a higher honor to be selected as 
the guardians of a free people. They will be satisfied with a reasonable compensation for their 
time and service; nor will they wish to be within the vortex of influence. The valuable effects of 
this principle of making legislators ineligible to offices for a given time, has never yet been 
sufficiently attended to or considered. I am assured that it was established by the convention after 
long debate, and afterwards, on an unfortunate change of a few members, altered. Could the 
federal legislators be excluded in the manner proposed, I think it would be an important point 
gained; as to themselves, they would be left to act much more from motives consistent with the 
public good. In considering the principle of rotation I had occasion to distinguish the condition of 
a legislator from that of a mere official man. We acquire certain habits, feelings, and opinions, as 
men and citizens-others, and very different ones, from a long continuance in office. It is, 
therefore, a valuable observation in many bills of rights, that rulers ought frequently to return and 
mix with the people. A legislature, in a free country, must be numerous; it is in some degree a 
periodical assemblage of the people, frequently formed. The principal officers in the executive 
and judicial departments must have more permanency in office. Hence it may be inferred, that 
the legislature will remain longer uncorrupted and virtuous; longer congenial to the people, than 
the officers of those departments. If it is not, therefore in our power to preserve republican 
principles for a series of ages, in all the departments of government, we may a long while 
preserve them in a well formed legislature. To this end we ought to take every precaution to 
prevent legislators becoming mere office-men; choose them frequently, make them recallable, 
establish rotation among them, make them ineligible to offices, and give them as small a share as 
possible in the disposal of them. Add to this, a legislature in the nature of things is not formed for 
the detail business of appointing officers, there is also generally an impropriety in the same men 
making offices and filling them, and a still greater impropriety in their impeaching and trying the 
officers they appoint. For these and other reasons, I conclude the legislature is not a proper body 
for the appointment of officers in general. But having gone through with the different modes of 
appointment, I shall endeavor to show what share in the distribution of the power of 
appointments the legislature must, from necessity, rather than from propriety, take. 
2. Officers may be appointed by the president and senate. This mode, for general purposes, is 
clearly not defensible. All the reasoning touching the legislature will apply to the senate. The 
senate is a branch of the legislature, which ought to be kept pure and unbiased. It has a part in 
trying officers for misconduct, and in creating offices it is too numerous for a council of 
appointment, or to feel any degree of responsibility. If it has an advantage of the legislature, in 
being the least numerous, it has a disadvantage in being more unsafe; add to this, the senate is to 
have a share in the important branch of power respecting treaties. Further, this sexennial senate 
of 26 members, representing 13 sovereign states, will not in practice be found to be a body to 
advise, but to order and dictate in fact; and the president will be a mere primus inter pares. The 
consequence will be that the senate, with these efficient means of influence, will not only dictate, 
probably, to the president, but manage the house, as the constitution now stands; and under 
appearances of a balanced system, in reality govern alone. There may also, by this undue 
connection, be particular periods when a very popular president may have a very improper 
influence upon the senate and upon the legislature. A council of appointment must very probably 
sit all, or near all, the year. The senate will be too important and too expensive a body for this. 
By giving the senate, directly or indirectly, an undue influence over the representatives, and the 
improper means of fettering, embarrassing, or controlling the president or executive, we give the 
government in the very outset a fatal and pernicious tendency to . . . aristocracy. When we, as a 
circumstance not well to be avoided, admit the senate to a share of power in making treaties, and 
in managing foreign concerns, we certainly progress full far enough towards this most 
undesirable point in government. For with this power, also, I believe, we must join that of 
appointing ambassadors, other foreign ministers, and consuls, being powers necessarily 
connected. In every point of view, in which I can contemplate this subject, it appears extremely 
clear to me, that the senate ought not generally to be a council of appointment. The legislature, 
after the people, is the great fountain of power, and ought to be kept as pure and uncorrupt as 
possible, from the hankerings, biases, and contagion of offices. Then the streams issuing from it 
will be less tainted with those evils. It is not merely the number of impeachments, that are to be 
expected to make public officers honest and attentive in their business. A general opinion must 
pervade the community, that the house, the body to impeach them for misconduct, is 
disinterested, and ever watchful for the public good; and that the judges who shall try 
impeachments, will not feel a shadow of bias. Under such circumstances men will not dare 
transgress, who, not deterred by such accusers and judges, would repeatedly misbehave. We 
have already suffered many and extensive evils, owing to the defects of the confederation, in not 
providing against the misconduct of public officers. When we expect the law to be punctually 
executed, not one man in ten thousand will disobey it. It is the probable chance of escaping 
punishment that induces men to transgress. It is one important means to make the government 
just and honest, rigidly and constantly to hold before the eyes of those who execute it, 
punishment and dismissal from office for misconduct. These are principles no candid man who 
has just ideas of the essential features of a free government will controvert. They are, to be sure, 
at this period, called visionary, speculative and anti-governmental-but in the true style of 
courtiers, selfish politicians, and flatterers of despotism. Discerning republican men of both 
parties see their value. They are said to be of no value by empty boasting advocates for the 
constitution, who, by their weakness and conduct, in fact, injure its cause much more than most 
of its opponents. From their high sounding promises, men are led to expect a defense of it, and to 
have their doubts removed. When a number of long pieces appear, they, instead of the defense, 
etc., they expected, see nothing but a parade of names; volumes written without ever coming to 
the point; cases quoted between which and ours there is not the least similitude; and partial 
extracts made from histories and governments, merely to serve a purpose. Some of them, like the 
true admirers of royal and senatorial robes, would fain prove, that nations who have thought like 
free-men and philosophers about government, and endeavored to be free, have often been the 
most miserable. If a single riot in the course of five hundred years happened in a free country; if 
a salary or the interest of a public or private debt was not paid at the moment-they seem to lay 
more stress upon these trifles (for trifles they are in a free and happy country), than upon the 
oppressions of despotic government for ages together. As to the lengthy writer in New York, I 
have attentively examined his pieces. He appears to be a candid good hearted man, to have a 
good style and some plausible ideas. But when we carefully examine his pieces, to see where the 
strength of them lies-when the mind endeavors to fix on those material parts, which ought to be 
the essence of all voluminous productions-we do not find them. The writer appears constantly to 
move on a smooth surface, the part of his work like the parts of a cob-house, are all equally 
strong and all equally weak, and all like those works of the boys, without an object. His pieces 
appear to have but little relation to the great question, whether the constitution is fitted to the 
condition and character of this people or not. 
But to return. 3. Officers may be appointed by the president and an executive council. When we 
have assigned to the legislature the appointment of a few important officers; to the president and 
senate the appointment of those concerned in managing foreign affairs; to the state governments 
the appointment of militia officers; and authorise the legislature, by legislative acts, to assign to 
the president alone, to the heads of the departments, and courts of law respectively, the 
appointment of many inferior officers-we shall then want to lodge some where a residuum of 
power, a power to appoint all other necessary officers, as established by law. The fittest 
receptacle for this residuary power is clearly, in my opinion, the first executive magistrate, 
advised and directed by an executive council of seven or nine members, periodically chosen 
from such proportional districts as the union may for the purpose be divided into. The people 
may give their votes for twice the number of counsellors wanted, and the federal legislature take 
twice the number also from the highest candidates, and from among them choose the seven or 
nine, or number wanted. Such a council may be rationally formed for the business of 
appointments; whereas the senate, created for other purposes, never can be. Such councils form a 
feature in some of the best executives in the union. They appear to be essential to every first 
magistrate, who may frequently want advice. 
To authorise the president to appoint his own council would be unsafe. To give the sole 
appointment of it to the legislature would confer an undue and unnecessary influence upon that 
branch. Such a council for a year would be less expensive than the senate for four months. The 
president may nominate, and the counsellors always be made responsible for their advice and 
opinions, by recording and signing whatever they advise to be done. They and the president, to 
many purposes, will properly form an independent executive branch; have an influence unmixed 
with the legislative, which the executive never can have while connected with a powerful branch 
of the legislature. And yet the influence arising from the power of appointments be less 
dangerous, because in less dangerous hands-hands properly adequate to possess it. Whereas the 
senate, from its character and situation, will add a dangerous weight to the power itself, and be 
far less capable of responsibility, than the council proposed. There is another advantage: the 
residuum of power as to appointments, which the president and council need possess, is less than 
that the president and senate must have. And as such a council would render the sessions of the 
senate unnecessary many months in the year, the expenses of the government would not be 
increased, if they would not be lessened by the institution of such a council. I think I need not 
dwell upon this article, as the fitness of this mode of appointment will perhaps amply appear by 
the evident unfitness of the others. 
4. Officers may be appointed by the president alone. It has been almost universally found, when 
a man has been authorized to exercise power alone, he has never done it alone; but, generally, 
[was] aided [in] his determinations by, and rested on the advice and opinions of others. And it 
often happens when advice is wanted, the worst men, the most interested creatures obtrude 
themselves, the worst advice is at hand, and misdirects the mind of him who would be informed 
and advised. It is very seldom we see a single executive depend on accidental advice and 
assistance; but each single executive has, almost always, formed to itself a regular council, to be 
assembled and consulted on important occasions. This proves that a select council, of some kind 
is, by experience, generally found necessary and useful. But in a free country, the exercise of any 
considerable branch of power ought to be under some checks and controls. As to this point, I 
think the constitution stands well. The legislature may, when it shall deem it expedient, from 
time to time, authorise the president alone to appoint particular inferior officers; and when 
necessary, to take back the power. His power, therefore, in this respect, may always be increased 
or decreased by the legislature, as experience, the best instructor, shall direct-always keeping 
him, by the constitution, within certain bounds. Officers, in the fifth place, may be appointed by 
the heads of departments or courts of law. Art. 2., Sect. 2., respecting appointments, goes on-
"But congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in 
the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments." The probability is, as 
the constitution now stands, that the Senate, a branch of the legislature, will be tenacious of the 
power of appointment, and much too sparingly part with a share of it to the courts of law, and 
heads of departments. Here again the impropriety appears of the senate's having, generally, a 
share in the appointment of officers. We may fairly assume, that the judges and principal officers 
in the departments will be able well informed men in their respective branches of business; that 
they will, from experience, be best informed as to proper persons to fill inferior offices in them; 
that they will feel themselves responsible for the execution of their several branches of business, 
and for the conduct of the officers they may appoint therein. From these, and other 
considerations, I think we may infer, that impartial and judicious appointments of subordinate 
officers will, generally, be made by the courts of law, and the heads of departments. This power 
of distributing appointments, as circumstances may require, into several hands, in a well formed 
disinterested legislature, might be of essential service not only in promoting beneficial 
appointments, but also in preserving the balance in government. A feeble executive may be 
strengthened and supported by placing in its hands more numerous appointments; an executive 
too influential may be reduced within proper bounds, by placing many of the inferior 
appointments in the courts of law, and heads of departments; nor is there much danger that the 
executive will be wantonly weakened or strengthened by the legislature by thus shifting the 
appointments of inferior officers. Since all must be done by legislative acts which cannot be 
passed without the consent of the executive, or the consent of two- thirds of both branches, a 
good legislature will use this power to preserve the balance and perpetuate the government. Here 
again we are brought to our ultimatum-is the legislature so constructed as to deserve our 
confidence? 
6. Officers may be appointed by the state governments. By Art. 1., Sect. S., the respective states 
are authorised exclusively to appoint the militia officers. This not only lodges the appointments 
in proper places, but it also tends to distribute and lodge in different executive hands the powers 
of appointing to offices, so dangerous when collected into the hands of one or a few men. 
It is a good general rule, that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, ought to be kept 
distinct. But this, like other general rules, has its exceptions; and without these exceptions we 
cannot form a good government, and properly balance its parts. And we can determine only from 
reason, experience and a critical inspection of the parts of the government, how far it is proper to 
intermix those powers. Appointments, I believe, in all mixed governments, have been assigned to 
different hands-some are made by the executive, some by the legislature, some by the judges, 
and some by the people. It has been thought advisable by the wisest nations-that the legislature 
should so far exercise executive and judicial powers as to appoint some officers judge of the 
elections of its members, and impeach and try officers for misconduct; that the executive should 
have a partial share in legislation; and that judges should appoint some subordinate officers, and 
regulate so far as to establish rules for their own proceedings. Where the members of the 
government, as the house, the senate, the executive, and judiciary, are strong and complete, each 
in itself, the balance is naturally produced; each party may take the powers congenial to it, and 
we have less need to be anxious about checks, and the subdivision of powers. 
If after making the deductions already alluded to, from the general power to appoint federal 
officers, the residuum shall be thought to be too large and unsafe, and to place an undue 
influence in the hands of the president and council, a further deduction may be made, with many 
advantages and perhaps with but a few inconveniencies-and that is, by giving the appointment of 
a few great officers to the legislature-as of the commissioners of the treasury, of the comptroller, 
treasurer, master coiner, and some of the principal officers in the money department; of the 
sheriffs or marshalls of the United States; of states attorneys, secretary of the home department, 
and secretary of war; perhaps of the judges of the supreme court; of major generals and admirals. 
The appointments of these officers, who may be at the heads of the great departments of 
business, in carrying into execution the national system, involve in them a variety of 
considerations. They will not often occur and the power to make them ought to remain in safe 
hands. Officers of the above description are appointed by the legislatures in some of the states, 
and in some not. We may, I believe, presume that the federal legislature will possess sufficient
knowledge and discernment to make judicious appointments. However, as these appointments by 
the legislature tend to increase a mixture of power, to lessen the advantages of impeachments and 
responsibility, I would by no means contend for them any further than it may be necessary for 
reducing the power of the executive within the bounds of safety. 
THE FEDERAL FARMER
Antifederalist No. 78-79 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY 
(PART I)
Part I is taken from the first part of the "Brutus's" 15th essay of The New-York Journal on March 
20, 1788; 
Part II is part one of his 16th of the New York Journal of April 10, 1788. 
The supreme court under this constitution would be exalted above all other power in the 
government, and subject to no control. The business of this paper will be to illustrate this, and to 
show the danger that will result from it. I question whether the world ever saw, in any period of 
it, a court of justice invested with such immense powers, and yet placed in a situation so little 
responsible. Certain it is, that in England, and in the several states, where we have been taught to 
believe the courts of law are put upon the most prudent establishment, they are on a very 
different footing. 
The judges in England, it is true, hold their offices during their good behavior, but then their 
determinations are subject to correction by the house of lords; and their power is by no means so 
extensive as that of the proposed supreme court of the union. I believe they in no instance 
assume the authority to set aside an act of parliament under the idea that it is inconsistent with 
their constitution. They consider themselves bound to decide according to the existing laws of 
the land, and never undertake to control them by adjudging that they are inconsistent with the 
constitution-much less are they vested with the power of giv[ing an] equitable construction to the 
constitution. 
The judges in England are under the control of the legislature, for they are bound to determine 
according to the laws passed under them. But the judges under this constitution will control the 
legislature, for the supreme court are authorised in the last resort, to determine what is the extent 
of the powers of the Congress. They are to give the constitution an explanation, and there is no 
power above them to set aside their judgment. The framers of this constitution appear to have 
followed that of the British, in rendering the judges independent, by granting them their offices 
during good behavior, without following the constitution of England, in instituting a tribunal in 
which their errors may be corrected; and without adverting to this, that the judicial under this 
system have a power which is above the legislative, and which indeed transcends any power 
before given to a judicial by any free government under heaven. 
I do not object to the judges holding their commissions during good behavior. I suppose it a 
proper provision provided they were made properly responsible. But I say, this system has 
followed the English government in this, while it has departed from almost every other principle 
of their jurisprudence, under the idea, of rendering the judges independent; which, in the British 
constitution, means no more than that they hold their places during good behavior, and have 
fixed salaries . . . [the authors of the constitution] have made the judges independent, in the 
fullest sense of the word. There is no power above them, to control any of their decisions. There 
is no authority that can remove them, and they cannot be controlled by the laws of the 
legislature. In short, they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power 
under heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of 
heaven itself. Before I proceed to illustrate the truth of these reflections, I beg liberty to make 
one remark. Though in my opinion the judges ought to hold their offices during good behavior, 
yet I think it is clear, that the reasons in favor of this establishment of the judges in England, do 
by no means apply to this country. 
The great reason assigned, why the judges in Britain ought to be commissioned during good 
behavior, is this, that they may be placed in a situation, not to be influenced by the crown, to give 
such decisions as would tend to increase its powers and prerogatives. While the judges held their 
places at the will and pleasure of the king, on whom they depended not only for their offices, but 
also for their salaries, they were subject to every undue influence. If the crown wished to carry a 
favorite point, to accomplish which the aid of the courts of law was necessary, the pleasure of the 
king would be signified to the judges. And it required the spirit of a martyr for the judges to 
determine contrary to the king's will. They were absolutely dependent upon him both for their 
offices and livings. The king, holding his office during life, and transmitting it to his posterity as 
an inheritance, has much stronger inducements to increase the prerogatives of his office than 
those who hold their offices for stated periods or even for life. Hence the English nation gained a 
great point, in favor of liberty, when they obtained the appointment of the judge, during good 
behavior. They got from the crown a concession which deprived it of one of the most powerful 
engines with which it might enlarge the boundaries of the royal prerogative and encroach on the 
liberties of the people. But these reasons do not apply to this country. We have no hereditary 
monarch; those who appoint the judges do not hold their offices for life, nor do they descend to 
their children. The same arguments, therefore, which will conclude in favor of the tenure of the 
judge's offices for good behavior, lose a considerable part of their weight when applied to the 
state and condition of America. But much less can it be shown, that the nature of our government 
requires that the courts should be placed beyond all account more independent, so much so as to 
be above control. 
I have said that the judges under this system will be independent in the strict sense of the word. 
To prove this I will show that there is no power above them that can control their decisions, or 
correct their errors. There is no authority that can remove them from office for any errors or want 
of capacity, or lower their salaries, and in many cases their power is superior to that of the 
legislature. 
1st. There is no power above them that can correct their errors or control their decisions. The 
adjudications of this court are final and irreversible, for there is no court above them to which 
appeals can lie, either in error or on the merits. In this respect it differs from the courts in 
England, for there the house of lords is the highest court, to whom appeals, in error, are carried 
from the highest of the courts of law. 
2nd. They cannot be removed from office or suffer a diminution of their salaries, for any error in 
judgment [due] to want of capacity. It is expressly declared by the constitution, "That they shall 
at stated times receive a compensation for their services which shall not be diminished during 
their continuance in office." 
The only clause in the constitution which provides for the removal of the judges from offices, is 
that which declares, that "the president, vice- president, and all civil officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors." By this paragraph, civil officers, in which the judges are 
included, are removable only for crimes. Treason and bribery are named, and the rest are 
included under the general terms of high crimes and misdemeanors. Errors in judgment, or want 
of capacity to discharge the duties of the office, can never be supposed to be included in these 
words, high crimes and misdemeanors. A man may mistake a case in giving judgment, or 
manifest that he is incompetent to the discharge of the duties of a judge, and yet give no evidence 
of corruption or want of integrity. To support the charge, it will be necessary to give in evidence 
some facts that will show, that the judges committed the error from wicked and corrupt motives. 
3d. The power of this court is in many cases superior to that of the legislature. I have showed, in 
a former paper, that this court will be authorised to decide upon the meaning of the constitution; 
and that, not only according to the natural and obvious meaning of the words, but also according 
to the spirit and intention of it. In the exercise of this power they will not be subordinate to, but 
above the legislature. For all the departments of this government will receive their powers, so far 
as they are expressed in the constitution, from the people immediately, who are the source of 
power. The legislature can only exercise such powers as are given them by the constitution; they 
cannot assume any of the rights annexed to the judicial; for this plain reason, that the same 
authority which vested the legislature with their powers, vested the judicial with theirs. Both are 
derived from the same source; both therefore are equally valid, and the judicial hold their powers 
independently of the legislature, as the legislature do of the judicial. The supreme court then 
have a right, independent of the legislature, to give a construction to the constitution and every 
part of it, and there is no power provided in this system to correct their construction or do it 
away. If, therefore, the legislature pass any laws, inconsistent with the sense the judges put upon 
the constitution, they will declare it void; and therefore in this respect their power is superior to 
that of the legislature. In England the judges are not only subject to have their decisions set aside 
by the house of lords, for error, but in cases where they give an explanation to the laws or 
constitution of the country contrary to the sense of the parliament -though the parliament will not 
set aside the judgment of the court-yet, they have authority, by a new law, to explain the former 
one, and by this means to prevent a reception of such decisions. But no such power is in the 
legislature. The judges are supreme and no law, explanatory of the constitution, will be binding 
on them. 
When great and extraordinary powers are vested in any man, or body of men, which in their 
exercise, may operate to the oppression of the people, it is of high importance that powerful 
checks should be formed to prevent the abuse of it. 
Perhaps no restraints are more forcible, than such as arise from responsibility to some superior 
power. Hence it is that the true policy of a republican government is, to frame it in such manner, 
that all persons who are concerned in the government, are made accountable to some superior for 
their conduct in office. This responsibility should ultimately rest with the people. To have a 
government well administered in all its parts, it is requisite the different departments of it should 
be separated and lodged as much as may be in different hands. The legislative power should be 
in one body, the executive in another, and the judicial in one different from either. But still each 
of these bodies should be accountable for their conduct. Hence it is impracticable, perhaps, to 
maintain a perfect distinction between these several departments. For it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to call to account the several officers in government, without in some degree mixing 
the legislative and judicial. The legislature in a free republic are chosen by the people at stated 
periods, and their responsibility consists, in their being amenable to the people. When the term 
for which they are chosen shall expire, who [the people) will then have opportunity to displace 
them if they disapprove of their conduct. But it would be improper that the judicial should be 
elective, because their business requires that they should possess a degree of law knowledge, 
which is acquired only by a regular education; and besides it is fit that they should be placed, in a 
certain degree in an independent situation, that they may maintain firmness and steadiness in 
their decisions. As the people therefore ought not to elect the judges, they cannot be amenable to 
them immediately, some other mode of amenability must therefore be devised for these, as well 
as for all other officers which do not spring from the immediate choice of the people. This is to 
be effected by making one court subordinate to another, and by giving them cognizance of the 
behavior of all officers. But on this plan we at last arrive at some supreme, over whom there is 
no power to control but the people themselves. This supreme controlling power should be in the 
choice of the people, or else you establish an authority independent, and not amenable at all, 
which is repugnant to the principles of a free government. Agreeable to these principles I 
suppose the supreme judicial ought to be liable to be called to account, for any misconduct, by 
some body of men, who depend upon the people for their places; and so also should all other 
great officers in the State, who are not made amenable to some superior officers.... 
BRUTUS
Antifederalist No. 80 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY 
(PART II)
From the 11th essay of "Brutus" taken from The New-York Journal, January 31, 1788. 
The nature and extent of the judicial power of the United States, proposed to be granted by the 
constitution, claims our particular attention. 
Much has been said and written upon the subject of this new system on both sides, but I have not 
met with any writer who has discussed the judicial powers with any degree of accuracy. And yet 
it is obvious, that we can gain but very imperfect ideas of the manner in which this government 
will work, or the effect it will have in changing the internal police and mode of distributing 
justice at present subsisting in the respective states, without a thorough investigation of the 
powers of the judiciary and of the manner in which they will operate. This government is a 
complete system, not only for making, but for executing laws. And the courts of law, which will 
be constituted by it, are not only to decide upon the constitution and the laws made in pursuance 
of it, but by officers subordinate to them to execute all their decisions. The real effect of this 
system of government, will therefore be brought home to the feelings of the people, through the 
medium of the judicial power. It is, moreover, of great importance, to examine with care the 
nature and extent of the judicial power, because those who are to be vested with it, are to be 
placed in a situation altogether unprecedented in a free country. They are to be rendered totally 
independent, both of the people and the legislature, both with respect to their offices and salaries. 
No errors they may commit can be corrected by any power above them, if any such power there 
be, nor can they be removed from office for making ever so many erroneous adjudications. 
The only causes for which they can be displaced, is, conviction of treason, bribery, and high 
crimes and misdemeanors. 
This part of the plan is so modelled, as to authorize the courts, not only to carry into execution 
the powers expressly given, but where these are wanting or ambiguously expressed, to supply 
what is wanting by their own decisions. 
That we may be enabled to form a just opinion on this subject, I shall, in considering it, lst. 
Examine the nature and extent of the judicial powers, and 2nd. Inquire, whether the courts who 
are to exercise them, are so constituted as to afford reasonable ground of confidence, that they 
will exercise them for the general good. 
With a regard to the nature and extent of the judicial powers, I have to regret my want of 
capacity to give that full and minute explanation of them that the subject merits. To be able to do 
this, a man should be possessed of a degree of law knowledge far beyond what I pretend to. A 
number of hard words and technical phrases are used in this part of the system, about the 
meaning of which gentlemen learned in the law differ. Its advocates know how to avail 
themselves of these phrases. In a number of instances, where objections are made to the powers 
given to the judicial, they give such an explanation to the technical terms as to avoid them. 
Though I am not competent to give a perfect explanation of the powers granted to this 
department of the government, I shall yet attempt to trace some of the leading features of it, from 
which I presume it will appear, that they will operate to a total subversion of the state judiciaries, 
if not to the legislative authority of the states. 
In article 3d, sect. 2d, it is said, "The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity 
arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their authority, etc." The first article to which this power extends is, all cases in law 
and equity arising under this constitution. 
What latitude of construction this clause should receive, it is not easy to say. At first view, one 
would suppose, that it meant no more than this, that the courts under the general government 
should exercise, not only the powers of courts of law, but also that of courts of equity, in the
manner in which those powers are usually exercised in the different states. But this cannot be the 
meaning, because the next clause authorises the courts to take cognizance of all cases in law and 
equity arising under the laws of the United States; this last article, I conceive, conveys as much 
power to the general judicial as any of the state courts possess. 
The cases arising under the constitution must be different from those arising under the laws, or 
else the two clauses mean exactly the same thing. The cases arising under the constitution must 
include such, as bring into question its meaning, and will require an explanation of the nature and 
extent of the powers of the different departments under it. This article, therefore, vests the 
judicial with a power to resolve all questions that may arise on any case on the construction of 
the constitution, either in law or in equity. 
lst. They are authorised to determine all questions that may arise upon the meaning of the 
constitution in law. This article vests the courts with authority to give the constitution a legal 
construction, or to explain it according to the rules laid down for construing a law. These rules 
give a certain degree of latitude of explanation. According to this mode of construction, the 
courts are to give such meaning to the constitution as comports best with the common, and 
generally received acceptation of the words in which it is expressed, regarding their ordinary and 
popular use, rather than their grammatical propriety. Where words are dubious, they will be 
explained by the context. The end of the clause will be attended to, and the words will be 
understood, as having a view to it; and the words will not be so understood as to bear no meaning 
or a very absurd one. 
2nd. The judicial are not only to decide questions arising upon the meaning of the constitution in 
law, but also in equity. By this they are empowered, to explain the constitution according to the 
reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter. "From this method of 
interpreting laws (says Blackstone) by the reason of them, arises what we call equity"; which is 
thus defined by Grotius, "the correction of that, wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is 
deficient; for since in laws all cases cannot be foreseen, or expressed, it is necessary, that when 
the decrees of the law cannot be applied to particular cases, there should somewhere be a power 
vested of defining those circumstances, which had they been foreseen the legislator would have 
expressed. . . ." The same learned author observes, "That equity, thus depending essentially upon 
each individual case, there can be no established rules and fixed principles of equity laid down, 
without destroying its very essence, and reducing it to a positive law." 
From these remarks, the authority and business of the courts of law, under this clause, may be 
understood. 
They [the courts] will give the sense of every article of the constitution, that may from time to 
time come before them. And in their decisions they will not confine themselves to any fixed or 
established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and spirit of 
the constitution. The opinions of the supreme court, whatever they may be, will have the force of 
law; because there is no power provided in the constitution that can correct their errors, or 
control their adjudications. From this court there is no appeal. And I conceive the legislature 
themselves, cannot set aside a judgment of this court, because they are authorised by the 
constitution to decide in the last resort. The legislature must be controlled by the constitution, 
and not the constitution by them. They have therefore no more right to set aside any judgment 
pronounced upon the construction of the constitution, than they have to take from the president, 
the chief command of the army and navy, and commit it to some other person. The reason is 
plain; the judicial and executive derive their authority from the same source, that the legislature 
do theirs; and therefore in all cases, where the constitution does not make the one responsible to, 
or controllable by the other, they are altogether independent of each other. 
The judicial power will operate to effect, in the most certain, but yet silent and imperceptible 
manner, what is evidently the tendency of the constitution: I mean, an entire subversion of the 
legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual states. Every adjudication of the 
supreme court, on any question that may arise upon the nature and extent of the general 
government, will affect the limits of the state jurisdiction. In proportion as the former enlarge the 
exercise of their powers, will that of the latter be restricted. 
That the judicial power of the United States, will lean strongly in favor of the general 
government, and will give such an explanation to the constitution, as will favor an extension of 
its jurisdiction, is very evident from a variety of considerations. 
lst. The constitution itself strongly countenances such a mode of construction. Most of the 
articles in this system, which convey powers of any considerable importance, are conceived in 
general and indefinite terms, which are either equivocal, ambiguous, or which require long 
definitions to unfold the extent of their meaning. The two most important powers committed to 
any government, those of raising money, and of raising and keeping up troops, have already been 
considered, and shown to be unlimited by any thing but the discretion of the legislature. The 
clause which vests the power to pass all laws which are proper and necessary, to carry the 
powers given into execution, it has been shown, leaves the legislature at liberty, to do everything, 
which in their judgment is best. It is said, I know, that this clause confers no power on the 
legislature, which they would not have had without it-though I believe this is not the fact, Yet, 
admitting it to be, it implies that the constitution is not to receive an explanation strictly 
according to its letter; but more power is implied than is expressed. And this clause, if it is to be 
considered as explanatory of the extent of the powers given, rather than giving a new power, is to 
be understood as declaring that in construing any of the articles conveying power, the spirit, 
intent and design of the clause should be attended to, as welt as the words in their common 
acceptation. 
This constitution gives sufficient color for adopting an equitable construction, if we consider the 
great end and design it professedly has in view. These appear from its preamble to be, "to form a 
more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common 
defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and 
posterity." The design of this system is here expressed, and it is proper to give such a meaning to 
the various parts, as will best promote the accomplishment of the end; this idea suggests itself 
naturally upon reading the preamble, and will countenance the court in giving the several articles 
such a sense, as will the most effectually promote the ends the constitution had in view. How this 
manner of explaining the constitution will operate in practice, shall be the subject of future 
inquiry. 
2nd. Not only will the constitution justify the courts in inclining to this mode of explaining it, but 
they will be interested in using this latitude of interpretation. Every body of men invested with 
office are tenacious of power; they feel interested, and hence it has become a kind of maxim, to 
hand down their offices, with all its rights and privileges, unimpaired to their successors. The 
same principle will influence them to extend their power, and increase their rights; this of itself 
will operate strongly upon the courts to give such a meaning to the constitution in all cases where 
it can possibly be done, as will enlarge the sphere of their own authority. Every extension of the 
power of the general legislature, as well as of the judicial powers, will increase the powers of the 
courts; and the dignity and importance of the judges, will be in proportion to the extent and 
magnitude of the powers they exercise. I add, it is highly probable the emolument of the judges 
will be increased, with the increase of the business they will have to transact and its importance. 
From these considerations the judges will be interested to extend the powers of the courts, and to 
construe the constitution as much as possible, in such a way as to favor it; and that they will do 
it, appears probable. 
3rd. Because they [the courts] will have precedent to plead, to justify them in it [extending their 
powers]. It is well known, that the courts in England, have by their authority, extended their 
jurisdiction far beyond the limits set them in their original institution, and by the laws of the 
land. 
The court of exchequer is a remarkable instance of this. It was originally intended principally to 
recover the king's debts, and to order the revenues of the crown. It had a common law 
jurisdiction, which was established merely for the benefit of the king's accountants. We learn 
from Blackstone, that the proceedings in this court are grounded on a writ called quo minus, in 
which the plaintiff suggests, that he is the king's farmer or debtor, and that the defendant hath 
done him the damage complained of, by which he is less able to pay the king. These suits, by the 
statute of Rutland, are expressly directed to be confined to such matters as specially concern the 
king, or his ministers in the exchequer. And by the articuli super cartas, it is enacted, that no 
common pleas be thenceforth held in the exchequer contrary to the form of the great charter. But 
now any person may sue in the exchequer. The surmise of being debtor to the king being matter 
of form, and mere words of course, the court is open to all the nation. 
When the courts will have a precedent before them of a court which extended its jurisdiction in 
opposition to an act of the legislature, is it not to be expected that they will extend theirs, 
especially when there is nothing in the constitution expressly against it? And they are authorised 
to construe its meaning, and are not under any control. 
This power in the judicial, will enable them to mould the government, into any shape they 
please. The manner in which this may be effected we will hereafter examine. 
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In my last, I showed, that the judicial power of the United States under the first clause of the 
second section of article eight, would be authorised to explain the constitution, not only 
according to its letter, but according to its spirit and intention; and having this power, they would 
strongly incline to give it such a construction as to extend the powers of the general government, 
as much as possible, to the diminution, and finally to the destruction, of that of the respective 
states. 
I shall now proceed to show how this power will operate in its exercise to effect these purposes. . 
. . First, let us inquire how the judicial power will effect an extension of the legislative authority. 
Perhaps the judicial power will not be able, by direct and positive decrees, ever to direct the 
legislature, because it is not easy to conceive how a question can be brought before them in a 
course of legal discussion, in which they can give a decision, declaring, that the legislature have 
certain powers which they have not exercised, and which, in consequence of the determination of 
the judges, they will be bound to exercise. But it is easy to see, that in their adjudication they 
may establish certain principles, which being received by the legislature will enlarge the sphere 
of their power beyond all bounds. 
It is to be observed, that the supreme court has the power, in the last resort, to determine all 
questions that may arise in the course of legal discussion, on the meaning and construction of the 
constitution. This power they will hold under the constitution, and independent of the legislature. 
The latter can no more deprive the former of this right, than either of them, or both of them 
together, can take from the president, with the advice of the senate, the power of making treaties, 
or appointing ambassadors. 
In determining these questions, the court must and will assume certain principles, from which 
they will reason, in forming their decisions. These principles, whatever they may be, when they 
become fixed by a course of decisions, will be adopted by the legislature, and will be the rule by 
which they will explain their own powers. This appears evident from this consideration, that if 
the legislature pass laws, which, in the judgment of the court, they are not authorised to do by the 
constitution, the court will not take notice of them; for it will not be denied, that the constitution 
is the highest or supreme law. And the courts are vested with the supreme and uncontrollable 
power, to determine in all cases that come before them, what the constitution means. They 
cannot, therefore, execute a law, which in their judgment, opposes the constitution, unless we 
can suppose they can make a superior law give way to an inferior. The legislature, therefore, will 
not go over the limits by which the courts may adjudge they are confined. And there is little 
room to doubt but that they will come up to those bounds, as often as occasion and opportunity 
may offer, and they may judge it proper to do it. For as on the one hand, they will not readily 
pass taws which they know the courts will not execute, so on the other, we may be sure they will 
not scruple to pass such as they know they will give effect, as often as they may judge it proper. 
From these observations it appears, that the judgment of the judicial, on the constitution, will 
become the rule to guide the legislature in their construction of their powers. 
What the principles are, which the courts will adopt, it is impossible for us to say. But taking up 
the powers as I have explained them in my last number, which they will possess under this 
clause, it is not difficult to see, that they may, and probably will, be very liberal ones. 
We have seen, that they will be authorized to give the constitution a construction according to its 
spirit and reason, and not to confine themselves to its letter. 
To discover the spirit of the constitution, it is of the first importance to attend to the principal 
ends and designs it has in view. These are expressed in the preamble, in the following words, 
viz., "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish 
justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general 
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish 
this constitution," etc. If the end of the government is to be learned from these words, which are 
clearly designed to declare it, it is obvious it has in view every object which is embraced by any 
government. The preservation of internal peace-the due admission of justice-and to provide for 
the defense of the community-seems to include all the objects of government. But if they do not, 
they are certainly comprehended in the words, "to provide for the general welfare." If it be 
further considered, that this constitution, if it is ratified, will not be a compact entered into by 
states, in their corporate capacities, but an agreement of the people of the United States as one 
great body politic, no doubt can remain but that the great end of the constitution, if it is to be 
collected from the preamble, in which its end is declared, is to constitute a government which is 
to extend to every case for which any government is instituted, whether external or internal. The 
courts, therefore, will establish this as a principle in expounding the constitution, and will give 
every part of it such an explanation as will give latitude to every department under it, to take 
cognizance of every matter, not only that affects the general and national concerns of the union, 
but also of such as relate to the administration of private justice, and to regulating the internal 
and local affairs of the different parts. 
Such a rule of exposition is not only consistent with the general spirit of the preamble, but it will 
stand confirmed by considering more minutely the different clauses of it. 
The first object declared to be in view, is "To form a more perfect union." It is to be observed, it 
is not an union of states or bodies corporate; had this been the case the existence of the state 
governments might have been secured. But it is a union of the people of the United States 
considered as one body, who are to ratify this constitution if it is adopted. Now to make a union 
of this kind perfect, it is necessary to abolish all inferior governments, and to give the general 
one complete legislative, executive and judicial powers to every purpose. The courts therefore 
will establish it as a rule in explaining the constitution; to give it such a construction as will best 
tend to perfect the union or take from the state governments every power of either making or 
executing laws. The second object is "to establish justice." This must include not only the idea of 
instituting the rule of justice, or of making laws which shall be the measure or rule of right, but 
also of providing for the application of this rule or of administering justice under it. And under 
this the courts will in their decisions extend the power of the government to all cases they 
possibly can, or otherwise they will be restricted in doing what appears to be the intent of the 
constitution they should do, to wit, pass laws and provide for the execution of them, for the 
general distribution of justice between man and man. Another end declared is "to insure domestic 
tranquility." This comprehends a provision against all private breaches of the peace, as well as 
against all public commotions or general insurrections; and to attain the object of this clause 
fully, the government must exercise the power of passing laws in these subjects, as well as of 
appointing magistrates with authority to execute them. And the courts will adopt these ideas in 
their expositions. I might proceed to the other clause, in the preamble, and it would appear by a 
consideration of all of them separately, as it does by taking them together, that if the spirit of this 
system is to be known from its declared end and design in the preamble, its spirit is to subvert 
and abolish all the powers of the state governments, and to embrace every object to which any 
government extends. 
As it sets out in the preamble with this declared intention, so it proceeds in the different parts 
with the same idea. Any person, who will peruse the 5th section with attention, in which most of 
the powers are enumerated, will perceive that they either expressly or by implication extend to 
almost every thing about which any legislative power can be employed. If this equitable mode of 
construction is applied to this part of the constitution, nothing can stand before it. 
This will certainly give the first clause in that article a construction which I confess I think the 
most natural and grammatical one, to authorise the Congress to do any thing which in their 
judgment will tend to provide for the general welfare, and this amounts to the same thing as 
general and unlimited powers of legislation in all cases. 
This same manner of explaining the constitution, will fix a meaning, and a very important one 
too, to the 12th clause of the same section, which authorises the Congress to make all laws which 
shall be proper and necessary for carrying into effect the foregoing powers, etc. A voluminous 
writer in favor of this system, has taken great pains to convince the public, that this clause means 
nothing: for that the same powers expressed in this, are implied in other parts of the constitution. 
Perhaps it is so, but still this will undoubtedly be an excellent auxiliary to assist the courts to 
discover the spirit and reason of the constitution, and when applied to any and every of the other 
clauses granting power, will operate powerfully in extracting the spirit from them. 
I might instance a number of clauses in the constitution, which, if explained in an equitable 
manner, would extend the powers of the government to every case, and reduce the state 
legislatures to nothing. But, I should draw out my remarks to an undue length, and I presume 
enough has been said to show, that the courts have sufficient ground in the exercise of this 
power, to determine, that the legislature have no bounds set to them by this constitution, by any 
supposed right the legislatures of the respective states may have to regulate any of their local 
concerns. 
I proceed, 2nd, to inquire, in what manner this power will increase the jurisdiction of the courts. 
I would here observe, that the judicial power extends, expressly, to all civil cases that may arise 
save such as arise between citizens of the same state, with this exception to those of that 
description, that the judicial of the United States have cognizance of cases between citizens of 
the same state, claiming lands -under grants of different states. Nothing more, therefore, is 
necessary to give the courts of law, under this constitution, complete jurisdiction of all civil 
causes, but to comprehend cases between citizens of the same state not included in the foregoing 
exception. 
I presume there will be no difficulty in accomplishing this. Nothing more is necessary than to set 
forth in the process, that the party who brings the suit is a citizen of a different state from the one 
against whom the suit is brought and there can be little doubt but that the court will take 
cognizance of the matter. And if they do, who is to restrain them? Indeed, I will freely confess, 
that it is my decided opinion, that the courts ought to take cognizance of such causes under the 
powers of the constitution. For one of the great ends of the constitution is, "to establish justice." 
This supposes that this cannot be done under the existing governments of the states; and there is 
certainly as good reason why individuals, living in the same state, should have justice, as those 
who live in different states. Moreover, the constitution expressly declares, that "the citizens of 
each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states," It 
will therefore be no fiction, for a citizen of one state to set forth, in a suit, that he is a citizen of 
another; for he that is entitled to all the privileges and immunities of a country, is a citizen of that 
country. And in truth, the citizen of one state will, under this constitution, be a citizen of every 
state.... 
It is obvious that these courts will have authority to decide upon the validity of the laws of any of 
the states, in all cases where they come in question before them. Where the constitution gives the 
general government exclusive jurisdiction, they will adjudge all laws made by the states, in such 
cases, void ab inilio. Where the constitution gives them concurrent jurisdiction, the laws of the 
United States must prevail, because they are the supreme law. In such cases, therefore, the laws 
of the state legislatures must be repealed, restricted, or so construed, as to give full effect to the 
laws of the union on the same subject. From these remarks it is easy to see, that in proportion as 
the general government acquires power and jurisdiction, by the liberal construction which the 
judges may give the constitution, those of the states will lose their rights, until they become so 
trifling and unimportant, as not to be worth having. I am much mistaken, if this system will not 
operate to effect this with as much celerity, as those who have the administration of it will think 
prudent to suffer it. The remaining objections of the judicial power shall be considered in a 
future paper. 
The second paragraph of sect. 2, art. 3, is in these words: "In all cases affecting ambassadors, 
other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the supreme court 
shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the supreme court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such 
regulations as the Congress shall make." 
Although it is proper that the courts of the general government should have cognizance of all 
matters affecting ambassadors, foreign ministers, and consuls, yet I question much the propriety 
of giving the supreme court original jurisdiction in all cases of this kind. 
Ambassadors, and other public ministers, claim, and are entitled by the law of nations, to certain 
privileges, and exemptions, both for their persons and their servants. The meanest servant of an 
ambassador is exempted by the law of nations from being sued for debt. Should a suit be brought 
against such an one by a citizen, through inadvertency or want of information, he will be subject 
to an action in the supreme court. All the officers concerned in issuing or executing the process 
will be liable to like actions. Thus may a citizen of a state be compelled, at great expense and 
inconveniency, to defend himself against a suit, brought against him in the supreme court, for 
inadvertently commencing an action against the most menial servant of an ambassador for a just 
debt. 
The appellate jurisdiction granted to the supreme court, in this paragraph, has justly been 
considered as one of the most objectionable parts of the constitution. Under this power, appeals 
may be had from the inferior courts to the supreme, in every case to which the judicial power 
extends, except in the few instances in which the supreme court will have original jurisdiction. 
By this article, appeals will lie to the supreme court, in all criminal as well as civil causes. This I 
know, has been disputed by some; but I presume the point will appear clear to any one, who will 
attend to the connection of this paragraph with the one that precedes it. In the former, all the 
cases, to which the power of the judicial shall extend, whether civil or criminal, are enumerated. 
There is no criminal matter, to which the judicial power of the United States will extend, but 
such as are included under some one of the cases specified in this section. For this section is 
intended to define all cases, of every description, to which the power of the judicial shall reach. 
But in all these cases it is declared, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, except in 
those which affect ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state 
shall be a party. If then this section extends the power of the judicial, to criminal cases, it allows 
appeals in such cases. If the power of the judicial is not extended to criminal matters by this 
section, I ask, by what part of this system does it appear, that they have any cognizance of them? 
I believe it is a new and unusual thing to allow appeals in criminal matters. It is contrary to the 
sense of our laws, and dangerous to our lives and liberties. . . . As our taw now stands, a person 
charged with a crime has a right to a fair and impartial trial by a jury of his country, and their 
verdict is final. If be is acquitted no other court can call upon him to answer for the same crime. 
But by this system, a man may have had ever so fair a trial, have been acquitted by ever so 
respectable a jury of his country, and still the officer of the government who prosecutes may 
appeal to the supreme court. The whole matter may have a second hearing. By this means, 
persons who may have disobliged those who execute the general government, may be subjected 
to intolerable oppression. They may be kept in long and ruinous confinement, and exposed to 
heavy and insupportable charges, to procure the attendance of witnesses, and provide the means 
of their defense, at a great distance from their places of residence. 
I can scarcely believe there can be a considerate citizen of the United States that will approve of 
this appellate jurisdiction, as extending to criminal cases, if they will give themselves time for 
reflection. 
Whether the appellate jurisdiction as it respects civil matters, will not prove injurious to the 
rights of the citizens, and destructive of those privileges which have ever been held sacred by 
Americans, and whether it will not render the administration of justice intolerably burdensome, 
intricate, and dilatory, will best appear, when we have considered the nature and operation of this 
power. 
It has been the fate of this clause, as it has of most of those against which unanswerable 
objections have been offered, to be explained different ways, by the advocates and opponents to 
the constitution. I confess I do not know what the advocates of the system would make it mean, 
for I have not been fortunate enough to see in any publication this clause taken up and 
considered. It is certain however, they do not admit the explanation which those who oppose the 
constitution give it, or otherwise they would not so frequently charge them with want of candor, 
for alleging that it takes away the trial by jury. Appeals from an inferior to a superior court, as 
practised in the civil law courts, are well understood. In these courts, the judges determine both 
on the law and the fact; and appeals are allowed from the inferior to the superior courts, on the 
whole merits; the superior tribunal will re-examine all the facts as well as the law, and frequently 
new facts will be introduced, so as many times to render the cause in the court of appeals very 
different from what it was in the court below. 
If the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, be understood in the above sense, the term is 
perfectly intelligible. The meaning then is, that in an the civil case enumerated, the supreme 
court shall have authority to reexamine the whole merits of the case, both with respect to the 
facts and the law which may arise under it, without the intervention of a jury; that this is the 
sense of this part of the system appears to me clear, from the express words of it, "in all the other 
cases before mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and 
fact, etc." Who are the supreme court? Does it not consist of the judges? . . . They will therefore 
have the same authority to determine the fact as they will have to determine the law, and no 
room is left for a jury on appeals to the supreme court. 
If we understand the appellate jurisdiction in any other way, we shall be left utterly at a loss to 
give it a meaning. The common law is a, stranger to any such jurisdiction: no appeals can lie 
from any of our common law courts, upon the merits of the case. The only way in which they 
can go up from an inferior to a superior tribunal is by habeas corpus before a hearing, or by 
certiorari, or writ of error, after they are determined in the subordinate courts. But in no case, 
when they are carried up, are the facts re-examined, but they are always taken as established in 
the inferior court. 
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It may still be insisted that this clause [on appellate jurisdiction] does not take away the trial by 
jury on appeals, but that this may be provided for by the legislature, under that paragraph which 
authorises them to form regulations and restrictions for the court in the exercise of this power. 
The natural meaning of this paragraph seems to be no more than this, that Congress may declare, 
that certain cases shall not be subject to the appellate jurisdiction, and they may point out the 
mode in which the court shall proceed in bringing up the causes before them, the manner of their 
taking evidence to establish the facts, and the method of the court's proceeding. But I presume 
they cannot take from the court the right of deciding on the fact, any more than they can deprive 
them of the right of determining on the law, when a cause is once before them; for they have the 
same jurisdiction as to fact, as they have as to the law. But supposing the Congress may under 
this clause establish the trial by jury on appeals. It does not seem to me that it will render this 
article much less exceptionable. An appeal from one court and jury, to another court and jury, is 
a thing altogether unknown in the laws of our state [New York], and in most of the states in the 
union. A practice of this kind prevails in the eastern states: actions are there commenced in the 
inferior courts, and an appeal lies from them on the whole merits to the superior courts. The 
consequence is well known. Very few actions are determined in the lower courts; it is rare that a 
case of any importance is not carried by appeal to the supreme court, and the jurisdiction of the 
inferior courts is merely nominal; this has proved so burdensome to the people in Massachusetts, 
that it was one of the principal causes which excited the insurrection in that state, in the year 
past. [There are] very few sensible and moderate men in that state but what will admit, that the 
inferior courts are almost entirely useless, and answer very little purpose, save only to 
accumulate costs against the poor debtors who are already unable to pay their just debts. 
But the operation of the appellate power in the supreme judicial of the United States, would work 
infinitely more mischief than any such power can do in a single state. 
The trouble and expense to the parties would be endless and intolerable. No man can say where 
the supreme court are to hold their sessions; the presumption is, however, that it must be at the 
seat of the general government. In this case parties must travel many hundred miles, with their 
witnesses and lawyers, to prosecute or defend a suit. No man of middling fortune, can sustain the 
expense of such a law suit, and therefore the poorer and middling class of citizens will be under 
the necessity of submitting to the demands of the rich and the lordly, in cases that will come 
under the cognizance of this court. If it be said, that to prevent this oppression, the supreme court 
will sit in different parts of the union, it may be replied, that this would only make the oppression 
somewhat more tolerable, but by no means so much as to give a chance of justice to the poor and 
middling class. It is utterly impossible that the supreme court can move into so many different 
parts of the Union, as to make it convenient or even tolerable to attend before them with 
witnesses to try causes from every part of the United States. If to avoid the expense and 
inconvenience of calling witnesses from a great distance, to give evidence before the supreme 
court, the expedient of taking the deposition of witnesses in writing should be adopted, it would 
not help the matter. It is of great importance in the distribution of justice that witnesses should be 
examined face to face, that the parties should have the fairest opportunity of cross examining 
them in order to bring out the whole truth. There is something in the manner in which a witness 
delivers his testimony which can not be committed to paper, and which yet very frequently gives 
a complexion to his evidence, very different from what it would bear if committed to writing. 
Besides, the expense of taking written testimony would be, enormous. Those who are acquainted 
with the costs that arise in the courts, where all the evidence is taken in writing, well know that 
they exceed beyond all comparison those of the common law courts, where witnesses are 
examined viva voce. 
The costs accruing in courts generally advance with the grade of the courts. Thus the charges 
attending a suit in our common pleas, is much less than those in the supreme court, and these are 
much lower than those in the court of chancery. Indeed, the costs in the last mentioned court, are 
in many cases so exorbitant and the proceedings so dilatory that the suitor had almost as well 
give up his demand as to prosecute his suit. We have just reason to suppose, that the costs in the 
supreme general court will exceed either of our courts. The officers of the general court will be 
more dignified than those of the states, the lawyers of the most ability will practice in them, and 
the trouble and expense of attending them will be greater. From all these considerations, it 
appears, that the expense attending suits in the supreme court will be so great, as to put it out of 
the power of the poor and middling class of citizens to contest a suit in it. 
From these remarks it appears, that the administration of justice under the powers of the judicial 
will be dilatory; that it will be attended with such an heavy expense as to amount to little short of 
a denial of justice to the poor and middling class of people who in every government stand most 
in need of the protection of the law; and that the trial by jury, which has so justly been the boast 
of our forefathers as well as ourselves is taken away under them. 
These extraordinary powers in this court are the more objectionable, because there does not 
appear the least necessity for them, in order to secure a due and impartial distribution of justice. 
The want of ability or integrity, or a disposition to render justice to every suitor, has not been 
objected against the courts of the respective states. So far as I have been informed, the courts of 
justice in all the states have ever been found ready to administer justice with promptitude and 
impartiality according to the laws of the land. It is true in some of the states, paper money has 
been made, and the debtor authorised to discharge his debts with it, at a depreciated value; in 
others, tender laws have been passed, obliging the creditor to receive on execution other property 
than money in discharge of his demand; and in several of the states laws have been made 
unfavorable to the creditor and tending to render property insecure. 
But these evils have not happened from any defect in the judicial departments of the states. The 
courts indeed are bound to take notice of these laws, and so will the courts of the general 
government be under obligation to observe the laws made by the general legislature not 
repugnant to the constitution. But so far have the judicial been from giving undue latitude of 
construction to laws of this kind, that they have invariably strongly inclined to the other side. All 
the acts of our legislature, which have been charged with being of this complexion, have 
uniformly received the strictest construction by the judges, and have been extended to no cases 
but to such as came within the strict letter of the law. In this way, have our courts, I will not say 
evaded the law, but so limited its operation as to work the least possible injustice. The same 
thing has taken place in Rhode-Island, which has justly rendered herself infamous, by 
tenaciously adhering to her paper money system. The judges there gave a decision, in opposition 
to the words of the statute, on this principle: that a construction according to the words of it 
would contradict the fundamental maxims of their laws and constitution. 
No pretext therefore can be formed, from the conduct of the judicial courts [of the states], which 
will justify giving such powers to the supreme general court. For their decisions have been such 
as to give just ground of confidence in them, that they will finally adhere to the principles of 
rectitude; and there is no necessity of lodging these powers in the [federal] courts, in order to 
guard against the evils justly complained of, on the subject of security of property under this 
constitution. For it has provided, "that no state shall emit bills of credit, or make any thing but 
gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts." It has also declared, that "no state shall pass 
any law impairing the obligation of contracts." These prohibitions give the most perfect security 
against those attacks upon property which I am sorry to say some of the states have but too 
wantonly made, . . . For "this constitution will be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in 
every state will be bound thereby; any thing in the constitution and laws of any state to the 
contrary notwithstanding." 
The courts of the respective states might therefore have been securely trusted with deciding all 
cases between man and man, whether citizens of the same state or of different states, or between 
foreigners and citizens. Indeed, for ought I see, every case that can arise under the constitution or 
laws of the United States ought in the first instance to be tried in the court of the state, except 
those which might arise b@tween states, such as respect ambassadors, or other public ministers, 
and perhaps such as call in question the claim of lands under grants from different states. The 
state courts would be under sufficient control, if writs of error were allowed from the state courts 
to the supreme court of the union, according to the practice of the courts in England and of this 
state, on all cases in which the laws of the union are concerned, and perhaps to all cases in which 
a foreigner is a party. 
This method would preserve the good old way of administering justice, would bring justice to 
every man's door, and preserve the inestimable right of trial by jury. It would be following, as 
near as our circumstances will admit, the practice of the courts in England, which is almost the 
only thing I would wish to copy in their government. 
But as this system now stands, there is to be as many inferior courts as Congress may see fit to 
appoint, who are to be authorised to originate and in the first instance to try all the cases falling 
under the description of this article. There is no security that a trial by jury shall be had in these 
courts, but the trial here will soon become, as it is in Massachusetts' inferior courts, [a] mere 
matter of form; for an appeal may be had to the supreme court on the whole merits. This court is 
to have power to determine in law and in equity, on the law and the fact, and this court is exalted 
above all other power in the government, subject to no control; and so fixed as not to be 
removable, but upon impeachment, which is much the same thing as not to be removable at all. 
To obviate the objections made to the judicial power, it has been said, that the Congress, in 
forming the regulations and exceptions which they are authorised to make respecting the 
appellate jurisdiction, will make provision against all the evils which are apprehended from this 
article. On this I would remark, that this way of answering the objection made to the power, 
implies an admission that the power is in itself improper without restraint; and if so, why not 
restrict it in the first instance. 
The just way of investigating any power given to a government, is to examine its operation 
supposing it to be put in exercise. If upon inquiry, it appears that the power, if exercised, would 
be prejudicial, it ought not to be given. For to answer objections made to a power given to a 
government, by saying it will never be exercised, is really admitting that the power ought not to 
be exercised, and therefore ought not to be granted. 
I have, in the course of my observation on this constitution, affirmed and endeavored to show, 
that it was calculated to abolish entirely the state governments, and to melt down the states into 
one entire government, for every purpose as well internal and local, as external and national. In 
this opinion the opposers of the system have generally agreed - and this has been uniformly 
denied by its advocates in public. Some individuals indeed, among them, will confess that it has 
this tendency, and scruple not to say it is what they wish; and I will venture to predict, without 
the spirit of prophecy, that if it is adopted without amendments, or some such precautions as will 
insure amendments immediately after its adoption, that the same gentlemen who have employed 
their talents and abilities with such success to influence the public mind to adopt this plan, will 
employ the same to persuade the people, that it will be for their good to abolish the state 
governments as useless and burdensome. 
Perhaps nothing could have been better conceived to facilitate the abolition of the state 
governments than the constitution of the judicial. They will be able to extend the limits of the 
general government gradually, and by insensible degrees, and to accommodate themselves to the 
temper of the people. Their decisions on the meaning of the constitution will commonly take 
place in cases which arise between individuals, with which the public will not be generally 
acquainted. One adjudication will form a precedent to the next, and this to a following one. 
These cases will immediately affect individuals only, so that a series of determinations will 
probably take place before even the people will be informed of them. In the meantime all the art 
and address of those who wish for the change will be employed to make converts to their 
opinion. The people will be told that their state officers, and state legislatures, are a burden and 
expense without affording any solid advantage; that all the laws passed by them might be equally 
well made by the general legislature. If to those who will be interested in the change, be added 
those who will be under their influence, and such who will submit to almost any change of 
government which they can be persuaded to believe will ease them of taxes, it is easy to see the 
party who will favor the abolition of the state governments would be far from being 
inconsiderable. In this situation, the general legislature might pass one law after another, 
extending the general and abridging the state jurisdictions, and to sanction their proceedings 
would have a course of decisions of the judicial to whom the constitution has committed the 
power of explaining the constitution. If the states remonstrated, the constitutional mode of 
deciding upon the validity of the law is with the supreme court; and neither people, nor state 
legislatures, nor the general legislature can remove them or reverse their decrees. Had the 
construction of the constitution been less [more?] with the legislature, they would have explained 
it at their peril. If they exceed[ed] their powers, or sought to find in the spirit of the constitution, 
more than was expressed in the letter, the people from whom they derived their power could 
remove them, . . . Indeed, I can see no other remedy that the people can have against their rulers 
for encroachments of this nature. A constitution is a compact of a people with their rulers; if the 
rulers break the compact, the people have a right and ought to remove them and do themselves 
justice. But in order to enable them to do this with the greater facility, those whom the people 
choose at stated periods should have the power in the last resort to determine the sense of the 
compact. If they determine contrary to the understanding of the people, an appeal will lie to the 
people at the period when the rulers are to be elected, and they will have it in their power to 
remedy the evil. But when this power is lodged in the hands of men independent of the people, 
and of their representatives, and who are not constitutionally accountable for their opinions, no 
way is left to control them but with a high hand and an outstretched arm. 
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. . . . in all those cases, where the general government has jurisdiction in civil questions, the 
proposed Constitution not only makes no provision for the trial by jury in the first instance, but, 
by its appellate jurisdiction, absolutely takes away that inestimable privilege, since it expressly 
declares the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact. Should, 
therefore, a jury be adopted in the inferior court, it would only be a needless expense, since, on 
an appeal, the determination of that jury, even on questions of fact, however honest and upright, 
is to be of no possible effect. The Supreme Court is to take up all questions of fact; to examine 
the evidence relative thereto; to decide upon them, in the same manner as if they had never been 
tried by a jury. Nor is trial by jury secured in criminal cases. It is true that, in the first instance, in 
the inferior court, the trial is to be by jury. In this, and in this only, is the difference between 
criminal and civil cases. But, sir, the appellate jurisdiction extends, as I have observed, to cases 
criminal, as well as civil, and on the appeal the court is to decide not only on the law but on the 
fact. If, therefore, even in criminal cases, the general government is not satisfied with the verdict 
of the jury, its officer may remove the prosecution to the Supreme Court; and there the verdict of 
the jury is to be of no effect, but the judges of this court are to decide upon the fact as well as the 
law, the same as in civil cases. 
Thus, sir, jury trials, which have ever been the boast of the English constitution-which have been 
by our several state constitutions so cautiously secured to us-jury trials, which have so long been 
considered the surest barrier against arbitrary power, and the palladium of liberty, with the loss 
of which the loss of our freedom may be dated, are taken away by the proposed form of 
government, not only in a great variety of questions between individual and individual, but in 
every case, whether civil or criminal, arising under the laws of the United States, or the 
execution of those laws. It is taken away in those very cases where, of all others, it is most 
essential for our liberty to have it sacredly guarded and preserved: in every case, whether civil or 
criminal, between government and its officers on the one part, and the subject or citizen on the 
other. Nor was this the effect of inattention, nor did it arise from any real difficulty in 
establishing and securing jury trials by the proposed Constitution if the Convention had wished 
to do so; but the same reason influenced here as in the case of the establishment of the inferior 
courts. As they could not trust state judges, so would they not confide in state juries. They 
alleged that the general government and the state governments would always be at variance-that 
the citizens of the different states would enter into the views and interests of their respective 
states, and therefore ought not to be trusted in determining causes in which the general 
government was any way interested, without giving the general government an opportunity, if it 
disapproved the verdict of the jury, to appeal, and to have the facts examined into again, and 
decided upon by its own judges, on whom it was thought a reliance might be had by the general 
government, they being appointed under its authority. Thus, sir, in consequence of this appellate 
jurisdiction, and its extension to facts as well as to law, every arbitrary act of the general 
government, and every oppression of all that variety of officers appointed under its authority for 
the collection of taxes, duties, impost, excise, and other purposes, must be submitted to by the 
individual, or must be opposed with little prospect of success, and almost a certain prospect of 
ruin, at least in those cases where the middle and common class of citizens are interested. Since, 
to avoid that oppression, or to obtain redress, the application must be made to one of the courts 
of the United States-by good fortune, should this application be in the first instance attended with 
success, and should damages be recovered equivalent to the injury sustained, an appeal lies to the 
Supreme Court, in which case the citizen must at once give up his cause, or he must attend to it 
at the distance, perhaps, of more than a thousand miles from the place of his residence, and must 
take measures to procure before that court, on the appeal, all the evidence necessary to support 
his action, which, even if ultimately prosperous, must be attended with a loss of time, a neglect 
of business, and an expense, which will be greater than the original grievance, and to which men 
in moderate circumstances would be utterly unequal. 
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When a building is to be erected which is intended to stand for ages, the foundation should be 
firmly laid. The Constitution proposed to your acceptance is designed, not for yourselves alone, 
but for generations yet unborn. The principles, therefore, upon which the social compact is 
founded, ought to have been clearly and precisely stated, and the most express and full 
declaration of rights to have been made. But on this subject there is almost an entire silence. 
If we may collect the sentiments of the people of America, from their own most solemn 
declarations, they hold this truth as self-evident, that all men are by nature free. No one man, 
therefore, or any class of men, have a right, by the law of nature, or of God, to assume or 
exercise authority over their fellows. The origin of society, then, is to be sought, not in any 
natural right which one man has to exercise authority over another, but in the united consent of 
those who associate. The mutual wants of men at first dictated the propriety of forming societies: 
and when they were established, protection and defense pointed out the necessity of instituting 
government. In a state of nature every individual pursues his own interest; in this pursuit it 
frequently happened, that the possessions or enjoyments of one were sacrificed to the views and 
designs of another; thus the weak were a prey to the strong, the simple and unwary were subject 
to impositions from those who were more crafty and designing. In this state of things, every 
individual was insecure; common interest, therefore, directed that government should be 
established, in which the force of the whole community should be collected, and under such 
directions, as to protect and defend every one who composed it. The common good, therefore, is 
the end of civil government, and common consent, the foundation on which it is established. To 
effect this end, it was necessary that a certain portion of natural liberty should be surrendered, in 
order that what remained should be preserved. How great a proportion of natural freedom is 
necessary to be yielded by individuals, when they submit to government, I shall not inquire. So 
much, however, must be given, as will be sufficient to enable those to whom the administration 
of the government is committed, to establish laws for the promoting the happiness of the 
community, and to carry those laws into effect. But it is not necessary, for this purpose, that 
individuals should relinquish all their natural rights. Some are of such a nature that they cannot 
be surrendered. Of this kind are the rights of conscience, the right of enjoying and defending life, 
etc. Others are not necessary to be resigned in order to attain the end for which government is 
instituted; these therefore ought not to be given up. To surrender them, would counteract the very 
end of government, to wit, the common good. From these observations it appears, that in forming 
a government on its true principles, the foundation should be laid in the manner I before stated, 
by expressly reserving to the people such of their essential rights as are not necessary to be 
parted with. The same reasons which at first induced mankind to associate and institute 
government, will operate to influence them to observe this precaution. If they had been disposed 
to conform themselves to the rule of immutable righteousness, government would not have been 
requisite. It was because one part exercised fraud, oppression and violence, on the other, that 
men came together, and agreed that certain rules should be formed to regulate the conduct of all, 
and the power of the whole community lodged in the hands of rulers to enforce an obedience to 
them. But rulers have the same propensities as other men; they are as likely to use the power 
with which they are vested, for private purposes, and to the injury and oppression of those over 
whom they are placed, as individuals in a state of nature are to injure and oppress one another. It 
is therefore as proper that bounds should be set to their authority, as that government should have 
at first been instituted to restrain private injuries. 
This principle, which seems so evidently founded in the reason and nature of things, is confirmed 
by universal experience. Those who have governed, have been found in all ages ever active to 
enlarge their powers and abridge the public liberty. This has induced the people in all countries, 
where any sense of freedom remained, to fix barriers against the encroachments of their rulers. 
The country from which we have derived our origin, is an eminent example of this. Their magna 
charta and bill of rights have long been the boast, as well as the security of that nation. I need say 
no more, I presume, to an American, than that this principle is a fundamental one, in all the 
Constitutions of our own States; there is not one of them but what is either founded on a 
declaration or bill of rights, or has certain express reservation of rights interwoven in the body of 
them. From this it appears, that at a time when the pulse of liberty beat high, and when an appeal 
was made to the people to form Constitutions for the government of themselves, it was their 
universal sense, that such declarations should make a part of their frames of government. It is, 
therefore, the more astonishing, that this grand security to the rights of the people is not to be 
found in this Constitution. 
It has been said, in answer to this objection, that such declarations of rights, however requisite 
they might be in the Constitutions of the States, are not necessary in the general Constitution, 
because, "in the former case, every thing which is not reserved is given; but in the latter, the 
reverse of the proposition prevails, and every thing which is not given is reserved." It requires 
but little attention to discover, that this mode of reasoning is rather specious than solid. The 
powers, rights and authority, granted to the general government by this Constitution, are as 
complete, with respect to every object to which they extend, as that of any State government-it 
reaches to every thing which concerns human happiness-life, liberty, and property are under its 
control. There is the same reason, therefore, that the exercise of power, in this case, should be 
restrained within proper limits, as in that of the State governments. To set this matter in a clear 
light, permit me to instance some of the articles of the bills of rights of the individual States, and 
apply them to the case in question. 
For the security of life, in criminal prosecutions, the bills of rights of most of the States have 
declared, that no man shall be held to answer for a crime until he is made fully acquainted with 
the charge brought against him; he shall not be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against 
himself-the witnesses against him shall be brought face to face, and he shall be fully heard by 
himself or counsel. That it is essential to the security of life and liberty, that trial of facts be in 
the vicinity where they happen. Are not provisions of this kind as necessary in the general 
government, as in that of a particular State? The powers vested in the new Congress extend in 
many cases to life; they are authorized to provide for the punishment of a variety of capital 
crimes, and no restraint is laid upon them in its exercise, save only, that "the trial of all crimes, 
except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be in the State where the 
said crimes shall have been committed." No man is secure of a trial in the county where he is 
charged to have committed a crime; he may be brought from Niagara to New York, or carried 
from Kentucky to Richmond for trial for an offense supposed to be committed. What security is 
there, that a man shall be furnished with a full and plain description of the charges against him? 
That he shall be allowed to produce all proof he can in his favor? That he shall see the witnesses 
against him face to face, or that he shall be fully heard in his own defense by himself or counsel? 
For the security of liberty it has been declared, "that excessive bail should not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted. That all warrants, without 
oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or seize any person, his papers or property, are 
grievous and oppressive." 
These provisions are as necessary under the general government as under that of the individual 
States; for the power of the former is as complete to the purpose of requiring bail, imposing 
fines, inflicting punishments, granting search warrants, and seizing persons, papers, or property, 
in certain cases, as the other. 
For the purpose of securing the property of the citizens, it is declared by all the States, "that in all 
controversies at law, respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best 
securities of the rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable." 
Does not the same necessity exist of reserving this right under their national compact, as in that 
of the States? Yet nothing is said respecting it. In the bills of rights of the States it is declared, 
that a well regulated militia is the proper and natural defense of a free government; that as 
standing armies in time of peace are dangerous, they are not to be kept up, and that the military 
should be kept under strict subordination to, and controlled by, the civil power. 
The same security is as necessary in this Constitution, and much more so; for the general 
government will have the sole power to raise and to pay armies, and are under no control in the 
exercise of it; yet nothing of this is to be found in this new system. 
I might proceed to instance a number of other rights, which were as necessary to be reserved, 
such as, that elections should be free, that the liberty of the press should be held sacred; but the 
instances adduced are sufficient to prove that this argument is without foundation. Besides, it is 
evident that the reason here assigned was not the true one, why the framers of this Constitution 
omitted a bill of rights; if it had been, they would not have made certain reservations, while they 
totally omitted others of more importance. We find they have, in the ninth section of the first 
article declared, that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in cases of 
rebellion,-that no bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, shall be passed,-that no title of nobility 
shall be granted by the United States, etc. If every thing which is not given is reserved, what 
propriety is there in these exceptions? Does this Constitution any where grant the power of 
suspending the habeas corpus, to make ex post facto laws, pass bills of attainder, or grant titles of 
nobility? It certainly does not in express terms. The only answer that can be given is, that these 
are implied in the general powers granted. With equal truth it may be said, that all the powers 
which the bills of rights guard against the abuse of, are contained or implied in the general ones 
granted by this Constitution. 
So far is it from being true, that a bill of rights is less necessary in the general Constitution than 
in those of the States, the contrary is evidently the fact. This system, if it is possible for the 
people of America to accede to it, will be an original compact; and being the last wilt, in the 
nature of things, vacate every former agreement inconsistent with it. For it being a plan of 
government received and ratified by the whole people, all other forms which are in existence at 
the time of its adoption, must yield to it. This is expressed in positive and unequivocal terms in 
the sixth article: "That this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any thing in the Constitution, or laws of any State, to the contrary notwithstanding." 
"The senators and representatives before-mentioned, and the members of the several State 
legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States, and of the several 
States, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution." 
It is therefore not only necessarily implied thereby, but positively expressed, that the different 
State Constitutions are repealed and entirely done away, so far as they are inconsistent with this, 
with the laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, or with treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the authority of the United States. Of what avail will the Constitutions of the 
respective States be to preserve the rights of its citizens? Should they be pled, the answer would 
be, the Constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, is the supreme 
law, and all legislatures and judicial officers, whether of the General or State governments, are 
bound by oath to support it. No privilege, reserved by the bills of rights, or secured by the State 
governments, can limit the power granted by this, or restrain any laws made in pursuance of it. It 
stands, therefore, on its own bottom, and must receive a construction by itself, without any 
reference to any other. And hence it was of the highest importance, that the most precise and 
express declarations and reservations of rights should have been made. 
This will appear the more necessary, when it is considered, that not only the Constitution and 
laws made in pursuance thereof, but alt treaties made, under the authority of the United States, 
are the supreme law of the land, and supersede the Constitutions of all the States. The power to 
make treaties, is vested in the president, by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the 
senate. I do not find any limitation or restriction to the exercise of this power. The most 
important article in any Constitution may therefore be repealed, even without a legislative act. 
Ought not a government, vested with such extensive and indefinite authority, to have been 
restricted by a declaration of rights? It certainly ought. 
So clear a point is this, that I cannot help suspecting that persons who attempt to persuade people 
that such reservations were less necessary under this Constitution than under those of the States, 
are wilfully endeavoring to deceive, and to lead you into an absolute state of vassalage. 
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. . . . It is agreed, the plan is defective-that some of the powers granted are dangerous-others not 
well defined-and amendments are necessary why then not amend it? Why not remove the cause 
of danger, and, possible, even the apprehension of it? The instrument is yet in the hands of the 
people; it is not signed, sealed, and delivered, and they have power to give it any form they 
please. 
But it is contended, adopt it first, and then amend it. I ask, why not amend, and then adopt it? 
Most certainly the latter mode of proceeding is more consistent with our ideas of prudence in the 
ordinary concerns of life If men were about entering into a contract respecting their private 
concerns it would be highly absurd in them to sign and seal an instrument containing stipulations 
which are contrary to their interests and wishes, under the expectation, that the parties, after its 
execution, would agree to make alteration agreeable to their desire. They would insist upon the 
exceptionable clause being altered before they would ratify the contract. And is a compact for the
government of ourselves and our posterity of less moment than contract between individuals? 
Certainly not. But to this reasoning, which at first vie would appear to admit of no reply, a 
variety of objections are made, and number of reasons urged for adopting the system, and 
afterwards proposing amendments. Such as have come under my observation, I shall state, an 
remark upon. 
It is insisted, that the present situation of our country is such, as not t admit of a delay in forming 
a new government, or of time sufficient to deliberate and agree upon the amendments which are 
proper, without involving ourselves in a state of anarchy and confusion. 
On this head, all the powers of rhetoric, and arts of description, ar employed to paint the 
condition of this country, in the most hideous an frightful colors. We are told, that agriculture is 
without encouragement trade is languishing; private faith and credit are disregarded, and public 
credit is prostrate; that the laws and magistrates are condemned and set at naught; that a spirit of 
licentiousness is rampant, and ready to break over every bound set to it by the government; that 
private embarrassments and distresses invade the house of every man of middling property, and 
insecurity threatens every man in affluent circumstances: in short, that we are in a state of the 
most grievous calamity at home, and that we are contemptible abroad, the scorn of foreign 
nations, and the ridicule of the world. From this high wrought picture, one would suppose that 
we were in a condition the most deplorable of any people upon earth. But suffer me, my 
countrymen, to call your attention to a serious and sober estimate of the situation in which you 
are placed, while I trace the embarrassments under which you labor, to their true sources, What 
is your condition? Does not every man sit under his own vine and under his own fig-tree, having 
none to make him afraid? Does not every one follow his calling without impediments and 
receive the reward of his well-earned industry? The farmer cultivates his land, and reaps the fruit 
which the bounty of heaven bestows on his honest toil. The mechanic is exercised in his art, and 
receives the reward of his labor. The merchant drives his commerce, and none can deprive him 
of the gain he honestly acquires; all classes and callings of men amongst us are protected in their 
various pursuits, and secured by the laws in the possession and enjoyment of the property 
obtained in those pursuits. The laws are as well executed as they ever were, in this or any other 
country. Neither the hand of private violence, nor the more to be dreaded hand of legal 
oppression, are reached out to distress us. 
It is true, many individuals labor under embarrassments, but these are to be imputed to the 
unavoidable circumstances of things, rather than to any defect in our governments. We have just 
emerged from a long and expensive war. During its existence few people were in a situation to 
increase their fortunes, but many to diminish them. Debts contracted before the war were left 
unpaid while it existed, and these were left a burden too heavy to be home at the commencement 
of peace. Add to these, that when the war was over, too many of us, instead of reassuming our 
old habits of frugality, and industry, by which alone every country must be placed in a 
prosperous condition, took up the profuse use of foreign commodities. The country was deluged 
with articles imported from abroad, and the cash of the country has been sent to pay for them, 
and still left us laboring under the weight of a huge debt to persons abroad. These are the true 
sources to which we are to trace all the private difficulties of individuals. But will a new 
government relieve you from these? ... Your present condition is such as is common to take place 
after the conclusion of a war. Those who can remember our situation after the termination of the 
war preceding the last, will recollect that our condition was similar to the present, but time and 
industry soon recovered us from it. Money was scarce, the produce of the country much lower 
than it has been since the peace, and many individuals were extremely embarrassed with debts; 
and this happened although we did not experience the ravages, desolations, and loss of property, 
that were suffered during the late war. 
With regard to our public and national concerns, what is there in our condition that threatens us 
with any immediate danger? We are at peace with all the world; no nation menaces us with war; 
nor are we called upon by any cause of sufficient importance to attack any nation. The state 
governments answer the purposes of preserving the peace, and providing for present exigencies. 
Our condition as a nation is in no respect worse than it has been for several years past. Our 
public debt has been lessened in various ways, and the western territory, which has been relied 
upon as a productive fund to discharge the national debt has at length been brought to market, 
and a considerable part actually applied to its reduction. I mention these things to show, that 
there is nothing special, in our present situation, as it respects our national affairs, that should 
induce us to accept the proffered system, without taking sufficient time to consider and amend it. 
I do not mean by this, to insinuate, that our government does not stand in need of reform. It is 
admitted by all parties, that alterations are necessary in our federal constitution, but the 
circumstances of our case do by no means oblige us to precipitate this business, or require that 
we should adopt a system materially defective. We may safely take time to deliberate and 
amend, without in the meantime hazarding a condition, in any considerable degree, worse than 
the present. 
But it is said that if we postpone the ratification of this system until the necessary amendments 
are first incorporated, the consequence will be a civil war among the states. . . . The idea of [New 
York] being attacked by the other states, will appear visionary and chimerical, if we consider that 
tho' several of them have adopted the new constitution, yet the opposition to it has been 
numerous and formidable. The eastern states from whom we are told we have most to fear, 
should a civil war be blown up, would have full employ to keep in awe those who are opposed to 
it in their own governments. Massachusetts, after a long and dubious contest in their convention, 
has adopted it by an inconsiderable majority, and in the very act has marked it with a stigma in 
its present form. No man of candor, judging from their public proceedings, will undertake to say 
on which side the majority of the people are. Connecticut, it is true, have acceded to it, by a large 
majority of their convention; but it is a fact well known, that a large proportion of the yeomanry 
of the country are against it. And it is equally true, that a considerable part of those who voted 
for it in the convention, wish to see it altered. In both these states the body of the common 
people, who always do the fighting of a country, would be more likely to fight against than for it. 
Can it then be presumed, that a country divided among themselves, upon a question where even 
the advocates for it, admit the system they contend for needs amendments, would make war upon 
a sister state? . . . The idea is preposterous. . . 
The reasonings made use of to persuade us, that no alterations can be agreed upon previous to the 
adoption of the system, are as curious as they are futile. It is alleged, that there was great 
diversity of sentiments in forming the proposed constitution; that it was the effect of mutual 
concessions and a spirit of accommodation, and from hence it is inferred, that further changes 
cannot be hoped for. I should suppose that the contrary inference was the fair one. If the 
convention, who framed this plan, were possessed of such a spirit of moderation and 
condescension, as to be induced to yield to each other certain points, and to accommodate 
themselves to each other's opinions, and even prejudices, there is reason to expect, that this same 
spirit will continue and prevail in a future convention, and produce an union of sentiments on the 
points objected to. There is more reason to hope for this, because the subject has received a full 
discussion, and the minds of the people much better known than they were when the convention 
sat. Previous to the meeting of the convention, the subject of a new form of government had been 
little thought of, and scarcely written upon at all. It is true, it was the general opinion, that some 
alterations were requisite in the federal system. This subject had been contemplated by almost 
every thinking man in the union. It had been the subject of many well- written essays, and it was 
the anxious wish of every true friend to America. But it was Dever in the contemplation of one in 
a thousand of those who had reflected on the matter, to have an entire change in the nature of our 
federal government-to alter it from a confederation of states, to that of one entire government, 
which will swallow up that of the individual states. I will venture to say, that the idea of a 
government similar to the one proposed, never entered the minds of the legislatures who 
appointed the convention, and of but very few of the members who composed it, until they had 
assembled and heard it proposed in that body: much less had the people any conception of such a 
plan until after it was promulgated, While it was agitated, the debates of the convention were 
kept an impenetrable secret, and no opportunity was given for well informed men to offer their 
sentiments upon the subject. The system was therefore never publicly discussed, nor indeed 
could be, because it was not known to the people until after it was proposed. Since then, it has 
been the object of universal attention-it has been thought of by every reflecting man-been 
discussed in a public and private manner, in conversation and in print; its defects have been 
pointed out, and every objection to it stated; able advocates have written in its favor, and able 
opponents have written against it. And what is the result? It cannot be denied but that the general 
opinion is, that it contains material errors, and requires important amendments. This then being 
the general sentiment, both of the friends and foes of the system, can it be doubted, that another 
convention would concur in such amendments as would quiet the fears of the opposers, and 
effect a great degree of union on the subject? -- An event most devoutly to be wished. But it is 
further said, that there can be no prospect of procuring alterations before it is acceded to, because 
those who oppose it do not agree among themselves with respect to the amendments that are 
necessary. To this I reply, that this may be urged against attempting alterations after it is 
received, with as much force as before; and therefore, if it concludes anything, it is that we must 
receive any system of government proposed to us, because those who object to it do not entirely 
concur in their objections. But the assertion is not true to any considerable extent. There is a 
remarkable uniformity in the objections made to the constitution, on the most important points. It 
is also worthy of notice, that very few of the matters found fault with in it, are of a local nature, 
or such as affect any particular state; on the contrary, they are such as concern the principles of 
general liberty, in which the people of New Hampshire, New York and Georgia are equally 
interested. . . . 
It has been objected too that the new system . . . is calculated to and will effect such a 
consolidation of the States, as to supplant and overturn the state governments.... 
It has been said that the representation in the general legislature is too small to secure liberty, or 
to answer the intention of representation. In this there is an union of sentiments in the opposers. 
The constitution has been opposed, because it gives to the legislature an unlimited power of 
taxation both with respect to direct and indirect taxes, a right to lay and collect taxes, duties, 
imposts and excises of every kind and description, and to any amount. In this there has been as 
general a concurrence of opinion as in the former. 
The opposers to the constitution have said that it is dangerous, because the judicial power may 
extend to many cases which ought to be reserved to the decision of the State courts, and because 
the right of trial by jury is not secured in the judicial courts of the general government, in civil 
cases. All the opposers are agreed in this objection. 
The power of the general legislature to alter and regulate the time, place and manner of holding 
elections, has been stated as an argument against the adoption of the system. The opposers to the 
constitution universally agree in this objection. . . 
The mixture of legislative, judicial, and executive powers in the Senate; the little degree of 
responsibility under which the great officers of government will be held; and the liberty granted 
by the system to establish and maintain a standing army without any limitation or restriction, are 
also objected to the constitution; and in these there is a great degree of unanimity of sentiment in 
the opposers. . . . 
You have heard that both sides on this great question, agree, that there are in it great defects; yet 
the one side tell you, choose such men as will adopt it, and then amend it-while the other say, 
amend previous to its adoption. I have stated to you my reasons for the latter, and I think they are 
unanswerable. Consider, you the common people, the yeomanry of the country, for to such I 
principally address myself, you are to be the principal losers, if the constitution should prove 
oppressive. When a tyranny is established, there are always masters as well as slaves; the great 
and well-born are generally the former, and the middling class the latter. Attempts have been 
made, and will be repeated, to alarm you with the fear of consequences; but reflect there are 
consequences on both sides, and none can be apprehended more dreadful, than entailing on 
ourselves and posterity a government which will raise a few to the height of human greatness and 
wealth, while it will depress the many to the extreme of poverty and wretchedness. 
Consequences are under the control of that all-wise and all-powerful being, whose providence 
conducts the affairs of all men. Our part is to act right, and we may then have confidence that the 
consequences will be favorable. The path in which you should walk is plain and open before 
you; be united as one man, and direct your choice to such men as have been uniform in their 
opposition to the proposed system in its present form, or without proper alterations. In men of 
this description you have reason to place confidence, while on the other hand, you have just 
cause to distrust those who urge the adoption of a bad constitution, under the delusive 
expectation of making amendments after it is acceded to. Your jealousy of such characters 
should be the more excited, when you consider that the advocates for the constitution have 
shifted their ground. When men are uniform in their opinions, it affords evidence that they are 
sincere. When they are shifting, it gives reason to believe, they do not change from conviction. It 
must be recollected, that when this plan was first announced to the public, its supporters cried it 
up as the most perfect production of human wisdom, It was represented either as having no 
defects, or if it had, they were so trifling and inconsiderable, that they served only, as the shades 
in a fine picture, to set off the piece to the greater advantage. One gentleman in Philadelphia 
went so far in the ardor of his enthusiasm in its favor, as to pronounce, that the men who formed 
it were as really under the guidance of Divine Revelation, as was Moses, the Jewish lawgiver. 
Their language is now changed; the question has been discussed; the objections to the plan ably 
stated, and they are admitted to be unanswerable. The same men who held it almost perfect, now 
admit it is very imperfect; that it is necessary it should be amended. The only question between 
us, is simply this@hall we accede to a bad constitution, under the uncertain prospect of getting it 
amended, after we have received it, or shall we amend it before we adopt it? Common sense will 
point out which is the most rational, which is the most secure line of conduct. May heaven 
inspire you with wisdom, union, moderation and firmness, and give you hearts to make a proper 
estimate of your invaluable privileges, and preserve them to you, to be transmitted to your 
posterity unimpaired, and may they be maintained in this our country, while Sun and Moon 
endure. 
A PLEBEIAN
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THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION.
James Madison's contemporaries generally conceded that he was the
leading statesman in the convention which framed the Constitution of the
United States; but in addition to this he kept a record of the proceedings of
the convention which outranks in importance all the other writings of the
founders of the American Republic. He is thus identified, as no other man is,
with the making of the Constitution and the correct interpretation of the
intentions of the makers. His is the only continuous record of the
proceedings of the convention. He took a seat immediately in front of the
presiding officer, among the members, and took down every speech or
motion as it was made, using abbreviations of his own and immediately
afterwards transcribing his notes when he returned to his lodgings. A few
motions only escaped him and of important speeches he omitted none. The
proceedings were ordered to be kept secret, but his self-imposed task of
reporter had the unofficial sanction of the convention. Alexander Hamilton
corrected slightly Madison's report of his great speech and handed him his
plan of government to copy. The same thing was done with Benjamin
Franklin's speeches, which were written out by Franklin and read by his
colleague Wilson, the fatigue of delivery being too great for the aged
Franklin, and Madison also copied the Patterson plan. Edmund Randolph
wrote out for him his opening speech from his notes two years after the
convention adjourned.[1]
[1] Madison to Randolph, April 21, 1789.
In the years after the convention Madison made a few alterations and
additions in his journal, with the result that in parts there is much
interlineation and erasure, but after patient study the meaning is always
perfectly clear. Three different styles of Madison's own penmanship at
different periods of his life appear in the journal, one being that of his old
age within five years of his death. In this hand appears the following note at
the end of the journal: "The few alterations and corrections made in the
debates which are not in my handwriting were dictated by me and made in
my presence by John C. Payne."[2] The rare occasions where Payne's
penmanship is distinguishable are indicated in the notes to this edition.
[2] Mrs. Madison's brother.
The importance attached by Madison to his record is shown by the terms
of his will, dated April 15, 1835, fourteen months before his death:
"I give all my personal estate ornamental as well as useful, except as
herein after otherwise given, to my dear Wife; and I also give to her all
my manuscript papers, having entire confidence in her discreet and
proper use of them, but subject to the qualification in the succeeding
clause. Considering the peculiarity and magnitude of the occasion
which produced the Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, the Characters
who composed it, the Constitution which resulted from their
deliberations, its effects during a trial of so many years on the
prosperity of the people living under it, and the interest it has inspired
among the friends of free Government, it is not an unreasonable
inference that a careful and extended report of the proceedings and
discussions of that body, which were with closed doors, by a member
who was constant in his attendance, will be particularly gratifying to the
people of the United States, and to all who take an interest in the
progress of political science and the course of true liberty. It is my
desire that the Report as made by me should be published under her
authority and direction."[3]
[3] Orange County, Va., MSS. records.
This desire was never consummated, for Mrs. Madison's friends advised
her that she could not herself profitably undertake the publication of the
work, and she accordingly offered it to the Government, by which it was
bought for $30,000, by act of Congress, approved March 3, 1837. On July 9,
1838, an act was approved authorizing the Joint Committee on the Library to
cause the papers thus purchased to be published, and the Committee
intrusted the superintendence of the work to Henry D. Gilpin, Solicitor of the
Treasury. The duplicate copy of the journal which Mrs. Madison had
delivered was, under authority of Congress, withdrawn from the State
Department and placed in Mr. Gilpin's hands. In 1840 (Washington: Lantree
& O'Sulivan), accordingly, appeared the three volumes, The Papers of James
Madison Purchased by Order of Congress, edited by Henry D. Gilpin. Other
issues of this edition, with changes of date, came out later in New York,
Boston, and Mobile. This issue contained not only the journal of the
Constitutional Convention, but Madison's notes of the debates in the
Continental Congress and in the Congress of the Confederation from
February 19 to April 25, 1787, and a report Jefferson had written of the
debates in 1776 on the Declaration of Independence, besides a number of
letters of Madison's. From the text of Gilpin a fifth volume was added to
Elliot's Debates in 1845, and it was printed in one volume in Chicago, 1893.
Mr. Gilpin's reading of the duplicate copy of the Madison journal is thus
the only one that has hitherto been published.[4] His work was both
painstaking and thorough, but many inaccuracies and omissions have been
revealed by a second reading from the original manuscript journal written in
Madison's own hand, just as he himself left it; and this original manuscript
has been followed with rigid accuracy in the text of the present edition.
[4] Volume iii of The Documentary History of the United States (Department of
State, 1894) is a presentation of a literal print of the original journal, indicating by
the use of larger and smaller type and by explanatory words the portions which
are interlined or stricken out.
The editor has compared carefully with Madison's report, as the notes will
show, the incomplete and less important records of the convention, kept by
others. Of these, the best known is that of Robert Yates, a delegate in the
convention from New York, who took notes from the time he entered the
convention, May 25, to July 5, when he went home to oppose what he
foresaw would be the result of the convention's labors. These notes were
published in 1821 (Albany), edited by Yates's colleague in the convention,
John Lansing, under the title, Secret Proceedings and Debates of the
Convention Assembled at Philadelphia, in the Year 1787, for the Purpose of
Forming the Constitution of the United States of America. This was
afterwards reprinted in several editions and in the three editions of The
Debates on the Federal Constitution, by Jonathan Elliot (Washington, 1827-
1836). Madison pronounced Yates's notes "Crude and broken." "When I
looked over them some years ago," he wrote to J. C. Cabell, February 2,
1829, "I was struck with the number of instances in which he had totally
mistaken what was said by me, or given it in scraps and terms which, taken
without the developments or qualifications accompanying them, had an
import essentially different from what was intended." Yates's notes were
colored by his prejudices, which were strong against the leaders of the
convention, but, making allowance for this and for their incompleteness, they
are of high value and rank next to Madison's in importance.
Rufus King, a delegate from Massachusetts, kept a number of notes,
scattered and imperfect, which were not published till 1894, when they
appeared in King's Life and Correspondence of Rufus King (New York:
Putnam's).
William Pierce, a delegate from Georgia, made some memoranda of the
proceedings of the convention, and brief and interesting sketches of all the
delegates, which were first printed in The Savannah Georgian, April, 18-28,
1828, and reprinted in The American Historical Review for January, 1898.
The notes of Yates, King, and Pierce are the only unofficial record of the
convention extant, besides Madison's, and their chief value is in connection
with the Madison record, which in the main they support, and which
occasionally they elucidate.
December 30, 1818, Charles Pinckney wrote to John Quincy Adams that
he had made more notes of the convention than any other member except
Madison, but they were never published and have been lost or destroyed.[5]
[5] See p. 22, n.
In 1819 (Boston) was published the Journal, Acts and Proceedings of the
Convention, etc., under the supervision of John Quincy Adams, Secretary of
State, by authority of a joint resolution of Congress of March 27, 1818. This
was the official journal of the convention, which the Secretary, William
Jackson, had turned over to the President, George Washington, when the
convention adjourned, Jackson having previously burned all other papers of
the convention in his possession. March 16, 1796, Washington deposited the
papers Jackson had given him with the Secretary of State, Timothy
Pickering. They consisted of three volumes,—the journal of the convention,
the journal of the proceedings of the Committee of the Whole of the
convention, and a list of yeas and nays, beside a printed draft of the
Constitution as reported August 6th, showing erasures and amendments
afterwards adopted, and the Virginia plan in different stages of development.
In preparing the matter for publication Secretary Adams found that for
Friday, September 14, and Saturday, September 15, the journal was a mere
fragment, and Madison was applied to and completed it from his minutes.
From General B. Bloomfield, executor of the estate of David Brearley, a
delegate in the convention from New Jersey, Adams obtained a few
additional papers, and from Charles Pinckney a copy of what purported to be
the plan of a constitution submitted by him to the convention. All of these
papers, with some others, appeared in the edition of 1819, which was a
singularly accurate publication, as comparison by the present editor of the
printed page with the original papers has shown.
The Pinckney plan, as it appeared in this edition of the journal, was
incorporated by Madison into his record, as he had not secured a copy of it
when the convention was sitting. But the draft furnished to Secretary Adams
in 1818, and the plan presented by Pinckney to the convention in 1787 were
not identical, as Madison conclusively proved in his note to his journal, in
his letter to Jared Sparks of November 25, 1831, and in several other letters,
in all of which he showed that the draft did not agree in several important
respects with Pinckney's own votes and motions in the convention, and that
there were important discrepancies between it and Pinckney's Observations
on the Plan of Government, a pamphlet printed shortly after the convention
adjourned.[6]
[6] See P. L. Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution, 419.
It is, indeed, inconceivable that the convention should have incorporated
into the constitution so many of the provisions of the Pinckney draft, and that
at the same time so little reference should have been made to it in the course
of the debates; and it is equally extraordinary that the contemporaries of
Pinckney did not accord to him the chief paternity of the Constitution, which
honor would have belonged to him if the draft he sent to Mr. Adams in 1818
had been the one he actually offered the convention in the first week of its
session. The editor has made a careful examination of the original
manuscripts in the case. They consist (1) of Mr. Pinckney's letter to Mr.
Adams of December 12, 1818, written from Winyaw, S. C., while Pinckney
was temporarily absent from Charleston, acknowledging Mr. Adams's
request for the draft, (2) his letter of December 30, written from Charleston,
transmitting the draft, and (3) the draft. The penmanship of all three papers is
contemporaneous, and the letter of December 30 and the draft were written
with the same pen and ink. This may possibly admit of a difference of
opinion, because the draft is in a somewhat larger chirography than the letter,
having been, as befitted its importance, written more carefully. But the letter
and the draft are written upon the same paper, and this paper was not made
when the convention sat in 1787. There are several sheets of the draft and
one of the letter, and all bear the same water-mark—"Russell & Co. 1797."
The draft cannot, therefore, claim to be the original Pinckney plan, and was
palpably made for the occasion, from Mr. Pinckney's original notes
doubtless, aided and modified by a copy of the Constitution itself. Thirty
years had elapsed since the close of the Constitutional Convention when the
draft was compiled, and its incorrectness is not a circumstance to occasion
great wonder.[7]
[7] See p. 19, n.
Correspondence on the subject of the convention, written while it was in
session, was not extensive, but some unpublished letters throwing light upon
contemporaneous opinion have been found and are quoted in the notes.
The editor desires to record his obligation for assistance in preparing
these volumes to his friend, Montgomery Blair, Esq., of Silver Spring, Md.
Gaillard Hunt.
Cherry Hill Farm, Va.,
September, 1902.

CHRONOLOGY OF JAMES MADISON.
1787.
1787.
May 6-25 Prepares the "Virginia plan" in conjunction with the Virginia
delegates.
May 14. Attends the first gathering of the delegates.
May 30. Moves postponement of question of representation by free
population.
Moves that congressional representation be proportioned to the
importance and size of the States.
Makes his first speech on this subject.
May 31. Advocates representation in one house by popular election.
Opposes uniting several States into one district for representation in
Senate.
Doubts practicability of enumerating powers of national legislature.
Suggests the impossibility of using force to coerce individual States.
June 1. Moves that the powers of the Executive be enumerated.
June 2. Objects to giving Congress power to remove the President upon
demand of a majority of the State legislatures.
June 4. Favors giving power to more than a majority of the national
legislature to overrule an Executive negative of a law.
June 5. Opposes election of judges by both branches of Congress.
Advocates submission of constitution to conventions of the people.
Favors inferior judicial tribunals.
June 6. Speaks for popular representation in the House.
Seconds motion to include a portion of the Judiciary with the Executive
in revisionary power over laws.
June 7. Speaks for proportional representation in both houses of
Congress.
June 8. Seconds motion to give Congress power to negative State laws.
Suggests temporary operation of urgent laws.
June 12. Seconds motion to make term of Representatives three years.
Thinks the people will follow the convention.
Favors a term of seven years for Senators.
June 13. Moves defining powers of Judiciary.
Objects to appointment of judges by whole legislature.
Thinks both houses should have right to originate money bills.
Advocates a national government and opposes the "Jersey plan."
June 21. Speaks in favor of national supremacy.
Opposes annual or biennial elections of Representatives.
June 22. Favors fixing payment of salaries by a standard.
June 23. Proposes to debar Senators from offices created or enhanced
during their term.
Speaks for the proposition.
June 25. Wishes to take up question of right of suffrage.
June 26. Speaks for a long term for Senators.
Opposes their payment by the States.
June 28. Speaks for proportional representation.
June 29. Insists that too much stress is laid on State sovereignty.
June 30. Contends against equal State representation in the Senate.
Speaks again on subject, but would preserve State rights.
July 2. Opposes submission of the question to a special committee.
July 5. Opposes compromise report of committee.
July 6. Thinks part of report need not be postponed.
July 7. Thinks question of representation ought to be settled before
other questions.
July 9. Suggests free inhabitants as basis of representation one house,
and all inhabitants as basis in the other house.
July 10. Moves increase of Representatives.
July 11. Favors representation based on population.
July 14. Urges proportional representation as necessary to protect the
smaller States.
July 17. Advocates national power of negative over State laws.
Thinks the branches of government should be kept separate.
Thinks monarchy likely to follow instability.
Thinks there should be provision for interregnum between adoption and
operation of constitution.
Moves national guarantee of States against domestic violence.
July 18. Seconds motion forbidding a State to form any but a
republican government.
JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1787.
Monday May 14th 1787 was the day fixed for the meeting of the deputies
in Convention for revising the federal System of Government. On that day a
small number only had assembled. Seven States were not convened till,
Friday 25 of May, when the following members appeared to wit:
From Massachusetts, Rufus King. N. York, Robert Yates,[8] Alexr
Hamilton. N. Jersey, David Brearly, William Churchill Houston, William
Patterson. Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, Thomas Fitzsimons, James Wilson,
Governeur Morris. Delaware, George Read, Richard Basset,[9] Jacob
Broome. Virginia, George Washington, Edmund Randolph, John Blair,[10]
James Madison, George Mason, George Wythe, James McClurg. N.
Carolina, Alexander Martin, William Richardson Davie, Richard Dobbs
Spaight, Hugh Williamson. S. Carolina, John Rutlidge, Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler. Georgia, William Few.[11]
[8] William Pierce, delegate from Georgia, made an estimate of each member of
the convention, the only contemporary estimate thus far brought to light. Yates
did not speak in the Convention.
"Mr Yates is said to be an able Judge. He is a Man of great legal abilities, but
not distinguished as an Orator. Some of his Enemies say he is an anti-federal
Man, but I discovered no such disposition in him. He is about 45 years old, and
enjoys a great share of health."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 327. For
more about Pierce's Notes, see p. 45, n.
[9] "Mr Bassett is a religious enthusiast, lately turned Methodist, and serves his
Country because it is the will of the people that he should do so. He is a Man of
plain sense, and has modesty enough to hold his Tongue. He is Gentlemanly Man
and is in high estimation among the Methodists. Mr. Bassett is about 36 years
old."—Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 330. He did not speak in the Convention.
[10] "Mr. Blair is one of the most respectable Men in Virginia, both on account of
his Family as well as fortune. He is one of the Judges of the Supreme Court in
Virginia, and acknowledged to have a very extensive knowledge of the Laws. Mr
Blair is however, no Orator, but his good sense, and most excellent principles,
compensate for other deficiencies. He is about 50 years of age."—Pierce's Notes,
Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 331. He did not speak in the Convention.
[11] "Mr Few possesses a strong natural Genius, and from application has
acquired some knowledge of legal matters;—he practises at the bar of Georgia,
and speaks tolerably well in the Legislature. He has been twice a Member of
Congress, and served in that capacity with fidelity to his State, and honor to
himself. Mr. Few is about 35 years of age."—Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 333. He did
not speak in the Convention.
The credentials of Connecticut and Maryland required but one deputy to
represent the state; of New York, South Carolina, Georgia, and New Hampshire,
two deputies; of Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, and North
Carolina, three; of Pennsylvania, four.—Journal of the Federal Convention, 16 et
seq.; Documentary History of the Constitution, i., 10 et seq.
Mr Robert Morris[12] informed the members assembled that by the
instruction & in behalf, of the deputation of Pena he proposed George
Washington, Esqr late Commander in chief for president of the Convention.
Mr Jno Rutlidge seconded the motion; expressing his confidence that the
choice would be unanimous, and observing that the presence of Genl
Washington forbade any observations on the occasion which might otherwise
be proper.
[12] "Robert Morris is a merchant of great eminence and wealth; an able
Financier, and a worthy Patriot. He has an understanding equal to any public
object, and possesses an energy of mind that few Men can boast of. Although he
is not learned, yet he is as great as those who are. I am told that when he speaks in
the Assembly of Pennsylvania, that he bears down all before him. What could
have been his reason for not Speaking in the Convention I know not,—but he
never once spoke on any point. This Gentleman is about 50 years old."—Pierce's
Notes, Am. Hist: Rev., iii., 328.
 
 
General Washington[13] was accordingly unanimously elected by ballot,
and conducted to the Chair by Mr R. Morris and Mr Rutlidge; from which in
a very emphatic manner he thanked the Convention for the honor they had
conferred on him, reminded them of the novelty of the scene of business in
which he was to act, lamented his want of better qualifications, and claimed
the indulgence of the House towards the involuntary errors which his
inexperience might occasion.
[13] "Genl Washington is well known as the Commander in chief of the late
American Army. Having conducted these States to independence and peace, he
now appears to assist in framing a Government to make the People happy. Like
Gustavus Vasa, he may be said to be the deliverer of his Country;—like Peter the
great he appears as the politician and the States-man; and like Cincinnatus he
returned to his farm perfectly contented with being only a plain Citizen, after
enjoying the highest honor of the confederacy,—and now only seeks for the
approbation of his Country-men by being virtuous and useful. The General was
conducted to the Chair as President of the Convention by the unanimous voice of
its Members. He is in the 52d year of his age."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev.,
iii., 331.
(The nomination came with particular grace from Pen͠na, as Docr Franklin
alone could have been thought of as a competitor. The Docr was himself to
have made the nomination of General Washington, but the state of the
weather and of his health confined him to his house.)
Mr Wilson[14] moved that a Secretary be appointed, and nominated Mr
Temple Franklin.
[14] "Mr. Wilson ranks among the foremost in legal and political knowledge. He
has joined to a fine genius all that can set him off and show him to advantage. He
is well acquainted with Man, and understands all the passions that influence him.
Government seems to have been his peculiar Study, all the political institutions of
the World he knows in detail, and can trace the causes and effects of every
revolution from the earliest stages of the Greecian commonwealth down to the
present time. No man is more clear, copious, and comprehensive than Mr. Wilson,
yet he is no great Orator. He draws the attention not by the charm of his
eloquence, but by the force of his reasoning. He is about 45 years old."—Pierce's
Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 329.
Col Hamilton[15] nominated Major Jackson.
[15] "Colo Hamilton is deservedly celebrated for his talents. He is a practitioner
of the Law, and reputed to be a finished Scholar. To a clear and strong judgment
he unites the ornaments of fancy, and whilst he is able, convincing, and engaging
in his eloquence the Heart and Head sympathize in approving him. Yet there is
something too feeble in his voice to be equal to the strains of oratory;—it is my
opinion he is rather a convincing Speaker, that [than] a blazing Orator. Colo
Hamilton requires time to think,—he enquires into every part of his subject with
the searchings of phylosophy, and when he comes forward he comes highly
charged with interesting matter, there is no skimming over the surface of a subject
with him, he must sink to the bottom to see what foundation it rests on.—His
language is not always equal, sometimes didactic like Bolingbroke's, at others
light and tripping like Stern's. His eloquence is not so defusive as to trifle with the
senses, but he rambles just enough to strike and keep up the attention. He is about
33 years old, of small stature, and lean. His manners are tinctured with stiffness,
and sometimes with a degree of vanity that is highly disagreable."—Pierce's
Notes, Id., iii., 327.
On the ballot Majr Jackson had 5 votes & Mr Franklin 2 votes.
On reading the credentials of the deputies it was noticed that those from
Delaware were prohibited from changing the Article in the Confederation
establishing an equality of votes among the States.[16]
[16] " ... So also and Provided, that such Alterations or further Provisions, or any
of them, do not extend to that part of the Fifth Article of the Confederation of the
said States, finally ratified on the first day March, in the Year One thousand seven
hundred and eighty one, which declares that 'In determining Questions in the
United States in Congress Assembled each State shall have one Vote.'"—
Documentary History of the Constitution (Dept. of State), i., 24.
The appointment of a Committee, consisting of Messrs Wythe, Hamilton
& C. Pinckney, on the motion of Mr. Pinckney, to prepare standing rules &
orders was the only remaining step taken on this day.
M      M   28.——
From Massts Nat: Gorham & Caleb Strong. From Connecticut Oliver
Elseworth. From Delaware, Gunning Bedford. From Maryland James
McHenry. From Penna B. Franklin, George Clymer, Ths Mifflin & Jared
Ingersol, took their seats.[17]
[17] "Entre nous. I believe the Eastern people have taken ground they will not
depart from respecting the Convention.—One legislature composed of a lower-
house triennially elected and an Executive & Senate for a good number of years.
—I shall see Gerry & Johnson, as they pass & may perhaps give you a hint."—
William Grayson to Madison, New York, May 24, 1787, Mad. MSS.
Mr Wythe[18] from the Committee for preparing rules made a report which
employed the deliberations of this day.
[18] "Mr Wythe is the famous Professor of Law at the University of William and
Mary. He is confessedly one of the most learned legal Characters of the present
age. From his close attention to the study of general learning he has acquired a
compleat knowledge of the dead languages and all the sciences. He is remarked
for his exemplary life, and universally esteemed for his good principles. No Man
it is said understands the history of Government better than Mr Wythe,—nor any
one who understands the fluctuating condition to which all societies are liable
better than he does, yet from his too favorable opinion of Men, he is no great
politician. He is a neat and pleasing Speaker, and a most correct and able Writer.
Mr. Wythe is about 55 years of age."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 331.
Mr King[19] objected to one of the rules in the Report authorizing any
member to call for the yeas & nays and have them entered on the minutes.
He urged that as the acts of the Convention were not to bind the
Constituents, it was unnecessary to exhibit this evidence of the votes; and
improper as changes of opinion would be frequent in the course of the
business & would fill the minutes with contradictions.
[19] "Mr King is a Man much distinguished for his eloquence and great
parliamentary talents. He was educated in Massachusetts, and is said to have good
classical as well as legal knowledge. He has served for three years in the
Congress of the United States with great and deserved applause, and is at this
time high in the confidence and approbation of his Country-men. This Gentleman
is about thirty three years of age, about five feet ten inches high, well formed, an
handsome face, with a strong expressive Eye, and a sweet high toned voice. In his
public speaking there is something peculiarly strong and rich in his expression,
clear, and convincing in his arguments, rapid and irresistible at times in his
eloquence but he is not always equal. His action is natural, swimming, and
graceful, but there is a rudeness of manner sometimes accompanying it. But take
him tout en semble, he may with propriety be ranked among the luminaries of the
present Age."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 325.
Col. Mason[20] seconded the objection; adding that such a record of the
opinions of members would be an obstacle to a change of them on
conviction; and in case of its being hereafter promulged must furnish handles
to the adversaries of the Result of the Meeting.
[20] "Mr. Mason is a Gentleman of remarkable strong powers, and possesses a
clear and copious understanding. He is able and convincing in debate, steady and
firm in his principles, and undoubtedly one of the best politicians in America. Mr
Mason is about 60 years old, with a fine strong constitution."—Pierce's Notes, Id.,
iii., 331.
The proposed rule was rejected nem. contrad certe. The standing rules[21]
agreed to were as follows:[22]
[21] Previous to the arrival of a majority of the States, the rule by which they
ought to vote in the Convention had been made a subject of conversation among
the members present. It was pressed by Governeur Morris and favored by Robert
Morris and others from Pennsylvania, that the large States should unite in firmly
refusing to the small states an equal vote, as unreasonable, and as enabling the
small States to negative every good system of Government, which must, in the
nature of things, be founded on a violation of that equality. The members from
Virginia, conceiving that such an attempt might beget fatal altercations between
the large & small States, and that it would be easier to prevail on the latter, in the
course of the deliberations, to give up their equality for the sake of an effective
Government, than on taking the field of discussion to disarm themselves of the
right & thereby throw themselves on the mercy of the larger States,
discountenanced and stifled the project.—Madison's Note.
[22] In the MS. Madison adds: "[See the Journal & copy here the printed rules],"
and they were copied by him from the Journal of the Federal Convention (1819).
They have been compared with the MS. journal and found to be correct.
Viz.
A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies of not less than
seven States; and all questions shall be decided by the greater number of
these which shall be fully represented; but a less number than seven may
adjourn from day to day.
Immediately after the President shall have taken the chair, and the
members their seats, the minutes of the preceding day shall be read by the
Secretary.
Every member, rising to speak, shall address the President; and whilst he
shall be speaking, none shall pass between them, or hold discourse with
another, or read a book, pamphlet or paper, printed or manuscript—and of
two members rising at the same time, the President shall name him who shall
be first heard.
A member shall not speak oftener than twice, without special leave, upon
the same question; and not the second time, before every other, who had
been silent, shall have been heard, if he choose to speak upon the subject.
A motion made and seconded, shall be repeated, and if written, as it shall
be when any member shall so require, read aloud by the Secretary, before it
shall be debated; and may be withdrawn at any time, before the vote upon it
shall have been declared.
Orders of the day shall be read next after the minutes, and either
discussed or postponed, before any other business shall be introduced.
When a debate shall arise upon a question, no motion, other than to
amend the question, to commit it, or to postpone the debate shall be received.
[23]A question which is complicated, shall, at the request of any member,
be divided, and put separately on the propositions of which it is
compounded.
[23] An undecided line is drawn through the page in the MS. from here to the
end of the rules; but not, as it would appear, to strike them out, as they were
actually adopted by the Convention.
The determination of a question, altho' fully debated, shall be postponed,
if the deputies of any State desire it until the next day.
A writing which contains any matter brought on to be considered, shall be
read once throughout for information, then by paragraphs to be debated, and
again, with the amendments, if any, made on the second reading; and
afterwards the question shall be put on the whole, amended, or approved in
its original form, as the case shall be.
Committees shall be appointed by ballot; and the members who have the
greatest number of ballots, altho' not a majority of the votes present, shall be
the Committee. When two or more members have an equal number of votes,
the member standing first on the list in the order of taking down the ballots,
shall be preferred.
A member may be called to order by any other member, as well as by the
President; and may be allowed to explain his conduct or expressions
supposed to be reprehensible. And all questions of order shall be decided by
the President without appeal or debate.
Upon a question to adjourn for the day, which may be made at any time, if
it be seconded, the question shall be put without a debate.
When the House shall adjourn, every member shall stand in his place,
until the President pass him.
A letter from sundry persons of the State of Rho. Island addressed to the
Honorable The Chairman of the General Convention was presented to the
Chair by Mr. Govr Morris,[24] and being read, was ordered to lie on the table
for further consideration.[25]
[24] "Mr Governeur Morris is one of those Genius's in whom every species of
talents combine to render him conspicuous and flourishing in public debate:—He
winds through all the mazes of rhetoric, and throws around him such a glare that
he charms, captivates, and leads away the senses of all who hear him. With an
infinite streach of fancy he brings to view things when he is engaged in deep
argumentation, that render all the labor of reasoning easy and pleasing. But with
all these powers he is fickle and inconstant,—never pursuing one train of
thinking,—nor ever regular. He has gone through a very extensive course of
reading, and is acquainted with all the sciences. No Man has more wit,—nor can
any one engage the attention more than Mr Morris. He was bred to the Law, but I
am told he disliked the profession, and turned Merchant. He is engaged in some
great mercantile matters with his namesake, Mr Robt Morris. This Gentleman is
about 38 years old, he has been unfortunate in losing one of his Legs, and getting
all the flesh taken off his right arm by a scald, when a youth."—Pierce's Notes,
Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 329.
[25] "N       June 18th 1787
"Sir—
"The inclosed address, of which I presume your Excellency has received
a duplicate, was returned to me from New York after my arrival in this State.
I flattered myself that our Legislature, which convened on monday last,
would have receded from the resolution therein refer'd to, and have complied
with the recommendation of Congress in sending deligates to the federal
convention. The upper house, or Governor, & Council, embraced the
measure, but it was negatived in the house of Assembly by a large majority,
notwithstanding the greatest exertions were made to support it.
"Being disappointed in their expectations, the minority in the
administration and all the worthy citizens of this State, whose minds are well
informd regreting the peculiarities of their Situation place their fullest
confidence in the wisdom & moderation of the national council, and indulge
the warmest hopes of being favorably consider'd in their deliberations. From
these deliberations they anticipate a political System which must finally be
adopted & from which will result the Safety, the honour, & the happiness of
the United States.
"Permit me, Sir, to observe, that the measures of our present Legislature
do not exhibit the real character of the State. They are equally reprobated, &
abhored by Gentlemen of the learned professions, by the whole mercantile
body, & by most of the respectable farmers and mechanicks. The majority of
the administration is composed of a licentious number of men, destitute of
education, and many of them, Void of principle. From anarchy and confusion
they derive their temporary consequence, and this they endeavor to prolong
by debauching the minds of the common people, whose attention is wholly
directed to the Abolition of debts both public & private. With these are
associated the disaffected of every description, particularly those who were
unfriendly during the war. Their paper money System, founded in oppression
& fraud, they are determined to Support at every hazard. And rather than
relinquish their favorite pursuit they trample upon the most sacred
obligations. As a proof of this they refused to comply with a requisition of
Congress for repealing all laws repugnant to the treaty of peace with Great
Britain, and urged as their principal reason, that it would be calling in
question the propriety of their former measures.
"These evils may be attributed, partly to the extreme freedom of our own
constitution, and partly to the want of energy in the federal Union: And it is
greatly to be apprehended that they cannot Speedily be removed but by
uncommon and very serious exertions. It is fortunate however that the wealth
and resources of this State are chiefly in possion of the well Affected, & that
they are intirely devoted to the public good.
"I have the honor of being Sir,
"with the greatest Veneration & esteem,





The letter was inadvertently unsigned, but it was well known to come from
General Varnum. The enclosure was as follows:
"P         , May 11. 1787.
"G        :
"Since the Legislature of this State have finally declined sending
Delegates to Meet you in Convention for the purposes mentioned in the
Resolve of Congress of the 21st February 1787, the Merchants Tradesmen
and others of this place, deeply affected with the evils of the present unhappy
times, have thought proper to Communicate in writing their approbation of
your Meeting, And their regret that it will fall short of a Compleat
Representation of the Federal Union.—
"The failure of this State was owing to the Nonconcurrence of the Upper
House of Assembly with a Vote passed in the Lower House, for appointing
Delegates to attend the said Convention, at their Session holden at Newport
on the first Wednesday of the present Month.—
"It is the general Opinion here and we believe of the well informed
throughout this State, that full power for the Regulation of the Commerce of
the United States, both Foreign & Domestick ought to be vested in the
National Council.
"And that Effectual Arrangements should also be made for giving
Operation to the present powers of Congress in their Requisitions upon the
States for National purposes.—
"As the Object of this Letter is chiefly to prevent any impressions
unfavorable to the Commercial Interest of this State, from taking place in our
Sister States from the Circumstance of our being unrepresented in the
present National Convention, we shall not presume to enter into any detail of
the objects we hope your deliberations will embrace and provide for being
convinced they will be such as have a tendency to strengthen the Union,
promote Commerce, increase the power & Establish the Credit of the United
States.
"The result of your deliberations tending to these desireable purposes we
still hope may finally be Approved and Adopted by this State, for which we
pledge our Influence and best exertions.—
"In behalf of the Merchants, Tradesmen &c
"We have the Honour to be with perfect Consideration &
Respect
"Your most Obedient &
"Most Humble Servant's
"J    B     J     B     }
T    L     H      N      B     }
J  . N           J    J       }
L    H    W       A      } Comtee.
P      A     W       R       }
P    A     J        O    }
 W       B      }
"The Honble the Chairman of the General Convention
"P           "
—Const. MSS.
Both letters are printed in the Documentary History of the Constitution, i., 277
and 275.
Mr Butler moved that the House provide agst interruption of business by
absence of members,[26] and against licentious publications of their
proceedings—to which was added by—Mr Spaight[27]—a motion to provide
that on the one hand the House might not be precluded by a vote upon any
question, from revising the subject matter of it, When they see cause, nor, on
the other hand, be led too hastily to rescind a decision, which was the result
of mature discussion.—Whereupon it was ordered that these motions be
referred for the consideration of the Committee appointed to draw up the
standing rules and that the Committee make report thereon.
[26] "Mr. Butler is a character much respected for the many excellent virtues
which he possesses. But as a politician or an Orator, he has no pretensions to
either. He is a Gentleman of fortune, and takes rank among the first in South
Carolina. He has been appointed to Congress, and is now a Member of the
Legislature of South Carolina. Mr Butler is about 40 years of age; an Irishman by
birth."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 333.
[27] "Mr. Spaight is a worthy Man, of some abilities, and fortune. Without
possessing a Genius to render him brilliant, he is able to discharge any public
trust that his Country may repose in him. He is about 31 years of age."—Pierce's
Notes, Id., iii., 332.
Adjj till tomorrow 10. OClock.
T       M   29.
John Dickenson and Elbridge Gerry, the former from Delaware, the latter
from Massts took their seats. The following rules were added, on the report
of Mr Wythe from the Committee—
That no member be absent from the House, so as to interrupt the
representation of the State, without leave.
That Committees do not sit whilst the House shall be or ought to be,
sitting.
That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the sitting
of the House without leave of the House.
That members only be permitted to inspect the journal.
That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise published
or communicated without leave.
That a motion to reconsider a matter which has been determined by a
majority, may be made, with leave unanimously given, on the same day
on which the vote passed; but otherwise not without one day's previous
notice: in which last case, if the House agree to the reconsideration,
some future day shall be assigned for that purpose.
Mr C. Pinkney[28] moved that a Committee be appointed to superintend
the Minutes.
[28] "Mr. Charles Pinckney is a young Gentleman of the most promising talents.
He is, altho' only 24 ys of age, in possession of a very great variety of knowledge.
Government, Law, History, and Phylosophy are his favorite studies, but he is
intimately acquainted with every species of polite learning, and has a spirit of
application and industry beyond most Men. He speaks with great neatness and
perspicuity, and treats every subject as fully, without running into prolixity, as it
requires. He has been a Member of Congress, and served in that Body with ability
and eclat."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 333.
Mr Govr Morris objected to it. The entry of the proceedings of the
Convention belonged to the Secretary as their impartial officer. A committee
might have an interest & bias in moulding the entry according to their
opinions and wishes.
The motion was negatived, 5 noes, 4 ays.
Mr. Randolph[29] then opened the main business.[30]
[29] "Mr. Randolph is Governor of Virginia,—a young Gentleman in whom unite
all the accomplishments of the Scholar, and the Statesman. He came forward with
the postulata, or first principles, on which the Convention acted, and he supported
them with a force of eloquence and reasoning that did him great honor. He has a
most harmonious voice, a fine person and striking manners. Mr. Randolph is
about 32 years of age."—Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 332.
[30] In the MS. in Randolph's hand: "[here insert his speech including his
resolutions]." The speech also is in Randolph's hand, having been furnished by
him.
He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, rather than those, who
were of longer standing in life and political experience, to open the great
subject of their mission. But, as the convention had originated from Virginia,
and his colleagues supposed that some proposition was expected from them,
they had imposed this task on him.
He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, and the necessity of
preventing the fulfilment of the prophecies of the American downfal.
He observed that in revising the fœderal system we ought to inquire 1.
into the properties, which such a government ought to possess, 2. the defects
of the confederation, 3. the danger of our situation & 4. the remedy.
1. The Character of such a government ought to secure 1. against foreign
invasion: 2. against dissensions between members of the Union, or seditions
in particular States: 3. to procure to the several States various blessings, of
which an isolated situation was incapable: 4. to be able to defend itself
against encroachment: & 5. to be paramount to the state constitutions.
2. In speaking of the defects of the confederation he professed a high
respect for its authors, and considered them as having done all that patriots
could do, in the then infancy of the science, of constitutions, & of
confederacies,—when the inefficiency of requisitions was unknown—no
commercial discord had arisen among any States—no rebellion had appeared
as in Massts—foreign debts had not become urgent—the havoc of paper
money had not been foreseen—treaties had not been violated—and perhaps
nothing better could be obtained from the jealousy of the states with regard
to their sovereignty.
He then proceeded to enumerate the defects. 1. that the confederation
produced no security against foreign invasion; congress not being permitted
to prevent a war nor to support it by their own authority—Of this he cited
many examples; most of which tended to shew, that they could not cause
infractions of treaties or of the law of nations to be punished: that particular
states might by their conduct provoke war without controul; and that neither
militia nor draughts being fit for defence on such occasions, enlistments only
could be successful, and these could not be executed without money.
2, that the fœderal government could not check the quarrels between
states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power nor means to
interpose according to the exigency.
3, that there were many advantages, which the U. S. might acquire, which
were not attainable under the confederation—such as a productive impost—
counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations—pushing of
commerce ad libitum,—&c &c.
4, that the fœderal government could not defend itself against
encroachments from the states.
5, that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions, ratified as it
was in many of the states.
3. He next reviewed the danger of our situation, appealed to the sense of
the best friends of the U. S. the prospect of anarchy from the laxity of
government every where; and to other considerations.
4. He then proceeded to the remedy; the basis of which he said must be
the republican principle.
He proposed as conformable to his ideas the following resolutions, which
he explained one by one.
1. Resolved that the articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected &
enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely,
"common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare."
2. Resd therefore that the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature
ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution, or to the number of
free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases.
3. Resd that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches.
4. Resd that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature
ought to be elected by the people of the several States every —— for the
term of ——; to be of the age of —— years at least, to receive liberal
stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to
the public service; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular
State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly
belong to the functions of the first branch, during the term of service, and for
the space of —— after its expiration; to be incapable of re-election for the
space of —— after the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject
to recall.
5. Resold that the members of the second branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper number
of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of ——
years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure their
independency; to receive liberal stipends, by which they may be
compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service; and to be
ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the
authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the
functions of the second branch, during the term of service; and for the space
of —— after the expiration thereof.
6. Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating
Acts; that the National Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the
Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to
legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in
which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise
of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States
contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union;
and to call forth the force of the Union agst any member of the Union failing
to fulfil its duty under the articles thereof.
7. Resd that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the
National Legislature for the term of —— years, to receive punctually at
stated times, a fixed compensation for the services rendered, in which no
increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the Magistracy, existing
at the time of increase or diminution, and to be ineligible a second time; and
that besides a general authority to execute the national laws, it ought to enjoy
the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation.
8. Resd that the Executive and a convenient number of the National
Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with authority to examine
every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a
particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the
dissent of the said Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the
National Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be
again negatived by —— of the members of each branch.
9. Resd that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more
supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National
Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and to receive
punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their services, in which no
increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in
office at the time of such increase or diminution. That the jurisdiction of the
inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance, and of the
supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all Piracies &
felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy: cases in which foreigners
or Citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested,
or which respect the collection of the National revenues; impeachments of
any national officers, and questions which may involve the national peace
and harmony.
10. Resolvd that provision ought to be made for the admission of States
lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a
voluntary junction of Government & Territory or otherwise, with the consent
of a number of voices in the National Legislature less than the whole.
11. Resd that a Republican Government & the territory of each State,
except in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government & territory,
ought to be guarantied by the United States to each State.
12. Resd that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress
and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after the reform of the
articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the completion of all their
engagements.
13. Resd that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the
Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of
the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.
14. Resd that the Legislative Executive & Judiciary powers within the
several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union.
15. Resd that the amendments which shall be offered to the
Confederation, by the Convention ought at a proper time, or times, after the
approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of
Representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly
chosen by the people to consider & decide thereon.
He concluded with an exhortation, not to suffer the present opportunity of
establishing general peace, harmony, happiness and liberty in the U. S. to
pass away unimproved.[31]
[31] This abstract of the speech was furnished to J. M. by Mr Randolph and is in
his handwriting. As a report of it from him had been relied on, it was omitted by
J. M.—Madison's Note. The fifteen resolutions, constituting the "Virginia Plan,"
are in Madison's handwriting.
It was then Resolved—That the House will tomorrow resolve itself into a
Committee of the Whole House to consider of the state of the American
Union—and that the propositions moved by Mr Randolph be referred to the
said Committee.
Mr Charles Pinkney laid before the House the draft of a federal
Government which he had prepared, to be agreed upon between the free and
independent States of America.[32]—Mr P. plan ordered that the same be
referred to the Committee of the Whole appointed to consider the state of the
American Union.[33]
[32] Robert Yates, delegate from New York, kept notes of the proceedings of the
Convention, until he left July 5th, with his colleague, John Lansing. They wrote a
joint letter to Governor Clinton afterwards, giving their reasons: "We were not
present at the completion of the new constitution; but before we left the
convention, its principles were so well established as to convince us, that no
alteration was to be expected to conform it to our ideas of expediency and
safety."—Secret Proceedings of the Federal Convention, 10. Yates's notes are
quoted here, whenever they are at variance with Madison's. He gives Pinckney's
motion as follows: "Mr. C. Pinckney, a member from South Carolina, then added,
that he had reduced his ideas of a new government to a system, which he read,
and confessed that it was grounded on the same principle as of the above [the
Randolph] resolutions."—Id., 97.
[33] Charles Pinckney wrote to John Quincy Adams:
"W           G          December 12 1818
"S  
"I have just had the honour to receive your favour—Being at present
absent from Charleston on a visit to my planting interest in this
neighbourhood I shall in consequence of your letter shorten my stay here
considerably & return to Town for the purpose of complying with your
request as soon as possible—From an inspection of my old papers not long
ago I know it was then easily in my power to have complied with your
request—I still hope it is & as soon as I return to my residence in Charleston
will again, or as quickly as I can write you on it to prevent delay.
"The Draught of the Constitution proposed by me was divided into a
number of articles & was in complete detail—the resolutions offered by Mr
Randolph were merely general ones & as far as I recollect they were both
referred to the same Committee.
"With great respect & esteem" &c.
—Dept. of State MSS., Miscellaneous Letters.
Three weeks later he wrote again:
"S  
"On my return to this City as I promised I examined carefully all the
numerous notes & papers which I had retained relating to the federal
Convention—among them I found several rough draughts of the Constitution
I proposed to the Convention—although they differed in some measure from
each other in the wording & arrangement of the articles—yet they were all
substantially the same—they all proceeded upon the idea of throwing out of
view the attempt to amend the existing Confederation (then a very favorite
idea of a number) & proceeding de novo—of a Division of the Powers of
Government into legislative executive & judicial & of making the
Government to operate directly upon the People & not upon the States. My
Plan was substantially adopted in the sequel except as to the Senate & giving
more power to the Executive than I intended—the force of vote which the
small & middling states had in the Convention prevented our obtaining a
proportional representation in more than one branch & the great powers
given to the President were never intended to have been given to him while
the Convention continued in that patient & coolly deliberative situation in
which they had been for nearly the whole of the preceding five months of
their session nor was it until within the last week or ten days that almost the
whole of the Executive Department was altered—I can assure you as a fact
that for more than Four months & a half out of five the power of exclusively
making treaties, appointing for the Ministers & judges of the Supreme Court
was given to the Senate after numerous debates & consideration of the
subject both in Committee of the whole & in the house—this I not only aver
but can prove by printed Documents in my possession to have been the case
—& should I ever have the pleasure to see you & converse on the subject
will state to you some things relative to this business that may be new &
perhaps surprising to you—the veil of secrecy from the Proceedings of the
Convention being removed by Congress & but very few of the members
alive would make disclosures now of the secrets there acted less improper
than before—With the aid of the journal & the numerous notes &
memorandums I have preserved should now be in my power to give a View
of the almost insuperable difficulties the Convention had to encounter & of
the conflicting opinions of the members I believe should have attempted it
had I not always understood Mr Madison intended it—he alone I believe
possessed & retained more numerous & particular notes of their proceedings
than myself. I will thank you sir to do me the honour to send me or to get the
President to direct a copy of the Journal of the Convention to be sent me as
also of the Secret Journals of Congress should it be considered not improper
in me to make the request.
"I have already informed you I have several rough draughts of the
Constitution I proposed & that they are all substantially the same differing
only in words & the arrangement of the Articles—at the distance of nearly
thirty two years it is impossible for me now to say which of the 4 or 5
draughts I have was the one but enclosed I send you the one I believe was it
—I repeat however that they are substantially the same differing only in
form & unessentials—It may be necessary to remark that very soon after the
Convention met I changed & avowed candidly the change of my opinion on
giving the power to Congress to revise the State Laws in certain cases & in
giving the exclusive Power to the Senate to declare War thinking it safer to
refuse the first altogether & to vest the latter in Congress—I will thank you
to acknowledge by a line the receipt of the Draught & this.
"With very great respect & esteem






The plan is written upon paper of the same size as the letter, and with the same
ink. It is undoubtedly contemporaneous with the letter.
Madison wrote the following note to accompany his journal:
"The length of the Document laid before the Convention, and other
circumstances having prevented the taking of a copy at the time, that which
is here inserted was taken from the paper furnished to the Secretary of State,
and contained in the Journal of the Convention published in 1819. On
comparing the paper with the Constitution in its final form, or in some of its
Stages; and with the propositions, and speeches of Mr Pinckney in the
Convention, it would seem that considerable errour must have crept into the
paper; occasioned possibly by the loss of the Document laid before the
convention (neither that nor the Resolutions offered by Mr Patterson being
among the preserved papers) and by a consequent resort for a copy to the
rough draught, in which erasures and interlineations following what passed
in the convention, might be confounded with the original text, and after a
lapse of more than thirty years, confounded also in the memory of the author.
"There is in the paper a similarity in some cases, and an identity in others,
with details, expressions, and definitions, the results of critical discussions
and modifications that can not be ascribed to accident or anticipation.
"Examples may be noticed in Article VIII of the paper; which is
remarkable also for the circumstance, that whilst it specifies the functions of
the President, no provision is contained in the paper for the election of such
an officer, nor indeed for the appointment of any executive magistracy;
notwithstanding the evident purpose of the author to provide an entire plan
of a Federal Government.
"Again, in several instances where the paper corresponds with the
Constitution, it is at variance with the ideas of Mr Pinckney, as decidedly
expressed in his propositions, and in his arguments, the former in the Journal
of the Convention, the latter in the report of its debates: Thus in Art: VIII of
the paper, provision is made for removing the President by impeachment;
when it appears that in the convention, July 20. he was opposed to any
impeachability of the Executive magistrate: In Art: III, it is required that all
money-bills shall originate in the first Branch of the Legislature; which he
strenuously opposed Aug: 8 and again Aug: 11: In Art: V members of each
House are made ineligible to, as well as incapable of holding, any office
under the union &c. as was the case at one Stage of the Constitution; a
disqualification highly disapproved and opposed by him Aug: 14.
"A still more conclusive evidence of errour in the paper is seen in Art: III,
which provides, as the Constitution does, that the first Branch of the
Legislature shall be chosen by the people of the several States; whilst it
appears that on the 6th of June, a few days only after the Draft was laid
before the convention, its author opposed that mode of choice, urging &
proposing in place of it, an election by the Legislatures of the several States.
"The remarks here made tho' not material in themselves, were due to the
authenticity and accuracy aimed at, in this Record of the proceedings of a
Publick Body, so much an object, sometimes, of curious research, as at all
times, of profound interest."—Mad. MSS.
This note, as given in Gilpin's Madison Papers (1840), is freely edited. The
Pinckney plan is given here as Pinckney sent it to Adams. Chief-Justice Charles
C. Nott, of the U. S. Court of Claims, informs the editor that correspondence with
Pinckney's descendants reveals the fact that none of the notes to which he alludes
in his letters are extant.
The letter of December 30, 1818, and plan, are printed in The Documentary








We the People of the States of New Hampshire Massachusetts Rhode
Island & Providence Plantations Connecticut New York New Jersey
Pennsylvania Delaware Maryland Virginia North Carolina South Carolina &
Georgia do ordain, declare & establish the following Constitution for the
government of ourselves & Posterity.
A       1:
The Style of this Government shall be The United States of America &
the Government shall consist of supreme legislative Executive & judicial
Powers.
2
The Legislative Power shall be vested in a Congress to consist of two
separate Houses—one to be called the House of Delegates & the other the
Senate who shall meet on the —— —— Day of —— in every year.
3
The members of the House of Delegates shall be chosen every —— year
by the people of the several States & the qualification of the electors shall be
the same as those of the electors in the several States for their legislatures—
each member shall have been a citizen of the United States for —— years;
and shall be of —— years of age & a resident in the State he is chosen for.
——Until a census of the people shall be taken in the manner herein after
mentioned the House of Delegates shall consist of —— to be chosen from
the different States in the following proportions: for New Hampshire, ——;
for Massachusetts, —— for Rhode Island, —— for Connecticut, —— for
New York, —— for New Jersey, —— for Pennsylvania, —— for Delaware,
—— for Maryld, —— for Virginia, —— for North Carolina, —— for South
Carolina, —— for Georgia, —— & the Legislature shall hereafter regulate
the number of delegates by the number of inhabitants according to the
Provisions herein after made, at the rate of one for every —— thousand.—
All money bills of every kind shall originate in the house of Delegates &
shall not be altered by the Senate. The House of Delegates shall exclusively
possess the power of impeachment & shall choose it's own officers &
vacancies therein shall be supplied by the executive authority of the State in
the representation from which they shall happen.
4
The Senate shall be elected & chosen by the House of Delegates which
House immediately after their meeting shall choose by ballot —— Senators
from among the Citizens & residents of New Hampshire —— from among
those of Massachusetts —— from among those of Rhode Island —— from
among those of Connecticut —— from among those of New York —— from
among those of New Jersey —— from among those of Pennsylvania ——
from among those of Delaware —— from among those of Maryland ——
from among those of Virginia —— from among those of North Carolina
—— from among those of South Carolina & —— from among those of
Georgia ——
The Senators chosen from New Hampshire Massachusetts Rhode Island
& Connecticut shall form one class—those from New York New Jersey
Pennsylvania & Delaware one class—& those from Maryland Virginia North
Carolina South Carolina & Georgia one class.
The House of Delegates shall number these Classes one two & three & fix
the times of their service by Lot—the first class shall serve for —— years—
the second for —— years & the third for —— years—as their times of
service expire the House of Delegates shall fill them up by elections for ——
years & they shall fill all vacancies that arise from death or resignation for
the time of service remaining of the members so dying or resigning.
Each Senator shall be —— years of age at least—shall have been a
Citizen of the United States 4 years before his election & shall be a resident
of the State he is chosen from. The Senate shall choose its own Officers.
5
Each State shall prescribe the time & manner of holding elections by the
People for the house of Delegates & the House of Delegates shall be the
judges of the elections returns & Qualifications of their members.
In each house a Majority shall constitute a Quorum to do business—
Freedom of Speech & Debate in the legislature shall not be impeached or
Questioned in any place out of it & the Members of both Houses shall in all
cases except for Treason Felony or Breach of the Peace be free from arrest
during their attendance at Congress & in going to & returning from it—Both
Houses shall keep journals of their Proceedings & publish them except on
secret occasions & the yeas & nays may be entered thereon at the desire of
one —— of the members present. Neither house without the consent of the
other shall adjourn for more than —— days nor to any Place but where they
are sitting.
The members of each house shall not be eligible to or capable of holding
any office under the Union during the time for which they have been
respectively elected nor the members of the Senate for one year after.
The members of each house shall be paid for their services by the States
which they represent.
Every bill which shall have passed the Legislature shall be presented to
the President of the United States for his revision—if he approves it he shall
sign it—but if he does not approve it he shall return it with his objections to
the house it originated in which house if two thirds of the members present,
notwithstanding the President's objections agree to pass it, shall send it to the
other house with the President's objections, where if two thirds of the
members present also agree to pass it, the same shall become a law—& all
bills sent to the President & not returned by him within —— days shall be
laws unless the Legislature by their adjournment prevent their return in
which case they shall not be laws.
6th
The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay & collect
Taxes Duties Imposts & excises
To regulate Commerce with all nations & among the several States.
To borrow money & emit bills of Credit
To establish Post offices.
To raise armies
To build & equip Fleets
To pass laws for arming organizing & disciplining the Militia of the
United States
To subdue a rebellion in any State on application of its legislature
To coin money & regulate the Value of all coins & fix the Standard of
Weights & measures
To provide such Dock Yards & arsenals & erect such fortifications as may
be necessary for the United States & to exercise exclusive Jurisdiction
therein
To appoint a Treasurer by ballot
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court
To establish Post & military Roads
To establish & provide for a national University at the Seat of the
Government of the United States
To establish uniform rules of Naturalization
To provide for the establishment of a Seat of Government for the United
States not exceeding —— miles square in which they shall have exclusive
jurisdiction
To make rules concerning Captures from an Enemy
To declare the law & Punishment of piracies & felonies at sea & of
counterfeiting Coin & of all offences against the Laws of Nations
To call forth the aid of the Militia to execute the laws of the Union
enforce treaties suppress insurrections and repel invasions
And to make all laws for carrying the foregoing powers into execution.
The Legislature of the United States shall have the Power to declare the
Punishment of Treason which shall consist only in levying War against the
United States or any of them or in adhering to their Enemies. No person shall
be convicted of Treason but by the testimony of two witnesses.
The proportion of direct taxation shall be regulated by the whole number
of inhabitants of every description which number shall within —— years
after the first meeting of the Legislature & within the term of every ——
year after be taken in the manner to be prescribed by the Legislature
No Tax shall be laid on articles exported from the States—nor capitation
tax but in proportion to the Census before directed
All Laws regulating Commerce shall require the assent of two thirds of
the members present in each house—The United States shall not grant any
title of Nobility—The Legislature of the United States shall pass no Law on
the subject of Religion, nor touching or abridging the Liberty of the Press
nor shall the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus ever be suspended
except in case of Rebellion or Invasion.
All acts made by the Legislature of the United States pursuant to this
Constitution & all Treaties made under the authority of the United States
shall be the supreme Law of the land & all Judges shall be bound to consider
them as such in their decisions.
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The Senate shall have the sole & exclusive power to declare War & to
make treaties & to appoint Ambassadors & other Ministers to foreign nations
& Judges of the Supreme Court.
They shall have the exclusive power to regulate the manner of deciding
all disputes & controversies now subsisting or which may arise between the
States respecting Jurisdiction or Territory.
8
The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America which shall be his style & his title shall be His
Excellency. He shall be elected for —— years & shall be reeligible.
He shall from time to time give information to the Legislature of the state
of the Union & recommend to their consideration the measures he may think
necessary—he shall take care that the laws of the United States be duly
executed: he shall commission all the officers of the United States & except
as to Ambassadors other ministers and Judges of the Supreme Court he shall
nominate & with the consent of the Senate appoint all other officers of the
United States. He shall receive public Ministers from foreign nations & may
correspond with the Executives of the different States. He shall have power
to grant pardons & reprieves except in impeachments—He shall be
Commander in chief of the army & navy of the United States & of the
Militia of the several States & shall receive a compensation which shall not
be increased or diminished during his continuance in office. At entering on
the Duties of his office he shall take an oath faithfully to execute the duties
of a President of the United States.—He shall be removed from his office on
impeachment by the house of Delegates & Conviction in the Supreme Court
of Treason bribery or Corruption—In case of his removal death resignation
or disability the President of the Senate shall exercise the duties of his office
until another President be chosen—& in case of the death of the President of
the Senate the Speaker of the House of Delegates shall do so.
9
The Legislature of the United States shall have the Power and it shall be
their duty to establish such Courts of Law Equity & Admiralty as shall be
necessary—The Judges of the Courts shall hold their offices during good
behaviour & receive a compensation, which shall not be increased or
diminished during their continuance in office—One of these Courts shall be
termed the Supreme Court whose jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising
under the laws of the United States or affecting ambassadors other public
Ministers & Consuls—to the trial of impeachment of officers of the United
States—to all cases of Admiralty & maritime jurisdiction—In cases of
impeachment affecting ambassadors and other public Ministers this
Jurisdiction shall be original & in all other cases appellate——
All criminal offences (except in cases of impeachment) shall be tried in
the State where they shall be committed—the trials shall be open & public &
shall be by Jury.
10
Immediately after the first census of the people of the United States the
House of Delegates shall apportion the Senate by electing for each State out
of the citizens resident therein one Senator for every —— members each
State shall have in the House of Delegates—Each State shall be entitled to
have at least one member in the Senate.
11
No State shall grant letters of marque & reprisal or enter into treaty or
alliance or confederation nor grant any title of nobility nor without the
Consent of the Legislature of the United States lay any impost on imports—
nor keep troops or Ships of War in time of peace—nor enter into compacts
with other States or foreign powers or emit bills of Credit or make any thing
but Gold Silver or Copper a tender in payment of debts nor engage in War
except for self defence when actually invaded or the danger of invasion be so
great as not to admit of a delay until the Government of the United States can
be informed thereof—& to render these prohibitions effectual the Legislature
of the United States shall have the power to revise the laws of the several
States that may be supposed to infringe the Powers exclusively delegated by
this Constitution to Congress & to negative & annul such as do.
12
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges & immunities
of Citizens in the several States—Any person charged with Crimes in any
State fleeing from justice to another shall on demand of the Executive of the
State from which he fled be delivered up & removed to the State having
jurisdiction of the offence.
13
Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislature & to
the records & judicial Proceedings of the Courts & magistrates of every
State.
14
The Legislature shall have power to admit new States into the Union on
the same terms with the original States provided two thirds of the members
present in both Houses agree.
15
On the application of the legislature of a State the United States shall
protect it against domestic insurrection.
16
If two thirds of the Legislatures of the States apply for the same the
Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for the purpose of
amending the Constitution—or should Congress, with the Consent of two
thirds of each house, propose to the States amendments to the same—the
agreement of two thirds of the Legislatures of the States shall be sufficient to
make the said amendments parts of the Constitution.
The Ratification of the conventions of —— States shall be sufficient for
organizing this Constitution.[34]
[34] "... What will be the result of their meeting I cannot with any certainty
determine, but I hardly think much good can come of it; the people of America
don't appear to me to be ripe for any great innovations & it seems they are
ultimately to ratify or reject: the weight of Genl Washington as you justly
observe is very great in America, but I hardly think it is sufficient to induce the
people to pay money or part with power.
"The delegates from the Eastwd are for a very strong government, & wish to
prostrate all ye State legislatures, & form a general system out of ye whole; but I
don't learn that the people are with them, on ye contrary in Massachusetts they
think that government too strong, & are about rebelling again, for the purpose of
making it more democratical: In Connecticut they have rejected the requisition
for ye present year decidedly, & no Man there would be elected to the office of a
constable if he was to declare that he meant to pay a copper towards the
domestic debt:—R. Island has refused to send members—the cry there is for a
good government after they have paid their debts in depreciated paper:—first
demolish the Philistines (i. e. their creditors) then for propiety.
"N. Hampshire has not paid a shilling, since peace, & does not ever mean to
pay on to all eternity:—if it was attempted to tax the people for ye domestic debt
500 Shays would arise in a fortnight.—In N. York they pay well because they
can do it by plundering N. Jersey & Connecticut.—Jersey will go great lengths
from motives of revenge and Interest: Pensylvany will join provided you let the
sessions of the Executive of America be fixed in Philada & give her other
advantages in trade to compensate for the loss of State power. I shall make no
observations on the Southern States, but I think they will be (perhaps from
different motives) as little disposed to part with efficient power as any in the




Roger Sherman (from Connecticut) took his seat.
The House went into Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union.
Mr Gorham was elected to the Chair by Ballot.
The propositions of Mr Randolph which had been referred to the
Com̃ittee being taken up. He moved on the suggestion of Mr G. Morris, that
the first of his propositions to wit "Resolved that the articles of
Confederation ought to be so corrected & enlarged, as to accomplish the
objects proposed by their institution; namely, common defence, security of
liberty, and general welfare,—should be postponed, in order to consider the
3 following:
1. that a union of the States merely federal will not accomplish the
objects proposed by the articles of Confederation, namely common
defence, security of liberty, & genl welfare.
2. that no treaty or treaties among the whole or part of the States, as
individual Sovereignties, would be sufficient.
3. that a national Government ought to be established consisting of
a supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary.
The motion for postponing was seconded by Mr Govr Morris and
unanimously agreed to.
Some verbal criticisms were raised agst the first proposition, and it was
agreed on motion of Mr Butler seconded by Mr Randolph, to pass on to the
third, which underwent a discussion, less however on its general merits than
on the force and extent of the particular terms national & supreme.
Mr Charles Pinkney wished to know of Mr Randolph, whether he meant
to abolish the State Governts altogether. Mr R. replied that he meant by
these general propositions merely to introduce the particular ones which
explained the outlines of the system he had in view.
Mr Butler said he had not made up his mind on the subject, and was open
to the light which discussion might throw on it. After some general
observations he concluded with saying that he had opposed the grant of
powers to Congs heretofore, because the whole power was vested in one
body. The proposed distribution of the powers into different bodies changed
the case, and would induce him to go great lengths.
Genl Pinkney[35] expressed a doubt whether the act of Congs
recom̃ending the Convention, or the Commissions of the Deputies to it,
could authorize a discussion of a system founded on different principles
from the federal Constitution.
[35] "Mr Chs Cotesworth Pinckney is a Gentleman of Family and fortune in his
own State. He has received the advantage of a liberal education, and possesses a
very extensive degree of legal knowledge. When warm in a debate he sometimes
speaks well,—but he is generally considered an indifferent Orator. Mr. Pinckney
was an Officer of high rank in the American Army, and served with great
reputation through the War. He is now about 40 years of age."—Pierce's Notes,
Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 333.
Mr Gerry[36] seemed to entertain the same doubt.
[36] "M. Gerry's character is marked for integrity and perseverance. He is a
hesitating and laborious speaker;—possesses a great degree of confidence and
goes extensively into all subjects that he speaks on, without respect to elegance
or flower of diction. He is connected and sometimes clear in his arguments,
conceives well, and cherishes as his first virtue, a love for his Country. Mr.
Gerry is very much of a Gentleman in his principles and manners;—he has been
engaged in the mercantile line and is a Man of property. He is about 37 years of
age."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 325.
Mr Govr Morris explained the distinction between a federal and national,
supreme, Govt; the former being a mere compact resting on the good faith
of the parties; the latter having a compleat and compulsive operation. He
contended that in all Communities there must be one supreme power, and
one only.
Mr Mason observed that the present confederation was not only deficient
in not providing for coercion & punishment agst delinquent States; but
argued very cogently that punishment could not in the nature of things be
executed on the States collectively, and therefore that such a Govt was
necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and would punish those
only whose guilt required it.
Mr Sherman[37] who took his seat today, admitted that the Confederation
had not given sufficient power to Congs and that additional powers were
necessary; particularly that of raising money which he said would involve
many other powers. He admitted also that the General & particular
jurisdictions ought in no case to be concurrent. He seemed however not to
be disposed to make too great inroads on the existing system; intimating as
one reason, that it would be wrong to lose every amendment, by inserting
such as would not be agreed to by the States.
[37] "Mr Sherman exhibits the oddest shaped character I ever remember to have
met with. He is awkward, un-meaning, and unaccountably strange in his manner.
But in his train of thinking there is something regular, deep, and comprehensive;
yet the oddity of his address, the vulgarisms that accompany his public speaking,
and that strange new England cant which runs through his public as well as his
private speaking make everything that is connected with him grotesque and
laughable;—and yet he deserves infinite praise,—no Man has a better Heart or a
clearer Head. If he cannot embellish he can furnish thoughts that are wise and
useful. He is an able politician and extremely artful in accomplishing any
particular object;—it is remarked that he seldom fails. I am told he sits on the
Bench in Connecticut, and is very correct in the discharge of his Judicial
functions. In the early part of his life he was a Shoe-maker;—but despising the
lowness of his condition, he turned Almanack maker, and so progressed upwards
to a Judge. He has been several years a Member of Congress, and discharged the
duties of his Office with honor and credit to himself, and advantage to the State
he represented. He is about 60."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 326.
It was moved by Mr Read,[38] 2ded by Mr Chs Cotesworth Pinkney, to
postpone the 3d proposition last offered by Mr Randolph viz that a national
Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme Legislative
Executive and Judiciary, in order to take up the following,—viz. "Resolved
that in order to carry into execution the Design of the States in forming this
Convention, and to accomplish the objects proposed by the Confederation a
more effective Government consisting of a Legislative, Executive and
Judiciary, ought to be established." The motion to postpone for this purpose
was lost:
Yeas Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, S. Carolina—4. Nays.
N. Y. Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina—4.
[38] "Mr Read is a Lawyer and a Judge;—his legal abilities are said to be very
great, but his powers of Oratory are fatiguing and tiresome to the last degree;—
his voice is feeble and his articulation so bad that few can have patience to
attend to him. He is a very good Man, and bears an amiable character with those
who know him. Mr. Read is about 50, of a low stature, and a weak
constitution."—Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 330.
On the question as moved by Mr Butler, on the third proposition it was
resolved in Committee of whole that a national governt ought to be
established consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive & Judiciary,—
Massts being ay.—Connect.—no. N. York divided (Col. Hamilton ay. Mr
Yates no.) Pena ay. Delaware ay. Virga ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
The following Resolution, being the 2d of those proposed by Mr
Randolph was taken up, viz.—"that the rights of suffrage in the National
Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the
number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in
different cases."
Mr Madison[39] observing that the words, "or to the number of free
inhabitants," might occasion debates which would divert the Committee
from the general question whether the principle of representation should be
changed, moved that they might be struck out.
[39] "Mr. Madison is a character who has long been in public life; and what is
very remarkable every Person seems to acknowledge his greatness. He blends
together the profound politician, with the Scholar. In the management of every
great question he evidently took the lead in the Convention, and tho' he cannot
be called an Orator, he is a most agreeable, eloquent, and convincing Speaker.
From a spirit of industry and application which he possesses in a most eminent
degree, he always comes forward the best informed Man of any point in debate.
The affairs of the United States, he perhaps, has the most correct knowledge of,
of any Man in the Union. He has been twice a Member of Congress, and was
always thought one of the ablest Members that ever sat in that Council. Mr.
Maddison is about 37 years of age, a Gentleman of great modesty,—with a
remarkable sweet temper. He is easy and unreserved among his acquaintance,
and has a most agreeable style of conversation."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev.,
iii., 331.
Mr King observed that the quotas of contribution which would alone
remain as the measure of representation, would not answer, because waving
every other view of the matter, the revenue might hereafter be so collected
by the General Govt that the sums respectively drawn from the States would
not appear, and would besides be continually varying.
Mr Madison admitted the propriety of the observation, and that some
better rule ought to be found.
Col. Hamilton moved to alter the resolution so as to read "that the rights
of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned to the
number of free inhabitiants." Mr Spaight 2ded the motion.
It was then moved that the Resolution be postponed, which was agreed
to.
Mr Randolph and Mr Madison then moved the following resolution
—"that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be
proportioned."
It was moved and 2ded to amend it by adding "and not according to the
present system"—which was agreed to.
It was then moved & 2ded to alter the resolution so as to read "that the
rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought not to be according to
the present system."
It was then moved & 2ded to postpone the Resolution moved by Mr
Randolph & Mr Madison, which being agreed to:
Mr Madison, moved, in order to get over the difficulties, the following
resolution—"that the equality of suffrage established by the articles of
Confederation ought not to prevail in the national Legislature, and "that an
equitable ratio of representation ought to be substituted." This was 2ded by
Mr Govr Morris, and being generally relished, would have been agreed to;
when,
Mr Reed moved that the whole clause relating to the point of
Representation be postponed; reminding the Come that the deputies from
Delaware were restrained by their com̃ission from assenting to any change
of the rule of suffrage, and in case such a change should be fixed on, it
might become their duty to retire from the Convention.
Mr Govr Morris observed that the valuable assistance of those members
could not be lost without real concern, and that so early a proof of discord
in the Convention as the secession of a State, would add much to the regret;
that the change proposed was however so fundamental an article in a
national Govt, that it could not be dispensed with.
Mr Madison observed that whatever reason might have existed for the
equality of suffrage when the Union was a federal one among sovereign
States, it must cease when a National Governmt, should be put into the
place. In the former case, the acts of Congs depended so much for their
efficacy on the cooperation of the States, that these had a weight both
within & without Congress, nearly in proportion to their extent and
importance. In the latter case, as the acts of the Genl, Govt, would take
effect without the intervention of the State legislatures, a vote from a small
State wd, have the same efficacy & importance as a vote from a large one,
and there was the same reason for different numbers of representatives from
different States, as from Counties of different extents within particular
States. He suggested as an expedient for at once taking the sense of the
members on this point and saving the Delaware deputies from
embarrassment, that the question should be taken in Committee, and the
clause on report to the House, be postponed without a question there. This
however did not appear to satisfy Mr. Read.
By several it was observed that no just construction of the Act of
Delaware, could require or justify a secession of her deputies, even if the
resolution were to be carried thro' the House as well as the Committee. It
was finally agreed however that the clause should be postponed: it being
understood that in the event the proposed change of representation would
certainly be agreed to, no objection or difficulty being started from any
other quarter than from Delaware.
The motion of Mr. Read to postpone being agreed to,
The Committee then rose. The Chairman reported progress, and the
House having resolved to resume the subject in Committee to-morrow,
Adjourned to 10 O Clock.
T        M   31[40]
[40] "This day the state of New Jersey was represented, so that there were now
ten states in Convention."—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 99. But in the
Journal of the Federal Convention (1819), as in Madison's account, New Jersey
is entered as present May 25th. On May 30 two votes are recorded by Madison
and in the Journal without New Jersey. It is probable that an error was made in
the Journal and that Madison followed it.
William Pierce, from Georgia took his seat.[41]
[41] Rufus King kept a few notes of the proceedings of the convention from
May 31st to August 8th. They are meagre, but corroborate Madison's report. See
King's Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, i., 587.
Pierce also kept a few rough notes of the proceedings which were printed in
the Savannah Georgian, April 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 28, 1828, and
reprinted in The American Historical Review, iii., 317 et seq. They throw little
additional light on the debates, but wherever they do are quoted here, as are
King's.
In Committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph's propositions.
The 3d Resolution "that the national Legislature ought to consist of two
branches" was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of
Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Docr Franklin who was
understood to be partial to a single House of Legislation.
Resol: 4. first clause, "that the members of the first branch of the
National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several
States," being taken up,
Mr Sherman opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought to
be by the State Legislatures. The people he said, immediately should have
as little to do as may be about the Government. They want information and
are constantly liable to be misled.
Mr Gerry. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy.
The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. In
Massts it had been fully confirmed by experience that they are daily misled
into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false reports circulated
by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute. One principal
evil arises from the want of due provision for those employed in the
administration of Governmt. It would seem to be a maxim of democracy to
starve the public servants. He mentioned the popular clamour in Massts for
the reduction of salaries and the attack made on that of the Govr though
secured by the spirit of the Constitution itself. He had he said been too
republican heretofore: he was still however republican, but had been taught
by experience the danger of the levelling spirit.
Mr Mason argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the
people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the
Govt. It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons—It ought to know
& sympathize with every part of the community; and ought therefore to be
taken not only from different parts of the whole republic, but also from
different districts of the larger members of it, which had in several instances
particularly in Virga, different interests and views arising from difference of
produce, of habits &c &c. He admitted that we had been too democratic but
was afraid we sd incautiously run into the opposite extreme. We ought to
attend to the rights of every class of the people. He had often wondered at
the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of humanity
& policy, considering that however affluent their circumstances, or elevated
their situations, might be, the course of a few years, not only might but
certainly would, distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of
Society. Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment, ought to
recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for
the rights and happiness of the lowest than of the highest orders of Citizens.
Mr Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch
of the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the
federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished to
give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long subsist
without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government this
confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it wrong to increase
the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the electors of the
national Legislature. All interference between the general and local
Governmts should be obviated as much as possible. On examination it
would be found that the opposition of States to federal measures had
proceeded much more from the officers of the States, than from the people
at large.
Mr Madison considered the popular election of one branch of the
national Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government. He
observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was
composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body
of electors. That if the first branch of the general legislature should be
elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the first—
the Executive by the second together with the first; and other appointments
again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be
lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their
rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an advocate for the policy of
refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations, but thought it
might be pushed too far. He wished the expedient to be resorted to only in
the appointment of the second branch of the Legislature, and in the
Executive & judiciary branches of the Government. He thought too that the
great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest
on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand
merely on the pillars of the Legislatures.
Mr Gerry did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from
the British Constitution were often fallacious when applied to our situation
which was extremely different. Experience he said had shewn that the State
legislatures drawn immediately from the people did not always possess
their confidence. He had no objection however to an election by the people
if it were so qualified that men of honor & character might not be unwilling
to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to think the people might
nominate a certain number out of which the State legislatures should be
bound to choose.[42]
[42] "Mr. Strong would agree to the principle, provided it would undergo a
certain modification, but pointed out nothing."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev.,
iii., 318.
Mr Butler thought an election by the people an impracticable mode.
On the question for an election of the first branch of the national
Legislature, by the people,
Massts ay. Connect divd. N. York ay. N. Jersey no. Pena ay.
Delawr divd. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Georga ay.
The remaiñg Clauses of Resolution 4th relating to the qualifications of
members of the National Legislature, being pospd nem. con., as entering too
much into detail for general propositions.
The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5. "that the second, (or
senatorial) branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the
first branch out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures."
Mr Spaight contended that the 2d branch ought to be chosen by the State
Legislatures and moved an amendment to that effect.[43]
[43] "Mr King observed that the Question called for was premature, and out of
order,—that unless we go on regularly from one principle to the other we shall
draw out our proceedings to an endless length."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev.,
iii., 318.
Mr Butler apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands
of the States as was proposed, tended to destroy all that balance and
security of interests among the States which it was necessary to preserve;
and called on Mr Randolph the mover of the propositions, to explain the
extent of his ideas, and particularly the number of members he meant to
assign to this second branch.
Mr Randf observed that he had at the time of offering his propositions
stated his ideas as far as the nature of general propositions required; that
details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with propriety have
been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to the number of the
second branch, he should say that it ought to be much smaller than that of
the first; so small as to be exempt from the passionate proceedings to which
numerous assemblies are liable. He observed that the general object was to
provide a cure for the evils under which the U. S. laboured; that in tracing
these evils to their origin every man had found it in the turbulance and
follies of democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for agst
this tendency of our Governments: and that a good Senate seemed most
likely to answer the purpose.[44]
[44] "Butler said that until the number of the Senate could be known it would be
impossible for him to give a vote on it."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii.,
318.
Mr King reminded the Committee that the choice of the second branch as
proposed (by Mr Spaight) viz. by the State Legislatures would be
impracticable, unless it was to be very numerous, or the idea of proportion
among the States was to be disregarded. According to this idea, there must
be 80 or 100 members to entitle Delaware to the choice of one of them.—
Mr Spaight withdrew his motion.
Mr Wilson opposed both a nomination by the State Legislatures, and an
election by the first branch of the national Legislature, because the second
branch of the latter, ought to be independent of both. He thought both
branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the people, but
was not prepared with a specific proposition. He suggested the mode of
chusing the Senate of N. York to wit of uniting several election districts for
one branch, in chusing members for the other branch, as a good model.
Mr Madison observed that such a mode would destroy the influence of
the smaller States associated with larger ones in the same district; as the
latter would chuse from within themselves, altho' better men might be
found in the former. The election of Senators in Virga where large & small
counties were often formed into one district for the purpose, had illustrated
this consequence. Local partiality, would often prefer a resident within the
County or State, to a candidate of superior merit residing out of it. Less
merit also in a resident would be more known throughout his own State.[45]
[45] "Mr Butler moved to have the proposition relating to the first branch
postponed, in order to take up another,—which was that the second branch of the
Legislature consist of blank.
"Mr King objected to the postponement for the reasons which he had offered
before."—Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 319.
Mr Sherman favored an election of one member by each of the State
Legislatures.[46]
[46] According to Pierce, Mason spoke after Sherman, and Pinckney's motion is
given more fully by Pierce than by Madison.
"Mr Mason was of opinion that it would be highly improper to draw the
Senate out of the first branch; that it would occasion vacancies which would cost
much time, trouble, and expense to have filled up,—besides which it would
make the members too dependent on the first branch.
"Mr Chs Pinckney said he meant to propose to divide the Continent into four
Divisions, out of which a certain number of persons shd be nominated, and out
of that nomination to appoint a senate."—Pierce's Notes, Amer. Hist. Rev., iii.,
319.
Mr Pinkney moved to strike out the "nomination by the State
Legislatures;" on this question.
[47]Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pena no. Del. divd Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg no.
[47] This question is omitted in the printed Journal, & the votes applied to the
succeeding one, instead of the votes as here stated.—Madison's Note.
On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of nominations
by the State Legislatures, Mass. ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no.
Pena no. Del. no. Virga ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Ga no.
So the clause was disagreed to & a chasm left in this part of the plan.
The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which the national Legislature
ought to legislate was next taken into discussion: On the question whether
each branch shd originate laws, there was an unanimous affirmative without
debate. On the question for transferring all the Legislative power of the
existing Congs to this Assembly, there was also a silent affirmative nem.
con.
On the proposition for giving "Legislative power in all cases to which
the State Legislatures were individually incompetent,"
Mr Pinkney & Mr Rutledge[48] objected to the vagueness of the term
incompetent, and said they could not well decide how to vote until they
should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this
definition.[49]
[48] "Mr. Rutledge is one of those characters who was highly mounted at the
commencement of the late revolution;—his reputation in the first Congress gave
him a distinguished rank among the American Worthies. He was bred to the
Law, and now acts as one of the Chancellors of South Carolina. This Gentleman
is much famed in his own State as an Orator, but in my opinion he is too rapid in
his public speaking to be denominated an agreeable Orator. He is undobotedly a
man of abilities, and a Gentleman of distinction and fortune. Mr. Rutledge was
once Governor of South Carolina. He is about 48 years of age."—Pierce's Notes,
Amer. Hist. Rev., iii., 333.
[49] According to Pierce:
"Mr Sherman was of opinion that it would be too indefinitely expressed,—
and yet it would be hard to define all the powers by detail. It appeared to him
that it would be improper for the national Legislature to negative all the Laws
that were connected with the States themselves.
"Mr Madison said it was necessary to adopt some general principles on
which we should act,—that we were wandering from one thing to another
without seeming to be settled in any one principle.
"Mr Wythe observed that it would be right to establish general principles
before we go into detail, or very shortly Gentlemen would find themselves in
confusion, and would be obliged to have recurrence to the point from whence
they sat out.
"Mr King was of opinion that the principles ought first to be established
before we proceed to the framing of the Act. He apprehends that the principles
only go so far as to embrace all the power that is given up by the people to the
Legislature, and to the federal Government, but no farther.
"Mr Randolph was of opinion that it would be impossible to define the
powers and the length to which the federal Legislature ought to extend just at
this time.
"Mr Wilson observed that it would be impossible to enumerate the powers
which the federal Legislature ought to have."—Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 319, 320.
Mr Butler repeated his fears that we were running into an extreme in
taking away the powers of the States, and called on Mr. Randolph for the
extent of his meaning.
Mr Randolph disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the
national Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an
inroad on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not think any
considerations whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion
was fixed on this point.
Mr Madison said that he had brought with him into the Convention a
strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers
necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also brought
doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered; but his
doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might ultimately be he could
not yet tell. But he should shrink from nothing which should be found
essential to such a form of Gov^[t.] as would provide for the safety, liberty
and happiness of the community. This being the end of all our deliberations,
all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be
submitted to.
On the question for giving powers, in cases to which the States are not
competent—Massts ay. Cont divd. (Sherman no. Elseworth ay.) N. Y. ay.
N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. Carolina ay. Georga ay.
The other clauses giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among
the States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the Nat.
Leg. the articles of union, down to the last clause, (the words "or any
treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union," being added after the
words "contravening &c. the articles of the Union," on motion of Dr
Franklin) were agreed to witht debate or dissent.
The last clause of Resolution 6, authorizing an exertion of the force of
the whole agst a delinquent State came next into consideration.
Mr Madison, observed that the more he reflected on the use of force, the
more he doubted, the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when
applied to people collectively and not individually.—A union of the States
containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction.
The use of force agst a State, would look more like a declaration of war,
than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the
party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might
be bound. He hoped that such a system would be framed as might render
this resource unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed. This
motion was agreed to, nem. con.
The Committee then rose & the House
Adjourned.[50]
[50] "When the Convention first opened at Philadelphia, there were a number of
propositions brought forward as great leading principles for the new
Government to be established for the United States. A copy of these propositions
was given to each Member with an injunction to keep everything a profound
secret. One morning, by accident, one of the Members dropt his copy of the
propositions, which being luckily picked up by General Mifflin was presented to
General Washington, our President, who put it in his pocket. After the debates of
the Day were over, and the question for adjournment was called for, the General
arose from his seat, and previous to his putting the question addressed the
Convention in the following manner,—
"'Gentlemen
"'I am sorry to find that some one Member of this Body, has been so
neglectful of the secrets of the Convention as to drop in the State House, a copy
of their proceedings, which by accident was picked up and delivered to me this
Morning. I must entreat Gentlemen to be more careful, lest our transactions get
into the News Papers, and disturb the public repose by premature speculations. I
know not whose Paper it is, but there it is [throwing it down on the table,] let
him who owns it take it.' At the same time he bowed, picked up his Hat, and
quitted the room with a dignity so severe that every Person seemed alarmed; for
my part I was extremely so, for putting my hand in my pocket I missed my copy
of the same Paper, but advancing up to the Table my fears soon dissipated; I
found it to be in the hand writing of another Person. When I went to my lodgings
at the Indian Queen, I found my copy in a coat pocket which I had pulled off that
Morning. It is something remarkable that no Person ever owned the Paper."—
Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 324.
F      J    1   1787
William Houston from Georgia took his seat.
The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution 7. "that a national
Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national Legislature for the
term of —— years &c to be ineligible thereafter, to possess the Executive
powers of Congress &c."
Mr Pinkney was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive
powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace & war &c which
would render the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an
elective one.
Mr Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a single person. Mr C.
Pinkney seconded the motion, so as to read "that a National Ex. to consist
of a single person, be instituted."
A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman asking if he should put
the question, Docr Franklin[51] observed that it was a point of great
importance and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments
on it before the question was put.
[51] "Dr Franklin is well known to be the greatest phylosopher of the present
age;—all the operations of nature he seems to understand,—the very heavens
obey him, and the Clouds yield up their Lightning to be imprisoned in his rod.
But what claim he has to the politician, posterity must determine. It is certain
that he does not shine much in public Council,—he is no Speaker, nor does he
seem to let politics engage his attention. He is, however, a most extraordinary
Man, and he tells a story in a style more engaging than anything I ever heard.
Let his Biographer finish his character. He is 82 years old, and possesses an
activity of mind equal to a youth of 25 years of age."—Pierce's Notes, Amer.
Hist. Rev., iii., 328.
Mr Rutlidge animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other
subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves precluded by
having frankly disclosed their opinions from afterwards changing them,
which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was for vesting the
Executive power in a single person, tho' he was not for giving him the
power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest responsibility
and administer the public affairs best.
Mr Sherman said he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing
more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect,
that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the
Legislature only, which was the depository of the supreme will of the
Society. As they were the best judges of the business which ought to be
done by the Executive department, and consequently of the number
necessary from time to time for doing it, he wished the number might not be
fixed, but that the legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more as
experience might dictate.
Mr Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch
and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the
British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some
of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war
& peace &c. The only powers he considered strictly Executive were those
of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to and
appointed by the Legislature.[52]
[52] According to King, Madison followed Wilson: "Madison agreed with
Wilson in the Definition of Executive power. Ex vi termini. Executive power
does not include the Power of War and Peace. Executive Power shd. be limited
and defined. If large, we shall have the Evils of Elective Monarchies. Perhaps
the best plan will be a single Executive of long duration, with a Council and with
Liberty to dissent on his personal Responsibility."—King's Life and
Correspondence of Rufus King, i., 588.
According to Pierce:
"Mr Madison was of opinion that an Executive formed of one Man
would answer the purpose when aided by a Council, who should have the
right to advise and record their proceedings, but not to control his
authority."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 320.
Mr Gerry favored the policy of annexing a Council to the Executive in
order to give weight & inspire confidence.[53]
[53] King gives Gerry's remarks: "Gerry. I am in favor of a Council to advise the
Executive: they will be organs of information respecting Persons qualified for
various offices. Their opinions may be recorded, so as to be liable to be called to
account & impeached—in this way, their Responsibility will be certain, and for
misconduct their Punishment sure."
Dickinson followed Gerry: "Dickinson. A limited yet vigorous Executive is
not republican, but peculiar to monarchy—the royal Executive has vigour, not
only by power, but by popular Attachment & Report—an Equivalent to popular
Attachment may be derived from the Veto on the Legislative acts. We cannot
have a limited monarchy—our condition does not permit it. Republics are in the
beginning and for a time industrious, but they finally destroy themselves because
they are badly constituted. I dread the consolidation of the States, & hope for a
good national Govt. from the present Division of the States with a feeble
Executive.
"We are to have a Legislature of two branches, or two Legislatures, as the
sovereign of the nation—this will work a change unless you provide that the
judiciary shall aid and correct the Executive. The first Branch of the Legislature,
the H. of Representatives, must be on another plan. The second Branch or Senate
may be on the present scheme of representing the States—the Representatives to
be apportioned according to the Quotas of the States paid into the general
Treasury. The Executive to be removed from office by the national Legislature,
on the Petition of seven States."—King's Life and Correspondence of Rufus
King, i., 588 et seq.
Mr Randolph strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy.
He regarded it as the fœtus of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be
governed by the British Govenmt as our prototype. He did not mean
however to throw censure on that Excellent fabric. If we were in a situation
to copy it he did not know that he should be opposed to it; but the fixt
genius of the people of America required a different form of Government.
He could not see why the great requisites for the Executive department,
vigor, dispatch & responsibility could not be found in three men, as well as
in one man. The Executive ought to be independent. It ought therefore in
order to support its independence to consist of more than one.
Mr Wilson said that unity in the Executive instead of being the fetus of
monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated that he
was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable to the
situation of this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the manners
so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic would do for
it.
Mr Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was postponed by common
consent, the Committee seeming unprepared for any decision on it; and the
first part of the clause agreed to, viz—"that a National Executive be
instituted."[54]
[54] Williamson followed Wilson, according to King: "Williamson—There is no
true difference between an Executive composed of a single person, with a
Council, and an Executive composed of three or more persons."—King's Life
and Correspondence of Rufus King, i., 590.
Mr Madison thought it would be proper, before a choice shd be made
between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to fix the extent of the
Executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature Executive,
and must be given to that departmt whether administered by one or more
persons, a definition of their extent would assist the judgment in
determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a single officer. He
accordingly moved that so much of the clause before the Committee as
related to the powers of the Executive shd be struck out & that after the
words "that a national Executive ought to be instituted" there be inserted the
words following viz. "with power to carry into effect the national laws, to
appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such
other powers "not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature," as may from
time to time be delegated by the national Legislature." The words "not
legislative nor judiciary in their nature" were added to the proposed
amendment, in consequence of a suggestion by Genl Pinkney that improper
powers might otherwise be delegated.
Mr Wilson seconded this motion.
Mr Pinkney moved to amend the amendment by striking out the last
member of it; viz: "and to execute such other powers not Legislative nor
Judiciary in their nature as may from time to time be delegated." He said
they were unnecessary, the object of them being included in the "power to
carry into effect the national laws."
Mr Randolph seconded the motion.
Mr Madison did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or
even the preceding words, "to appoint to offices &c. the whole being
perhaps included in the first member of the proposition. He did not however
see any inconveniency in retaining them, and cases might happen in which
they might serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions.
In consequence of the motion of Mr Pinkney, the question on Mr
Madison's motion was divided; and the words objected to by Mr Pinkney
struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y., N. J., Pena, Del., N. C., &
Geo. agst Mass., Virga & S. Carolina the preceding part of the motion being
first agreed to; Connecticut divided all the other States in the affirmative.
The next clause in Resolution 7, relating to the mode of appointing, &
the duration of, the Executive being under consideration,
Mr Wilson said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he
wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical.
He would say however at least that in theory he was for an election by the
people. Experience, particularly in N. York & Massts, shewed that an
election of the first magistrate by the people at large, was both a convenient
& successful mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be persons
whose merits have general notoriety.
Mr Sherman was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making
him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which was
to be executed. An independence of the Executive on the supreme
Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was any
such thing.
Mr Wilson moves that the blank for the term of duration should be filled
with three years, observing at the same time that he preferred this short
period, on the supposition that a re-eligibility would be provided for.
Mr Pinkney moves for seven years.
Mr Sherman was for three years, and agst the doctrine of rotation as
throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties.
Mr Mason was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a re-eligibility
as the best expedient both for preventing the effect of a false complaisance
on the side of the Legislature towards unfit characters; and a temptation on
the side of the Executive to intrigue with the Legislature for a re-
appointment.
Mr Bedford[55] was strongly opposed to so long a term as seven years.
He begged the Committee to consider what the situation of the Country
would be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for such a
period and it should be found on trial that he did not possess the
qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his appointment.
An impeachment he said would be no cure for this evil, as an impeachment
would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity. He was for a triennial
election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine years.
[55] "Mr. Bedford was educated for the Bar, and in his profession I am told, has
merit. He is a bold and nervous Speaker, and has a very commanding and
striking manner;—but he is warm and impetuous in his temper, and precipitate
in his judgment. Mr. Bedford is about 32 years old, and very corpulent."—
Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 330.
On the question for seven years,
Massts dividd. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pena ay. Del. ay. Virga ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geor. no.
There being 5 ays, 4 noes, & 1 divd, a question was asked whether a
majority had voted in the Affirmative? The President decided that it was an
affirmative vote.
The mode of appointing the Executive was the next question.
Mr Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the
people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature from
the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but the
Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of each
other, as well as of the States;
Col. Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes
however that Mr Wilson might have time to digest it into his own form.—
the clause, "to be chosen by the National Legislature"—was accordingly
postponed.—
Mr Rutlidge suggests an election of the Executive by the second branch
only of the national Legislature.
The Committee then rose and the House
Adjourned.
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William Saml Johnson from Connecticut, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer,
from Maryd, & John Lansing Jr from N. York, took their seats.
It was movd & 2ded to postpone ye Resol: of Mr Randolph respecting the
Executive, in order to take up the 2d branch of the Legislature; which being
negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. S. C. Geo: agst N. Y. Pena Maryd.
The mode of appointing the Executive was resumed.
Mr Wilson made the following motion, to be substituted for the mode
proposed by Mr. Randolph's resolution, "that the Executive Magistracy
shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided into
—— districts: & that the persons qualified to vote in each district for
members of the first branch of the national Legislature elect —— members
for their respective districts to be electors of the Executive Magistracy, that
the said Electors of the Executive magistracy meet at —— and they or any
—— of them so met shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their
own body —— person— in whom the Executive authority of the national
Government shall be vested."
Mr Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the
intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce
more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an election
by the national Legislature.
Mr Gerry, opposed the election by the National legislature. There would
be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature & the
candidates wd bargain & play into one another's hands, votes would be
given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter, of
recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or to their
friends. He liked the principle of Mr Wilson's motion, but fears it would
alarm & give a handle to the State partizans, as tending to supersede
altogether the State authorities. He thought the Community not yet ripe for
stripping the States of their powers, even such as might not be requisite for
local purposes. He was for waiting till the people should feel more the
necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the suffrages of the States,
instead of Electors, or letting the Legislatures nominate, and the electors
appoint. He was not clear that the people ought to act directly even in the
choice of electors, being too little informed of personal characters in large
districts, and liable to deceptions.
Mr Williamson[56] could see no advantage in the introduction of Electors
chosen by the people who would stand in the same relation to them as the
State Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be attended with great
trouble and expence.
[56] "Mr. Williamson is a Gentleman of education and talents. He enters freely
into public debate from his close attention to most subjects, but he is no Orator.
There is a great degree of good humour and pleasantry in his character; and in
his manners there is a strong trait of the Gentleman. He is about 48 years of
age."—Pierce's Notes, Amer. Hist. Rev., iii., 332.
On the question for agreeing to Mr Wilson's substitute, it was negatived:
Massts no. Cont no. N. Y.[57] no. Pa ay. Del. no. Mard ay. Virga no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geoa no.
[57] New York, in the printed Journal, divided.—Madison's Note.
On the question for electing the Executive by the national Legislature for
the term of seven years, it was agreed to, Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. ay.
Pena no. Del. ay. Maryd no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Docr Franklin moved that what related to the compensation for the
services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute—"whose
necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive no salary,
stipend fee or reward whatsoever for their services." He said that being very
sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he had been unwilling to trust
to that for the observations which seemed to support his motion and had
reduced them to writing, that he might with the permission of the
Committee read instead of speaking them. Mr Wilson made an offer to read
the paper, which was accepted. The following is a literal copy of the paper:
Sir,
It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of any
one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to the
honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first reading I
have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it success. In this
particular of salaries to the Executive branch I happen to differ; and as
my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a
persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty that I hazard it. The
Committee will judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and
their judgment may possibly change mine.—I think I see
inconveniences in the appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing
them, but on the contrary, great advantages.
Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the
affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of power, and
the love of money. Separately each of these has great force in
prompting men to action; but when united in view of the same object,
they have in many minds the most violent effects. Place before the
eyes of such men, a post of honour that shall be at the same time a
place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. The
vast number of such places it is that renders the British Government so
tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true sources of all those
factions which are perpetually dividing the Nation, distracting its
Councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless & mischievous wars, and
often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of peace.
And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable pre-
eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the
infinite mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of
characters? It will not be the wise and moderate, the lovers of peace
and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the
violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their
selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your Government
and be your rulers.—And these too will be mistaken in the expected
happiness of their situation: For their vanquished competitors of the
same spirit, and from the same motives will perpetually be
endeavouring to distress their administration, thwart their measures,
and render them odious to the people.
Besides these evils, Sir, tho' we may set out in the beginning with
moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of long
continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed
augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more to the
rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give more to them.
Hence as all history informs us, there has been in every State &
Kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the Governing &
Governed; the one striving to obtain more for its support, and the other
to pay less. And this has alone occasioned great convulsions, actual
civil wars, ending either in dethroning of the Princes, or enslaving of
the people. Generally indeed the ruling power carries its point, the
revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see that they are
never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the people are
discontented with the oppression of taxes; the greater need the prince
has of money to distribute among his partizans and pay the troops that
are to suppress all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure.
There is scarce a king in an hundred who would not, if he could,
follow the example of Pharoah, get first all the people's money, then all
their lands, and then make them and their children servants for ever. It
will be said, that we don't propose to establish Kings. I know it. But
there is a natural inclination in mankind to Kingly Government. It
sometimes relieves them from Aristocratic domination. They had
rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives more of the
appearance of equality among Citizens, and that they like. I am
apprehensive therefore, perhaps too apprehensive, that the Government
of these States, may in future times, end in a Monarchy. But this
Catastrophe I think may be long delayed, if in our proposed System we
do not sow the seeds of contention, faction & tumult, by making our
posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear that tho' we do employ
at first a number, and not a single person, the number will in time be
set aside, it will only nourish the fœtus of a King, as the honorable
gentleman from Virginia very aptly expressed it, and a King will the
sooner be set over us.
It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian Idea, and that
we can never find men to serve us in the Executive department,
without paying them well for their services. I conceive this to be a
mistake. Some existing facts present themselves to me, which incline
me to a contrary opinion. The high Sheriff of a County in England is
an honorable office, but it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive
and therefore not sought for. But yet, it is executed and well executed,
and usually by some of the principal Gentlemen of the County. In
France, the office of Counsellor, or Member of their Judiciary
Parliaments is more honorable. It is therefore purchased at a high
price: There are indeed fees on the law proceedings, which are divided
among them, but these fees do not amount to more than three Per Cent
on the sum paid for the place. Therefore as legal interest is there at five
PerCt they in fact pay two PerCt for being allowed to do the Judiciary
business of the Nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from
the burden of paying them any salaries for their services. I do not
however mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our Judiciary
department. I only bring the instance to shew that the pleasure of doing
good & serving their Country and the respect such conduct entitles
them to, are sufficient motives with some minds to give up a great
portion of their time to the Public, without the mean inducement of
pecuniary satisfaction.
Another instance is that of a respectable Society who have made the
experiment, and practised it with success more than one hundred years.
I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule with them, that they are
not to go to law; but in their controversies they must apply to their
monthly, quarterly and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with
patience to hear the parties, and spend much time in composing their
differences. In doing this, they are supported by a sense of duty, and
the respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed, but it
is never made profitable by salaries, fees or perquisites. And indeed in
all cases of Public service the less the profit the greater the honor.
To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen, the great and
most important of our offices, that of General of our armies executed
for eight years together without the smallest salary, by a Patriot whom
I will not now offend by any other praise; and this through fatigues and
distresses in common with the other brave men his military friends &
companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station? And
shall we doubt finding three or four men in all the U. States, with
public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful Council for perhaps an
equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our
laws are duly executed. Sir, I have a better opinion of our Country. I
think we shall never be without a sufficient number of wise and good
men to undertake and execute well and faithfully the office in question.
Sir. The saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is not an
object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them are what
I apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the amendment. If it is not
seconded or accepted I must be contented with the satisfaction of
having delivered my opinion frankly and done my duty.
The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton, with the view he said
merely of bringing so respectable a proposition before the Committee, and
which was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of
weight. No debate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the
consideration of the members. It was treated with great respect, but rather
for the author of it, than from any apparent conviction of its expediency or
practicability.
Mr Dickinson moved,[58] "that the Executive be made removable by the
National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of
individual States." It was necessary he said to place the power of removing
somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the Great officers of
State. He did not know how provision could be made for removal of them
in a better mode than that which he had proposed. He had no idea of
abolishing the State Governments as some gentlemen seemed inclined to
do. The happiness of this Country in his opinion required considerable
powers to be left in the hands of the States.
[58] "Mr. Dickinson has been famed through all America for his Farmers
Letters; he is a Scholar, and said to be a Man of very extensive information.
When I saw him in the Convention I was induced to pay the greatest attention to
him whenever he spoke. I had often heard that he was a great Orator, but I found
him an indifferent Speaker. With an affected air of wisdom he labors to produce
a trifle,—his language is irregular and incorrect,—his flourishes, (for he
sometimes attempts them,) are like expiring flames, they just shew themselves
and go out;—no traces of them are left on the mind to chear or animate it. He is,
however, a good writer and will be ever considered one of the most important
characters in the United States. He is about 55 years old, and was bred a
Quaker."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 329.
Mr Bedford seconded the motion.
Mr Sherman contended that the national Legislature should have power
to remove the Executive at pleasure.
Mr Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered
indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the
corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the
Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a violation of the
fundamental principle of good Government.
Mr Madison & Mr Wilson observed that it would leave an equality of
agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable a minority of
the people to prevent ye removal of an officer who had rendered himself
justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it would open a door for
intrigues agst him in States where his administration tho' just might be
unpopular, and might tempt him to pay court to particular States whose
leading partizans he might fear, or wish to engage as his partizans. They
both thought it bad policy to introduce such a mixture of the State
authorities, where their agency could be otherwise supplied.
Mr Dickinson considered the business as so important that no man ought
to be silent or reserved. He went into a discourse of some length, the sum of
which was, that the Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary departments ought
to be made as independt as possible; but that such an Executive as some
seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent with a republic: that a
firm Executive could only exist in a limited monarchy. In the British Govt
itself the weight of the Executive arises from the attachments which the
Crown draws to itself, & not merely from the force of its prerogatives. In
place of these attachments we must look out for something else. One source
of stability is the double branch of the Legislature. The division of the
Country into distinct States formed the other principal source of stability.
This division ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers to
be left with the States. This was the ground of his consolation for the future
fate of his Country. Without this, and in case of a consolidation of the States
into one great Republic, we might read its fate in the history of smaller
ones. A limited Monarchy he considered as one of the best Governments in
the world. It was not certain that the same blessings were derivable from
any other form. It was certain that equal blessings had never yet been
derived from any of the republican form. A limited Monarchy however was
out of the question. The spirit of the times—the state of our affairs forbade
the experiment, if it were desireable. Was it possible moreover in the nature
of things to introduce it even if these obstacles were less insuperable. A
House of Nobles was essential to such a Govt could these be created by a
breath, or by a stroke of the pen? No. They were the growth of ages, and
could only arise under a complication of circumstances none of which
existed in this Country. But though a form the most perfect perhaps in itself
be unattainable, we must not despair. If antient republics have been found to
flourish for a moment only & then vanish for ever, it only proves that they
were badly constituted; and that we ought to seek for every remedy for their
diseases. One of these remedies he conceived to be the accidental lucky
division of this Country into distinct States; a division which some seemed
desirous to abolish altogether.
As to the point of representation in the national Legislature as it might
affect States of different sizes, he said it must probably end in mutual
concession. He hoped that each State would retain an equal voice at least in
one branch of the National Legislature, and supposed the sums paid within
each State would form a better ratio for the other branch than either the
number of inhabitants or the quantum of property.[59]
[59] According to Pierce: "Mr Madison said it was far from being his wish that
every executive Officer should remain in Office, without being amenable to
some Body for his conduct."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 321.
A motion being made to strike out, "on request by a majority of the
Legislatures of the individual States," and rejected, Connecticut, S. Carol:
& Geo. being ay, the rest no: the question on Mr Dickinson's motion for
making Executive removable by Natl Legislature at request of majority of
State Legislatures was also rejected all the States being in the negative
Except Delaware which gave an affirmative vote.
The Question for making ye Executive ineligible after seven years, was
next taken and agreed to: Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. Pa divd. Del. ay.
Maryd ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.[60]
[60] In printed Journal Geo. ay.—Madison's Note.
Mr Williamson 2ded by Mr Davie[61] moved to add to the last clause, the
words—"and to be removable on impeachment & conviction of mal-
practice or neglect of duty"—which was agreed to.
[61] "Mr. Davey is a Lawyer of some eminence in his State. He is said to have a
good classical education, and is a Gentleman of considerable literary talents. He
was silent in the Convention, but his opinion was always respected. Mr. Davy is
about 30 years of age."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 332.
Mr Rutlidge & Mr C. Pinkney moved that the blank for the no of persons
in the Executive be filled with the words "one person." He supposed the
reasons to be so obvious & conclusive in favor of one that no member
would oppose the motion.
Mr Randolph opposed it with great earnestness, declaring that he should
not do justice to the Country which sent him if he were silently to suffer the
establishmt of a Unity in the Executive department. He felt an opposition to
it which he believed he should continue to feel as long as he lived. He urged
1. that the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very
semblance of Monarchy. 2. that a unity was unnecessary a plurality being
equally competent to all the objects of the department. 3. that the necessary
confidence would never be reposed in a single Magistrate. 4. that the
appointments would generally be in favor of some inhabitant near the center
of the Community, and consequently the remote parts would not be on an
equal footing. He was in favor of three members of the Executive to be
drawn from different portions of the country.
Mr Butler contended strongly for a single magistrate as most likely to
answer the purpose of the remote parts. If one man should be appointed he
would be responsible to the whole, and would be impartial to its interests. If
three or more should be taken from as many districts, there would be a
constant struggle for local advantages. In Military matters this would be
particularly mischievous. He said his opinion on this point had been formed
under the opportunity he had had of seeing the manner in which a plurality
of military heads distracted Holland when threatened with invasion by the
imperial troops. One man was for directing the force to the defence of this
part, another to that part of the Country, just as he happened to be swayed
by prejudice or interest.
The motion was then postpd, the Committee rose & the House Adjd.
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The Question was resumed on motion of Mr Pinkney, 2ded by Mr Wilson,
"shall the blank for the number of the Executive be filled with a single
person?"
Mr Wilson was in favor of the motion. It had been opposed by the
gentleman from Virga (Mr. Randolph) but the arguments used had not
convinced him. He observed that the objections of Mr R. were levelled not
so much agst the measure itself, as agst its unpopularity. If he could suppose
that it would occasion a rejection of the plan of which it should form a part,
though the part were an important one, yet he would give it up rather than
lose the whole. On examination he could see no evidence of the alledged
antipathy of the people. On the contrary he was persuaded that it does not
exist. All know that a single magistrate is not a King. One fact has great
weight with him. All the 13 States tho agreeing in scarce any other instance,
agree in placing a single magistrate at the head of the Governt. The idea of
three heads has taken place in none. The degree of power is indeed
different; but there are no co-ordinate heads. In addition to his former
reasons for preferring a Unity, he would mention another. The tranquillity
not less than the vigor of the Govt he thought would be favored by it.
Among three equal members, he foresaw nothing but uncontrouled,
continued, & violent animosities; which would not only interrupt the public
administration; but diffuse their poison thro' the other branches of Govt,
thro' the States, and at length thro' the people at large. If the members were
to be unequal in power the principle of opposition to the Unity was given
up. If equal, the making them an odd number would not be a remedy. In
Courts of Justice there are two sides only to a question. In the Legislative &
Executive departmts questions have commonly many sides. Each member
therefore might espouse a separate one & no two agree.[62]
[62] According to Pierce, King followed Wilson:
"Mr. King was of opinion that the Judicial ought not to join in the
negative of a Law, because the Judges will have the expounding of those
Laws when they come before them; and they will no doubt stop the
operation of such as shall appear repugnant to the Constitution."—Pierce's
Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 322.
Mr Sherman. This matter is of great importance and ought to be well
considered before it is determined. Mr Wilson he said had observed that in
each State a single magistrate was placed at the head of the Govt. It was so
he admitted, and properly so, and he wished the same policy to prevail in
the federal Govt. But then it should be also remarked that in all the States
there was a Council of advice, without which the first magistrate could not
act. A council he thought necessary to make the establishment acceptable to
the people. Even in G. B. the King has a Council; and though he appoints it
himself, its advice has its weight with him, and attracts the Confidence of
the people.
Mr Williamson asks Mr Wilson whether he means to annex a Council.
Mr Wilson means to have no Council, which oftener serves to cover,
than prevent malpractices.
Mr Gerry was at a loss to discover the policy of three members for the
Executive. It wd be extremely inconvenient in many instances, particularly
in military matters, whether relating to the militia, an army, or a navy. It
would be a general with three heads.
On the question for a single Executive it was agreed to Massts ay.
Cont ay. N. Y. no. Pena ay. Del. no. Maryd no. Virga ay. (Mr R. & Mr Blair
no—Docr McCg Mr M. & Gen. W. ay. Col. Mason being no., but not in the
house, Mr Wythe ay. but gone home). N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Georga ay.
First Clause of Proposition 8th relating to a Council of Revision taken
into consideration.
Mr Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of it, as they
will have a sufficient check agst encroachments on their own department by
their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their
Constitutionality. In some States the Judges had actually set aside laws as
being agst the Constitution. This was done too with general approbation. It
was quite foreign from the nature of ye office to make them judges of the
policy of public measures. He moves to postpone the clause in order to
propose "that the National Executive shall have a right to negative any
Legislative act which shall not be afterwards passed by —— parts of each
branch of the national Legislature."
Mr King seconds the motion, observing that the Judges ought to be able
to expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of
having participated in its formation.
Mr Wilson thinks neither the original proposition nor the amendment
goes far enough. If the Legislative Exetv & Judiciary ought to be distinct &
independent, The Executive ought to have an absolute negative. Without
such a self-defence the Legislature can at any moment sink it into non-
existence. He was for varying the proposition in such a manner as to give
the Executive & Judiciary jointly an absolute negative.
On the question to postpone in order to take Mr Gerry's proposition into
consideration it was agreed to, Masss ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. Pa ay. Del. no.
Maryd no. Virga no. N. C ay. S. C. ay. Ga ay.
Mr. Gerry's proposition being now before Committee, Mr Wilson & Mr
Hamilton move that the last part of it (viz. "wch sl not be afterwds passed
"unless by —— parts of each branch of the National legislature") be struck
out, so as to give the Executive an absolute negative on the laws. There was
no danger they thought of such a power being too much exercised. It was
mentioned by Col: Hamilton that the King of G. B. had not exerted his
negative since the Revolution.
Mr Gerry sees no necessity for so great a controul over the legislature as
the best men in the Community would be comprised in the two branches of
it.
Docr Franklin, said he was sorry to differ from his colleague for whom
he had a very great respect, on any occasion, but he could not help it on
this. He had had some experience of this check in the Executive on the
Legislature, under the proprietary Government of Pena. The negative of the
Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law
whatever could be passed without a private bargain with him. An increase
of his salary, or some donation, was always made a condition; till at last it
became the regular practice, to have orders in his favor on the Treasury,
presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might actually receive
the former before he should sign the latter. When the Indians were scalping
the western people, and notice of it arrived, the concurrence of the
Governor in the means of self-defence could not be got, till it was agreed
that his Estate should be exempted from taxation: so that the people were to
fight for the security of his property, whilst he was to bear no share of the
burden. This was a mischevous sort of check. If the Executive was to have a
Council, such a power would be less objectionable. It was true, the King of
G. B. had not, as was said, exerted his negative since the Revolution; but
that matter was easily explained. The bribes and emoluments now given to
the members of parliament rendered it unnecessary, every thing being done
according to the will of the Ministers. He was afraid, if a negative should be
given as proposed, that more power and money would be demanded, till at
last eno' would be gotten to influence & bribe the Legislature into a
compleat subjection to the will of the Executive.
Mr Sherman was agst enabling any one man to stop the will of the whole.
No one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom. He thought
we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom in revising the laws, but not
permit him to overrule the decided and cool opinions of the Legislature.
Mr Madison supposed that if a proper proportion of each branch should
be required to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would answer the
same purpose as an absolute negative. It would rarely if ever happen that
the Executive constituted as ours is proposed to be, would have firmness
eno' to resist the legislature, unless backed by a certain part of the body
itself. The King of G. B. with all his splendid attributes would not be able to
withstand ye unanimous and eager wishes of both houses of Parliament. To
give such a prerogative would certainly be obnoxious to the temper of this
Country; its present temper at least.
Mr Wilson believed as others did that this power would seldom be used.
The Legislature would know that such a power existed, and would refrain
from such laws, as it would be sure to defeat. Its silent operation would
therefore preserve harmony and prevent mischief. The case of Pena
formerly was very different from its present case. The Executive was not
then as now to be appointed by the people. It will not in this case as in the
one cited be supported by the head of a Great Empire, actuated by a
different & sometimes opposite interest. The salary too is now proposed to
be fixed by the Constitution, or if Dr F.'s idea should be adopted all salary
whatever interdicted. The requiring a large proportion of each House to
overrule the Executive check might do in peaceable times; but there might
be tempestuous moments in which animosities may run high between the
Executive and Legislative branches, and in which the former ought to be
able to defend itself.
Mr Butler had been in favor of a single Executive Magistrate; but could
he have entertained an idea that a compleat negative on the laws was to be
given him he certainly should have acted very differently. It had been
observed that in all countries the Executive power is in a constant course of
increase. This was certainly the case in G. B. Gentlemen seemed to think
that we had nothing to apprehend from an abuse of the Executive power.
But why might not a Cataline or a Cromwell arise in this Country as well as
in others.
Mr Bedford was opposed to every check on the Legislature, even the
Council of Revision first proposed. He thought it would be sufficient to
mark out in the Constitution the boundaries to the Legislative Authority,
which would give all the requisite security to the rights of the other
departments. The Representatives of the people were the best Judges of
what was for their interest, and ought to be under no external controul
whatever. The two branches would produce a sufficient controul within the
Legislature itself.
Col. Mason observed that a vote had already passed he found [he was
out at the time] for vesting the executive powers in a single person. Among
these powers was that of appointing to offices in certain cases. The probable
abuses of a negative had been well explained by Dr F. as proved by
experience, the best of all tests. Will not the same door be opened here. The
Executive may refuse its assent to necessary measures till new
appointments shall be referred to him; and having by degrees engrossed
these into all his own hands, the American Executive, like the British, will
by bribery & influence, save himself the trouble & odium of exerting his
negative afterwards. We are Mr Chairman going very far in this business.
We are not indeed constituting a British Government, but a more dangerous
monarchy, an elective one. We are introducing a new principle into our
system, and not necessary as in the British Govt where the Executive has
greater rights to defend. Do gentlemen mean to pave the way to hereditary
Monarchy? Do they flatter themselves that the people will ever consent to
such an innovation? If they do I venture to tell them, they are mistaken. The
people never will consent. And do gentlemen consider the danger of delay,
and the still greater danger of a rejection, not for a moment but forever, of
the plan which shall be proposed to them. Notwithstanding the oppression
& injustice experienced among us from democracy; the genius of the people
is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted. He could
not but consider the federal system as in effect dissolved by the
appointment of this Convention to devise a better one. And do gentlemen
look forward to the dangerous interval between extinction of an old, and the
establishment of a new Governmt and to the scenes of confusion which may
ensue. He hoped that nothing like a Monarchy would ever be attempted in
this Country. A hatred to its oppressions had carried the people through the
late Revolution. Will it not be eno' to enable the Executive to suspend
offensive laws, till they shall be coolly revised, and the objections to them
overruled by a greater majority than was required in the first instance. He
never could agree to give up all the rights of the people to a single
magistrate: If more than one had been fixed on, greater powers might have
been entrusted to the Executive. He hoped this attempt to give such powers
would have its weight hereafter as an argument for increasing the number of
the Executive.
Docr Franklin. A Gentleman from S. C., (Mr Butler) a day or two ago
called our attention to the case of the U. Netherlands. He wished the
gentleman had been a little fuller, and had gone back to the original of that
Govt. The people being under great obligations to the Prince of Orange
whose wisdom and bravery had saved them, chose him for the Stadtholder.
He did very well. Inconveniences however were felt from his powers;
which growing more & more oppressive, they were at length set aside. Still
however there was a party for the P. of Orange, which descended to his son
who excited insurrections, spilt a great deal of blood, murdered the de
Witts, and got the powers revested in the Stadtholder. Afterwards another
Prince had power to excite insurrections & make the Stadtholdership
hereditary. And the present Stadthder is ready to wade thro' a bloody civil
war to the establishment of a monarchy. Col. Mason had mentioned the
circumstance of appointing officers. He knew how that point would be
managed. No new appointment would be suffered as heretofore in Pensa
unless it be referred to the Executive; so that all profitable offices will be at
his disposal. The first man put at the helm will be a good one. No body
knows what sort may come afterwards. The Executive will be always
increasing here, as elsewhere, till it ends in a Monarchy.
On the question for striking out so as to give Executive an absolute
negative,—Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Georga no.
Mr Butler moved that the Resoln be altered so as to read—"Resolved that
the National Executive have a power to suspend any Legislative act for the
term of ——."
Doctr Franklin seconds the motion.
Mr Gerry observed that a power of suspending might do all the mischief
dreaded from the negative of useful laws; without answering the salutary
purpose of checking unjust or unwise ones.
On question "for giving this suspending power" all the States, to wit
Massts Cont N. Y. Pa Del. Maryd Virga N. C. S. C. Georgia, were No.
On a question for enabling two thirds of each branch of the Legislature
to overrule the revisionary check, it passed in the affirmative sub silentio;
and was inserted in the blank of Mr Gerry's motion.
On the question on Mr Gerry's motion which gave the Executive alone
without the Judiciary the revisionary controul on the laws unless overruled
by 2/3 of each branch; Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay.
Maryd no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
It was moved by Mr Wilson 2ded by Mr Madison—that the following
amendment be made to the last resolution—after the words "National Ex."
to add "& a convenient number of the National Judiciary."[63]
[63] Before the motion, according to King's notes:
"Madison—The judiciary ought to be introduced in the business of
Legislation—they will protect their department, and united with the
Executive make its negatives more strong. There is weight in the objections
to this measure—but a check on the Legislature is necessary, Experience
proves it to be so, and teaches us that what has been thought a calumny on a
republican Govt. is nevertheless true—In all Countries are diversity of
Interests, the Rich & the Poor, the Dr. & Cr., the followers of different
Demagogues, the Diversity of religious Sects—the Effects of these
Divisions in Ancient Govts. are well known, and the like causes will now
produce like effects. We must therefore introduce in our system Provisions
against the measures of an interested majority—a check is not only
necessary to protect the Executive power, but the minority in the
Legislature. The independence of the Executive, having the Eyes of all
upon him will make him an impartial judge—add the Judiciary, and you
greatly increase his respectability."
After the motion: "Dickinson opposed—You shd. separate the
Departments—you have given the Executive a share in Legislation; and it is
asked why not give a share to the judicial power. Because the Judges are to
interpret the Laws, and therefore shd. have no share in making them—not
so with the Executive whose causing the Laws to be Executed is a
ministerial office only. Besides we have experienced in the Br. Constitution
which confers the Power of a negative on the Executive."—King's Life and
Correspondence of Rufus King, i., 592.
An Objection of order being taken by Mr Hamilton to the introduction of
the last amendment at this time, notice was given by Mr W. & Mr M., that
the same wd be moved to-morrow,—whereupon Wednesday (the day after)
was assigned to reconsider the amendment of Mr Gerry.
It was then moved & 2ded to proceed to the consideration of the 9th
resolution submitted by Mr Randolph—when on motion to agree to the first
clause namely "Resolved, that a National Judiciary be established," It
passed in the affirmative nem. con.
It was then moved & 2ded to add these words to the first clause of the
ninth resolution namely—"to consist of one supreme tribunal, and of one or
more inferior tribunals," which passed in the affirmative.
The Comme then rose and the House Adjourned.
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Governor Livingston from New Jersey, took his seat.
The words, "one or more" were struck out before "inferior tribunals" as
an amendment to the last clause of Resoln 9th. The Clause—"that the
National Judiciary be chosen by the National Legislature," being under
consideration.
Mr Wilson opposed the appointmt of Judges by the National Legisl:
Experience shewed the impropriety of such appointmts by numerous bodies.
Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the necessary consequences. A
principal reason for unity in the Executive was that officers might be
appointed by a single, responsible person.
Mr Rutlidge was by no means disposed to grant so great a power to any
single person. The people will think we are leaning too much towards
Monarchy. He was against establishing any national tribunal except a single
supreme one. The State tribunals are most proper to decide in all cases in
the first instance.
Docr Franklin observed that two modes of chusing the Judges had been
mentioned, to wit, by the Legislature and by the Executive. He wished such
other modes to be suggested as might occur to other gentlemen; it being a
point of great moment. He would mention one which he had understood
was practised in Scotland. He then in a brief and entertaining manner
related a Scotch mode, in which the nomination proceeded from the
Lawyers, who always selected the ablest of the profession in order to get rid
of him, and share his practice among themselves. It was here he said the
interest of the electors to make the best choice, which should always be
made the case if possible.
Mr. Madison disliked the election of the Judges by the Legislature or any
numerous body. Besides the danger of intrigue and partiality, many of the
members were not judges of the requisite qualifications. The Legislative
talents which were very different from those of a Judge, commonly
recommended men to the favor of Legislative Assemblies. It was known
too that the accidental circumstances of presence and absence, of being a
member or not a member, had a very undue influence on the appointment.
On the other hand He was not satisfied with referring the appointment to the
Executive, He rather inclined to give it to the Senatorial branch, as
numerous eno' to be confided in—as not so numerous as to be governed by
the motives of the other branch; and as being sufficiently stable and
independent to follow their deliberate judgments. He hinted this only and
moved that the appointment by the Legislature might be struck out, & a
blank left to be hereafter filled on maturer reflection. Mr Wilson second it.
On the question for striking out, Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay.
Pena ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Mr. Wilson gave notice that he should at a future day move for a
reconsideration of that clause which respects "inferior tribunals."
Mr Pinkney gave notice that when the clause respecting the appointment
of the Judiciary should again come before the Committee he should move
to restore the "appointment by the national Legislature."
The following clauses of Resol: 9. were agreed to viz "to hold their
offices during good behaviour, and to receive punctually at stated times, a
fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution
shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of
such increase or diminution."
The remaining clause of Resolution 9. was postponed.
Resolution 10 was agreed to,—viz—that provision ought to be made for
the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the U. States,
whether from a voluntary junction of Government & territory, or otherwise
with the consent of a number of voices in the National Legislature less than
the whole.
The 11. Propos: "for guaranteeing to States Republican Govt &
territory" &c. being read Mr Patterson[64] wished the point of representation
could be decided before this clause should be considered, and moved to
postpone it, which was not opposed, and agreed to,—Connecticut &
S. Carolina only voting agst it.
[64] "Mr Patterson is one of those kind of Men whose powers break in upon you,
and create wonder and astonishment. He is a Man of great modesty, with looks
that bespeak talents of no great extent,—but he is a Classic, a Lawyer, and an
Orator;—and of a disposition so favorable to his advancement that every one
seemed ready to exalt him with their praises. He is very happy in the choice of
time and manner of engaging in a debate, and never speaks but when he
understands his subject well. This Gentleman is about 43 Y. of age, of a very low
stature."—Pierce's Notes, Amer. Hist. Rev., iii., 328.
Propos. 12 "for continuing Congs till a given day and for fulfilling their
engagements," produced no debate.
On the question, Mass. ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J.[65] ay. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. G. ay.
[65] Note in Madison's writing: New Jersey omitted in printed Journal.
Propos: 13. "that provision ought to be made for hereafter amending the
system now to be established, without requiring the assent of the Natl
Legislature", being taken up,
Mr Pinkney doubted the propriety or necessity of it.
Mr Gerry favored it. The novelty & difficulty of the experiment requires
periodical revision. The prospect of such a revision would also give
intermediate stability to the Govt. Nothing had yet happened in the States
where this provision existed to prove its impropriety.—The proposition was
postponed for further consideration: the votes being, Mas: Con. N. Y. Pa
Del. Ma. N. C. ay. Virga S. C. Geo. no.
Propos. 14. "requiring oath from the State officers to support National
Govt" was postponed after a short uninteresting conversation: the votes.
Con. N. Jersey Md Virg. S. C. Geo. ay. N. Y. Pa Del. N. C. no.
Massachusetts divided.
Propos. 15. for "recommending Conventions under appointment of the
people to ratify the new Constitution" &c. being taken up,
Mr Sherman thought such a popular ratification unnecessary: the articles
of Confederation providing for changes and alterations with the assent of
Congs and ratification of State Legislatures.
Mr Madison thought this provision essential. The articles of Confedn
themselves were defective in this respect, resting in many of the States on
the Legislative sanction only. Hence in conflicts between acts of the States,
and of Congs especially where the former are of posterior date, and the
decision is to be made by State tribunals, an uncertainty must necessarily
prevail, or rather perhaps a certain decision in favor of the State authority.
He suggested also that as far as the articles of Union were to be considered
as a Treaty only of a particular sort, among the Governments of
Independent States, the doctrine might be set up that a breach of any one
article, by any of the parties, absolved the other parties from the whole
obligation. For these reasons as well as others he thought it indispensable
that the new Constitution should be ratified in the most unexceptionable
form, and by the supreme authority of the people themselves.
Mr Gerry observed that in the Eastern States the Confedn had been
sanctioned by the people themselves. He seemed afraid of referring the new
system to them. The people in that quarter have at this time the wildest
ideas of Government in the world. They were for abolishing the Senate in
Massts and giving all the other powers of Govt to the other branch of the
Legislature.
Mr King supposed that the last article of ye Confedn Rendered the
legislature competent to the ratification. The people of the Southern States
where the federal articles had been ratified by the Legislatures only, had
since impliedly given their sanction to it. He thought notwithstanding that
there might be policy in varying the mode. A Convention being a single
house, the adoption may more easily be carried thro' it, than thro' the
Legislatures where there are several branches. The Legislatures also being
to lose power, will be most likely to raise objections. The people having
already parted with the necessary powers it is immaterial to them, by which
Government they are possessed, provided they be well employed.
Mr Wilson took this occasion to lead the Committee by a train of
observations to the idea of not suffering a disposition in the plurality of
States to confederate anew on better principles, to be defeated by the
inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few States. He hoped the provision
for ratifying would be put on such a footing as to admit of such a partial
union, with a door open for the accession of the rest.[66]
[66] (This hint was probably meant in terrorem to the smaller States of N. Jersey
& Delaware. Nothing was said in reply to it.)—Madison's Note.
Mr Pinkney hoped that in case the experiment should not unanimously
take place, nine States might be authorized to unite under the same
Governmt.
The propos. 15. was postponed nem. cont.
Mr Pinkney & Mr Rutlidge moved that to-morrow be assigned to
reconsider that clause of Propos: 4: which respects the election of the first
branch of the National Legislature—which passed in affirmative,—Con.:
N. Y., Pa Del. Md, Va, ay.—6 Mas.: N. J.: N. C.: S. C.: Geo.: no. 5.
Mr. Rutlidge havg obtained a rule for reconsideration of the clause for
establishing inferior tribunals under the national authority, now moved that
that part of the clause in the propos. 9. should be expunged: arguing that the
State tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first
instance the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient
to secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgmts: that it was making an
unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction of the States and creating
unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the new system. Mr. Sherman
2ded the motion.
Mr Madison observed that unless inferior tribunals were dispersed
throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in many cases, appeals
would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that besides, an appeal
would not in many cases be a remedy. What was to be done after improper
Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under the biassed directions of a
dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an undirected jury? To remand
the cause for a new trial would answer no purpose. To order a new trial at
the Supreme bar would oblige the parties to bring up their witnesses, tho'
ever so distant from the seat of the Court. An effective Judiciary
establishment commensurate to the legislative authority, was essential. A
Government without a proper Executive & Judiciary would be the mere
trunk of a body, without arms or legs to act or move.
Mr Wilson opposed the motion on like grounds. He said the admiralty
jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to the national Government, as it
related to cases not within the jurisdiction of particular states, & to a scene
in which controversies with foreigners would be most likely to happen.
Mr Sherman was in favor of the motion. He dwelt chiefly on the
supposed expensiveness of having a new set of Courts, when the existing
State Courts would answer the same purpose.
Mr Dickinson contended strongly that if there was to be a National
Legislature, there ought to be a national Judiciary, and that the former ought
to have authority to institute the latter.
On the question for Mr Rutlidge's motion to strike out "inferior
tribunals"
Massts divided. Cont ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md no.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Wilson & Mr Madison then moved, in pursuance of the idea
expressed above by Mr. Dickinson, to add to the Resol: 9. the words
following "that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior
tribunals." They observed that there was a distinction between establishing
such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to
establish or not establish them. They repeated the necessity of some such
provision.
Mr Butler. The people will not bear such innovations. The States will
revolt at such encroachments. Supposing such an establishment to be
useful, we must not venture on it. We must follow the example of Solon
who gave the Athenians not the best Govt he could devise, but the best they
wd receive.
Mr King remarked as to the comparative expence, that the establishment
of inferior tribunals wd cost infinitely less than the appeals that would be
prevented by them.
On this question as moved by Mr W. & Mr M.
Mass. ay. Ct no. N. Y. divd. N. J.[67] ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
[67] In printed Journals N. Jersey, no.—Madison's Note.
The Committee then rose & the House adjourned to 11 OC tomw.
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Mr Pinkney according to previous notice & rule obtained, moved "that
the first branch of the national Legislature be elected by the State
Legislatures, and not by the people;" contending that the people were less
fit Judges in such a case, and that the Legislatures would be less likely to
promote the adoption of the new Government, if they were to be excluded
from all share in it.
Mr Rutlidge 2ded the motion.
Mr Gerry.[68] Much depends on the mode of election. In England the
people will probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the proportion
having a right of suffrage. Our danger arises from the opposite extreme:
hence in Massts the worst men get into the Legislature. Several members of
that Body had lately been convicted of infamous crimes. Men of indigence,
ignorance & baseness, spare no pains, however dirty to carry their point agst
men who are superior to the artifices practised. He was not disposed to run
into extremes. He was as much principled as ever agst aristocracy and
monarchy. It was necessary on the one hand that the people should appoint
one branch of the Govt in order to inspire them with the necessary
confidence. But he wished the election on the other to be so modified as to
secure more effectually a just preference of merit. His idea was that the
people should nominate certain persons in certain districts, out of whom the
State Legislatures shd make the appointment.
[68] "Mr. Gerry.—If the national legislature are appointed by the state
legislatures, demagogues and corrupt members will creep in."—Yates's Secret
Debates in Forming the Constitution, 105.
Mr Wilson. He wished for vigor in the Govt, but he wished that vigorous
authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority.
The Govt ought to possess not only 1st the force, but 2dly the mind or sense
of the people at large. The Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript
of the whole Society. Representation is made necessary only because it is
impossible for the people to act collectively. The opposition was to be
expected he said from the Governments, not from the Citizens of the States.
The latter had parted as was observed (by Mr King) with all the necessary
powers; and it was immaterial to them, by whom they were exercised, if
well exercised. The State officers were to be the losers of power. The
people he supposed would be rather more attached to the national Govt than
to the State Govts as being more important in itself, and more flattering to
their pride. There is no danger of improper elections if made by large
districts. Bad elections proceed from the smallness of the districts which
give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office.
Mr Sherman. If it were in view to abolish the State Govts the elections
ought to be by the people. If the State Govts are to be continued, it is
necessary in order to preserve harmony between the National & State Govts
that the elections to the former shd be made by the latter. The right of
participating in the National Govt would be sufficiently secured to the
people by their election of the State Legislatures. The objects of the Union,
he thought were few, 1. defence agst foreign danger, 2. agst internal disputes
& a resort to force, 3. Treaties with foreign nations 4. regulating foreign
commerce, & drawing revenue from it. These & perhaps a few lesser
objects alone rendered a Confederation of the States necessary. All other
matters civil & criminal would be much better in the hands of the States.
The people are more happy in small than in large States. States may indeed
be too small as Rhode Island, & thereby be too subject to faction. Some
others were perhaps too large, the powers of Govt not being able to pervade
them. He was for giving the General Govt power to legislate and execute
within a defined province.
Col. Mason. Under the existing Confederacy, Congs represent the States
and not the people of the States: their acts operate on the States, not on the
individuals. The case will be changed in the new plan of Govt. The people
will be represented; they ought therefore to choose the Representatives. The
requisites in actual representation are that the Reps should sympathize with
their constituents; shd think as they think, & feel as they feel; and that for
these purposes shd even be residents among them. Much he sd had been
alledged agst democratic elections. He admitted that much might be said;
but it was to be considered that no Govt was free from imperfections &
evils; and that improper elections in many instances were inseparable from
Republican Govts. But compare these with the advantage of this Form in
favor of the rights of the people, in favor of human nature. He was
persuaded there was a better chance for proper elections by the people, if
divided into large districts, than by the State Legislatures. Paper money had
been issued by the latter when the former were against it. Was it to be
supposed that the State Legislatures then wd not send to the Natl legislature
patrons of such projects, if the choice depended on them.
Mr Madison considered an election of one branch at least of the
Legislature by the people immediately, as a clear principle of free Govt and
that this mode under proper regulations had the additional advantage of
securing better representatives, as well as of avoiding too great an agency of
the State Governments in the General one. He differed from the member
from Connecticut (Mr. Sherman) in thinking the objects mentioned to be all
the principal ones that required a National Govt. Those were certainly
important and necessary objects; but he combined with them the necessity
of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the
steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these were evils which
had more perhaps than anything else, produced this convention. Was it to be
supposed that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of it
practised in some of the States. The gentleman (Mr Sherman) had admitted
that in a very small State, faction & oppression wd prevail. It was to be
inferred then that wherever these prevailed the State was too small. Had
they not prevailed in the largest as well as the smallest tho' less than in the
smallest; and were we not thence admonished to enlarge the sphere as far as
the nature of the Govt would Admit. This was the only defence agst the
inconveniences of democracy consistent with the democratic form of Govt.
All civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects, Factions, &
interests, as they happened to consist of rich & poor, debtors & creditors,
the landed, the manufacturing, the commercial interests, the inhabitants of
this district or that district, the followers of this political leader or that
political leader—the disciples of this religious Sect or that religious Sect. In
all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the
rights of the minority are in danger. What motives are to restrain them? A
prudent regard to the maxim that honesty is the best policy is found by
experience to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals.
Respect for character is always diminished in proportion to the number
among whom the blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience, the only
remaining tie is known to be inadequate in individuals: In large numbers,
little is to be expected from it. Besides, Religion itself may become a
motive to persecution & oppression. These observations are verified by the
Histories of every country antient & modern. In Greece & Rome the rich &
poor, the Creditors & debtors, as well as the patricians & plebeians
alternately oppressed each other with equal unmercifulness. What a source
of oppression was the relation between the parent cities of Rome, Athens &
Carthage, & their respective provinces; the former possessing the power, &
the latter being sufficiently distinguished to be separate objects of it? Why
was America so justly apprehensive of Parliamentary injustice? Because G.
Britain had a separate interest real or supposed, & if her authority had been
admitted, could have pursued that interest at our expence. We have seen the
mere distinction of colour made in the most enlightened period of time, a
ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man.
What has been the source of those unjust laws complained of among
ourselves? Has it not been the real or supposed interest of the major
number? Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The landed interest has
borne hard on the mercantile interest. The Holders of one species of
property have thrown a disproportion of taxes on the holders of another
species. The lesson we are to draw from the whole is that where a majority
are united by a common sentiment, and have an opportunity, the rights of
the minor party become insecure. In a Republican Govt the majority if
united have always an opportunity. The only remedy is to enlarge the
sphere, & thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests
& parties, that in the 1st place a majority will not be likely at the same
moment to have a common interest separate from that of the whole or of the
minority; and in the 2d place that in case they shd have such an interest, they
may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it. It was incumbent on us then to
try this remedy, and with that view to frame a republican system on such a
scale & in such a form as will controul all the evils wch have been
experienced.
Mr Dickinson considered it essential that one branch of the Legislature
shd be drawn immediately from the people; and as expedient that the other
shd be chosen by the Legislatures of the States. This combination of the
State Govts with the national Govt was as politic as it was unavoidable. In
the formation of the Senate we ought to carry it through such a refining
process as will assimilate it as nearly as may be to the House of Lords in
England. He repeated his warm eulogiums on the British Constitution. He
was for a strong National Govt but for leaving the States a considerable
agency in the System. The objection agst making the former dependent on
the latter might be obviated by giving to the Senate an authority permanent
& irrevocable for three, five or seven years. Being thus independent they
will check & decide with becoming freedom.
Mr Read. Too much attachment is betrayed to the State Governts. We
must look beyond their continuance. A national Govt must soon of
necessity swallow all of them up. They will soon be reduced to the mere
office of electing the National Senate. He was agst patching up the old
federal System: he hoped the idea wd be dismissed. It would be like putting
new cloth on an old garment. The confederation was founded on temporary
principles. It cannot last: it can not be amended. If we do not establish a
good Govt on new principles, we must either go to ruin, or have the work to
do over again. The people at large are wrongly suspected of being averse to
a Genl Govt. The aversion lies among interested men who possess their
confidence.
Mr Pierce[69] was for an election by the people as to the 1st branch & by
the States as to the 2d branch; by which means the Citizens of the States wd
be represented both individually & collectively.
[69] "My own character I shall not attempt to draw, but leave those who may
choose to speculate on it, to consider it in any light that their fancy or
imagination may depict. I am conscious of having discharged my duty as a
Soldier through the course of the late revolution with honor and propriety; and
my services in Congress and the Convention were bestowed with the best
intention towards the interest of Georgia, and towards the general welfare of the
Confederacy. I possess ambition, and it was that, and the flattering opinion
which some of my Friends had of me, that gave me a seat in the wisest Council
in the World, and furnished me with an opportunity of giving these short
Sketches of the Characters who composed it."—Pierce's Notes, Amer. Hist. Rev.,
iii., 334.
General Pinkney wished to have a good National Govt & at the same
time to leave a considerable share of power in the States. An election of
either branch by the people scattered as they are in many States, particularly
in S. Carolina was totally impracticable. He differed from gentlemen who
thought that a choice by the people wd be a better guard agst bad measures,
than by the Legislatures. A majority of the people in S. Carolina were
notoriously for paper-money as a legal tender; the Legislature had refused
to make it a legal tender. The reason was that the latter had some sense of
character and were restrained by that consideration. The State Legislatures
also he said would be more jealous, & more ready to thwart the National
Govt, if excluded from a participation in it. The Idea of abolishing these
Legislatures wd never go down.
Mr Wilson would not have spoken again, but for what had fallen from
Mr. Read; namely, that the idea of preserving the State Govts ought to be
abandoned. He saw no incompatibility between the national & State Govts
provided the latter were restrained to certain local purposes; nor any
probability of their being devoured by the former. In all confederated
Systems antient & modern the reverse had happened; the Generality being
destroyed gradually by the usurpations of the parts composing it.
On the question for electing the 1st branch by the State Legislatures as
moved by Mr Pinkney: it was negatived:
Mass. no. Ct ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Mr Wilson moved to reconsider the vote excluding the Judiciary from a
share in the revision of the laws, and to add after "National Executive" the
words "with a convenient number of the national Judiciary;" remarking the
expediency of reinforcing the Executive with the influence of that
Department.
Mr Madison 2ded the motion. He observed that the great difficulty in
rendering the Executive competent to its own defence arose from the nature
of Republican Govt which could not give to an individual citizen that settled
pre-eminence in the eyes of the rest, that weight of property, that personal
interest agst betraying the national interest, which appertain to an hereditary
magistrate. In a Republic personal merit alone could be the ground of
political exaltation, but it would rarely happen that this merit would be so
pre-eminent as to produce universal acquiescence. The Executive
Magistrate would be envied & assailed by disappointed competitors: His
firmness therefore wd need support. He would not possess those great
emoluments from his station, nor that permanent stake in the public interest
which wd place him out of the reach of foreign corruption. He would stand
in need therefore of being controuled as well as supported. An association
of the Judges in his revisionary function wd both double the advantage and
diminish the danger. It wd also enable the Judiciary Department the better to
defend itself agst Legislative encroachments. Two objections had been made
1st that the Judges ought not to be subject to the bias which a participation
in the making of laws might give in the exposition of them. 2dly that the
Judiciary Departmt ought to be separate & distinct from the other great
Departments. The 1st objection had some weight; but it was much
diminished by reflecting that a small proportion of the laws coming in
question before a Judge wd be such wherein he had been consulted; that a
small part of this proportion wd be so ambiguous as to leave room for his
prepossessions; and that but a few cases wd probably arise in the life of a
Judge under such ambiguous passages. How much good on the other hand
wd proceed from the perspicuity, the conciseness, and the systematic
character wch the Code of laws wd receive from the Judiciary talents. As to
the 2d objection, it either had no weight, or it applied with equal weight to
the Executive & to the Judiciary revision of the laws. The maxim on which
the objection was founded required a separation of the Executive as well as
the Judiciary from the Legislature & from each other. There wd in truth
however be no improper mixture of these distinct powers in the present
case. In England, whence the maxim itself had been drawn, the Executive
had an absolute negative on the laws; and the Supreme tribunal of Justice
(the House of Lords) formed one of the other branches of the Legislature. In
short whether the object of the revisionary power was to restrain the
Legislature from encroaching on the other co-ordinate Departments, or on
the rights of the people at large; or from passing laws unwise in their
principle, or incorrect in their form, the utility of annexing the wisdom and
weight of the Judiciary to the Executive seemed incontestable.
Mr Gerry thought the Executive, whilst standing alone wd be more
impartial than when he cd be covered by the sanction & seduced by the
sophistry of the Judges.
Mr King. If the Unity of the Executive was preferred for the sake of
responsibility, the policy of it is as applicable to the revisionary as to the
executive power.
Mr Pinkney had been at first in favor of joining the heads of the principal
departmts the Secretary at War, of foreign affairs &c—in the council of
revision. He had however relinquished the idea from a consideration that
these could be called on by the Executive Magistrate whenever he pleased
to consult them. He was opposed to the introduction of the Judges into the
business.
Col. Mason was for giving all possible weight to the revisionary
institution. The Executive power ought to be well secured agst Legislative
usurpations on it. The purse & the sword ought never to get into the same
hands whether Legislative or Executive.
Mr Dickinson. Secrecy, vigor & despatch are not the principal properties
reqd in the Executive. Important as these are, that of responsibility is more
so, which can only be preserved; by leaving it singly to discharge its
functions. He thought too a junction of the Judiciary to it, involved an
improper mixture of powers.
Mr Wilson remarked, that the responsibility required belonged to his
Executive duties. The revisionary duty was an extraneous one, calculated
for collateral purposes.
Mr Williamson, was for substituting a clause requiring 2/3 for every
effective act of the Legislature, in place of the revisionary provision.
On the question for joining the Judges to the Executive in the revisionary
business,
Mass. no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Pinkney gave notice that tomorrow he should move for the
reconsideration of that clause in the sixth Resolution adopted by the Comme
which vests a negative in the National Legislature on the laws of the several
States.
The Come rose & the House adjd to 11 OC.
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Mr Pinkney according to notice moved to reconsider the clause
respecting the negative on State laws, which was agreed to, and tomorrow
for fixed the purpose.
The Clause providing for ye appointment of the 2d branch of the national
Legislature, having lain blank since the last vote on the mode of electing it,
to wit, by the 1st branch, Mr Dickinson now moved "that the members of
the 2d branch ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures."
Mr Sherman seconded the motion; observing that the particular States
would thus become interested in supporting the National Govenmt and that
a due harmony between the two Governments would be maintained. He
admitted that the two ought to have separate and distinct jurisdictions, but
that they ought to have a mutual interest in supporting each other.
Mr Pinkney. If the small States should be allowed one Senator only, the
number will be too great, there will be 80 at least.
Mr Dickinson had two reasons for his motion. 1, because the sense of the
States would be better collected through their Governments; than
immediately from the people at large; 2. because he wished the Senate to
consist of the most distinguished characters, distinguished for their rank in
life and their weight of property, and bearing as strong a likeness to the
British House of Lords as possible; and he thought such characters more
likely to be selected by the State Legislatures, than in any other mode. The
greatness of the number was no objection with him. He hoped there would
be 80 and twice 80. of them. If their number should be small, the popular
branch could not be balanced by them. The legislature of a numerous
people ought to be a numerous body.
Mr Williamson, preferred a small number of Senators, but wished that
each State should have at least one. He suggested 25 as a convenient
number. The different modes of representation in the different branches,
will serve as a mutual check.
Mr Butler was anxious to know the ratio of representation before he gave
any opinion.
Mr Wilson. If we are to establish a national Government, that
Government ought to flow from the people at large. If one branch of it
should be chosen by the Legislatures, and the other by the people, the two
branches will rest on different foundations, and dissensions will naturally
arise between them. He wished the Senate to be elected by the people as
well as the other branch, the people might be divided into proper districts
for the purpose & moved to postpone the motion of Mr Dickinson, in order
to take up one of that import.
Mr Morris 2ded him.
Mr Read proposed "that the Senate should be appointed by the Executive
Magistrate out of a proper number of persons to be nominated by the
individual legislatures." He said he thought it his duty, to speak his mind
frankly. Gentlemen he hoped would not be alarmed at the idea. Nothing
short of this approach towards a proper model of Government would
answer the purpose, and he thought it best to come directly to the point at
once.—His proposition was not seconded nor supported.
Mr Madison, if the motion (of Mr. Dickinson) should be agreed to, we
must either depart from the doctrine of proportional representation; or admit
into the Senate a very large number of members. The first is inadmissible,
being evidently unjust. The second is inexpedient. The use of the Senate is
to consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with more system, & with
more wisdom, than the popular branch. Enlarge their number and you
communicate to them the vices which they are meant to correct. He differed
from Mr D. who thought that the additional number would give additional
weight to the body. On the contrary it appeared to him that their weight
would be in an inverse ratio to their number. The example of the Roman
Tribunes, was applicable. They lost their influence and power, in proportion
as their number was augmented. The reason seemed to be obvious: They
were appointed to take care of the popular interests & pretensions at Rome,
because the people by reason of their numbers could not act in concert;
were liable to fall into factions among themselves, and to become a prey to
their aristocratic adversaries. The more the representatives of the people
therefore were multiplied, the more they partook of the infirmities of their
constituents, the more liable they became to be divided among themselves
either from their own indiscretions or the artifices of the opposite faction,
and of course the less capable of fulfilling their trust. When the weight of a
set of men depends merely on their personal characters; the greater the
number the greater the weight. When it depends on the degree of political
authority lodged in them the smaller the number the greater the weight.
These considerations might perhaps be combined in the intended Senate;
but the latter was the material one.
Mr Gerry. 4 modes of appointing the Senate have been mentioned. 1. by
the 1st branch of the National Legislature. This would create a dependance
contrary to the end proposed. 2. by the National Executive. This is a stride
towards monarchy that few will think of. 3. by the people. The people have
two great interests, the landed interest, and the commercial including the
stockholders. To draw both branches from the people will leave no security
to the latter interest; the people being Chiefly composed of the landed
interest, and erroneously supposing, that the other interests are adverse to it.
4. by the Individual Legislatures. The elections being carried thro' this
refinement, will be most likely to provide some check in favor of the
Commercial interest agst the landed; without which oppression will take
place, and no free Govt can last long where that is the case. He was
therefore in favor of this last.
Mr Dickenson.[70] The preservation of the States in a certain degree of
agency is indispensable. It will produce that collision between the different
authorities which should be wished for in order to check each other. To
attempt to abolish the States altogether, would degrade the Councils of our
Country, would be impracticable, would be ruinous. He compared the
proposed National System to the Solar System, in which the States were the
planets, and ought to be left to move freely in their proper orbits. The
Gentleman from Pa (Mr Wilson)
[70] It will throw light on this discussion to remark that an election by the State
Legislatures involved a surrender of the principle insisted on by the large States
& dreaded by the small ones, namely that of a proportional representation in the
Senate. Such a rule wd make the body too numerous, as the smallest State must
elect one member at least.—Madison's Note.
wished he said to extinguish these planets. If the State Governments
were excluded from all agency in the national one, and all power drawn
from the people at large, the consequence would be that the national Govt
would move in the same direction as the State Govts now do, and would run
into all the same mischiefs. The reform would only unite the 13 small
streams into one great current pursuing the same course without any
opposition whatever. He adhered to the opinion that the Senate ought to be
composed of a large number, and that their influence from family weight &
other causes would be increased thereby. He did not admit that the Tribunes
lost their weight in proportion as their no was augmented and gave a
historical sketch of this institution. If the reasoning of (Mr Madison) was
good it would prove that the number of the Senate ought to be reduced
below ten, the highest no of the Tribunitial corps.
Mr Wilson. The subject it must be owned is surrounded with doubts and
difficulties. But we must surmount them. The British Governmt cannot be
our model. We have no materials for a similar one. Our manners, our laws,
the abolition of entails and of primogeniture, the whole genius of the
people, are opposed to it. He did not see the danger of the States being
devoured by the Nationl Govt. On the contrary, he wished to keep them
from devouring the national Govt. He was not however for extinguishing
these planets as was supposed by Mr. D.—neither did he on the other hand,
believe that they would warm or enlighten the Sun. Within their proper
orbits they must still be suffered to act for subordinate purposes, for which
their existence is made essential by the great extent of our Country. He
could not comprehend in what manner the landed interest wd be rendered
less predominant in the Senate, by an election through the medium of the
Legislatures than by the people themselves. If the Legislatures, as was now
complained, sacrificed the commercial to the landed interest, what reason
was there to expect such a choice from them as would defeat their own
views. He was for an election by the people in large districts which wd be
most likely to obtain men of intelligence & uprightness; subdividing the
districts only for the accommodation of voters.
Mr Madison could as little comprehend in what manner family weight,
as desired by Mr D. would be more certainly conveyed into the Senate
through elections by the State Legislatures, than in some other modes. The
true question was in what mode the best choice wd be made? If an election
by the people, or thro' any other channel than the State Legislatures
promised as uncorrupt & impartial a preference of merit, there could surely
be no necessity for an appointment by those Legislatures. Nor was it
apparent that a more useful check would be derived thro' that channel than
from the people thro' some other. The great evils complained of were that
the State Legislatures run into schemes of paper money &c. whenever
solicited by the people, & sometimes without even the sanction of the
people. Their influence then, instead of checking a like propensity in the
National Legislature, may be expected to promote it. Nothing can be more
contradictory than to say that the Natl Legislature witht a proper check, will
follow the example of the State Legislatures, & in the same breath, that the
State Legislatures are the only proper check.
Mr Sherman opposed elections by the people in districts, as not likely to
produce such fit men as elections by the State Legislatures.
Mr Gerry insisted that the commercial & monied interest wd be more
secure in the hands of the State Legislatures, than of the people at large. The
former have more sense of character, and will be restrained by that from
injustice. The people are for paper money when the Legislatures are agst it.
In Massts the County Conventions had declared a wish for a depreciating
paper that wd sink itself. Besides, in some States there are two Branches in
the Legislature, one of which is somewhat aristocratic. There wd therefore
be so far a better chance of refinement in the choice. There seemed, he
thought to be three powerful objections agst elections by districts, 1. it is
impracticable; the people cannot be brought to one place for the purpose;
and whether brought to the same place or not, numberless frauds wd be
unavoidable. 2. small States forming part of the same district with a large
one, or large part of a large one, wd have no chance of gaining an
appointment for its citizens of merit. 3 a new source of discord wd be
opened between different parts of the same district.
Mr Pinkney thought the 2d branch ought to be permanent & independent;
& that the members of it wd be rendered more so by receiving their
appointment from the State Legislatures. This mode wd avoid the rivalships
& discontents incident to the election by districts. He was for dividing the
States into three classes according to their respective sizes, & for allowing
to the 1st class three members, to the 2d two, & to the 3d one.
On the question for postponing Mr Dickinson's motion referring the
appointment of the Senate to the State Legislatures, in order to consider Mr
Wilson's for referring it to the people.
Mass. no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Col. Mason. Whatever power may be necessary for the Natl Govt a
certain portion must necessarily be left in the States. It is impossible for one
power to pervade the extreme parts of the U. S. so as to carry equal justice
to them. The State Legislatures also ought to have some means of defending
themselves agst encroachments of the Natl Govt. In every other department
we have studiously endeavoured to provide for its self-defence. Shall we
leave the States alone unprovided with the means for this purpose? And
what better means can we provide than the giving them some share in, or
rather to make them a constituent part of, the Natl Establishment. There is
danger on both sides no doubt; but we have only seen the evils arising on
the side of the State Govts. Those on the other side remain to be displayed.
The example of Congs does not apply. Congs had no power to carry their
acts into execution, as the Natl Govt will have.
On Mr Dickinson's motion for an appointment of the Senate by the State
Legislatures,
Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. Y. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Gerry gave notice that he wd tomorrow move for a reconsideration of
the mode of appointing the Natl Executive in order to substitute an
appointmt by the State Executives.
The Committee rose & The House adjd.
F      J    8   I  C                W    .
On a reconsideration of the clause giving the Natl Legislature a negative
on such laws of the States as might be contrary to the articles of Union, or
Treaties with foreign nations,
Mr Pinkney moved "that the National Legislature shd have authority to
negative all laws which they shd judge to be improper." He urged that such
a universality of the power was indispensably necessary to render it
effectual; that the States must be kept in due subordination to the nation;
that if the States were left to act of themselves in any case, it wd be
impossible to defend the national prerogatives, however extensive they
might be on paper; that the acts of Congress had been defeated by this
means; nor had foreign treaties escaped repeated violations: that this
universal negative was in fact the corner stone of an efficient national Govt;
that under the British Govt the negative of the Crown had been found
beneficial, and the States are more one nation now, than the Colonies were
then.
Mr Madison seconded the motion. He could not but regard an indefinite
power to negative legislative acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a
perfect System. Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to
encroach on the federal authority; to violate national Treaties; to infringe
the rights & interests of each other; to oppress the weaker party within their
respective jurisdictions. A negative was the mildest expedient that could be
devised for preventing these mischiefs. The existence of such a check
would prevent attempts to commit them. Should no such precaution be
engrafted, the only remedy wd lie in an appeal to coercion. Was such a
remedy eligible? was it practicable? Could the national resources, if exerted
to the utmost enforce a national decree agst Massts abetted perhaps by
several of her neighbours? It wd not be possible. A small proportion of the
Community, in a compact situation acting on the defensive, and at one of its
extremities, might at any time bid defiance to the National authority. Any
Govt for the U. States formed on the supposed practicability of using force
agst the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, wd prove as visionary &
fallacious as the Govt of Congs. The negative wd render the use of force
unnecessary. The States cd of themselves pass no operative act, any more
than one branch of a Legislature where there are two branches, can proceed
without the other. But in order to give the negative this efficacy, it must
extend to all cases. A discrimination wd only be a fresh source of contention
between the two authorities. In a word, to recur to the illustrations borrowed
from the planetary system. This prerogative of the General Govt, is the great
pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of the
States; which, without it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits and
destroy the order & harmony of the political System.
Mr Williamson was agst giving a power that might restrain the States
from regulating their internal police.
Mr Gerry cd not see the extent of such a power, and was agst every power
that was not necessary. He thought a remonstrance agst unreasonable acts of
the States wd reclaim them. If it shd not force might be resorted to. He had
no objection to authorize a negative to paper money and similar measures.
When the confederation was depending before Congress, Massachusetts
was then for inserting the power of emitting paper money amg the exclusive
powers of Congress. He observed that the proposed negative wd extend to
the regulations of the Militia, a matter on which the existence of a State
might depend. The Natl Legislature with such a power may enslave the
States. Such an idea as this will never be acceded to. It has never been
suggested or conceived among the people. No speculative projector, and
there are eno' of that character among us, in politics as well as in other
things, has in any pamphlet or newspaper thrown out the idea. The States
too have different interests and are ignorant of each other's interests. The
Negative therefore will be abused. New States too having separate views
from the old States will never come into the Union. They may even be
under some foreign influence; are they in such case to participate in the
negative on the will of the other States?
Mr Sherman thought the cases in which the negative ought to be
exercised, might be defined. He wished the point might not be decided till a
trial at least shd be made for that purpose.
Mr Wilson would not say what modifications of the proposed power
might be practicable or expedient. But however novel it might appear the
principle of it when viewed with a close & steady eye, is right. There is no
instance in which the laws say that the individual shd be bound in one case,
& at liberty to judge whether he will obey or disobey in another. The cases
are parallel. Abuses of the power over the individual person may happen as
well as over the individual States. Federal liberty is to the States, what civil
liberty, is to private individuals, and States are not more unwilling to
purchase it, by the necessary concession of their political sovereignty, than
the savage is to purchase Civil liberty by the surrender of the personal
sovereignty, which he enjoys in a State of nature. A definition of the cases
in which the Negative should be exercised, is impracticable. A discretion
must be left on one side or the other? will it not be most safely lodged on
the side of the Natl Govt? Among the first sentiments expressed in the first
Congs one was that Virga is no more, that Massts is no [more], that Pa is no
more &c. We are now one nation of brethren. We must bury all local
interests & distinctions. This language continued for some time. The tables
at length began to turn. No sooner were the State Govts formed than their
jealousy & ambition began to display themselves. Each endeavoured to cut
a slice from the common loaf, to add to its own morsel, till at length the
confederation became frittered down to the impotent condition in which it
now stands. Review the progress of the articles of Confederation thro'
Congress & compare the first & last draught of it. To correct its vices is the
business of this convention. One of its vices is the want of an effectual
controul in the whole over its parts. What danger is there that the whole will
unnecessarily sacrifice a part? But reverse the case, and leave the whole at
the mercy of each part, and will not the general interest be continually
sacrificed to local interests?
Mr Dickenson deemed it impossible to draw a line between the cases
proper & improper for the exercise of the negative. We must take our choice
of two things. We must either subject the States to the danger of being
injured by the power of the Natl Govt or the latter to the danger of being
injured by that of the States. He thought the danger greater from the States.
To leave the power doubtful, would be opening another spring of discord,
and he was for shutting as many of them as possible.
Mr Bedford, in answer to his colleague's question, where wd be the
danger to the States from this power, would refer him to the smallness of
his own State which may be injured at pleasure without redress. It was
meant he found to strip the small States of their equal right of suffrage. In
this case Delaware would have about 1/90 for its share in the General
Councils, whilst Pa & Va would possess 1/3 of the whole. Is there no
difference of interests, no rivalship of commerce, of manufactures? Will not
these large States crush the small ones whenever they stand in the way of
their ambitious or interested views. This shews the impossibility of
adopting such a system as that on the table, or any other founded on a
change in the priñple of representation. And after all, if a State does not
obey the law of the new System, must not force be resorted to as the only
ultimate remedy, in this as in any other system. It seems as if Pa & Va by the
conduct of their deputies wished to provide a system in which they would
have an enormous & monstrous influence. Besides, How can it be thought
that the proposed negative can be exercised? Are the laws of the States to
be suspended in the most urgent cases until they can be sent seven or eight
hundred miles, and undergo the deliberation of a body who may be
incapable of Judging of them? Is the National Legislature too to sit
continually in order to revise the laws of the States?
Mr Madison observed that the difficulties which had been started were
worthy of attention and ought to be answered before the question was put.
The case of laws of urgent necessity must be provided for by some
emanation of the power from the Natl Govt into each State so far as to give
a temporary assent at least. This was the practice in the Royal Colonies
before the Revolution and would not have been inconvenient if the supreme
power of negativing had been faithful to the American interest, and had
possessed the necessary information. He supposed that the negative might
be very properly lodged in the senate alone, and that the more numerous &
expensive branch therefore might not be obliged to sit constantly. He asked
Mr B. what would be the consequence to the small States of a dissolution of
the Union wch seemed likely to happen if no effectual substitute was made
for the defective System existing, and he did not conceive any effectual
system could be substituted on any other basis than that of a proportional
suffrage? If the large States possessed the Avarice & ambition with which
they were charged, would the small ones in their neighbourhood, be more
secure when all controul of a Genl Govt was withdrawn.
Mr Butler was vehement agst the Negative in the proposed extent, as
cutting off all hope of equal justice to the distant States. The people there
would not he was sure give it a hearing.
On the question for extending the negative power to all cases as
proposed by (Mr P. & Mr M.) Mass. ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay.
Del. divd. Mr Read & Mr Dickenson ay. Mr Bedford & Mr Basset no.
Maryd no. Va ay. Mr R. Mr Mason no. Mr Blair, Docr Mc Cg Mr M. ay. Genl
W. not consulted. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo no.
On motion of Mr Gerry and Mr King tomorrow was assigned for
reconsidering the mode of appointing the National Executive: the
reconsideration being voted for by all the States except Connecticut &
N. Carolina.
Mr Pinkney and Mr Rutlidge moved to add to the Resoln 4. agreed to by
the Come the following, viz. "that the States be divided into three classes,
the 1st class to have 3 members, the 2d two, & the 3d one member each, that
an estimate be taken of the comparative importance of each State at fixed
periods, so as to ascertain the number of members they may from time to
time be entitled to." The Committee then rose and the House adjourned.
S        J    9  [71] M . L      M          
M                     . I  C               
W    .
[71] Edward Carrington wrote to Jefferson from New York, June 9,1787:
"The debates and proceedings of the Convention are kept in profound
secrecy—opinions of the probable result of their deliberations can only be
formed from the prevailing impressions of men of reflection and
understanding—these are reducible to two schemes—the first, a
consolidation of the whole Empire into one republic, leaving in the States
nothing more than subordinate courts for facilitating the administration of
the Laws—the second an investiture of the fœderal sovereignty with full
and independent authority as to the Trade, Revenues, and forces of the
union, and the rights of peace and war, together with a negative upon all the
acts of the State legislatures.
The first idea, I apprehend, would be impracticable, and therefore do not
suppose it can be adopted—general Laws through a Country embracing so
many climates, productions, and manners as the United States, would
operate many oppressions & a general legislature would be found
incompetent to the formation of local ones, as a majority would in every
instance, be ignorant of, and unaffected by the objects of legislation....
Something like the second will probably be formed—indeed I am certain
that nothing less than what will give the fœderal sovereignty a compleat
controul over the state Governments, will be thought worthy of discussion
—such a scheme constructed upon well adjusted principles would certainly
give us stability and importance as a nation, and if the Executive powers
can be sufficiently checked, must be eligible—unless the whole has a
decided influence over the parts, the constant effort will be to resume the
delegated powers, and there cannot be an inducement in the fœderal
sovereignty to refuse its assent to an innocent act of a State.... The Eastern
opinions are for a total surrender of the state Sovereignties, and indeed
some amongst them go to a monarchy at once—they have verged to
anarchy, while to the southward we have only felt an inconvenience, and
their proportionate disposition to an opposite extreme is a natural
consequence."—Jeff. MSS.
Mr Gerry, according to previous notice given by him, moved "that the
national Executive should be elected by the Executives of the States whose
proportion of votes should be the same with that allowed to the States in the
election of the Senate." If the appointmt should be made by the Natl
Legislature, it would lessen that independence of the Executive which ought
to prevail, would give birth to intrigue and corruption between the
Executive & Legislature previous to the election, and to partiality in the
Executive afterwards to the friends who promoted him. Some other mode
therefore appeared to him necessary. He proposed that of appointing by the
State Executives as most analogous to the principle observed in electing the
other branches of the Natl Govt; the first branch being chosen by the people
of the States, & the 2d by the Legislatures of the States, he did not see any
objection agst letting the Executive be appointed by the Executives of the
States. He supposed the Executives would be most likely to select the fittest
men, and that it would be their interest to support the man of their own
choice.
Mr Randolph urged strongly the inexpediency of Mr Gerry's mode of
appointing the Natl Executive. The confidence of the people would not be
secured by it to the Natl magistrate. The small States would lose all chance
of an appointmt from within themselves. Bad appointments would be made;
the Executives of the States being little conversant with characters not
within their own small spheres. The State Executives too notwithstanding
their constitutional independence, being in fact dependent on the State
Legislatures will generally be guided by the views of the latter, and prefer
either favorites within the States, or such as it may be expected will be most
partial to the interests of the State. A Natl Executive thus chosen will not be
likely to defend with becoming vigilance & firmness the National rights agst
State encroachments. Vacancies also must happen. How can these be filled?
He could not suppose either that the Executives would feel the interest in
supporting the Natl Executive which had been imagined. They will not
cherish the great Oak which is to reduce them to paltry shrubs.
On the question for referring the appointment of the Natl Executive to
the State Executives as propd by Mr Gerry Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. no.
N. J. no. Pa no. Del. divd. Md no. Va no. S. C. no. Geo. no.[72]
[72] "Carried against the motion, 10 noes, and Delaware divided."—Yates,
Secret Proceedings, etc., 111. The Journal also includes North Carolina among
the noes.—Journal of the Federal Convention, 110.
Mr Patterson moves that the Committee resume the clause relating to the
rule of suffrage in the Natl Legislature.
Mr Brearly[73] seconds him. He was sorry he said that any question on
this point was brought into view. It had been much agitated in Congs at the
time of forming the Confederation, and was then rightly settled by allowing
to each sovereign State an equal vote. Otherwise the smaller States must
have been destroyed instead of being saved. The substitution of a ratio, he
admitted carried fairness on the face of it; but on a deeper examination was
unfair and unjust. Judging of the disparity of the States by the quota of
Congs, Virga would have 16 votes, and Georgia but one. A like proportion
to the others will make the whole number ninety. There will be 3 large
states, and 10 small ones. The large States by which he meant Massts Pena
& Virga will carry every thing before them. It had been admitted, and was
known to him from facts within N. Jersey that where large & small counties
were united into a district for electing representatives for the district, the
large counties always carried their point, and Consequently that the large
States would do so. Virga with her sixteen votes will be a solid column
indeed, a formidable phalanx. While Georgia with her Solitary vote, and the
other little States will be obliged to throw themselves constantly into the
scale of some large one, in order to have any weight at all. He had come to
the convention with a view of being as useful as he could in giving energy
and stability to the federal Government. When the proposition for
destroying the equality of votes came forward, he was astonished, he was
alarmed. Is it fair then it will be asked that Georgia should have an equal
vote with Virga. He would not say it was. What remedy then? One only, that
a map of the U. S. be spread out, that all the existing boundaries be erased,
and that a new partition of the whole be made into 13 equal parts.
[73] "Mr. Brearly is a man of good, rather than of brilliant parts. He is a Judge of
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and is very much in the esteem of the people.
As an Orator he has little to boast of, but as a Man he has every virtue to
recommend him. Mr. Brearly is about 40 years of age."—Pierce's Notes, Am.
Hist. Rev., iii., 327.
Mr Patterson considered the proposition for a proportional representation
as striking at the existence of the lesser States. He wd premise however to
an investigation of this question some remarks on the nature structure and
powers of the Convention. The Convention he said was formed in
pursuance of an Act of Congs that this act was recited in several of the
Commissions, particularly that of Massts which he required to be read: that
the amendment of the Confederacy was the object of all the laws and
Commissions on the subject: that the articles of the Confederation were
therefore the proper basis of all the proceedings of the Convention. We
ought to keep within its limits, or we should be charged by our Constituents
with usurpation, that the people of America were sharpsighted and not to be
deceived. But the Commissions under which we acted were not only the
measure of our power, they denoted also the sentiments of the States on the
subject of our deliberation. The idea of a National Govt as
contradistinguished from a federal one, never entered into the mind of any
of them, and to the public mind we must accommodate ourselves. We have
no power to go beyond the federal Scheme, and if we had the people are not
ripe for any other. We must follow the people; the people will not follow us.
—The proposition could not be maintained whether considered in reference
to us as a nation, or as a confederacy. A confederacy supposes sovereignty
in the members composing it & sovereignty supposes equality. If we are to
be considered as a nation, all State distinctions must be abolished, the
whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when an equal division is made,
then there may be fairly an equality of representation. He held up Virga
Massts & Pa as the three large States, and the other ten as small ones;
repeating the calculations of Mr Brearly, as to the disparity of votes which
wd take place, and affirming that the small States would never agree to it.
He said there was no more reason that a great individual State contributing
much, should have more votes than a small one contributing little, than that
a rich individual citizen should have more votes than an indigent one. If the
rateable property of A was to that of B as 40 to 1, ought A for that reason to
have 40 times as many votes as B. Such a principle would never be
admitted, and if it were admitted would put B entirely at the mercy of A. As
A has more to be protected than B so he ought to contribute more for the
common protection. The same may be said of a large State wch has more to
be protected than a small one. Give the large States an influence in
proportion to their magnitude, and what will be the consequence? Their
ambition will be proportionally increased, and the small States will have
every thing to fear. It was once proposed by Galloway & some others that
America should be represented in the British Parlt and then be bound by its
laws. America could not have been entitled to more than 1/3 of the no of
Representatives which would fall to the share of G. B. Would American
rights & interests have been safe under an authority thus constituted? It has
been said that if a Natl Govt is to be formed so as to operate on the people,
and not on the States, the representatives ought to be drawn from the
people. But why so? May not a Legislature filled by the State Legislatures
operate on the people who chuse the State Legislatures? or may not a
practicable coercion be found. He admitted that there was none such in the
existing System.—He was attached strongly to the plan of the existing
Confederacy, in which the people chuse their Legislative representatives;
and the Legislatures their federal representatives. No other amendments
were wanting than to mark the orbits of the States with due precision, and
provide for the use of coercion, which was the great point. He alluded to the
hint thrown out heretofore by Mr Wilson of the necessity to which the large
States might be reduced of confederating among themselves, by a refusal of
the others to concur. Let them unite if they please, but let them remember
that they have no authority to compel the others to unite. N. Jersey will
never confederate on the plan before the Committee. She would be
swallowed up. He had rather submit to a monarch, to a despot, than to such
a fate. He would not only oppose the plan here but on his return home do
every thing in his power to defeat it there.
Mr Wilson, hoped if the Confederacy should be dissolved, that a
majority, that a minority of the States would unite for their safety. He
entered elaborately into the defence of a proportional representation, stating
for his first position that as all authority was derived from the people, equal
numbers of people ought to have an equal no of representatives, and
different numbers of people different numbers of representatives. This
principle had been improperly violated in the Confederation, owing to the
urgent circumstances of the time. As to the case of A. & B. stated by Mr
Patterson, he observed that in districts as large as the States, the number of
people was the best measure of their comparative wealth. Whether therefore
wealth or numbers were to form the ratio it would be the same. Mr P.
admitted persons, not property to be the measure of suffrage. Are not the
Citizens of Pena equal to those of N. Jersey? does it require 150 of the
former to balance 50 of the latter? Representatives of different districts
ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their respective
Constituents hold to each other. If the small States will not confederate on
this plan, Pena & he presumed some other States, would not confederate on
any other. We have been told that each State being sovereign, all are equal.
So each man is naturally a sovereign over himself, and all men are therefore
naturally equal. Can he retain this equality when he becomes a member of
Civil Government. He can not. As little can a Sovereign State, when it
becomes a member of a federal governt. If N. J. will not part with her
sovereignty it is vain to talk of Govt. A new partition of the States is
desirable, but evidently & totally impracticable.
Mr Williamson illustrated the cases by a comparison of the different
States, to Counties of different sizes within the same State; observing that
proportional representation was admitted to be just in the latter case, and
could not therefore be fairly contested in the former.
The Question being about to be put Mr Patterson hoped that as so much
depended on it, it might be thought best to postpone the decision till
tomorrow, which was done, nem. con.
The Come rose & the House adjourned.
M     , J    11   M  A       B           
G                    . I  C               
W    .
The clause concerning the rule of suffrage in the Natl Legislature
postponed on Saturday was resumed.
Mr Sherman proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1st branch
should be according to the respective numbers of free inhabitants; and that
in the second branch or Senate, each State should have one vote and no
more. He said as the States would remain possessed of certain individual
rights, each State ought to be able to protect itself: otherwise a few large
States will rule the rest. The House of Lords in England he observed had
certain particular rights under the Constitution, and hence they have an
equal vote with the House of Commons that they may be able to defend
their rights.
Mr Rutlidge proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1st branch
should be according to the quotas of contribution. The justice of this rule he
said could not be contested. Mr Butler urged the same idea: adding that
money was power; and that the States ought to have weight in the Govt in
proportion to their wealth.
Mr King & Mr Wilson,[74] in order to bring the question to a point moved
"that the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national Legislature
ought not to be according [to] the rule established in the articles of
Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of representation."
The clause so far as it related to suffrage in the first branch was postponed
in order to consider this motion.
[74] In the printed Journal Mr. Rutlidge is named as the seconder of the motion.
—Madison's Note.
Mr Dickenson contended for the actual contributions of the States as the
rule of their representation & suffrage in the first branch. By thus
connecting the interests of the States with their duty, the latter would be
sure to be performed.
Mr King remarked that it was uncertain what mode might be used in
levying a National revenue; but that it was probable, imposts would be one
source of it. If the actual contributions were to be the rule the non-
importing States, as Cont & N. Jersey, wd be in a bad situation indeed. It
might so happen that they wd have no representation. This situation of
particular States had been always one powerful argument in favor of the 5
Per Ct impost.
The question being abt to be put Docr Franklin sd he had thrown his
ideas of the matter on a paper wch Mr. Wilson read to the Committee in the
words following—Mr. Chairman
It has given me great pleasure to observe that till this point, the
proportion of representation, came before us, our debates were carried
on with great coolness & temper. If any thing of a contrary kind, has
on this occasion appeared. I hope it will not be repeated; for we are
sent here to consult, not to contend, with each other; and declarations
of a fixed opinion, and of determined resolution, never to change it,
neither enlighten nor convince us. Positiveness and warmth on one
side, naturally beget their like on the other; and tend to create and
augment discord & division in a great concern, wherein harmony &
Union are extremely necessary to give weight to our Councils, and
render them effectual in promoting & securing the common good.
I must own that I was originally of opinion it would be better if
every member of Congress, or our national Council, were to consider
himself rather as a representative of the whole, than as an Agent for
the interests of a particular State; in which case the proportion of
members for each State would be of less consequence, & it would not
be very material whether they voted by States or individually. But as I
find this is not to be expected, I now think the number of
Representatives should bear some proportion to the number of the
Represented; and that the decisions shd be by the majority of members,
not by the majority of the States. This is objected to from an
apprehension that the greater States would then swallow up the
smaller. I do not at present clearly see what advantage the greater
States could propose to themselves by swallowing up the smaller, and
therefore do not apprehend they would attempt it. I recollect that in the
beginning of this Century, When the Union was proposed of the two
Kingdoms, England & Scotland, the Scotch Patriots were full of fears,
that unless they had an equal number of Representatives in Parliament,
they should be ruined by the superiority of the English. They finally
agreed however that the different proportions of importance in the
Union, of the two Nations should be attended to, whereby they were to
have only forty members in the House of Commons, and only sixteen
in the House of Lords; A very great inferiority of numbers! And yet to
this day I do not recollect that any thing has been done in the
Parliament of Great Britain to the prejudice of Scotland; and whoever
looks over the lists of Public officers, Civil & Military of that nation
will find I believe that the North Britons enjoy at least their full
proportion of emolument.
But, sir, in the present mode of voting by States, it is equally in the
power of the lesser States to swallow up the greater; and this is
mathematically demonstrable. Suppose for example, that 7 smaller
States had each 3 members in the House, and the 6 larger to have one
with another 6 members; and that upon a question, two members of
each smaller State should be in the affirmative and one in the
Negative, they would make
Affirmatives 14 Negatives 7
And that all the larger States
should be unanimously in the Negative,
they would make Negatives 36
In all 43
It is then apparent that the 14 carry the question against the 43, and
the minority overpowers the majority, contrary to the common practice
of Assemblies in all Countries and Ages.
The greater States Sir are naturally as unwilling to have their
property left in the disposition of the smaller, as the smaller are to have
theirs in the disposition of the greater. An honorable gentleman has, to
avoid this difficulty, hinted a proposition of equalizing the States. It
appears to me an equitable one, and I should, for my own part, not be
against such a measure, if it might be found practicable. Formerly,
indeed, when almost every province had a different Constitution, some
with greater others with fewer privileges, it was of importance to the
borderers when their boundaries were contested, whether by running
the division lines, they were placed on one side or the other. At present
when such differences are done away, it is less material. The Interest of
a State is made up of the interests of its individual members. If they are
not injured, the State is not injured. Small States are more easily well
& happily governed than large ones. If therefore in such an equal
division, it should be found necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, I
should not be averse to the giving a part of it to N. Jersey, and another
to Delaware. But as there would probably be considerable difficulties
in adjusting such a division; and however equally made at first, it
would be continually varying by the augmentation of inhabitants in
some States, and their fixed proportion in others; and thence frequent
occasion for new divisions, I beg leave to propose for the
consideration of the Committee another mode, which appears to me to
be as equitable, more easily carried into practice, and more permanent
in its nature.
Let the weakest State say what proportion of money or force it is
able and willing to furnish for the general purposes of the Union.
Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish each an equal
proportion.
The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely in the disposition
of Congress.
The Congress in this case to be composed of an equal number of
Delegates from each State.
And their decisions to be by the Majority of individual members
voting.
If these joint and equal supplies should on particular occasions not
be sufficient, Let Congress make requisitions on the richer and more
powerful States for further aids, to be voluntarily afforded, leaving to
each State the right of considering the necessity and utility of the aid
desired, and of giving more or less as it should be found proper.
This mode is not new. It was formerly practised with success by the
British Government with respect to Ireland and the Colonies. We
sometimes gave even more than they expected, or thought just to
accept; and in the last war carried on while we were united, they gave
us back in 5 years a million Sterling. We should probably have
continued such voluntary contributions, whenever the occasions
appeared to require them for the common good of the Empire. It was
not till they chose to force us, and to deprive us of the merit and
pleasure of voluntary contributions that we refused & resisted. Those
contributions however were to be disposed of at the pleasure of a
Government in which we had no representative. I am therefore
persuaded, that they will not be refused to one in which the
Representation shall be equal.
My learned colleague (Mr Wilson) has already mentioned that the
present method of voting by States, was submitted to originally by
Congress, under a conviction of its impropriety, inequality, and
injustice. This appears in the words of their Resolution. It is of Sepr 6.
1774. The words are
"Resolved that in determining questions in this Congs each Colony
or province shall have one vote: The Congs not being possessed of or
at present able to procure materials for ascertaining the importance of
each Colony."
On the question for agreeing to Mr King's and Mr Wilson's motion it
passed in the affirmative.
Massts ay. Ct ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md divd. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
It was then moved by Mr Rutlidge, 2ded by Mr Butler to add to the words
"equitable ratio of representation" at the end of the motion just agreed to,
the words "according to the quotas of contribution." On motion of Mr
Wilson seconded by Mr Pinkney, this was postponed; in order to add, after
the words "equitable ratio of representation" the words following: "in
proportion to the whole number of white & other free Citizens &
inhabitants of every age sex & condition including those bound to servitude
for a term of years and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in
the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes, in each State,"
this being the rule in the Act of Congress agreed to by eleven States, for
apportioning quotas of revenue on the States, and requiring a Census only
every 5, 7, or 10 years.
Mr Gerry thought property not the rule of representation. Why then shd
the blacks, who were property in the South, be in the rule of representation
more than the Cattle & horses of the North.[75]
[75] After Gerry spoke, according to Yates, "Mr. Madison was of opinion at
present, to fix the standard of representation, and let the detail be the business of
a sub-committee."—Secret Proceedings, p. 116.
On the question,—Mass: Con: N. Y. Pen: Maryd Virga N. C. S. C. &
Geo: were in the affirmative: N. J. & Del: in the negative.
Mr Sherman moved that a question be taken whether each State shall
have one vote in the 2d branch. Every thing he said depended on this. The
smaller States would never agree to the plan on any other principle than an
equality of suffrage in this branch. Mr Elsworth[76] seconded the motion.
[76] "Mr Elsworth is a Judge of the Supreme Court in Connecticut;—he is
Gentleman of a clear, deep, and copius understanding; eloquent, and connected
in public debate; and always attentive to his duty. He is very happy in a reply,
and choice in selecting such parts of his adversary's arguments as he finds make
the strongest impressions,—in order to take off the force of them, so as to admit
the power of his own. Mr Elsworth is about 37 years of age, a Man much
respected for his integrity, and venerated for his abilities."—Pierce's Notes, Am.
Hist. Rev., iii., 326.
On the question for allowing each State one vote in the 2d branch,
Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Wilson & Mr Hamilton moved that the right of suffrage in the 2d
branch ought to be according to the same rule as in the 1st branch. On this
question for making the ratio of representation the same in the 2d as in the
1st branch it passed in the affirmative;
Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Resol: 11, for guarantying Republican Govt & territory to each State,
being considered—the words "or partition," were, on motion of Mr Madison
added, after the words "voluntary junction;"
Mas. N. Y. P. Va N. C. S. C. G. ay. Con: N. J. Del: Md no.
Mr Read disliked the idea of guarantying territory. It abetted the idea of
distinct States wch would be a perpetual source of discord. There can be no
cure for this evil but in doing away States altogether and uniting them all
into one great Society.
Alterations having been made in the Resolution, making it read, "that a
Republican Constitution & its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each
State by the U. States," the whole was agreed to nem. con.[77]
[77] Yates attributes this amendment to Madison. "Mr. Madison moved an
amendment, to add to or alter the resolution as follows: The republican
constitutions and the existing laws of each state, to be guaranteed by the United
States."—Secret Proceedings, etc., 116.
Resolution 13. for amending the national Constitution hereafter without
consent of the Natl Legislature being considered, Several members did not
see the necessity of the Resolution at all, nor the propriety of making the
consent of the Natl Legisl. unnecessary.
Col. Mason urged the necessity of such a provision. The plan now to be
formed will certainly be defective, as the Confederation has been found on
trial to be. Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to
provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust to
chance and violence. It would be improper to require the consent of the Natl
Legislature, because they may abuse their power, and refuse their consent
on that very account. The opportunity for such an abuse, may be the fault of
the Constitution calling for amendmt.
Mr Randolph enforced these arguments.
The words, "without requiring the consent of the Natl Legislature" were
postponed. The other provision in the clause passed nem. con.
Resolution 14. requiring oaths from the members of the State Govts to
observe the Natl Constitution & laws, being considered,[78]
[78] "Mr. Williamson. This resolve will be unnecessary, as the union will
become the law of the land."—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 117.
Mr Sherman opposed it as unnecessarily intruding into the State
jurisdictions.
Mr Randolph considered it necessary to prevent that competition
between the National Constitution & laws & those of the particular States,
which had already been felt. The officers of the States are already under
oath to the States. To preserve a due impartiality they ought to be equally
bound to the Natl Govt. The Natl authority needs every support we can give
it. The Executive & Judiciary of the States, notwithstanding their nominal
independence on the State Legislatures are in fact, so dependent on them,
that unless they be brought under some tie to the Natl System, they will
always lean too much to the State systems, whenever a contest arises
between the two.
Mr Gerry did not like the clause. He thought there was as much reason
for requiring an oath of fidelity to the States from Natl officers, as vice
versa.
Mr Luther Martin moved to strike out the words requiring such an oath
from the State officers, viz "within the several States," observing that if the
new oath should be contrary to that already taken by them it would be
improper; if coincident the oaths already taken will be sufficient.
On the question for striking out as proposed by Mr. L. Martin
Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Question on whole Resolution as proposed by Mr Randolph;
Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Come rose & House Adjd.

T       J    12      C            W    
The Question taken on the Resolution 15, to wit, referring the new
system to the people of the States for ratification it passed in the affirmative
Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa[79] ay. Del. divd. Md divd. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
[79] Pennsylvania omitted in the printed Journal. The vote is there entered as of
June 11th.—Madison's Note.
Mr Sherman & Mr Elseworth moved to fill the blank left in the 4th
Resolution for the periods of electing the members of the first branch with
the words, "every year;" Mr. Sherman observing that he did it in order to
bring on some question.
Mr Rutlidge proposed "every two years."
Mr Jennifer[80] propd, "every three years," observing that the too great
frequency of elections rendered the people indifferent to them, and made
the best men unwilling to engage in so precarious a service.
[80] "Mr Jenifer is a Gentleman of fortune in Maryland;—he is always in good
humour, and never fails to make his company pleased with him. He sits silent in
the Senate, and seems to be conscious that he is no politician. From his long
continuance in single life, no doubt but he has made the vow of celibacy. He
speaks warmly of the Ladies notwithstanding. Mr Jenifer is about 55 years of
Age, and once served as Aid de Camp to Major Genl Lee."—Pierce's Notes, Am.
Hist. Rev., iii., 330.
Mr Madison seconded the motion for three years. Instability is one of the
great vices of our republics, to be remedied. Three years will be necessary,
in a Government so extensive, for members to form any knowledge of the
various interests of the States to which they do not belong, and of which
they can know but little from the situation and affairs of their own. One
year will be almost consumed in preparing for and travelling to & from the
seat of national business.
Mr Gerry. The people of New England will never give up the point of
annual elections, they know of the transition made in England from
triennial to septennial elections, and will consider such an innovation here
as the prelude to a like usurpation. He considered annual elections as the
only defence of the people agst tyranny. He was as much agst a triennial
House as agst a hereditary Executive.
Mr Madison, observed that if the opinions of the people were to be our
guide, it wd be difficult to say what course we ought to take. No member of
the Convention could say what the opinions of his Constituents were at this
time; much less could he say what they would think if possessed of the
information & lights possessed by the members here; & still less what
would be their way of thinking 6 or 12 months hence. We ought to consider
what was right & necessary in itself for the attainment of a proper
Governmt. A plan adjusted to this idea will recommend itself—The
respectability of this convention will give weight to their recommendation
of it. Experience will be constantly urging the adoption of it, and all the
most enlightened & respectable citizens will be its advocates. Should we
fall short of the necessary & proper point, this influential class of Citizens,
will be turned against the plan, and little support in opposition to them can
be gained to it from the unreflecting multitude.
Mr Gerry repeated his opinion that it was necessary to consider what the
people would approve. This had been the policy of all Legislators. If the
reasoning of Mr. Madison were just, and we supposed a limited Monarchy
the best form in itself, we ought to recommend it, tho' the genius of the
people was decidedly adverse to it, and having no hereditary distinctions
among us, we were destitute of the essential materials for such an
innovation.
On the question for the triennial election of the 1st branch
Mass. no. (Mr King ay.) Mr Ghorum wavering. Cont no. N. Y. ay.
N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The words requiring members of ye 1st branch to be of the age of ——
years were struck out Maryland alone no. The words "liberal compensation
for members," being considd Mr Madison moves to insert the words, "&
fixt." He observed that it would be improper to leave the members of the
Natl legislature to be provided for by the State Legisls, because it would
create an improper dependence; and to leave them to regulate their own
wages, was an indecent thing, and might in time prove a dangerous one. He
thought wheat or some other article of which the average price throughout a
reasonable period preceding might be settled in some convenient mode,
would form a proper standard.
Col. Mason seconded the motion; adding that it would be improper for
other reasons to leave the wages to be regulated by the States. 1. the
different States would make different provision for their representatives,
and an inequality would be felt among them, whereas he thought they ought
to be in all respects equal. 2. the parsimony of the States might reduce the
provision so low that as had already happened in choosing delegates to
Congress, the question would be not who were most fit to be chosen, but
who were most willing to serve.
On the question for inserting the words, "and fixt"
Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Docr Franklyn said he approved of the amendment just made for
rendering the salaries as fixed as possible; but disliked the word "liberal."
He would prefer the word moderate if it was necessary to substitute any
other. He remarked the tendency of abuses in every case, to grow of
themselves when once begun, and related very pleasantly the progression in
ecclesiastical benefices, from the first departure from the gratuitous
provision for the Apostles, to the establishment of the papal system. The
word "liberal" was struck out nem con.
On the motion of Mr Pierce, that the wages should be paid out of the
National Treasury, Massts ay. Ct no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. G. ay.
Question on the clause relating to term of service & compensation of 1st
branch,
Massts ay. Ct no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
On a question for striking out the "ineligibility of members of the Natl
Legis: to State offices,"
Massts divd. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md divd. Va no.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On the question for agreeing to the clause as amended,
Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On a question for making members of the Natl Legislature ineligible to
any office under the Natl Govt for the term of 3 years after ceasing to be
members,
Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question for such ineligibility for one year,
Massts ay. Ct ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md divd. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On question moved by Mr. Pinckney, for striking out "incapable of re-
election into 1st branch of the Natl Legisl. for —— years, and subject to
recall" agd to nem. con.
On question for striking out from the Resol: 5 the words requiring
members of the Senatorial branch to be of the age of —— years at least
Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va no.
N. C. divd. S. C. no. Geo. divd.
On the question for filling the blank with 30 years as the qualification; it
was agreed to,
Massts ay. Ct no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Mr Spaight moved to fill the blank for the duration of the appointmts to
the 2d branch of the National Legislature with the words "7 years."
Mr Sherman, thought 7 years too long. He grounded his opposition he
said on the principle that if they did their duty well, they would be
reelected. And if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity should be allowed
for getting rid of them. He preferred 5 years which wd be between the terms
of the 1st branch & of the executive.
Mr Pierce proposed 3 years. 7 years would raise an alarm. Great
mischiefs had arisen in England from their septennial Act which was
reprobated by most of their patriotic Statesmen.
Mr Randolph was for the term of 7 years. The democratic licentiousness
of the State Legislatures proved the necessity of a firm Senate. The object
of this 2d branch is to controul the democratic branch of the Natl
Legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch being more numerous,
and coming immediately from the people, will overwhelm it. The Senate of
Maryland constituted on like principles had been scarcely able to stem the
popular torrent. No mischief can be apprehended, as the concurrence of the
other branch, and in some measure, of the Executive, will in all cases be
necessary. A firmness & independence may be the more necessary also in
this branch, as it ought to guard the Constitution agst encroachments of the
Executive who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of
the popular branch.
Mr Madison, considered 7 years as a term by no means too long. What
we wished was to give to the Govt that stability which was every where
called for, and which the Enemies of the Republican form alledged to be
inconsistent with its nature. He was not afraid of giving too much stability
by the term of Seven years. His fear was that the popular branch would still
be too great an overmatch for it. It was to be much lamented that we had so
little direct experience to guide us. The Constitution of Maryland was the
only one that bore any analogy to this part of the plan. In no instance had
the Senate of Maryd created just suspicions of danger from it. In some
instances perhaps it may have erred by yielding to the H. of Delegates. In
every instance of their opposition to the measures of the H. of D. they had
had with them the suffrages of the most enlightened and impartial people of
the other States as well as of their own. In the States where the Senates,
were chosen in the same manner as the other branches, of the Legislature,
and held their seats for 4 years, the institution was found to be no check
whatever agst the instabilities of the other branches. He conceived it to be of
great importance that a stable & firm Govt, organized in the republican
form should be held out to the people. If this be not done, and the people be
left to judge of this species of Govt by ye operations of the defective
systems under which they now live, it is much to be feared the time is not
distant when, in universal disgust, they will renounce the blessing which
they have purchased at so dear a rate, and be ready for any change that may
be proposed to them.
On the question for "seven years" as the term for the 2d branch Massts
divided. (Mr King, Mr Ghorum ay, Mr Gerry, Mr Strong, no) Cont no.
N. Y. divd N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Butler and Mr Rutlidge proposed that the members of the 2d branch
should be entitled to no salary or compensation for their services. On the
question,[81]—
Massts divd. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P. no. Del. ay. Md no. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
[81] (It is probable ye votes here turned chiefly on the idea that if the salaries
were not here provided for, the members would be paid by their respective
States) This note for the bottom margin.—Madison's Note.
It was then moved & agreed that the clauses respecting the stipends &
ineligibility of the 2d branch be the same as, of the 1st branch:—Con:
disagreeing to the ineligibility.
It was moved & 2ded to alter the Resol: 9. so as to read "that the
jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall be to hear & determine in the
dernier resort, all piracies, felonies, &c."
It was moved & 2ded to strike out "all piracies & felonies on the high
seas," which was agreed to.
It was moved & agreed to strike out "all captures from an enemy."
It was moved & agreed to strike out "other States" and insert "two
distinct States of the Union."
It was moved & agreed to postpone the consideration of the Resolution
9, relating to the Judiciary:
The Come then rose & the House Adjourned.
W         J    13.[82]    C               
     
[82] Edward Carrington wrote to Madison from New York, June 13, 1787:
"The public mind is now on the point of a favourable turn to the objects
of your meeting, and, being fairly met with the result, will, I am persuaded,
eventually embrace it—being calculated for the permanent fitness, and not
the momentary habits of the country, it may at first be viewed with
hesitation, but derived and patronized as it will be, its influence must
extend into an adoption as the present fabric gives way—the work once
well done will be done forever, but patched up in accommodation to the
whim of the day, it will soon require the hand of the cobbler again, and in
every unfortunate experiment the materials are rendered the less fit for that
monument of civil liberty which we wish to erect.—Constitute a federal
Government, invigorate & check it well—give it then independent powers
over the Trade the Revenues, and force of the Union, and all things that
involve any relationship to foreign powers—give it also the revisal of all
State acts—unless it possesses a compleat controul over the State
Governments, the constant effort will be to resume the delegated powers,—
nor do I see what inducement the federal sovereignty can have to negative
an innocent act of a State—Constitute it in such shape that, its first
principles being preserved, it will be a good republic—I wish to see that
system have a fair experiment—but let the liability to encroachment be
rather from the federal, than the State, governments—in the first case we
shall insensibly glide into a monarchy: in the latter nothing but anarchy can
be the consequence.
"Some Gentlemen think of a total surrender of the State Sovereignty—I
see not the necessity of that measure for giving us national stability in
consequence—the negative of the federal sovereignty will effectually
prevent the existence of any licentious or inconsiderate act—and I believe
that even under a new monarchy it would be found necessary thus to
continue the local administration—general Laws would operate many
particular [undecipherable] and a general legislature would be found
incompetent to the formation of local ones—the interest of the United
States may be well combined for the common good—but the affairs of so
extensive a country are not to be thrown into one mass—an attempt to
confederate upon terms materially opposed to the particular Interests would
in all probability occasion a dismemberment, and in that event, within a
long time yet to come, the prospects of commerce will be at an end as to
any degree of national importance, let her fate be what it may as to freedom
or vassalage."—Mad. MSS.
Resol: 9 being resumed
The latter parts of the clause relating to the jurisdiction of the Natl
tribunals, was struck out nem. con in order to leave full room for their
organization.
Mr Randolph & Mr Madison, then moved the following resolution
respecting a National Judiciary, viz "that the jurisdiction of the National
Judiciary shall extend to cases, which respect the collection of the national
revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions which
involve the national peace and harmony" which was agreed to.
Mr Pinkney & Mr Sherman moved to insert after the words "one
supreme tribunal" the words "the Judges of which to be appointed by the
National Legislature."
Mr Madison, objected to an appt by the whole Legislature. Many of them
were incompetent Judges of the requisite qualifications. They were too
much influenced by their partialities. The candidate who was present, who
had displayed a talent for business in the legislative field, who had perhaps
assisted ignorant members in business of their own, or of their Constituents,
or used other winning means, would without any of the essential
qualifications for an expositor of the laws prevail over a competitor not
having these recommendations, but possessed of every necessary
accomplishment. He proposed that the appointment should be made by the
Senate, which as a less numerous & more select body, would be more
competent judges, and which was sufficiently numerous to justify such a
confidence in them.
Mr Sherman & Mr Pinkney withdrew their motion, and the appt by the
Senate was agd to nem. con.
Mr Gerry moved to restrain the Senatorial branch from originating
money bills. The other branch was more immediately the representatives of
the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the Purse-
strings. If the Senate should be allowed to originate such bills, they wd
repeat the experiment, till chance should furnish a sett of representatives in
the other branch who will fall into their snares.
Mr Butler saw no reason for such a discrimination. We were always
following the British Constitution when the reason of it did not apply. There
was no analogy between the H. of Lords and the body proposed to be
established. If the Senate should be degraded by any such discriminations,
the best men would be apt to decline serving in it in favor of the other
branch. And it will lead the latter into the practice of tacking other clauses
to money bills.
Mr Madison observed that the Comentators on the Brit: Const: had not
yet agreed on the reason of the restriction on the H. of L. in money bills.
Certain it was there could be no similar reason in the case before us. The
Senate would be the representatives of the people as well as the 1st branch.
If they sd have any dangerous influence over it, they would easily prevail on
some member of the latter to originate the bill they wished to be passed. As
the Senate would be generally a more capable sett of men, it wd be wrong to
disable them from any preparation of the business, especially of that which
was most important, and in our republics, worse prepared than any other.
The Gentleman in pursuance of his principle ought to carry the restraint to
the amendment, as well as the originating of money bills, since, an addition
of a given sum wd be equivalent to a distinct proposition of it.
Mr King differed from Mr Gerry, and concurred in the objections to the
proposition.
Mr Read favored the proposition, but would not extend the restraint to
the case of amendments.
Mr Pinkney thinks the question premature. If the Senate shd be formed
on the same proportional representation as it stands at present, they sd have
equal power, otherwise if a different principle sd be introduced.
Mr Sherman. As both branches must concur, there can be no danger
whichever way the Senate be formed. We establish two branches in order to
get more wisdom, which is particularly needed in the finance business—
The Senate bear their share of the taxes, and are also the representatives of
the people. What a man does by another, he does by himself is a maxim. In
Cont both branches can originate in all cases, and it has been found safe &
convenient. Whatever might have been the reason of the rule as to The H.
of Lords, it is clear that no good arises from it now even there.
Genl Pinkney. This distinction prevails in S. C. and has been a source of
pernicious disputes between ye 2 branches. The Constitution is now evaded,
by informal schedules of amendments handed from ye Senate to the other
House.
Mr Williamson wishes for a question chiefly to prevent re-discussion.
The restriction will have one advantage, it will oblige some member in the
lower branch to move, & people can then mark him.
On the question for excepting money bills, as propd by Mr Gerry,
Mass. no. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.[83]
[83] According to the Journal (121) Pennsylvania was among the noes.
Committee rose & Mr Ghorum made report, which was postponed till
tomorrow, to give an opportunity for other plans to be proposed. The report
was in the words following:
Report of the Committee of Whole on Mr Randolph's propositions.
1. Resd that it is the opinion of this Committee that a National Governmt
ought to be established, consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive &
Judiciary.
2. Resold that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches.
3. Resd that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature
ought to be elected by the people of the several States for the term of three
years, to receive fixed Stipends by which they may be compensated for the
devotion of their time to public service, to be paid out of the National
Treasury: to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or
under the authority of the U. States, (except those peculiarly belonging to
the functions of the first branch), during the term of service, and under the
national Government for the Space of one year after its expiration.
4. Resd that the members of the second branch of the Natl Legislature
ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of 30
years at least, to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure their
independency, namely, seven years, to receive fixed stipends by which they
may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service to be
paid out of the National Treasury; to be ineligible to any office established
by a particular State, or under the authority of the U. States, (except those
peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch) during the term
of service, and under the Natl Govt for the space of one year after its
expiration.
5. Resd that each branch ought to possess the right of originating Acts.
6. Resd that the Natl Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the
Legislative rights vested in Congs by the Confederation, and moreover to
legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent; or in
which the harmony of the U. S. may be interrupted by the exercise of
individual legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States
contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of
Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union.
7. Resd that the rights of suffrage in the 1st branch of the National
Legislature, ought not to be according to the rule established in the articles
of confederation but according to some equitable ratio of representation,
namely, in proportion to the whole number of white & other free citizens &
inhabitants, of every age sex and condition, including those bound to
servitude for a term of years, & three fifths of all other persons, not
comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes
in each State.
8. Resolved that the right of suffrage in the 2d branch of the National
Legislature ought to be according to the rule established for the first.
9. Resolved that a National Executive be instituted to consist of a single
person, to be chosen by the Natl Legislature for the term of seven years,
with power to carry into execution the national laws, to appoint to offices in
cases not otherwise provided for—to be ineligible a second time, & to be
removeable on impeachment and conviction of malpractices or neglect of
duty—to receive a fixed stipend by which he may be compensated for the
devotion of his time to public service to be paid out of the national
Treasury.
10. Resold that the Natl Executive shall have a right to negative any
Legislative Act, which shall not be afterwards passed unless by two thirds
of each branch of the National Legislature.
11. Resold that a Natl Judiciary be established, to consist of one supreme
tribunal, the Judges of which to be appointed by the 2d branch of the Natl
Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour, & to receive
punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services, in which
no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually
in office at the time of such increase or diminution.
12. Resold that the Natl Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior
Tribunals.
13. Resd that the jurisdiction of the Natl Judiciary shall extend to all
cases which respect the collection of the Natl revenue, impeachments of any
Natl Officers, and questions which involve the national peace & harmony.
14. Resd that provision ought to be made for the admission of States
lawfully arising within the limits of the U. States, whether from a voluntary
junction of Government & territory or otherwise, with the consent of a
number of voices in the Natl Legislature less than the whole.
15. Resd that provision ought to be made for the continuance of
Congress and their authorities and privileges untill a given day after the
reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted and for the completion of
all their engagements.
16. Resd that a Republican Constitution & its existing laws ought to be
guaranteed to each State by the U. States.
17. Resd that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the
Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary.
18. Resd that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers within the
several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union.
19. Resd that the amendments which shall be offered to the confederation
by the Convention ought at a proper time or times after the approbation of
Congs to be submitted to an Assembly or Assemblies recommended by the
several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and
decide thereon.
T        J    14. I  C         .
Mr Patterson, observed to the Convention that it was the wish of several
deputations, particularly that of N. Jersey, that further time might be
allowed them to contemplate the plan reported from the Committee of the
Whole, and to digest one purely federal, and contradistinguished from the
reported plan. He said they hoped to have such an one ready by tomorrow
to be laid before the Convention: And the Convention adjourned that leisure
might be given for the purpose.
F      J    15   1787
Mr Patterson, laid before the Convention the plan which he said several
of the deputations wished to be substituted in place of that proposed by Mr
Randolph. After some little discussion of the most proper mode of giving it
a fair deliberation it was agreed that it should be referred to a Committee of
the Whole, and that in order to place the two plans in due comparison, the
other should be recommitted. At the earnest request of Mr Lansing[84] &
some other gentlemen, it was also agreed that the Convention should not go
into Com̃ittee of the whole on the subject till tomorrow, by which delay the
friends of the plan proposed by Mr Patterson wd be better prepared to
explain & support it, and all would have an opportuy of taking copies.[85]
[84] "Mr. Lansing is a practising Attorney at Albany, and Mayor of that
Corporation. He has a hisitation in his speech, that will prevent his being an
Orator of any eminence;—his legal knowledge I am told is not extensive, nor his
education a good one. He is however a Man of good sense, plain in his manners,
and sincere in his friendships. He is about 32 years of age."—Pierce's Notes, Am.
Hist. Rev., iii., 327.
[85] (This plan had been concerted among the deputations or members thereof,
from Cont N. Y. N. J. Del. and perhaps Mr Martin from Maryd who made with
them a common cause though on different principles. Cont & N. Y. were agst a
departure from the principle of the Confederation, wishing rather to add a few
new powers to Congs than to substitute, a National Govt. The States of N. J. &
Del. were opposed to a National Govt because its patrons considered a
proportional representation of the States as the basis of it. The eagerness
displayed by the members opposed to a Natl Govt from these different motives
began now to produce serious anxiety for the result of the Convention. Mr
Dickenson said to Mr Madison You see the consequence of pushing things too
far. Some of the members from the small States wish for two branches in the
General Legislature, and are friends to a good National Government; but we
would sooner submit to foreign power, than submit to be deprived of an equality
of suffrage in both branches of the legislature, and thereby be thrown under the
domination of the large States.)—Madison Note.
"Mr. Madison moved for the report of the committee, and the question may
then come on whether the convention will postpone it in order to take into
consideration the system now offered.
"Mr. Lansing is of opinion that the two systems are fairly contrasted. The one
now offered is on the basis of amending the federal government, and the other to
be reported as a national government, on propositions which exclude the
propriety of amendment. Considering therefore its importance, and that justice
may be done to its weighty consideration, he is for postponing it a day.
"Col. Hamilton cannot say he is in sentiment with either plan—supposes both
might again be considered as federal plans, and by this means they will be fairly
in committee, and be contrasted so as to make a comparative estimate of the
two."—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 121, 122.
The propositions from N. Jersey moved by Mr Patterson were in the
words following.
1. Resd that the articles of Confederation ought to be so revised,
corrected, & enlarged, as to render the federal Constitution adequate to
the exigencies of Government, & the preservation of the Union.
2. Resd that in addition to the powers vested in the U. States in
Congress, by the present existing articles of Confederation, they be
authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty or
duties on all goods or merchandizes of foreign growth or manufacture,
imported into any part of the U. States, by Stamps on paper, vellum or
parchment, and by a postage on all letters or packages passing through
the general post-office, to be applied to such federal purposes as they
shall deem proper & expedient; to make rules & regulations for the
collection thereof; and the same from time to time, to alter & amend in
such manner as they shall think proper, to pass Acts for the regulation
of trade & commerce as well with foreign Nations as with each other:
provided that all punishments, fines, forfeitures & penalties to be
incurred for contravening such acts rules and regulations shall be
adjudged by the Common law Judiciaries of the State in which any
Offence contrary to the true intent & meaning of such Acts rules &
regulations shall have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty of
commencing in the first instance all suits & prosecutions for that
purpose in the Superior Common law Judiciary in such State, subject
nevertheless, for the correction of all errors, both in law & fact in
rendering Judgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary of the U. States.
3. Resd that whenever requisitions shall be necessary, instead of the
rule for making requisitions mentioned in the articles of
Confederation, the United States in Congs be authorized to make such
requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white & other free
citizens & inhabitants of every age Sex and condition including those
bound to servitude for a term of years & three fifths of all other
persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians
not paying taxes; that if such requisitions be not complied with, in the
time specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non
complying States & for that purpose to devise and pass acts directing
& authorizing the same; provided that none of the powers hereby
vested in the U. States in Congs shall be exercised without the consent
of at least —— States, and in that proportion if the number of
Confederated States should hereafter be increased or diminished.
4. Resd that the U. States in Congs be authorized to elect a federal
Executive to consist of —— persons, to continue in office for the term
of —— years, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed
compensation for their services, in which no increase nor diminution
shall be made so as to affect the persons composing the Executive at
the time of such increase or diminution, to be paid out of the federal
treasury; to be incapable of holding any other office or appointment
during their time of service and for —— years thereafter: to be
ineligible a second time, & removeable by Congs on application by a
majority of the Executives of the several States; that the Executives
besides their general authority to execute the federal acts ought to
appoint all federal officers not otherwise provided for, & to direct all
military operations; provided that none of the persons composing the
federal Executive shall on any occasion take command of any troops,
so as personally to conduct any enterprise as General or in any other
capacity.
5. Resd that a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a
supreme Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by the
Executive, & to hold their offices during good behaviour, to receive
punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services in
which no increase nor diminution shall be made, so as to affect the
persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution:
that the Judiciary so established shall have authority to hear &
determine in the first instance on all impeachments of federal Officers,
& by way of appeal in the dernier resort in all cases touching the rights
of Ambassadors, in all cases of captures from an enemy, in all cases of
piracies & felonies on the high Seas, in all cases in which foreigners
may be interested, in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or
which may arise on any of the Acts for the regulation of trade, or the
collection of the federal Revenue: that none of the Judiciary shall
during the time they remain in office be capable of receiving or
holding any other office or appointment during their term of service, or
for —— thereafter.
6. Resd that all Acts of the U. States in Congs made by virtue & in
pursuance of the powers hereby & by the Articles of Confederation
vested in them, and all Treaties made & ratified under the authority of
the U. States shall be the supreme law of the respective States so far
forth as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States or their
Citizens, and that the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound
thereby in their decisions any thing in the respective laws of the
Individual States to the Contrary notwithstanding: and that if any State,
or any body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent ye carrying
into execution such acts or treaties, the federal Executive shall be
authorized to call forth ye power of the Confederated States, or so
much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an
Obedience to such Acts, or an observance of such Treaties.
7. Resd that provision be made for the admission of new States into
the Union.
8. Resd that the rule for naturalization ought to be same in every
State.
9. Resd that a Citizen of one State committing an offence in another
State of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the same offence as if it
had been committed by a Citizen of the State in which the offence was
committed. [86]
[86] This copy of Mr Patterson's propositions varies in a few clauses from that in
the printed Journal furnished from the papers of Mr Brearley a colleague of Mr
Patterson. A confidence is felt, notwithstanding, in its accuracy. That the copy in
the Journal is not entirely correct is shewn by the ensuing speech of Mr Wilson
(June 16) in which he refers to the mode of removing the Executive by
impeachment & conviction as a feature in the Virga plan forming one of its
contrasts to that of Mr Patterson, which proposed a removal on the application of
a majority of the Executives of the States. In the copy printed in the Journal, the
two modes are combined in the same clause; whether through inadvertence, or as
a contemplated amendment, does not appear.—Madison's Note.
The Journal contains: "6. Resolved, that the legislative, executive, and
judiciary powers within the several states, ought to be bound, by oath, to support
the articles of union," and "9. Resolved, that provision ought to be made for
hearing and deciding upon all disputes arising between the United States and an
individual state, respecting territory."—Journal of the Federal Convention, 126.
Adjourned.
S        J    16.    C                W    
on Resolutions proposd by Mr P. & Mr R.
Mr Lansing called for the reading of the 1st resolution of each plan, which
he considered as involving principles directly in contrast; that of Mr
Patterson says he sustains the sovereignty of the respective States, that of Mr
Randolph destroys it: the latter requires a negative on all the laws of the
particular States; the former, only certain general powers for the general
good. The plan of Mr R. in short absorbs all power except what may be
exercised in the little local matters of the States which are not objects worthy
of the supreme cognizance. He grounded his preference of Mr P's plan,
chiefly on two objections agst that of Mr R. 1. want of power in the
Convention to discuss & propose it. 2. the improbability of its being adopted,
1. He was decidedly of opinion that the power of the Convention was
restrained to amendments of a federal nature, and having for their basis the
Confederacy in being. The Act of Congress The tenor of the Acts of the
States, the Com̃issions produced by the several deputations all proved this.
And this limitation of the power to an amendment of the Confederacy,
marked the opinion of the States, that it was unnecessary & improper to go
farther. He was sure that this was the case with his State. N. York would
never have concurred in sending deputies to the Convention, if she had
supposed the deliberations were to turn on a consolidation of the States, and
a National Government.
2. was it probable that the States would adopt & ratify a scheme, which
they had never authorized us to propose? and which so far exceeded what
they regarded as sufficient? We see by their several Acts particularly in
relation to the plan of revenue proposed by Cong. in 1783, not authorized by
the Articles of Confederation, what were the ideas they then entertained. Can
so great a change be supposed to have already taken place. To rely on any
change which is hereafter to take place in the sentiments of the people would
be trusting to too great an uncertainty. We know only what their present
sentiments are. And it is in vain to propose what will not accord with these.
The States will never feel a sufficient confidence in a general Government to
give it a negative on their laws. The Scheme is itself totally novel. There is
no parallel to it to be found. The Authority of Congress is familiar to the
people, and an augmentation of the powers of Congress will be readily
approved by them.
Mr Patterson, said as he had on a former occasion given his sentiments on
the plan proposed by Mr R. he would now avoiding repetition as much as
possible give his reasons in favor of that proposed by himself. He preferred it
because it accorded 1. with the powers of the Convention, 2 with the
sentiments of the people. If the confederacy was radically wrong, let us
return to our States, and obtain larger powers, not assume them ourselves. I
came here not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments of those who
sent me. Our object is not such a Governmt as may be best in itself, but such
a one as our Constituents have authorized us to prepare, and as they will
approve. If we argue the matter on the supposition that no Confederacy at
present exists, it can not be denied that all the States stand on the footing of
equal sovereignty. All therefore must concur before any can be bound. If a
proportional representation be right, why do we not vote so here? If we argue
on the fact that a federal compact actually exists, and consult the articles of it
we still find an equal Sovereignty to be the basis of it. He reads the 5th art: of
Confederation giving each State a vote—& the 13th declaring that no
alteration shall be made without unanimous consent. This is the nature of all
treaties. What is unanimously done, must be unanimously undone. It was
observed (by Mr Wilson) that the larger State gave up the point, not because
it was right, but because the circumstances of the moment urged the
concession. Be it so. Are they for that reason at liberty to take it back. Can
the donor resume his gift without the consent of the donee. This doctrine
may be convenient, but it is a doctrine that will sacrifice the lesser States.
The larger States acceded readily to the confederacy. It was the small ones
that came in reluctantly and slowly. N. Jersey & Maryland were the two last,
the former objecting to the want of power in Congress over trade: both of
them to the want of power to appropriate the vacant territory to the benefit of
the whole.—If the sovereignty of the States is to be maintained, the
Representatives must be drawn immediately from the States, not from the
people: and we have no power to vary the idea of equal sovereignty. The
only expedient that will cure the difficulty, is that of throwing the States into
Hotchpot. To say that this is impracticable, will not make it so. Let it be
tried, and we shall see whether the Citizens of Massts Pena & Va accede to it.
It will be objected that Coercion will be impracticable. But will it be more so
in one plan than the other? Its efficacy will depend on the quantum of power
collected, not on its being drawn from the States, or from the individuals;
and according to his plan it may be exerted on individuals as well as
according that of Mr R. A distinct executive & Judiciary also were equally
provided by his plan. It is urged that two branches in the Legislature are
necessary. Why? for the purpose of a check. But the reason of the precaution
is not applicable to this case. Within a particular State, where party heats
prevail, such a check may be necessary. In such a body as Congress it is less
necessary, and besides, the delegations of the different States are checks on
each other. Do the people at large complain of Congs? No, what they wish is
that Congs may have more power. If the power now proposed be not eno', the
people hereafter will make additions to it. With proper powers Congs will act
with more energy & wisdom than the proposed Natl Legislature; being fewer
in number, and more secreted & refined by the mode of election. The plan of
Mr R. will also be enormously expensive. Allowing Georgia & Del. two
representatives each in the popular branch the aggregate number of that
branch will be 180. Add to it half as many for the other branch and you have
270, coming once at least a year from the most distant as well as the most
central parts of the republic. In the present deranged State of our finances
can so expensive a System be seriously thought of? By enlarging the powers
of Congs the greatest part of this expence will be saved, and all purposes will
be answered. At least a trial ought to be made.
Mr Wilson entered into a contrast of the principal points of the two plans
so far he said as there had been time to examine the one last proposed. These
points were 1. in the Virga plan there are 2 & in some degree 3 branches in
the Legislature: in the plan from N. J. there is to be a single legislature only
—2. Representation of the people at large is the basis of one: the State
Legislatures, the pillars of the other—3. proportional representation prevails
in one;—equality of suffrage in the other—4. A single Executive Magistrate
is at the head of the one:—a plurality is held out in the other.—5. in the one
the majority of the people of the U. S. must prevail:—in the other a minority
may prevail. 6. the Natl Legislature is to make laws in all cases to which the
separate States are incompetent &:—in place of this Congs are to have
additional power in a few cases only—7. A negative on the laws of the
States:—in place of this coertion to be substituted—8. The Executive to be
removable on impeachment & conviction;—in one plan: in the other to be
removable at the instance of a majority of the Executives of the States—9.
Revision of the laws provided for in one:—no such check in the other—10.
inferior national tribunals in one:—none such in the other. 11. In one ye
jurisdiction of Natl tribunals to extend &c—; an appellate jurisdiction only
allowed in the other. 12. Here the jurisdiction is to extend to all cases
affecting the Nationl peace & harmony; there a few cases only are marked
out. 13. finally ye ratification is in this to be by the people themselves:—in
that by the legislative authorities according to the 13 art: of the
Confederation.
With regard to the power of the Convention, he conceived himself
authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at liberty to propose any thing. In
this particular he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the two plans.
With regard to the sentiments of the people, he conceived it difficult to
know precisely what they are. Those of the particular circle in which one
moved, were commonly mistaken for the general voice. He could not
persuade himself that the State Govts & Sovereignties were so much the idols
of the people, nor a Natl Govt so obnoxious to them, as some supposed. Why
sd a Natl Govt be unpopular? Has it less dignity? will each Citizen enjoy
under it less liberty or protection? Will a Citizen of Deleware be degraded by
becoming a Citizen of the United States? Where do the people look at
present for relief from the evils of which they complain? Is it from an
internal reform of their Govts? no, Sir. It is from the Natl Councils that relief
is expected. For these reasons he did not fear, that the people would not
follow us into a National Govt and it will be a further recommendation of Mr
R's plan that it is to be submitted to them, and not to the Legislatures, for
ratification.
Proceeding now to the 1st point on which he had contrasted the two plans,
he observed that anxious as he was for some augmentation of the federal
powers, it would be with extreme reluctance indeed that he could ever
consent to give powers to Congs he had two reasons either of wch was
sufficient, 1. Congs as a Legislative body does not stand on the people. 2. it
is a single body. 1. He would not repeat the remarks he had formerly made
on the principles of Representation, he would only say that an inequality in
it, has ever been a poison contaminating every branch of Govt. In G. Britain
where this poison has had a full operation, the security of private rights is
owing entirely to the purity of her tribunals of Justice, the Judges of which
are neither appointed nor paid, by a venal Parliament. The political liberty of
that Nation, owing to the inequality of representation is at the mercy of its
rulers. He means not to insinuate that there is any parallel between the
situation of that Country & ours at present. But it is a lesson we ought not to
disregard, that the smallest bodies in G. B. are notoriously the most corrupt.
Every other source of influence must also be stronger in small than large
bodies of men. When Lord Chesterfield had told us that one of the Dutch
provinces had been seduced into the views of France, he need not have
added, that it was not Holland, but one of the smallest of them. There are
facts among ourselves which are known to all. Passing over others, he will
only remark that the Impost, so anxiously wished for by the public was
defeated not by any of the larger States in the Union. 2. Congress is a single
Legislature. Despotism comes on Mankind in different Shapes, sometimes in
an Executive, sometimes in a Military, one. Is there no danger of a
Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative
authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it
can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and
independent branches. In a single House there is no check, but the
inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it.
On another great point, the contrast was equally favorable to the plan
reported by the Committee of the whole. It vested the Executive powers in a
single Magistrate. The plan of N. Jersey, vested them in a plurality. In order
to controul the Legislative authority, you must divide it. In order to controul
the Executive you must unite it. One man will be more responsible than
three. Three will contend among themselves till one becomes the master of
his colleagues. In the triumvirates of Rome first Cæsar, then Augustus, are
witnesses of this truth. The Kings of Sparta, & the Consuls of Rome prove
also the factious consequences of dividing the Executive Magistracy. Having
already taken up so much time he wd not he sd, proceed to any of the other
points. Those on which he had dwelt, are sufficient of themselves; and on the
decision of them, the fate of the others will depend.
Mr Pinkney,[87] the whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give N. Jersey
an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Natl
system. He thought the Convention authorized to go any length in
recommending; which they found necessary to remedy the evils which
produced this Convention.
[87] Yates states it was C. C. Pinckney who said this.—Secret Proceedings, etc.,
123.
Mr Elseworth proposed as a more distinctive form of collecting the mind
of the Committee on the subject, "that the Legislative power of the U. S.
should remain in Congs" This was not seconded, though it seemed better
calculated for the purpose than the 1st proposition of Mr Patterson in place of
which Mr. E. wished to substitute it.
Mr Randolph, was not scrupulous on the point of power. When the
Salvation of the Republic was at stake, it would be treason to our trust, not to
propose what we found necessary. He painted in strong colours, the
imbecility of the existing Confederacy, & the danger of delaying a
substantial reform. In answer to the objection drawn from the sense of our
Constituents as denoted by their acts relating to the Convention and the
objects of their deliberation, he observed that as each State acted separately
in the case, it would have been indecent for it to have charged the existing
Constitution with all the vices which it might have perceived in it. The first
State that set on foot this experiment would not have been justified in going
so far, ignorant as it was of the opinion of others, and sensible as it must
have been of the uncertainty of a successful issue to the experiment. There
are certainly reasons of a peculiar nature where the ordinary cautions must
be dispensed with; and this is certainly one of them. He wd not as far as
depended on him leave any thing that seemed necessary, undone. The present
moment is favorable, and is probably the last that will offer.
The true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or
introduce the national plan. The insufficiency of the former has been fully
displayed by the trial already made. There are but two modes, by which the
end of a Genl Govt can be attained: the 1st is by coercion as proposed by Mr
P's plan 2. by real legislation as propd by the other plan. Coercion he
pronounced to be impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals. It tended
also to habituate the instruments of it to shed the blood & riot in the Spoils of
their fellow Citizens, and consequently trained them up for the service of
Ambition. We must resort therefore to a National Legislation over
individuals, for which Congs are unfit. To vest such power in them, would be
blending the Legislative with the Executive, contrary to the recd maxim on
this subject: If the Union of these powers heretofore in Congs has been safe,
it has been owing to the general impotency of that body. Congs are moreover
not elected by the people, but by the Legislatures who retain even a power of
recall. They have therefore no will of their own, they are a mere diplomatic
body, and are always obsequious to the views of the States, who are always
encroaching on the authority of the U. States. A provision for harmony
among the States, as in trade, naturalization &.—for crushing rebellion
whenever it may rear its crest—and for certain other general benefits, must
be made. The powers for these purposes can never be given to a body,
inadequate as Congress are in point of representation, elected in the mode in
which they are, and possessing no more confidence than they do: for
notwithstanding what has been said to the contrary, his own experience
satisfied him that a rooted distrust of Congress pretty generally prevailed. A
Natl Govt alone, properly constituted, will answer the purpose; and he
begged it to be considered that the present is the last moment for establing
one. After this select experiment, the people will yield to despair.
The Committee rose & the House adjourned.
M      J    18.    C                      on
the propositions of Mr Patterson & Mr Randolph.
On motion of Mr Dickinson to postpone the 1st Resolution in Mr
Patterson's plan, in order to take up the following viz—"that the Articles of
Confederation ought to be revised and amended, so as to render the
Government of the U. S. adequate to the exigencies, the preservation and the
prosperity of the Union" the postponement was agreed to by 10 States, Pen:
divided.
Mr. Hamilton,[88] had been hitherto silent on the business before the
Convention, partly from respect to others whose superior abilities age &
experience rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar to
theirs, and partly from his delicate situation with respect to his own State, to
whose sentiments as expressed by his Colleages, he could by no means
accede. This crisis however which now marked our affairs, was too serious
to permit any scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed on every
man to contribute his efforts for the public safety & happiness. He was
obliged therefore to declare himself unfriendly to both plans. He was
particularly opposed to that from N. Jersey, being fully convinced, that no
amendment of the Confederation, leaving the States in possession of their
Sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose. On the other hand he
confessed he was much discouraged by the amazing extent of Country in
expecting the desired blessings from any general sovereignty that could be
substituted.—As to the powers of the Convention, he thought the doubts
started on that subject had arisen from distinctions & reasonings too subtle.
A federal Govt he conceived to mean an association of independent
Communities into one. Different Confederacies have different powers, and
exercise them in different ways. In some instances the powers are exercised
over collective bodies; in others over individuals, as in the German Diet—&
among ourselves in cases of piracy. Great latitude therefore must be given to
the signification of the term. The plan last proposed departs itself from the
federal idea, as understood by some, since it is to operate eventually on
individuals. He agreed moreover with the Honble gentleman from Va (Mr R.)
that we owed it to our Country, to do on this emergency whatever we should
deem essential to its happiness. The States sent us here to provide for the
exigencies of the Union. To rely on & propose any plan not adequate to these
exigencies, merely because it was not clearly within our powers, would be to
sacrifice the means to the end. It may be said that the States cannot ratify a
plan not within the purview of the article of the Confederation providing for
alterations & amendments. But may not the States themselves in which no
constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists in the Legislatures, have
had in view a reference to the people at large. In the Senate of N. York, a
proviso was moved, that no act of the Convention should be binding untill it
should be referred to the people & ratified; and the motion was lost by a
single voice only, the reason assigned agst it being, that it might possibly be
found an inconvenient shackle.
[88] Hamilton happened to call upon Madison while the latter was putting the last
touches to this speech and "acknowledged its fidelity, without suggesting more
than a few verbal alterations which were made."—(Cf. Madison's Writings, vol.
ii.). A brief of the speech from the Hamilton Papers is given in Lodge's Works of





The great question is what provision shall we make for the happiness of
our Country? He would first make a comparative examination of the two
plans—prove that there were essential defects in both—and point out such
changes as might render a national one, efficacious.—The great & essential
principles necessary for the support of Government are 1. an active &
constant interest in supporting it. This principle does not exist in the States in
favor of the federal Govt. They have evidently in a high degree, the esprit de
corps. They constantly pursue internal interests adverse to those of the
whole. They have their particular debts—their particular plans of finance &c.
All these when opposed to, invariably prevail over the requisitions & plans
of Congress. 2. The love of power. Men love power. The same remarks are
applicable to this principle. The States have constantly shewn a disposition
rather to regain the powers delegated by them than to part with more, or to
give effect to what they had parted with. The ambition of their demagogues
is known to hate the controul of the Genl Government. It may be remarked
too that the Citizens have not that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of the Genl
Govt as of the particular Govts. A dissolution of the latter would be fatal; of
the former would still leave the purposes of Govt attainable to a considerable
degree. Consider what such a State as Virga will be in a few years, a few
compared with the life of nations. How strongly will it feel its importance
and self-sufficiency? 3. An habitual attachment of the people. The whole
force of this tie is on the side of the State Govt. Its sovereignty is
immediately before the eyes of the people: its protection is immediately
enjoyed by them. From its hand distributive justice, and all those acts which
familiarize & endear a Govt to a people, are dispensed to them. 4. Force by
which may be understood a coercion of laws or coercion of arms. Congs
have not the former except in few cases. In particular States, this Coercion is
nearly sufficient; tho' he held it in most cases, not entirely so. A certain
portion of military force is absolutely necessary in large communities. Massts
is now feeling this necessity & making provision for it. But how can this
force be exerted on the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a
war between the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spectators.
They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the
Union will ensue. 5. Influence. he did not mean corruption, but a
dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments, which produce an
attachment to the Govt. Almost all the weight of these is on the side of the
States; and must continue so as long as the States continue to exist. All the
passions then we see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern most
individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the current of the States, and do
not flow into the stream of the Genl Govt. The former therefore will
generally be an overmatch for the Genl Govt and render any confederacy, in
its very nature precarious. Theory is in this case fully confirmed by
experience. The Amphyctionic Council had it would seem ample powers for
general purposes. It had in particular the power of fining and using force agst
delinquent members. What was the consequence. Their decrees were mere
signals of war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length
taking advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their
councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The German Confederacy
affords another lesson. The Authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as great
as could be necessary. The great feudal chiefs however, exercising their local
sovereignties, soon felt the spirit & found the means of, encroachments,
which reduced the imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty. The Diet has
succeeded, which tho' aided by a Prince at its head, of great authority
independently of his imperial attributes, is a striking illustration of the
weakness of Confederated Governments. Other examples instruct us in the
same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce any union at all, and have been
more than once at war with one another.—How then are all these evils to be
avoided? only by such a compleat sovereignty in the General Govermt as
will turn all the strong principles & passions abovementioned on its side.
Does the scheme of N. Jersey produce this effect? does it afford any
substantial remedy whatever? On the contrary it labors under great defects,
and the defect of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of others. It
gives a direct revenue to Congs but this will not be sufficient. The balance
can only be supplied by requisitions: which experience proves cannot be
relied on. If States are to deliberate on the mode, they will also deliberate on
the object of the supplies, and will grant or not grant as they approve or
disapprove of it. The delinquency of one will invite and countenance it in
others. Quotas too must in the nature of things be so unequal as to produce
the same evil. To what standard will you resort? Land is a fallacious one.
Compare Holland with Russia; France or Engd with other countries of
Europe, Pena with N. Carola will the relative pecuniary abilities in those
instances, correspond with the relative value of land. Take numbers of
inhabitants for the rule and make like comparison of different countries, and
you will find it to be equally unjust. The different degrees of industry and
improvement in different Countries render the first object a precarious
measure of wealth. Much depends too on situation. Cont N. Jersey & N.
Carolina, not being commercial States & contributing to the wealth of the
Commercial ones, can never bear quotas assessed by the ordinary rules of
proportion. They will & must fail in their duty, their example will be
followed, and the union itself be dissolved. Whence then is the national
revenue to be drawn? from Commerce; even from exports which
notwithstanding the com̃on opinion are fit objects of moderate taxation, from
excise, &c &c. These tho' not equal, are less unequal than quotas. Another
destructive ingredient in the plan, is that equality of suffrage which is so
much desired by the small States. It is not in human nature that Va & the
large States should consent to it, or if they did that they shd long abide by it.
It shocks too much all ideas of Justice, and every human feeling. Bad
principles in a Govt tho slow are sure in their operation, and will gradually
destroy it. A doubt has been raised whether Congs at present have a right to
keep Ships or troops in time of peace. He leans to the negative. Mr. P's plan
provides no remedy.—If the powers proposed were adequate, the
organization of Congs is such that they could never be properly & effectually
exercised. The members of Congs being chosen by the States & subject to
recall, represent all the local prejudices. Should the powers be found
effectual, they will from time to time be heaped on them, till a tyrannic sway
shall be established. The general power whatever be its form if it preserves
itself, must swallow up the State powers. Otherwise it will be swallowed up
by them. It is agst all the principles of a good Government to vest the
requisite powers in such a body as Congs. Two Sovereignties can not co-exist
within the same limits. Giving powers to Congs must eventuate in a bad Govt
or in no Govt. The plan of N. Jersey therefore will not do. What then is to be
done? Here he was embarrassed. The extent of the Country to be governed,
discouraged him. The expence of a general Govt was also formidable; unless
there were such a diminution of expence on the side of the State Govts as the
case would admit. If they were extinguished, he was persuaded that great
œconomy might be obtained by substituting a general Govt. He did not mean
however to shock the public opinion by proposing such a measure. On the
other hand he saw no other necessity for declining it. They are not necessary
for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture.
Subordinate authorities he was aware would be necessary. There must be
district tribunals; corporations for local purposes. But cui bono, the vast &
expensive apparatus now appertaining to the States. The only difficulty of a
serious nature which occurred to him, was that of drawing representatives
from the extremes to the centre of the Community. What inducements can be
offered that will suffice? The moderate wages for the 1st branch would only
be a bait to little demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts he supposed
would be the utmost. The Senate he feared from a similar cause, would be
filled by certain undertakers who wish for particular offices under the Govt.
This view of the subject almost led him to despair that a Republican Govt
could be established over so great an extent. He was sensible at the same
time that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form. In his private
opinion he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinion of
so many of the wise & good, that the British Govt was the best in the world:
and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America.
He hoped Gentlemen of different opinions would bear with him in this, and
begged them to recollect the change of opinion on this subject which had
taken place and was still going on. It was once thought that the power of
Congs was amply sufficient to secure the end of their institution. The error
was now seen by every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism,
he observed, were as loud as any in declaiming agst the vices of democracy.
This progress of the public mind led him to anticipate the time, when others
as well as himself would join in the praise bestowed by Mr Neckar on the
British Constitution, namely, that it is the only Govt in the world "which
unites public strength with individual security."—In every Com̃unity where
industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few & the many.
Hence separate interests will arise. There will be debtors & Creditors &c.
Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the
few, they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have the power, that
each may defend itself agst the other. To the want of this check we owe our
paper money, instalment laws &c. To the proper adjustment of it the British
owe the excellence of their Constitution. Their house of Lords is a most
noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient
interest by means of their property, in being faithful to the national interest,
they form a permanent barrier agst every pernicious innovation, whether
attempted on the part of the Crown or of the Commons. No temporary
Senate will have firmness eno' to answer the purpose. The Senate (of
Maryland) which seems to be so much appealed to, has not yet been
sufficiently tried. Had the people been unanimous & eager in the late appeal
to them on the subject of a paper emission they would have yielded to the
torrent. Their acquiescing in such an appeal is a proof of it.—Gentlemen
differ in their opinions concerning the necessary checks, from the different
estimates they form of the human passions. They suppose seven years a
sufficient period to give the senate an adequate firmness, from not duly
considering the amazing violence & turbulence of the democratic spirit.
When a great object of Govt is pursued, which seizes the popular passions,
they spread like wild fire, and become irresistable. He appealed to the
gentlemen from the N. England States whether experience had not there
verified the remark.—As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no
good one could be established on Republican Principles. Was not this giving
up the merits of the question; for can there be a good Govt without a good
Executive. The English Model was the only good one on this subject. The
Hereditary interest of the King was so interwoven with that of the Nation,
and his personal emoluments so great, that he was placed above the danger
of being corrupted from abroad—and at the same time was both sufficiently
independent and sufficiently controuled, to answer the purpose of the
institution at home, one of the weak sides of Republics was their being liable
to foreign influence & corruption. Men of little character, acquiring great
power become easily the tools of intermeddling Neibours. Sweden was a
striking instance. The French & English had each their parties during the late
Revolution which was effected by the predominant influence of the former.
—What is the inference from all these observations? That we ought to go as
far in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will
admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life or at least
during good behaviour. Let the Executive also be for life. He appealed to the
feelings of the members present whether a term of seven years, would induce
the sacrifices of private affairs which an acceptance of public trust would
require, so as to ensure the services of the best Citizens. On this plan we
should have in the Senate a permanent will, a weighty interest, which would
answer essential purposes. But is this a Republican Govt, it will be asked?
Yes if all the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are filled, by the
people, or a process of election originating with the people. He was sensible
that an Executive constituted as he proposed would have in fact but little of
the power and independence that might be necessary. On the other plan of
appointing him for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought to have but little
power. He would be ambitious, with the means of making creatures, and as
the object of his ambition wd be to prolong his power, it is probable that in
case of a war, he would avail himself of the emergence, to evade or refuse a
degradation from his place. An Executive for life has not this motive for
forgetting his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer depository of power. It
will be objected probably, that such an Executive will be an elective
Monarch, and will give birth to the tumults which characterize that form of
Govt. He wd reply that Monarch is an indefinite term. It marks not either the
degree or duration of power. If this Executive Magistrate wd be a monarch
for life—the other propd by the Report from the Com̃ittee of the whole, wd
be a monarch for seven years. The circumstance of being elective was also
applicable to both. It had been observed by judicious writers that elective
monarchies wd be the best if they could be guarded agst the tumults excited
by the ambition and intrigues of competitors. He was not sure that tumults
were an inseparable evil. He rather thought this character of Elective
Monarchies had been taken rather from particular cases than from general
principles. The election of Roman Emperors was made by the Army. In
Poland the election is made by great rival princes with independent power,
and ample means, of raising commotions. In the German Empire, The
appointment is made by the Electors & Princes, who have equal motives &
means, for exciting cabals & parties. Might not such a mode of election be
devised among ourselves as will defend the community agst these effects in
any dangerous degree? Having made these observations he would read to the
Committee a sketch of a plan which he shd prefer to either of those under
consideration. He was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most members.
But will such a plan be adopted out of doors? In return he would ask will the
people adopt the other plan? At present they will adopt neither. But he sees
the Union dissolving or already dissolved—he sees evils operating in the
States which must soon cure the people of their fondness for democracies—
he sees that a great progress has been already made & is still going on in the
public mind. He thinks therefore that the people will in time be unshackled
from their prejudices; and whenever that happens, they will themselves not
be satisfied at stopping where the plan of Mr R. wd place them, but be ready
to go as far at least as he proposes. He did not mean to offer the paper he had
sketched as a proposition to the Committee. It was meant only to give a more
correct view of his ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he should
probably propose to the plan of Mr R. in the proper stages of its future
discussion. He read his sketch in the words following; to wit
I. The supreme Legislative power of the United States of America to
be vested in two different bodies of men; the one to be called the
Assembly, the other the Senate who together shall form the Legislature
of the United States with power to pass all laws whatsoever subject to
the Negative hereafter mentioned.
II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the people to serve
for three years.
III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve during good
behaviour; their election to be made by electors chosen for that purpose
by the people: in order to this the States to be divided into election
districts. On the death, removal or resignation of any Senator his place
to be filled out of the district from which he came.
IV. The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be
vested in a Governour to be elected to serve during good behaviour—
the election to be made by Electors chosen by the people in the Election
Districts aforesaid—The authorities & functions of the Executive to be
as follows: to have a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the
execution of all laws passed; to have the direction of war when
authorized or begun; to have with the advice and approbation of the
Senate the power of making all treaties; to have the sole appointment of
the heads or chief officers of the departments of Finance, War and
Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all other officers
(Ambassadors to foreign Nations included) subject to the approbation or
rejection of the Senate; to have the power of pardoning all offences
except Treason; which he shall not pardon without the approbation of
the Senate.
V. On the death resignation or removal of the Governour his
authorities to be exercised by the President of the Senate till a Successor
be appointed.
VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war, the power of
advising and approving all Treaties, the power of approving or rejecting
all appointments of officers except the heads or chiefs of the
departments of Finance War and foreign affairs.
VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vested in —— Judges to
hold their offices during good behaviour with adequate and permanent
salaries. This Court to have original jurisdiction in all causes of capture,
and an appellative jurisdiction in all causes in which the revenues of the
General Government or the Citizens of foreign Nations are concerned.
VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have power to institute
Courts in each State for the determination of all matters of general
concern.
IX. The Governour Senators and all officers of the United States to
be liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct; and upon
conviction to be removed from office, & disqualified for holding any
place of trust or profit—All impeachments to be tried by a Court to
consist of the Chief —— or Judge of the Superior Court of Law of each
State, provided such Judge shall hold his place during good behavior,
and have a permanent salary.
X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution or
laws of the United States to be utterly void; and the better to prevent
such laws being passed, the Governour or president of each State shall
be appointed by the General Government and shall have a Negative
upon the laws about to be passed in the State of which he is the
Governour or President.
XI. No State to have any forces land or Naval; and the militia of all
the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the United
States, the officers of which to be appointed and commissioned by
them.
On these several articles he entered into explanatory observations
corresponding with the principles of his introductory reasoning.[89]
[89] C                               J. M.    C  . H       ,          
                           P      , 1787,                             
                                                             
          . H                                                      
             .
The people of the United States of America do ordain & establish this
Constitution for the government of themselves and their posterity.
A       I
§ 1. The Legislative power shall be vested in two distinct bodies of men, one
to be called the Assembly, the other the Senate, subject to the negative hereinafter
mentioned.
§ 2. The Executive power, with the qualifications hereinafter specified, shall
be vested in a President of the United States.
§ 3. The Supreme Judicial authority, except in the cases otherwise provided for
in this Constitution, shall be vested in a Court to be called the S       C    , to
consist of not less than six nor more than twelve Judges.
A       II
§ 1. The Assembly shall consist of persons to be called representatives, who
shall be chosen, except in the first instance, by the free male citizens &
inhabitants of the several States comprehended in the Union, all of whom of the
age of twenty one years & upwards shall be entitled to an equal vote.
§ 2. But the first Assembly shall be chosen in the manner prescribed in the last
article and shall consist of one hundred members of whom N. Hampshire shall
have five, Massachusetts thirteen, Rhode Island two, Connecticut seven, N. York
nine, N. Jersey six, Pennsylvania twelve, Delaware two, Maryland eight, Virginia
sixteen, N. Carolina eight, S. Carolina eight, Georgia four.
§ 3. The Legislature shall provide for the future elections of Representatives,
apportioning them in each State, from time to time, as nearly as may be to the
number of persons described in the 4§ of the VII article, so as that the whole
number of Representatives shall never be less than one hundred, nor more than
—— hundred. There shall be a Census taken for this purpose within three years
after the first meeting of the Legislature, and within every successive period of
ten years. The term for which Representatives shall be elected shall be determined
by the Legislature but shall not exceed three years. There shall be a general
election at least once in three years; and the time of service of all the members in
each Assembly shall begin, (except in filling vacancies) on the same day, and
shall always end on the same day.
§ 4. Forty members shall make a House sufficient to proceed to business; but
their number may be increased by the Legislature, yet so as never to exceed a
majority of the whole number of Representatives.
§ 5. The Assembly shall choose its President and other officers, shall judge of
the qualifications & elections of its own members, punish them for improper
conduct in their capacity of Representatives not extending to life or limb; and
shall exclusively possess the power of impeachment except in the case of the
President of the United States; but no impeachment of a member of the Senate
shall be by less than two thirds of the Representatives present.
§ 6. Representatives may vote by proxy; but no Representative present shall be
proxy for more than one who is absent.[A]
[A] Quere, ? (to provide for distant States).—Note in Madison's
hand.
§ 7. Bills for raising revenue, and bills for appropriating monies for the
support of fleets and armies, and for paying the salaries of the officers of
Government, shall originate in the Assembly; but may be altered and amended by
the Senate.
§ 8. The acceptance of an office under the United States by a Representative
shall vacate his seat in the Assembly.
A       III
§ 1. The Senate shall consist of persons to be chosen, except in the first
instance, by Electors elected for that purpose by the Citizens and inhabitants of
the several States comprehended in the Union who shall have in their own right,
or in the right of their wifes, an Estate in land for not less than life, or a term of
years, whereof at the time of giving their votes there shall be at least fourteen
years unexpired.
§ 2. But the first Senate shall be chosen in the manner prescribed in the last
Article and shall consist of forty members to be called Senators, of whom
N. Hampshire shall have —— Massts —— R. Island —— Connecticut ——
N. York —— N. Jersey —— Pena —— Delaware —— Maryd —— Virga ——
N. Carol. —— S. Carol. —— Geo. ——.
§ 3. The Legislature shall provide for the future elections of Senators, for
which purpose the States respectively, which have more than one Senator, shall be
divided into convenient districts to which the Senators shall be apportioned. A
State having but one Senator shall be itself a district. On the death, resignation or
removal from office of a Senator his place shall be supplied by a new election in
the district from which he came. Upon each election there shall be not less than
six nor more than twelve electors chosen in a district.
§ 4. The number of Senators shall never be less than forty, nor shall any State,
if the same shall not hereafter be divided, ever have less than the number allotted
to it in the second section of this article; but the Legislature may increase the
whole number of Senators, in the same proportion to the whole number of
Representatives as forty is to one hundred; and such increase beyond the present
number, shall be apportioned to the respective States in a ratio to the respective
numbers of their representatives.
§ 5. If States shall be divided, or if a new arrangement of the boundaries of
two or more States shall take place, the Legislature shall apportion the number of
Senators (in elections succeeding such division or new arrangement) to which the
constituent parts were entitled according to the change of situation, having regard
to the number of persons described in the 4 §. of the VII article.
§ 6. The Senators shall hold their places during good behaviour, removable
only by conviction on impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor. They shall
continue to exercise their offices when impeached untill a conviction shall take
place. Sixteen Senators attending in person shall be sufficient to make a House to
transact business; but the Legislature may increase this number, yet so as never to
exceed a majority of the whole number of Senators. The Senators may vote by
proxy, but no Senator who is present shall be proxy for more than two who are
absent.
§ 7. The Senate shall choose its President and other officers; shall judge of the
qualifications and elections of its members, and shall punish them for improper
conduct in their capacity of Senators; but such punishment shall not extend to life
or limb, nor to expulsion. In the absence of their President they may choose a
temporary President. The President shall only have a casting vote when the House
is equally divided.
§ 8. The Senate shall exclusively possess the power of declaring war. No
treaty shall be made without their advice and consent; which shall also be
necessary to the appointment of all officers, except such for which a different
provision is made in this Constitution.
A       IV
§ 1. The President of the United States of America, (except in the first
instance) shall be elected in the manner following—The Judges of the Supreme
Court shall within sixty days after a vacancy shall happen, cause public notice to
be given in each State, of such vacancy, appointing therein three several days for
the several purposes following, to wit, a day for commencing the election of
electors for the purposes hereinafter specified, to be called the first electors,
which day shall not be less than forty, nor more than sixty days, after the day of
the publication of the notice in each State—another day for the meeting of the
electors not less [than] forty nor more than ninety days from the day for
commencing their election—another day for the meeting of electors to be chosen
by the first electors, for the purpose hereinafter specified, and to be called the
second Electors, which day shall be not less than forty nor more than sixty days
after the day for the meeting of the first electors.
§ 2. After notice of a vacancy shall have been given there shall be chosen in
each State a number of persons, as the first electors in the preceding section
mentioned, equal to the whole number of the Representatives and Senators of
such State in the Legislature of the United States; which electors shall be chosen
by the Citizens of such State having an estate of inheritance or for three lives in
land, or a clear personal estate of the value of one thousand Spanish milled dollars
of the present standard.
§ 3. These first electors shall meet in their respective States at the time
appointed, at one place; and shall proceed to vote by ballot for a President, who
shall not be one of their own number, unless the Legislature upon experiment
should hereafter direct otherwise. They shall cause two lists to be made of the
name or names of the person or persons voted for, which they or the major part of
them shall sign & certify. They shall then proceed each to nominate openly in the
presence of the others, two persons as for second electors, and out of the persons
who shall have the four highest numbers of nominations, they shall afterwards by
ballot by plurality of votes choose two who shall be the second electors, to each
of whom shall be delivered one of the lists before mentioned. These second
electors shall not be any of the persons voted for as President. A copy of the same
list signed and certified in like manner shall be transmitted by the first electors to
the Seat of the Government of the United States, under a sealed cover directed to
the President of the Assembly, which after the meeting of the Second electors
shall be opened for the inspection of the two Houses of the Legislature.
§ 4. The second electors shall meet precisely on the day appointed and not on
another day, at one place. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or if there be
no Chief Justice, the Judge senior in office in such Court, or if there be no one
Judge senior in office, some other Judge of that Court, by the choice of the rest of
the Judges or of a majority of them, shall attend at the same place and shall
preside at the meeting, but shall have no vote. Two thirds of the whole number of
the Electors shall constitute a sufficient meeting for the execution of their trust. At
this meeting the lists delivered to the respective electors shall be produced and
inspected, and if there be any person who has a majority of the whole number of
votes given by the first electors, he shall be the President of the United States; but
if there be no such person, the second electors so met shall proceed to vote, by
ballot for one of the persons named in the lists who shall have the three highest
numbers of the votes of the first electors; and if upon the first or any succeeding
ballot on the day of their meeting, either of those persons shall have a number of
votes equal to a majority of the whole number of second electors chosen, he shall
be the President. But if no such choice be made on the day appointed for the
meeting either by reason of the non-attendance of the second electors, or their not
agreeing, or any other matter, the person having the greatest number of votes of
the first electors shall be the President.
§ 5. If it should happen that the Chief Justice or some other Judge of the
Supreme Court should not attend in due time, the second electors shall proceed to
the execution of their trust without him.
§ 6. If the Judges should neglect to cause the notice required by the first
section of this article to be given within the time therein limited, they may
nevertheless cause it to be afterwards given; but their neglect if wilful, is hereby
declared to be an offence for which they may be impeached, and if convicted they
shall be punished as in other cases of conviction on impeachment.
§ 7. The Legislature shall by permanent laws provide such further regulations
as may be necessary for the more orderly election of the President; not
contravening the provisions herein contained.
§ 8. The President before he shall enter upon the execution of his office shall
take an oath or affirmation, faithfully to execute the same, and to the utmost of his
Judgment & power to protect the rights of the people, and preserve the
Constitution inviolate. This oath or affirmation shall be administered by the
President of the Senate for the time being in the presence of both Houses of the
Legislature.
§ 9. The Senate and the Assembly shall always convene in Session on the day
appointed for the meeting of the second electors and shall continue sitting till the
President take the oath or affirmation of office. He shall hold his place during
good behavior, removeable only by conviction upon impeachment for some crime
or misdemeanor.
§ 10. The President at the beginning of every meeting of the Legislature as
soon as they shall be ready to proceed to business, shall convene them together at
the place where the Senate shall sit, and shall communicate to them all such
matters as may be necessary for their information, or as may require their
consideration. He may by message during the Session communicate all other
matters which may appear to him proper. He may, whenever in his opinion the
public business shall require it, convene the Senate and Assembly, or either of
them, and may prorogue them for a time not exceeding forty days at one
prorogation; and if they should disagree about their adjournment, he may adjourn
them to such time as he shall think proper. He shall have a right to negative all
bills, Resolutions or acts of the two Houses of the Legislature about to be passed
into laws. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He shall be the
commander in chief of the army and Navy of the United States and of the Militia
within the several States, and shall have the direction of war when commenced,
but he shall not take the actual command in the field of an army without the
consent of the Senate and Assembly. All treaties, conventions and agreements
with foreign nations shall be made by him, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate. He shall have the appointment of the Principal or Chief officer of each
of the departments of war, naval Affairs, Finance and Foreign Affairs; and shall
have the nomination; and by and with the consent of the Senate, the appointment
of all other officers to be appointed under the authority of the United States,
except such for whom different provision is made by this Constitution; and
provided that this shall not be construed to prevent the Legislature, from
appointing by name, in their laws, persons to special and particular trusts created
in such laws; nor shall be construed to prevent principals in offices merely
ministerial, from constituting deputies.—In the recess of the Senate he may fill
vacancies in offices by appointments to continue in force until the end of the next
Session of the Senate, and he shall commission all officers. He shall have power
to pardon all offences except treason, for which he may grant reprieves, untill the
opinion of the Senate & Assembly can be had, and with their concurrence may
pardon the same.
§ 11. He shall receive a fixed compensation for his services to be paid to him
at stated times, and not to be increased nor diminished during his continuance in
office.
§ 12. If he depart out of the United States without the Consent of the Senate
and Assembly, he shall thereby abdicate his office.
§ 13. He may be impeached for any crime or misdemeanor by the two Houses
of the Legislature, two thirds of each House concurring, and if convicted shall be
removed from office. He may be afterwards tried & punished in the ordinary
course of law. His impeachment shall operate as a suspension from office until the
determination thereof.
§ 14. The President of the Senate shall be vice President of the United States.
On the death, resignation, impeachment, removal from office, or absence from the
United States, of the President thereof, the Vice President shall exercise all the
powers by this Constitution vested in the President, until another shall be
appointed, or untill he shall return within the United States, if his absence was
with the consent of the Senate and Assembly.
A       V
§ 1. There shall be a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who together with
the other Judges thereof, shall hold the office during good behaviour, removable
only by conviction on impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor. Each Judge
shall have a competent salary to be paid to him at stated times, and not to be
diminished during his continuance in office.
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all causes in which the
United States shall be a party, in all controversies between the United States, and
a particular State, or between two or more States, except such as relate to a claim
of territory between the United States, and one or more States, which shall be
determined in the mode prescribed in the VI article; in all cases affecting foreign
Ministers, Consuls and Agents; and an appellate jurisdiction both as to law and
fact in all cases which shall concern the Citizens of foreign nations, in all
questions between the Citizens of different States, and in all others in which the
fundamental rights of this Constitution are involved, subject to such exceptions as
are herein contained and to such regulations as the Legislature shall provide.
The Judges of all Courts which may be constituted by the Legislature shall
also hold their places during good behaviour, removeable only by conviction on
impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor, and shall have competent salaries
to be paid at stated times and not to be diminished during their continuance in
office; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the Legislature
from abolishing such Courts themselves.
All crimes, except upon impeachment, shall be tried by a Jury of twelve men;
and if they shall have been committed within any State, shall be tried within such
State; and all civil causes arising under this constitution of the like kind with
those which have been heretofore triable by Jury in the respective States, shall in
like manner be tried by jury; unless in special cases the Legislature shall think
proper to make different provision, to which provision the concurrence of two
thirds of both Houses shall be necessary.
§ 2. Impeachments of the President and Vice President of the U. States,
members of the Senate, the Governours and Presidents of the several States, the
Principal or Chief Officers of the Departments enumerated in the 10 §. of the 4th
Article, Ambassadors and other like Public Ministers, the Judges of the Supreme
Court, Generals, and Admirals of the Navy shall be tried by a Court to consist of
the Judges of the Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice or first or Senior Judge of
the superior Court of law in each State, of whom twelve shall constitute a Court.
A majority of the Judges present may convict. All other persons shall be tried on
impeachment by a court to consist of the Judges of the Supreme Court and six
Senators drawn by lot, a majority of whom may convict.
Impeachments shall clearly specify the particular offence for which the party
accused is to be tried, and judgment on conviction upon the trial thereof shall be
either removal from office singly, or removal from office and disqualification for
holding any future office or place of trust; but no Judgment on impeachment shall
prevent prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law; provided that
no Judge concerned in such conviction shall sit as Judge on the second trial. The
Legislature may remove the disabilities incurred by conviction on impeachment.
A       VI
Controversies about the right of territory between the United States and
particular States shall be determined by a Court to be constituted in manner
following. The State or States claiming in opposition to the United States as
parties shall nominate a number of persons, equal to double the number of the
Judges of the Supreme Court for the time being, of whom none shall be citizens
by birth of the States which are parties, nor inhabitants thereof when nominated,
and of whom not more than two shall have their actual residence in one State. Out
of the persons so nominated the Senate shall elect one half, who together with the
Judges of the Supreme Court, shall form the Court. Two thirds of the whole
number may hear and determine the controversy, by plurality of voices. The
States concerned may at their option claim a decision by the Supreme Court only.
All of the members of the Court hereby instituted shall, prior to the hearing of the
Cause take an oath impartially and according to the best of their judgments and
consciences, to hear and determine the controversy.
A       VII
§ 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have power to pass all laws
which they shall judge necessary to the common defence and general welfare of
the Union: But no Bill, Resolution, or act of the Senate and assembly shall have
the force of a law until it shall have received the assent of the President, or of the
vice-President when exercising the powers of the President; and if such assent
shall not have been given within ten days, after such bill, resolution or other act
shall have been presented to him for that purpose, the same shall not be a law. No
bill, resolution or other act not assented to shall be revived in the same Session of
the Legislature. The mode of signifying such assent, shall be by signing the bill
act of [r] resolution, and returning it so signed to either House of the Legislature.
§ 2. The enacting stile of all laws shall be "Be it enacted by the people of the
United States of America."
§ 3. No bill of attainder shall be passed, nor any ex post facto law; nor shall
any title of nobility be granted by the United States, or by either of them; nor shall
any person holding an office or place of trust under the United States without the
permission of the Legislature accept any present, emolument office or title from a
foreign prince or State. Nor shall any Religious Sect, or denomination, or
religious test for any office or place, be ever established by law.
§ 4. Taxes on lands, houses and other real estate, and capitation taxes shall be
proportioned in each State by the whole number of free persons, except Indians
not taxed, and by three fifths of all other persons.
§ 5. The two Houses of the Legislature may by joint ballot appoint a Treasurer
of the United States. Neither House in the Session of both Houses, without the
consent of the other shall adjourn for more than three days at a time. The Senators
and Representatives, in attending, going to and coming from the Session of their
respective houses shall be privileged from arrest, except for crimes and breaches
of the peace. The place of meeting shall always be at the seat of Government
which shall be fixed by law.
§ 6. The laws of the United States, and the treaties which have been made
under the articles of the confederation, and which shall be made under this
Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Land, and shall be so construed by
the Courts of the several States.
§ 7. The Legislature shall convene at least once in each year, which unless
otherwise provided for by law, shall be on the first Monday in December.
§ 8. The members of the two Houses of the Legislature shall receive a
reasonable compensation for their services, to be paid out of the Treasury of the
United States and ascertained by law. The law for making such provision shall be
passed with the concurrence of the first Assembly and shall extend to succeeding
Assemblies; and no succeeding assembly shall concur in an alteration of such
provision, so as to increase its own compensation; but there shall be always a law
in existence for making such provision.
A       VIII
§ 1. The Governour or President of each State shall be appointed under the
authority of the United States, and shall have a right to negative all laws about to
be passed in the State of which he shall be Governour or President, subject to
such qualifications and regulations, as the Legislature of the United States shall
prescribe. He shall in other respects have the same powers only which the
Constitution of the State does or shall allow to its Governour or President, except
as to the appointment of Officers of the Militia.
§ 2. Each Governour or President of a State shall hold his office until a
successor be actually appointed, unless he die, or resign or be removed from
office by conviction on impeachment. There shall be no appointment of such
Governor or President in the Recess of the Senate.
The Governours and Presidents of the several States at the time of the
ratification of this Constitution shall continue in office in the same manner and
with the same powers as if they had been appointed pursuant to the first section of
this article.
The officers of the Militia in the several States may be appointed under the
authority of the U. States; the Legislature whereof may authorize the Governors
or Presidents of States to make such appointments with such restrictions as they
shall think proper.
A       IX
§ 1. No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States
unless he be now a Citizen of one of the States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of
the United States.
§ 2. No person shall be eligible as a Senator or Representative unless at the
time of his election he be a Citizen and inhabitant of the State in which he is
chosen; provided that he shall not be deemed to be disqualified by a temporary
absence from the State.
§ 3. No person entitled by this Constitution to elect or to be elected President
of the United States, or a Senator or Representative in the Legislature thereof,
shall be disqualified but by the conviction of some offence for which the law shall
have previously ordained the punishment of disqualification. But the Legislature
may by law provide that persons holding offices under the United States or either
of them shall not be eligible to a place in the Assembly or Senate, and shall be
during their continuance in office suspended from sitting in the Senate.
§ 4. No person having an office or place of trust under the United States shall
without permission of the Legislature accept any present emolument office or title
from any foreign Prince or State.
§ 5. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to the rights privileges and
immunities of Citizens in every other State; and full faith and credit shall be given
in each State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of another.
§ 6. Fugitives from justice from one State who shall be found in another shall
be delivered up on the application of the State from which they fled.
§ 7. No new State shall be erected within the limits of another, or by the
junction of two or more States, without the concurrent consent of the Legislatures
of the United States and of the States concerned. The Legislature of the United
States may admit new States into the Union.
§ 8. The United States are hereby declared to be bound to guarantee to each
State a Republican form of Government, and to protect each State as well against
domestic violence as foreign invasion.
§ 9. All Treaties, Contracts and engagements of the United States of America
under the articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, shall have equal validity
under this Constitution.
§ 10. No State shall enter into a Treaty, Alliance, or contract with another, or
with a foreign power without the consent of the United States.
§ 11. The members of the Legislature of the United States and of each State,
and all officers Executive & Judicial of the one and of the other shall take an oath
or affirmation to support the Constitution of the United States.
§ 12. This Constitution may receive such alterations and amendments as may
be proposed by the Legislature of the United States, with the concurrence of two
thirds of the members of both Houses, and ratified by the Legislatures of, or by
Conventions of deputies chosen by the people in, two thirds of the States
composing the Union.
A       X
This Constitution shall be submitted to the consideration of Conventions in the
several States, the members whereof shall be chosen by the people of such States
respectively under the direction of their respective Legislatures. Each Convention
which shall ratify the same, shall appoint the first representatives and Senators
from such State according to the rule prescribed in the —— § of the —— article.
The representatives so appointed shall continue in office for one year only. Each
Convention so ratifying shall give notice thereof to the Congress of the United
States, transmitting at the same time a list of the Representatives and Senators
chosen. When the Constitution shall have been duly ratified, Congress shall give
notice of a day and place for the meeting of the Senators and Representatives
from the several States; and when these or a majority of them shall have
assembled according to such notice, they shall by joint ballot, by plurality of
votes, elect a President of the United States; and the Constitution thus organized
shall be carried into effect.—Mad. MSS.
"Col: Hamilton did not propose in the Convention any plan of a Constitution.
He had sketched an outline which he read as part of a speech; observing that he
did not mean it as a proposition, but only to give a more correct view of his ideas.
"Mr. Patterson regularly proposed a plan which was discussed & voted on."—
Madison to John Quincy Adams, Montpellier, Nov. 2, 1818, Dept. of State MSS.,
Miscellaneous Letters.
Committee rose & the House Adjourned.
T       J    19      C            W       
    P               M  P        ,—[90]
[90] This was the last session of the Convention in Committee of the Whole.
The substitute offered yesterday by Mr Dickenson being rejected by a
vote now taken on it; Con. N. Y. N. J. Del. ay. Mass. Pa V. N. C. S. C.
Geo. no. Maryd divided Mr Patterson's plan was again at large before the
Committee.
Mr Madison. Much stress has been laid by some gentlemen on the want
of power in the Convention to propose any other than a federal plan. To
what had been answered by others, he would only add, that neither of the
characteristics attached to a federal plan would support this objection. One
characteristic, was that in a federal Government, the power was exercised
not on the people individually; but on the people collectively, on the States.
Yet in some instances as in piracies, captures &c. the existing Confederacy,
and in many instances the amendments to it proposed by Mr Patterson, must
operate immediately on individuals. The other characteristic was, that a
federal Govt derived its appointments not immediately from the people, but
from the States which they respectively composed. Here too were facts on
the other side. In two of the States, Connectt & Rh. Island, the delegates to
Congs were chosen, not by the Legislatures, but by the people at large; and
the plan of Mr P. intended no change in this particular.
It had been alledged (by Mr Patterson), that the Confederation having
been formed by unanimous consent, could be dissolved by unanimous
Consent only. Does this doctrine result from the nature of compacts? does it
arise from any particular stipulation in the articles of Confederation? If we
consider the federal Union as analagous to the fundamental compact by
which individuals compose one Society, and which must in its theoretic
origin at least, have been the unanimous act of the component members, it
cannot be said that no dissolution of the compact can be effected without
unanimous consent. A breach of the fundamental principles of the compact
by a part of the Society would certainly absolve the other part from their
obligations to it. If the breach of any article by any of the parties, does not
set the others at liberty, it is because, the contrary is implied in the compact
itself, and particularly by that law of it, which gives an indefinite authority
to the majority to bind the whole in all cases. This latter circumstance
shews that we are not to consider the federal Union as analagous to the
social compact of individuals: for if it were so, a Majority would have a
right to bind the rest, and even to form a new Constitution for the whole,
which the Gentln from N. Jersey would be among the last to admit. If we
consider the federal Union as analagous not to the Social compacts among
individual men: but to the conventions among individual States, What is the
doctrine resulting from these conventions? Clearly, according to the
Expositors of the law of Nations, that a breach of any one article by any one
party, leaves all the other parties at liberty, to consider the whole convention
as dissolved, unless they choose rather to compel the delinquent party to
repair the breach. In some treaties indeed it is expressly stipulated that a
violation of particular articles shall not have this consequence, and even
that particular articles shall remain in force during war, which in general is
understood to dissolve all subsisting Treaties. But are there any exceptions
of this sort to the Articles of Confederation? So far from it that there is not
even an express stipulation that force shall be used to compell an offending
member of the Union to discharge its duty. He observed that the violations
of the federal articles had been numerous & notorious. Among the most
notorious was an act of N. Jersey herself; by which she expressly refused to
comply with a Constitutional requisition of Congs and yielded no farther to
the expostulations of their deputies, than barely to rescind her vote of
refusal without passing any positive act of compliance. He did not wish to
draw any rigid inferences from these observations. He thought it proper
however that the true nature of the existing confederacy should be
investigated, and he was not anxious to strengthen the foundations on which
it now stands.
Proceeding to the consideration of Mr Patterson's plan, he stated the
object of a proper plan to be twofold. 1. to preserve the Union. 2. to provide
a Governmt that will remedy the evils felt by the States both in their united
and individual capacities. Examine Mr P's plan, & say whether it promises
satisfaction in these respects.
1. Will it prevent the violations of the law of nations & of Treaties which
if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars? The
tendency of the States to these violations has been manifested in sundry
instances. The files of Congs contain complaints already, from almost every
Nation with which treaties have been formed. Hitherto indulgence has been
shewn to us. This cannot be the permanent disposition of foreign nations. A
rupture with other powers is among the greatest of national calamities. It
ought therefore to be effectually provided that no part of a nation shall have
it in its power to bring them on the whole. The existing Confederacy does
not sufficiently provide against this evil. The proposed amendment to it
does not supply the omission. It leaves the will of the States as
uncontrouled as ever.
2. Will it prevent encroachments on the federal authority? A tendency to
such encroachments has been sufficiently exemplified, among ourselves, as
well as in every other confederated republic antient and modern. By the
federal articles, transactions with the Indians appertain to Congs. Yet in
several instances, the States have entered into treaties & wars with them. In
like manner no two or more States can form among themselves any treaties
&c. without the consent of Congs. Yet Virga & Maryd in one instance—Pena
& N. Jersey in another, have entered into compacts, without previous
application or subsequent apology. No State again can of right raise troops
in time of peace without the like consent. Of all cases of the league, this
seems to require the most scrupulous observance. Has not Massts,
notwithstanding, the most powerful member of the Union, already raised a
body of troops? Is she not now augmenting them, without having even
deigned to apprise Congs of Her intention? In fine—Have we not seen the
public land dealt out to Cont to bribe her acquiescence in the decree
constitutionally awarded agst her claim on the territory of Pena: for no other
possible motive can account for the policy of Congs in that measure?—If
we recur to the examples of other confederacies, we shall find in all of them
the same tendency of the parts to encroach on the authority of the whole. He
then reviewed the Amphyctionic & Achæan confederacies among the
antients, and the Helvetic, Germanic & Belgic among the moderns, tracing
their analogy to the U. States in the constitution and extent of their federal
authorities—in the tendency of the particular members to usurp on these
authorities, and to bring confusion & ruin on the whole.—He observed that
the plan of Mr. Pat[er]son, besides omitting a controul over the States as a
general defence of the federal prerogatives was particularly defective in two
of its provisions. 1. Its ratification was not to be by the people at large, but
by the legislatures. It could not therefore render the acts of Congs in
pursuance of their powers, even legally paramount to the acts of the States.
2. It gave to the federal Tribunal an appellate jurisdiction only—even in the
criminal cases enumerated. The necessity of any such provision supposed a
danger of undue acquittals in the State tribunals, of what avail cd an
appellate tribunal be, after an acquittal? Besides in most if not all of the
States, the Executives have by their respective Constitutions, the right of
pardg. How could this be taken from them by a legislative ratification only?
3. Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each other? Of these enough
has been already seen. He instanced Acts of Virga & Maryland which gave
a preference to their own Citizens in cases where the Citizens of other
States are entitled to equality of privileges by the Articles of Confederation.
He considered the emissions of paper money & other kindred measures as
also aggressions. The States relatively to one another being each of them
either Debtor or Creditor; The creditor States must suffer unjustly from
every emission by the debtor States. We have seen retaliating Acts on the
subject which threatened danger not to the harmony only, but the
tranquillity of the Union. The plan of Mr Paterson, not giving even a
negative on the Acts of the States, left them as much at liberty as ever to
execute their unrighteous projects agst each other.
4. Will it secure the internal tranquillity of the States themselves? The
insurrections in Massts admonished all the States of the danger to which
they were exposed. Yet the plan of Mr P. contained no provisions for
supplying the defect of the Confederation on this point. According to the
Republican theory indeed, Right & power being both vested in the majority,
are held to be synonymous. According to fact & experience, a minority may
in an appeal to force be an overmatch for the majority. 1. If the minority
happen to include all such as possess the skill & habits of military life, with
such as possess the great pecuniary resources, one third may conquer the
remaining two thirds. 2. one third of those who participate in the choice of
rulers may be rendered a majority by the accession of those whose poverty
disqualifies them from a suffrage, & who for obvious reasons may be more
ready to join the standard of sedition than that of established Government.
3. where slavery exists, the Republican Theory becomes still more
fallacious.
5. Will it secure a good internal legislation & administration to the
particular States? In developing the evils which vitiate the political system
of the U. S. it is proper to take into view those which prevail within the
States individually as well as those which affect them collectively: Since
the former indirectly affect the whole; and there is great reason to believe
that the pressure of them had a full share in the motives which produced the
present Convention. Under this head he enumerated and animadverted on 1.
the multiplicity of the laws passed by the several States. 2. the mutability of
their laws. 3. the injustice of them. 4. the impotence of them: observing that
Mr Patterson's plan contained no remedy for this dreadful class of evils, and
could not therefore be received as an adequate provision for the exigencies
of the Community.
6. Will it secure the Union agst the influence of foreign powers over its
members. He pretended not to say that any such influence had yet been
tried: but it was naturally to be expected that occasions would produce it.
As lessons which claimed particular attention, he cited the intrigues
practised among the Amphyctionic Confederates first by the Kings of
Persia, and afterwards fatally by Philip of Macedon: Among the Achæans,
first by Macedon & afterwards no less fatally by Rome: among the Swiss
by Austria, France & the lesser neighbouring powers: among the members
of the Germanic Body by France, England, Spain & Russia—And in the
Belgic Republic, by all the great neighbouring powers. The plan of Mr
Patterson, not giving to the general Councils any negative on the will of the
particular States, left the door open for the like pernicious Machinations
among ourselves.
7. He begged the smaller States which were most attached to Mr
Patterson's plan to consider the situation in which it would leave them. In
the first place they would continue to bear the whole expence of
maintaining their Delegates in Congress. It ought not to be said that if they
were willing to bear this burthen, no others had a right to complain. As far
as it led the small States to forbear keeping up a representation, by which
the public business was delayed, it was evidently a matter of common
concern. An examination of the minutes of Congress would satisfy every
one that the public business had been frequently delayed by this cause; and
that the States most frequently unrepresented in Congs were not the larger
States. He reminded the Convention of another consequence of leaving on a
small State the burden of maintaining a Representation in Congs. During a
considerable period of the War, one of the Representatives of Delaware, in
whom alone before the signing of the Confederation the entire vote of that
State and after that event one half of its vote, frequently resided, was a
Citizen & Resident of Pena and held an office in his own State incompatible
with an appointment from it to Congs. During another period, the same
State was represented by three delegates two of whom were citizens of
Penna and the third a Citizen of New Jersey. These expedients must have
been intended to avoid the burden of supporting Delegates from their own
State. But whatever might have been ye cause, was not in effect the vote of
one State doubled, and the influence of another increased by it? In the 2d
place the coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan depends, can never be
exerted but on themselves. The larger States will be impregnable, the
smaller only can feel the vengeance of it. He illustrated the position by the
history of the Amphyctionic confederates: and the ban of the German
Empire. It was the cobweb wch could entangle the weak, but would be the
sport of the strong.
8. He begged them to consider the situation in which they would remain
in case their pertinacious adherence to an inadmissible plan, should prevent
the adoption of any plan. The contemplation of such an event was painful;
but it would be prudent to submit to the task of examining it at a distance,
that the means of escaping it might be the more readily embraced. Let the
Union of the States be dissolved, and one of two consequences must
happen. Either the States must remain individually independent &
sovereign; or two or more Confederacies must be formed among them. In
the first event would the small States be more secure agst the ambition &
power of their larger neighbours, than they would be under a General
Government pervading with equal energy every part of the Empire, and
having an equal interest in protecting every part agst every other part? In the
second, can the smaller expect that their larger neighbours would
confederate with them on the principle of the present Confederacy, which
gives to each member, an equal suffrage; or that they would exact less
severe concessions from the smaller States, than are proposed in the scheme
of Mr Randolph?
The great difficulty lies in the affair of Representation; and if this could
be adjusted, all others would be surmountable. It was admitted by both the
gentlemen from N. Jersey, (Mr Brearly and Mr Patterson) that it would not
be just to allow Virga which was 16 times as large as Delaware an equal
vote only. Their language was that it would not be safe for Delaware to
allow Virga 16 times as many votes. The expedient proposed by them was
that all the States should be thrown into one mass and a new partition be
made into 13 equal parts. Would such a scheme be practicable? The
dissimilarities existing in the rules of property, as well as in the manners,
habits and prejudices of the different States, amounted to a prohibition of
the attempt. It had been found impossible for the power of one of the most
absolute princes in Europe (K. of France) directed by the wisdom of one of
the most enlightened and patriotic Ministers (Mr Neckar) that any age has
produced, to equalize in some points only the different usages & regulations
of the different provinces. But admitting a general amalgamation and
repartition of the States to be practicable, and the danger apprehended by
the smaller States from a proportional representation to be real; would not a
particular and voluntary coalition of these with their neighbours, be less
inconvenient to the whole community, and equally effectual for their own
safety. If N. Jersey or Delaware conceived that an advantage would accrue
to them from an equalization of the States, in which case they would
necessarily form a junction with their neighbours, why might not this end
be attained by leaving them at liberty by the Constitution to form such a
junction whenever they pleased? And why should they wish to obtrude a
like arrangement on all the States, when it was, to say the least, extremely
difficult, would be obnoxious to many of the States, and when neither the
inconveniency, nor the benefit of the expedient to themselves, would be
lessened by confining it to themselves.—The prospect of many new States
to the Westward was another consideration of importance. If they should
come into the Union at all, they would come when they contained but few
inhabitants. If they shd be entitled to vote according to their proportions of
inhabitants, all would be right & safe. Let them have an equal vote, and a
more objectionable minority than ever might give law to the whole.[91]
[91] "Mr. Dickinson supposed that there were good regulations in both. Let us
therefore contrast the one with the other, and consolidate such parts of them as
the committee approve."—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 140.
On a question for postponing generally the 1st proposition of Mr
Patterson's plan, it was agreed to: N. Y. & N. J. only being no.
On the question moved by Mr King whether the Com̃itee should rise &
Mr Randolph's proposition be reported without alteration, which was in fact
a question whether Mr R's should be adhered to as preferable to those of Mr
Patterson;
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md divd. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Copy of the Resolns of Mr. R. as altered in Come and reported to the
House.
(Of Mr Randolph's plan as reported from the Com̃ittee)—the 1. propos:
"that a Natl Govt ought to be established consisting &c." being taken up in
the House.
Mr Wilson observed that by a Natl Govt he did not mean one that would
swallow up the State Govts as seemed to be wished by some gentlemen. He
was tenacious of the idea of preserving the latter. He thought, contrary to
the opinion of (Col. Hamilton) that they might not only subsist but subsist
on friendly terms with the former. They were absolutely necessary for
certain purposes which the former could not reach. All large Governments
must be subdivided into lesser jurisdictions. As Examples he mentioned
Persia, Rome, and particularly the divisions & subdivisions of England by
Alfred.
Col. Hamilton coincided with the proposition as it stood in the Report.
He had not been understood yesterday. By an abolition of the States, he
meant that no boundary could be drawn between the National & State
Legislatures; that the former must therefore have indefinite authority. If it
were limited at all, the rivalship of the States would gradually subvert it.
Even as Corporations the extent of some of them as Va Massts &c would be
formidable. As States, he thought they ought to be abolished. But he
admitted the necessity of leaving in them, subordinate jurisdictions. The
examples of Persia & the Roman Empire, cited by (Mr Wilson) were he
thought in favor of his doctrine: the great powers delegated to the Satraps &
proconsuls having frequently produced revolts, and schemes of
independence.
Mr King wished as every thing depended on this proposition, that no
objections might be improperly indulged agst the phraseology of it. He
conceived that the import of the term "States" "Sovereignty" "national"
"federal," had been often used & applied in the discussions inaccurately &
delusively. The States were not "Sovereigns" in the sense contended for by
some. They did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty, they could
not make war, nor peace, nor alliances nor treaties. Considering them as
political Beings, they were dumb, for they could not speak to any for[~e]gn
Sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they could not hear any
propositions from such Sovereign. They had not even the organs or faculties
of defence or offence, for they could not of themselves raise troops, or
equip vessels, for war. On the other side, if the Union of the States
comprises the idea of a confederation, it comprises that also of
consolidation. A Union of the States is a Union of the men composing
them, from whence a national character results to the whole. Congs can act
alone without the States—they can act & their acts will be binding agst the
Instructions of the States. If they declare war: war is de jure declared—
captures made in pursuance of it are lawful—no Acts of the States can vary
the situation, or prevent the judicial consequences. If the States therefore
retained some portion of their sovereignty, they had certainly divested
themselves of essential portions of it. If they formed a confederacy in some
respects—they formed a Nation in others. The Convention could clearly
deliberate on & propose any alterations that Congs could have done under
ye federal articles, and Could not Congs propose by virtue of the last article,
a change in any article whatever; and as well that relating to the equality of
suffrage, as any other. He made these remarks to obviate some scruples
which had been expressed. He doubted much the practicability of
annihilating the States; but thought that much of their power ought to be
taken from them.[92]
[92] King, in his notes, gives a résumé of his speech. It illustrates the accuracy
of Madison's reporting:
"Answer (R. King) The States under the confed. are not sovereign States
they can do no act but such as are of a subordinate nature or such as
terminate in themselves—and even these are restrained—coinage, P. office
&c they are wholly incompetent to the exercise of any of the gt. &
distinguishing acts of sovereignty—They can neither make nor receive
(embassies) to or from any other sovereign—they have not the powers of
injuring another or of defending themselves from an Injury offered from
one another—they are deaf, dumb and impotent—these Faculties are
yielded up and the U. S. in C. Assd. hold and possess them, and they alone
can exercise them—they are so far out of the controul of the separate States
yt. if every State in the Union was to instruct yr. Deleg., and those
Delegates within ye powers of the Arts. of Union shd. do an act in violation
of their Instructions it wd. nevertheless be valid. If they declared a war, any
giving aid or comfort to the enemy wd. be Treason; if peace, any capture on
the high seas wd. be piracy. This remark proves yt. the States are now
subordinate corporations or societies and not sovereigns—these imperfect
States are the confederates and they are the electors of the magistrates who
exercise the national sovereignty. The Articles of Confedr. and perpetual
Union, are partly federal & partly of the nature of a constitution or form of
Govt. arising from and applying to the Citizens of the U. S. & not from the
individual States.
"The only criterion of determining what is federal & what is national is
this, those acts which are for the government of the States only are purely
federal, those which are for the government of the Citizens of the individual
States are national and not federal.
"If then the articles of Confedr. & perpetual union have this twofold
capacity, and if they provide for an alteration in a certain mode, why may
not they be so altered as that the federal article may be changed to a
national one, and the national to a federal? I see no argument that can be
objected to the authority. The 5th article regulates the influence of the
several States and makes them equal—does not the confed. authorize this
alteration, that instead of this Equality, one state may have double the
Influence of another—I conceive it does—and so of every Article except
that wh. destroys the Idea of a confedy. I think it may be proved that every
article may be totally altered provided you have one guarantying to each
State the right of regulating its private & internal affairs in the manner of a
subordinate corporation.
"But admitting that the Arts, of Confed. & perpet. Union, or the powers
of the Legis. did not extend to the proposed Reform; yet the public
Deputations & the public Danger require it—the system proposed to be
adopted is no scheme of a day, calculated to postpone the hour of Danger,
& thus leave it to fall with double ruin on our successors—It is no crude
and undigested plan; the child of narrow and unextensive views, brought
forward under the Auspices of Cowardice & Irresolution—It is a measure
of Decision, it is the foundation of Freedom & of national Glory. It will
draw on itself and be able to support the severest scrutiny & Examination.
It is no idle experiment, no romantic speculation—the measure forces itself
upon wise men, and if they have not firmness to look it in the face and
protect it—Farewell to the Freedom of our Government—our military glory
will be tarnished and our boasts of Freedom will be the scorn of the
Enemies of Liberty."—Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, i., 602, n.
Mr Martin.[93] said he considered that the separation from G. B. placed
the 13 States in a state of Nature towards each other; that they would have
remained in that state till this time, but for the confederation; that they
entered into the Confederation on the footing of equality; that they met now
to amend it on the same footing; and that he could never accede to a plan
that would introduce an inequality and lay 10 States at the mercy of Va
Massts and Penna.
[93] "Mr. Martin was educated for the Bar, and is Attorney general for the State
of Maryland. This Gentleman possesses a good deal of information, but he has a
very bad delivery, and so extremely prolix, that he never speaks without tiring
the patience of all who hear him. He is about 34 years of age."—Pierce's Notes,
Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 330.
Mr Wilson, could not admit the doctrine that when the Colonies became
independent of G. Britain, they became independent also of each other. He
read the declaration of Independence, observing thereon that the United
Colonies were declared to be free & independent States; and inferring that
they were independent, not individually but Unitedly and that they were
confederated as they were independent, States.
Col. Hamilton assented to the doctrine of Mr Wilson. He denied the
doctrine that the States were thrown into a State of Nature. He was not yet
prepared to admit the doctrine that the Confederacy, could be dissolved by
partial infractions of it. He admitted that the States met now on an equal
footing but could see no inference from that against concerting a change of
the system in this particular. He took this occasion of observing for the
purpose of appeasing the fears of the small States, that two circumstances
would render them secure under a National Govt in which they might lose
the equality of rank they now held: one was the local situation of the 3
largest States Virga Massts & Pa. They were separated from each other by
distance of place, and equally so, by all the peculiarities which distinguish
the interests of one State from those of another. No combination therefore
could be dreaded. In the second place, as there was a gradation in the States
from Va the largest down to Delaware the smallest, it would always happen
that ambitious combinations among a few States might & wd be
counteracted by defensive combinations of greater extent among the rest.
No combination has been seen among the large Counties merely as such,
agst lesser Counties. The more close the Union of the States, and the more
compleat the authority of the whole: the less opportunity will be allowed to
the stronger States to injure the weaker.
Adjd.
W         J    20. 1897. I  C         .
Mr William Blount from N. Carolina took his seat.
1st propos: of the Report of Come of the whole, before the House.
Mr Elseworth 2ded by Mr Gorham, moves to alter it so as to run "that the
Government of the United States ought to consist of a supreme legislative,
Executive and Judiciary." This alteration he said would drop the word
national, and retain the proper title "the United States." He could not admit
the doctrine that a breach of any of the federal articles could dissolve the
whole. It would be highly dangerous not to consider the Confederation as
still subsisting. He wished also the plan of the Convention to go forth as an
amendment of the articles of the Confederation, since under this idea the
authority of the Legislatures could ratify it. If they are unwilling, the people
will be so too. If the plan goes forth to the people for ratification several
succeeding Conventions within the States would be unavoidable. He did not
like these conventions. They were better fitted to pull down than to build up
Constitutions.
Mr Randolph. did not object to the change of expression, but apprised
the gentleman who wished for it that he did not admit it for the reasons
assigned; particularly that of getting rid of a reference to the people for
ratification. The motion of Mr Elsewth was acquiesced in nem: con:
The 2d Resol: "that the National Legislature ought to consist of two
branches" taken up, the word "national" struck out as of course.
Mr Lansing. observed that the true question here was, whether the
Convention would adhere to or depart from the foundation of the present
Confederacy; and moved instead of the 2d Resolution, "that the powers of
Legislation be vested in the U. States in Congress." He had already assigned
two reasons agst such an innovation as was proposed: 1. the want of
competent powers in the Convention.—2. the state of the public mind. It
had been observed by (Mr Madison) in discussing the first point, that in two
States the Delegates to Congs were chosen by the people. Notwithstanding
the first appearance of this remark, it had in fact no weight, as the Delegates
however chosen, did not represent the people merely as so many
individuals; but as forming a Sovereign State. (Mr. Randolph) put it, he
said, on its true footing namely that the public safety superseded the scruple
arising from the review of our powers. But in order to feel the force of this
consideration, the same impression must be had of the public danger. He
had not himself the same impression, and could not therefore dismiss his
scruple. (Mr Wilson) contended that as the Convention were only to
recommend, they might recommend what they pleased. He differed much
from him. Any act whatever of so respectable a body must have a great
effect, and if it does not succeed, will be a source of great dissentions. He
admitted that there was no certain criterion of the Public mind on the
subject. He therefore recurred to the evidence of it given by the opposition
in the States to the scheme of an Impost. It could not be expected that those
possessing Sovereignty could ever voluntarily part with it. It was not to be
expected from any one State, much less from thirteen. He proceeded to
make some observations on the plan itself and the argumts urged in support
of it. The point of Representation could receive no elucidation from the case
of England. The corruption of the boroughs did not proceed from their
comparative smallness; but from the actual fewness of the inhabitants, some
of them not having more than one or two. A great inequality existed in the
Counties of England. Yet the like complaint of peculiar corruption in the
small ones had not been made. It had been said that Congress represent the
State Prejudices: will not any other body whether chosen by the
Legislatures or people of the States, also represent their prejudices? It had
been asserted by his colleague (Col. Hamilton) that there was no
coincidence of interests among the large States that ought to excite fears of
oppression in the smaller. If it were true that such a uniformity of interests
existed among the States, there was equal safety for all of them, whether the
representation remained as heretofore, or were proportioned as now
proposed. It is proposed that the Genl Legislature shall have a negative on
the laws of the States. Is it conceivable that there will be leisure for such a
task? There will on the most moderate calculation, be as many Acts sent up
from the States as there are days in the year. Will the members of the
General Legislature be competent Judges? Will a gentleman from Georgia
be a judge of the expediency of a law which is to operate in N. Hampshire.
Such a Negative would be more injurious than that of Great Britain
heretofore was. It is said that the National Govt must have the influence
arising from the grant of offices and honors. In order to render such a
Government effectual he believed such an influence to be necessary. But if
the States will not agree to it, it is in vain, worse than in vain to make the
proposition. If this influence is to be attained, the States must be entirely
abolished. Will any one say this would ever be agreed to? He doubted
whether any Genl Government equally beneficial to all can be attained. That
now under consideration he is sure, must be utterly unattainable. He had
another objection. The system was too novel & complex. No man could
foresee what its operation will be either with respect to the Genl Govt or the
State Govts. One or other it has been surmised must absorb the whole.
Col. Mason. did not expect this point would have been reagitated. The
essential differences between the two plans, had been clearly stated. The
principal objections agst that of Mr R. were the want of power & the want of
practicability. There can be no weight in the first as the fiat is not to be
here, but in the people. He thought with his colleague Mr R. that there were
besides certain crisises, in which all the ordinary cautions yielded to public
necessity. He gave as an example, the eventual Treaty with G. B. in forming
which the Com̃srs of the U. S. had boldly disregarded the improvident
shackles of Congs had given to their Country an honorable & happy peace,
and instead of being censured for the transgression of their powers, had
raised to themselves a monument more durable than brass. The
impracticability of gaining the public concurrence he thought was still more
groundless. (Mr Lansing) had cited the attempts of Congress to gain an
enlargement of their powers, and had inferred from the miscarriage of these
attempts, the hopelessness of the plan which he (Mr L) opposed. He thought
a very different inference ought to have been drawn; viz that the plan which
(Mr L) espoused, and which proposed to augment the powers of Congress,
never could be expected to succeed. He meant not to throw any reflections
on Congs as a body, much less on any particular members of it. He meant
however to speak his sentiments without reserve on this subject; it was a
privilege of age, and perhaps the only compensation which nature had given
for, the privation of so many other enjoyments: and he should not scruple to
exercise it freely. Is it to be thought that the people of America, so watchful
over their interests; so jealous of their liberties, will give up their all, will
surrender both the sword and the purse, to the same body, and that too not
chosen immediately by themselves? They never will. They never ought.
Will they trust such a body, with the regulation of their trade, with the
regulation of their taxes; with all the other great powers, which are in
contemplation? Will they give unbounded confidence to a secret Journal—
to the intrigues—to the factions which in the nature of things appertain to
such an Assembly? If any man doubts the existence of these characters of
Congress, let him consult their Journals for the years 78, 79, & 80.—It will
be said, that if the people are averse to parting with power, why is it hoped
that they will part with it to a National Legislature. The proper answer is
that in this case they do not part with power: they only transfer it from one
sett of immediate Representatives to another sett.—Much has been said of
the unsettled state of the mind of the people, he believed the mind of the
people of America, as elsewhere, was unsettled as to some points; but
settled as to others. In two points he was sure it was well settled. 1. in an
attachment to Republican Government. 2. in an attachment to more than
one branch in the Legislature. Their constitutions accord so generally in
both these circumstances, that they seem almost to have been preconcerted.
This must either have been a miracle, or have resulted from the genius of
the people. The only exceptions to the establishmt of two branches in the
Legislatures are the State of Pa & Congs and the latter the only single one
not chosen by the people themselves. What has been the consequence? The
people have been constantly averse to giving that Body further powers—It
was acknowledged by (Mr Patterson) that his plan could not be enforced
without military coercion. Does he consider the force of this concession.
The most jarring elements of Nature; fire & water themselves are not more
incompatible that[n] such a mixture of civil liberty and military execution.
Will the militia march from one State to another, in order to collect the
arrears of taxes from the delinquent members of the Republic? Will they
maintain an army for this purpose? Will not the Citizens of the invaded
State assist one another till they rise as one Man, and shake off the Union
altogether. Rebellion is the only case, in which the military force of the
State can be properly exerted agst its Citizens. In one point of view he was
struck with horror at the prospect of recurring to this expedient. To punish
the non-payment of taxes with death, was a severity not yet adopted by
despotism itself: yet this unexampled cruelty would be mercy compared to a
military collection of revenue, in which the bayonet could make no
discrimination between the innocent and the guilty. He took this occasion to
repeat, that notwithstanding his solicitude to establish a national
Government, he never would agree to abolish the State Govts or render
them absolutely insignificant. They were as necessary as the Genl Govt and
he would be equally careful to preserve them. He was aware of the
difficulty of drawing the line between them, but hoped it was not
insurmountable. The Convention, tho' comprising so many distinguished
characters, could not be expected to make a faultless Govt. And he would
prefer trusting to Posterity the amendment of its defects, rather than to push
the experiment too far.
Mr Luther Martin agreed with (Col Mason) as to the importance of the
State Govts he would support them at the expence of the Genl Govt which
was instituted for the purpose of that support. He saw no necessity for two
branches, and if it existed Congress might be organized into two. He
considered Congs as representing the people, being chosen by the
Legislatures who were chosen by the people. At any rate, Congress
represented the Legislatures; and it was the Legislatures not the people who
refused to enlarge their powers. Nor could the rule of voting have been the
ground of objection, otherwise ten of the States must always have been
ready, to place further confidence in Congs. The causes of repugnance must
therefore be looked for elsewhere.—At the separation from the British
Empire, the people of America preferred the establishment of themselves
into thirteen separate sovereignties instead of incorporating themselves into
one: to these they look up for the security of their lives, liberties &
properties: to these they must look up. The federal Govt they formed, to
defend the whole agst foreign nations, in case of war, and to defend the
lesser States agst the ambition of the larger: they are afraid of granting
power unnecessarily, lest they should defeat the original end of the Union;
lest the powers should prove dangerous to the sovereignties of the particular
States which the Union was meant to support; and expose the lesser to
being swallowed up by the larger. He conceived also that the people of the
States having already vested their powers in their respective Legislatures,
could not resume them without a dissolution of their Governments. He was
agst Conventions in the States: was not agst assisting States agst rebellious
subjects; thought the federal plan of Mr Patterson did not require coercion
more than the National one, as the latter must depend for the deficiency of
its revenues on requisitions & quotas, and that a national Judiciary extended
into the States would be ineffectual, and would be viewed with a jealousy
inconsistent with its usefulness.
Mr Sherman 2ded & supported Mr Lansings motion. He admitted two
branches to be necessary in the State Legislatures, but saw no necessity for
them in a Confederacy of States. The examples were all, of a single
Council. Congs carried us thro' the war, and perhaps as well as any Govt
could have done. The complaints at present are not that the views of Congs
are unwise or unfaithful; but that their powers are insufficient for the
execution of their views. The national debt & the want of power somewhere
to draw forth the National resources, are the great matters that press. All the
States were sensible of the defect of power in Congs. He thought much
might be said in apology for the failure of the State Legislatures to comply
with the Confederation. They were afraid of leaning too hard on the people,
by accumulating taxes; no constitutional rule had been or could be observed
in the quotas—the Accounts also were unsettled & every State supposed
itself in advance, rather than in arrears. For want of a general system, taxes
to a due amount had not been drawn from trade which was the most
convenient resource. As almost all the States had agreed to the
recommendation of Congs on the subject of an impost, it appeared clearly
that they were willing to trust Congs with power to draw a revenue from
Trade. There is no weight therefore in the argument drawn from a distrust
of Congs for money matters being the most important of all, if the people
will trust them with power as to them, they will trust them with any other
necessary powers. Congs indeed by the confederation have in fact the right
of saying how much the people shall pay, and to what purpose it shall be
applied: and this right was granted to them in the expectation that it would
in all cases have its effect. If another branch were to be added to Congs to
be chosen by the people, it would serve to embarrass. The people would not
much interest themselves in the elections, a few designing men in the large
districts would carry their points, and the people would have no more
confidence in their new representatives than in Congs. He saw no reason
why the State Legislatures should be unfriendly as had been suggested, to
Congs. If they appoint Congs and approve of their measures, they would be
rather favourable and partial to them. The disparity of the States in point of
size he perceived was the main difficulty. But the large States had not yet
suffered from the equality of votes enjoyed by the small ones. In all great
and general points, the interests of all the States were the same. The State of
Virga notwithstanding the equality of votes, ratified the Confederation
without, or even proposing, any alteration. Massts also ratified without any
material difficulty &c. In none of the ratifications is the want of two
branches noticed or complained of. To consolidate the States as some had
proposed would dissolve our Treaties with foreign Nations, which had been
formed with us, as Confederated States. He did not however suppose that
the creation of two branches in the Legislature would have such an effect. If
the difficulty on the subject of representation can not be otherwise got over,
he would agree to have two branches, and a proportional representation in
one of them, provided each State had an equal voice in the other. This was
necessary to secure the rights of the lesser States; otherwise three or four of
the large States would rule the others as they please. Each State like each
individual had its peculiar habits usages and manners, which constituted its
happiness. It would not therefore give to others a power over this happiness,
any more than an individual would do, when he could avoid it.
Mr Wilson. urged the necessity of two branches; observed that if a
proper model were not to be found in other Confederacies it was not to be
wondered at. The number of them was small & the duration of some at least
short. The Amphyctionic and Achæan were formed in the infancy of
political Science; and appear by their History & fate, to have contained
radical defects. The Swiss & Belgic Confederacies were held together not
by any vital principle of energy but by the incumbent pressure of
formidable neighbouring nations: The German owed its continuance to the
influence of the H. of Austria. He appealed to our own experience for the
defects of our Confederacy. He had been 6 years in the 12 since the
commencement of the Revolution, a member of Congress, and had felt all
its weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection of others whether on many
important occasions, the public interest had not been obstructed by the
small members of the Union. The success of the Revolution was owing to
other causes, than the Constitution of Congress. In many instances it went
on even agst the difficulties arising from Congs themselves. He admitted
that the large States did accede as had been stated, to the Confederation in
its present form. But it was the effect of necessity not of choice. There are
other instances of their yielding from the same motive to the unreasonable
measures of the small States. The situation of things is now a little altered.
He insisted that a jealousy would exist between the State Legislatures & the
General Legislature: observing that the members of the former would have
views & feelings very distinct in this respect from their constituents. A
private Citizen of a State is indifferent whether power be exercised by the
Genl or State Legislatures, provided it be exercised most for his happiness.
His representative has an interest in its being exercised by the body to
which he belongs. He will therefore view the National Legisl: with the eye
of a jealous rival. He observed that the addresses of Congs to the people at
large, had always been better received & produced greater effect, than those
made to the Legislatures.
On the question for postponing in order to take up Mr Lansing's
proposition "to vest the powers of legislation in Congs"
Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md divd. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the question on the 2d
Resolution in the Report from the Committee of the whole was postponed
till tomorrow.
Adjd.
T        J    21.    C         .
Mr Jonathan Dayton from N. Jersey took his seat.[94]
[94] From June 21 to July 18 inclusive not copied by Mr Eppes.—Madison's
Note. This applies evidently to notes he permitted Hon. George W. Eppes,
Jefferson's son-in-law, to take.
Docr Johnson.[95] On a comparison of the two plans which had been
proposed from Virginia & N. Jersey, it appeared that the peculiarity which
characterized the latter was its being calculated to preserve the individuality
of the States. The plan from Va did not profess to destroy this individuality
altogether, but was charged with such a tendency. One Gentleman alone
(Col. Hamilton) in his animadversions on the plan of N. Jersey, boldly and
decisively contended for an abolition of the State Govts. Mr Wilson & the
gentleman from Virga who also were adversaries of the plan of N. Jersey
held a different language. They wished to leave the States in possession of a
considerable, tho' a subordinate jurisdiction. They had not yet however
shewn how this cd consist with, or be secured agst the general sovereignty &
jurisdiction, which they proposed to give to the National Government. If
this could be shewn in such a manner as to satisfy the patrons of the N.
Jersey propositions, that the individuality of the States would not be
endangered, many of their objections would no doubt be removed. If this
could not be shewn their objections would have their full force. He wished
it therefore to be well considered whether in case the States, as was
proposed, shd retain some portion of sovereignty at least, this portion could
be preserved, without allowing them to participate effectually in the Genl
Govt, without giving them each a distinct and equal vote for the purpose of
defending themselves in the general Councils.
[95] "Dr Johnson is a character much celebrated for his legal knowledge; he is
said to be one of the first classics in America, and certainly possesses a very
strong and enlightened understanding.
"As an Orator in my opinion, there is nothing in him that warrants the high
reputation which he has for public speaking. There is something in the tone of
his voice not pleasing to the Ear,—but he is eloquent and clear,—always
abounding with information and instruction. He was once employed as an Agent
for the State of Connecticut to state her claims to certain landed territory before
the British House of Commons; this Office he discharged with so much dignity,
and made such an ingenious display of his powers, that he laid the foundation of
a reputation which will probably last much longer than his own life. Dr Johnson
is about sixty years of age, possesses the manners of a Gentleman, and engages
the Hearts of Men by the sweetness of his temper, and that affectionate style of
address with which he accosts his acquaintance."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist.
Rev., iii., 326.
Mr Wilson's respect for Docr Johnson, added to the importance of the
subject led him to attempt, unprepared as he was, to solve the difficulty
which had been started. It was asked how the Genl Govt and individuality of
the particular States could be reconciled to each other; and how the latter
could be secured agst the former? Might it not, on the other side be asked
how the former was to be secured agst the latter? It was generally admitted
that a jealousy & rivalship would be felt between the Genl & particular
Govts. As the plan now stood, tho' indeed contrary to his opinion, one
branch of the Genl Govt (the Senate or second branch) was to be appointed
by the State Legislatures. The State Legislatures, therefore, by this
participation in the Genl Govt would have an opportunity of defending their
rights. Ought not a reciprocal opportunity to be given to the Genl Govt of
defending itself by having an appointment of some one constituent branch
of the State Govts. If a security be necessary on one side, it wd seem
reasonable to demand it on the other. But taking the matter in a more
general view, he saw no danger to the States from the Genl Govt. In case a
combination should be made by the large ones it wd produce a general
alarm among the rest; and the project wd be frustrated. But there was no
temptation to such a project. The States having in general a similar interest,
in case of any propositions in the National Legislature to encroach on the
State Legislatures, he conceived a general alarm wd take place in the
National Legislature itself, that it would communicate itself to the State
Legislatures, and wd finally spread among the people at large. The Genl
Govt will be as ready to preserve the rights of the States as the latter are to
preserve the rights of individuals; all the members of the former, having a
common interest, as representatives of all the people of the latter, to leave
the State Govts in possession of what the people wish them to retain. He
could not discover, therefore any danger whatever on the side from which it
was apprehended. On the contrary, he conceived that in spite of every
precaution the General Govt would be in perpetual danger of encroachments
from the State Govts.
Mr Madison was of opinion that there was 1. less danger of
encroachment from the Genl Govt than from the State Govts 2. that the
mischief from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former,
than if made by the latter. 1. All the examples of other confederacies prove
the greater tendency in such systems to anarchy than to tyranny; to a
disobedience of the members than usurpations of the federal head. Our own
experience had fully illustrated this tendency.—But it will be said that the
proposed change in the principles & form of the Union will vary the
tendency; that the Genl Govt will have real & greater powers, and will be
derived in one branch at least from the people, not from the Govts of the
States. To give full force to this objection, let it be supposed for a moment
that indefinite power should be given to the Genl Legislature, and the States
reduced to Corporations dependent on the Genl Legislature; Why shd it
follow that the Genl Govt wd take from the States any branch of their power
as far as its operation was beneficial, and its continuance desireable to the
people? In some of the States, particularly in Connecticut, all the Townships
are incorporated, and have a certain limited jurisdiction. Have the
Representatives of the people of the Townships in the Legislature of the
State ever endeavoured to despoil the Townships of any part of their local
authority? As far as this local authority is convenient to the people they are
attached to it; and their representatives chosen by & amenable to them,
naturally respect their attachment to this, as much as their attachment to any
other right or interest. The relation of a General Govt to State Govts is
parallel. 2. Guards were more necessary agst encroachments of the State
Govts on the Genl Govt than of the latter on the former. The great objection
made agst an abolition of the State Govts was that the Genl Govt could not
extend its care to all the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of
the local jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not agst the probable
abuse of the general power, but agst the imperfect use that could be made of
it throughout so great an extent of country, and over so great a variety of
objects. As far as its operation would be practicable it could not in this view
be improper; as far as it would be impracticable, the conveniency of the
Genl Govt itself would concur with that of the people in the maintenance of
subordinate Governments. Were it practicable for the Genl Govt to extend
its care to every requisite object without the cooperation of the State Govts
the people would not be less free as members of one great Republic than as
members of thirteen small ones. A Citizen of Delaware was not more free
than a Citizen of Virginia: nor would either be more free than a Citizen of
America. Supposing therefore a tendency in the Genl Government to absorb
the State Govts no fatal consequence could result. Taking the reverse as the
supposition, that a tendency should be left in the State Govts towards an
independence on the General Govt and the gloomy consequences need not
be pointed out. The imagination of them, must have suggested to the States
the experiment we are now making to prevent the calamity, and must have
formed the chief motive with those present to undertake the arduous task.
On the question for resolving "that the Legislature ought to consist of
two Branches"
Mass. ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md divd.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The third resolution of the Report taken into consideration.
Genl Pinkney moved "that the 1st branch, instead of being elected by the
people, shd be elected in such manner as the Legislature of each State
should direct." He urged 1. that this liberty would give more satisfaction, as
the Legislatures could then accommodate the mode to the conveniency &
opinions of the people. 2. that it would avoid the undue influence of large
Counties which would prevail if the elections were to be made in districts as
must be the mode intended by the Report of the Committee. 3. that
otherwise disputed elections must be referred to the General Legislature
which would be attended with intolerable expence and trouble to the distant
parts of the Republic.
Mr L. Martin seconded the Motion.[96]
[96] After Martin's second, according to Yates:
"Mr Madison. I oppose the motion—there are no difficulties, but they
may be obviated in the details connected with the subject."—Yates, Secret
Proceedings, etc., 149.
Col. Hamilton considered the Motion as intended manifestly to transfer
the election from the people to the State Legislatures, which would
essentially vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influence which
could not be too watchfully guarded agst. All too must admit the possibility,
in case the Genl Govt shd maintain itself, that the State Govts might
gradually dwindle into nothing. The system therefore shd not be engrafted
on what might possibly fail.
Mr Mason urged the necessity of retaining the election by the people.
Whatever inconveniency may attend the democratic principle, it must
actuate one part of the Govt. It is the only security for the rights of the
people.
Mr Sherman, would like an election by the Legislatures best, but is
content with the plan as it stands.
Mr Rutlidge could not admit the solidity of the distinction between a
mediate & immediate election by the people. It was the same thing to act by
oneself, and to act by another. An election by the Legislature would be
more refined than an election immediately by the people: and would be
more likely to correspond with the sense of the whole community. If this
Convention had been chosen by the people in districts it is not to be
supposed that such proper characters would have been preferred. The
Delegates to Congs he thought had also been fitter men than would have
been appointed by the people at large.
Mr Wilson considered the election of the 1st branch by the people not
only as the Corner Stone, but as the foundation of the fabric: and that the
difference between a mediate & immediate election was immense. The
difference was particularly worthy of notice in this respect: that the
Legislatures are actuated not merely by the sentiment of the people; but
have an official sentiment opposed to that of the Genl Govt and perhaps to
that of the people themselves.
Mr King enlarged on the same distinction. He supposed the Legislatures
wd constantly choose men subservient to their own views as contrasted to
the general interest; and that they might even devise modes of election that
wd be subversive of the end in view. He remarked several instances in
which the views of a State might be at variance with those of the Genl Govt:
and mentioned particularly a competition between the National & State
debts, for the most certain & productive funds.
Genl Pinkney was for making the State Govts a part of the General
System. If they were to be abolished, or lose their agency, S. Carolina &
other States would have but a small share of the benefits of Govt.
On the question for Genl Pinkney motion to substitute election of the 1st
branch in such mode as the Legislatures should appoint, in stead of its being
elected by the people"
Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md divd. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
General Pinkney then moved that the 1st branch be elected by the people
in such mode as the Legislatures should direct; but waived it on its being
hinted that such a provision might be more properly tried in the detail of the
plan.
On the question for ye election of the 1st branch by the people"
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md divd. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Election of the 1st branch "for the term of three years," considered.
Mr Randolph moved to strike out, "three years" and insert "two years"—
he was sensible that annual elections were a source of great mischiefs in the
States, yet it was the want of such checks agst the popular intemperence as
were now proposed, that rendered them so mischievous. He would have
preferred annual to biennial, but for the extent of the U. S. and the
inconveniency which would result from them to the representatives of the
extreme parts of the Empire. The people were attached to frequency of
elections. All the Constitutions of the States except that of S. Carolina, had
established annual elections.
Mr Dickinson. The idea of annual elections was borrowed from the
antient Usage of England, a country much less extensive than ours. He
supposed biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred triennial, and in
order to prevent the inconveniency of an entire change of the whole number
at the same moment, suggested a rotation, by an annual election of one
third.
Mr Elseworth was opposed to three years, supposing that even one year
was preferable to two years. The people were fond of frequent elections and
might be safely indulged in one branch of the Legislature. He moved for 1
year.
Mr Strong[97] seconded & supported the motion.
[97] "Mr Strong is a Lawyer of some eminence,—he has received a liberal
education, and has good connections to recommend him. As a speaker he is
feeble, and without confidence. This Gentn is about thirty five years of age, and
greatly in the esteem of his Colleagues."—Pierce's Notes, Amer. Hist. Rev. iii.,
326.
Mr Wilson being for making the 1st branch an effectual representation of
the people at large, preferred an annual election of it. This frequency was
most familiar & pleasing to the people. It would not be more inconvenient
to them, than triennial elections, as the people in all the States have annual
meetings with which the election of the National representatives might be
made to co-incide. He did not conceive that it would be necessary for the
Natl Leigsl: to sit constantly; perhaps not half—perhaps not one fourth of
the year.
Mr Madison was persuaded that annual elections would be extremely
inconvenient and apprehensive that biennial would be too much so; he did
not mean inconvenient to the electors; but to the representatives. They
would have to travel seven or eight hundred miles from the distant parts of
the Union; and would probably not be allowed even a reimbursement of
their expences. Besides, none of those who wished to be re-elected would
remain at the seat of Governmt; confiding that their absence would not
affect them. The members of Congs had done this with few instances of
disappointment. But as the choice was here to be made by the people
themselves who would be much less complaisant to individuals, and much
more susceptible of impressions from the presence of a Rival candidate, it
must be supposed that the members from the most distant States would
travel backwards & forwards at least as often as the elections should be
repeated. Much was to be said also on the time requisite for new Members
who would always form a large proportion, to acquire that knowledge of the
affairs of the States in general without which their trust could not be
usefully discharged.
Mr Sherman preferred annual elections, but would be content with
biennial. He thought the Representatives ought to return home and mix with
the people. By remaining at the seat of Govt they would acquire the habits
of the place which might differ from those of their Constituents.
Col. Mason observed that the States being differently situated such a rule
ought to be formed as would put them as nearly as possible on a level. If
elections were annual the middle States would have a great advantage over
the extreme ones. He wished them to be biennial; and the rather as in that
case they would coincide with the periodical elections of S. Carolina as well
of the other States.
Col. Hamilton urged the necessity of 3 years, there ought to be neither
too much nor too little dependence, on the popular sentiments. The checks
in the other branches of the Governt would be but feeble, and would need
every auxiliary principle that could be interwoven. The British House of
Commons were elected septennially, yet the democratic spirit of ye
Constitution had not ceased. Frequency of elections tended to make the
people listless to them; and to facilitate the success of little cabals. This evil
was complained of in all the States. In Virga it had been lately found
necessary to force the attendance & voting of the people by severe
regulations.
On the question for striking out "three years"
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. divd. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The motion for "two years" was then inserted nem. con.
Adjd.
F      J    22.    C         
The clause in Resol. 3 "to receive fixed stipends to be paid out of the
Nationl Treasury" considered.
Mr Elseworth, moved to substitute payment by the States out of their
own Treasurys: observing that the manners of different States were very
different in the stile of living and in the profits accruing from the exercise of
like talents. What would be deemed therefore a reasonable compensation in
some States, in others would be very unpopular, and might impede the
system of which it made a part.
Mr Williamson favored the idea. He reminded the House of the prospect
of new States to the Westward. They would be too poor—would pay little
into the common Treasury—and would have a different interest from the
old States. He did not think therefore that the latter ought to pay the
expences of men who would be employed in thwarting their measures &
interests.
Mr Ghorum[98] wished not to refer the matter to the State Legislatures
who were always paring down salaries in such a manner as to keep out of
offices men most capable of executing the functions of them. He thought
also it would be wrong to fix the compensations by the constitution,
because we could not venture to make it as liberal as it ought to be without
exciting an enmity agst the whole plan. Let the Natl Legisl: provide for their
own wages from time to time; as the State Legislatures do. He had not seen
this part of their power abused, nor did he apprehend an abuse of it.
[98] "Mr Gorham is a merchant in Boston, high in reputation, and much in the
esteem of his country-men. He is a man of very good sense, but not much
improved in his education. He is eloquent and easy in public debate, but has
nothing fashionable or elegant in his style;—all he aims at is to convince, and
where he fails it never is from his auditory not understanding him, for no man is
more perspicuous and full. He has been President of Congress, and three years a
Member of that Body. Mr Gorham is about 46 years of age, rather lusty, and has
an agreeable and pleasing manner."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 325.
Mr Randolph said he feared we were going too far, in consulting popular
prejudices. Whatever respect might be due to them, in lesser matters, or in
cases where they formed the permanent character of the people, he thought
it neither incumbent on nor honorable for the Convention, to sacrifice right
& justice to that consideration. If the States were to pay the members of the
Natl Legislature, a dependence would be created that would vitiate the
whole System. The whole nation has an interest in the attendance &
services of the members. The Nationl Treasury therefore is the proper fund
for supporting them.
Mr King, urged the danger of creating a dependence on the States by
leavg to them the payment of the members of the Natl Legislature. He
supposed it wd be best to be explicit as to the compensation to be allowed.
A reserve on that point, or a reference to the Natl Legislature of the
quantum, would excite greater opposition than any sum that would be
actually necessary or proper.
Mr Sherman contended for referring both the quantum and the payment
of it to the State Legislatures.
Mr Wilson was agst fixing the compensation as circumstances would
change and call for a change of the amount. He thought it of great moment
that the members of the Natl Govt should be left as independent as possible
of the State Govts in all respects.
Mr Madison concurred in the necessity of preserving the compensations
for the Natl Govt independent on the State Govts but at the same time
approved of fixing them by the Constitution, which might be done by taking
a standard which wd not vary with circumstances. He disliked particularly
the policy suggested by Mr Williamson of leaving the members from the
poor States beyond the Mountains, to the precarious & parsimonious
support of their constituents. If the Western States hereafter arising should
be admitted into the Union, they ought to be considered as equals & as
brethren. If their representatives were to be associated in the Common
Councils, it was of common concern that such provisions should be made as
would invite the most capable and respectable characters into the service.
Mr Hamilton apprehended inconveniency from fixing the wages. He was
strenuous agst making the National Council dependent on the Legislative
rewards of the States. Those who pay are the masters of those who are paid.
Payment by the States would be unequal as the distant States would have to
pay for the same term of attendance and more days in travelling to & from
the seat of the Govt. He expatiated emphatically on the difference between
the feelings & views of the people—& the Governments of the States
arising from the personal interest & official inducements which must render
the latter unfriendly to the Genl Govt.
Mr Wilson moved that the Salaries of the 1st branch "be ascertained by
the National Legislature," and be paid out of the Natl Treasury.
Mr Madison, thought the members of the Legisl too much interested to
ascertain their own compensation. It wd be indecent to put their hands into
the public purse for the sake of their own pockets.
On this question Mass. no. Cont no. N. Y. divd N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. divd.
On the question for striking out "Natl Treasury" as moved by Mr
Elseworth.
Mr Hamilton renewed his opposition to it. He pressed the distinction
between the State Govts & the people. The former wd be the rivals of the
Genl Govt. The State legislatures ought not therefore to be the paymasters
of the latter.
Mr Elseworth. If we are jealous of the State Govts they will be so of us.
If on going home I tell them we gave the Gen: Govt such powers because
we cd not trust you. Will they adopt it, and witht yr approbation it is a
nullity.[99]
[99] According to Yates, Wilson followed Ellsworth:
"Mr. Wilson. I am not for submitting the national government to the
approbation of the state legislatures. I know that they and the state officers
will oppose it. I am for carrying it to the people of each state."—Yates,
Secret Proceedings, etc., 153.
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. no. Pena no. Del. no. Md no. Va no.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. divd[100]
[100] (It appeared that Massts concurred, not because they thought the State
Treasy ought to be substituted; but because they thought nothing should be said
on the subject, in which case it wd silently devolve on the Natl Treasury to
support the National Legislature.)—Madison's Note.
On a question for substituting "adequate compensation" in place of "fixt
stipends" it was agreed to nem. con. the friends of the latter being willing
that the practicability of fixing the compensation should be considered
hereafter in forming the details.
It was then moved by Mr Butler that a question be taken on both points
jointly; to wit "adequate compensation to be paid out of the Natl Treasury."
It was objected to as out of order, the parts having been separately decided
on. The Presidt referd the question of order to the House, and it was
determined to be in order. Con. N. J. Del. Md N. C. S. C.—ay.—N. Y. Pa Va
Geo. no.—Mass. divided. The question on the sentence was then postponed
by S. Carolina in right of the State.
Col. Mason moved to insert "twenty-five years of age as a qualification
for the members of the 1st branch." He thought it absurd that a man today
should not be permitted by the law to make a bargain for himself, and
tomorrow should be authorized to manage the affairs of a great nation. It
was more extraordinary as every man carried with him in his own
experience a scale for measuring the deficiency of young politicians; since
he would if interrogated be obliged to declare that his political opinions at
the age of 21. were too crude & erroneous to merit an influence on public
measures. It had been said that Congs had proved a good school for our
young men. It might be so for any thing he knew but if it were, he chose
that they should bear the expence of their own education.
Mr Wilson was agst abridging the rights of election in any shape. It was
the same thing whether this were done by disqualifying the objects of
choice, or the persons chusing. The motion tended to damp the efforts of
genius, and of laudable ambition. There was no more reason for
incapacitating youth than age, where the requisite qualifications were
found. Many instances might be mentioned of signal services rendered in
high stations to the public before the age of 25: The present Mr Pitt and
Lord Bolingbroke were striking instances.
On the question for inserting "25 years of age"
Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Mr Ghorum moved to strike out the last member of the 3 Resol:
concerning ineligibility of members of the 1st branch to office during the
term of their membership & for one year after. He considered it as
unnecessary & injurious. It was true abuses had been displayed in G. B. but
no one cd say how far they might have contributed to preserve the due
influence of the Govt nor what might have ensued in case the contrary
theory had been tried.
Mr Butler opposed it. This precaution agst intrigue was necessary. He
appealed to the example of G. B. where men got into Parlt that they might
get offices for themselves or their friends. This was the source of the
corruption that ruined their Govt.
Mr King, thought we were refining too much. Such a restriction on the
members would discourage merit. It would also give a pretext to the
Executive for bad appointments, as he might always plead this as a bar to
the choice he wished to have made.
Mr Wilson was agst fettering elections, and discouraging merit. He
suggested also the fatal consequence in time of war, of rendering perhaps
the best Commanders ineligible; appealing to our situation during the late
war, and indirectly leading to a recollection of the appointment of the
Com̃ander in Chief out of Congress.[101]
[101] According to Yates, Madison followed Wilson:
"Mr. Madison. Some gentlemen give too much weight and others too
little to this subject. If you have no exclusive clause, there may be danger of
creating offices or augmenting the stipends of those already created, in
order to gratify some members if they were not excluded. Such an instance
has fallen within my own observation. I am therefore of opinion, that no
office ought to be open to a member, which may be created or augmented
while he is in the legislature."—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 155. Yates
gives the rest of the debate as follows:
"Mr. Mason. It seems as if it was taken for granted, that all offices
will be filled by the executive, while I think many will remain in the
gift of the legislature. In either case, it is necessary to shut the door
against corruption. If otherwise, they may make or multiply offices, in
order to fill them. Are gentlemen in earnest when they suppose that
this exclusion will prevent the first characters from coming forward?
Are we not struck at seeing the luxury and venality which has already
crept in among us? If not checked we shall have ambassadors to every
petty state in Europe—the little republic of St. Marino not excepted.
We must in the present system remove the temptation. I admire many
parts of the British constitution and government, but I detest their
corruption.—Why has the power of the crown so remarkably increased
the last century? A stranger, by reading their laws, would suppose it
considerably diminished; and yet, by the sole power of appointing the
increased officers of government, corruption pervades every town and
village in the kingdom. If such a restriction should abridge the right of
election, it is still necessary, as it will prevent the people from ruining
themselves; and will not the same causes here produce the same
effects? I consider this clause as the corner-stone on which our
liberties depend—and if we strike it out we are erecting a fabric for
our destruction.
"Mr. Gorham. The corruption of the English government cannot be
applied to America. This evil exists there in the venality of their
boroughs; but even this corruption has its advantage, as it gives
stability to their government. We do not know what the effect would
be if members of parliament were excluded from offices. The great
bulwark of our liberty is the frequency of elections, and the great
danger is the septennial parliaments.
"Mr. Hamilton. In all general questions which become the subjects
of discussion, there are always some truths mixed with falsehoods. I
confess there is danger where men are capable of holding two offices.
Take mankind in general, they are vicious—their passions may be
operated upon. We have been taught to reprobate the danger of
influence in the British government, without duly reflecting how far it
was necessary to support a good government. We have taken up many
ideas on trust, and at last, pleased with their own opinions, establish
them as undoubted truths. Hume's opinion of the British constitution
confirms the remark, that there is always a body of firm patriots, who
often shake a corrupt administration. Take mankind as they are, and
what are they governed by? Their passions. There may be in every
government a few choice spirits, who may act from more worthy
motives. One great error is that we suppose mankind more honest than
they are. Our prevailing passions are ambition and interest; and it will
ever be the duty of a wise government to avail itself of those passions,
in order to make them subservient to the public good—for these ever
induce us to action. Perhaps a few men in a state, may, from patriotic
motives, or to display their talents, or to reap the advantage of public
applause, step forward; but if we adopt the clause, we destroy the
motive. I am therefore against all exclusions and refinements, except
only in this case; that when a member takes his seat, he should vacate
every other office. It is difficult to put any exclusive regulation into
effect. We must in some degree submit to the inconvenience."—Yates,
Secret Proceedings, etc., 155, 156.
Col. Mason was for shutting the door at all events agst corruption. He
enlarged on the venality and abuses in this particular in G. Britain: and
alluded to the multiplicity of foreign Embassies by Congs. The
disqualification he regarded as a corner stone in the fabric.
Col. Hamilton, there are inconveniences on both sides. We must take
man as we find him, and if we expect him to serve the public must interest
his passions in doing so. A reliance on pure patriotism had been the source
of many of our errors. He thought the remark of Mr Ghorum a just one. It
was impossible to say what wd be the effect in G. B. of such a reform as had
been urged. It was known that one of the ablest politicians (Mr Hume) had
pronounced all that influence on the side of the crown, which went under
the name of corruption, an essential part of the weight which maintained the
equilibrium of the Constitution.
On Mr Ghorum's Motion for striking out "ineligibility,"
Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa divd. Del. divd. Mard no.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Ga ay.
Adjd.
S        J    23.    C         
The 3d Resol: resumed.
On Question yesterday postponed by S. Carol: for agreeing to the whole
sentence "for allowing an adequate compensation to be paid out of the
Treasury of the U. States"
Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pena ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. divided. So the question was lost, & the
sentence not inserted:
Genl Pinkney moves to strike out the ineligibility of members of the 1st
branch to offices established "by a particular State." He argued from the
inconveniency to which such a restriction would expose both the members
of the 1st branch, and the States wishing for their services; & from the
smallness of the object to be attained by the restriction.
It wd seem from the ideas of some that we are erecting a Kingdom to be
divided agst itself,[102] he disapproved such a fetter on the Legislature.
[102] According to Yates Wilson followed Pinckney:
"Mr. Wilson. I perceive that some gentlemen are of opinion to give a
bias in favor of state governments. This question ought to stand on the same
footing."—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 157.
Mr Sherman seconds the motion. It wd seem that we are erecting a
Kingdom at war with itself. The Legislature ought not to [be] fettered in
such a case. On the question
Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Md divd. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Madison renewed his motion yesterday made & waved to render the
members of the 1st branch "ineligible during their term of service, & for one
year after—to such offices only as should be established, or the emoluments
thereof augmented, by the Legislature of the U. States during the time of
their being members." He supposed that the unnecessary creation of offices,
and increase of salaries, were the evils most experienced, & that if the door
was shut agst them: it might properly be left open for the appointt of
members to other offices as an encouragemt to the Legislative service.
Mr Alex: Martin[103] seconded the Motion.
[103] "Mr. Martin was lately Governor of North Carolina, which office he filled
with credit. He is a man of sense, and undoubtedly is a good politician, but he is
not formed to shine in public debate, being no speaker. Mr. Martin was once a
Colonel in the American Army, but proved unfit for the field. He is about 40
years of age."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 332.
Mr Butler. The amendt does not go far eno. & wd be easily evaded.
Mr Rutlidge, was for preserving the Legislature as pure as possible, by
shutting the door against appointments of its own members to offices,
which was one source of its corruption.
Mr Mason.[104] The motion of my colleague is but a partial remedy for
the evil. He appealed to him as a witness of the shameful partiality of the
Legislature of Virginia to its own members. He enlarged on the abuses &
corruption in the British Parliament, connected with the appointment of its
members. He cd not suppose that a sufficient number of Citizens could not
be found who would be ready, without the inducement of eligibility to
offices, to undertake the Legislative service. Genius & virtue it may be said,
ought to be encouraged. Genius, for aught he knew, might, but that virtue
should be encouraged by such a species of venality, was an idea, that at
least had the merit of being new.
[104] Yates gives Mason's speech more fully and a speech by Madisonomitted
here:
"Mr. Mason. I differ from my colleague in his proposed amendment. Let
me state the practice in the state where we came from. There, all officers
are appointed by the legislature. Need I add, that many of their
appointments are most shameful. Nor will the check proposed by this
amendment be sufficient. It will soon cease to be any check at all. It is
asserted that it will be very difficult to find men sufficiently qualified as
legislators without the inducement of emolument. I do believe that men of
genius will be deterred unless possessed of great virtues. We may well
dispense with the first characters when destitute of virtue—I should wish
them never to come forward—But if we do not provide against corruption,
our government will soon be at an end; nor would I wish to put a man of
virtue in the way of temptation. Evasions and caballing would evade the
amendment. Nor would the danger be less, if the executive has the
appointment of officers. The first three or four years we might go on well
enough; but what would be the case afterwards? I will add, that such a
government ought to be refused by the people—and it will be refused.
"Mr. Madison. My wish is that the national legislature be as uncorrupt as
possible. I believe all public bodies are inclined, from various motives, to
support its members; but it is not always done from the base motives of
venality. Friendship, and a knowledge of the abilities of those with whom
they associate, may produce it. If you bar the door against such
attachments, you deprive the government of its greatest strength and
support. Can you always rely on the patriotism of the members? If this be
the only inducement, you will find a great indifferency in filling your
legislative body. If we expect to call forth useful characters, we must hold
out allurements; nor can any great inconveniency arise from such
inducements. The legislative body must be the road to public honor; and the
advantage will be greater to adopt my motion, than any possible
inconvenience."—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 158.
Mr King remarked that we were refining too much in this business; and
that the idea of preventing intrigue and solicitation of offices was
chimerical. You say that no member shall himself be eligible to any office.
Will this restrain him from availing himself of the same means which would
gain appointments for himself, to gain them for his son, his brother, or any
other object of his partiality. We were losing therefore the advantages on
one side, without avoiding the evils on the other.
Mr Wilson supported the motion. The proper cure he said for corruption
in the Legislature was to take from it the power of appointing to offices.
One branch of corruption would indeed remain, that of creating unnecessary
offices, or granting unnecessary salaries, and for that the amendment would
be a proper remedy. He animadverted on the impropriety of stigmatizing
with the name of venality the laudable ambition of rising into the honorable
offices of the Government; an ambition most likely to be felt in the early &
most incorrupt period of life, & which all wise & free Govts had deemed it
sound policy, to cherish, not to check. The members of the Legislature have
perhaps the hardest & least profitable task of any who engage in the service
of the state. Ought this merit to be made a disqualification?
Mr Sherman observed that the motion did not go far enough. It might be
evaded by the creation of a new office, the translation to it of a person from
another office, and the appointment of a member of the Legislature to the
latter. A new Embassy might be established to a new Court, & an
ambassador taken from another, in order to create a vacancy for a favorite
member. He admitted that inconveniences lay on both sides. He hoped there
wd be sufficient inducements to the public service without resorting to the
prospect of desirable offices, and on the whole was rather agst the motion of
Mr Madison.
Mr Gerry thought there was great weight in the objection of Mr Sherman.
He added as another objection agst admitting the eligibility of members in
any case that it would produce intrigues of ambitious men for displacing
proper officers, in order to create vacancies for themselves.[105] In answer to
Mr King he observed that although members, if disqualified themselves
might still intrigue & cabal for their sons, brothers &c, yet as their own
interests would be dearer to them, than those of their nearest connections, it
might be expected they would go greater lengths to promote it.
[105] Yates gives Gerry's remarks:
"This amendment is of great weight, and its consequences ought to be
well considered. At the beginning of the war, we possessed more than
Roman virtue. It appears to me it is now the reverse. We have more land
and stock-jobbers than any place on earth. It appears to me that we have
constantly endeavored to keep distinct the three great branches of
government; but if we agree to this motion, it must be destroyed by
admitting the legislators to share in the executive, or to be too much
influenced by the executive, in looking up to them for offices."—Yates,
Secret Proceedings, etc., 160.
Mr Madison had been led to this motion as a middle ground between an
eligibility in all cases, and an absolute disqualification. He admitted the
probable abuses of an eligibility of the members, to offices particularly
within the gift of the Legislature. He had witnessed the partiality of such
bodies to their own members, as had been remarked of the Virginia
Assembly by his colleague (Col. Mason). He appealed however to him, in
turn to vouch another fact not less notorious in Virginia, that the
backwardness of the best citizens to engage in the Legislative service gave
but too great success to unfit characters. The question was not to be viewed
on one side only. The advantages & disadvantages on both ought to be
fairly compared. The objects to be aimed at were to fill all offices with the
fittest characters, & to draw the wisest & most worthy citizens into the
Legislative service. If on one hand, public bodies were partial to their own
members; on the other they were as apt to be misled by taking characters on
report, or the authority of patrons and dependents.
All who had been concerned in the appointment of strangers on those
recommendations must be sensible of this truth. Nor wd the partialities of
such Bodies be obviated by disqualifying their own members. Candidates
for office would hover round the seat of Govt or be found among the
residents there, and practise all the means of counting the favor of the
members. A great proportion of the appointments made by the States were
evidently brought about in this way. In the General Govt the evil must be
still greater, the characters of distant states, being much less known
throughout the U. States than those of the distant parts of the same State.
The elections by Congress had generally turned on men living at the seat of
the fedl Govt or in its neighbourhood.—As to the next object, the impulse to
the Legislative service, was evinced by experience to be in general too
feeble with those best qualified for it. This inconveniency wd also be more
felt in the Natl Govt than in the State Govts as the Sacrifices reqd from the
distant members, wd be much greater, and the pecuniary provisions,
probably, more disproportionate. It wd therefore be impolitic to add fresh
objections to the Legislative service by an absolute disqualification of its
members. The point in question was whether this would be an objection
with the most capable citizens. Arguing from experience he concluded that
it would. The Legislature of Virga would probably have been without many
of its best members, if in that situation, they had been ineligible to Congs to
the Govt & other honorable offices of the State.
Mr Butler thought Characters fit for office wd never be unknown.
Col. Mason. If the members of the Legislature are disqualified, still the
honors of the State will induce those who aspire to them to enter that
service, as the field in which they can best display & improve their talents,
& lay the train for their subsequent advancement.
Mr Jenifer remarked that in Maryland, the Senators chosen for five
years, cd hold no other office & that this circumstance gained them the
greatest confidence of the people.
On the question for agreeing to the motion of Mr Madison,
Massts divd. Ct ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Sherman movd to insert the words "and incapable of holding" after
the words "eligible to offices" wch was agreed to without opposition.
The word "established" & the words "Natl Govt" were struck out of the
Resolution 3d.
Mr Spaight called for a division of the question, in consequence of which
it was so put, as that it turned in the first member of it, "on the ineligibility
of members during the term for which they were elected"—whereon the
States were,
Massts divd. Ct ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On the 2d member of the sentence extending ineligibility of members to
one year after the term for which they were elected Col. Mason thought this
essential to guard agst evasions by resignations, and stipulations for office to
be filled at the expiration of the legislative term. Mr Gerry, had known such
a case. Mr Hamilton. Evasions cd not be prevented—as by proxies—by
friends holding for a year, & then opening the way &c. Mr Rutlidge
admitted the possibility of evasions, but was for contracting them as
possible.
Mass. no. Ct no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa divd. Del. ay. Mard ay. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Adjd.
M     , J    25.    C         .
Resolution 4. being taken up.
Mr Pinkney spoke as follows—[106] The efficacy of the System will
depend on this article. In order to form a right judgmt in the case, it will be
proper to examine the situation of this Country more accurately than it has
yet been done. The people of the U. States are perhaps the most singular of
any we are acquainted with. Among them there are fewer distinctions of
fortune & less of rank, than among the inhabitants of any other nation.
Every freeman has a right to the same protection & security; and a very
moderate share of property entitles them to the possession of all the honors
and privileges the Public can bestow: hence arises a greater equality, than is
to be found among the people of any other Country, and an equality which
is more likely to continue—I say this equality is likely to continue, because
in a new Country, possessing immense tracts of uncultivated lands, where
every temptation is offered to emigration & where industry must be
rewarded with competency, there will be few poor, and few dependent—
Every member of the Society almost, will enjoy an equal power of arriving
at the supreme offices & consequently of directing the strength &
sentiments of the whole Community. None will be excluded by birth, & few
by fortune, from voting for proper persons to fill the offices of Government
—the whole community will enjoy in the fullest sense that kind of political
liberty which consists in the power the members of the State reserve to
themselves, of arriving at the Public offices, or at least, of having votes in
the nomination of those who fill them.
[106] Pinckney furnished Madison with a copy of this speech which he
transcribed, but apparently not with the whole of it, as Madison's note at the end
indicates. The original Pinckney draft is among the Madison papers, and shows
Madison's copying to have been accurate.
If this State of things is true & the prospect of its continuing probable, it
is perhaps not politic to endeavour too close an imitation of a Government
calculated for a people whose situation is, & whose views ought to be
extremely different.
Much has been said of the Constitution of G. Britain. I will confess that I
believe it to be the best Constitution in existence; but at the same time I am
confident it is one that will not or cannot be introduced into this Country,
for many centuries.—If it were proper to go here into a historical
dissertation on the British Constitution, it might easily be shewn that the
peculiar excellence, the distinguishing feature of that Governmt cannot
possibly be introduced into our System—that its balance between the
Crown & the people cannot be made a part of our Constitution,—that we
neither have nor can have the members to compose it, nor the rights,
privileges & properties of so distinct a class of Citizens to guard,—that the
materials for forming this balance or check do not exist, nor is there a
necessity for having so permanent a part of our Legislative, until the
Executive power is so constituted as to have something fixed & dangerous
in its principle—By this I mean a sole, hereditary, though limited
Executive.
That we cannot have a proper body for forming a Legislative balance
between the inordinate power of the Executive and the people, is evident
from a review of the accidents & circumstances which gave rise to the
peerage of Great Britain—I believe it is well ascertained that the parts
which compose the British Constitution arose immediately from the forests
of Germany; but the antiquity of the establishment of Nobility is by no
means clearly defined. Some authors are of opinion that the dignity denoted
by the titles of dux et comes, was derived from the old Roman to the
German Empire; while others are of the opinion that they existed among the
Germans long before the Romans were acquainted with them. The
institution however of Nobility is immemorial among the Nations who may
properly be termed the ancestors of Britain.—At the time they were
summoned in England to become a part of the National Council, the
circumstances which contributed to make them a Constituent part of that
constitution, must be well known to all gentlemen who have had industry &
curiosity enough to investigate the subject—The Nobles with their
possessions & dependents composed a body permanent in their nature and
formidable in point of power. They had a distinct interest both from the
King and the people; an interest which could only be represented by
themselves, and the guardianship could not be safely intrusted to others.—
At the time they were originally called to form a part of the National
Council, necessity perhaps as much as other cause, induced the Monarch to
look up to them. It was necessary to demand the aid of his subjects in
personal & pecuniary services. The power and possessions of the Nobility
would not permit taxation from any Assembly of which they were not a
part: & the blending the Deputies of the Commons with them, & thus
forming what they called their parlerment was perhaps as much the effect of
chance as of any thing else. The Commons were at that time compleatly
subordinate to the nobles, whose consequence & influence seem to have
been the only reasons for their superiority; a superiority so degrading to the
Commons that in the first summons we find the peers are called upon to
consult the commons to consent. From this time the peers have composed a
part of the British Legislature, and notwithstanding their power and
influence have diminished & those of the Commons have increased, yet still
they have always formed an excellent balance agst either the encroachments
of the Crown or the people.
I have said that such a body cannot exist in this Country for ages, and
that untill the situation of our people is exceedingly changed no necessity
will exist for so permanent a part of the Legislature. To illustrate this I have
remarked that the people of the United States are more equal in their
circumstances than the people of any other Country—that they have very
few rich men among them,—by rich men I mean those whose riches may
have a dangerous influence, or such as are esteemed rich in Europe—
perhaps there are not one hundred such on the Continent; that it is not
probable this number will be greatly increased; that the genius of the people
their mediocrity of situation & the prospects which are afforded their
industry in a Country which must be a new one for centuries are
unfavorable to the rapid distinction of ranks. The destruction of the right of
primogeniture & the equal division of the property of Intestates will also
have an effect to preserve this mediocrity; for laws invariably affect the
manners of a people. On the other hand that vast extent of unpeopled
territory which opens to the frugal & industrious a sure road to competency
& independence will effectually prevent for a considerable time the increase
of the poor or discontented, and be the means of preserving that equality of
condition which so eminently distinguishes us.
If equality is as I contend the leading feature of the U. States, where then
are the riches & wealth whose representation & protection is the peculiar
province of this Permanent body. Are they in the hands of the few who may
be called rich; in the possession of less than a hundred citizens? Certainly
not. They are in the great body of the people, among whom there are no
men of wealth, and very few of real poverty.—Is it probable that a change
will be created, and that a new order of men will arise? If under the British
Government, for a century no such change was probable, I think it may be
fairly concluded it will not take place while even the semblance of
Republicanism remains.—How is this change to be effected? Where are the
sources from whence it is to flow? From the landed interest? No. That is too
unproductive & too much divided in most of the States. From the Monied
interest? If such exists at present, little is to be apprehended from that
source. Is it to spring from commerce? I believe it would be the first
instance in which a nobility sprang from merchants. Besides, Sir, I
apprehend that on this point the policy of the U. States has been much
mistaken. We have unwisely considered ourselves as the inhabitants of an
old instead of a new country. We have adopted the maxims of a State full of
people & manufactures & established in credit. We have deserted our true
interest, and instead of applying closely to those improvements in domestic
policy which would have ensured the future importance of our commerce,
we have rashly & prematurely engaged in schemes as extensive as they are
imprudent. This however is an error which daily corrects itself & I have no
doubt that a few more severe trials will convince us, that very different
commercial principles ought to govern the conduct of these States.
The people of this Country are not only very different from the
inhabitants of any State we are acquainted with in the modern world; but I
assert that their situation is distinct from either the people of Greece or
Rome, or of any State we are acquainted with among the antients.—Can the
orders introduced by the institution of Solon, can they be found in the
United States? Can the military habits & manners of Sparta be resembled to
our habits & manners? Are the distinction of Patrician & Plebeian known
among us? Can the Helvetic or Belgic confederacies, or can the unwieldy,
unmeaning body called the Germanic Empire, can they be said to possess
either the same or a situation like ours? I apprehend not.—They are
perfectly different, in their distinctions of rank, their Constitutions, their
manners & their policy.
Our true situation appears to me to be this,—a new extensive Country
containing within itself the materials for forming a Government capable of
extending to its Citizens all the blessings of Civil & religious liberty—
capable of making them happy at home. This is the great end of Republican
Establishments. We mistake the object of our Government, if we hope or
wish that it is to make us respectable abroad. Conquest or superiority
among other powers is not or ought not ever to be the object of republican
Systems. If they are sufficiently active & energetic to rescue us from
contempt & preserve our domestic happiness & security, it is all we can
expect from them,—it is more than almost any other Government ensures to
its citizens.
I believe this observation will be found generally true:—that no two
people are so exactly alike in their situation or circumstances as to admit the
exercise of the same Government with equal benefit; that a system must be
suited to the habits & genius of the People it is to govern, and must grow
out of them.
The people of the U. S. may be divided into three classes—Professional
men who must from their particular pursuits always have a considerable
weight in the Government while it remains popular—Commercial men, who
may or may not have weight as a wise or injudicious commercial policy is
pursued.—If that commercial policy is pursued which I conceive to be the
true one, the merchants of this Country will not or ought not for a
considerable time to have much weight in the political scale.—The third is
the landed interest, the owners and cultivators of the soil, who are and
ought ever to be the governing spring in the system.—These three classes,
however distinct in their pursuits are individually equal in the political
scale, and may be easily proved to have but one interest. The dependence of
each on the other is mutual. The merchant depends on the planter. Both
must in private as well as public affairs be connected with the professional
men; who in their turn must in some measure depend on them. Hence it is
clear from this manifest connection, & the equality which I before stated
exists, & must for the reasons then assign, continue, that after all there is
one, but one great & equal body of Citizens composing the inhabitants of
this Country among whom there are no distinctions of rank, and very few or
none of fortune.
For a people thus circumstanced are we then to form a Government &
the question is what sort of Government is best suited to them.
Will it be the British Govt? No. Why? Because G. Britain contains three
orders of people distinct in their situation, their possessions & their
principles.—These orders combined form the great body of the Nation. And
as in national expences the wealth of the whole community must contribute,
so ought each component part to be properly & duly represented.—No
other combination of power could form this due representation, but the one
that exists.—Neither the peers or the people could represent the royalty, nor
could the Royalty & the people form a proper representation for the Peers.
—Each therefore must of necessity be represented by itself, or the sign of
itself; and this accidental mixture has certainly formed a Government
admirably well balanced.
But the U. States contain but one order that can be assimilated to the
British Nation,—this is the order of Commons. They will not surely then
attempt to form a Government consisting of three branches, two of which
shall have nothing to represent. They will not have an Executive & Senate
(hereditary) because the King & Lords of England are so. The same reasons
do not exist and therefore the same provisions are not necessary.
We must as has been observed suit our Governmt to the people it is to
direct. These are I believe as active, intelligent & susceptible of good
Governmt as any people in the world. The Confusion which has produced
the present relaxed State is not owing to them. It is owing to the weakness
& (defects) of a Govt incapable of combining the various interests it is
intended to unite, and destitute of energy.—All that we have to do then is to
distribute the powers of Govt in such a manner, and for such limited
periods, as while it gives a proper degree of permanency to the Magistrate,
will reserve to the people, the right of election they will not or ought not
frequently to part with.—I am of opinion that this may easily be done; and
that with some amendments the propositions before the Committee will
fully answer this end.
No position appears to me more true than this; that the General Govt
cannot effectually exist without reserving to the States the possession of
their local rights. They are the instruments upon which the Union must
frequently depend for the support & execution of their powers, however
immediately operating upon the people, and not upon the States.
Much has been said about the propriety of abolishing the distinction of
State Governments, & having but one general System. Suffer me for a
moment to examine this question.[107]
[107] The residue of this speech was not furnished, like the above, by Mr.
Pinckney.—Madison's Note.
Yates' report of the speech is meagre. The closing paragraph, apparently the
part lacking in Madison's report, is:
"While we were dependent on the crown of Great Britain, it was in
contemplation to form the whole into one; but it was found impracticable.
No legislature could make good laws for the whole, nor can it now be done.
It would necessarily place the power in the hands of the few nearest the seat
of government. State governments must therefore remain, if you mean to
prevent confusion. The general negative powers will support the general
government. Upon these considerations, I am led to form the second branch
differently from the report. These powers are important, and the number not
too large, upon the principle of proportion. I have considered the subject
with great attention; and I propose this plan (reads it), and if no better plan
is proposed, I will then move its adoption."—Yates, Secret Proceedings,
etc., 163.
The mode of constituting the 2d branch being under consideration.
The word "national" was struck out, and "United States" inserted.
Mr Ghorum, inclined to a compromise as to the rule of proportion. He
thought there was some weight in the objections of the small States. If Va
should have 16. votes & Delre with several other States together 16, those
from Virga would be more likely to unite than the others, and would
therefore have an undue influence. This remark was applicable not only to
States, but to Counties or other districts of the same State. Accordingly the
Constitution of Massts had provided that the representatives of the larger
districts should not be in an exact ratio to their numbers, and experience he
thought had shewn the provision to be expedient.
Mr Read. The States have heretofore been in a sort of partnership. They
ought to adjust their old affairs before they open a new account. He brought
into view the appropriation of the com̃on interest in the Western lands, to
the use of particular States. Let justice be done on this head; let the fund be
applied fairly & equally to the discharge of the general debt, and the smaller
States who had been injured; would listen then perhaps to those ideas of just
representation which had been held out.
Mr Ghorum, did not see how the Convention could interpose in the case.
Errors he allowed had been committed on the subject. But Congs were now
using their endeavours to rectify them. The best remedy would be such a
Government as would have vigor enough to do justice throughout. This was
certainly the best chance that could be afforded to the smaller States.
Mr Wilson, the question is shall the members of the 2d branch be chosen
by the Legislatures of the States? When he considered the amazing extent
of Country—the immense population which is to fill it, the influence which
the Govt we are to form will have, not only on the present generation of our
people & their multiplied posterity, but on the whole Globe, he was lost in
the magnitude of the object. The project of Henry the 4th & his Statesmen
was but the picture in miniature of the great portrait to be exhibited. He was
opposed to an election by the State Legislatures. In explaining his reasons it
was necessary to observe the twofold relation in which the people would
stand, 1. as Citizens of the Genl Govt 2. as Citizens of their particular State.
The Genl Govt was meant for them in the first capacity: the State Govts in
the second. Both Govts were derived from the people—both meant for the
people—both therefore ought to be regulated on the same principles. The
same train of ideas which belonged to the relation of the Citizens to their
State Govts were applicable to their relation to the Genl Govt and in forming
the latter, we ought to proceed, by abstracting as much as possible from the
idea of the State Govts. With respect to the province & object of the Genl
Govt they should be considered as having no existence. The election of the
2d branch by the Legislatures, will introduce & cherish local interests &
local prejudices. The Genl Govt is not an assemblage of States, but of
individuals for certain political purposes—it is not meant for the States, but
for the individuals composing them; the individuals therefore not the States,
ought to be represented in it: A proportion in this representation can be
preserved in the 2d as well as in the 1st branch; and the election can be made
by electors chosen by the people for that purpose. He moved an amendment
to that effect which was not seconded.
Mr Elseworth saw no reason for departing from the mode contained in
the Report. Whoever chooses the member, he will be a Citizen of the State
he is to represent & will feel the same spirit & act the same part whether he
be appointed by the people or the Legislature. Every State has its particular
views & prejudices, which will find their way into the general Councils,
through whatever channel they may flow. Wisdom was one of the
characteristics which it was in contemplation to give the second branch.
Would not more of it issue from the Legislatures; than from an immediate
election by the people. He urged the necessity of maintaining the existence,
& agency of the States. Without their co-operation it would be impossible
to support a Republican Govt over so great an extent of Country. An army
could scarcely render it practicable. The largest States are the worst
Governed. Virga is obliged to acknowledge her incapacity to extend her
Govt to Kentuckey. Massts cannot keep the peace one hundred miles from
her capitol and is now forming an army for its support. How long Pena may
be free from a like situation cannot be foreseen. If the principles &
materials of our Govt are not adequate to the extent of these single States;
how can it be imagined that they can support a single Govt throughout the
U. States. The only chance of supporting a Genl Govt lies in grafting it on
that of the individual States.
Docr Johnson urged the necessity of preserving the State Govts which
would be at the mercy of the Genl Govt on Mr Wilson's plan.
Mr Madison thought it wd obviate difficulty if the present resol: were
postponed, & the 8th taken up, which is to fix the right of suffrage in the 2d
branch.
Docr Williamson professed himself a friend to such a system as would
secure the existence of the State Govts. The happiness of the people
depended on it. He was at a loss to give his vote as to the Senate untill he
knew the number of its members. In order to ascertain this, he moved to
insert these words after "2d branch of the Natl Legislature"—"who shall
bear such proportion to the no of the 1st branch as 1 to ——." He was not
seconded.
Mr Mason. It has been agreed on all hands that an efficient Govt is
necessary that to render it such it ought to have the faculty of self defence,
that to render its different branches effectual each of them ought to have the
same power of self defence. He did not wonder that such an agreement
should have prevailed in these points. He only wondered that there should
be any disagreement about the necessity of allowing the State Govts the
same self-defence. If they are to be preserved as he conceived to be
essential, they certainly ought to have this power. And the only mode left of
giving it to them, was by allowing them to appoint the 2d branch of the Natl
Legislature.
Mr Butler observing that we were put to difficulties at every step by the
uncertainty whether an equality or a ratio of representation wd prevail
finally in the 2d branch, moved to postpone the 4th Resol: & to proceed to
the Resol: on that point. Mr Madison seconded him.
On the question
Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa no, Del. no. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On a question to postpone the 4 and take up the 7 Resol: ays, Maryd Va
N. C. S. C. Geo;—Noes, Mass. Ct N. Y. N. J. Pa Del:
On the question to agree "that the members of the 2d branch be chosen
by the indivl Legislatures" Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no.
Del. ay. Md ay. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.[108]
[108] Madison's Note:
It must be kept in view that the largest States particularly Pennsylvania &
Virginia always considered the choice of the 2d Branch by the State Legislatures
as opposed to a proportional representation to which they were attached as a
fundamental principle of just Government. The smaller States who had opposite
views, were reinforced by the members from the large States most anxious to
secure the importance of the State Governments.
On a question on the clause requiring the age of 30 years at least,—it
was agreed to unanimously:
On a question to strike out the words, "sufficient to ensure their
independency" after the word "term" it was agreed to.
That the 2d branch hold their offices for a term of seven years,
considered.
Mr Ghorum suggests a term of "4 years," 1/4 to be elected every year.
Mr Randolph, supported the idea of rotation, as favorable to the wisdom
& stability of the Corps, which might possibly be always sitting, and aiding
the Executive.
And moves after "7 years," to add, "to go out in fixt proportion" which
was agreed to.
Mr Williamson suggests "6 years," as more convenient for Rotation than
7 years.
Mr Sherman seconds him.
Mr Reed proposed that they sd hold their offices "during good
behaviour." Mr. R. Morris seconds him.
Genl Pinkney, proposed "4 years." A longer term wd fix them at the seat
of Govt. They wd acquire an interest there, perhaps transfer their property &
lose sight of the States they represent. Under these circumstances the
distant States wd labour under great disadvantages.[109]
[109] According to Yates, Madison followed Pinckney:
"Mr. Madison. We are proceeding in the same manner that was done
when the Confederation was first formed. Its original draft was excellent,
but in its progress and completion it became so insufficient as to give rise to
the present Convention. By the vote already taken, will not the temper of
the state legislatures transfuse itself into the Senate? Do we create a free
government?"—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 168.
Mr Sherman moved to strike out "7 years" in order to take questions on
the several propositions.
On the question to strike out "seven"
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md divd. Va no.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On the question to insert "6 years", which failed 5 Sts being ay. 5 no, & 1
divided
Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md divd. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On a motion to adjourn, the votes were 5 for 5 agst it & 1 divided,—Con.
N. J. Pa Del. Va ay. Massts N. Y. N. C. S. C. Geo: no. Maryd divided.
On the question for "5 years" it was lost.
Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md divd. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Adjd.
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The duration of the 2d branch under consideration.
Mr Ghorum moved to fill the blank with "six years," one third of the
members to go out every second year.
Mr Wilson 2ded the motion.
Genl Pinkney opposed six years in favor of four years. The States he said
had different interests. Those of the Southern, and of S. Carolina in
particular were different from the Northern. If the Senators should be
appointed for a long term, they wd settle in the State where they exercised
their functions; and would in a little time be rather the representatives of
that than of the State appointg them.
Mr Reed movd that the term be nine years. This wd admit of a very
convenient rotation, one third going out triennially. He wd still prefer
"during good behaviour," but being little supported in that idea, he was
willing to take the longest term that could be obtained.
Mr Broome 2ded the motion.
Mr Madison. In order to judge of the form to be given to this institution,
it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served by it. These were
first to protect the people agst their rulers; secondly to protect the people
agst the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led. A
people deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the experience of
other nations before them, on the plan of Govt most likely to secure their
happiness, would first be aware, that those chargd with the public happiness
might betray their trust. An obvious precaution agst this danger wd be to
divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might watch & check
each other. In this they wd be governed by the same prudence which has
prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of Govt, where all
business liable to abuses is made to pass thro' separate hands, the one being
a check on the other. It wd next occur to such people, that they themselves
were liable to temporary errors, thro' want of information as to their true
interest, and that men chosen for a short term, & employed but a small
portion of that in public affairs, might err from the same cause. This
reflection wd naturally suggest that the Govt be so constituted as that one of
its branches might have an oppy of acquiring a competent knowledge of the
public interests. Another reflection equally becoming a people on such an
occasion, wd be that they themselves, as well as a numerous body of
Representatives, were liable to err also, from fickleness and passion. A
necessary fence agst this danger would be to select a portion of enlightened
citizens, whose limited number, and firmness might seasonably interpose
agst impetuous councils. It ought finally to occur to a people deliberating on
a Govt for themselves, that as different interests necessarily result from the
liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might under sudden impulses
be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In all civilized Countries
the people fall into different classes havg a real or supposed difference of
interests. There will be creditors & debtors; farmers, merchts &
manufacturers. There will be particularly the distinction of rich & poor. It
was true as had been observd (by Mr Pinkney) we had not among us those
hereditary distinctions, of rank which were a great source of the contests in
the ancient Govts as well as the modern States of Europe, nor those
extremes of wealth or poverty which characterize the latter. We cannot
however be regarded even at this time, as one homogeneous mass, in which
every thing that affects a part will affect in the same manner the whole. In
framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we shd not lose sight of
the changes which ages will produce. An increase of population will of
necessity increase the proportion of those who will labour under all the
hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its
blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the
feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power
will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been
made in this Country, but symptoms, of a levelling spirit, as we have
understood, have sufficiently appeared in certain quarters, to give notice of
the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded agst on the republican
principles? How is the danger in all cases of interested coalitions to oppress
the minority to be guarded agst? Among other means by the establishment
of a body in the Govt sufficiently respectable for its wisdom & virtue, to aid
on such emergencies, the preponderance of justice by throwing its weight
into that scale. Such being the objects of the second branch in the proposed
Govt he thought a considerable duration ought to be given to it. He did not
conceive that the term of nine years could threaten any real danger; but in
pursuing his particular ideas on the subject, he should require that the long
term allowed to the 2d branch should not commence till such a period of
life, as would render a perpetual disqualification to be re-elected little
inconvenient either in a public or private view. He observed that as it was
more than probable we were now digesting a plan which in its operation wd
decide for ever the fate of Republican Govt we ought not only to provide
every guard to liberty that its preservation cd require, but be equally careful
to supply the defects which our own experience had particularly pointed
out.
Mr Sherman. Govt is instituted for those who live under it. It ought
therefore to be so constituted as not to be dangerous to their liberties. The
more permanency it has the worse if it be a bad Govt. Frequent elections are
necessary to preserve the good behavior of rulers. They also tend to give
permanency to the Government, by preserving that good behavior, because
it ensures their re-election. In Connecticut elections have been very
frequent, yet great stability & uniformity both as to persons & measures
have been experienced from its original establishmt to the present time; a
period of more than a 130 years. He wished to have provision made for
steadiness & wisdom in the system to be adopted; but he thought six or four
years would be sufficient. He shd be content with either.
Mr Read wished it to be considered by the small States that it was their
interest that we should become one people as much as possible; that State
attachments shd be extinguished as much as possible; that the Senate, shd be
so constituted as to have the feelings of Citizens of the whole.
Mr Hamilton. He did not mean to enter particularly into the subject. He
concurred with Mr Madison in thinking we were now to decide forever the
fate of Republican Government; and that if we did not give to that form due
stability and wisdom, it would be disgraced & lost among ourselves,
disgraced & lost to mankind forever. He acknowledged himself not to think
favorably of Republican Government; but addressed his remarks to those
who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail on them to tone their
Government as high as possible. He professed himself to be as zealous an
advocate for liberty as any man whatever, and trusted he should be as
willing a martyr to it though he differed as to the form in which it was most
eligible.—He concurred also in the general observations of (Mr Madison)
on the subject, which might be supported by others if it were necessary. It
was certainly true that nothing like an equality of property existed; that an
inequality would exist as long as liberty existed, and that it would
unavoidably result from that very liberty itself. This inequality of property
constituted the great & fundamental distinction in Society. When the
Tribunitial power had levelled the boundary between the patricians &
plebeians, what followed? The distinction between rich & poor was
substituted. He meant not however to enlarge on the subject. He rose
principally to remark that (Mr Sherman) seemed not to recollect that one
branch of the proposed Govt was so formed, as to render it particularly the
guardians of the poorer orders of Citizens; nor to have adverted to the true
causes of the stability which had been exemplified in Cont. Under the
British system as well as the federal, many of the great powers appertaining
to Govt particularly all those relating to foreign Nations were not in the
hands of the Govt there. Their internal affairs also were extremely simple,
owing to sundry causes many of which were peculiar to that Country. Of
late the Governmt had entirely given way to the people, and had in fact
suspended many of its ordinary functions in order to prevent those turbulent
scenes which had appeared elsewhere. He asks Mr S. whether the State at
this time dare impose & collect a tax on ye people? To these causes & not to
the frequency of elections, the effect as far as it existed ought to be chiefly
ascribed.
Mr Gerry, wished we could be united in our ideas concerning a
permanent Govt. All aim at the same end, but there are great differences as
to the means. One circumstance He thought should be carefully attended to.
There was not 1/1000 part of our fellow citizens who were not agst every
approach towards Monarchy. Will they ever agree to a plan which seems to
make such an approach. The Convention ought to be extremely cautious in
what they hold out to the people. Whatever plan may be proposed will be
espoused with warmth by many out of respect to the quarter it proceeds
from as well as from an approbation of the plan itself. And if the plan
should be of such a nature as to rouse a violent opposition, it is easy to
foresee that discord & confusion will ensue, and it is even possible that we
may become a prey to foreign powers. He did not deny the position of Mr
Madison, that the majority will generally violate justice when they have an
interest in so doing: But did not think there was any such temptation in this
Country. Our situation was different from that of G. Britain; and the great
body of lands yet to be parcelled out & settled would very much prolong
the difference. Notwithstanding the symptoms of injustice which had
marked many of our public Councils, they had not proceeded so far as not
to leave hopes, that there would be a sufficient sense of justice & virtue for
the purpose of Govt. He admitted the evils arising from a frequency of
elections; and would agree to give the Senate a duration of four or five
years. A longer term would defeat itself. It never would be adopted by the
people.
Mr Wilson did not mean to repeat what had fallen from others, but wd
add an observation or two which he believed had not yet been suggested.
Every nation may be regarded in two relations 1 to its own citizens. 2 to
foreign nations. It is therefore not only liable to anarchy & tyranny within,
but has wars to avoid & treaties to obtain from abroad. The Senate will
probably be the depository of the powers concerning the latter objects. It
ought therefore to be made respectable in the eyes of foreign Nations. The
true reason why G. Britain has not yet listened to a commercial treaty with
us has been, because she had no confidence in the stability or efficacy of
our Government. 9 years with a rotation, will provide these desirable
qualities; and give our Govt an advantage in this respect over Monarchy
itself. In a Monarchy much must always depend on the temper of the man.
In such a body, the personal character will be lost in the political. He wd add
another observation. The popular objection agst appointing any public body
for a long term was that it might by gradual encroachments prolong itself
first into a body for life, and finally become a hereditary one. It would be a
satisfactory answer to this objection that as 1/3 would go out triennially,
there would be always three divisions holding their places for unequal
times, and consequently acting under the influence of different views, and
different impulses.—On the question for 9 years, 1/3 to go out triennially,
Massts no. Cont, no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question for 6 years,[110] 1/3 to go out biennially
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
[110] Yates has the question on five years, but this is obviously a mistake.—
Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 172.
"To receive fixt stipends by which they may be compensated for their
services" considered.
General Pinkney proposed "that no Salary should be allowed." As this
(the Senatorial) branch was meant to represent the wealth of the Country, it
ought to be composed of persons of wealth; and if no allowance was to be
made the wealthy alone would undertake the service. He moved to strike
out the clause.
Doctr Franklin seconded the motion. He wished the Convention to stand
fair with the people. There were in it a number of young men who would
probably be of the Senate. If lucrative appointments should be
recommended we might be chargeable with having carved out places for
ourselves. On the question,—Masts Connecticut[111] Pa Md S. Carolina ay.
N. Y. N. J. Del. Virga N. C. Geo. no.
[111] Quer. whether Connecticut should not be, no, & Delaware, ay.—Madison's
Note.
Mr Williamson moved to change the expression into these words to wit
"to receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to the public
service." The motion was seconded by Mr Elseworth, and agreed to by all
the States except S. Carola. It seemed to be meant only to get rid of the
word "fixt" and leave greater room for modifying the provision on this
point.
Mr Elseworth moved to strike out "to be paid out of the Natl Treasury"
and insert "to be paid by their respective States." If the Senate was meant to
strengthen the Govt it ought to have the confidence of the States. The States
will have an interest in keeping up a representation, and will make such
provision for supporting the members as will ensure their attendance.
Mr Madison considered this as a departure from a fundamental principle,
and subverting the end intended by allowing the Senate a duration of 6
years. They would if this motion should be agreed to, hold their places
during pleasure; during the pleasure of the State Legislatures. One great end
of the institution was, that being a firm, wise and impartial body, it might
not only give stability to the Genl Govt in its operations on individuals, but
hold an even balance among different States. The motion would make the
Senate like Congress, the mere Agents & Advocates of State interests &
views, instead of being the impartial umpires & Guardians of justice and the
general Good. Congs had lately by the establishment of a board with full
powers to decide on the mutual claims between the U. States & the
individual States, fairly acknowledged themselves to be unfit for
discharging this part of the business referred to them by the Confederation.
Mr Dayton[112] considered the payment of the Senate by the States as
fatal to their independence, he was decided for paying them out of the Natl
Treasury.
[112] "Cap. Dayton is a young Gentleman of talents, with ambition to exert
them. He possesses a good education and some reading; he speaks well, and
seems desirous of improving himself in Oratory. There is an impetuosity in his
temper that is injurious to him; but there is an honest rectitude about him that
makes him a valuable Member of Society, and secures to him the esteem of all
good Men. He is about 30 years old, served with me a Brother Aid to General
Sullivan in the Western Expedition of '79."—Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii.,
328.
On the question for payment of the Senate to be left to the States as
moved by Mr Elseworth.
Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Col. Mason. He did not rise to make any motion, but to hint an idea
which seemed to be proper for consideration. One important object in
constituting the Senate was to secure the rights of property. To give them
weight & firmness for this purpose, a considerable duration in office was
thought necessãy. But a longer term than 6 years, would be of no avail in
this respect, if needy persons should be appointed. He suggested therefore
the propriety of annexing to the office a qualification of property. He
thought this would be very practicable; as the rules of taxation would
supply a scale for measuring the degree of wealth possessed by every man.
A question was then taken whether the words "to be paid out of the
public treasury," should stand.
Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Butler moved to strike out the ineligibility of Senators to State
offices.
Mr. Williamson seconded the motion.[113]
[113] According to Yates, before Wilson spoke:
"Mr. Madison. Congress heretofore depended on state interests; we are now
going to pursue the same plan."—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 173.
Mr Wilson remarked the additional dependance this wd create in the
Senators on the States. The longer the time he observed allotted to the
Officer, the more compleat will be the dependance if it exists at all.[114]
[114] After Wilson, according to Yates:
"Mr. Butler. This second branch I consider as the aristocratic part of our
government; and they must be controlled by the states, or they will be too
independent."—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 173.
Genl Pinkney was for making the States as much as could be
conveniently done, a part of the Genl Govt. If the Senate was to be
appointed by the States, it ought in pursuance of the same idea to be paid by
the States: and the States ought not to be barred from the opportunity of
calling members of it into offices at home. Such a restriction would also
discourage the ablest men from going into the Senate.
Mr Williamson moved a resolution so penned as to admit of the two
following questions. 1. whether the members of the Senate should be
ineligible to & incapable of holding offices under the U. States
2. Whether &c. under the particular States.
On the Question to postpone in order to consider Williamson's Resoln.
Masts no. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Gerry & Mr Madison move to add to Mr Williamson's 1. Quest: "and
for 1 year thereafter." On this amendt
Masts no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On Mr Will[iam]son's 1 Question as amended vz, inelig: & incapable &c.
&c. for 1 year &c. agd to unãmously.
On the 2. question as to ineligibility &c. to State offices,
Mass. ay. Ct no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The 5. Resol: "that each branch have the right of originating acts," was
agreed to nem. con.
Adjd.
W         J    27.    C         .
Mr Rutlidge moved to postpone the 6th Resolution, defining the powers
of Congs in order to take up the 7 & 8 which involved the most fundamental
points; the rules of suffrage in the 2 branches which was agreed to nem.
con.
A question being proposed on the Resol: 7; declaring that the suffrage in
the first branch shd be according to an equitable ratio.
Mr L. Martin[115] contended at great length and with great eagerness that
the General Govt was meant merely to preserve the State Governts not to
govern individuals: that its powers ought to be kept within narrow limits:
that if too little power was given to it, more might be added; but that if too
much, it could never be resumed: that individuals as such have little to do
but with their own States; that the Genl Govt has no more to apprehend
from the States composing the Union, while it pursues proper measures,
that Govt over individuals has to apprehend from its subjects: that to resort
to the Citizens at large for their sanction to a new Governt will be throwing
them back into a state of Nature; that the dissolution of the State Govts is
involved in the nature of the process; that the people have no right to do this
without the consent of those to whom they have delegated their power for
State purposes: through their tongues only they can speak, through their
ears, only can hear: that the States have shewn a good disposition to comply
with the Acts of Congs, weak, contemptibly weak as that body has been;
and have failed through inability alone to comply: that the heaviness of the
private debts, and the waste of property during the war, were the chief
causes of this inability; that he did not conceive the instances mentioned by
Mr Madison of compacts between Va & Md between Pa & N. J. or of troops
raised by Massts for defence against the Rebels, to be violations of the
articles of confederation—that an equal vote in each State was essential to
the federal idea, and was founded in justice & freedom, not merely in
policy: that tho' the States may give up this right of sovereignty, yet they
had not, and ought not: that the States like individuals were in a State of
nature equally sovereign & free. In order to prove that individuals in a State
of Nature are equally free & independent he read passages from Locke,
Vattel, Lord Summers—Priestly. To prove that the case is the same with
States till they surrender their equal sovereignty, he read other passages in
Locke & Vattel, and also Rutherford: that the States being equal cannot treat
or confederate so as to give up an equality of votes without giving up their
liberty: that the propositions on the table were a system of slavery for 10
States: that as Va Massts & Pa have 42/90 of the votes they can do as they
please without a miraculous Union of the other ten: that they will have
nothing to do, but to gain over one of the ten to make them compleat
masters of the rest; that they can then appoint an Execute & Judiciary &
legislate for them as they please: that there was & would continue a natural
predilection & partiality in men for their own States; that the States,
particularly the smaller, would never allow a negative to be exercised over
their laws: that no State in Ratifying the Confederation had objected to the
equality of votes; that the complaints at present run not agst this equality but
the want of power: that 16 members from Va would be more likely to act in
concert than a like number formed of members from different States: that
instead of a junction of the small States as a remedy, he thought a division
of the large States would be more eligible.—This was the substance of a
speech which was continued more than three hours. He was too much
exhausted he said to finish his remarks, and reminded the House that he
should tomorrow, resume them.
[115] "Mr. Martin, the Attorney-General from Maryland, spoke on this subject
upwards of three hours. As his arguments were too diffuse, and in many
instances desultory, it was not possible to trace him through the whole, or to
methodize his ideas into a systematic or argumentative arrangement."—Yates,
Secret Proceedings, etc., 174.
Adjd.
T        J    28  .    C         
Mr L. Martin resumed his discourse,[116] contending that the Genl Govt
ought to be formed for the States, not for individuals: that if the States were
to have votes in proportion to their numbers of people, it would be the same
thing whether their representatives were chosen by the Legislatures or the
people; the smaller States would be equally enslaved; that if the large States
have the same interest with the smaller as was urged, there could be no
danger in giving them an equal vote; they would not injure themselves, and
they could not injure the large ones on that supposition without injuring
themselves and if the interests, were not the same, the inequality of suffrage
wd be dangerous to the smaller States: that it will be in vain to propose any
plan offensive to the rulers of the States, whose influence over the people
will certainly prevent their adopting it: that the large States were weak at
present in proportion to their extent; & could only be made formidable to
the small ones, by the weight of their votes: that in case a dissolution of the
Union should take place, the small States would have nothing to fear from
their power; that if in such a case the three great States should league
themselves together, the other ten could do so too; & that he had rather see
partial Confederacies take place, than the plan on the table. This was the
substance of the residue of his discourse which was delivered with much
diffuseness & considerable vehemence.
[116] Yates gives Martin's speech more fully:
"On federal grounds, it is said, that a minority will govern a majority—
but on the Virginia plan a minority would tax a majority. In a federal
government, a majority of states must and ought to tax. In the local
government of states, counties may be unequal—still numbers, not
property, govern. What is the government now forming, over states or
persons? As to the latter, their rights cannot be the object of a general
government. These are already secured by their guardians, the state
governments. The general government is therefore intended only to protect
and guard the rights of the states as states.
"This general government, I believe, is the first upon earth which gives
checks against democracies or aristocracies. The only necessary check in a
general government ought to be a restraint to prevent its absorbing the
powers of the state governments. Representation on federal principles can
only flow from state societies. Representation and taxation are ever
inseparable—not according to the quantum of property, but the quantum of
freedom.
"Will the representatives of a state forget state interests? The mode of
election cannot change it. These prejudices cannot be eradicated—Your
general government cannot be just or equal upon the Virginia plan, unless
you abolish state interests. If this cannot be done, you must go back to
principles purely federal.
"On this latter ground, the state legislatures and their constituents will
have no interests to pursue different from the general government, and both
will be interested to support each other. Under these ideas can it be
expected that the people can approve the Virginia plan? But it is said, the
people, not the state legislatures, will be called upon for approbation—with
an evident design to separate the interests of the governors from the
governed. What must be the consequence? Anarchy and confusion. We lose
the ideas of the powers with which we are intrusted. The legislatures must
approve. By them it must, on your own plan, be laid before the people.
How will such a government, over so many great states, operate. Wherever
new settlements have been formed in large states, they immediately want to
shake off their independency. Why? Because the government is too remote
for their good. The people want it nearer home.
"The basis of all ancient and modern confederacies is the freedom and
the independency of the states composing it. The states forming the
amphictionic council were equal, though Lacedemon, one of the greatest
states, attempted the exclusion of three of the lesser states from this right.
The plan reported, it is true, only intends to diminish those rights, not to
annihilate them—It was the ambition and power of the great Grecian states
which at last ruined this respectable council. The states as societies are ever
respectful. Has Holland or Switzerland ever complained of the equality of
the states which compose their respective confederacies? Bern and Zurich
are larger than the remaining eleven cantons—so of many of the states of
Germany; and yet their governments are not complained of. Bern alone
might usurp the whole power of the Helvetic confederacy, but she is
contented still with being equal.
"The admission of the larger states into the confederation, on the
principle of equality, is dangerous—But on the Virginia system it is ruinous
and destructive. Still it is the true interest of all the states to confederate—It
is their joint efforts which must protect and secure us from foreign danger,
and give us peace and harmony at home.
"(Here Mr. Martin entered into a detail of the comparative powers of
each state, and stated their probable weakness and strength.)
"At the beginning of our troubles with Great Britain, the smaller states
were attempted to be cajoled to submit to the views of that nation, lest the
larger states should usurp their rights. We then answered them—your
present plan is slavery, which on the remote prospect of a distant evil, we
will not submit to.
"I would rather confederate with any single state, than submit to the
Virginia plan. But we are already confederated, and no power on earth can
dissolve it but by the consent of all the contracting powers—and four states,
on this floor, have already declared their opposition to annihilate it. Is the
old confederation dissolved, because some of the states wish a new
confederation?"—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 177.
Mr Lansing & Mr Dayton moved to strike out "not," so that the 7 art.
might read that the rights of suffrage in the 1st branch ought to be according
to the rule established by the Confederation."
Mr Dayton expressed great anxiety that the question might not be put till
tomorrow; Governr Livingston being kept away by indisposition, and the
representation of N. Jersey thereby suspended.
Mr Williamson, thought that if any political truth could be grounded on
mathematical demonstration, it was that if the States were equally sovereign
now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty, that they would
remain equally sovereign. He could not comprehend how the smaller States
would be injured in the case, and wished some Gentleman would vouchsafe
a solution of it. He observed that the small States, if they had a plurality of
votes would have an interest in throwing the burdens off their own
shoulders on those of the large ones. He begged that the expected addition
of new States from the Westward might be kept in view. They would be
small States, they would be poor States, they would be unable to pay in
proportion to their numbers; their distance from market rendering the
produce of their labour less valuable; they would consequently be tempted
to combine for the purpose of laying burdens on comm̃erce & consumption
which would fall with greatest weight on the old States.
Mr Madison, sd he was much disposed to concur in any expedient not
inconsistent with fundamental principles, that could remove the difficulty
concerning the rule of representation. But he could neither be convinced
that the rule contended for was just, nor necessary for the safety of the small
States agst the large States. That it was not just, had been conceded by Mr
Breerly & Mr Paterson themselves. The expedient proposed by them was a
new partition of the territory of the U. States. The fallacy of the reasoning
drawn from the equality of Sovereign States in the formation of compacts,
lay in confounding together mere Treaties, in which were specified certain
duties to which the parties were to be bound, and certain rules by which
their subjects were to be reciprocally governed in their intercourse, with a
compact by which an authority was created paramount to the parties, &
making laws for the government of them. If France, England & Spain were
to enter into a Treaty for the regulation of commerce &c with the Prince of
Monacho & 4 or 5 other of the smallest sovereigns of Europe, they would
not hesitate to treat as equals, and to make the regulations perfectly
reciprocal. Wd the case be the same, if a Council were to be formed of
deputies from each with authority and discretion, to raise money, levy
troops, determine the value of coin &c? Would 30 or 40, million of people
submit their fortunes into the hands of a few thousands? If they did it would
only prove that they expected more from the terror of their superior force,
than they feared from the selfishness of their feeble associates. Why are
Counties of the Same States represented in proportion to their numbers? Is
it because the representatives are chosen by the people themselves? So will
be the representatives in the Nationl Legislature. Is it because, the larger
have more at stake than the smaller? The Case will be the same with the
larger & smaller States. Is it because the laws are to operate immediately on
their persons & properties? The same is the case in some degree as the
articles of confederation stand; the same will be the case in a far greater
degree, under the plan proposed to be substituted. In the cases of captures,
of piracies, and of offences in a federal army, the property & persons of
individuals depend on the laws of Congs. By the plan proposed a compleat
power of taxation, the highest prerogative of supremacy is proposed to be
vested in the National Govt. Many other powers are added which assimilate
it to the Govt of individual States. The negative proposed on the State laws,
will make it an essential branch of the State Legislatures & of course will
require that it should be exercised by a body established on like principles
with the other branches of those Legislatures.—That it is not necessãy to
secure the small States agst the large ones he conceived to be equally
obvious: Was a combination of the large ones dreaded? This must arise
either from some interest common to Va Massts & Pa & distinguishing them
from the other States, or from the mere circumstance of similarity of size.
Did any such common interest exist? In point of situation they could not
have been more effectually separated from each other by the most jealous
citizen of the most jealous State. In point of manners, Religion, and the
other circumstances which sometimes beget affection between different
communities, they were not more assimilated than the other States—In
point of the staple productions they were as dissimilar as any three other
States in the Union. The Staple of Massts was fish, of Pa flower, of Va Tobo
Was a Combination to be apprehended from the mere circumstance of
equality of size? Experience suggested no such danger. The journals of
Congs did not present any peculiar association of these States in the votes
recorded. It had never been seen that different Counties in the same State,
conformable in extent, but disagreeing in other circumstances, betrayed a
propensity to such combinations. Experience rather taught a contrary
lesson. Among individuals of superior eminence & weight in Society,
rivalships were much more frequent than coalitions. Among independent
Nations, pre-eminent over their neighbours, the same remark was verified.
Carthage & Rome tore one another to pieces instead of uniting their forces
to devour the weaker nations of the Earth. The Houses of Austria & France
were hostile as long as they remained the greatest powers of Europe.
England & France have succeeded to the pre-eminence & to the enmity. To
this principle we owe perhaps our liberty. A coalition between those powers
would have been fatal to us. Among the principal members of antient &
Modern confederacies, we find the same effect from the same cause. The
contentions, not the Coalitions of Sparta, Athens & Thebes, proved fatal to
the smaller members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy. The contentions,
not the combinations of Prussia & Austria, have distracted & oppressed the
German empire. Were the large States formidable singly to their smaller
neighbours? On this supposition the latter ought to wish for such a General
Govt as will operate with equal energy on the former as on themselves. The
more lax the band, the more liberty the larger will have to avail themselves
of their superior force. Here again Experience was an instructive monitor.
What is ye situation of the weak compared with the strong in those stages of
civilization in which the violence of individuals is least controuled by an
efficient Government? The Heroic period of Antient Greece, the feudal
licentiousness of the middle ages of Europe, the existing condition of the
American Savages, answer this question. What is the situation of the minor
sovereigns in the great society of independent nations, in which the more
powerful are under no controul but the nominal authority of the law of
Nations? Is not the danger to the former exactly in proportion to their
weakness. But there are cases still more in point. What was the condition of
the weaker members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy. Plutarch (life of
Themistocles) will inform us that it happened but too often that the
strongest cities corrupted & awed the weaker, and that Judgment went in
favor of the more powerful party. What is the condition of the lesser states
in the German Confederacy? We all know that they are exceedingly
trampled upon: and that they owe their safety as far as they enjoy it, partly
to their enlisting themselves, under the rival banners of the pre-eminent
members, partly to alliances with neighbouring Princes which the
Constitution of the Empire does not prohibit. What is the state of things in
the lax system of the Dutch Confederacy? Holland contains about 1/2 the
People, supplies about 1/2 of the money, and by her influence, silently &
indirectly governs the whole republic. In a word; the two extremes before
us are a perfect separation & a perfect incorporation, of the 13 States. In the
first case they would be independent nations subject to no law, but the law
of nations. In the last, they would be mere counties of one entire republic,
subject to one common law. In the first case the smaller States would have
every thing to fear from the larger. In the last they would have nothing to
fear. The true policy of the small States therefore lies in promoting those
principles & that form of Govt which will most approximate the States to
the condition of counties. Another consideration may be added. If the Genl
Govt be feeble, the large States distrusting its continuance, and foreseeing
that their importance & security may depend on their own size & strength,
will never submit to a partition. Give to the Genl Govt sufficient energy &
permanency, & you remove the objection. Gradual partitions of the large, &
junctions of the small States will be facilitated, and time may effect that
equalization, which is wished for by the small States now, but can never be
accomplished at once.
Mr Wilson. The leading argument of those who contend for equality of
votes among the States is that the States as such being equal, and being
represented not as districts of individuals, but in their political & corporate
capacities, are entitled to an equality of suffrage. According to this mode of
reasoning the representation of the boroughs in Engl[~d] which has been
allowed on all hands to be the rotten part of the Constitution, is perfectly
right & proper. They are like the States represented in their corporate
capacity like the States therefore they are entitled to equal voices, old
Sarum to as many as London. And instead of the injury supposed hitherto to
be done to London, the true ground of Complaint lies with old Sarum: for
London instead of two which is her proper share, sends four representatives
to Parliament.[117]
[117] According to King's Notes, Charles Pinckney spoke after Madison:
"Charles Pinckney. The Honors & offices may become the objects of strong
desire and of combination to acquire them. If Representatives be apportioned
among the States in the Ratio of numbers, the Citizens will be free and equal but
the States will be unequal, and their sovereignty will be degraded."—King's Life
and Correspondence of Rufus King, i., 610.
Mr Sherman. The question is not what rights naturally belong to man;
but how they may be most equally & effectually guarded in Society. And if
some give up more than others in order to obtain this end, there can be no
room for complaint. To do otherwise, to require an equal concession from
all, if it would create danger to the rights of some, would be sacrificing the
end to the means. The rich man who enters into Society along with the poor
man, gives up more than the poor man, yet with an equal vote he is equally
safe. Were he to have more votes than the poor man in proportion to his
superior stake the rights of the poor man would immediately cease to be
secure. This consideration prevailed when the articles of Confederation
were formed.[118]
[118] According to Yates, Madison followed Sherman: "Mr. Madison. There is
danger in the idea of the gentleman from Connecticut. Unjust representation will
ever produce it. In the United Netherlands, Holland governs the whole, although
she has only one vote. The counties in Virginia are exceedingly disproportionate,
and yet the smaller has an equal vote with the greater, and no inconvenience
arises."—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 182.
The determination of the question from striking out the word "not" was
put off till tomorrow at the request of the Deputies of N. York.
Docr Franklin. Mr President.
The small progress we have made after 4 or five weeks close attendance
& continual reasonings with each other—our different sentiments on almost
every question, several of the last producing as many noes as ays, is
methinks a melancholy proof of the imperfection of the Human
Understanding. We indeed seem to feel our own want of political wisdom,
since we have been running about in search of it. We have gone back to
ancient history for models of Government, and examined the different
forms of those Republics which having been formed with the seeds of their
own dissolution now no longer exist. And we have viewed Modern States
all round Europe, but find none of their Constitutions suitable to our
circumstances.
In this situation of this Assembly, groping as it were in the dark to find
political truth, and scarce able to distinguish it when presented to us, how
has it happened, Sir, that we have not hitherto once thought of humbly
applying to the Father of lights to illuminate our understandings? In the
beginning of the Contest with G. Britain, when we were sensible of danger
we had daily prayer in this room for the divine protection.—Our prayers,
Sir, were heard, & they were graciously answered. All of us who were
engaged in the struggle must have observed frequent instances of a
superintending providence in our favor. To that kind providence we owe
this happy opportunity of consulting in peace on the means of establishing
our future national felicity. And have we now forgotten that powerful
friend? or do we imagine that we no longer need his assistance? I have
lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I
see of this truth—that God Governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow
cannot fall to the ground without his notice, is it probable that an empire
can rise without his aid? We have been assured, Sir, in the sacred writings
that "except the Lord build the House they labour in vain that build it." I
firmly believe this; and I also believe that without his concurring aid we
shall succeed in this political building no better than the Builders of Babel:
We shall be divided by our little partial local interests; our projects will be
confounded, and we ourselves shall become a reproach and bye word down
to future ages. And what is worse, mankind may hereafter from this
unfortunate instance, despair of establishing Governments by Human
wisdom and leave it to chance, war and conquest.
I therefore beg leave to move—that henceforth prayers imploring the
assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held in this
Assembly every morning before we proceed to business, and that one or
more of the Clergy of this City be requested to officiate in that Service—
Mr Sherman seconded the motion.
Mr Hamilton & several others expressed their apprehensions that
however proper such a resolution might have been at the beginning of the
convention, it might at this late day, 1. bring on it some disagreeable
animadversions, & 2. lead the public to believe that the embarrassments and
dissensions within the Convention, had suggested this measure. It was
answered by Docr F. Mr Sherman & others, that the past omission of a duty
could not justify a further omission—that the rejection of such a proposition
would expose the Convention to more unpleasant animadversions than the
adoption of it: and that the alarm out of doors that might be excited for the
state of things within, would at least be as likely to do good as ill.
Mr Williamson, observed that the true cause of the omission could not be
mistaken. The Convention had no funds.
Mr Randolph proposed in order to give a favorable aspect to ye measure,
that a sermon be preached at the request of the convention on 4th of July, the
anniversary of Independence; & thenceforward prayers be used in ye
Convention every morning. Dr Frankn 2ded this motion. After several
unsuccessful attempts for silently postponing this matter by adjourng the
adjournment was at length carried, without any vote on the motion.
F      J    29      C         .
Docr Johnson. The controversy must be endless whilst Gentlemen differ
in the grounds of their arguments; Those on one side considering the States
as districts of people composing one political Society; those on the other
considering them as so many political societies. The fact is that the States
do exist as political Societies, and a Govt is to be formed for them in their
political capacity, as well as for the individuals composing them. Does it
not seem to follow, that if the States as such are to exist they must be armed
with some power of self-defence. This is the idea of (Col. Mason) who
appears to have looked to the bottom of this matter. Besides the aristocratic
and other interests, which ought to have the means of defending themselves,
the States have their interests as such, and are equally entitled to like means.
On the whole he thought that as in some respects the States are to be
considered in their political capacity, and in others as districts of individual
citizens the two ideas embraced on different sides, instead of being opposed
to each other, ought to be combined; that in one branch the people, ought to
be represented, in the other the States.
Mr Ghoram. The States as now confederated have no doubt a right to
refuse to be consolidated, or to be formed into any new system. But he
wished the small States which seemed most ready to object, to consider
which are to give up most, they or the larger ones. He conceived that a
rupture of the Union wd be an event unhappy for all, but surely the large
States would be least unable to take care of themselves, and to make
connections with one another. The weak therefore were most interested in
establishing some general system for maintaining order. If among
individuals, composed partly of weak, and partly of strong, the former most
need the protection of law & Government, the case is exactly the same with
weak & powerful States. What would be the situation of Delaware (for
these things he found must be spoken out, & it might as well be done at first
as last) what wd be the situation of Delaware in case of a separation of the
States? Would she not be at the mercy of Pennsylvania? would not her true
interest lie in being consolidated with her, and ought she not now to wish
for such a union with Pa under one Govt as will put it out of the power of
Pena to oppress her? Nothing can be more ideal than the danger
apprehended by the States from their being formed into one nation. Massts
was originally three colonies, viz old Massts Plymouth—& the province of
Mayne. These apprehensions existed then. An incorporation took place; all
parties were safe & satisfied; and every distinction is now forgotten. The
case was similar with Connecticut & New haven. The dread of Union was
reciprocal; the consequence of it equally salutary and satisfactory. In like
manner N. Jersey has been made one society out of two parts. Should a
separation of the States take place, the fate of N. Jersey wd be worst of all.
She has no foreign commerce & can have but little. Pa & N. York will
continue to levy taxes on her consumption. If she consults her interest she
wd beg of all things to be annihilated. The apprehensions of the small States
ought to be appeased by another reflection Massts will be divided. The
province of Maine is already considered as approaching the term of its
annexation to it; and Pa will probably not increase, considering the present
state of her population, & other events that may happen. On the whole he
considered a Union of the States as necessary to their happiness, & a firm
Genl Govt as necessary to their Union. He shd consider it as his duty if his
colleagues viewed the matter in the same light he did to stay here as long as
any other State would remain with them, in order to agree on some plan that
could with propriety be recommended to the people.
Mr Elseworth, did not despair. He still trusted that some good plan of
Govt wd be devised & adopted.
Mr Read. He shd have no objection to the system if it were truly national,
but it has too much of a federal mixture in it. The little States he thought
had not much to fear. He suspected that the large States felt their want of
energy, & wished for a Genl Govt to supply the defect. Massts was evidently
labouring under her weakness and he believed Delaware wd not be in much
danger if in her neighbourhood. Delaware had enjoyed tranquillity & he
flattered himself wd continue to do so. He was not however so selfish as not
to wish for a good Genl Govt. In order to obtain one the whole States must
be incorporated. If the States remain, the representatives of the large ones
will stick together, and carry everything before them. The Executive also
will be chosen under the influence of this partiality, and will betray it in his
administration. These jealousies are inseparable from the scheme of leaving
the States in existence. They must be done away. The ungranted lands also
which have been assumed by particular States must also be given up. He
repeated his approbation of the plan of Mr Hamilton, & wished it to be
substituted in the place of that on the table.
Mr Madison agreed with Docr Johnson, that the mixed nature of the Govt
ought to be kept in view; but thought too much stress was laid on the rank
of the States as political societies. There was a gradation, he observed from
the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to the largest empire
with the most perfect sovereignty. He pointed out the limitations on the
sovereignty of the States, as now confederated their laws in relation to the
paramount law of the Confederacy were analagous to that of bye laws to the
supreme law within a State. Under the proposed Govt the powers of the
States will be much farther reduced. According to the views of every
member, the Genl Govt will have powers far beyond those exercised by the
British Parliament, when the States were part of the British Empire. It will
in particular have the power, without the consent of the State Legislatures,
to levy money directly on the people themselves; and therefore not to divest
such unequal portions of the people as composed the several States, of an
equal voice, would subject the system to the reproaches & evils which have
resulted from the vicious representation in G. B.
He entreated the gentlemen representing the small States to renounce a
principle wch was confessedly unjust, which cd never be admitted, & if
admitted must infuse mortality into a Constitution which we wished to last
forever. He prayed them to ponder well the consequences of suffering the
Confederacy to go to pieces. It had been sd that the want of energy in the
large states wd be a security to the small. It was forgotten that this want of
energy proceeded from the supposed security of the States agst all external
danger. Let each state depend on itself for its security, & let apprehensions
arise of danger, from distant powers or from neighbouring States, & the
languishing condition of all the States, large as well as small, wd soon be
transformed into vigorous & high toned Govts. His great fear was that their
Govts wd then have too much energy, that these might not only be
formidable in the large to the small States, but fatal to the internal liberty of
all. The same causes which have rendered the old world the Theatre of
incessant wars, & have banished liberty from the face of it, wd soon
produce the same effects here. The weakness & jealousy of the small States
wd quickly introduce some regular military force agst sudden danger from
their powerful neighbours. The example wd be followed by others, and wd
soon become universal. In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are
constantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of war,
has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing
military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe
companions to liberty. The means of defence agst foreign danger, have been
always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a
standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended.
Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending,
have enslaved the people. It is perhaps questionable, whether the best
concerted system of absolute power in Europe cd maintain itself, in a
situation, where no alarms of external danger cd tame the people to the
domestic yoke. The insular situation of G. Britain was the principal cause of
her being an exception to the general fate of Europe. It has rendered less
defence necessary, and admitted a kind of defence wch cd not be used for the
purpose of oppression.—These consequences he conceived ought to be
apprehended whether the States should run into a total separation from each
other, or shd enter into partial confederacies. Either event wd be truly
deplorable; & those who might be accessary to either, could never be
forgiven by their Country, nor by themselves.
[119]Mr Hamilton observed that individuals forming political Societies
modify their rights differently with regard to suffrage. Examples of it are
found in all the States. In all of them some individuals are deprived of the
right altogether, not having the requisite qualification of property. In some
of the States the right of suffrage is allowed in some cases and refused in
others. To vote for a member in one branch, a certain quantum of property,
to vote for a member in another branch of the Legislature, a higher quantum
of property is required. In like manner States may modify their right of
suffrage differently, the larger exercising a larger, the smaller a smaller
share of it. But as States are a collection of individual men which ought we
to respect most, the rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial
beings resulting from the composition. Nothing could be more preposterous
or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been sd that if the
smaller States renounce their equality, they renounce at the same time their
liberty. The truth is it is a contest for power, not for liberty. Will the men
composing the small States be less free than those composing the larger.
The State of Delaware having 40,000 souls will lose power, if she has 1/10
only of the votes allowed to Pa having 400,000: but will the people of Del:
be less free, if each citizen has an equal vote with each citizen of Pa He
admitted that common residence within the same State would produce a
certain degree of attachment; and that this principle might have a certain
influence in public affairs. He thought however that this might by some
precautions be in a great measure excluded: and that no material
inconvenience could result from it, as there could not be any ground for
combination among the States whose influence was most dreaded. The only
considerable distinction of interests, lay between the carrying & non-
carrying States, which divides instead of uniting the largest States. No
considerable inconvenience had been found from the division of the State of
N. York into different districts of different sizes.
[119] From this date he was absent till the —— of ——.—Madison's Note.
Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the Union, and the
establishment of partial confederacies, had been pointed out. He would add
another of a most serious nature. Alliances will immediately be formed with
different rival & hostile nations of Europes, who will foment disturbances
among ourselves, and make us parties to all their own quarrels. Foreign
Nations having American dominion are & must be jealous of us. Their
representatives betray the utmost anxiety for our fate, & for the result of
this meeting, which must have an essential influence on it.—It had been
said that respectability in the eyes of foreign Nations was not the object at
which we aimed; that the proper object of republican Government was
domestic tranquillity & happiness. This was an ideal distinction. No
Government could give us tranquillity & happiness at home, which did not
possess sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable abroad. This
was the critical moment for forming such a Government. We should run
every risk in trusting to future amendments. As yet we retain the habits of
union. We are weak & sensible of our weakness. Henceforward the motives
will become feebler, and the difficulties greater. It is a miracle that we were
now here exercising our tranquil & free deliberations on the subject. It
would be madness to trust to future miracles. A thousand causes must
obstruct a reproduction of them.
Mr Pierce considered the equality of votes under the Confederation as
the great source of the public difficulties. The members of Congs were
advocates for local advantages. State distinctions must be sacrificed as far
as the general good required, but without destroying the States. Tho' from a
small State he felt himself a Citizen of the U. S.
Mr Gerry, urged that we never were independent States, were not such
now, & never could be even on the principles of the Confederation. The
States & the advocates for them were intoxicated with the idea of their
sovereignty. He was a member of Congress at the time the federal articles
were formed. The injustice of allowing each State an equal vote was long
insisted on. He voted for it, but it was agst his Judgment, and under the
pressure of public danger, and the obstinacy of the lesser States. The present
Confederation he considered as dissolving. The fate of the Union will be
decided by the Convention. If they do not agree on something, few
delegates will probably be appointed to Congs. If they do Congs will
probably be kept up till the new System should be adopted. He lamented
that instead of coming here like a band of brothers, belonging to the same
family, we seemed to have brought with us the spirit of political negotiators.
Mr L. Martin remarked that the language of the States being sovereign &
independent, was once familiar & understood; though it seemed now so
strange & obscure. He read those passages in the articles of Confederation,
which describe them in that language.
On the question as moved by Mr Lansing. Shall the word "not" be struck
out.
Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md divd. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the motion to agree to the clause as reported, "that the rule of
suffrage in the 1st branch ought not to be according to that established by
the Articles of the Confederation
Mass. ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md divd. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Docr Johnson & Mr Elseworth moved to postpone the residue of the
clause, & take up ye 8 Resol:
On question
Mas. no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Elseworth moved that the rule of suffrage in the 2d branch be the
same with that established by the articles of Confederation. "He was not
sorry on the whole he said that the vote just passed, had determined against
this rule in the first branch. He hoped it would become a ground of
compromise with regard to the 2d branch. We were partly national; partly
federal. The proportional representation in the first branch was conformable
to the national principle & would secure the large States agst the small. An
equality of voices was conformable to the federal principle and was
necessary to secure the Small States agst the large. He trusted that on this
middle ground a compromise would take place. He did not see that it could
on any other. And if no compromise should take place, our meeting would
not only be in vain but worse than in vain. To the Eastward he was sure
Massts was the only State that would listen to a proposition for excluding
the States as equal political Societies, from an equal voice in both branches.
The others would risk every consequence rather than part with so dear a
right. An attempt to deprive them of it, was at once cutting the body of
America in two, and as he supposed would be the case, somewhere about
this part of it. The large States he conceived would notwithstanding the
equality of votes, have an influence that would maintain their superiority.
Holland, as had been admitted (by Mr Madison) had, notwithstanding a like
equality in the Dutch Confederacy, a prevailing influence in the public
measures. The power of self defence was essential to the small States.
Nature had given it to the smallest insect of the creation. He could never
admit that there was no danger of combinations among the large States.
They will like individuals find out and avail themselves of the advantage to
be gained by it. It was true the danger would be greater if they were
contiguous and had a more immediate common interest. A defensive
combination of the small States was rendered more difficult by their great
number. He would mention another consideration of great weight. The
existing confederation was founded on the equality of the States in the
article of suffrage: was it meant to pay no regard to this antecedent plighted
faith. Let a strong Executive, a Judiciary & Legislative power be created,
but Let not too much be attempted; by which all may be lost. He was not in
general a half-way man, yet he preferred doing half the good we could,
rather than do nothing at all. The other half may be added, when the
necessity shall be more fully experienced.[120]
[120] In King's Notes another speech of Madison's is given after Ellsworth's:
"Madison. One Gentleman from Connecticut has proposed doing as
much as is prudent now, leaving future amendments to Posterity,—this is a
dangerous doctrine. The Defects of the Amphictionic League were
acknowledged, but were reformed. The Netherlands have four times
attempted to make amendments in their Confederation, but have failed in
each attempt. The Fear of innovation, the hue & Cry in favour of the
Liberty of the People will as they have done prevent the necessary Reforms.
If the States have equal Votes & influence in the Senate we shall be in the
utmost danger, the minority of the People will govern the majority.
Delaware during the late war opposed and defeated an Embargo, to which
twelve States had agreed, and continued to supply the enemy with
Provisions in time of war."—King's Life and Times of Rufus King, i., 612.
Mr Baldwin[121] could have wished that the powers of the General
Legislature had been defined, before the mode of constituting it had been
agitated. He should vote against the motion of Mr Elseworth, tho. he did not
like the Resolution as it stood in the Report of the Committee of the whole.
He thought the second branch ought to be the representation of property,
and that in forming it therefore some reference ought to be had to the
relative wealth of their Constituents, and to the principles on which the
Senate of Massts was constituted. He concurred with those who thought it
wd be impossible for the Genl Legislature to extend its cares to the local
matters of the States.[122] Adjd.
[121] "Mr. Baldwin is a Gentleman of superior abilities, and joins in a public
debate with great art and eloquence. Having laid the foundation of a compleat
classical education at Harvard College, he pursues every other study with ease.
He is well acquainted with Books and Characters, and has an accommodating
turn of mind, which enables him to gain the confidence of Men, and to
understand them. He is a practising Attorney in Georgia, and has been twice a
Member of Congress. Mr. Baldwin is about 38 years of age."—Pierce's Notes
Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 333.
[122] According to Yates, after Baldwin spoke:
"Mr. Madison. I would always exclude inconsistent principles in framing
a system of government. The difficulty of getting its defects amended are
great and sometimes insurmountable. The Virginia state government was
the first which was made, and though its defects are evident to every
person, we cannot get it amended. The Dutch have made four several
attempts to amend their system without success. The few alterations made
in it were by tumult and faction, and for the worse. If there was real danger,
I would give the smaller states the defensive weapons—But there is none
from that quarter. The great danger to our general government is the great
southern and northern interests of the continent, being opposed to each
other. Look to the votes in congress, and most of them stand divided by the
geography of the country, not according to the size of the states.
"Suppose the first branch granted money, may not the second branch,
from state views, counteract the first? In congress, the single state of
Delaware prevented an embargo, at the time that all the other states thought
it absolutely necessary for the support of the army. Other powers, and those
very essential, besides the legislative, will be given to the second branch—
such as the negativing all state laws. I would compromise on this question,
if I could do it on correct principles, but otherwise not—if the old fabric of
the confederation must be the groundwork of the new, we must fall."—
Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 189.
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Mr Brearly moved that the Presidt write to the Executive of
N. Hampshire, informing it that the business depending before the
Convention was of such a nature as to require the immediate attendance of
the deputies of that State. In support of his motion he observed that the
difficulties of the subject and the diversity of opinions called for all the
assistance we could possibly obtain, (it was well understood that the object
was to add N. Hampshire to the no of States opposed to the doctrine of
proportional representation, which it was presumed from her relative size
she must be adverse to).
Mr Patterson seconded the motion.
Mr Rutlidge could see neither the necessity nor propriety of such a
measure. They are not unapprized of the meeting, and can attend if they
choose. Rho. Island might as well be urged to appoint & send deputies. Are
we to suspend the business until the deputies arrive? if we proceed he hoped
all the great points would be adjusted before the letter could produce its
effect.
Mr King, said he had written more than once as a private correspondent,
& the answers gave him every reason to expect that State would be
represented very shortly, if it shd be so at all. Circumstances of a personal
nature had hitherto prevented it. A letter cd have no effect.
Mr Wilson wished to know whether it would be consistent with the rule
or reason of secrecy, to communicate to N. Hampshire that the business was
of such a nature as the motion described. It wd spread a great alarm. Besides
he doubted the propriety of soliciting any State on the subject; the meeting
being merely voluntary—on motion of Mr Brearly Masts no. Cont no.
N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa not on ye floor. Del. not on floor. Md divd Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not on floor.
The motion of Mr Elseworth resumed for allowing each State an equal
vote in ye 2d branch.
Mr Wilson did not expect such a motion after the establishment of ye
contrary principle in the 1st branch; and considering the reasons which
would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed in the 1st branch.
The Gentleman from Connecticut (Mr Elseworth) had pronounced that if
the motion should not be acceded to, of all the States North of Pena one
only would agree to any Genl Government. He entertained more favorable
hopes of Connt and of the other Northern States. He hoped the alarms
exceeded their cause, and that they would not abandon a Country to which
they were bound by so many strong and endearing ties. But should the
deplored event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty.
If the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the
majority on just and proper principles, if a separation must take place, it
could never happen on better grounds. The votes of yesterday agst the just
principle of representation, were as 22 to 90 of the people of America.
Taking the opinions to be the same on this point, and he was sure if there
was any room for change, it could not be on the side of the majority, the
question will be shall less than 1/4 of the U. States withdraw themselves
from the Union; or shall more than 3/4 renounce the inherent, indisputable
and unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial systems of States. If
issue must be joined, it was on this point he would chuse to join it. The
Gentleman from Connecticut in supposing that the preponderancy secured
to the majority in the 1st branch had removed the objections to an equality
of votes in the 2d branch for the security of the minority, narrowed the case
extremely. Such an equality will enable the minority to controul in all cases
whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven States will
controul six: Seven States, according to the estimates that had been used,
composed 24/90 of the whole people. It would be in the power then of less
than 1/3 to overrule 2/3 whenever a question should happen to divide the
States in that manner. Can we forget for whom we are forming a
Government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called States? Will
our honest Constituents be satisfied with metaphysical distinctions? Will
they, ought they to be satisfied with being told, that the one-third compose
the greater number of States? The rule of suffrage ought on every principle
to be the same in the 2d as in the 1st branch. If the Government be not laid
on this foundation, it can be neither solid nor lasting. Any other principle
will be local, confined & temporary. This will expand with the expansion,
and grow with the growth of the U. States.—Much has been said of an
imaginary combination of three States. Sometimes a danger of monarchy,
sometimes of aristocracy has been charged on it. No explanation however
of the danger has been vouchsafed. It would be easy to prove both from
reason & history that rivalships would be more probable than coalitions;
and that there are no coinciding interests that could produce the latter. No
answer has yet been given to the observations of (Mr Madison) on this
subject. Should the Executive Magistrate be taken from one of the large
States would not the other two be thereby thrown into the scale with the
other States? Whence then the danger of monarchy? Are the people of the
three large States more aristocratic than those of the small ones? Whence
then the danger of aristocracy from their influence? It is all a mere illusion
of names. We talk of States, till we forget what they are composed of. Is a
real & fair majority, the natural hot-bed of aristocracy? It is a part of the
definition of this species of Govt or rather of tyranny, that the smaller
number governs the greater. It is true that a majority of States in the 2d
branch cannot carry a law agst a majority of the people in the 1st. But this
removes half only of the objection. Bad Governts are of two sorts. 1. that
which does too little. 2. that which does too much: that which fails thro'
weakness; and that which destroys thro' oppression. Under which of these
evils do the U. States at present groan? Under the weakness and
inefficiency of its Governt. To remedy this weakness we have been sent to
this Convention. If the motion should be agreed to, we shall leave the U.
S. fettered precisely as heretofore; with the additional mortification of
seeing the good purposes of ye fair representation of the people in the 1st
branch, defeated in the 2d. Twenty four will still controul sixty six. He
lamented that such a disagreement should prevail on the point of
representation, as he did not foresee that it would happen on the other point
most contested, the boundary between the Genl & the local authorities. He
thought the States necessary & valuable parts of a good system.
Mr Elseworth. The capital objection of Mr Wilson, "that the minority
will rule the majority" is not true. The power is given to the few to save
them from being destroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had been
given to them in both branches, the objection might have had weight. Is it a
novel thing that the few should have a check on the many? Is it not the case
in the British Constitution the wisdom of which so many gentlemen have
united in applauding? Have not the House of Lords, who form so small a
proportion of the nation a negative on the laws, as a necessary defence of
their peculiar rights agst the encroachmts of the Commons. No instance of a
Confederacy has existed in which an equality of voices has not been
exercised by the members of it. We are running from one extreme to
another. We are razing the foundations of the building, when we need only
repair the roof. No salutary measure has been lost for want of a majority of
the States, to favor it. If security be all that the great States wish for the 1st
branch secures them. The danger of combinations among them is not
imaginary. Altho' no particular abuses could be foreseen by him, the
possibility of them would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could easily
conceive cases in which they might result from such combinations. Suppose
that in pursuance of some commercial treaty or arrangement, three or four
free ports & no more were to be established would not combinations be
formed in favor of Boston—Philada & some port of the Chesapeak? A like
concert might be formed in the appointment of the Great officers. He
appealed again to the obligations of the federal pact which was still in force,
and which had been entered into with so much solemnity; persuading
himself that some regard would still be paid to the plighted faith under
which each State small as well as great, held an equal right of suffrage in
the general Councils. His remarks were not the result of partial or local
views. The State he represented (Connecticut) held a middle rank.
Mr Madison did justice to the able and close reasoning of Mr E. but must
observe that it did not always accord with itself. On another occasion, the
large States were described by him as the Aristocratic States, ready to
oppress the small. Now the Small are the House of Lords requiring a
negative to defend them agst the more numerous Commons. Mr E. had also
erred in saying that no instance had existed in which confederated States
had not retained to themselves a perfect equality of suffrage. Passing over
the German system in which the K. of Prussia has nine voices, he reminded
Mr E. of the Lycian Confederacy, in which the component members had
votes proportioned to their importance, and which Montesquieu
recommends as the fittest model for that form of Government. Had the fact
been as stated by Mr E. it would have been of little avail to him, or rather
would have strengthened the arguments agst him; the History & fate of the
several confederacies modern as well as Antient, demonstrating some
radical vice in their structure. In reply to the appeal of Mr E. to the faith
plighted in the existing federal compact, he remarked that the party
claiming from others an adherence to a common engagement ought at least
to be guiltless itself of a violation. Of all the States however Connecticut
was perhaps least able to urge this plea. Besides the various omissions to
perform the stipulated acts from which no State was free, the Legislature of
that State had by a pretty recent vote, positively refused to pass a law for
complying with the Requisitions of Congs, and had transmitted a copy of
the vote to Congs. It was urged, he said, continually that an equality of votes
in the 2d branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but would be
perfectly safe to the large ones whose majority in the 1st branch was an
effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence, the majority
of States might still injure the majority of people. 1. they could obstruct the
wishes and interests of the majority. 2. they could extort measures
repugnant to the wishes & interest of the Majority. 3. they could impose
measures adverse thereto; as the 2d branch will prob[~l]y exercise some
great powers, in which the 1st will not participate. He admitted that every
peculiar interest whether in any class of Citizens, or any description of
States, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of
attack there ought to be given a Constitutional power of defence. But he
contended that the States were divided into different interests not by their
difference of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which
resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having
or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great
division of interests in the U. States. It did not lie between the large & small
States: It lay between the Northern & Southern. And if any defensive power
were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these two interests. He was
so strongly impressed with this important truth that he had been casting
about in his mind for some expedient that would answer the purpose. The
one which had occurred was that instead of proportioning the votes of the
States in both branches, to their respective numbers of inhabitants
computing the slaves in the ratio of 5 to 3, they should be represented in
one branch according to the number of free inhabitants only; and in the
other according to the whole no counting the slaves as free. By this
arrangement the Southern Scale would have the advantage in one House,
and the Northern in the other. He had been restrained from proposing this
expedient by two considerations: one was his unwillingness to urge any
diversity of interests on an occasion where it is but too apt to arise of itself
—the other was, the inequality of powers that must be vested in the two
branches, and which wd destroy the equilibrium of interests.
Mr Elseworth assured the House that whatever might be thought of the
Representatives of Connecticut the State was entirely federal in her
disposition. He appealed to her great exertions during the war, in supplying
both men & money. The muster rolls would show she had more troops in
the field than Virga. If she had been Delinquent, it had been from inability,
and not more so than other States.
Mr Sherman. Mr Madison had animadverted on the delinquency of the
States, when his object required him to prove that the Constitution of Congs
was faulty. Congs is not to blame for the faults of the States. Their measures
have been right, and the only thing wanting has been, a further power in
Congs to render them effectual.
Mr Davy was much embarrassed and wished for explanations. The
Report of the Committee allowing the Legislatures to choose the Senate,
and establishing a proportional representation in it, seemed to be
impracticable. There will according to this rule be ninety members in the
outset, and the number will increase as new States are added. It was
impossible that so numerous a body could possess the activity and other
qualities required in it. Were he to vote on the comparative merits of the
report as it stood, and the amendment, he should be constrained to prefer
the latter. The appointment of the Senate by electors chosen by the people
for that purpose was he conceived liable to an insuperable difficulty. The
larger Counties or districts thrown into a general district, would certainly
prevail over the smaller Counties or Districts, and merit in the latter would
be excluded altogether. The report therefore seemed to be right in referring
the appointment to the Legislatures, whose agency in the general System
did not appear to him objectionable as it did to some others. The fact was
that the local prejudices & interests which could not be denied to exist,
would find their way into the national Councils whether the Representatives
should be chosen by the Legislatures or by the people themselves. On the
other hand if a proportional representation was attended with insuperable
difficulties, the making the Senate the Representative of the States, looked
like bringing us back to Congs again, and shutting out all the advantages
expected from it. Under this view of the subject he could not vote for any
plan for the Senate yet proposed. He thought that in general there were
extremes on both sides. We were partly federal, partly national in our
Union, and he did not see why the Govt might not in some respects operate
on the States, in others on the people.
Mr Wilson admitted the question concerning the number of Senators, to
be embarrassing. If the smallest States be allowed one, and the others in
proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous. He looked forward to
the time when the smallest States will contain 100,000 souls at least. Let
there be then one Senator in each for every 100,000 souls and let the States
not having that no of inhabitants be allowed one. He was willing himself to
submit to this temporary concession to the small States; and threw out the
idea as a ground of compromise.
Docr Franklin. The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If a
proportional representation takes place, the small States contend that their
liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be put in its place, the
large States say their money will be in danger. When a broad table is to be
made, and the edges of planks do not fit, the artist takes a little from both,
and makes a good joint. In like manner here both sides must part with some
of their demands, in order that they may join in some accommodating
proposition. He had prepared one which he would read, that it might lie on
the table for consideration. The proposition was in the words following
"That the Legislatures of the several States shall choose & send an
equal number of Delegates, namely —— who are to compose the 2d
branch of the General Legislature—
That in all cases or questions wherein the Sovereignty of individual
States may be affected, or whereby their authority over their own
Citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the General
Government within the several States augmented, each State shall have
equal suffrage.
That in the appointment of all Civil officers of ye Genl Govt in the
election of whom the 2d branch may by the Constitution have part,
each State shall have equal suffrage.
That in fixing the Salaries of such Officers, and in all allowances for
public services, and generally in all appropriations & dispositions of
money to be drawn out of the general Treasury; and in all laws for
supplying that Treasury, the Delegates of the several States shall have
suffrage in proportion to the Sums which their respective States do
actually contribute to the Treasury." Where a ship had many owners
this was the rule of deciding on her expedition. He had been one of the
Ministers from this Country to France during the joint war and wd
have been very glad if allowed a vote in distributing the money to
carry it on.
Mr King observed that the simple question was whether each State
should have an equal vote in the 2d branch; that it must be apparent to those
Gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this equality, nor the report as
it stood, that the report was as susceptible of melioration as the motion; that
a reform would be nugatory & nominal only if we should make another
Congress of the proposed Senate: that if the adherence to an equality of
votes was fixed & unalterable, there could not be less obstinacy on the other
side, & that we were in fact cut asunder already, and it was in vain to shut
our eyes against it: that he was however filled with astonishment that if we
were convinced that every man in America was secured in all his rights, we
should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good to the Phantom of State
sovereignty: that his feelings were more harrowed & his fears more agitated
for his Country than he could express, that he conceived this to be the last
opportunity of providing for its liberty & happiness: that he could not
therefore but repeat his amazement that when a just governt founded on a
fair representation of the people of America was within our reach, we
should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal freedom &
importance of States: that should this wonderful illusion continue to prevail,
his mind was prepared for every event, rather than to sit down under a Govt
founded in a vicious principle of representation, and which must be as short
lived as it would be unjust. He might prevail on himself to accede to some
such expedient as had been hinted by Mr Wilson; but he never could listen
to an equality of votes as proposed in the motion.
Mr Dayton. When assertion is given for proof, and terror substituted for
argument, he presumed they would have no effect however eloquently
spoken. It should have been shewn that the evils we have experienced have
proceeded from the equality now objected to; and that the seeds of
dissolution for the State Governments are not sown in the Genl
Government. He considered the system on the table as a novelty, an
amphibious monster; and was persuaded that it never would be recd by the
people. Mr Martin wd never confederate if it could not be done on just
principles.
Mr Madison would acquiesce in the concession hinted by Mr Wilson, on
condition that a due independence should be given to the Senate. The plan
in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent on the States.
The Senate therefore is only another edition of Congs. He knew the faults of
that Body & had used a bold language agst it. Still he would preserve the
State rights, as carefully as the trials by jury.
Mr Bedford, contended that there was no middle way between a perfect
consolidation and a mere confederacy of the States. The first is out of the
question, and in the latter they must continue if not perfectly, yet equally
sovereign. If political Societies possess ambition avarice, and all the other
passions which render them formidable to each other, ought we not to view
them in this light here? Will not the same motives operate in America as
elsewhere? If any gentleman doubts it let him look at the votes. Have they
not been dictated by interest, by ambition? Are not the large States
evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the small?
They think no doubt that they have right on their side, but interest had
blinded their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small State at present, she is
actuated by the prospect of soon being a great one. S. Carolina is actuated
both by present interest & future prospects. She hopes too to see the other
States cut down to her own dimensions. N. Carolina has the same motives
of present & future interest. Virga follows. Maryd is not on that side of the
Question. Pena has a direct and future interest. Massts has a decided and
palpable interest in the part she takes. Can it be expected that the small
States will act from pure disinterestedness. Look at G. Britain. Is the
Representation there less unequal? But we shall be told again that that is the
rotten part of the Constitution. Have not the boroughs however held fast
their constitutional rights? And are we to act with greater purity than the
rest of mankind. An exact proportion in the Representation is not preserved
in any one of the States. Will it be said that an inequality of power will not
result from an inequality of votes. Give the opportunity, and ambition will
not fail to abuse it. The whole History of mankind proves it. The three large
States have a common interest to bind them together in commerce. But
whether a combination as we suppose, or a competition as others suppose,
shall take place among them, in either case, the small States must be ruined.
We must like Solon make such a Governt as the people will approve. Will
the smaller States ever agree to the proposed degradation of them. It is not
true that the people will not agree to enlarge the powers of the present
Congs. The language of the people has been that Congs ought to have the
power of collecting an impost, and of coercing the States where it may be
necessary. On The first point they have been explicit &, in a manner,
unanimous in their declarations. And must they not agree to this & similar
measures if they ever mean to discharge their engagements. The little States
are willing to observe their engagements, but will meet the large ones on no
ground but that of the Confederation. We have been told with a dictatorial
air that this is the last moment for a fair trial in favor of a Good Governmt.
It will be the last indeed if the propositions reported from the Committee go
forth to the people. He was under no apprehensions. The Large States dare
not dissolve the Confederation. If they do the small ones will find some
foreign ally of more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand
and do them justice. He did not mean by this to intimidate or alarm. It was a
natural consequence, which ought to be avoided by enlarging the federal
powers not annihilating the federal system. This is what the people expect.
All agree in the necessity of a more efficient Govt and why not make such
an one as they desire.
Mr Elseworth. Under a National Govt he should participate in the
National Security, as remarked by (Mr King) but that was all. What he
wanted was domestic happiness. The Natl Govt could not descend to the
local objects on which this depended. It could only embrace objects of a
general nature. He turned his eyes therefore for the preservation of his
rights to the State Govts. From these alone he could derive the greatest
happiness he expects in this life. His happiness depends on their existence,
as much as a new born infant on its mother for nourishment. If this
reasoning was not satisfactory, he had nothing to add that could be so.
Mr King was for preserving the States in a subordinate degree, and as far
as they could be necessary for the purposes stated by Mr Elseworth. He did
not think a full answer had been given to those who apprehended a
dangerous encroachment on their jurisdictions. Expedients might be devised
as he conceived that would give them all the security the nature of things
would admit of. In the establisht of Societies the Constitution was to the
Legislature what the laws were to individuals. As the fundamental rights of
individuals are secured by express provisions in the State Constitutions;
why may not a like security be provided for the Rights of States in the
National Constitution. The articles of Union between Engld & Scotland
furnish an example of such a provision in favor of sundry rights of
Scotland. When that Union was in agitation, the same language of
apprehension which has been heard from the smaller States, was in the
mouths of the Scotch patriots. The articles however have not been violated
and the Scotch have found an increase of prosperity & happiness. He was
aware that this will be called a mere paper security. He thought it a
sufficient answer to say that if fundamental articles of compact, are no
sufficient defence against physical power, neither will there be any safety
agst it if there be no compact. He could not sit down, without taking some
notice of the language of the honorable gentleman from Delaware (Mr
Bedford). It was not he that had uttered a dictatorial language. This
intemperance had marked the honorable Gentleman himself. It was not he
who with a vehemence unprecedented in that House, had declared himself
ready to turn his hopes from our common Country, and court the protection
of some foreign hand. This too was the language of the Honbl member
himself. He was grieved that such a thought had entered into his heart. He
was more grieved that such an expression had dropped from his lips. The
gentleman cd only excuse it to himself on the score of passion. For himself
whatever might be his distress, he wd never court relief from a foreign
power.
Adjourned.
M      J    2     C         .
On the question for allowing each State one vote in the second branch as
moved by Mr Elseworth, Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no.
Del. ay. Md ay. Mr Jenifer being not present Mr Martin alone voted Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. divd. Mr Houston no. Mr Baldwin ay.
Mr Pinkney thought an equality of votes in the 2d branch inadmissible.
At the same time candor obliged him to admit that the large States would
feel a partiality for their own Citizens & give them a preference, in
appointments: that they might also find some common points in their
Commercial interests, and promote treaties favorable to them. There is a
real distinction [between] the Northern & Southn interests. N. Carola
S. Carol: & Geo. in their Rice & Indigo had a peculiar interest which might
be sacrificed. How then shall the larger States be prevented from
administering the Genl Govt as they please, without being themselves
unduly subjected to the will of the smaller? By allowing them some but not
a full, proportion. He was extremely anxious that something should be
done, considering this as the last appeal to a regular experiment. Congs have
failed in almost every effort for an amendment of the federal System.
Nothing has prevented a dissolution of it, but the appointmt of this
Convention; & he could not express his alarms for the consequence of such
an event. He read his motion, to form the States into classes, with an
apportionment of Senators among them (see Art: 4, of his plan).
General Pinkney was willing the motion might be considered. He did not
entirely approve it. He liked better the motion of Docr Franklin (which see
Saturday June 30). Some Compromise seemed to be necessary, the States
being exactly divided on the question for an equality of votes in the 2d
branch. He proposed that a Committee consisting of a member from each
State should be appointed to devise & report some compromise.
Mr L. Martin had no objection to a commitment, but no modifications
whatever could reconcile the Smaller States to the least diminution of their
equal Sovereignty.
Mr Sherman. We are now at a full stop, and nobody he supposed meant
that we shd break up without doing something. A committee he thought
most likely to hit on some expedient.
[123]Mr. Govr Morris. thought a Come adviseable as the Convention had
been equally divided. He had a stronger reason also. The mode of
appointing the 2d branch tended he was sure to defeat the object of it. What
is this object? To check the precipitation, changeableness, and excesses of
the first branch. Every man of observation had seen in the democratic
branches of the State Legislatures, precipitation—in Congress
changeableness, in every department excesses agst personal liberty private
property & personal safety. What qualities are necessary to constitute a
check in this case? Abilities and virtue, are equally necessary in both
branches. Something more then is now wanted, 1. the checking branch must
have a personal interest in checking the other branch, one interest must be
opposed to another interest. Vices as they exist, must be turned agst each
other. 2. It must have great personal property, it must have the aristocratic
spirit; it must love to lord it thro' pride. Pride is indeed the great principle
that actuates both the poor & the rich. It is this principle which in the
former resists, in the latter abuses authority. 3. It should be independent. In
Religion the Creature is apt to forget its Creator. That it is otherwise in
Political Affairs, the late debates here are an unhappy proof. The
aristocratic body, should be as independent & as firm as the democratic. If
the members of it are to revert to a dependence on the democratic choice,
the democratic scale will preponderate. All the guards contrived by
America have not restrained the Senatorial branches of the Legislatures
from a servile complaisance to the democratic. If the 2d branch is to be
dependent we are better without it. To make it independent, it should be for
life. It will then do wrong, it will be said. He believed so; He hoped so. The
Rich will strive to establish their dominion & enslave the rest. They always
did. They always will. The proper security agst them is to form them into a
separate interest. The two forces will then controul each other. Let the rich
mix with the poor and in a Commercial Country, they will establish an
Oligarchy. Take away commerce, and the democracy will triumph. Thus it
has been all the world over. So it will be among us. Reason tells us we are
but men: and we are not to expect any particular interference of Heaven in
our favor. By thus combining & setting apart, the aristocratic interest, the
popular interest will be combined agst it. There will be a mutual check and
mutual security. 4. An independence for life, involves the necessary
permanency. If we change our measures nobody will trust us: and how
avoid a change of measures, but by avoiding a change of men. Ask any man
if he confides in Congs if he confides in the State of Pena if he will lend his
money or enter into contract? He will tell you no. He sees no stability. He
can repose no confidence. If G. B. were to explain her refusal to treat with
us, the same reasoning would be employed.—He disliked the exclusion of
the 2d branch from holding offices. It is dangerous. It is like the imprudent
exclusion of the military officers during the war, from civil appointments. It
deprives the Executive of the principal source of influence. If danger be
apprehended from the Executive what a left-handed way is this of obviating
it? If the son, the brother or the friend can be appointed, the danger may be
even increased, as the disqualified father &c. can then boast of a
disinterestedness which he does not possess. Besides shall the best, the most
able, the most virtuous citizens not be permitted to hold offices? Who then
are to hold them? He was also agst paying the Senators. They will pay
themselves if they can. If they can not they will be rich and can do without
it. Of such the 2d branch ought to consist; and none but such can compose it
if they are not to be paid—He contended that the Executive should appoint
the Senate & fill up vacancies. This gets rid of the difficulty in the present
question. You may begin with any ratio you please; it will come to the same
thing. The members being independt & for life, may be taken as well from
one place as from another.—It should be considered too how the scheme
could be carried through the States. He hoped there was strength of mind
eno' in this House to look truth in the face. He did not hesitate therefore to
say that loaves & fishes must bribe the Demagogues. They must be made to
expect higher offices under the general than the State Govts. A Senate for
life will be a noble bait. Without such captivating prospects, the popular
leaders will oppose & defeat the plan. He perceived that the 1st branch was
to be chosen by the people of the States; the 2d by those chosen by the
people. Is not here a Govt by the States, a Governt by Compact between
Virga in the 1st & 2d branch, Massts in the 1st & 2d branch &c. This is going
back to mere treaty. It it no Govt at all. It is altogether dependent on the
States, and will act over again the part which Congs has acted. A firm
Governt alone can protect our liberties. He fears the influence of the rich.
They will have the same effect here as elsewhere if we do not by such a
Govt keep them within their proper sphere. We should remember that the
people never act from reason alone. The Rich will take the advantage of
their passions & make these the instruments for oppressing them. The
Result of the Contest will be a violent aristocracy, or a more violent
despotism. The schemes of the Rich will be favored by the extent of the
Country. The people in such distant parts cannot communicate & act in
concert. They will be the dupes of those who have more knowledge &
intercourse. The only security agst encroachments will be a select &
sagacious body of men, instituted to watch agst them on all sides. He meant
only to hint these observations, without grounding any motion on them.
[123] He had just returned from N. Y. havg left ye Convention a few days after it
commenced business.—Madison's Note.
Mr Randolph favored the commitment though he did not expect much
benefit from the expedient. He animadverted on the warm & rash language
of Mr Bedford on Saturday; reminded the small States that if the large
States should combine some danger of which he did not deny there would
be a check in the revisionary power of the Executive, and intimated that in
order to render this still more effectual, he would agree that in the choice of
an Executive each State should have an equal vote. He was persuaded that
two such opposite bodies as Mr Morris had planned, could never long co-
exist. Dissentions would arise, as has been seen even between the Senate
and H. of Delegates in Maryland, appeals would be made to the people; and
in a little time commotions would be the result—He was far from thinking
the large States could subsist of themselves any more than the small; an
avulsion would involve the whole in ruin, and he was determined to pursue
such a scheme of Government as would secure us agst such a calamity.
Mr Strong was for the com̃itment; and hoped the mode of constituting
both branches would be referred. If they should be established on different
principles, contentions would prevail, and there would never be a
concurrence in necessary measures.
Docr Williamson. If we do not concede on both sides, our business must
soon be at an end. He approved of the com̃itment, supposing that as the
Come wd be a smaller body, a compromise would be pursued with more
coolness.
Mr Wilson objected to the Committee, because it would decide
according to that very rule of voting which was opposed on one side.
Experience in Congs had also proved the inutility of Committees consisting
of members from each State.
Mr Lansing wd not oppose the commitment, though expecting little
advantage from it.
Mr Madison opposed the Com̃itment. He had rarely seen any other effect
than delay from such Committees in Congs. Any scheme of compromise
that could be proposed in the Committee might as easily be proposed in the
House; and the report of the Committee where it contained merely the
opinion of the Come would neither shorten the discussion, nor influence the
decision of the House.
Mr Gerry was for the commitmt. Something must be done, or we shall
disappoint not only America, but the whole world. He suggested a
consideration of the State we should be thrown into by the failure of the
Union. We should be without an Umpire to decide controversies and must
be at the mercy of events. What too is to become of our treaties—what of
our foreign debts, what of our domestic? We must make concessions on
both sides. Without these the Constitutions of the several States would
never have been formed.
On the question "for com̃iting," generally:
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On the question for com̃iting it "to a member from each State,"
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The Com̃ittee elected by ballot, were Mr Gerry, Mr Elseworth, Mr Yates,
Mr Patterson, Dr Franklin, Mr Bedford, Mr Martin, Mr Mason, Mr Davy, Mr
Rutlidge, Mr. Baldwin.
That time might be given to the Com̃ittee, and to such as chose to attend
to the celebrations on the anniversary of Independence, the Convention
adjourned till Thursday.[124]
[124] "T      , July 3, 1787.
"The grand committee met. Mr. Gerry was chosen chairman.
"The committee proceeded to consider in what manner they should
discharge the business with which they were intrusted. By the proceedings
in the Convention, they were so equally divided on the important question
of representation in the two branches, that the idea of a conciliatory
adjustment must have been in contemplation of the house in the
appointment of this committee. But still, how to effect this salutory purpose
was the question. Many of the members, impressed with the utility of a
general government, connected with it the indispensable necessity of a
representation from the states according to their numbers and wealth; while
others, equally tenacious of the rights of the states, would admit of no other
representation but such as was strictly federal, or, in other words, equality
of suffrage. This brought on a discussion of the principles on which the
house had divided, and a lengthy recapitulation of the arguments advanced
in the house in support of these opposite propositions. As I had not openly
explained my sentiments on any former occasion on this question, but
constantly, in giving my vote, showed my attachment to the national
government on federal principles, I took this occasion to explain my
motives.
"These remarks gave rise to a motion of Dr. Franklin, which after some
modification was agreed to, and made the basis of the following report of
the Committee."—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 205. The report is given
by Madison.
Hamilton, who had gone to New York, wrote to Washington under date
of July 3d:
"In my passage through the Jerseys, and since my arrival here, I have
taken particular pains to discover the public sentiment, and I am more and
more convinced that this is the critical opportunity for establishing the
prosperity of this country on a solid foundation. I have conversed with men
of information, not only in this city, but from different parts of the State,
and they agree that there has been an astonishing revolution for the better in
the minds of the people.
"The prevailing apprehension among thinking men is, that the
Convention, from the fear of shocking the popular opinion, will not go far
enough. They seem to be convinced that a strong, well-mounted
government will better suit the popular palate than one of a different
complexion. Men in office are indeed taking all possible pains to give an
unfavorable impression of the Convention, but the current seems to be
moving strongly the other way.
"A plain but sensible man, in a conversation I had with him yesterday,
expressed himself nearly in this manner: The people begin to be convinced
that 'their excellent form of government,' as they have been used to call it,
will not answer their purpose, and that they must substitute something not
very remote from that which they have lately quitted.
"These appearances, though they will not warrant a conclusion that the
people are yet ripe for such a plan as I advocate, yet serve to prove that
there is no reason to despair of their adopting one equally energetic, if the
Convention should think proper to propose it. They serve to prove that we
ought not to allow too much weight to objections drawn from the supposed
repugnance of the people to an efficient constitution. I confess I am more
and more inclined to believe that former habits of thinking are regaining
their influence with more rapidity than is generally imagined.
"Not having compared ideas with you, sir, I cannot judge how far our
sentiments agree; but, as I persuade myself the genuineness of my
representations will receive credit with you, my anxiety for the event of the
deliberations of the Convention induces me to make this communication of
what appears to be the tendency of the public mind.
"I own to you, sir, that I am seriously and deeply distressed at the aspect
of the counsels which prevailed when I left Philadelphia. I fear we shall let
slip the golden opportunity of rescuing the American empire from disunion,
anarchy, and misery.
"No motley or feeble measure can answer the end, or will finally receive
the public support. Decision is true wisdom, and will not be less reputable
to the Convention than salutary to the community.
"I shall of necessity remain here ten or twelve days. If I have reason to
believe that my attendance at Philadelphia will not be mere waste of time, I
shall, after that period, rejoin the Convention."—Hamilton's Works
(Lodge).
T        J    5      C         
Mr Gerry delivered in from the Committee appointed on Monday last the
following Report.
"The Committee to whom was referred the 8th Resol. of the Report
from the Committee of the Whole House, and so much of the 7th as has
not been decided on, submit the following Report: That the subsequent
propositions be recommended to the Convention on condition that both
shall be generally adopted. I. that in the 1st branch of the Legislature
each of the States now in the Union shall be allowed 1 member for
every 40,000 inhabitants of the description reported in the 7th
Resolution of the Come of the whole House: that each State not
containing that number shall be allowed 1 member: that all bills for
raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the
officers of the Governt of the U. States shall originate in the 1st branch
of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the 2d
branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury but
in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the 1st branch. "II.
That in the 2d branch each State shall have an equal vote."[125]
[125] This report was founded on a motion in the Com̃itte made by Dr Franklin.
It was barely acquiesced in by the members from the States opposed to an equity
of votes in the 2d branch and was evidently considered by the members on the
other side, as a gaining of their point. A motion was made by Mr Sherman. He
acted in the place of Mr Elseworth who was kept away by indisposition, in the
Committee to the following effect "that each State should have an equal vote in
the 2d branch; provided that no decision therein should prevail unless the
majority of States concurring should also comprise a majority of the inhabitants
of the U. States." This motion was not much deliberated on nor approved in the
Committee. A similar proviso had been proposed in the debates on the articles of
Confederation in 1777, to the articles giving certain powers to "nine States." See
Journals of Congs for 1777, p. 462.—Madison Note.
Mr Ghoram observed that as the report consisted of propositions
mutually conditional he wished to hear some explanations touching the
grounds on which the conditions were estimated.
Mr Gerry. The Committee were of different opinions as well as the
Deputations from which the Come were taken, and agreed to the Report
merely in order that some ground of accommodation might be proposed.
Those opposed to the equality of votes have only assented conditionally;
and if the other side do not generally agree will not be under any obligation
to support the Report.
Mr. Wilson thought the Committee had exceeded their powers.
Mr Martin was for taking the question on the whole report.
Mr Wilson was for a division of the question; otherwise it wd be a leap in
the dark.
Mr Madison could not regard the privilege of originating money bills as
any concession on the side of the small States. Experience proved that it
had no effect. If seven States in the upper branch wished a bill to be
originated, they might surely find some member from some of the same
States in the lower branch who would originate it. The restriction as to
amendments was of as little consequence. Amendments could be handed
privately by the Senate to members in the other house. Bills could be
negatived that they might be sent up in the desired shape. If the Senate
should yield to the obstinacy of the 1st branch the use of that body as a
check would be lost. If the 1st branch should yield to that of the Senate, the
privilege would be nugatory. Experience had also shewn both in G. B. and
the States having a similar regulation that it was a source of frequent &
obstinate altercations. These considerations had produced a rejection of a
like motion on a former occasion when judged by its own merits. It could
not therefore be deemed any concession on the present, and left in force all
the objections which had prevailed agst allowing each State an equal voice.
He conceived that the Convention was reduced to the alternative of either
departing from justice in order to conciliate the smaller States, and the
minority of the people of the U. S. or of displeasing these by justly
gratifying the larger States and the majority of the people. He could not
himself hesitate as to the option he ought to make. The Convention with
justice & the majority of the people on their side, had nothing to fear. With
injustice and the minority on their side they had every thing to fear. It was
in vain to purchase concord in the Convention on terms which would
perpetuate discord among their Constituents. The Convention ought to
pursue a plan which would bear the test of examination, which would be
espoused & supported by the enlightened and impartial part of America, &
which they could themselves vindicate and urge. It should be considered
that altho' at first many may judge of the system recom̃ended, by their
opinion of the Convention, yet finally all will judge of the Convention by
the System. The merits of the System alone can finally & effectually obtain
the public suffrage. He was not apprehensive that the people of the small
States would obstinately refuse to accede to a Govt founded on just
principles, and promising them substantial protection. He could not suspect
that Delaware would brave the consequences of seeking her fortunes apart
from the other States, rather than submit to such a Govt; much less could he
suspect that she would pursue the rash policy of courting foreign support,
which the warmth of one of her representatives (Mr Bedford) had
suggested, or if she shd, that any foreign nation wd be so rash as to hearken
to the overture. As little could he suspect that the people of N. Jersey
notwithstanding the decided tone of the gentlemen from that State, would
choose rather to stand on their own legs, and bid defiance to events, than to
acquiesce under an establishment founded on principles the justice of which
they could not dispute, and absolutely necessary to redeem them from the
exactions levied on them by the com̃erce of the neighbouring States. A
review of other States would prove that there was as little reason to
apprehend an inflexible opposition elsewhere. Harmony in the Convention
was no doubt much to be desired. Satisfaction to all the States, in the first
instance still more so. But if the principal States comprehending a majority
of the people of the U. S. should concur in a just & judicious plan, he had
the firmest hopes, that all the other States would by degrees accede to it.[126]
[126] Yates, and his colleague, Lansing, left the Convention July 5, despairing of
the result of its labors being satisfactory to them. Madison's speech is the last
one reported by Yates.—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc.
Mr Butler said he could not let down his idea of the people, of America
so far as to believe they would from mere respect to the Convention adopt a
plan evidently unjust. He did not consider the privilege concerning money
bills as of any consequence. He urged that the 2d branch ought to represent
the States according to their property.
Mr Govr Morris, thought the form as well as the matter of the Report
objectionable. It seemed in the first place to render amendments
impracticable. In the next place, it seemed to involve a pledge to agree to
the 2d part if the 1st shd be agreed to. He conceived the whole aspect of it to
be wrong. He came here as a Representative of America; he flattered
himself he came here in some degree as a Representative of the whole
human race; for the whole human race will be affected by the proceedings
of this Convention. He wished gentlemen to extend their views beyond the
present moment of time; beyond the narrow limits of place from which they
derive their political origin. If he were to believe some things which he had
heard, he should suppose that we were assembled to truck and bargain for
our particular States. He can not descend to think that any gentlemen are
really actuated by these views. We must look forward to the effects of what
we do. These alone ought to guide us. Much has been said of the sentiments
of the people. They were unknown. They could not be known. All that we
can infer is that if the plan we recommend be reasonable & right; all Who
have reasonable minds and sound intentions will embrace it,
notwithstanding what had been said by some gentlemen. Let us suppose
that the larger States shall agree; and that the smaller refuse; and let us trace
the consequences. The opponents of the system in the smaller States will no
doubt make a party, and a noise for a time, but the ties of interest, of
kindred & of common habits which connect them with other States will be
too strong to be easily broken. In N. Jersey particularly he was sure a great
many would follow the sentiments of Pena & N. York. This Country must
be united. If persuasion does not unite it, the sword will. He begged that this
consideration might have its due weight. The scenes of horror attending
Civil commotion cannot be described, and the conclusion of them will be
worse than the term of their continuance. The stronger party will then make
traytors of the weaker; and the Gallows & Halter will finish the work of the
sword. How far foreign powers would be ready to take part in the
confusions he would not say. Threats that they will be invited have it seems
been thrown out. He drew the melancholy picture of foreign intrusions as
exhibited in the History of Germany, & urged it as a standing lesson to
other nations. He trusted that the Gentlemen who may have hazarded such
expressions, did not entertain them till they reached their own lips. But
returning to the Report he could not think it in any respect calculated for the
Public good. As the 2d branch is now constituted, there will be constant
disputes & appeals to the States which will undermine the Genl
Government & controul & annihilate the 1st branch. Suppose that the
delegates from Massts & Rho I. in the Upper House disagree, and that the
former are outvoted. What Results? they will immediately declare that their
State will not abide by the decision, and make such representations as will
produce that effect. The same may happen as to Virga & other States. Of
what avail then will be what is on paper. State attachments, and State
importance have been the bane of this Country. We cannot annihilate; but
we may perhaps take out the teeth of the serpents. He wished our ideas to
be enlarged to the true interest of man, instead of being circumscribed
within the narrow compass of a particular Spot. And after all how little can
be the motive yielded by selfishness for such a policy. Who can say whether
he himself, much less whether his children, will the next year be an
inhabitant of this or that State.
Mr Bedford. He found that what he had said as to the small States being
taken by the hand, had been misunderstood; and he rose to explain. He did
not mean that the small States would court the aid & interposition of foreign
powers. He meant that they would not consider the federal compact as
dissolved untill it should be so by the Acts of the large States. In this case
The consequences of the breach of faith on their part, and the readiness of
the small States to fulfill their engagements, would be that foreign Nations
having demands on this Country would find it their interest to take the small
States by the hand, in order to do themselves justice. This was what he
meant. But no man can foresee to what extremities the small States may be
driven by oppression. He observed also in apology that some allowance
ought to be made for the habits of his profession in which warmth was
natural & sometimes necessary. But is there not an apology in what was
said by (Mr Govr Morris) that the sword is to unite: by Mr Ghorum that
Delaware must be annexed to Penna and N. Jersey divided between Pena
and N. York. To hear such language without emotion, would be to renounce
the feelings of a man and the duty of a Citizen—As to the propositions of
the Committee, the lesser States have thought it necessary to have a security
somewhere. This has been thought necessary for the Executive Magistrate
of the proposed Govt who has a sort of negative on the laws; and is it not of
more importance that the States should be protected, than that the Executive
branch of the Govt shd be protected. In order to obtain this, the smaller
States have conceded as to the constitution of the first branch, and as to
money bills. If they be not gratified by correspondent concessions as to the
2d branch is it to be supposed they will ever accede to the plan; and what
will be the consequence if nothing should be done? The condition of the U.
States requires that something should be immediately done. It will be better
that a defective plan should be adopted, than that none should be
recommended. He saw no reason why defects might not be supplied with
meetings 10, 15, or 20 years hence.
Mr Elseworth said he had not attended the proceedings of the
Committee, but was ready to accede to the compromise they had reported.
Some compromise was necessary; and he saw none more convenient or
reasonable.
Mr Williamson hoped that the expressions of individuals would not be
taken for the sense of their colleagues, much less of their States which was
not & could not be known. He hoped also that the meaning of those
expressions would not be misconstrued or exaggerated. He did not conceive
that (Mr Govr Morris) meant that the sword ought to be drawn agst the
smaller States. He only pointed out the probable consequences of anarchy
in the U. S. A similar exposition ought to be given of the expressions of (Mr
Ghorum). He was ready to hear the Report discussed; but thought the
propositions contained in it, the most objectionable of any he had yet heard.
Mr Patterson said that he had when the Report was agreed to in the Come
reserved to himself the right of freely discussing it. He acknowledged that
the warmth complained of was improper; but he thought the Sword & the
Gallows little calculated to produce conviction. He complained of the
manner in which Mr M and Mr Govr Morris had treated the small States.
Mr Gerry. Tho' he had assented to the Report in the Committee, he had
very material objections to it. We were however in a peculiar situation. We
were neither the same Nation nor different Nations. We ought not therefore
to pursue the one or the other of these ideas too closely. If no compromise
should take place what will be the consequence. A secession he foresaw
would take place; for some gentlemen seem decided on it: two different
plans will be proposed; and the result no man could foresee. If we do not
come to some agreement among ourselves some foreign sword will
probably do the work for us.
Mr Mason. The Report was meant not as specific propositions to be
adopted; but merely as a general ground of accommodation. There must be
some accommodation on this point, or we shall make little further progress
in the work. Accommodation was the object of the House in the
appointment of the Committee; and of the Committee in the Report they
had made. And however liable the Report might be to objections, he
thought it preferable to an appeal to the world by the different sides, as had
been talked of by some Gentlemen. It could not be more inconvenient to
any gentleman to remain absent from his private affairs, than it was for him;
but he would bury his bones in this City rather than expose his Country to
the Consequences of a dissolution of the Convention without any thing
being done.
The 1st proposition in the report for fixing the representation in the 1st
branch, "one member for every 40,000 inhabitants," being taken up.
Mr Govr Morris objected to that scale of apportionment. He thought
property ought to be taken into the estimate as well as the number of
inhabitants. Life & liberty were generally said to be of more value than
property. An accurate view of the matter would nevertheless prove that
property was the main object of Society. The Savage State was more
favorable to liberty than the Civilized; and sufficiently so to life. It was
preferred by all men who had not acquired a taste for property; it was only
renounced for the sake of property which could only be secured by the
restraints of regular Government. These ideas might appear to some new,
but they were nevertheless just. If property then was the main object of
Govt certainly it ought to be one measure of the influence due to those who
were to be affected by the Governt. He looked forward also to that range of
New States which wd soon be formed in the West. He thought the rule of
representation ought to be so fixed as to secure to the Atlantic States a
prevalence in the National Councils. The new States will know less of the
public interest than these, will have an interest in many respects different, in
particular will be little scrupulous of involving the Community in wars the
burdens & operations of which would fall chiefly on the maritime States.
Provision ought therefore to be made to prevent the maritime States from
being hereafter outvoted by them. He thought this might be easily done by
irrevocably fixing the number of representatives which the Atlantic States
should respectively have, and the number which each new State will have.
This wd not be unjust, as the Western settlers wd previously know the
conditions on which they were to possess their lands. It would be politic as
it would recom̃end the plan to the present as well as future interest of the
States which must decide the fate of it.
Mr Rutlidge. The gentleman last up had spoken some of his sentiments
precisely. Property was certainly the principal object of Society. If numbers
should be made the rule of representation, the Atlantic States will be
subjected to the Western. He moved that the first proposition in the report
be postponed in order to take up the following viz "that the suffrages of the
several States be regulated and proportioned according to the sums to be
paid towards the general revenue by the inhabitants of each State
respectively: that an apportionment of suffrages, according to the ratio
aforesaid shall be made and regulated at the end of —— years from the 1st
meeting of the Legislature of the U. S., and at the end of every —— years
but that for the present, and until the period above mentioned, the suffrages
shall be for N. Hampshire —— for Massachts —— &c.
Col. Mason said the case of new States was not unnoticed in the
Committee; but it was thought and he was himself decidedly of opinion that
if they made a part of the Union, they ought to be subject to no unfavorable
discriminations. Obvious considerations required it.
Mr Randolph concurred with Col. Mason.
On Question on Mr Rutlidges motion,
Masts no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Maryd no. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. not on floor.
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Mr Govr Morris moved to commit so much of the Report as relates to "1
member for every 40,000 inhabitants." His view was that they might
absolutely fix the number for each State in the first instance; leaving the
Legislature at liberty to provide for changes in the relative importance of
the States, and for the case of new States.
Mr Wilson 2ded the motion; but with a view of leaving the Committee
under no implied shackles.
Mr Ghorum apprehended great inconveniency from fixing directly the
number of Representatives to be allowed to each State. He thought the
number of Inhabitants the true guide; tho' perhaps some departure might be
expedient from the full proportion. The States also would vary in their
relative extent by separations of parts of the largest States. A part of Virga is
now on the point of a separation. In the province of Mayne a Convention is
at this time deliberating on a separation from Masts. In such events the
number of representatives ought certainly to be reduced. He hoped to see all
the States made small by proper divisions, instead of their becoming
formidable as was apprehended, to the Small States. He conceived that let
the Genl Government be modified as it might, there would be a constant
tendency in the State Governmts to encroach upon it: it was of importance
therefore that the extent of the States shd be reduced as much & as fast as
possible. The stronger the Govt shall be made in the first instance the more
easily will these divisions be effected; as it will be of less consequence in
the opinion of the States whether they be of great or small extent.
Mr Gerry did not think with his Colleague that the large States ought to
be cut up. This policy has been inculcated by the middling and smaller
States, ungenerously & contrary to the spirit of the Confederation.
Ambitious men will be apt to solicit needless divisions, till the States be
reduced to the size of Counties. If this policy should still actuate the small
States, the large ones cou'd not confederate safely with them; but would be
obliged to consult their safety by confederating only with one another. He
favored the commitment and thought that Representation ought to be in the
Combined ratio of numbers of Inhabitants and of wealth, and not of either
singly.
Mr King wished the clause to be committed, chiefly in order to detach it
from the Report with which it had no connection. He thought also that the
Ratio of Representation proposed could not be safely fixed, since in a
century & a half our computed increase of population would carry the
number of representatives to an enormous excess; that ye number of
inhabitants was not the proper index of ability & wealth; that property was
the primary object of Society; and that in fixing a ratio this ought not to be
excluded from the estimate.—With regard to new States, he observed that
there was something peculiar in the business which had not been noticed.
The U. S. were now admitted to be proprietors of the Country N. West of
the Ohio. Congs by one of their ordinances have impoliticly laid it out into
ten States, and have made it a fundamental article of compact with those
who may become settlers, that as soon as the number in any one state shall
equal that of the smallest of the 13 original States, it may claim admission
into the Union. Delaware does not contain it is computed more than 35,000
souls, and for obvious reasons will not increase much for a considerable
time. It is possible then that if this plan be persisted in by Congs 10 new
votes may be added, without a greater addition of inhabitants than are
represented by the single vote of Pena. The plan as it respects one of the
new States is already irrevocable, the sale of the lands having commenced,
and the purchasers & settlers will immediately become entitled to all the
privileges of the compact.
Mr Butler agreed to the Commitment if the Committee were to be left at
liberty. He was persuaded that the more the subject was examined, the less
it would appear that the number of inhabitants would be a proper rule of
proportion. If there were no other objection the changeableness of the
standard would be sufficient. He concurred with those who thought some
balance was necessary between the old & the new States. He contended
strenuously that property was the only just measure of representation. This
was the great object of Governt; the great cause of war; the great means of
carrying it on.
Mr Pinkney saw no good reason for committing. The value of land had
been found on full investigation to be an impracticable rule. The
contributions of revenue including imports & exports must be too
changeable in their amount; too difficult to be adjusted; and too injurious to
the non-commercial States. The number of inhabitants appeared to him the
only just & practicable rule. He thought the blacks ought to stand on an
equality with the whites: But wd agree to the ratio settled by Congs. He
contended that Congs had no right under the articles of Confederation to
authorize the admission of new States; no such case having been provided
for.
Mr Davy was for committing the clause in order to get at the merits of
the question arising on the Report. He seemed to think that wealth or
property ought to be represented in the 2d branch; and numbers in the 1st
branch.
On the Motion for committing as made by Mr Govr Morris,
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md divd. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The members appd by Ballot were Mr Govr Morris, Mr Gorham, Mr
Randolph, Mr Rutlidge, Mr King.
Mr Wilson signified that his view in agreeing to the com̃itmt was that the
Come might consider the propriety of adopting a scale similar to that
established by the Constitution of Massts which wd give an advantage to ye
small States without substantially departing from the rule of proportion.
Mr Wilson & Mr Mason moved to postpone the clause relating to money
bills in order to take up the clause relating to an equality of votes in the
Second branch.
On the question Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The clause relating to equality of votes being under consideration,
Docr Franklin observed that this question could not be properly put by
itself, the Com̃ittee having reported several propositions as mutual
conditions of each other. He could not vote for it if separately taken, but
should vote for the whole together.
Col. Mason perceived the difficulty & suggested a reference of the rest
of the Report to ye Committee just appointed, that the whole might be
brought into one view.
Mr Randolph disliked ye reference to that Committee, as it consisted of
members from States opposed to the wishes of the smaller States, and could
not therefore be acceptable to the latter.
Mr Martin & Mr Jenifer moved to postpone the clause till the Come last
appointed shd report.
Mr Madison observed that if the uncommitted part of the Report was
connected with the part just committed, it ought also to be committed; if not
connected, it need not be postponed till report should be made.
On the question for postponing, moved by Mr Martin & Mr Jenifer,—
Cont N. J. Del. Md Va Geo. ay. Pa N. C. S. C. no. Mass. N. Y. divided.
The 1st clause relating to the originating of money bills was then
resumed.
Mr Governr Morris was opposed to a restriction of this right in either
branch, considered merely in itself and as unconnected with the point of
representation in the 2d branch. It will disable the 2d branch from proposing
its own money plans, and giving the people an opportunity of judging by
comparison of the merits of those proposed by the 1st branch.
Mr Wilson could see nothing like a concession here on the part of the
smaller States. If both branches were to say yes or no, it was of little
consequence which should say yes or no first, which last. If either was
indiscriminately to have the right of originating, the reverse of the Report,
would he thought be most proper; since it was a maxim that the least
numerous body was the fittest for deliberation; the most numerous for
decision. He observed that this discrimination had been transcribed from the
British into several American constitutions. But he was persuaded that on
examination of the American experiments it would be found to be a trifle
light as air. Nor could he ever discover the advantage of it in the
Parliamentary history of G. Britain. He hoped if there was any advantage in
the privilege, that it would be pointed out.
Mr Williamson thought that if the privilege were not common to both
branches it ought rather to be confined to the 2d as the bills in that case
would be more narrowly watched, than if they originated with the branch
having most of the popular confidence.
Mr Mason. The consideration which weighed with the Committee was
that the 1st branch would be the immediate representatives of the people, the
2d would not. Should the latter have the power of giving away the people's
money, they might soon forget the source from whence they received it. We
might soon have an aristocracy. He had been much concerned at the
principles which had been advanced by some gentlemen, but had the
satisfaction to find they did not generally prevail. He was a friend to
proportional representation in both branches; but supposed that some points
must be yielded for the sake of accomodation.
Mr Wilson. If he had proposed that the 2d branch should have an
independent disposal of public money, the observations of (Col. Mason)
would have been a satisfactory answer. But nothing could be farther from
what he had said. His question was how is the power of the 1st branch
increased or that of the 2d diminished by giving the proposed privilege to
the former? Where is the difference, in which branch it begins, if both must
concur, in the end?
Mr Gerry would not say that the concession was a sufficient one on the
part of the small States. But he could not but regard it in the light of a
concession. It wd make it a constitutional principle that the 2d branch were
not possessed of the Confidence of the people in money matters, which wd
lessen their weight & influence. In the next place if the 2d branch were
dispossessed of the privilege, they wd be deprived of the opportunity which
their continuance in office 3 times as long as the 1st branch would give them
of making three successive essays in favor of a particular point.
Mr Pinkney thought it evident that the Concession was wholly on one
side, that of the large States, the privilege of originating money bills being
of no account.
Mr Govr Morris had waited to hear the good effects of the restriction. As
to the alarm sounded, of an aristocracy, his creed was that there never was,
nor ever will be a civilized Society without an aristocracy. His endeavor
was to keep it as much as possible from doing mischief. The restriction if it
has any real operation, will deprive us of the services of the 2d branch in
digesting & proposing money bills of which it will be more capable than the
1st branch. It will take away the responsibility of the 2d branch, the great
security for good behavior. It will always leave a plea, as to an obnoxious
money bill that it was disliked, but could not be constitutionally amended;
nor safely rejected. It will be a dangerous source of disputes between the
two Houses. We should either take the British Constitution altogether or
make one for ourselves. The Executive there has dissolved two Houses as
the only cure for such disputes. Will our Executive be able to apply such a
remedy? Every law directly or indirectly takes money out of the pockets of
the people. Again What use may be made of such a privilege in case of
great emergency? Suppose an Enemy at the door, and money instantly &
absolutely necessary for repelling him, may not the popular branch avail
itself of this duress, to extort concessions from the Senate destructive of the
Constitution itself. He illustrated this danger by the example of the Long
Parliament's expedts for subverting the H. of Lords; concluding on the
whole that the restriction would be either useless or pernicious.
Docr Franklin did not mean to go into a justification of the Report, but as
it had been asked what would be the use of restraining the 2d branch from
medling with money bills, he could not but remark that it was always of
importance that the people should know who had disposed of their money,
& how it had been disposed of. It was a maxim that those who feel, can best
judge. This end would, he thought, be best attained, if money affairs were to
be confined to the immediate representatives of the people. This was his
inducement to concur in the report. As to the danger or difficulty that might
arise from a Negative in the 2d where the people wd not be proportionately
represented, it might easily be got over by declaring that there should be no
such negative; or if that will not do, by declaring that there shall be no such
branch at all.
Mr Martin said that it was understood in the Committee that the
difficulties and disputes which had been apprehended, should be guarded
agst in the detailing of the plan.
Mr Wilson. The difficulties & disputes will increase with the attempts to
define & obviate them. Queen Anne was obliged to dissolve her Parliamt in
order to terminate one of these obstinate disputes between the two Houses.
Had it not been for the mediation of the Crown, no one can say what the
result would have been. The point is still sub judice in England. He
approved of the principles laid down by the Honble President (Doctr
Franklin) his Colleague, as to the expediency of keeping the people
informed of their money affairs. But thought they would know as much, and
be as well satisfied, in one way as in the other.
Genl Pinkney was astonished that this point should have been considered
as a concession. He remarked that the restriction to money bills had been
rejected on the merits singly considered, by 8 States agst 3. and that the very
States which now called it a concession, were then agst it as nugatory or
improper in itself.
On the Question whether the clause relating to money bills in the Report
of the Come consisting of a member from each State, shd stand as part of the
Report
Massts dividd Cont ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. divd.
A Question was then raised whether the question was carried in the
affirmative; there being but 5 ays out of 11. States present. The words of the
rule are (see May 28).
On this question: Mas. Cont N. J. Pa Del. Md N. C. S. C. Geo. ay. N. Y.
Va no
(In several preceding instances like votes had sub silentio been entered
as decided in the affirmative.)
Adjourned
S       , J    7.    C         .
"Shall the clause allowing each State one vote in the 2d branch, stand as
part of the Report,"? being taken up—
Mr Gerry. This is the critical question. He had rather agree to it than have
no accommodation. A Governt short of a proper national plan, if generally
acceptable, would be preferable to a proper one which if it could be carried
at all, would operate on discontented States. He thought it would be best to
suspend the question till the Comme yesterday appointed, should make
report.
Mr Sherman Supposed that it was the wish of every one that some Genl
Govt should be established. An equal vote in the 2d branch would, he
thought, be most likely to give it the necessary vigor. The small States have
more vigor in their Govts than the large ones, the more influence therefore
the large ones have, the weaker will be the Govt. In the large States it will
be most difficult to collect the real & fair sense of the people. Fallacy &
undue influence will be practised with most success; and improper men will
most easily get into office. If they vote by States in the 2d branch, and each
State has an equal vote, there must be always a majority of States as well as
a majority of the people on the side of public measures, & the Govt will
have decision and efficacy. If this be not the case in the 2d branch there may
be a majority of States agst public measures, and the difficulty of
compelling them to abide by the public determination, will render the
Government feebler than it has ever yet been.
Mr Wilson was not deficient in a conciliating temper, but firmness was
sometimes a duty of higher obligation. Conciliation was also misapplied in
this instance. It was pursued here rather among the Representatives, than
among the Constituents; and it wd be of little consequence if not established
among the latter; and there could be little hope of its being established
among them if the foundation should not be laid in justice and right.
On Question shall the words stand as part of the Report?
Massts divd. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J, ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. divd
(Note. several votes were given here in the affirmative or were divd
because another final question was to be taken on the whole report.)
Mr Gerry[127] thought it would be proper to proceed to enumerate &
define the powers to be vested in the Genl Govt before a question on the
report should be taken as to the rule of representation in the 2d branch.
[127] King gives the three speeches of Gerry, Madison and Pattersonas follows:
"Gerry. I agree to the measure, provided that the first Br. (H. of Reps.)
shall originate money bills and money appropriations. The prejudices as
well as the interest of our Constituents must be regarded—two or three
thousand men are in office in the States—their influence will be in favor of
an Equality of votes among the States.
"Madison. Equality in the Senate will enable a minority to hold a
majority, and to oblige them to submit to their interests, or they will
withdraw their assent to measures essential and necessary to the general
Good. I have known one man, when the State was represented by only two,
and they were divided, oppose six States in Congress on an important
occasion for three days, and finally compel them to gratify his caprice in
order to obtain his suffrage. The Senate will possess certain exclusive
Powers, such as the appointments to office, if the States have equal votes; a
minority of People will appoint the Great Offices. Besides the small States
may be near the Seat of Govt.—a bare Quorum of the H. of R. may be
easily assembled, and carry a bill against the sense of a majority if all were
present, and the Senate, tho' all were present, might confirm such Bill.
Virginia has objected to every addition of the powers of Congress, because
she has only 1/13 of the Power when she ought to have one sixth.
"Paterson. I hope the question will be taken: if we do not give equal
votes in the Senate to the States, the small States agreeing that money Bills
and appropriations shall originate in the H. of Reps., elected according to
numbers, it must not be expected that the small States will agree to the
amendments of the Confederation. Let us decide this question and lose no
more time. I think that I shall vote against the provision, because I think
that the exclusive originating of money Bills & appropriations by the H. of
Reps. is giving up too much on the part of the small States."—King's Life
and Correspondence of Rufus King, I., 613.
Mr Madison, observed that it wd be impossible to say what powers could
be safely & properly vested in the Govt before it was known, in what
manner the States were to be represented in it. He was apprehensive that if a
just representation were not the basis of the Govt it would happen, as it did
when the Articles of Confederation were depending, that every effectual
prerogative would be withdrawn or withheld, and the New Govt wd be
rendered as impotent and as shortlived as the old.
Mr Patterson would not decide whether the privilege concerning money
bills were a valuable consideration or not: But he considered the mode &
rule of representation in the 1st branch as fully so; and that after the
establishment of that point, the small States would never be able to defend
themselves without an equality of votes in the 2d branch. There was no
other ground of accommodation. His resolution was fixt. He would meet the
large States on that ground and no other. For himself he should vote agst the
Report, because it yielded too much.
Mr Govr Morris. He had no resolution unalterably fixed except to do
what should finally appear to him right. He was agst the Report because it
maintained the improper constitution of the 2d branch. It made it another
Congress, a mere whisp of straw. It had been sd (by Mr Gerry) that the new
Governt would be partly national, partly federal; that it ought in the first
quality to protect individuals; in the second, the States. But in what quality
was it to protect the aggregate interest of the whole. Among the many
provisions which had been urged, he had seen none for supporting the
dignity and splendor of the American Empire. It had been one of our
greatest misfortunes that the great objects of the nation had been sacrificed
constantly to local views; in like manner as the general interests of States
had been sacrificed to those of the Counties. What is to be the check in the
Senate? none; unless it be to keep the majority of the people from injuring
particular States. But particular States ought to be injured for the sake of a
majority of the people, in case their conduct should deserve it. Suppose they
should insist on claims evidently unjust, and pursue them in a manner
detrimental to the whole body. Suppose they should give themselves up to
foreign influence. Ought they to be protected in such cases. They were
originally nothing more than colonial corporations. On the declaration of
Independence, a Governmt was to be formed. The small States aware of the
necessity of preventing anarchy, and taking advantage of the moment,
extorted from the large ones an equality of votes. Standing now on that
ground, they demand under the new system greater rights as men, than their
fellow Citizens of the large States. The proper answer to them is that the
same necessity of which they formerly took advantage, does not now exist,
and that the large States are at liberty now to consider what is right, rather
than what may be expedient. We must have an efficient Govt and if there be
an efficiency in the local Govts the former is impossible. Germany alone
proves it. Notwithstanding their common diet, notwithstanding the great
prerogatives of the Emperor as head of the Empire, and his vast resources,
as sovereign of his particular dominions, no union is maintained; foreign
influence disturbs every internal operation, & there is no energy whatever in
the General Governmt. Whence does this proceed? From the energy of the
local authorities; from its being considered of more consequence to support
the Prince of Hesse, than the Happiness of the people of Germany. Do
Gentlemen wish this to be ye case here. Good God, Sir, is it possible they
can so delude themselves. What if all the Charters & Constitutions of the
States were thrown into the fire, and all their demagogues into the Ocean.
What would it be to the happiness of America. And will not this be the case
here if we pursue the train in wch the business lies. We shall establish an
Aulic Council without an Emperor to execute its decrees. The same
circumstances which unite the people here, unite them in Germany. They
have there a common language, a common law, common usages and
manners, and a common interest in being united; Yet their local
jurisdictions destroy every tie. The case was the same in the Grecian States.
The United Netherlands are at this time torn in factions. With these
examples before our eyes shall we form establishments which must
necessarily produce the same effects. It is of no consequence from what
districts the 2d branch shall be drawn, if it be so constituted as to yield an
asylum agst these evils. As it is now constituted he must be agst its being
drawn from the States in equal portions. But still he was ready to join in
devising such an amendment of the plan, as will be most likely to secure
our liberty & happiness.
Mr Sherman & Mr Elseworth moved to postpone the Question on the
Report from the Committee of a member from each State, in order to wait
for the Report from the Come of 5 last appointed.
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Maryland ay.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Adjd.
M      J    9      C         .
Mr Daniel Carroll, from Maryland took his seat.
Mr Govr Morris delivered a report from the Come of 5 members to
whom was committed the clause in the Report of the Come consisting of a
member from each State, stating the proper ratio of Representatives in the
1st branch, to be as 1 to every 40,000 inhabitants, as follows viz
"The Committee to whom was referred the 1st clause of the 1st
proposition reported from the grand Committee, beg leave to report:
I. that in the 1st meeting of the Legislature the 1st branch thereof consist
of 56. members of which Number N. Hampshire shall have 2, Massts 7, R.
Id 1, Cont 4, N. Y. 5, N. J. 3, Pa 8, Del. 1, Md 4, Va 9, N. C. 5, S. C. 5, Geo.
2.
II. But as the present situation of the States may probably alter as well in
point of wealth as in the number of their inhabitants, that the Legislature be
authorized from time to time to augment ye number of Representatives. And
in case any of the States shall hereafter be divided, or any two or more
States united, or any new States created within the limits of the United
States, the Legislature shall possess authority to regulate the number of
Representatives in any of the foregoing cases, upon the principles of their
wealth and number of inhabitants."
Mr Sherman wished to know on what principles or calculations the
Report was founded. It did not appear to correspond with any rule of
numbers, or of any requisition hitherto adopted by Congs
Mr Gorham. Some provision of this sort was necessary in the outset. The
number of blacks & whites with some regard to supposed wealth was the
general guide. Fractions could not be observed. The Legislre is to make
alterations from time to time as justice & propriety may require. Two
objections prevailed agst the rate of 1 member for every 40,000 inhts. The
1st was that the Representation would soon be too numerous: the 2d that the
Westn States who may have a different interest, might if admitted on that
principle by degrees, outvote the Atlantic. Both these objections are
removed. The number will be small in the first instance and may be
continued so. And the Atlantic States having ye Govt in their own hands,
may take care of their own interest, by dealing out the right of
Representation in safe proportions to the Western States. These were the
views of the Committee.
Mr L. Martin wished to know whether the Come were guided in the ratio,
by the wealth or number of inhabitants, of the States, or by both; noting its
variations from former apportionments by Congs
Mr Govr Morris & Mr Rutlidge moved to postpone the 1st paragraph
relating to the number of members to be allowed each State in the first
instance, and to take up the 2d paragraph authorizing the Legislre to alter the
number from time to time according to wealth & inhabitants. The motion
was agreed to nem. con.
On Question on the 2d paragh taken without any debate
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Sherman moved to refer the 1st part apportioning the Representatives,
to a Comme of a member from each State.
Mr Govr Morris seconded the motion; observing that this was the only
case in which such committees were useful.
Mr Williamson thought it would be necessary to return to the rule of
numbers, but that the Western States stood on different footing. If their
property shall be rated as high as that of the Atlantic States, then their
representation ought to hold a like proportion. Otherwise if their property
was not to be equally rated.
Mr Govr Morris. The Report is little more than a guess. Wealth was not
altogether disregarded by the Come. Where it was apparently in favor of
one State, whose nos were superior to the numbers of another, by a fraction
only, a member extraordinary was allowed to the former: and so vice versa.
The Committee meant little more than to bring the matter to a point for the
consideration of the House.
Mr Reed asked why Georgia was allowed 2 members, when her number
of inhabitants had stood below that of Delaware.
Mr Govr Morris. Such is the rapidity of the population of that State, that
before the plan takes effect, it will probably be entitled to 2 Representatives.
Mr Randolph, disliked the Report of the Come but had been unwilling to
object to it. He was apprehensive that as the number was not be changed,
till the Natl Legislature should please, a pretext would never be wanting to
postpone alterations, and keep the power in the hands of those possessed of
it. He was in favor of the Commitmt to a member from each State.
Mr Patterson considered the proposed estimate for the future according
to the combined rules of numbers and wealth, as too vague. For this reason
N. Jersey was agst it. He could regard negroes slaves in no light but as
property. They are no free agents, have no personal liberty, no faculty of
acquiring property, but on the contrary are themselves property, & like other
property entirely at the will of the Master. Has a man in Virga a number of
votes in proportion to the number of his slaves? And if negroes are not
represented in the States to which they belong, why should they be
represented in the Genl Govt. What is the true principle of Representation?
It is an expedient by which an assembly of certain individls chosen by the
people is substituted in place of the inconvenient meeting of the people
themselves. If such a meeting of the people was actually to take place,
would the slaves vote? They would not. Why then shd they be represented.
He was also agst such an indirect encouragemt of the slave trade; observing
that Congs in their act relating to the change of the 8 art: of Confedn had
been ashamed to use the term "slaves" & had substituted a description.
Mr Madison reminded Mr Patterson that his doctrine of Representation
which was in its principle the genuine one, must forever silence the
pretensions of the small States to an equality of votes with the large ones.
They ought to vote in the same proportion in which their Citizens would do,
if the people of all the States were collectively met. He suggested as a
proper ground of compromise, that in the first branch the States should be
represented according to their number of free inhabitants; And in the 2d
which had for one of its primary objects the guardianship of property,
according to the whole number, including slaves.
Mr Butler urged warmly the justice & necessity of regarding wealth in
the apportionment of Representation.
Mr King had always expected that as the Southern States are the richest,
they would not league themselves with the Northn unless some respect were
paid to their superior wealth. If the latter expect those preferential
distinctions in Commerce, & other advantages which they will derive from
the connexion they must not expect to receive them without allowing some
advantages in return. Eleven out of 13 of the States had agreed to consider
Slaves in the apportionment of taxation; and taxation and Representation
ought to go together.
On the question for committing the first paragraph of the Report to a
member from each State
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The Come appointed were Mr King, Mr Sherman, Mr Yates, Mr Brearly,
Mr Govr Morris, Mr Reed, Mr Carrol, Mr Madison, Mr Williamson, Mr
Rutlidge, Mr Houston.
Adjd.
T       J    10. I  C         .
Mr King reported from the Come yesterday appointed that the States at
the 1st meeting of the General Legislature, should be represented by 65
members, in the following proportions, to wit N. Hampshire by 3, Massts 8,
R. Isd 1, Cont 5, N. Y. 6, N. J. 4, Pa 8, Del. 1, Md 6, Va 10, N. C. 5, S. C. 5,
Georgia 3.
Mr Rutlidge moved that N. Hampshire be reduced from 3 to 2. members.
Her numbers did not entitle her to 3 and it was a poor State.
Genl Pinkney seconds the motion.
Mr King. N. Hampshire has probably more than 120,000 Inhabts and has
an extensive Country of tolerable fertility. Its inhabts therefore may be
expected to increase fast. He remarked that the four Eastern States, having
800,000 souls, have 1/3 fewer representatives than the four Southern States,
having not more than 700,000 souls, rating the blacks as 5 for 3. The
Eastern people will advert to these circumstances, and be dissatisfied. He
believed them to be very desirous of uniting with their Southern brethren,
but did not think it prudent to rely so far on that disposition as to subject
them to any gross inequality. He was fully convinced that the question
concerning a difference of interests did not lie where it had hitherto been
discussed, between the great & small States; but between the Southern &
Eastern. For this reason he had been ready to yield something in the
proportion of representatives for the security of the Southern. No principle
would justify the giving them a majority. They were brought as near an
equality as was possible. He was not averse to giving them a still greater
security, but did not see how it could be done.
Genl Pinkney. The Report before it was committed was more favorable
to the S. States than as it now stands. If they are to form so considerable a
minority, and the regulation of trade is to be given to the Genl Government,
they will be nothing more than overseers for the Northern States. He did not
expect the S. States to be raised to a majority of representatives, but wished
them to have something like an equality. At present by the alterations of the
Come in favor of the N. States they are removed farther from it than they
were before. One member indeed had been added to Virga which he was
glad of as he considered her as a Southern State. He was glad also that the
members of Georgia were increased.
Mr Williamson was not for reducing N. Hampshire from 3 to 2, but for
reducing some others. The Southn Interest must be extremely endangered
by the present arrangement. The Northn States are to have a majority in the
first instance and the means of perpetuating it.
Mr Dayton observed that the line between Northn & Southern interest
had been improperly drawn; that Pa was the dividing State, there being six
on each side of her.
Genl Pinkney urged the reduction, dwelt on the superior wealth of the
Southern States, and insisted on its having its due weight in the
Government.
Mr Govr Morris regretted the turn of the debate. The States he found had
many Representatives on the floor. Few he fears were to be deemed the
Representatives of America. He thought the Southern States have by the
report more than their share of representation. Property ought to have its
weight, but not all the weight. If the Southn States are to supply money. The
Northn States are to spill their blood. Besides, the probable Revenue to be
expected from the S. States has been greatly overrated. He was agst
reducing N. Hampshire.
Mr Randolph was opposed to a reduction of N. Hampshire, not because
she had a full title to three members; but because it was in his
contemplation 1. to make it the duty instead of leaving it in the discretion of
the Legislature to regulate the representation by a periodical census. 2. to
require more than a bare majority of votes in the Legislature in certain cases
& particularly in commercial cases.
On the question for reducing N. Hampshire from 3 to 2 Represents it
passed in the negative
Massts no. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. no.[128]
[128] In printed Journal. N. C. no. Geo. ay. Note in Madison's hand.
Genl Pinkney and Mr Alexr Martin moved that 6 Reps instead of 5 be
allowed to N. Carolina.
On the Question, it passed in the negative
Massts no. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Genl Pinkney & Mr Butler made the same motion in favor of S. Carolina
On the Question it passed in the negative
Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no. Va no.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Genl Pinckney & Mr Houston moved that Georgia be allowed 4 instead
of 3 Reps urging the unexampled celerity of its population. On the
Question, it passed in the Negative
Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Madison, moved that the number allowed to each State be doubled. A
majority of a Quorum of 65 members, was too small a number to represent
the whole inhabitants of the U. States; They would not possess enough of
the confidence of the people, and wd be too sparsely taken from the people,
to bring with them all the local information which would be frequently
wanted. Double the number will not be too great, even with the future
additions from New States. The additional expence was too inconsiderable
to be regarded in so important a case. And as far as the augmentation might
be unpopular on that score, the objection was overbalanced by its effect on
the hopes of a greater number of the popular candidates.
Mr Elseworth urged the objection of expence, & that the greater the
number, the more slowly would the business proceed; and the less probably
be decided as it ought, at last. He thought the number of Representatives too
great in most of the State Legislatures; and that a large number was less
necessary in the Genl Legislature than in those of the States, as its business
would relate to a few great national Objects only.
Mr Sherman would have preferred 50 to 65. The great distance they will
have to travel will render their attendance precarious and will make it
difficult to prevail on a sufficient number of fit men to undertake the
service. He observed that the expected increase from new States also
deserved consideration.
Mr Gerry was for increasing the number beyond 65. The larger the
number, the less the danger of their being corrupted. The people are
accustomed to & fond of a numerous representation, and will consider their
rights as better secured by it. The danger of excess in the number may be
guarded agst by fixing a point within which the number shall always be
kept.
Col. Mason admitted that the objection drawn from the consideration of
expence, had weight both in itself, and as the people might be affected by it.
But he thought it outweighed by the objections agst the smallness of the
number. 38, will he supposes, as being a majority of 65. form a quorum. 20
will be a majority of 38. This was certainly too small a number to make
laws for America. They would neither bring with them all the necessary
information relative to various local interests, nor possess the necessary
confidence of the people. After doubling the number, the laws might still be
made by so few as almost to be objectionable on that account.
Mr Read was in favor of the Motion. Two of the States (Del. & R. I.)
would have but a single member if the aggregate number should remain at
65. and in case of accident to either of these one State wd have no
representative present to give explanations or informations of its interests or
wishes. The people would not place their confidence in so small a number.
He hoped the objects of the Genl Govt would be much more numerous than
seemed to be expected by some gentlemen, and that they would become
more & more so. As to New States the highest number of Reps for the
whole might be limited, and all danger of excess thereby prevented.
Mr Rutlidge opposed the motion. The Representatives were too
numerous in all the States. The full number allotted to the States may be
expected to attend, & the lowest possible quorum shd not therefore be
considered. The interests of their Constituents will urge their attendance too
strongly for it to be omitted: and he supposed the Genl Legislature would
not sit more than 6 or 8 weeks in the year.
On the Question for doubling the number, it passed in the negative
Masts no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question for agreeing to the apportionment of Reps as amended
by the last committee, it passed in the affirmative
Mas. ay. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Broom gave notice to the House that he had concurred with a reserve
to himself of an intention to claim for his State an equal voice in the 2d
branch; which he thought could not be denied after this concession of the
small States as to the first branch.
Mr Randolph moved as an amendment to the report of the Comme of
five "that in order to ascertain the alterations in the population & wealth of
the several States the Legislature should be required to cause a census, and
estimate to be taken within one year after its first meeting; and every ——
years thereafter, and that the Legislre arrange the Representation
accordingly."
Mr Govr Morris opposed it as fettering the Legislature too much.
Advantage may be taken of it in time of war or the apprehension of it, by
new States to extort particular favors. If the mode was to be fixed for taking
a Census, it might certainly be extremely inconvenient: if unfixt the
Legislature may use such a mode as will defeat the object: and perpetuate
the inequality. He was always agst such shackles on the Legislre. They had
been found very pernicious in most of the State Constitutions. He dwelt
much on the danger of throwing such a preponderancy into the Western
Scale, suggesting that in time the Western people wd outnumber the Atlantic
States. He wished therefore to put it in the power of the latter to keep a
majority of votes in their own hands. It was objected he said that if the
Legislre are left at liberty, they will never readjust the Representation. He
admitted that this was possible; but he did not think it probable unless the
reasons agst a revision of it were very urgent & in this case, it ought not to
be done.
It was moved to postpone the proposition of Mr Randolph in order to
take up the following, viz. "that the Committee of Eleven, to whom was
referred the report of the Committee of five on the subject of
Representation, be requested to furnish the Convention with the principles
on which they grounded the Report," which was disagreed to; S. C. alone
voting in the affirmative.
Adjourned
W         J    11.    C         .
Mr Randolph's motion requiring the Legislre to take a periodical census
for the purpose of redressing inequalities in the Representation was
resumed.
Mr Sherman was agst. Shackling the Legislature too much. We ought to
choose wise & good men, and then confide in them.
Mr Mason. The greater the difficulty we find in fixing a proper rule of
Representation, the more unwilling ought we to be, to throw the task from
ourselves on the Genl Legislre. He did not object to the conjectural ratio
which was to prevail in the outset; but considered a Revision from time to
time according to some permanent & precise standard as essential to ye fair
representation required in the 1st branch. According to the present
population of America, the Northn part of it had a right to preponderate, and
he could not deny it. But he wished it not to preponderate hereafter when
the reason no longer continued. From the nature of man we may be sure that
those who have power in their hands will not give it up while they can
retain it. On the contrary we know that they will always when they can
rather increase it. If the S. States therefore should have 3/4 of the people of
America within their limits, the Northern will hold fast the majority of
Representatives. 1/4 will govern the 3/4. The S. States will complain; but
they may complain from generation to generation without redress. Unless
some principle therefore which will do justice to them hereafter shall be
inserted in the Constitution, disagreable as the declaration was to him, he
must declare he could neither vote for the system here, nor support it, in his
State. Strong objections had been drawn from the danger to the Atlantic
interests from new Western States. Ought we to sacrifice what we know to
be right in itself, lest it should prove favorable to States which are not yet in
existence. If the Western States are to be admitted into the Union, as they
arise, they must, he wd repeat, be treated as equals, and subjected to no
degrading discriminations. They will have the same pride & other passions
which we have and will either not unite with or will speedily revolt from
the Union, if they are not in all respects placed on an equal footing with
their brethren. It has been said they will be poor, and unable to make equal
contributions to the general Treasury. He did not know but that in time they
would be both more numerous & more wealthy than their Atlantic brethren.
The extent & fertility of their soil, made this probable; and though Spain
might for a time deprive them of the natural outlet for their productions, yet
she will, because she must, finally yield to their demands. He urged that
numbers of inhabitants; though not always a precise standard of wealth was
sufficiently so for every substantial purpose.
Mr Williamson was for making it a duty of the Legislature to do what
was right & not leaving it at liberty to do or not to do it. He moved that Mr
Randolph's propositions be postpond in order to consider the following "that
in order to ascertain the alterations that may happen in the population &
wealth of the several States, a census shall be taken of the free white
inhabitants and 3/5ths of those of other descriptions on the 1st year after this
Government shall have been adopted and every —— year thereafter; and
that the Representation be regulated accordingly."
Mr Randolph agreed that Mr Williamson's proposition should stand in
the place of his. He observed that the ratio fixt for the 1st meeting was a
mere conjecture, that it placed the power in the hands of that part of
America, which could not always be entitled to it, that this power would not
be voluntarily renounced; and that it was consequently the duty of the
Convention to secure its renunciation when justice might so require; by
some constitutional provisions. If equality between great & small States be
inadmissible, because in that case unequal numbers of Constituents wd be
represented by equal number of votes; was it not equally inadmissible that a
larger & more populous district of America should hereafter have less
representation, than a smaller & less populous district. If a fair
representation of the people be not secured, the injustice of the Govt will
shake it to its foundations. What relates to suffrage is justly stated by the
celebrated Montesquieu, as a fundamental article in Republican Govt. If the
danger suggested by Mr Govr Morris be real, of advantage being taken of
the Legislature in pressing moments, it was an additional reason, for tying
their hands in such a manner that they could not sacrifice their trust to
momentary considerations. Congs have pledged the public faith to New
States, that they shall be admitted on equal terms. They never would or
ought to accede on any other. The census must be taken under the direction
of the General Legislature. The States will be too much interested to take an
impartial one for themselves.
Mr Butler & Genl Pinkney insisted that blacks be included in the rule of
Representation equally with the whites; and for that purpose moved that the
words "three-fifths" be struck out.
Mr Gerry thought that 3/5 of them was to say the least the full proportion
that could be admitted.
Mr Ghorum. This ratio was fixed by Congs as a rule of taxation. Then it
was urged by the Delegates representing the States having slaves that the
blacks were still more inferior to freemen. At present when the ratio of
representation is to be established, we are assured that they are equal to
freemen. The arguments on ye former occasion convinced him that 3/5 was
pretty near the just proportion and he should vote according to the same
opinion now.
Mr Butler insisted that the labour of a slave in S. Carola was as
productive & valuable as that of a freeman in Massts, that as wealth was the
great means of defence and utility to the Nation they were equally valuable
to it with freemen; and that consequently an equal representation ought to
be allowed for them in a Government which was instituted principally for
the protection of property, and was itself to be supported by property.
Mr Mason could not agree to the motion, notwithstanding it was
favorable to Virga because he thought it unjust. It was certain that the slaves
were valuable, as they raised the value of land, increased the exports &
imports, and of course the revenue, would supply the means of feeding &
supporting an army, and might in cases of emergency become themselves
soldiers. As in these important respects they were useful to the Community
at large, they ought not to be excluded from the estimate of Representation.
He could not however regard them as equal to freemen and could not vote
for them as such. He added as worthy of remark, that the Southern States
have this peculiar species of property over & above the other species of
property common to all the States.
Mr Williamson reminded Mr Ghorum that if the Southn States contended
for the inferiority of blacks to whites when taxation was in view, the
Eastern States on the same occasion contended for their equality. He did not
however either then or now concur in either extreme, but approved of the
ratio of 3/5.
On Mr Butler's motion for considering blacks as equal to Whites in the
apportionmt of Representation
Massts no. Cont no. (N. Y. not on floor). N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Govr Morris said he had several objections to the proposition of Mr
Williamson. 1. It fettered the Legislature too much. 2. it would exclude
some States altogether who would not have a sufficient number to entitle
them to a single Representative. 3. it will not consist with the Resolution
passed on Saturday last authorizing the Legislature to adjust the
Representation from time to time on the principles of population & wealth
or with the principles of equity. If slaves were to be considered as
inhabitants, not as wealth then the sd Resolution would not be pursued. If as
wealth, then why is no other wealth but slaves included? These objections
may perhaps be removed by amendments. His great objection was that the
number of inhabitants was not a proper standard of wealth. The amazing
difference between the comparative numbers & wealth of different
countries, rendered all reasoning superfluous on the subject. Numbers might
with greater propriety be deemed a measure of strength, than of wealth, yet
the late defence made by G. Britain, agst her numerous enemies proved in
the clearest manner, that it is entirely fallacious even in this respect.
Mr King thought there was great force in the objections of Mr Govr
Morris: he would however accede to the proposition for the sake of doing
something.
Mr Rutlidge contended for the admission of wealth in the estimate by
which Representation should be regulated. The Western States will not be
able to contribute in proportion to their numbers; they shd not therefore be
represented in that proportion. The Atlantic States will not concur in such a
plan. He moved that "at the end of —— years after the 1st meeting of the
Legislature, and of every —— years thereafter, the Legislature shall
proportion the Representation according to the principles of wealth &
population."
Mr Sherman thought the number of people alone the best rule for
measuring wealth as well as representation; and that if the Legislature were
to be governed by wealth, they would be obliged to estimate it by numbers.
He was at first for leaving the matter wholly to the discretion of the
Legislature; but he had been convinced by the observation of (Mr Randolph
& Mr Mason), that the periods & the rule, of revising the Representation
ought to be fixt by the Constitution.
Mr Reed thought the Legislature ought not to be too much shackled. It
would make the Constitution like Religious Creeds, embarrassing to those
bound to conform to them & more likely to produce dissatisfaction and
scism, than harmony and union.
Mr Mason objected to Mr Rutlidge's motion, as requiring of the
Legislature something too indefinite & impracticable, and leaving them a
pretext for doing nothing.
Mr Wilson had himself no objection to leaving the Legislature entirely at
liberty. But considered wealth as an impracticable rule.
Mr Ghorum. If the Convention who are comparatively so little biassed
by local views are so much perplexed, How can it be expected that the
Legislature hereafter under the full biass of those views, will be able to
settle a standard. He was convinced by the arguments of others & his own
reflections, that the Convention ought to fix some standard or other.
Mr Govr Morris. The argts of others & his own reflections had led him to
a very different conclusion. If we can't agree on a rule that will be just at
this time, how can we expect to find one that will be just in all times to
come. Surely those who come after us will judge better of things present,
than we can of things future. He could not persuade himself that numbers
would be a just rule at any time. The remarks of (Mr Mason) relative to the
Western Country had not changed his opinion on that head. Among other
objections it must be apparent they would not be able to furnish men
equally enlightened, to share in the administration of our common interests.
The Busy haunts of men not the remote wilderness, was the proper school
of political Talents. If the Western people get the power into their hands
they will ruin the Atlantic interests. The Back members are always most
averse to the best measures. He mentioned the case of Pena formerly. The
lower part of the State had ye power in the first instance. They kept it in yr
own hands & the country was ye better for it. Another objection with him
agst admitting the blacks into the census, was that the people of Pena would
revolt at the idea of being put on a footing with slaves. They would reject
any plan that was to have such an effect. Two objections had been raised
agst leaving the adjustment of the Representation from time, to time, to the
discretion of the Legislature. The 1. was, they would be unwilling to revise
it at all. The 2 that by referring to wealth they would be bound by a rule
which if willing, they would be unable to execute. The 1st objn distrusts
their fidelity. But if their duty, their honor & their oaths will not bind them,
let us not put into their hands our liberty, and all our other great interests; let
us have no Govt at all. 2. If these ties will bind them, we need not distrust
the practicability of the rule. It was followed in part by the Come in the
apportionment of Representatives yesterday reported to the House. The best
course that could be taken would be to leave the interests of the people to
the Representatives of the people.
Mr Madison was not a little surprised to hear this implicit confidence
urged by a member who on all occasions, had inculcated so strongly, the
political depravity of men, and the necessity of checking one vice and
interest by opposing to them another vice & interest. If the Representatives
of the people would be bound by the ties he had mentioned, what need was
there of a Senate? What of a Revisionary power? But his reasoning was not
only inconsistent with his former reasoning, but with itself. At the same
time that he recommended this implicit confidence to the Southern States in
the Northern majority, he was still more zealous in exhorting all to a
jealousy of a Western Majority. To reconcile the gentln with himself, it must
be imagined that he determined the human character by the points of the
compass. The truth was that all men having power ought to be distrusted to
a certain degree. The case of Pena had been mentioned where it was
admitted that those who were possessed of the power in the original
settlement, never admitted the new settlemts to a due share of it. England
was a still more striking example. The power there had long been in the
hands of the boroughs, of the minority; who had opposed & defeated every
reform which had been attempted. Virga was in a lesser degree another
example. With regard to the Western States, he was clear & firm in opinion,
that no unfavorable distinctions were admissible either in point of justice or
policy. He thought also that the hope of contributions to the Treasy from
them had been much underrated. Future contributions it seemed to be
understood on all hands would be principally levied on imports & exports.
The extent and fertility of the Western Soil would for a long time give to
agriculture a preference over manufactures. Trials would be repeated till
some articles could be raised from it that would bear a transportation to
places where they could be exchanged for imported manufactures.
Whenever the Mississippi should be opened to them, which would of
necessity be ye case as soon as their population would subject them to any
considerable share of the Public burden, imposts on their trade could be
collected with less expence & greater certainty, than on that of the Atlantic
States. In the mean time, as their supplies must pass through the Atlantic
States, their contributions would be levied in the same manner with those of
the Atlantic States. He could not agree that any substantial objection lay agst
fixg numbers for the perpetual standard of Representation. It was said that
Representation & taxation were to go together; that taxation and wealth
ought to go together, that population & wealth were not measures of each
other. He admitted that in different climates, under different forms of Govt
and in different stages of civilization the inference was perfectly just. He
would admit that in no situation, numbers of inhabitants were an accurate
measure of wealth. He contended however that in the U. States it was
sufficiently so for the object in contemplation. Altho' their climate varied
considerably, yet as the Govts the laws, and the manners of all were nearly
the same, and the intercourse between different parts perfectly free,
population, industry, arts, and the value of labour, would constantly tend to
equalize themselves. The value of labour might be considered as the
principal criterion of wealth and ability to support taxes; and this would
find its level in different places where the intercourse should be easy & free,
with as much certainty as the value of money or any other thing. Wherever
labour would yield most, people would resort, till the competition should
destroy the inequality. Hence it is that the people are constantly swarming
from the more to the less populous places—from Europe to Ama—from the
Northn & Middle parts of the U. S. to the Southern & Western. They go
where land is cheaper, because there labour is dearer. If it be true that the
same quantity of produce raised on the banks of the Ohio is of less value,
than on the Delaware, it is also true that the same labor will raise twice or
thrice, the quantity in the former, that it will raise in the latter situation.
Col. Mason. Agreed with Mr Govr Morris that we ought to leave the
interests of the people to the Representatives of the people; but the
objection was that the Legislature would cease to be the Representatives of
the people. It would continue so no longer than the States now containing a
majority of the people should retain that majority. As soon as the Southern
& Western population should predominate, which must happen in a few
years, the power wd be in the hands of the minority, and would never be
yielded to the majority, unless provided for by the Constitution.
On the Question for postponing Mr Williamson's motion, in order to
consider that of Mr Rutlidge, it passed in the negative, Massts ay.
Cont no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.
On the question on the first clause of Mr Williamson's motion as to
taking a census of the free inhabitants, it passed in the affirmative;
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. no. Geo. no.
the next clause as to 3/5 of the negroes considered.
Mr King being much opposed to fixing numbers as the rule of
representation, was particularly so on account of the blacks. He thought the
admission of them along with Whites at all, would excite great discontents
among the States having no slaves. He had never said as to any particular
point that he would in no event acquiesce in & support it; but he wd say that
if any in case such a declaration was to be made by him, it would be in this.
He remarked that in the temporary allotment of Representatives made by
the Committee, the Southern States had received more than the number of
their white & Three fifths of their black inhabitants entitled them to.
Mr Sherman. S. Carola had not more beyond her proportion than N. York
& N. Hampshire, nor either of them more than was necessary in order to
avoid fractions or reducing them below their proportions. Georgia had
more; but the rapid growth of that State seemed to justify it. In general the
allotment might not be just, but considering all circumstances, he was
satisfied with it.
Mr Ghorum. supported the propriety of establishing numbers as the rule.
He said that in Massts estimates had been taken in the different towns, and
that persons had been curious enough to compare these estimates with the
respective numbers of people; and it had been found even including Boston,
that the most exact proportion prevailed between numbers & property. He
was aware that there might be some weight in what had fallen from his
colleague, as to the umbrage which might be taken by the people of the
Eastern States. But he recollected that when the proposition of Congs for
changing the 8th art: of the Confedn was before the Legislature of Massts the
only difficulty then was to satisfy them that the negroes ought not to have
been counted equally with whites instead of being counted in ratio of three-
fifths only.[129]
[129] They were then to have been a rule of taxation only. Note in Madison's
handwriting.
Mr Wilson did not well see on what principle the admission of blacks in
the proportion of three fifths could be explained. Are they admitted as
Citizens? then why are they not admitted on an equality with White
Citizens? are they admitted as property? then why is not other property
admitted into the computation? These were difficulties however which he
thought must be overruled by the necessity of compromise. He had some
apprehensions also from the tendency of the blending of the blacks with the
whites, to give disgust to the people of Pena, as had been intimated by his
Colleague (Mr Govr Morris). But he differed from him in thinking numbers
of inhabts so incorrect a measure of wealth. He had seen the Western
settlemts of Pa and on a comparison of them with the City of Philada could
discover little other difference, than that property was more unequally
divided among individuals here than there. Taking the same number in the
aggregate in the two situations he believed there would be little difference
in their wealth and ability to contribute to the public wants.
Mr Govr Morris was compelled to declare himself reduced to the
dilemma of doing injustice to the Southern States or to human nature, and
he must therefore do it to the former. For he could never agree to give such
encouragement to the Slave Trade as would be given by allowing them a
representation for their negroes, and he did not believe those States would
ever confederate on terms that would deprive them of that trade.
On Question for agreeing to include 3/5 of the blacks Massts no. Cont ay.
N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md[130] no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
[130] (Mr Carrol sd in explanation of the vote of Md that he wished the
phraseology to be so altered as to obviate if possible the danger which had been
expressed of giving umbrage to the Eastern & Middle States.) Note in Madison's
hand.
On the question as to taking census "the first year after the meeting of
the Legislature"
Massts ay. Cont no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On filling the blank for the periodical census, with 15 years. Agreed to
nem. con.
Mr Madison moved to add, after "15 years," the words "at least" that the
Legislature might anticipate when circumstances were likely to render a
particular year inconvenient.
On this motion for adding "at least," it passed in the negative the States
being equally divided.
Mas. ay. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
A Change of the phraseology of the other clause so as to read, "and the
Legislature shall alter or augment the representation accordingly," was
agreed to nem. con.
On the question on the whole resolution of Mr Williamson as amended,
Mas. no. Cont no. N. J. no. Del. no. Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.
T       , J    12. I  C         .
Mr Govr Morris moved to add to the clause empowering the Legislature
to vary the Representation according to the principles of wealth & numbers
of inhabts a "proviso that taxation shall be in proportion to Representation."
Mr Butler contended again that Representation sd be according to the full
number of inhabts including all the blacks; admitting the justice of Mr Govr
Morris's motion.
Mr Mason also admitted the justice of the principle, but was afraid
embarrassments might be occasioned to the Legislature by it. It might drive
the Legislature to the plan of Requisitions.
Mr Govr Morris, admitted that some objections lay agst his Motion, but
supposed they would be removed by restraining the rule to direct taxation.
With regard to indirect taxes on exports & imports & on consumption the
rule would be inapplicable. Notwithstanding what had been said to the
contrary he was persuaded that the imports & consumption were pretty
nearly equal throughout the Union.
General Pinkney liked the idea. He thought it so just that it could not be
objected to. But foresaw that if the revision of the census was left to the
discretion of the Legislature, it would never be carried into execution. The
rule must be fixed, and the execution of it enforced by the Constitution. He
was alarmed at what was said[131] yesterday, concerning the Negroes. He
was now again alarmed at what had been thrown out concerning the taxing
of exports. S. Carola has in one year exported to the amount of £600,000
Sterling all which was the fruit of the labor of her blacks. Will she be
represented in proportion to this amount? She will not. Neither ought she
then to be subject to a tax on it. He hoped a clause would be inserted in the
system, restraining the Legislature from taxing Exports.
[131] By Mr Govr Morris. Note in Madison's handwriting.
Mr Wilson approved the principle, but could not see how it could be
carried into execution; unless restrained to direct taxation.
Mr Govr Morris having so varied his Motion by inserting the word
"direct." It passd nem. con. as follows—"provided always that direct
taxation ought to be proportioned to representation."
Mr Davie said it was high time now to speak out. He saw that it was
meant by some gentlemen to deprive the Southern States of any share of
Representation for their blacks. He was sure that N. Carola would never
confederate on any terms that did not rate them at least as 3/5. If the Eastern
States meant therefore to exclude them altogether the business was at an
end.
Dr Johnson, thought that wealth and population were the true, equitable
rule of representation; but he conceived that these two principles resolved
themselves into one; population being the best measure of wealth. He
concluded therefore that ye number of people ought to be established as the
rule, and that all descriptions including blacks equally with the Whites,
ought to fall within the computation. As various opinions had been
expressed on the subject, he would move that a Committee might be
appointed to take them into consideration and report thereon.
Mr Govr Morris. It has been said that it is high time to speak out, as one
member, he would candidly do so. He came here to form a compact for the
good of America. He was ready to do so with all the States. He hoped &
believed that all would enter into such a Compact. If they would not he was
ready to join with any States that would. But as the Compact was to be
voluntary, it is in vain for the Eastern States to insist on what the Southn
States will never agree to. It is equally vain for the latter to require what the
other States can never admit; and he verily believed the people of Pena will
never agree to a representation of Negroes. What can be desired by these
States more than has been already proposed; that the Legislature shall from
time to time regulate Representation according to population & wealth.
Genl Pinkney desired that the rule of wealth should be ascertained and
not left to the pleasure of the Legislature; and that property in slaves should
not be exposed to danger under a Govt instituted for the protection of
property.
The first clause in the Report of the first Grand Committee was
postponed.
Mr Elseworth. In order to carry into effect the principle established,
moved that to add to the last clause adopted by the House the words
following, "and that the rule of contribution by direct taxation for the
support of the Government of the U. States shall be the number of white
inhabitants, and three fifths of every other description in the several States,
until some other rule that shall more accurately ascertain the wealth of the
several States can be devised and adopted by the Legislature."
Mr Butler seconded the motion in order that it might be committed.
Mr Randolph was not satisfied with the motion. The danger will be
revived that the ingenuity of the Legislature may evade or pervert the rule
so as to perpetuate the power where it shall be lodged in the first instance.
He proposed in lieu of Mr Elseworth's motion, "that in order to ascertain the
alterations in Representation that may be required from time to time by
changes in the relative circumstances of the States, a Census shall be taken
within two years from the 1st meeting of the Genl Legislature of the
U.S. and once within the term of every —— year afterwards, of all the
inhabitants in the manner & according to the ratio recommended by
Congress in their resolution of the 18th day of Apl 1783, (rating the blacks
at 3/5 of their number) and that the Legislature of the U. S. shall arrange the
Representation accordingly." He urged strenuously that express security
ought to be provided for including slaves in the ratio of Representation. He
lamented that such a species of property existed. But as it did exist the
holders of it would require this security. It was perceived that the design
was entertained by some of excluding slaves altogether; the Legislature
therefore ought not to be left at liberty.
Mr Elseworth withdraws his motion & seconds that of Mr Randolph.
Mr Wilson observed that less umbrage would perhaps be taken agst an
admission of the slaves into the Rule of representation, if it should be so
expressed as to make them indirectly only an ingredient in the rule, by
saying that they should enter into the rule of taxation; and as representation
was to be according to taxation, the end would be equally attained. He
accordingly moved & was 2ded so to alter the last clause adopted by the
House, that together with the amendment proposed the whole should read
as follows—provided always that the representation ought to be
proportioned according to direct taxation, and in order to ascertain the
alterations in the direct taxation which may be required from time to time
by the changes in the relative circumstances of the States, Resolved that a
census be taken within two years from the first meeting of the Legislature
of the U. States, and once within the term of every —— years afterwards of
all the inhabitants of the U.S. in the manner and according to the ratio
recommended by Congress in their Resolution of April 18. 1783; and that
the Legislature of the U.S. shall proportion the direct taxation accordingly.
Mr King. Altho' this amendment varies the aspect somewhat, he had still
two powerful objections agst tying down the Legislature to the rule of
numbers. 1. they were at this time an uncertain index of the relative wealth
of the States. 2. if they were a just index at this time it can not be supposed
always to continue so. He was far from wishing to retain any unjust
advantage whatever in one part of the Republic. If justice was not the basis
of the connection it could not be of long duration. He must be shortsighted
indeed who does not foresee that whenever the Southern States shall be
more numerous than the Northern, they can & will hold a language that will
awe them into justice. If they threaten to separate now in case injury shall
be done them, will their threats be less urgent or effectual, when force shall
back their demands. Even in the intervening period, there will be no point
of time at which they will not be able to say, do us justice or we will
separate. He urged the necessity of placing confidence to a certain degree in
every Govt and did not conceive that the proposed confidence as to a
periodical readjustment of the representation exceeded that degree.
Mr Pinkney moved to amend Mr Randolph's motion so as to make
"blacks equal to the whites in the ratio of representation." This he urged was
nothing more than justice. The blacks are the labourers, the peasants of the
Southern States: they are as productive of pecuniary resources as those of
the Northern States. They add equally to the wealth, and considering money
as the sinew of war, to the strength of the nation. It will also be politic with
regard to the Northern States, as taxation is to keep pace with
Representation.
Genl Pinkney moves to insert 6 years instead of two, as the period
computing from the 1st meeting of ye Legise within which the first census
should be taken. On this question for inserting six, instead of "two" in the
proposition of Mr Wilson, it passed in the affirmative
Massts no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. divd. Mayd ay. Va no. N. C. no.
S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On a question for filling the blank for ye periodical census with 20 years,
it passed in the negative
Massts no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P. ay. Del. no. Md no. Va no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.
On a question for 10 years, it passed in the affirmative.
Mass. ay. Cont no. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On Mr Pinkney's motion for rating blacks as equal to Whites instead of
as 3/5.
Mass. no. Cont no. (Dr Johnson ay) N. J. no. Pa no. (3 agst 2.) Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo—ay.
Mr Randolph's proposition as varied by Mr Wilson being read for
question on the whole—
Mr Gerry, urged that the principle of it could not be carried into
execution as the States were not to be taxed as States. With regard to taxes
in imposts, he conceived they would be more productive Where there were
no slaves than where there were; the consumption being greater—
Mr Elseworth. In case of a poll tax there wd be no difficulty. But there wd
probably be none. The sum allotted to a State may be levied without
difficulty according to the plan used by the State in raising its own supplies.
On the question of ye whole proposition; as proportioning representation to
direct taxation & both to the white & 3/5 of black inhabitants, & requiring a
Census within six years—& within every ten years afterwards.
Mass. divd. Cont ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. divd. Geo. ay.
F     , J    13. I  C         .
It being moved to postpone the clause in the Report of the Committee of
Eleven as to the originating of money bills in the first branch, in order to
take up the following—"that in the 2d branch each State shall have an equal
voice,"
Mr Gerry, moved to add as an amendment to the last clause agreed to by
the House, "that from the first meeting of the Legislature of the U.S. till a
census shall be taken all monies to be raised for supplying the public
Treasury by direct taxation shall be assessed on the inhabitants of the
several States according to the number of their Representatives respectively
in the 1st branch." He said this would be as just before as after the Census;
according to the general principle that taxation & Representation ought to
go together.
Mr Williamson feared that N. Hampshire will have reason to complain. 3
members were allotted to her as a liberal allowance, for this reason among
others, that she might not suppose any advantage to have been taken of her
absence. As she was still absent, and had no opportunity of deciding
whether she would chuse to retain the number on the condition, of her being
taxed in proportion to it, he thought the number ought to be reduced from
three to two, before the question was taken on Mr G's motion.
Mr Read could not approve of the proposition. He had observed he said
in the Committee a backwardness in some of the members from the large
States, to take their full proportion of Representatives. He did not then see
the motive. He now suspects it was to avoid their due share of taxation. He
had no objection to a just & accurate adjustment of Representation &
taxation to each other.
Mr Govr Morris & Mr Madison answered that the charge itself involved
an acquittal; since notwithstanding the augmentation of the number of
members allotted to Massts & Va the motion for proportioning the burdens
thereto was made by a member from the former State & was approved by
Mr M. from the latter who was on the Come. Mr Govr Morris said that he
thought Pa had her due share in 8 members; and he could not in candor ask
for more. Mr M. said that having always conceived that the difference of
interest in the U. States lay not between the large & small, but the N. &
Southn States, and finding that the number of members allotted to the
N. States was greatly superior, he should have preferred, an addition of two
members to the S. States, to wit one to N. & 1 to S. Carla rather than of one
member to Virga. He liked the present motion, because it tended to
moderate the views both of the opponents & advocates for rating very high,
the negroes.
Mr Elseworth hoped the proposition would be withdrawn. It entered too
much into detail. The general principle was already sufficiently settled. As
fractions can not be regarded in apportioning the No of representatives, the
rule will be unjust, until an actual census shall be made. After that taxation
may be precisely proportioned according to the principle established, to the
number of inhabitants.
Mr Wilson hoped the motion would not be withdrawn. If it shd it will be
made from another quarter. The rule will be as reasonable & just before, as
after a Census. As to fractional numbers, the Census will not destroy, but
ascertain them. And they will have the same effect after as before the
Census; for as he understands the rule, it is to be adjusted not to the number
of inhabitants, but of Representatives.
Mr Sherman opposed the motion. He thought the Legislature ought to be
left at liberty: in which case they would probably conform to the principles
observed by Congs.
Mr Mason did not know that Virga would be a loser by the proposed
regulation, but had some scruple as to the justice of it. He doubted much
whether the conjectural rule which was to precede the Census, would be as
just, as it would be rendered by an actual census.
Mr Elseworth & Mr Sherman moved to postpone the motion of Mr
Gerry. On ye question, it passed in the negative. Mass. no. Cont ay. N. J. ay.
Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Question on Mr Gerry's motion, it passed in the negative, the States
being equally divided.
Mass. ay. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va no. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Gerry finding that the loss of the question had proceeded from an
objection with some, to the proposed assessment of direct taxes on the
inhabitants of the States, which might restrain the Legislature to a poll tax,
moved his proposition again, but so varied as to authorize the assessment on
the States, which leaves the mode to the Legislature, viz "that from the 1st
meeting of the Legislature of the U. S. untill a census shall be taken, all
monies for supplying the public Treasury by direct taxation shall be raised
from the said several States according to the number of their representatives
respectively in the 1st branch."
On this varied question, it passed in the affirmative
Mas. ay. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa divd Del. no. Md no. Va ay N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On the motion of Mr Randolph, the vote of saturday last authorizing the
Legislre to adjust from time to time, the representation upon the principles
of wealth & numbers of inhabitants, was reconsidered by common consent
in order to strike out "Wealth" and adjust the resolution to that requiring
periodical revisions, according to the number of whites & three fifths of the
blacks: the motion was in the words following:—"But as the present
situation of the States may probably alter in the number of their inhabitants,
that the Legislature of the U. S. be authorized from time to time to
apportion the number of representatives; and in case any of the States shall
hereafter be divided or any two or more States united or new States created
within the limits of the U. S. the Legislature of U. S. shall possess authority
to regulate the number of Representatives in any of the foregoing cases,
upon the principle of their number of inhabitants; according to the
provisions hereafter mentioned."
Mr Govr Morris opposed the alteration as leaving still incoherence. If
Negroes were to be viewed as inhabitants, and the revision was to proceed
on the principle of numbers of inhabts they ought to be added in their entire
number, and not in the proportion of 3/5. If as property, the word wealth
was right, and striking it out would produce the very inconsistency which it
was meant to get rid of.—The train of business & the late turn which it had
taken, had led him he said, into deep meditation on it, and He wd candidly
state the result. A distinction had been set up & urged, between the Nn and
Southn States. He had hitherto considered this doctrine as heretical. He still
thought the distinction groundless. He sees however that it is persisted in,
and the Southn Gentlemen will not be satisfied unless they see the way open
to their gaining a majority in the public Councils. The consequence of such
a transfer of power from the maritime to the interior & landed interest will
he foresees be such an oppression of commerce that he shall be obliged to
vote for ye vicious principle of equality in the 2d branch in order to provide
some defence for the N. States agst it. But to come more to the point; either
this distinction is fictitious or real; if fictitious let it be dismissed & let us
proceed with due confidence. If it be real, instead of attempting to blend
incompatible things, let us at once take a friendly leave of each other. There
can be no end of demands for security if every particular interest is to be
entitled to it. The Eastern States may claim it for their fishery, and for other
objects, as the Southn States claim it for their peculiar objects. In this
struggle between the two ends of the Union, what part ought the middle
States in point of policy to take: to join their Eastern brethren according to
his ideas. If the Southn States get the power into their hands, and be joined
as they will be with the interior Country, they will inevitably bring on a war
with Spain for the Mississippi. This language is already held. The interior
Country having no property nor interest exposed on the sea, will be little
affected by such a war. He wished to know what security the Northn &
middle States will have agst this danger. It has been said that N. C. S. C.,
and Georgia only will in a little time have a majority of the people of
America. They must in that case include the great interior Country, and
every thing was to be apprehended from their getting the power into their
hands.
Mr Butler. The security the Southn States want is that their negroes may
not be taken from them, which some gentlemen within or without doors,
have a very good mind to do. It was not supposed that N. C. S. C. & Geo.
would have more people than all the other States, but many more relatively
to the other States than they now have. The people & strength of America
are evidently bearing Southwardly & S. westwdly.
Mr Wilson. If a general declaration would satisfy any gentleman he had
no indisposition to declare his sentiments. Conceiving that all men
wherever placed have equal rights and are equally entitled to confidence, he
viewed without apprehension the period when a few States should contain
the superior number of people. The majority of people wherever found
ought in all questions to govern the minority. If the interior Country should
acquire this majority, it will not only have the right, but will avail itself of it
whether we will or no. This jealousy misled the policy of G. Britain with
regard to America. The fatal maxims espoused by her were that the
Colonies were growing too fast, and that their growth must be stinted in
time. What were the consequences?, first, enmity on our part, then actual
separation. Like consequences will result on the part of the interior
settlements, if like jealousy & policy be pursued on ours. Further, if
numbers be not a proper rule, why is not some better rule pointed out. No
one has yet ventured to attempt it. Congs have never been able to discover a
better. No State as far as he had heard, had suggested any other. In 1783,
after elaborate discussion of a measure of wealth all were satisfied then as
they are now that the rule of numbers, does not differ much from the
combined rule of numbers & wealth. Again he could not agree that property
was the sole or primary object of Govt & society. The cultivation &
improvement of the human mind was the most noble object. With respect to
this object, as well as to other personal rights, numbers were surely the
natural & precise measure of Representation. And with respect to property,
they could not vary much from the precise measure. In no point of view
however could the establishmt of numbers as the rule of representation in
the 1st branch vary his opinion as to the impropriety of letting a vicious
principle into the 2d branch.—On the Question to strike out Wealth, & to
make the change as moved by Mr Randolph, it passed in the affirmative.
Mas. ay. Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del divd. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Reed moved to insert after the word "divided," "or enlarged by
addition of territory" which was agreed to nem con. (his object probably
was to provide for such cases as an enlargemt of Delaware by annexing to it
the Peninsula on the East side of the Chesapeak.)
Adjourned.
S       , J    14.    C         .
Mr L. Martin called for the question on the whole report, including the
parts relating to the origination of money bills, and the equality of votes in
the 2d branch.
Mr Gerry, wished before the question should be put, that the attention of
the House might be turned to the dangers apprehended from Western States.
He was for admitting them on liberal terms, but not for putting ourselves in
their hands. They will if they acquire power like all men, abuse it. They will
oppress commerce, and drain our wealth into the Western Country. To guard
agst these consequences, he thought it necessary to limit the number of new
States to be admitted into the Union, in such a manner, that they should
never be able to outnumber the Atlantic States. He accordingly moved "that
in order to secure the liberties of the States already confederated, the
number of Representatives in the 1st branch, of the States which shall
hereafter be established, shall never exceed in number, the Representatives
from such of the States as shall accede to this Confederation.
Mr King, seconded the motion.
Mr Sherman, thought there was no probability that the number of future
States would exceed that of the Existing States. If the event should ever
happen, it was too remote to be taken into consideration at this time.
Besides We are providing for our posterity, for our children & our grand
Children; who would be as likely to be citizens of new Western States, as of
the old States. On this consideration alone, we ought to make no such
discrimination as was proposed by the motion.
Mr Gerry. If some of our children should remove, others will stay
behind, and he thought it incumbent on us to provide for their interests.
There was a rage for emigration from the Eastern States to the Western
Country, and he did not wish those remaining behind to be at the mercy of
the emigrants. Besides foreigners are resorting to that Country, and it is
uncertain what turn things may take there.—On the question for agreeing to
the Motion of Mr Gerry, it passed in the negative.
Mass. ay. Cont ay. N. J. no. Pa divd. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Rutlidge proposed to reconsider the two propositions touching the
originating of money bills in the first & the equality of votes in the second
branch.
Mr Sherman was for the question on the whole at once. It was he said a
conciliatory plan, it had been considered in all its parts, a great deal of time
had been spent upon it, and if any part should now be altered, it would be
necessary to go over the whole ground again.
Mr L. Martin urged the question on the whole. He did not like many
parts of it. He did not like having two branches, nor the inequality of votes
in the 1st branch. He was willing however to make trial of the plan, rather
than do nothing.
Mr Wilson traced the progress of the report through its several stages,
remarking yt when on the question concerning an equality of votes, the
House was divided, our Constituents had they voted as their representatives
did, would have stood as 2/3 agst the equality, and 1/3 only in favor of it.
This fact would ere long be known, and it will appear that this fundamental
point has been carried by 1/3 agst 2/3. What hopes will our Constituents
entertain when they find that the essential principles of justice have been
violated in the outset of the Governmt. As to the privilege of originating
money bills, it was not considered by any as of much moment, and by many
as improper in itself. He hoped both clauses wd be reconsidered. The
equality of votes was a point of such critical importance, that every
opportunity ought to be allowed, for discussing and collecting the mind of
the Convention upon it.
Mr L. Martin denies that there were 2/3 agst the equality of votes. The
States that please to call themselves large, are the weakest in the Union.
Look at Masts. Look at Virga. Are they efficient States? He was for letting a
separation take place if they desired it. He had rather there should be two
Confederacies, than one founded on any other principle than an equality of
votes in the 2d branch at least.
Mr Wilson was not surprised that those who say that a minority is more
than a majority should say the minority is stronger than the majority. He
supposed the next assertion will be that they are richer also; though he
hardly expected it would be persisted in when the States shall be called on
for taxes & troops.
Mr Gerry also animadverted on Mr L. Martins remarks on the weakness
of Masts. He favored the reconsideration with a view not of destroying the
equality of votes; but of providing that the States should vote per Capita,
which he said would prevent the delays & inconveniences that had been
experienced in Congs and would give a national aspect & Spirit to the
management of business. He did not approve of a reconsideration of the
clause relating to money bills. It was of great consequence. It was the
corner stone of the accommodation. If any member of the Convention had
the exclusive privilege of making propositions, would any one say that it
would give him no advantage over other members. The Report was not
altogether to his mind. But he would agree to it as it stood rather than throw
it out altogether.
The reconsideration being tacitly agreed to
Mr Pinkney moved that instead of an equality of votes, the States should
be represented in the 2d branch as follows: N. H. by 2 members. Mass. 4. R.
I. 1. Cont 3. N. Y. 3. N. J. 2. Pa 4. Del. 1; Md 3. Virga 5. N. C. 3. S. C. 3.
Geo. 2. making in the whole 36.
Mr Wilson seconds the motion
Mr Dayton. The smaller States can never give up their equality. For
himself he would in no event yield that security for their rights.
Mr Sherman, urged the equality of votes not so much as a Security for
the small States; as for the State Govts which could not be preserved unless
they were represented & had a negative in the Genl Government. He had no
objection to the members in the 2d b. voting per capita, as had been
suggested by (Mr Gerry).
Mr Madison concurred in this motion of Mr Pinkney as a reasonable
compromise.
Mr Gerry said he should like the motion, but could see no hope of
success. An accommodation must take place, and it was apparent from what
had been seen that it could not do so on the ground of the motion. He was
utterly against a partial confederacy, leaving other States to accede or not
accede, as had been intimated.
Mr King said it was always with regret that he differed from his
colleagues, but it was his duty to differ from (Mr Gerry) on this occasion.
He considered the proposed Government as substantially and formally, a
General and National Government over the people of America. There never
will be a case in which it will act as a federal Government on the States and
not on the individual Citizens. And is it not a clear principle that in a free
Govt those who are to be the objects of a Govt ought to influence the
operations of it? What reason can be assigned why the same rule of
representation sd not prevail in the 2d branch as in the 1st.? He could
conceive none. On the contrary, every view of the subject that presented
itself, seemed to require it. Two objections had been raised agst it, drawn 1.
from the terms of the existing compact. 2. from a supposed danger to the
smaller States.—As to the first objection he thought it inapplicable.
According to the existing Confederation, the rule by which the public
burdens is to be apportioned is fixed, and must be pursued. In the proposed
Governt it cannot be fixed, because indirect taxation is to be substituted.
The Legislature therefore will have full discretion to impose taxes in such
modes & proportions as they may judge expedient. As to the 2d objection,
he thought it of as little weight. The Genl Governt can never wish to intrude
on the State Governts. There could be no temptation. None had been pointed
out. In order to prevent the interference of measures which seemed most
likely to happen, he would have no objection to throwing all the State debts
into the federal debt, making one aggregate debt of about 70,000,000 of
dollars, and leaving it to be discharged by the Genl Govt. According to the
idea of securing the State Govts there ought to be three distinct legislative
branches. The 2d was admitted to be necessary, and was actually meant, to
check the 1st branch, to give more wisdom, system, & stability to the Govt
and ought clearly as it was to operate on the people, to be proportioned to
them. For the third purpose of securing the States, there ought then to be a
3d branch, representing the States as such, and guarding by equal votes their
rights & dignities. He would not pretend to be as thoroughly acquainted
with his immediate Constituents as his colleagues, but it was his firm belief
that Masts would never be prevailed on to yield to an equality of votes. In
N. York, (he was sorry to be obliged to say any thing relative to that State in
the absence of its representatives, but the occasion required it), in N. York
he had seen that the most powerful argument used by the considerate
opponents to the grant of the Impost to Congress, was pointed agst the
vicious constitution of Congs with regard to representation & suffrage. He
was sure that no Govt could last that was not founded on just principles. He
preferred the doing of nothing, to an allowance of an equal vote to all the
States. It would be better he thought to submit to a little more confusion &
convulsion, than to submit to such an evil. It was difficult to say what the
views of different Gentlemen might be. Perhaps there might be some who
thought no Governmt co-extensive with the U. States could be established
with a hope of its answering the purpose. Perhaps there might be other fixed
opinions incompatible with the object we are pursuing. If there were, he
thought it but candid that Gentlemen should speak out that we might
understand one another.
Mr Strong. The Convention had been much divided in opinion. In order
to avoid the consequences of it, an accommodation had been proposed. A
Committee had been appointed: and though some of the members of it were
averse to an equality of votes, a Report had been made in favor of it. It is
agreed on all hands that Congress are nearly at an end. If no
Accommodation takes place, the Union itself must soon be dissolved. It has
been suggested that if we cannot come to any general agreement, the
principal States may form & recommend a Scheme of Government. But
will the small States in that case ever accede it. Is it probable that the large
States themselves will under such circumstances embrace and ratify it. He
thought the small States had made a considerable concession in the article
of money bills, and that they might naturally expect some concessions on
the other side. From this view of the matter he was compelled to give his
vote for the Report taken altogether.
Mr Madison expressed his apprehensions that if the proper foundation of
Governmt was destroyed, by substituting an equality in place of a
proportional Representation, no proper superstructure would be raised. If
the small States really wish for a Government armed with the powers
necessary to secure their liberties, and to enforce obedience on the larger
members as well as themselves he could not help thinking them extremely
mistaken in their means. He reminded them of the consequences of laying
the existing Confederation on improper principles. All the principal parties
to its compilation joined immediately in mutilating & fettering the
Governmt in such a manner that it has disappointed every hope placed in it.
He appealed to the doctrine & arguments used by themselves on a former
occasion. It had been very properly observed by (Mr Patterson) that
Representation was an expedient by which the meeting of the people
themselves was rendered unnecessary; And that the representatives ought
therefore to bear a proportion to the votes which their constituents if
convened would respectively have. Was not this remark as applicable to one
branch of the Representation as to the other? But it had been said that the
Governt would in its operation be partly federal, partly national; that altho'
in the latter respect the Representatives of the people ought to be in
proportion to the people; yet in the former it ought to be according to the
number of States. If there was any solidity in this distinction he was ready
to abide by it, if there was none it ought to be abandoned. In all cases where
the Genl Governmt is to act on the people, let the people be represented and
the votes be proportional. In all cases where the Governt is to act on the
States as such in like manner as Congs now acts on them, let the States be
represented & the votes be equal. This was the true ground of compromise
if there was any ground at all. But he denied that there was any ground. He
called for a single instance in which the Genl Govt was not to operate on the
people individually. The practicability of making laws, with coercive
sanctions, for the States as Political bodies, had been exploded on all hands.
He observed that the people of the large States would in some way or other
secure to themselves a weight proportioned to the importance accruing from
their superior numbers. If they could not effect it by a proportional
representation in the Govt they would probably accede to no Govt which did
not in a great measure depend for its efficacy on their voluntary
cooperation; in which case they would indirectly secure their object. The
existing confederacy proved that where the Acts of the Genl Govt were to
be executed by the particular Govts the latter had a weight in proportion to
their importance. No one would say that either in Congs or out of Congs.
Delaware had equal weight with Pennsylva. If the latter was to supply ten
times as much money as the former, and no compulsion could be used, it
was of ten times more importance, that she should voluntarily furnish the
supply. In the Dutch confederacy the votes of the Provinces were equal. But
Holland which supplies about half the money, governed the whole republic.
He enumerated the objections agst an equality of votes in the 2d branch,
notwithstanding the proportional representation in the first. 1. the minority
could negative the will of the majority of the people. 2. they could extort
measures by making them a condition of their assent to other necessary
measures. 3. they could obtrude measures on the majority by virtue of the
peculiar powers which would be vested in the Senate. 4. the evil instead of
being cured by time, would increase with every new State that should be
admitted, as they must all be admitted on the principle of equality. 5. the
perpetuity it would give to the preponderance of the Northn agst the Southn
Scale was a serious consideration. It seemed now to be pretty well
understood that the real difference of interests lay, not between the large &
small but between the N. & Southn States. The institution of slavery & its
consequences formed the line of discrimination. There were 5 States on the
South, 8 on the Northn side of this line. Should a proportl representation
take place it was true, the N. side would still outnumber the other; but not in
the same degree, at this time; and every day would tend towards an
equilibrium.
Mr Wilson would add a few words only. If equality in the 2d branch was
an error that time would correct, he should be less anxious to exclude it
being sensible that perfection was unattainable in any plan; but being a
fundamental and a perpetual error, it ought by all means to be avoided. A
vice in the Representation, like an error in the first concoction, must be
followed by disease, convulsions, and finally death itself. The justice of the
general principle of proportional representation has not in argument at least
been yet contradicted. But it is said that a departure from it so far as to give
the States an equal vote in one branch of the Legislature is essential to their
preservation. He had considered this position maturely, but could not see its
application. That the States ought to be preserved he admitted. But does it
follow that an equality of votes is necessary for the purpose? Is there any
reason to suppose that if their preservation should depend more on the large
than on the small States the security of the States agst the Genl Government
would be diminished? Are the large States less attached to their existence
more likely to commit suicide, than the small? An equal vote then is not
necessary as far as he can conceive: and is liable among other objections to
this insuperable one: The great fault of the existing confederacy is its
inactivity. It has never been a complaint agst Congs that they governed over
much. The complaint has been that they have governed too little. To remedy
this defect we were sent here. Shall we effect the cure by establishing an
equality of votes as is proposed? no: this very equality carries us directly to
Congress; to the system which it is our duty to rectify. The small States
cannot indeed act, by virtue of this equality, but they may controul the Govt
as they have done in Congs. This very measure is here prosecuted by a
minority of the people of America. Is then the object of the Convention
likely to be accomplished in this way? Will not our Constituents say? we
sent you to form an efficient Govt and you have given us one more complex
indeed, but having all the weakness of the former governt. He was anxious
for uniting all the States under one Governt. He knew there were some
respectable men who preferred three confederacies, united by offensive &
defensive alliances. Many things may be plausibly said, some things may be
justly said, in favor of such a project. He could not however concur in it
himself; but he thought nothing so pernicious as bad first principles.
Mr Elseworth asked two questions, one of Mr Wilson, whether he had
ever seen a good measure fail in Congs for want of a majority of States in
its favor? He had himself never known such an instance: the other of Mr
Madison whether a negative lodged with the majority of the States even the
smallest, could be more dangerous than the qualified negative proposed to
be lodged in a single Executive Magistrate, who must be taken from some
one State?
Mr Sherman, signified that his expectation was that the Genl Legislature
would in some cases act on the federal principle, of requiring quotas. But
he thought it ought to be empowered to carry their own plans into
execution, if the States should fail to supply their respective quotas.
On the question for agreeing to Mr Pinkney's motion for allowing N. H.
2. Mas. 4. &c—it passed in the negative,
Mass. no. Mr King ay. Mr Ghorum absent. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa ay.
Del. no. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Adjourned.[132]
[132] "Memorandum. "July 15, '87.
"About twelve days since the Convention appointed a Grand Comee,
consisting of Gerry, Ellsworth, Yates, Paterson, Franklin, Bedford, Martin,
Mason, Rutledge & Baldwin to adjust the Representation in the two Brs. of the
Legislature of the U. S. They reported yt. every 40,000 Inhabs. taken agreeably
to the Resolution of Cong. of ye 18 Ap. 1783, shd. send one member to the first
Br. of the Legislature, yt. this Br. shd. originate exclusively Money Bills, & also
originate ye appropriations of money; and that in ye Senate or upper Br. each
State shd. have one vote & no more. The Representation as to the first Br. was
twice recommitted altho' not to the same Committee; finally it was agreed yt
Taxation of the direct sort & Representation shd. be in direct proportion with
each other—that the first Br. shd. consist of 65 members, viz. N. H. 3, M. 8, R. I.
1, C. 5, N. Y. 6, N. J. 4, P. 8, D. 1, M. 6, V. 10, N. C. 5, S. C. 5, G. 3,—and that
the origination of money Bills and the Appropriations of money shd. belong in
the first instance to yt. Br., but yt in the Senate or 2nd Br. each State shd. have an
equal Vote. In this situation of the Report it was moved by S. Car. that in the
formation of the 2nd Br., instead of an equality of Votes among the States, that
N. H. shd. have 2, M. 4, R. I. 1, C. 3, N. Y. 3, N. J. 2, P. 4, D. 1, M. 3, V. 5, N. C.
3, S. C. 3, G. 2 = total 36.
"On the question to agree to this apportionment, instead of the equality (Mr.
Gorham being absent) Mass., Con., N. Jer., Del., N. Car., & Georg—No. Penn.,
Mar., Virg. & S. Car. Aye.
"This Question was taken and to my mortification by the vote of Mass. lost
on the 14th July.
"(endorsed 'inequality lost by vote of Mass.')"—King's Note, King's Life and
Correspondence of Rufus King, I., 615.
M     , J    16. I  C         .
On the question for agreeing to the whole Report as amended &
including the equality of votes in the 2d branch, it passed in the affirmative.
Mass. divided Mr Gerry, Mr Strong. ay. Mr King, Mr Ghorum no.
Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pena no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no. N. C. ay. Mr Spraight
no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The whole thus passed is in the words following, viz. "Resolved, that in
the original formation of the Legislature of the U. S. the first branch thereof
shall consist of sixty five members, of which number N. Hampshire shall
send 3. Massts 8. Rh. I. 1. Connt 5. N. Y. 6. N. J. 4. Pena 8. Del. 1. Maryd 6.
Virga 10. N. C. 5. S. C. 5. Geo. 3.—But as the present situation of the States
may probably alter in the number of their inhabitants, the Legislature of the
U. S. shall be authorized from time to time to apportion the number of Reps
and in case any of the States shall hereafter be divided, or enlarged by
addition of territory, or any two or more States united, or any new States
created within the limits of the U. S. the Legislature of the U. S. shall
possess authority to regulate the number of Reps in any of the foregoing
cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabitants, according to the
provisions hereafter mentioned. namely—provided always that
representation ought to be proportioned according to direct taxation; and in
order to ascertain the alteration in the direct taxation, which may be
required from time to time by the changes in the relative circumstances of
the States—
Resolved, that a Census be taken within six years from the 1st meeting of
the Legislature of the U. S., and once within the term of every 10 years
afterwards of all the inhabitants of the U. S. in the manner and according to
the ratio recommended by Congress in their Resolution of April 18. 1783,
and that the Legislature of the U. S. shall proportion the direct taxation
accordingly—
Resolved, that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing
the salaries of officers of the Govt of the U. S. shall originate in the first
branch of the Legislature of the U. S. and shall not be altered or amended in
the 2d branch: and that no money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury,
but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the 1st branch.
Resolvd, that in the 2d branch of the Legislature of the U. S., each State
shall have an equal vote.
The 6th Resol: in the Report from the Come of the whole House, which
had been postponed in order to consider the 7 & 8th Resolns.; was now
resumed. see the Resoln:
The 1st member "That the Natl Legislature ought to possess the
Legislative Rights vested in Congs by the Confederation" was agreed to
nem. con.
The next, "And moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate
States are incompetent; or in which the harmony of the U. S. may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation," being read for a
question.
Mr Butler calls for some explanation of the extent of this power;
particularly of the word incompetent. The vagueness of the terms rendered
it impossible for any precise judgment to be formed.
Mr Ghorum. The vagueness of the terms constitutes the propriety of
them. We are now establishing general principles, to be extended hereafter
into details which will be precise & explicit.
Mr Rutlidge, urged the objection started by Mr Butler and moved that the
clause should be committed to the end that a specification of the powers
comprised in the general terms, might be reported.
On the question for commitment, the States were equally divided
Mas. no. Cont ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay: So it was lost.
Mr Randolph. The vote of this morning (involving an equality of
suffrage in 2d branch) had embarrassed the business extremely. All the
powers given in the Report from the Come of the whole, were founded on
the supposition that a Proportional representation was to prevail in both
branches of the Legislature. When he came here this morning his purpose
was to have offered some propositions that might if possible have united a
great majority of votes, and particularly might provide agst the danger
suspected on the part of the smaller States, by enumerating the cases in
which it might lie, and allowing an equality of votes in such cases.[133] But
finding from the Preceding vote that they persist in demanding an equal
vote in all cases, that they have succeeded in obtaining it, and that N. York,
if present would probably be on the same side, he could not but think we
were unprepared to discuss this subject further. It will probably be in vain to
come to any final decision with a bare majority on either side. For these
reasons he wished the Convention might adjourn, that the large States might
consider the steps proper to be taken in the present solemn crisis of the
business, and that the small States might also deliberate on the means of
conciliation.
[133] See the paper, in the appendix, com̃unicated by Mr R. to J. M. July 10.—
Note in Madison's hand.
Mr Patterson, thought with Mr R. that it was high time for the
Convention to adjourn that the rule of secrecy ought to be rescinded, and
that our Constituents should be consulted. No conciliation could be
admissible on the part of the smaller States on any other ground than that of
an equality of votes in the 2d branch. If Mr Randolph would reduce to form
his motion for an adjournment sine die, he would second it with all his
heart.
Genl Pinkney wished to know of Mr R. whether he meant an
adjournment sine die, or only an adjournment for the day. If the former was
meant, it differed much from his idea. He could not think of going to
S. Carolina and returning again to this place. Besides it was chimerical to
suppose that the States if consulted would ever accord separately, and
beforehand.
Mr Randolph, had never entertained an idea of an adjournment sine die;
& was sorry that his meaning had been so readily & strangely
misinterpreted. He had in view merely an adjournment till to-morrow, in
order that some conciliatory experiment might if possible be devised, and
that in case the smaller States should continue to hold back, the larger might
then take such measures, he would not say what, as might be necessary.
Mr Patterson seconded the adjournment till to-morrow, as an opportunity
seemed to be wished by the larger States to deliberate further on
conciliatory expedients.
On the question for adjourning till tomorrow, the States were equally
divided,
Mas. no. Cont no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. no. Geo. no, so it was lost.
Mr Broome thought it his duty to declare his opinion agst an adjournment
sine die, as had been urged by Mr Patterson. Such a measure he thought
would be fatal. Something must be done by the Convention, tho' it should
be by a bare majority.
Mr Gerry observed that Masts was opposed to an adjournment, because
they saw no new ground of compromise. But as it seemed to be the opinion
of so many States that a trial shd be made, the State would now concur in
the adjournmt.
Mr Rutlidge could see no need of an adjournt because he could see no
chance of a compromise. The little States were fixt. They had repeatedly &
solemnly declared themselves to be so. All that the large States then had to
do was to decide whether they would yield or not. For his part he conceived
that altho' we could not do what we thought best, in itself, we ought to do
something. Had we not better keep the Govt up a little longer, hoping that
another Convention will supply our omissions, than abandon every thing to
hazard. Our Constituents will be very little satisfied with us if we take the
latter course.
Mr Randolph & Mr King renewed the motion to adjourn till tomorrow.
On the question. Mas. ay. Cont no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. divd.
Adjourned
On the morning following before the hour of the Convention a number
of the members from the larger States, by common agreement met for the
purpose of consulting on the proper steps to be taken in consequence of the
vote in favor of an equal Representation in the 2d branch, and the apparent
inflexibility of the smaller States on that point. Several members from the
latter States also attended. The time was wasted in vague conversation on
the subject, without any specific proposition or agreement. It appeared
indeed that the opinions of the members who disliked the equality of votes
differed much as to the importance of that point, and as to the policy of
risking a failure of any general act of the Convention by inflexibly opposing
it. Several of them supposing that no good Governmt could or would be
built on that foundation, and that as a division of the convention into two
opinions was unavoidable; it would be better that the side comprising the
principal States, and a majority of the people of America, should propose a
scheme of Govt to the States, than that a scheme should be proposed on the
other side, would have concurred in a firm opposition to the smaller States,
and in a separate recommendation, if eventually necessary. Others seemed
inclined to yield to the smaller States, and to concur in such an Act however
imperfect & exceptionable, as might be agreed on by the Convention as a
body, tho' decided by a bare majority of States and by a minority of the
people of the U. States. It is probable that the result of this consultation
satisfied the smaller States that they had nothing to apprehend from a Union
of the larger, in any plan whatever agst the equality of votes in the 2d
branch.
T       J    17.    C         .
Mr Governr Morris, moved to reconsider the whole Resolution agreed to
yesterday concerning the constitution of the 2 branches of the Legislature.
His object was to bring the House to a consideration in the abstract of the
powers necessary to be vested in the general Government. It had been said,
Let us know how the Govt is to be modelled, and then we can determine
what powers can be properly given to it. He thought the most eligible
course was, first to determine on the necessary powers, and then so to
modify the Governt as that it might be justly & properly enabled to
administer them. He feared if we proceeded to a consideration of the
powers, whilst the vote of yesterday including an equality of the States in
the 2d branch, remained in force, a reference to it, either mental or
expressed, would mix itself with the merits of every question concerning
the powers.—This motion was not seconded. (It was probably approved by
several members who either despaired of success, or were apprehensive that
the attempt would inflame the jealousies of the smaller States.)
The 6th Resoln in the Report of the Come of the Whole relating to the
powers, which had been postponed in order to consider the 7 & 8th relating
to the constitution of the Natl Legislature, was now resumed.
Mr Sherman observed that it would be difficult to draw the line between
the powers of the Genl Legislature, and those to be left with the States; that
he did not like the definition contained in the Resolution, and proposed in
place of the words "individual legislation" line 4. inclusive, to insert "to
make laws binding on the people of the United States in all cases which
may concern the common interests of the Union; but not to interfere with
the Government of the individual States in any matters of internal police
which respect the Govt of such States only, and wherein the general welfare
of the U. States is not concerned."
Mr Wilson 2ded the amendment as better expressing the general principle.
Mr Govr Morris opposed it. The internal police, as it would be called &
understood by the States ought to be infringed in many cases, as in the case
of paper money & other tricks by which Citizens of other States may be
affected.
Mr Sherman, in explanation of his idea read an enumeration of powers,
including the power of levying taxes on trade, but not the power of direct
taxation.
Mr Govr Morris remarked the omission, and inferred that for the
deficiencies of taxes on consumption, it must have been the meaning of Mr.
Sherman, that the Genl Govt should recur to quotas & requisitions, which
are subversive of the idea of Govt.
Mr Sherman acknowledged that his enumeration did not include direct
taxation. Some provision he supposed must be made for supplying the
deficiency of other taxation, but he had not formed any.
On Question on Mr Sherman's motion it passed in the negative
Mas. no. Cont ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Bedford moved that the 2d member of Resolution 6. be so altered as
to read, "and moreover to legislate in all cases for the general interests of
the Union, and also in those to which the States are severally incompetent,
or in which the harmony of the U. States may be interrupted by the exercise
of individual Legislation."
Mr Govr Morris 2ds the motion.
Mr Randolph. This is a formidable idea indeed. It involves the power of
violating all the laws and constitutions of the States, and of intermeddling
with their police. The last member of the sentence is also superfluous, being
included in the first.
Mr Bedford. It is not more extensive or formidable than the clause as it
stands: no State being separately competent to legislate for the general
interest of the Union.
On question for agreeing to Mr Bedford's motion it passed in the
affirmative.
Mas. ay. Cont no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no. N. C. ay.
S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the sentence as amended, it passed in the affirmative.
Mas. ay. Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. no. Geo. no.
The next. "To negative all laws passed by the several States contravening
in the opinion of the Nat: Legislature the articles of Union, or any treaties
subsisting under the authority of ye Union."
Mr Govr Morris opposed this power as likely to be terrible to the States,
and not necessary, if sufficient Legislative authority should be given to the
Genl Government.
Mr Sherman thought it unnecessary; as the Courts of the States would
not consider as valid any law contravening the Authority of the Union, and
which the legislature would wish to be negatived.
Mr L. Martin considered the power as improper & inadmissible. Shall all
the laws of the States be sent up to the Genl Legislature before they shall be
permitted to operate?
Mr Madison, considered the negative on the laws of the States as
essential to the efficacy & security of the Genl Govt. The necessity of a
general Govt proceeds from the propensity of the States to pursue their
particular interests in opposition to the general interest. This propensity will
continue to disturb the system, unless effectually controuled. Nothing short
of a negative on their laws will controul it. They will pass laws which will
accomplish their injurious objects before they can be repealed by the Genl
Legislre or be set aside by the National Tribunals. Confidence can not be put
in the State Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and interests. In
all the States these are more or less dependt on the Legislatures. In Georgia
they are appointed annually by the Legislature. In R. Island the Judges who
refused to execute an unconstitutional law were displaced, and others
substituted, by the Legislature who would be the willing instruments of the
wicked & arbitrary plans of their masters. A power of negativing the
improper laws of the States is at once the most mild & certain means of
preserving the harmony of the system. Its utility is sufficiently displayed in
the British system. Nothing could maintain the harmony & subordination of
the various parts of the empire, but the prerogative by which the Crown,
stifles in the birth every Act of every part tending to discord or
encroachment. It is true the prerogative is sometimes misapplied thro'
ignorance or a partiality to one particular part of ye empire; but we have not
the same reason to fear such misapplications in our System. As to the
sending all laws up to the Natl Legisl: that might be rendered unnecessary
by some emanation of the power into the States, so far at least as to give a
temporary effect to laws of immediate necessity.
Mr Govr Morris was more & more opposed to the negative. The proposal
of it would disgust all the States. A law that ought to be negatived will be
set aside in the Judiciary departmt and if that security should fail; may be
repealed by a Nationl law.
Mr Sherman. Such a power involves a wrong principle, to wit, that a law
of a State contrary to the articles of the Union would if not negatived, be
valid & operative.
Mr Pinkney urged the necessity of the Negative.
On the question for agreeing to the power of negativing laws of States
&c. it passed in the negative.
Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Luther Martin moved the following resolution "that the Legislative
acts of the U. S. made by virtue & in pursuance of the articles of Union and
all Treaties made & ratified under the authority of the U. S. shall be the
supreme law of the respective States, as far as those acts or treaties shall
relate to the said States, or their Citizens and inhabitants—& that the
Judiciaries of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions,
any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary
notwithstanding" which was agreed to nem: con:
9th Resol: "that Natl Executive consist of a single person," Agd to nem.
con.
"To be chosen by the National Legisl:"
Mr Governr Morris was pointedly agst his being so chosen. He will be
the mere creature of the Legisl: if appointed & impeachable by that body.
He ought to be elected by the people at large, by the freeholders of the
Country. That difficulties attend this mode, he admits. But they have been
found superable in N. Y. & in Cont and would he believed be found so, in
the case of an Executive for the U. States. If the people should elect, they
will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished character, or services;
some man, if he might so speak, of continental reputation. If the Legislature
elect, it will be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction; it will be like
the election of a pope by a conclave of cardinals; real merit will rarely be
the title to the appointment. He moved to strike out "National Legislature,"
& insert "citizens of the U. S."
Mr Sherman thought that the sense of the Nation would be better
expressed by the Legislature, than by the people at large. The latter will
never be sufficiently informed of characters, and besides will never give a
majority of votes to any one man. They will generally vote for some man in
their own State, and the largest State will have the best chance for the
appointment. If the choice be made by the Legislre a majority of voices may
be made necessary to constitute an election.
Mr Wilson. Two arguments have been urged agst an election of the
Executive Magistrate by the people. 1 the example of Poland where an
Election of the supreme Magistrate is attended with the most dangerous
commotions. The cases he observed were totally dissimilar. The Polish
nobles have resources & dependants which enable them to appear in force,
and to threaten the Republic as well as each other. In the next place the
electors all assemble in one place; which would not be the case with us. The
2d argt is that a majority of the people would never concur. It might be
answered that the concurrence of a majority of the people is not a necessary
principle of election, nor required as such in any of the States. But allowing
the objection all its force, it may be obviated by the expedient used in
Massts, where the Legislature by majority of voices, decide in case a
majority of people do not concur in favor of one of the candidates. This
would restrain the choice to a good nomination at least, and prevent in a
great degree intrigue & cabal. A particular objection with him agst an
absolute election by the Legislre was that the Exec: in that case would be
too dependent to stand the mediator between the intrigues & sinister views
of the Representatives and the general liberties & interests of the people.
Mr Pinkney did not expect this question would again have been brought
forward: An Election by the people being liable to the most obvious &
striking objections. They will be led by a few active & designing men. The
most populous States by combining in favor of the same individual will be
able to carry their points. The Natl Legislature being most immediately
interested in the laws made by themselves, will be most attentive to the
choice of a fit man to carry them properly into execution.
Mr Govr Morris. It is said that in case of an election by the people the
populous States will combine & elect whom they please. Just the reverse.
The people of such States cannot combine. If there be any combination it
must be among their representatives in the Legislature. It is said the people
will be led by a few designing men. This might happen in a small district. It
can never happen throughout the continent. In the election of a Govr of
N. York, it sometimes is the case in particular spots, that the activity &
intrigues of little partizans are successful, but the general voice of the State
is never influenced by such artifices. It is said the multitude will be
uninformed. It is true they would be uninformed of what passed in the
Legislative Conclave, if the election were to be made there; but they will
not be uninformed of those great & illustrious characters which have
merited their esteem & confidence. If the Executive be chosen by the Natl
Legislature, he will not be independent on it; and if not independent,
usurpation & tyranny on the part of the Legislature will be the consequence.
This was the case in England in the last Century. It has been the case in
Holland, where their Senates have engrossed all power. It has been the case
every where. He was surprised that an election by the people at large should
ever have been likened to the polish election of the first Magistrate. An
election by the Legislature will bear a real likeness to the election by the
Diet of Poland. The great must be the electors in both cases, and the
corruption & cabal wch are known to characterize the one would soon find
their way into the other. Appointments made by numerous bodies, are
always worse than those made by single responsible individuals, or by the
people at large.
Col. Mason. It is curious to remark the different language held at
different times. At one moment we are told that the Legislature is entitled to
thorough confidence, and to indefinite power. At another, that it will be
governed by intrigue & corruption, and cannot be trusted at all. But not to
dwell on this inconsistency he would observe that a Government which is to
last ought at least to be practicable. Would this be the case if the proposed
election should be left to the people at large. He conceived it would be as
unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for Chief Magistrate to
the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind man. The extent
of the Country renders it impossible that the people can have the requisite
capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the Candidates.
Mr Wilson, could not see the contrariety stated (by Col. Mason.) The
Legislre might deserve confidence in some respects, and distrust in others.
In acts which were to affect them & yr Constituents precisely alike
confidence was due. In others jealousy was warranted. The appointment to
great offices, where the Legislre might feel many motives, not common to
the public confidence was surely misplaced. This branch of business it was
notorious, was the most corruptly managed of any that had been committed
to legislative bodies.
Mr Williamson, conceived that there was the same difference between an
election in this case, by the people and by the legislature, as between an
appt by lot, and by choice. There are at present distinguished characters,
who are known perhaps to almost every man. This will not always be the
case. The people will be sure to vote for some man in their own State, and
the largest State will be sure to succeed. This will not be Virga however. Her
slaves will have no suffrage. As the Salary of the Executive will be fixed,
and he will not be eligible a 2d time, there will not be such a dependence on
the Legislature as has been imagined.
Question on an election by the people instead of the Legislature, which
passed in the negative.
Mas. no. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr L. Martin moved that the Executive be chosen by Electors appointed
by the several Legislatures of the individual States.
Mr Broome 2ds. On the Question, it passed in the negative.
Mas. no. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question on the words, "to be chosen by the Nationl Legislature"
it passed unanimously in the affirmative
"For the term of seven years"—postponed nem. con. on motion of Mr
Houston and Gov. Morris
"to carry into execution the nationl laws"—agreed to nem. con.
"to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for,"—agreed to
nem. con.
"to be ineligible a second time"—Mr Houston moved to strike out this
clause.
Mr Sherman 2ds the motion.
Mr Govr Morris espoused the motion. The ineligibility proposed by the
clause as it stood tended to destroy the great motive to good behavior, the
hope of being rewarded by a re-appointment. It was saying to him, make
hay while the sun shines.
On the question for striking out, as moved by Mr Houston, it passed in
the affirmative
Mas. ay. Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. ay.
"For the term of 7 years," resumed.
Mr Broom was for a shorter term since the Executive Magistrate was
now to be re-eligible. Had he remained ineligible a 2d time, he should have
preferred a longer term.
Docr McClurg moved[134] to strike out 7 years, and insert "during good
behavior." By striking out the words declaring him not re-eligible, he was
put into a situation that would keep him dependent forever on the
Legislature; and he conceived the independence of the Executive to be
equally essential with that of the Judiciary department.
[134] The probable object of this motion was merely to enforce the argument
against the re-eligibility of the Executive magistrate by holding out a tenure
during good behaviour as the alternate for keeping him independent of the
legislature.—Note in Madison's handwriting.
Mr Govr Morris 2ded the motion. He expressed great pleasure in hearing
it. This was the way to get a good Government. His fear that so valuable an
ingredient would not be attained had led him to take the part he had done.
He was indifferent how the Executive should be chosen, provided he held
his place by this tenure.
Mr Broome highly approved the motion. It obviated all his difficulties
Mr Sherman considered such a tenure as by no means safe or admissible.
As the Executive Magistrate is now re-eligible, he will be on good behavior
as far as will be necessary. If he behaves well he will be continued; if
otherwise, displaced, on a succeeding election.
Mr Madison.[135] If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that the
Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each
other. The Executive could not be independent of the Legislure, if
dependent on the pleasure of that branch for a re-appointment. Why was it
determined that the Judges should not hold their places by such a tenure?
Because they might be tempted to cultivate the Legislature, by an undue
complaisance, and thus render the Legislature the virtual expositor, as well
as the maker of the laws. In like manner a dependence of the Executive on
the Legislature, would render it the Executor as well as the maker of laws;
& then according to the observation of Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may
be made that they may be executed in a tyrannical manner. There was an
analogy between the Executive & Judiciary departments in several respects.
The latter executed the laws in certain cases as the former did in others. The
former expounded & applied them for certain purposes, as the latter did for
others. The difference between them seemed to consist chiefly in two
circumstances—1. the collective interest & security were much more in the
power belonging to the Executive than to the Judiciary department. 2. in the
administration of the former much greater latitude is left to opinion and
discretion than in the administration of the latter. But if the 2d consideration
proves that it will be more difficult to establish a rule sufficiently precise
for trying the Execut: than the Judges, & forms an objection to the same
tenure of office, both considerations prove that it might be more dangerous
to suffer a Union between the Executive & Legisl: powers, than between
the Judiciary & Legislative powers. He conceived it to be absolutely
necessary to a well constituted Republic that the two first shd be kept
distinct & independent of each other. Whether the plan proposed by the
motion was a proper one was another question, as it depended on the
practicability of instituting a tribunal for impeachmts as certain & as
adequate in the one case as in the other. On the other hand, respect for the
mover entitled his proposition to a fair hearing & discussion, until a less
objectionable expedient should be applied for guarding agst a dangerous
union of the Legislative & Executive departments.
[135] The view here taken of the subject was meant to aid in parrying the
animadversions likely to fall on the motion of Dr McClurg, for whom J. M. had
a particular regard. The Docr though possessing talents of the highest order was
modest & unaccustomed to exert them in public debate.—Note in Madison's
handwriting.
Col. Mason. This motion was made some time ago & negatived by a
very large majority. He trusted that it wd be again negatived. It wd be
impossible to define the misbehaviour in such a manner as to subject it to a
proper trial; and perhaps still more impossible to compel so high an
offender holding his office by such a tenure to submit to a trial. He
considered an Executive during good behavior as a softer name only for an
Executive for life. And that the next would be an easy step to hereditary
Monarchy. If the motion should finally succeed, he might himself live to
see such a Revolution. If he did not it was probable his children or grand
children would. He trusted there were few men in that House who wished
for it. No state he was sure had so far revolted from Republican principles
as to have the least bias in its favor.
Mr Madison, was not apprehensive of being thought to favor any step
towards monarchy. The real object with him was to prevent its introduction.
Experience had proved a tendency in our governments to throw all power
into the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in general little
more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent. If no effectual check be
devised for restraining the instability & encroachments of the latter, a
revolution of some kind or other would be inevitable. The preservation of
Republican Govt therefore required some expedient for the purpose, but
required evidently at the same time that in devising it, the genuine
principles of that form should be kept in view.
Mr Govr Morris was as little a friend to monarchy as any gentleman. He
concurred in the opinion that the way to keep out monarchical Govt was to
establish such a Repub. Govt as wd make the people happy and prevent a
desire of change.
Docr McClurg was not so much afraid of the shadow of monarchy as to
be unwilling to approach it; nor so wedded to Republican Govt as not to be
sensible of the tyrannies that had been & may be exercised under that form.
It was an essential object with him to make the Executive independent of
the Legislature; and the only mode left for effecting it, after the vote
destroying his ineligibility a second time, was to appoint him during good
behavior.
On the question for inserting "during good behavior" in place of '7 years
(with a re-eligibility)' it passed in the negative,
Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.[136]
[136] (This vote is not considered as any certain index of opinion, as a number
in the affirmative probably had it chiefly in view to alarm those attached to a
dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, & thereby facilitate some final
arrangement of a contrary tendency. The avowed friends of an Executive, during
good behaviour were not more than three or four, nor is it certain they would
finally have adhered to such a tenure, an independence of the three great
departments of each other, as far as possible, and the responsibility of all to the
will of the community seemed to be generally admitted as the true basis of a well
constructed government.)—Note in Madison's hand, except from the words "nor
is it certain" etc., which is in the hand of his wife's brother, John C. Payne.
On the motion "to strike out seven years" it passed in the negative,
Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va no. N. C. ay.
S. C. no. Geo. no.[137]
[137] (There was no debate on this motion. The apparent object of many in the
affirmative was to secure the re-eligibility by shortening the term, and of many
in the negative to embarrass the plan of referring the appointment and
dependence of the Executive to the Legislature.)—Note in Madison's hand.
It was now unanimously agreed that the vote which had struck out the
words "to be ineligible a second time" should be reconsidered to-morrow.
Adjd.
W         J    18.    C         .
On motion of Mr L. Martin to fix tomorrow for reconsidering the vote
concerning "eligibility of the Exective a 2d time" it passed in the affirmative.
Mas. ay. Cont ay. N. J. absent. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. absent.
The residue of the Resol. 9. concerning the Executive was postpd till
tomorrow.
Resol. 10. that Executive shl have a right to negative legislative acts not
afterwards passed by 2/3 of each branch, agreed to nem. con.
Resol. 11. "that a Natl Judiciary shall be estabd to consist of one supreme
tribunal", agd to nem. con.
"The judges of which to be appointd by the 2d branch of the Natl
Legislature,"
Mr Ghorum, wd prefer an appointment by the 2d branch to an appointmt
by the whole Legislature; but he thought even that branch too numerous,
and too little personally responsible, to ensure a good choice. He suggested
that the Judges be appointed by the Execuve with the advice & consent of
the 2d branch, in the mode prescribed by the constitution of Masts. This
mode had been long practised in that country, & was found to answer
perfectly well.
Mr Wilson, still wd prefer an appointmt by the Executive; but if that
could not be attained, wd prefer in the next place, the mode suggested by Mr
Ghorum. He thought it his duty however to move in the first instance "that
the Judges be appointed by the Executive." Mr Govr Morris 2ded the motion.
Mr L. Martin was strenuous for an appt by the 2d branch. Being taken
from all the States it wd be best informed of characters & most capable of
making a fit choice.
Mr Sherman concurred in the observations of Mr Martin, adding that the
Judges ought to be diffused, which would be more likely to be attended to
by the 2d branch, than by the Executive.
Mr Mason. The mode of appointing the Judges may depend in some
degree on the mode of trying impeachments of the Executive. If the Judges
were to form a tribunal for that purpose, they surely ought not to be
appointed by the Executive. There were insuperable objections besides agst
referring the appointment to the Executive. He mentioned as one, that as the
Seat of Govt must be in some one State, and as the Executive would remain
in office for a considerable time, for 4. 5. or 6 years at least, he would
insensibly form local & personal attachments within the particular State that
would deprive equal merit elsewhere, of an equal chance of promotion.
Mr Ghorum. As the Executive will be responsible in point of character at
least, for a judicious and faithful discharge of his trust, he will be careful to
look through all the States for proper characters. The Senators will be as
likely to form their attachments at the seat of Govt where they reside, as the
Executive. If they cannot get the man of the particular State to which they
may respectively belong, they will be indifferent to the rest. Public bodies
feel no personal responsibility, and give full play to intrigue & cabal. Rh.
Island is a full illustration of the insensibility to character produced by a
participation of numbers in dishonorable measures, and of the length to
which a Public body may carry wickedness & cabal.
Mr Govr Morris supposed it would be improper for an impeachmt of the
Executive to be tried before the Judges. The latter would in such case be
drawn into intrigues with the Legislature and an impartial trial would be
frustrated. As they wd be much about the Seat of Govt they might even be
previously consulted & arrangements might be made for a prosecution of
the Executive. He thought therefore that no argument could be drawn from
the probability of such a plan of impeachments agst the motion before the
House.
Mr Madison suggested that the Judges might be appointed by the
Executive, with the concurrence of 1/3 at least, of the 2d branch. This would
unite the advantage of responsibility in the Executive with the security
afforded in the 2d branch agst any incautious or corrupt nomination by the
Executive.
Mr Sherman, was clearly for an election by the Senate. It would be
composed of men nearly equal to the Executive, and would of course have
on the whole more wisdom. They would bring into their deliberations a
more diffusive knowledge of characters. It would be less easy for
candidates to intrigue with them, than with the Executive Magistrate. For
these reasons he thought there would be a better security for a proper choice
in the Senate than in the Executive.
Mr Randolph. It is true that when the appt of the Judges was vested in the
2d branch an equality of votes had not been given to it. Yet he had rather
leave the appointmt there than give it to the Executive. He thought the
advantage of personal responsibility might be gained in the Senate by
requiring the respective votes of the members to be entered on the Journal.
He thought too that the hope of receiving appts would be more diffusive if
they depended on the Senate, the members of which wd be diffusively
known, than if they depended on a single man who could not be personally
known to a very great extent; and consequently that opposition to the
System, would be so far weakened.
Mr Bedford thought there were solid reasons agst leaving the
appointment to the Executive. He must trust more to information than the
Senate. It would put it in his power to gain over the larger States, by
gratifying them with a preference of their Citizens. The responsibility of the
Executive so much talked of was chimerical. He could not be punished for
mistakes.
Mr Ghorum remarked that the Senate could have no better information
than the Executive. They must like him, trust to information from the
members belonging to the particular State where the candidate resided. The
Executive would certainly be more answerable for a good appointment, as
the whole blame of a bad one would fall on him alone. He did not mean that
he would be answerable under any other penalty than that of public censure,
which with honorable minds was a sufficient one.
On the question for referring the appointment of the Judges to the
Executive, instead of the 2d branch
Mas. ay. Cont no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. absent.
Mr Ghorum moved "that the Judges be nominated and appointed by the
Executive, by & with the advice & consent of the 2d branch & every such
nomination shall be made at least —— days prior to such appointment."
This mode he said had been ratified by the experience of a 140 years in
Massachusts. If the appt should be left to either branch of the Legislature, it
will be a mere piece of jobbing.
Mr Govr Morris 2ded & supported the motion.
Mr Sherman thought it less objectionable than an absolute appointment
by the Executive; but disliked it, as too much fettering the Senate.
Question on Mr Ghorum's motion
Mas. ay. Cont no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
absent.
Mr Madison moved that the Judges should be nominated by the
Executive & such nomination should become an appointment if not
disagreed to within —— days by 2/3 of the 2d branch.
Mr Govr Morris 2ded the motion. By com̃on consent the consideration of
it was postponed till tomorrow.
"To hold their offices during good behavior" & "to receive fixed
salaries" agreed to nem: con:.
"In which (salaries of Judges) no increase or diminution shall be made so
as to affect the persons at the time in office."
Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out "or increase." He thought the
Legislature ought to be at liberty to increase salaries as circumstances might
require, and that this would not create any improper dependence in the
Judges.
Docr Franklin was in favor of the motion. Money may not only become
plentier, but the business of the department may increase as the Country
becomes more populous.
Mr Madison. The dependence will be less if the increase alone should be
permitted, but it will be improper even so far to permit a dependence.
Whenever an increase is wished by the Judges, or may be in agitation in the
legislature, an undue complaisance in the former may be felt towards the
latter. If at such a crisis there should be in Court suits to which leading
members of the Legislature may be parties, the Judges will be in a situation
which ought not to be suffered, if it can be prevented. The variations in the
value of money, may be guarded agst by taking for a standard wheat or
some other thing of permanent value. The increase of business will be
provided for by an increase of the number who are to do it. An increase of
salaries may easily be so contrived as not to affect persons in office.
Mr Govr Morris. The value of money may not only alter but the State of
Society may alter. In this event the same quantity of wheat, the same value
would not be the same compensation. The Amount of salaries must always
be regulated by the manners & the style of living in a Country. The increase
of business can not be provided for in the supreme tribunal in the way that
has been mentioned. All the business of a certain description whether more
or less must be done in that single tribunal. Additional labor alone in the
Judges can provide for additional business. Additional compensation
therefore ought not to be prohibited.
On the question for striking out "or increase"
Mas. ay. Cont ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.
absent
The whole clause as amended was then agreed to nem: con:
12. Resol: "that Natl Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior
tribunals"
Mr Butler could see no necessity for such tribunals. The State Tribunals
might do the business.
Mr L. Martin concurred. They will create jealousies & oppositions in the
State tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they will interfere.
Mr Ghorum. There are in the States already federal Courts with
jurisdiction for trial of piracies &c. committed on the Seas. No complaints
have been made by the States or the Courts of the States. Inferior tribunals
are essential to render the authority of the Natl Legislature effectual.
Mr Randolph observed that the Courts of the States can not be trusted
with the administration of the National laws. The objects of jurisdiction are
such as will often place the General & local policy at variance.
Mr Govr Morris urged also the necessity of such a provision.
Mr Sherman was willing to give the power to the Legislature but wished
them to make use of the State Tribunals whenever it could be done with
safety to the general interest.
Col. Mason thought many circumstances might arise not now to be
foreseen, which might render such a power absolutely necessary.
On question for agreeing to 12. Resol: empowering the National
Legislature to appoint "inferior tribunals," Agd to nem. con.
"Impeachments of national officers," were struck out on motion for the
purpose.
13. Resol: "The jurisdiction of the Natl Judiciary." Several criticisms
having been made on the definition; it was proposed by Mr Madison so to
alter it as to read thus—"that the jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising
under the Natl laws; And to such other questions as may involve the Natl
peace & harmony," which was agreed to, nem. con.
Resol. 14. providing for the admission of new States agreed to, nem.
con.
Resol. 15. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congs
&c. & for the completion of their engagements."
Mr Govr Morris thought the assumption of their engagements might as
well be omitted; and that Congs ought not to be continued till all the States
should adopt the reform; since it may become expedient to give effect to it
whenever a certain number of States shall adopt it.
Mr Madison the clause can mean nothing more than that provision ought
to be made for preventing an interregnum; which must exist in the interval
between the adoption of the New Govt and the commencement of its
operation, if the old Govt should cease on the first of these events.
Mr Wilson did not entirely approve of the manner in which the clause
relating to the engagements of Congs was expressed; but he thought some
provision on the subject would be proper in order to prevent any suspicion
that the obligations of the Confederacy might be dissolved along with the
Governt under which they were contracted.
On the question on the 1st part—relating to the continuance of Congs.
Mas. no. Cont no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C.[138] ay.
Geo. no.
[138] In the printed Journal, S. Carolina—no. Note in Madison'shand.
The 2d part as to completion of their engagements, disagd to, nem. con.
Resol. 16. "That a Republican Constitution & its existing laws ought to
be guaranteed to each State by the U. States."
Mr Govr Morris, thought the Resol: very objectionable. He should be
very unwilling that such laws as exist in R. Island should be guaranteed.
Mr Wilson. The object is merely to secure the States agst dangerous
commotions, insurrections and rebellions.
Col. Mason. If the Genl Govt should have no right to suppress rebellions
agst particular States, it will be in a bad situation indeed. As Rebellions agst
itself originate in & agst individual States, it must remain a passive
Spectator of its own subversion.
Mr Randolph. The Resoln has 2. objects. 1. to secure a Republican
Government. 2. to suppress domestic commotions. He urged the necessity
of both these provisions.
Mr Madison moved to substitute "that the Constitutional authority of the
States shall be guaranteed to them respectively agst domestic as well as
foreign violence."
Docr McClurg seconded the motion.
Mr Houston was afraid of perpetuating the existing Constitutions of the
States. That of Georgia was a very bad one, and he hoped would be revised
& amended. It may also be difficult for the Genl Govt to decide between
contending parties each of which claim the sanction of the Constitution.
Mr L. Martin was for leaving the States to suppress Rebellions
themselves.
Mr Ghorum thought it strange that a Rebellion should be known to exist
in the Empire, and the Genl Govt shd be restrained from interposing to
subdue it. At this rate an enterprising Citizen might erect the standard of
Monarchy in a particular State, might gather together partizans from all
quarters, might extend his views from State to State, and threaten to
establish a tyranny over the whole & the Genl Govt be compelled to remain
an inactive witness of its own destruction. With regard to different parties in
a State; as long as they confine their disputes to words, they will be
harmless to the Genl Govt & to each other. If they appeal to the sword, it
will then be necessary for the Genl Govt, however difficult it may be to
decide on the merits of their contest, to interpose & put an end to it.
Mr Carrol. Some such provision is essential. Every State ought to wish
for it. It has been doubted whether it is a casus federis at the present. And
no room ought to be left for such a doubt hereafter.
Mr Randolph moved to add as an amendt to the motion; "and that no
State be at liberty to form any other than a Republican Govt." Mr Madison
seconded the motion.
Mr Rutlidge thought it unnecessary to insert any guarantee. No doubt
could be entertained but that Congs had the authority if they had the means
to co-operate with any State in subduing a rebellion. It was & would be
involved in the nature of the thing.
Mr Wilson moved as a better expression of the idea, "that a Republican
form of Governmt shall be guaranteed to each State & that each State shall
be protected agst foreign & domestic violence.
This seeming to be well received, Mr Madison & Mr Randolph withdrew
their propositions & on the Question for agreeing to Mr Wilson's motion, it
passed nem. con.
Adjd.
END OF VOL. 1.
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CHRONOLOGY OF JAMES MADISON.
1787.
1787
July 19. Advocates election of the Executive by the people.
July 20. Speaks in favor of making the Executive impeachable.
July 21. Seconds proposition to include the Judiciary with the
Executive in power to revise laws.
Moves that judges be appointed by the Executive with
concurrence of two-thirds of Senate.
July 25. Shows the difficulty of devising satisfactory mode of
selecting Executive.
August 7. Advocates liberal suffrage.
August 8. Moves that basis of representation in House of
Representatives be one to not more than 40,000 inhabitants.
Opposes proposition that money bills originate only in House
of Representatives.
August 9. Opposes incorporation in constitution of provision against
persons of foreign birth holding office.
August 10. Moves that legislature have power to compel attendance
of members.
August 11. Moves that Congress publish its journals, except such
parts of Senate proceedings as may be ordered kept secret.
Advocates a centrally located capital.
August 13. Seconds motion in favor of liberal treatment of
foreigners.
Speaks in favor of participation of Senate in making
appropriations.
August 15. Moves that all bills be passed upon by the Executive and
Judiciary before becoming laws.
August 16. Advocates national power to tax exports.
August 17. Moves that legislature have power to declare war.
August 18. Submits propositions for national power over public
lands, to form governments for new States, over Indian affairs,
over seat of government, to grant charters of incorporation,
copyrights, to establish a university, grant patents, acquire forts,
magazines, etc.
Speaks in favor of national control of militia.
August 22. Appointed on committee to consider navigation acts.
Moves that States have power to appoint militia officers under
rank of general officers.
Moves to commit question of negative of State laws.
Moves to include the Executive in treaty-making power.
August 25. Declares it is wrong to admit the idea of property in men
in constitution.
August 27. Suggests that in case of death of President his council
may act.
Moves form of oath for President.
Moves that judges' salaries be fixed.
Expresses doubt whether Judiciary should have power over
cases arising under constitution.
August 28. Moves that States be forbidden to lay embargoes, export
and import duties.
August 29. Speaks in favor of navigation acts.
August 31. Moves that ratification of constitution be by a majority of
States and people.
Advocates ratification by State conventions.
Appointed on committee to consider parts of constitution and
propositions not yet acted upon.
Sept 3. Thinks eventual election of President by legislature should be
made difficult.
Sept 7. Moves that Senate have power to make treaties of peace
without President.
Sept 8. Moves that quorum of Senate be two-thirds of all the
members.
Seconds motion to increase representation.
Sept 14. Suggests that legislature should have power to grant
charters of incorporation.




T        J    19.    C         .
On reconsideration of the vote rendering the Executive re-eligible a 2d
time, Mr Martin moved to re-instate the words, "to be ineligible a 2d time."
Mr Governeur Morris. It is necessary to take into one view all that relates
to the establishment of the Executive; on the due formation of which must
depend the efficacy & utility of the Union among the present and future
States. It has been a maxim in Political Science that Republican
Government is not adapted to a large extent of Country, because the energy
of the Executive Magistracy can not reach the extreme parts of it. Our
Country is an extensive one. We must either then renounce the blessings of
the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient vigor to pervade every
part of it. This subject was of so much importance that he hoped to be
indulged in an extensive view of it. One great object of the Executive is to
controul the Legislature. The Legislature will continually seek to
aggrandize & perpetuate themselves; and will seize those critical moments
produced by war, invasion or convulsion for that purpose. It is necessary
then that the Executive Magistrate should be the guardian of the people,
even of the lower classes, agst Legislative tyranny, against the Great & the
wealthy who in the course of things will necessarily compose the
Legislative body. Wealth tends to corrupt the mind to nourish its love of
power, and to stimulate it to oppression. History proves this to be the spirit
of the opulent. The check provided in the 2d branch was not meant as a
check on Legislative usurpations of power, but on the abuse of lawful
powers, on the propensity in the 1st branch to legislate too much to run into
projects of paper money & similar expedients. It is no check on Legislative
tyranny. On the contrary it may favor it, and if the 1st branch can be seduced
may find the means of success. The Executive therefore ought to be so
constituted as to be the great protector of the Mass of the people.–It is the
duty of the Executive to appoint the officers & to command the forces of
the Republic: to appoint 1. ministerial officers for the administration of
public affairs. 2. officers for the dispensation of Justice. Who will be the
best Judges whether these appointments be well made? The people at large,
who will know, will see, will feel the effects of them. Again who can judge
so well of the discharge of military duties for the protection & security of
the people, as the people themselves who are to be protected & secured? He
finds too that the Executive is not to be re-eligible. What effect will this
have? 1. it will destroy the great incitement to merit public esteem by taking
away the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment. It may give a
dangerous turn to one of the strongest passions in the human breast. The
love of fame is the great spring to noble & illustrious actions. Shut the Civil
road to Glory & he may be compelled to seek it by the sword. 2. It will
tempt him to make the most of the short space of time allotted him, to
accumulate wealth and provide for his friends. 3. It will produce violations
of the very constitution it is meant to secure. In moments of pressing danger
the tried abilities and established character of a favorite magistrate will
prevail over respect for the forms of the Constitution. The Executive is also
to be impeachable. This is a dangerous part of the plan. It will hold him in
such dependence that he will be no check on the Legislature, will not be a
firm guardian of the people and of the public interest. He will be the tool of
a faction, of some leading demagogue in the Legislature. These then are the
faults of the Executive establishment as now proposed. Can no better
establisht be devised? If he is to be the Guardian of the people let him be
appointed by the people? If he is to be a check on the Legislature let him
not be impeachable. Let him be of short duration, that he may with
propriety be re-eligible. It has been said that the candidates for this office
will not be known to the people. If they be known to the Legislature, they
must have such a notoriety and eminence of Character, that they cannot
possibly be unknown to the people at large. It cannot be possible that a man
shall have sufficiently distinguished himself to merit this high trust without
having his character proclaimed by fame throughout the Empire. As to the
danger from an Unimpeachable magistrate he could not regard it as
formidable. There must be certain great Officers of State; a minister of
finance, of war, of foreign affairs &c. These he presumes will exercise their
functions in subordination to the Executive, and will be amenable by
impeachment to the Public Justice. Without these ministers the Executive
can do nothing of consequence. He suggested a biennial election of the
Executive at the time of electing the 1st branch, and the Executive to hold
over, so as to prevent any interregnum in the administration. An election by
the people at large throughout so great an extent of country could not be
influenced by those little combinations and those momentary lies, which
often decide popular elections within a narrow sphere. It will probably, be
objected that the election will be influenced by the members of the
Legislature; particularly of the 1st branch, and that it will be nearly the same
thing with an election by the Legislature itself. It could not be denied that
such an influence would exist. But it might be answered that as the
Legislature or the candidates for it would be divided, the enmity of one part
would counteract the friendship of another; that if the administration of the
Executive were good, it would be unpopular to oppose his re-election, if
bad it ought to be opposed & a reappointmt prevented; and lastly that in
every view this indirect dependence on the favor of the Legislature could
not be so mischievous as a direct dependence for his appointment. He saw
no alternative for making the Executive independent of the Legislature but
either to give him his office for life, or make him eligible by the people.
Again, it might be objected that two years would be too short a duration.
But he believes that as long as he should behave himself well, he would be
continued in his place. The extent of the Country would secure his re-
election agst the factions & discontents of particular States. It deserved
consideration also that such an ingredient in the plan would render it
extremely palatable to the people. These were the general ideas which
occurred to him on the subject, and which led him to wish & move that the
whole constitution of the Executive might undergo reconsideration.
Mr Randolph urged the motion of Mr L. Martin for restoring the words
making the Executive ineligible a 2d time. If he ought to be independent, he
should not be left under a temptation to court a re-appointment. If he should
be re-appointable by the Legislature, he will be no check on it. His
revisionary power will be of no avail. He had always thought & contended
as he still did that the danger apprehended by the little States was
chimerical; but those who thought otherwise ought to be peculiarly anxious
for the motion. If the Executive be appointed, as has been determined, by
the Legislature, he will probably be appointed either by joint ballot of both
houses, or be nominated by the 1st and appointed by the 2d branch. In either
case the large States will preponderate. If he is to court the same influence
for his re-appointment, will he not make his revisionary power, and all the
other functions of his administration subservient to the views of the large
States. Besides, is there not great reason to apprehend that in case he should
be re-eligible, a false complaisance in the Legislature might lead them to
continue an unfit man in office in preference to a fit one. It has been said
that a constitutional bar to re-appointment will inspire unconstitutional
endeavours to perpetuate himself. It may be answered that his endeavours
can have no effect unless the people be corrupt to such a degree as to render
all precautions hopeless; to which may be added that this argument
supposes him to be more powerful & dangerous, than other arguments
which have been used, admit, and consequently calls for stronger fetters on
his authority. He thought an election by the Legislature with an incapacity
to be elected a second time would be more acceptable to the people than the
plan suggested by Mr Govr Morris.
Mr King did not like the ineligibility. He thought there was great force in
the remark of Mr Sherman, that he who has proved himself most fit for an
Office, ought not to be excluded by the constitution from holding it. He
would therefore prefer any other reasonable plan that could be substituted.
He was much disposed to think that in such cases the people at large would
chuse wisely. There was indeed some difficulty arising from the
improbability of a general concurrence of the people in favor of any one
man. On the whole he was of opinion that an appointment by electors
chosen by the people for the purpose, would be liable to fewest objections.
Mr Patterson's ideas nearly coincided he said with those of Mr King. He
proposed that the Executive should be appointed by Electors to be chosen
by the States in a ratio that would allow one elector to the smallest and three
to the largest States.
Mr Wilson. It seems to be the unanimous sense that the Executive should
not be appointed by the Legislature, unless he be rendered in-eligible a 2d
time: he perceived with pleasure that the idea was gaining ground, of an
election mediately or immediately by the people.
Mr Madison. If it be a fundamental principle of free Govt that the
Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should be separately exercised,
it is equally so that they be independently exercised. There is the same &
perhaps greater reason why the Executive shd be independent of the
Legislature, than why the Judiciary should. A coalition of the two former
powers would be more immediately & certainly dangerous to public liberty.
It is essential then that the appointment of the Executive should either be
drawn from some source, or held by some tenure that will give him a free
agency with regard to the Legislature. This could not be if he was to be
appointable from time to time by the Legislature. It was not clear that an
appointment in the 1st instance even with an ineligibility afterwards would
not establish an improper connection between the two departments. Certain
it was that the appointment would be attended with intrigues and
contentions that ought not to be unnecessarily admitted. He was disposed
for these reasons to refer the appointment to some other source. The people
at large was in his opinion the fittest in itself. It would be as likely as any
that could be devised to produce an Executive Magistrate of distinguished
Character. The people generally could only know & vote for some Citizen
whose merits had rendered him an object of general attention & esteem.
There was one difficulty however of a serious nature attending an
immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much more
diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could have
no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes. The substitution of
electors obviated this difficulty and seemed on the whole to be liable to
fewest objections.
Mr Gerry. If the Executive is to be elected by the Legislature he certainly
ought not to be re-eligible. This would make him absolutely dependent. He
was agst a popular election. The people are uninformed, and would be
misled by a few designing men. He urged the expediency of an appointment
of the Executive by Electors to be chosen by the State Executives. The
people of the States will then choose the 1st branch; the legislatures of the
States the 2d branch of the National Legislature, and the Executives of the
States, the National Executive. This he thought would form a strong
attachmt in the States to the National System. The popular mode of electing
the chief Magistrate would certainly be the worst of all. If he should be so
elected & should do his duty, he will be turned out for it like Govr Bowdoin
in Massts & President Sullivan in N. Hampshire.
On the question on Mr Govr Morris motion to reconsider generally the
Constitution of the Executive
Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. & all the others ay.
Mr Elseworth moved to strike out the appointmt by the Natl Legislature,
and to insert, to be chosen by electors appointed by the Legislatures of the
States in the following ratio; to wit–one for each State not exceeding
200,000 [1] inhabts two for each above yt number & not exceeding 300,000.
and three for each State exceeding 300,000.–Mr Broome 2ded. the motion.
[2]
[1] The Journal gives it 100,000.—Journal of the Federal Convention, 190.
[2] "Mr. Broom is a plain good Man, with some abilities, but nothing to render
him conspicuous. He is silent in public, but chearful and conversable in private.
He is about 35 years old."–Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 330.
Mr Rutlidge was opposed to all the modes, except the appointmt by the
Natl Legislature. He will be sufficiently independent, if he be not re-
eligible.
Mr Gerry preferred the motion of Mr Elseworth to an appointmt by the
Natl Legislature, or by the people; tho' not to an appt by the State
Executives. He moved that the electors proposed by Mr E. should be 25 in
number, and allotted in the following proportion. to N. H. 1. to Mas. 3. to R.
I. 1. to Cont 2. to N. Y. 2. N. J. 2. Pa 3. Del. 1. Md 2. Va 3. N. C. 2. S. C. 2.
Geo. 1.
The question as moved by Mr Elseworth being divided, on the 1st part
shall ye Natl Executive be appointed by Electors?
Mas. divd. Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On 2d part shall the Electors be chosen by the State Legislatures?
Mas. ay. Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The part relating to the ratio in which the States sd chuse electors was
postponed nem. con.
Mr L. Martin moved that the Executive be ineligible a 2d time.
Mr Williamson, 2ds the motion. He had no great confidence in Electors to
be chosen for the special purpose. They would not be the most respectable
citizens; but persons not occupied in the high offices of Govt. They would
be liable to undue influence, which might the more readily be practised as
some of them will probably be in appointment 6 or 8 months before the
object of it comes on.
Mr Elseworth supposed any persons might be appointed Electors,
excepting, solely, members of the Natl Legislature.
On the question Shall he be ineligible a 2d time?
Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On the question Shall the Executive continue for 7 years? It passed in the
negative
Mas. divd. Cont ay. [3] N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no.
Va no. N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
[3] In the printed Journal Cont, no: N. Jersey ay.–Madison's Note.
Mr King was afraid we shd shorten the term too much.
Mr Govr Morris was for a short term, in order to avoid impeachts which
wd be otherwise necessary.
Mr Butler was agst the frequency of the elections. Geo. & S. C. were too
distant to send electors often.
Mr Elseworth was for 6 years. If the elections be too frequent, the
Executive will not be firm eno. There must be duties which will make him
unpopular for the moment. There will be outs as well as ins. His
administration therefore will be attacked and misrepresented.
Mr Williamson was for 6 years. The expence will be considerable &
ought not to be unnecessarily repeated. If the Elections are too frequent, the
best men will not undertake the service and those of an inferior character
will be liable to be corrupted.
On the question for 6 years?
Mas. ay. Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Adjourned
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The postponed Ratio of Electors for appointing the Executive; to wit 1
for each State whose inhabitants do not exceed 100.000. &c. being taken
up.
Mr Madison observed that this would make in time all or nearly all the
States equal. Since there were few that would not in time contain the
number of inhabitants intitling them to 3 Electors; that this ratio ought
either to be made temporary, or so varied as that it would adjust itself to the
growing population of the States.
Mr Gerry moved that in the 1st instance the Electors should be allotted to
the States in the following ratio: to N. H. 1. Mass. 3. R. I. 1. Cont 2. N. Y. 2.
N. J. 2. Pa 3. Del. 1. Md 2. Va 3. N. C. 2. S. C. 2. Geo. 1.
On the question to postpone in order to take up this motion of Mr Gerry.
It passed in the affirmative
Mass. ay. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Elseworth moved that 2 Electors be allotted to N. H. Some rule ought
to be pursued; and N. H. has more than 100,000 inhabitants. He thought it
would be proper also to allot 2. to Georgia.
Mr Broom & Mr Martin moved to postpone Mr Gerry's allotment of
Electors, leaving a fit ratio to be reported by the Committee to be appointed
for detailing the Resolutions.
On this motion,
Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Houston 2ded the motion of Mr Elseworth to add another Elector to
N. H. & Georgia. On the Question;
Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Williamson moved as an amendment to Mr Gerry's allotment of
Electors in the 1st instance that in future elections of the Natl Executive, the
number of Electors to be appointed by the several States shall be regulated
by their respective numbers of Representatives in the 1st branch pursuing as
nearly as may be the present proportions.
On question on Mr Gerry's ratio of Electors
Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
"to be removable on impeachment and conviction for malpractice or
neglect of duty," see Resol. 9.
Mr Pinkney & Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out this part of the
Resolution. Mr P. observd he ought not to be impeachable whilst in office.
Mr Davie. If he be not impeachable whilst in office, he will spare no
efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected. He considered this as
an essential security for the good behaviour of the Executive.
Mr Wilson concurred in the necessity of making the Executive
impeachable whilst in office.
Mr Govr Morris. He can do no criminal act without Coadjutors who may
be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that will be a sufficient proof
of his innocence. Besides who is to impeach? Is the impeachment to
suspend his functions. If it is not the mischief will go on. If it is the
impeachment will be nearly equivalent to a displacement, and will render
the Executive dependent on those who are to impeach.
Col. Mason. No point is of more importance than that the right of
impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above Justice? Above
all shall that man be above it, who can commit the most extensive injustice?
When great crimes were committed he was for punishing the principal as
well as the Coadjutors. There had been much debate & difficulty as to the
mode of chusing the Executive. He approved of that which had been
adopted at first, namely of referring the appointment to the Natl Legislature.
One objection agst Electors was the danger of their being corrupted by the
Candidates, & this furnished a peculiar reason in favor of impeachments
whilst in office. Shall the man who has practised corruption & by that
means procured his appointment in the first instance, be suffered to escape
punishment, by repeating his guilt?
Docr Franklin was for retaining the clause as favorable to the Executive.
History furnishes one example only of a first Magistrate being formally
brought to public Justice. Every body cried out agst this as unconstitutional.
What was the practice before this in cases where the Chief Magistrate
rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse was had to assassination in wch
he was not only deprived of his life but of the opportunity of vindicating his
character. It wd be the best way therefore to provide in the Constitution for
the regular punishment of the Executive where his misconduct should
deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal where he should be unjustly
accused.
Mr Govr Morris admits corruption & some few other offences to be such
as ought to be impeachable; but thought the cases ought to be enumerated &
defined.
Mr Madison thought it indispensable that some provision should be
made for defending the Community agst the incapacity, negligence or
perfidy of the chief Magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service
was not a sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his
appointment. He might pervert his administration into a scheme of
peculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers. The
case of the Executive Magistracy was very distinguishable, from that of the
Legislature or any other public body, holding offices of limited duration. It
could not be presumed that all or even a majority of the members of an
Assembly would either lose their capacity for discharging, or be bribed to
betray, their trust. Besides the restraints of their personal integrity & honor,
the difficulty of acting in concert for purposes of corruption was a security
to the Public. And if one or a few members only should be seduced, the
soundness of the remaining members, would maintain the integrity and
fidelity of the body. In the case of the Executive Magistracy which was to
be administered by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more
within the compass of probable events, and either of them might be fatal to
the Republic.
Mr Pinkney did not see the necessity of impeachments. He was sure they
ought not to issue from the Legislature who would in that case hold them as
a rod over the Executive and by that means effectually destroy his
independence. His revisionary power in particular would be rendered
altogether insignificant.
Mr Gerry urged the necessity of impeachments. A good Magistrate will
not fear them. A bad one ought to be kept in fear of them. He hoped the
maxim would never be adopted here that the chief magistrate could do no
wrong.
Mr King expressed his apprehensions that an extreme caution in favor of
liberty might enervate the Government we were forming. He wished the
House to recur to the primitive axiom that the three great departments of
Govts should be separate & independent: that the Executive & Judiciary
should be so as well as the Legislative: that the Executive should be so
equally with the Judiciary. Would this be the case, if the Executive should
be impeachable? It had been said that the Judiciary would be impeachable.
But it should have been remembered at the same time that the Judiciary
hold their places not for a limited time, but during good behaviour. It is
necessary therefore that a form should be established for trying
misbehaviour. Was the Executive to hold his place during good behaviour?
The Executive was to hold his place for a limited term like the members of
the Legislature. Like them, particularly the Senate whose members would
continue in appointmt the same term of 6 years he would periodically be
tried for his behaviour by his electors, who would continue or discontinue
him in trust according to the manner in which he had discharged it. Like
them therefore, he ought to be subject to no intermediate trial, by
impeachment. He ought not to be impeachable unless he held his office
during good behavior, a tenure which would be most agreeable to him;
provided an independent and effectual forum could be devised. But under
no circumstances ought he to be impeachable by the Legislature. This
would be destructive of his independence and of the principles of the
Constitution. He relied on the vigor of the Executive as a great security for
the public liberties.
Mr Randolph. The propriety of impeachments was a favorite principle
with him. Guilt wherever found ought to be punished. The Executive will
have great opportunitys of abusing his power; particularly in time of war
when the military force, and in some respects the Public money will be in
his hands. Should no regular punishment be provided, it will be irregularly
inflicted by tumults & insurrections. He is aware of the necessity of
proceeding with a cautious hand, and of excluding as much as possible the
influence of the Legislature from the business. He suggested for
consideration an idea which had fallen (from Col. Hamilton) of composing
a forum out of the Judges belonging to the States: and even of requiring
some preliminary inquest whether just ground of impeachment existed.
Doctr Franklin mentioned the case of the Prince of Orange during the
late war. An agreement was made between France & Holland; by which
their two fleets were to unite at a certain time & place. The Dutch fleet did
not appear. Every body began to wonder at it. At length it was suspected
that the Statholder was at the bottom of the matter. This suspicion prevailed
more & more. Yet as he could not be impeached and no regular examination
took place, he remained in his office, and strengthening his own party, as
the party opposed to him became formidable, he gave birth to the most
violent animosities & contentions. Had he been impeachable, a regular &
peaceable enquiry would have taken place and he would if guilty have been
duly punished, if innocent restored to the confidence of the Public.
Mr King remarked that the case of the Statholder was not applicable. He
held his place for life, and was not periodically elected. In the former case
impeachments are proper to secure good behaviour. In the latter they are
unnecessary; the periodical responsibility to the electors being an equivalent
security.
Mr Wilson observed that if the idea were to be pursued, the Senators who
are to hold their places during the same term with the Executive, ought to
be subject to impeachment & removal.
Mr Pinkney apprehended that some gentlemen reasoned on a supposition
that the Executive was to have powers which would not be committed to
him: He presumed that his powers would be so circumscribed as to render
impeachments unnecessary.
Mr Govr Morris's opinion had been changed by the arguments used in
the discussion. He was now sensible of the necessity of impeachments, if
the Executive was to continue for any length of time in office. Our
Executive was not like a Magistrate having a life interest, much less like
one having an hereditary interest in his office. He may be bribed by a
greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would say that we ought to
expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first Magistrate in foreign pay,
without being able to guard agst it by displacing him. One would think the
King of England well secured agst bribery. He has as it were a fee simple in
the whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II. was bribed by Louis XIV. The
Executive ought therefore to be impeachable for treachery: Corrupting his
electors, and incapacity were other causes of impeachment. For the latter he
should be punished not as a man, but as an officer, and punished only by
degradation from his office. This Magistrate is not the King but the prime
Minister. The people are the King. When we make him amenable to Justice
however we should take care to provide some mode that will not make him
dependent on the Legislature.
It was moved & 2ded to postpone the question of impeachments which
was negatived, Mas. & S. Carolina only being ay.
On ye Question, Shall the Executive be removable on impeachments
&c.?
Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
"Executive to receive fixed compensation." Agreed to nem. con.
"to be paid out of the national Treasury" agreed to, N. Jersey only in the
negative.
Mr Gerry & Govr Morris moved that the Electors of the Executive shall
not be members of the Natl Legislature, nor officers of the U. States, nor
shall the Electors themselves be eligible to the supreme magistracy. Agreed
to nem. con.
Docr McClurg [4] asked whether it would not be necessary, before a
Committee for detailing the Constitution should be appointed, to determine
on the means by which the Executive, is to carry the laws into effect, and to
resist combinations agst them. Is he to have a military force for the purpose,
or to have the command of the Militia, the only existing force that can be
applied to that use? As the Resolutions now stand the Committee will have
no determinate directions on this great point.
[4] "Mr. McClurg is a learned physician, but having never appeared before in
public life his character as a politician is not sufficiently known. He attempted
once or twice to speak, but with no great success. It is certain that he has a
foundation of learning, on which, if he pleases, he may erect a character of high
renown. The Doctor is about 38 years of age, a Gentleman of great
respectability, and of a fair and unblemished character."–Pierce's Notes, Am.
Hist. Rev., iii., 332.
Mr Wilson thought that some additional directions to the Committee wd
be necessary.
Mr King. The Committee are to provide for the end. Their discretionary
power to provide for the means is involved according to an established
axiom.
Adjourned.
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Mr Williamson moved that the Electors of the Executive should be paid
out of the National Treasury for the Service to be performed by them.
Justice required this: as it was a national service they were to render. The
motion was agreed to Nem. Con.
Mr Wilson moved as an amendment to Resoln 10. that the supreme Natl
Judiciary should be associated with the Executive in the Revisionary power.
This proposition had been before made and failed: but he was so confirmed
by reflection in the opinion of its utility, that he thought it incumbent on
him to make another effort: The Judiciary ought to have an opportunity of
remonstrating agst projected encroachments on the people as well as on
themselves. It had been said that the Judges, as expositors of the Laws
would have an opportunity of defending their constitutional rights. There
was weight in this observation; but this power of the Judges did not go far
enough. Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be
destructive; and yet may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges
in refusing to give them effect. Let them have a share in the Revisionary
power, and they will have an opportunity of taking notice of these
characters of a law, and of counteracting, by the weight of their opinions the
improper views of the Legislature.–Mr Madison 2ded the motion.
Mr Ghorum did not see the advantage of employing the Judges in this
way. As Judges they are not to be presumed to possess any peculiar
knowledge of the mere policy of public measures. Nor can it be necessary
as a security for their constitutional rights. The Judges in England have no
such additional provision for their defence, yet their jurisdiction is not
invaded. He thought it would be best to let the Executive alone be
responsible, and at most to authorize him to call on Judges for their
opinions.
Mr Elseworth approved heartily of the motion. The aid of the Judges will
give more wisdom & firmness to the Executive. They will possess a
systematic and accurate knowledge of the Laws, which the Executive
cannot be expected always to possess. The Law of Nations also will
frequently come into question. Of this the Judges alone will have competent
information.
Mr Madison considered the object of the motion as of great importance
to the meditated Constitution. It would be useful to the Judiciary departmt
by giving it an additional opportunity of defending itself agst Legislative
encroachments: It would be useful to the Executive, by inspiring additional
confidence & firmness in exerting the revisionary power: It would be useful
to the Legislature by the valuable assistance it would give in preserving a
consistency, conciseness, perspicuity & technical propriety in the laws,
qualities peculiarly necessary; & yet shamefully wanting in our republican
Codes. It would moreover be useful to the Community at large as an
additional check agst a pursuit of those unwise & unjust measures which
constituted so great a portion of our calamities. If any solid objection could
be urged agst the motion, it must be on the supposition that it tended to give
too much strength either to the Executive or Judiciary. He did not think
there was the least ground for this apprehension. It was much more to be
apprehended that notwithstanding this co-operation of the two departments,
the Legislature would still be an overmatch for them. Experience in all the
States had evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all
power into its vortex. This was the real source of danger to the American
Constitutions; & suggested the necessity of giving every defensive authority
to the other departments that was consistent with Republican principles.
Mr Mason said he had always been a friend to this provision. It would
give a confidence to the Executive, which he would not otherwise have, and
without which the Revisionary power would be of little avail.
Mr Gerry did not expect to see this point which had undergone full
discussion, again revived. The object he conceived of the Revisionary
power was merely to secure the Executive department agst legislative
encroachment. The Executive therefore who will best know and be ready to
defend his rights ought alone to have the defence of them. The motion was
liable to strong objections. It was combining & mixing together the
Legislative & the other departments. It was establishing an improper
coalition between the Executive & Judiciary departments. It was making
statesmen of the Judges; and setting them up as the guardians of the Rights
of the people. He relied for his part on the Representatives of the people as
the guardians of their Rights & interests. It was making the Expositors of
the Laws, the Legislators which ought never to be done. A better expedient
for correcting the laws, would be to appoint as had been done in Pena, a
person or persons of proper skill, to draw bills for the Legislature.
Mr Strong thought with Mr Gerry that the power of making ought to be
kept distinct from that of expounding, the laws. No maxim was better
established. The Judges in exercising the function of expositors might be
influenced by the part they had taken in framing the laws.
Mr Govr Morris. Some check being necessary on the Legislature, the
question is in what hands it should be lodged. On one side it was contended
that the Executive alone ought to exercise it. He did not think that an
Executive appointed for 6 years, and impeachable whilst in office wd be a
very effectual check. On the other side it was urged that he ought to be
reinforced by the Judiciary department. Agst this it was objected that
Expositors of laws ought to have no hand in making them, and arguments in
favor of this had been drawn from England. What weight was due to them
might be easily determined by an attention to facts. The truth was that the
Judges in England had a great share in ye Legislation. They are consulted in
difficult & doubtful cases. They may be & some of them are members of
the Legislature. They are or may be members of the privy Council, and can
there advise the Executive as they will do with us if the motion succeeds.
The influence the English Judges may have in the latter capacity in
strengthening the Executive check can not be ascertained, as the King by
his influence in a manner dictates the laws. There is one difference in the
two cases however which disconcerts all reasoning from the British to our
proposed Constitution. The British Executive has so great an interest in his
prerogatives and such powerful means of defending them that he will never
yield any part of them. The interest of our Executive is so inconsiderable &
so transitory, and his means of defending it so feeble, that there is the justest
ground to fear his want of firmness in resisting incroachments. He was
extremely apprehensive that the auxiliary firmness & weight of the
Judiciary would not supply the deficiency. He concurred in thinking the
public liberty in greater danger from Legislative usurpations than from any
other source. It had been said that the Legislature ought to be relied on as
the proper Guardians of liberty. The answer was short and conclusive.
Either bad laws will be pushed or not. On the latter supposition no check
will be wanted. On the former a strong check will be necessary: and this is
the proper supposition. Emissions of paper money, largesses to the people–a
remission of debts and similar measures, will at some times be popular, and
will be pushed for that reason. At other times such measures will coincide
with the interests of the Legislature themselves, & that will be a reason not
less cogent for pushing them. It may be thought that the people will not be
deluded and misled in the latter case. But experience teaches another lesson.
The press is indeed a great means of diminishing the evil, yet it is found to
be unable to prevent it altogether.
Mr L. Martin, considered the association of the Judges with the
Executive as a dangerous innovation; as well as one which could not
produce the particular advantage expected from it. A knowledge of
Mankind, and of Legislative affairs cannot be presumed to belong in a
higher degree to the Judges than to the Legislature. And as to the
Constitutionality of laws, that point will come before the Judges in their
proper official character. In this character they have a negative on the laws.
Join them with the Executive in the Revision and they will have a double
negative. It is necessary that the Supreme Judiciary should have the
confidence of the people. This will soon be lost, if they are employed in the
task of remonstrating agst popular measures of the Legislature. Besides in
what mode & proportion are they to vote in the Council of Revision?
Mr Madison could not discover in the proposed association of the Judges
with the Executive in the Revisionary check on the Legislature any
violation of the maxim which requires the great departments of power to be
kept separate & distinct. On the contrary he thought it an auxiliary
precaution in favor of the maxim. If a Constitutional discrimination of the
departments on paper were a sufficient security to each agst encroachments
of the others, all further provisions would indeed be superfluous. But
experience had taught us a distrust of that security; and that it is necessary
to introduce such a balance of powers and interests as will guarantee the
provisions on paper. Instead therefore of contenting ourselves with laying
down the Theory in the Constitution that each department ought to be
separate & distinct, it was proposed to add a defensive power to each which
should maintain the Theory in practice. In so doing we did not blend the
departments together. We erected effectual barriers for keeping them
separate. The most regular example of this theory was in the British
Constitution. Yet it was not only the practice there to admit the Judges to a
seat in the legislature, and in the Executive Councils, and to submit to their
previous examination all laws of a certain description, but it was a part of
their Constitution that the Executive might negative any law whatever; a
part of their Constitution which had been universally regarded as calculated
for the preservation of the whole. The objection agst a union of the Judiciary
& Executive branches in the revision of the laws, had either no foundation
or was not carried far enough. If such a Union was an improper mixture of
powers, or such a Judiciary check on the laws, was inconsistent with the
Theory of a free Constitution, it was equally so to admit the Executive to
any participation in the making of laws; and the revisionary plan ought to
be discarded altogether.
Col. Mason observed that the defence of the Executive was not the sole
object of the Revisionary power. He expected even greater advantages from
it. Notwithstanding the precautions taken in the Constitution of the
Legislature, it would still so much resemble that of the individual States,
that it must be expected frequently to pass unjust and pernicious laws. This
restraining power was therefore essentially necessary. It would have the
effect not only of hindering the final passage of such laws; but would
discourage demagogues from attempting to get them passed. It has been
said (by Mr L. Martin) that if the Judges were joined in this check on the
laws, they would have a double negative, since in their expository capacity
of Judges they would have one negative. He would reply that in this
capacity they could impede in one case only, the operation of laws. They
could declare an unconstitutional law void. But with regard to every law
however unjust oppressive or pernicious, which did not come plainly under
this description, they would be under the necessity as Judges to give it a
free course. He wished the further use to be made of the Judges, of giving
aid in preventing every improper law. Their aid will be the more valuable as
they are in the habit and practice of considering laws in their true principles,
and in all their consequences.
Mr Wilson. The separation of the departments does not require that they
should have separate objects but that they should act separately tho' on the
same objects. It is necessary that the two branches of the Legislature should
be separate and distinct, yet they are both to act precisely on the same
object.
Mr Gerry had rather give the Executive an absolute negative for its own
defence than thus to blend together the Judiciary & Executive departments.
It will bind them together in an offensive and defensive alliance agst the
Legislature, and render the latter unwilling to enter into a contest with them.
Mr Govr Morris was surprised that any defensive provision for securing
the effectual separation of the departments should be considered as an
improper mixture of them. Suppose that the three powers, were to be vested
in three persons, by compact among themselves; that one was to have the
power of making, another of executing, and a third of judging, the laws.
Would it not be very natural for the two latter after having settled the
partition on paper, to observe, and would not candor oblige the former to
admit, that as a security agst legislative acts of the former which might
easily be so framed as to undermine the powers of the two others, the two
others ought to be armed with a veto for their own defence, or at least to
have an opportunity of stating their objections agst acts of encroachment?
And would any one pretend that such a right tended to blend & confound
powers that ought to be separately exercised? As well might it be said that
If three neighbours had three distinct farms, a right in each to defend his
farm agst his neighbours, tended to blend the farms together.
Mr Ghorum. All agree that a check on the Legislature is necessary. But
there are two objections agst admitting the Judges to share in it which no
observations on the other side seem to obviate, the 1st is that the Judges
ought to carry into the exposition of the laws no prepossessions with regard
to them. 2d that as the Judges will outnumber the Executive, the revisionary
check would be thrown entirely out of the Executive hands, and instead of
enabling him to defend himself, would enable the Judges to sacrifice him.
Mr Wilson. The proposition is certainly not liable to all the objections
which have been urged agst it. According (to Mr Gerry) it will unite the
Executive & Judiciary in an offensive & defensive alliance agst the
Legislature. According to Mr Ghorum it will lead to a subversion of the
Executive by the Judiciary influence. To the first gentleman the answer was
obvious: that the joint weight of the two departments was necessary to
balance the single weight of the Legislature. To the 1st objection stated by
the other Gentleman it might be answered that supposing the prepossession
to mix itself with the exposition, the evil would be overbalanced by the
advantages promised by the expedient. To the 2d objection, that such a rule
of voting might be provided in the detail as would guard agst it.
Mr Rutlidge thought the Judges of all men the most unfit to be concerned
in the revisionary Council. The Judges ought never to give their opinion on
a law till it comes before them. He thought it equally unnecessary. The
Executive could advise with the officers of State, as of war, finance &c. and
avail himself of their information & opinions.
On Question on Mr Wilson's motion for joining the Judiciary in the
Revision of laws it passed in the negative—
Mass. no. Cont ay. N. J. not present. Pa divd. Del. no.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. divd.
Resol. 10, giving the Ex a qualified veto, without the amendt was then
agd to nem. con.
The motion made by Mr Madison July 18. & then postponed, "that the
Judges shd be nominated by the Executive & such nominations become
appointments unless disagreed to by 2/3 of the 2d branch of the
Legislature," was now resumed.
Mr Madison stated as his reasons for the motion, 1. that it secured the
responsibility of the Executive who would in general be more capable &
likely to select fit characters than the Legislature, or even the 2d b. of it,
who might hide their selfish motives under the number concerned in the
appointment. 2. that in case of any flagrant partiality or error, in the
nomination it might be fairly presumed that 2/3 of the 2d branch would join
in putting a negative on it. 3. that as the 2d b. was very differently
constituted when the appointment of the Judges was formerly referred to it,
and was now to be composed of equal votes from all the States, the
principle of compromise which had prevailed in other instances required in
this that there shd be a concurrence of two authorities, in one of which the
people, in the other the States should be represented. The Executive
Magistrate wd be considered as a national officer, acting for and equally
sympathizing with every part of the U. States. If the 2d branch alone should
have this power, the Judges might be appointed by a minority of the people,
tho' by a majority, of the States, which could not be justified on any
principle as their proceedings were to relate to the people, rather than to the
States: and as it would moreover throw the appointments entirely into the
hands of ye Northern States, a perpetual ground of jealousy & discontent
would be furnished to the Southern States.
Mr Pinkney was for placing the appointmt in the 2d b. exclusively. The
Executive will possess neither the requisite knowledge of characters, nor
confidence of the people for so high a trust.
Mr Randolph wd have preferred the mode of appointmt proposed
formerly by Mr Ghorum, as adopted in the Constitution of Massts but
thought the motion depending so great an improvement of the clause as it
stands, that he anxiously wished it success. He laid great stress on the
responsibility of the Executive as a security for fit appointments.
Appointments by the Legislatures have generally resulted from cabal, from
personal regard, or some other consideration than a title derived from the
proper qualifications. The same inconveniences will proportionally prevail
if the appointments be referred to either branch of the Legislature or to any
other authority administered by a number of individuals.
Mr Elseworth would prefer a negative in the Executive on a nomination
by the 2d branch, the negative to be overruled by a concurrence of 2/3 of the
2d b. to the mode proposed by the motion; but preferred an absolute
appointment by the 2d branch to either. The Executive will be regarded by
the people with a jealous eye. Every power for augmenting unnecessarily
his influence will be disliked. As he will be stationary it was not to be
supposed he could have a better knowledge of characters. He will be more
open to caresses & intrigues than the Senate. The right to supersede his
nomination will be ideal only. A nomination under such circumstances will
be equivalent to an appointment.
Mr Govr Morris supported the motion. 1. The States in their corporate
capacity will frequently have an interest staked on the determination of the
Judges. As in the Senate the States are to vote the Judges ought not to be
appointed by the Senate. Next to the impropriety of being Judge in one's
own cause, is the appointment of the Judge. 2. It had been said the
Executive would be uninformed of characters. The reverse was ye truth. The
Senate will be so. They must take the character of candidates from the
flattering pictures drawn by their friends. The Executive in the necessary
intercourse with every part of the U. S. required by the nature of his
administration, will or may have the best possible information. 3. It had
been said that a jealousy would be entertained of the Executive. If the
Executive can be safely trusted with the command of the army, there cannot
surely be any reasonable ground of Jealousy in the present case. He added
that if the Objections agst an appointment of the Executive by the
Legislature, had the weight that had been allowed there must be some
weight in the objection to an appointment of the Judges by the Legislature
or by any part of it.
Mr Gerry. The appointment of the Judges like every other part of the
Constitution shd be so modelled as to give satisfaction both to the people
and to the States. The mode under consideration will give satisfaction to
neither. He could not conceive that the Executive could be as well informed
of characters throughout the Union, as the Senate. It appeared to him also a
strong objection that 2/3 of the Senate were required to reject a nomination
of the Executive. The Senate would be constituted in the same manner as
Congress. And the appointments of Congress have been generally good.
Mr Madison, observed that he was not anxious that 2/3 should be
necessary to disagree to a nomination. He had given this form to his motion
chiefly to vary it the more clearly from one which had just been rejected.
He was content to obviate the objection last made, and accordingly so
varied the motion as to let a majority reject.
Col. Mason found it his duty to differ from his colleagues in their
opinions & reasonings on this subject. Notwithstanding the form of the
proposition by which the appointment seemed to be divided between the
Executive & Senate, the appointment was Substantially vested in the former
alone. The false complaisance which usually prevails in such cases will
prevent a disagreement to the first nominations. He considered the
appointment by the Executive as a dangerous prerogative. It might even
give him an influence over the Judiciary department itself. He did not think
the difference of interest between the Northern and Southern States could
be properly brought into this argument. It would operate & require some
precautions in the case of regulating navigation, commerce & imposts; but
he could not see that it had any connection with the Judiciary department.
On the question, the motion now being "that the executive should
nominate & such nominations should become appointments unless
disagreed to by the Senate"
Mass. ay. Ct no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va ay. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.
On question for agreeing to the clause as it stands by which the Judges
are to be appointed by the 2d branch
Mass. no. Ct ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Adjourned.
M      J    23.    C         
Mr John Langdon & Mr Nicholas Gilman [5] from N. Hampshire, [6] took
their seats.
[5] Mr Gilman is modest, genteel, and sensible. There is nothing brilliant or
striking in his character, but there is something respectable and worthy in the
man.–About 30 years of age."–Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 325.
He did not speak in the convention.
[6] The act appointing deputies to the convention was not passed by the New
Hampshire Legislature till June 27, 1787.—Journal of Federal Convention, 17.
Resol:n 17. that provision ought to be made for future amendments of the
Articles of Union, agreed to, nem. con.
Resoln 18. "requiring the Legis: Execut: & Judy of the States to be bound
by oath to support the articles of Union," taken into consideration.
Mr Williamson suggests that a reciprocal oath should be required from
the National officers, to support the Governments of the States.
Mr Gerry moved to insert as an amendmt that the oath of the officers of
the National Government also should extend to the support of the Natl Govt
which was agreed to nem. con.
Mr Wilson said he was never fond of oaths, considering them as a left
handed security only. A good Govt did not need them, and a bad one could
not or ought not to be supported. He was afraid they might too much
trammel the members of the existing Govt in case future alterations should
be necessary; and prove an obstacle to Resol: 17. just agd to.
Mr Ghorum did not know that oaths would be of much use; but could see
no inconsistency between them and the 17. Resol. or any regular amendt of
the Constitution. The oath could only require fidelity to the existing
Constitution. A constitutional alteration of the Constitution, could never be
regarded as a breach of the Constitution, or of any oath to support it.
Mr Gerry thought with Mr Ghorum there could be no shadow of
inconsistency in the case. Nor could he see any other harm that could result
from the Resolution. On the other side he thought one good effect would be
produced by it. Hitherto the officers of the two Governments had
considered them as distinct from, and not as parts of the General System, &
had in all cases of interference given a preference to the State Govts. The
proposed oath will cure that error.
The Resoln (18) was agreed to nem. con.
Resol: 19. referring the new Constitution to Assemblies to be chosen by
the people for the express purpose of ratifying it was next taken into
consideration.
Mr Elseworth moved that it be referred to the Legislatures of the States
for ratification. Mr Patterson 2ded the motion.
Col. Mason considered a reference of the plan to the authority of the
people as one of the most important and essential of the Resolutions. The
Legislatures have no power to ratify it. They are the mere creatures of the
State Constitutions, and cannot be greater than their creators. And he knew
of no power in any of the Constitutions, he knew there was no power in
some of them, that could be competent to this object. Whither then must we
resort? To the people with whom all power remains that has not been given
up in the Constitutions derived from them. It was of great moment he
observed that this doctrine should be cherished as the basis of free
Government. Another strong reason was that admitting the Legislatures to
have a competent authority, it would be wrong to refer the plan to them,
because succeeding Legislatures having equal authority could undo the acts
of their predecessors; and the National Govt would stand in each State on
the weak and tottering foundation of an Act of Assembly. There was a
remaining consideration of some weight. In some of the States the Govts
were not derived from the clear & undisputed authority of the people. This
was the case in Virginia. Some of the best & wisest citizens considered the
Constitution as established by an assumed authority. A national
Constitution derived from such a source would be exposed to the severest
criticisms.
Mr Randolph. One idea has pervaded all our proceedings, to wit, that
opposition as well from the States as from individuals, will be made to the
System to be proposed. Will it not then be highly imprudent, to furnish any
unnecessary pretext by the mode of ratifying it. Added to other objections
agst a ratification by the Legislative authority only, it may be remarked that
there have been instances in which the authority of the Common law has
been set up in particular States agst that of the Confederation which has had
no higher sanction than Legislative ratification.–Whose opposition will be
most likely to be excited agst the System? That of the local demagogues
who will be degraded by it from the importance they now hold. These will
spare no efforts to impede that progress in the popular mind which will be
necessary to the adoption of the plan, and which every member will find to
have taken place in his own, if he will compare his present opinions with
those brought with him into the Convention. It is of great importance
therefore that the consideration of this subject should be transferred from
the Legislatures where this class of men, have their full influence to a field
in which their efforts can be less mischievous. It is moreover worthy of
consideration that some of the States are averse to any change in their
Constitution, and will not take the requisite steps, unless expressly called
upon to refer the question to the people.
Mr Gerry. The arguments of Col. Mason & Mr Randolph prove too
much. They prove an unconstitutionality in the present federal system &
even in some of the State Govts. Inferences drawn from such a source must
be inadmissible. Both the State Govts & the federal Govt have been too long
acquiesced in, to be now shaken. He considered the Confederation to be
paramount to any State Constitution. The last article of it authorizing
alterations must consequently be so as well as the others, and every thing
done in pursuance of the article must have the same high authority with the
article. Great confusion he was confident would result from a recurrence to
the people. They would never agree on any thing. He could not see any
ground to suppose that the people will do what their rulers will not. The
rulers will either conform to, or influence the sense of the people.
Mr Ghorum was agst referring the plan to the Legislatures. 1. Men
chosen by the people for the particular purpose, will discuss the subject
more candidly than members of the Legislature who are to lose the power
which is to be given up to the Genl Govt. 2. Some of the Legislatures are
composed of several branches. It will consequently be more difficult in
these cases to get the plan through the Legislatures, than thro' a Convention.
3. in the States many of the ablest men are excluded from the Legislatures,
but may be elected into a convention. Among these may be ranked many of
the Clergy who are generally friends to good Government. Their services
were found to be valuable in the formation & establishment of the
Constitution of Massachts. 4. the Legislatures will be interrupted with a
variety of little business, by artfully pressing which designing men will find
means to delay from year to year, if not to frustrate altogether the national
system. 5. If the last art: of the Confederation is to be pursued the
unanimous concurrence of the States will be necessary. But will any one
say, that all the States are to suffer themselves to be ruined, if Rho. Island
should persist in her opposition to general measures. Some other States
might also tread in her steps. The present advantage which N. York seems
to be so much attached to, of taxing her neighbours by the regulation of her
trade, makes it very probable, that she will be of the number. It would
therefore deserve serious consideration whether provision ought not to be
made for giving effect to the System without waiting for the unanimous
concurrence of the States.
Mr Elseworth. If there be any Legislatures who should find themselves
incompetent to the ratification, he should be content to let them advise with
their constituents and pursue such a mode as wd be competent. He thought
more was to be expected from the Legislatures than from the people. The
prevailing wish of the people in the Eastern States is to get rid of the public
debt; and the idea of strengthening the Natl Govt carries with it that of
strengthening the public debt. It was said by Col. Mason 1. that the
Legislatures have no authority in this case. 2. that their successors having
equal authority could rescind their acts. As to the 2d point he could not
admit it to be well founded. An Act to which the States by their
Legislatures, make themselves parties, becomes a compact from which no
one of the parties can recede of itself. As to the 1st point, he observed that a
new sett of ideas seemed to have crept in since the articles of Confederation
were established. Conventions of the people, or with power derived
expressly from the people, were not then thought of. The Legislatures were
considered as competent. Their ratification has been acquiesced in without
complaint. To whom have Congs applied on subsequent occasions for
further powers? To the Legislatures; not to the people. The fact is that we
exist at present, and we need not enquire how, as a federal Society, united
by a charter one article of which is that alterations therein may be made by
the Legislative authority of the States. It has been said that if the
confederation is to be observed, the States must unanimously concur in the
proposed innovations. He would answer that if such were the urgency &
necessity of our situation as to warrant a new compact among a part of the
States, founded on the consent of the people; the same pleas would be
equally valid in favor of a partial compact, founded on the consent of the
Legislatures.
Mr Williamson thought the Resol:n (19) so expressed as that it might be
submitted either to the Legislatures or to Conventions recommended by the
Legislatures. He observed that some Legislatures were evidently
unauthorized to ratify the system. He thought too that Conventions were to
be preferred as more likely to be composed of the ablest men in the States.
Mr Govr Morris considered the inference of Mr Elseworth from the plea
of necessity as applied to the establishment of a new System on ye consent
of the people of a part of the States, in favor of a like establishmt on the
consent of a part of the Legislatures, as a non sequitur. If the Confederation
is to be pursued no alteration can be made without the unanimous consent
of the Legislatures: Legislative alterations not conformable to the federal
compact, would clearly not be valid. The Judges would consider them as
null & void. Whereas in case of an appeal to the people of the U. S., the
supreme authority, the federal compact may be altered by a majority of
them; in like manner as the Constitution of a particular State may be altered
by a majority of the people of the State. The amendmt moved by
Mr Elseworth erroneously supposes that we are proceeding on the basis of
the Confederation. This Convention is unknown to the Confederation.
Mr King thought with Mr Elseworth that the Legislatures had a
competent authority, the acquiescence of the people of America in the
Confederation, being equivalent to a formal ratification by the people. He
thought with Mr E. also that the plea of necessity was as valid in the one
case as the other. At the same time he preferred a reference to the authority
of the people expressly delegated to Conventions, as the most certain means
of obviating all disputes & doubts concerning the legitimacy of the new
Constitution; as well as the most likely means of drawing forth the best men
in the States to decide on it. He remarked that among other objections made
in the State of N. York to granting powers to Congs one had been that such
powers as would operate within the State, could not be reconciled to the
Constitution; and therefore were not grantible by the Legislative authority.
He considered it as of some consequence also to get rid of the scruples
which some members of the State Legislatures might derive from their
oaths to support & maintain the existing Constitutions.
Mr Madison thought it clear that the Legislatures were incompetent to
the proposed changes. These changes would make essential inroads on the
State Constitutions, and it would be a novel & dangerous doctrine that a
Legislature could change the constitution under which it held its existence.
There might indeed be some Constitutions within the Union, which had
given a power to the Legislature to concur in alterations of the federal
Compact. But there were certainly some which had not; and in the case of
these, a ratification must of necessity be obtained from the people. He
considered the difference between a system founded on the Legislatures
only, and one founded on the people, to be the true difference between a
league or treaty, and a Constitution. The former in point of moral
obligation might be as inviolable as the latter. In point of political
operation, there were two important distinctions in favor of the latter. 1. A
law violating a treaty ratified by a pre-existing law, might be respected by
the Judges as a law, though an unwise or perfidious one. A law violating a
constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by
the Judges as null & void. 2. The doctrine laid down by the law of Nations
in the case of treaties is that a breach of any one article by any of the
parties, frees the other parties from their engagements. In the case of a
union of people under one Constitution, the nature of the pact has always
been understood to exclude such an interpretation. Comparing the two
modes in point of expediency he thought all the considerations which
recommended this Convention in preference to Congress for proposing the
reform were in favor of State Conventions in preference to the Legislatures
for examining and adopting it.
On question on Mr Elseworth's motion to refer the plan to the
Legislatures of the States
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Govr Morris moved that the reference of the plan be made to one
general Convention, chosen & authorized by the people to consider, amend,
& establish the same.–Not seconded.
On question for agreeing to Resolution 19. touching the mode of
Ratification as reported from the Committee of the Whole; viz, to refer the
Constn, after the approbation of Congs to assemblies chosen by the people;
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Govr Morris & Mr King moved that the representation in the second
branch consist of –— members from each State, who shall vote per capita.
Mr Elseworth said he had always approved of voting in that mode.
Mr Govr Morris moved to fill the blank with three. He wished the Senate
to be a pretty numerous body. If two members only should be allowed to
each State, and a majority be made a quorum, the power would be lodged in
14 members, which was too small a number for such a trust.
Mr Ghorum preferred two to three members for the blank. A small
number was most convenient for deciding on peace & war &c. which he
expected would be vested in the 2d branch. The number of States will also
increase. Kentucky, Vermont, the Province of Mayne & Franklin will
probably soon be added to the present number. He presumed also that some
of the largest States would be divided. The strength of the General Govt will
lie not in the largeness, but in the smallness of the States.
Col. Mason thought 3 from each State including new States would make
the 2d branch too numerous. Besides other objections, the additional
expence ought always to form one, where it was not absolutely necessary.
Mr Williamson. If the number be too great, the distant States will not be
on an equal footing with the nearer States. The latter can more easily send
& support their ablest Citizens. He approved of the voting per capita.
On the question for filling the blank with "three"
N. H. no. Mass. no. Cont no. Pa ay. Del. no. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On question for filling it with "two." Agreed to nem. con.
Mr L Martin was opposed to voting per Capita, as departing from the
idea of the States being represented in the 2d branch.
Mr Carroll, [7] was not struck with any particular objection agst the
mode; but he did not wish so hastily to make so material an innovation.
[7] "Mr. Carrol is a Man of large fortune, and influence in his State. He
possesses plain good sense, and is in the full confidence of his Countrymen. This
Gentleman is about [blank] years of age."–Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii.,
330.
On the question on the whole motion viz. the 2d b. to consist of 2
members from each State and to vote per Capita,
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Houston [8] & Mr Spaight moved "that the appointment of the
Executive by Electors chosen by the Legislatures of the States, be
reconsidered." Mr Houston urged the extreme inconveniency & the
considerable expence, of drawing together men from all the States for the
single purpose of electing the Chief Magistrate.
[8] "Mr. Houston is an Attorney at Law, and has been Member of Congress for
the State of Georgia. He is a Gentleman of Family, and was educated in England.
As to his legal or political knowledge he has very little to boast of. Nature seems
to have done more for his corporeal than mental powers. His Person is striking,
but his mind very little improved with useful or elegant knowledge. He has none
of the talents requisite for the Orator, but in public debate is confused and
irregular. Mr. Houston is about 30 years of age of an amiable and sweet temper,
and of good and honorable principles."–Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 334.
On the question which was put without any debate
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no.
Virga no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Ordered that tomorrow be assigned for the reconsideration, Cont & Pena
no–all the rest ay.
Mr Gerry moved that the proceedings of the Convention for the
establishment of a Natl Govt (except the part relating to the Executive), be
referred to a Committee to prepare & report a Constitution conformable
thereto.
Genl Pinkney reminded the Convention that if the Committee should fail
to insert some security to the Southern States agst an emancipation of
slaves, and taxes on exports, he shd be bound by duty to his State to vote
agst their Report. The appt of a Come as moved by Mr Gerry. Agd to nem.
con.
Shall the Come consist of 10 members one from each State prest–All the
States were no, except Delaware, ay.
Shall it consist of 7. members
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
The question being lost by an equal division of Votes.
It was agreed, nem-con- that the Committee consist of 5 members to be
appointed tomorrow.
Adjourned.
T       J    24.    C         
The appointment of the Executive by Electors reconsidered.
Mr Houston moved that he be appointed by the "Natl Legislature,"
instead of "Electors appointed by the State Legislatures" according to the
last decision of the mode. He dwelt chiefly on the improbability, that
capable men would undertake the service of Electors from the more distant
States.
Mr Spaight seconded the motion.
Mr Gerry opposed it. He thought there was no ground to apprehend the
danger urged by Mr Houston. The election of the Executive Magistrate will
be considered as of vast importance and will create great earnestness. The
best men, the Governours of the States will not hold it derogatory from their
character to be the electors. If the motion should be agreed to, it will be
necessary to make the Executive ineligible a 2d time, in order to render him
independent of the Legislature; which was an idea extremely repugnant to
his way of thinking.
Mr Strong supposed that there would be no necessity, if the Executive
should be appointed by the Legislature, to make him ineligible a 2d time; as
new elections of the Legislature will have intervened; and he will not
depend for his 2d appointment on the same sett of men as his first was recd
from. It had been suggested that gratitude for his past appointment wd
produce the same effect as dependence for his future appointment. He
thought very differently. Besides this objection would lie agst the Electors
who would be objects of gratitude as well as the Legislature. It was of great
importance not to make the Govt too complex which would be the case if a
new sett of men like the Electors should be introduced into it. He thought
also that the first characters in the States would not feel sufficient motives
to undertake the office of Electors.
Mr Williamson was for going back to the original ground; to elect the
Executive for 7 years and render him ineligible a 2d time. The proposed
Electors would certainly not be men of the 1st nor even of the 2d grade in
the States. These would all prefer a seat either in the Senate or the other
branch of the Legislature. He did not like the Unity in the Executive. He
had wished the Executive power to be lodged in three men taken from three
districts into which the States should be divided. As the Executive is to
have a kind of veto on the laws, and there is an essential difference of
interests between the N. & S. States, particularly in the carrying trade, the
power will be dangerous, if the Executive is to be taken from part of the
Union, to the part from which he is not taken. The case is different here
from what it is in England; where there is a sameness of interests
throughout the Kingdom. Another objection agst a single Magistrate is that
he will be an elective King, and will feel the spirit of one. He will spare no
pains to keep himself in for life, and will then lay a train for the succession
of his children. It was pretty certain he thought that we should at some time
or other have a King; but he wished no precaution to be omitted that might
postpone the event as long as possible.–Ineligibility a 2d time appeared to
him to be the best precaution. With this precaution he had no objection to a
longer term than 7 years. He would go as far as 10 or 12 years.
Mr Gerry moved that the Legislatures of the States should vote by ballot
for the Executive in the same proportions as it had been proposed they
should chuse electors; and that in case a majority of the votes should not
centre on the same person, the 1st branch of the Natl Legislature should
chuse two out of the 4 candidates having most votes, and out of these two,
the 2d branch should chuse the Executive.
Mr King seconded the motion–and on the Question to postpone in order
to take it into consideration. The noes were so predominant, that the States
were not counted.
Question on Mr Houston's motion that the Executive be appd by the Nal
Legislature.
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr L. Martin & Mr Gerry moved to re-instate the ineligibility of the
Executive a 2d time.
Mr Elseworth. With many this appears a natural consequence of his
being elected by the Legislature. It was not the case with him. The
Executive he thought should be reelected if his conduct proved him worthy
of it. And he will be more likely to render himself, worthy of it if he be
rewardable with it. The most eminent characters also, will be more willing
to accept the trust under this condition, than if they foresee a necessary
degradation at a fixt period.
Mr Gerry. That the Executive shd be independent of the Legislature is a
clear point. The longer the duration of his appointment the more will his
dependence be diminished. It will be better then for him to continue 10. 15.
or even 20. years and be ineligible afterwards.
Mr King was for making him re-eligible. This is too great an advantage
to be given up for the small effect it will have on his dependence, if
impeachments are to lie. He considered these as rendering the tenure during
pleasure.
Mr L. Martin, suspending his motion as to the ineligibility, moved "that
the appointmt of the Executive shall continue for Eleven years.
Mr Gerry suggested fifteen years.
Mr King twenty years. This is the medium life of princes. [9]
[9] This might possibly be meant as a carricature of the previous motions in
order to defeat the object of them.–Madison's Note.
Mr Davie eight years.
Mr Wilson. The difficulties & perplexities into which the House is
thrown proceed from the election by the Legislature which he was sorry had
been reinstated. The inconveniency of this mode was such that he would
agree to almost any length of time in order to get rid of the dependence
which must result from it. He was persuaded that the longest term would
not be equivalent to a proper mode of election, unless indeed it should be
during good behaviour. It seemed to be supposed that at a certain advance
of life, a continuance in office would cease to be agreeable to the officer, as
well as desirable to the public. Experience had shewn in a variety of
instances that both a capacity & inclination for public service existed in
very advanced stages. He mentioned the instance of a Doge of Venice who
was elected after he was 80 years of age. The Popes have generally been
elected at very advanced periods, and yet in no case had a more steady or a
better concerted policy been pursued than in the Court of Rome. If the
Executive should come into office at 35 years of age, which he presumes
may happen & his continuance should be fixt at 15 years, at the age of 50.
in the very prime of life, and with all the aid of experience, he must be cast
aside like a useless hulk. What an irreparable loss would the British
Jurisprudence have sustained, had the age of 50. been fixt there as the
ultimate limit of capacity or readiness to serve the public. The great
luminary (Ld Mansfield) held his seat for thirty years after his arrival at that
age. Notwithstanding what had been done he could not but hope that a
better mode of election would yet be adopted; and one that would be more
agreeable to the general sense of the House. That time might be given for
further deliberation he wd move that the present question be postponed till
tomorrow.
Mr Broom seconded the motion to postpone.
Mr Gerry. We seem to be entirely at a loss on this head. He would
suggest whether it would not be advisable to refer the clause relating to the
Executive to the Committee of detail to be appointed. Perhaps they will be
able to hit on something that may unite the various opinions which have
been thrown out.
Mr Wilson. As the great difficulty seems to spring from the mode of
election, he wd suggest a mode which had not been mentioned. It was that
the Executive be elected for 6 years by a small number, not more than 15 of
the Natl Legislature, to be drawn from it, not by ballot, but by lot and who
should retire immediately and make the election without separating. By this
mode intrigue would be avoided in the first instance, and the dependence
would be diminished. This was not he said a digested idea and might be
liable to strong objections.
Mr Govr Morris. Of all possible modes of appointment that by the
Legislature is the worst. If the Legislature is to appoint, and to impeach or
to influence the impeachment, the Executive will be the mere creature of it.
He had been opposed to the impeachment but was now convinced that
impeachments must be provided for, if the appt was to be of any duration.
No man wd say, that an Executive known to be in the pay of an Enemy,
should not be removable in some way or other. He had been charged
heretofore (by Col. Mason) with inconsistency in pleading for confidence in
the Legislature on some occasions, & urging a distrust on others. The
charge was not well founded. The Legislature is worthy of unbounded
confidence in some respects, and liable to equal distrust in others. When
their interest coincides precisely with that of their Constituents, as happens
in many of their Acts, no abuse of trust is to be apprehended. When a strong
personal interest happens to be opposed to the general interest, the
Legislature cannot be too much distrusted. In all public bodies there are two
parties. The Executive will necessarily be more connected with one than
with the other. There will be a personal interest therefore in one of the
parties to oppose as well as in the other to support him. Much had been said
of the intrigues, that will be practised by the Executive to get into office.
Nothing had been said on the other side of the intrigues to get him out of
office. Some leader of a party will always covet his seat, will perplex his
administration, will cabal with the Legislature, till he succeeds in
supplanting him. This was the way in which the King of England was got
out, he meant the real King, the Minister. This was the way in which Pitt
(Ld Chatham) forced himself into place. Fox was for pushing the matter still
farther. If he had carried his India bill, which he was very near doing, he
would have made the Minister, the King in form almost as well as in
substance. Our President will be the British Minister, yet we are about to
make him appointable by the Legislature. Something had been said of the
danger of Monarchy. If a good government should not now be formed, if a
good organization of the Executive should not be provided, he doubted
whether we should not have something worse than a limited monarchy. In
order to get rid of the dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, the
expedient of making him ineligible a 2d time had been devised. This was as
much as to say we shd give him the benefit of experience, and then deprive
ourselves of the use of it. But make him ineligible a 2d time–and prolong
his duration even to 15 years, will he by any wonderful interposition of
providence at that period cease to be a man? No he will be unwilling to quit
his exaltation, the road to his object thro' the Constitution will be shut; he
will be in possession of the sword, a civil war will ensue, and the Com̃ander
of the victorious army on which ever side, will be the despot of America.
This consideration renders him particularly anxious that the Executive
should be properly constituted. The vice here would not, as in some other
parts of the system be curable. It is the most difficult of all rightly to
balance the Executive. Make him too weak: The Legislature will usurp his
powers. Make him too strong. He will usurp on the Legislature. He
preferred a short period, a re-eligibility, but a different mode of election. A
long period would prevent an adoption of the plan: it ought to do so. He shd
himself be afraid to trust it. He was not prepared to decide on Mr Wilson's
mode of election just hinted by him. He thought it deserved consideration.
It would be better that chance shd decide than intrigue.
On a question to postpone the consideration of the Resolution on the
subject of the Executive
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. divd.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Wilson then moved that the Executive be chosen every –— years by
–— Electors to be taken by lot from the Natt Legislature who shall proceed
immediately to the choice of the Executive and not separate until it be
made."
Mr Carrol 2ds the motion.
Mr Gerry. This is committing too much to chance. If the lot should fall
on a sett of unworthy men, an unworthy Executive must be saddled on the
Country. He thought it had been demonstrated that no possible mode of
electing by the Legislature could be a good one.
Mr King. The lot might fall on a majority from the same State which wd
ensure the election of a man from that State. We ought to be governed by
reason, not by chance. As nobody seemed to be satisfied, he wished the
matter to be postponed.
Mr Wilson did not move this as the best mode. His opinion remained
unshaken that we ought to resort to the people for the election. He seconded
the postponement.
Mr Govr Morris observed that the chances were almost infinite agst a
majority of Electors from the same State.
On a question whether the last motion was in order, it was determined in
the affirmative: 7 ays. 4 noes.
On the question of postponemt it was agreed to nem. con.
Mr Carrol took occasion to observe that he considered the clause
declaring that direct taxation on the States should be in proportion to
representation, previous to the obtaining an actual census, as very
objectionable, and that he reserved to himself the right of opposing it, if the
Report of the Committee of detail should leave it in the plan.
Mr Govr Morris hoped the Committee would strike out the whole of the
clause proportioning direct taxation to representation. He had only meant it
as a bridge [10] to assist us over a certain gulph; having passed the gulph the
bridge may be removed. He thought the principle laid down with so much
strictness, liable to strong objections.
[10] The object was to lessen the eagerness on one side, & the opposition on the
other, to the share of representation claimed by the S. States on account of the
Negroes.–Madison's Note.
On a ballot for a Committee to report a Constitution conformable to the
Resolutions passed by the Convention, the members chosen were
Mr Rutlidge, Mr Randolph, Mr Ghorum, Mr Elseworth, Mr Wilson—
On motion to discharge the Come of the whole from the propositions
submitted to the Convention by Mr C. Pinkney as the basis of a constitution,
and to refer them to the Committee of detail just appointed, it was agd to
nem: con.
A like motion was then made & agreed to nem: con: with respect to the
propositions of Mr Patterson.
Adjourned.
W         J    25. I  C         
Clause relating to the Executive being again under consideration [11]
[11] "Permit me to hint, whether it would not be wise & seasonable to provide a
strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our
national Government; and to declare expressly that the command in chief of the
American army shall not be given to, nor devolve on, any but a natural born
citizen."–John Jay to Washington, July 25, 1787 (Wash. MSS.).
Mr Elseworth moved "that the Executive be appointed by the
Legislature," except when the magistrate last chosen shall have continued in
office the whole term for which he was chosen, & be reeligible, in which
case the choice shall be by Electors appointed by the Legislatures of the
States for that purpose. By this means a deserving magistrate may be
reelected without making him dependent on the Legislature.
Mr Gerry repeated his remark that an election at all by the Natl
Legislature was radically and incurably wrong; and moved that the
Executive be appointed by the Governours & Presidents of the States, with
advice of their Councils, and where there are no Councils by Electors
chosen by the Legislatures. The executives to vote in the following
proportions: viz—
Mr Madison. There are objections agst every mode that has been, or
perhaps can be proposed. The election must be made either by some
existing authority under the Natl or State Constitutions–or by some special
authority derived from the people–or by the people themselves.–The two
Existing authorities under the Natl Constitution wd be the Legislative &
Judiciary. The latter he presumed was out of the question. The former was
in his Judgment liable to insuperable objections. Besides the general
influence of that mode on the independence of the Executive, 1. the election
of the Chief Magistrate would agitate & divide the legislature so much that
the public interest would materially suffer by it. Public bodies are always
apt to be thrown into contentions, but into more violent ones by such
occasions than by any others. 2. the candidate would intrigue with the
Legislature, would derive his appointment from the predominant faction,
and be apt to render his administration subservient to its views. 3. The
Ministers of foreign powers would have and would make use of, the
opportunity to mix their intrigues & influence with the Election. Limited as
the powers of the Executive are, it will be an object of great moment with
the great rival powers of Europe who have American possessions, to have at
the head of our Governmt a man attached to their respective politics &
interests. No pains, nor perhaps expence, will be spared, to gain from the
Legislature an appointmt favorable to their wishes. Germany & Poland are
witnesses of this danger. In the former, the election of the Head of the
Empire, till it became in a manner hereditary, interested all Europe, and was
much influenced by foreign interference. In the latter, altho' the elective
Magistrate has very little real power, his election has at all times produced
the most eager interference of foreign princes, and has in fact at length slid
entirely into foreign hands. The existing authorities in the States are the
Legislative, Executive & Judiciary. The appointment of the Natl Executive
by the first was objectionable in many points of view, some of which had
been already mentioned. He would mention one which of itself would
decide his opinion. The Legislatures of the States had betrayed a strong
propensity to a variety of pernicious measures. One object of the Natl
Legislre was to controul this propensity. One object of the Natl Executive,
so far as it would have a negative on the laws, was to controul the Natl
Legislature so far as it might be infected with a similar propensity. Refer the
appointmt of the Natl Executive to the State Legislatures, and this
controuling purpose may be defeated. The Legislatures can & will act with
some kind of regular plan, and will promote the appointmt of a man who
will not oppose himself to a favorite object. Should a majority of the
Legislatures at the time of election have the same object, or different
objects of the same kind, The Natl Executive would be rendered subservient
to them.–An appointment by the State Executives, was liable among other
objections to this insuperable one, that being standing bodies, they could &
would be courted, and intrigued with by the Candidates, by their partizans,
and by the Ministers of foreign powers. The State Judiciary had not & he
presumed wd not be proposed as a proper source of appointment. The
option before us then lay between an appointment by Electors chosen by the
people–and an immediate appointment by the people. He thought the
former mode free from many of the objections which had been urged agst it,
and greatly preferable to an appointment by the Natl Legislature. As the
electors would be chosen for the occasion, would meet at once, & proceed
immediately to an appointment, there would be very little opportunity for
cabal, or corruption. As a further precaution, it might be required that they
should meet at some place, distinct from the seat of Govt and even that no
person within a certain distance of the place at the time shd be eligible. This
Mode however had been rejected so recently & by so great a majority that it
probably would not be proposed anew. The remaining mode was an election
by the people or rather by the qualified part of them, at large: With all its
imperfections he liked this best. He would not repeat either the general
argumts. for or the objections agst this mode. He would only take notice of
two difficulties which he admitted to have weight. The first arose from the
disposition in the people to prefer a Citizen of their own State, and the
disadvantage this wd throw on the smaller States. Great as this objection
might be he did not think it equal to such as lay agst every other mode
which had been proposed. He thought too that some expedient might be hit
upon that would obviate it. The second difficulty arose from the
disproportion of qualified voters in the N. & S. States, and the
disadvantages which this mode would throw on the latter. The answer to
this objection was 1. that this disproportion would be continually decreasing
under the influence of the Republican laws introduced in the S. States, and
the more rapid increase of their population. 2. That local considerations
must give way to the general interest. As an individual from the S. States,
he was willing to make the sacrifice.
Mr Elseworth. The objection drawn from the different sizes of the States,
is unanswerable. The Citizens of the largest States would invariably prefer
the candidate within the State; and the largest States wd invariably have the
man.
Question on Mr Elseworth's motion as above.
N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Pinkney moved that the election by the Legislature be qualified with
a proviso that no person be eligible for more than 6 years in any twelve
years. He thought this would have all the advantage & at the same time
avoid in some degree the inconveniency, of an absolute ineligibility a 2d
time.
Col. Mason approved the idea. It had the sanction of experience in the
instance of Congs and some of the Executives of the States. It rendered the
Executive as effectually independent, as an ineligibility after his first
election, and opened the way at the same time for the advantage of his
future services. He preferred on the whole the election by the Natl
Legislature: Tho' Candor obliged him to admit, that there was great danger
of foreign influence, as had been suggested. This was the most serious
objection with him that had been urged.
Mr Butler. The two great evils to be avoided are cabal at home, &
influence from abroad. It will be difficult to avoid either if the Election be
made by the Natl Legislature. On the other hand. The Govt should not be
made so complex & unwieldy as to disgust the States. This would be the
case, if the election shd be referred to the people. He liked best an election
by Electors chosen by the Legislatures of the States. He was agst a re-
eligibility at all events. He was also agst a ratio of votes in the States. An
equality should prevail in this case. The reasons for departing from it do not
hold in the case of the Executive as in that of the Legislature.
Mr Gerry approved of Mr Pinkney's motion as lessening the evil.
Mr Govr Morris was agst a rotation in every case. It formed a political
School, in wch we were always governed by the scholars, and not by the
Masters. The evils to be guarded agst in this case are. 1. the undue influence
of the Legislature. 2. instability of Councils. 3. misconduct in office. To
guard agst the first, we run into the second evil. We adopt a rotation which
produces instability of Councils. To avoid Sylla we fall into Charibdis. A
change of men is ever followed by a change of measures. We see this fully
exemplified in the vicissitudes among ourselves, particularly in the State of
Pena. The self-sufficiency of a victorious party scorns to tread in the paths
of their predecessors. Rehoboam will not imitate Soloman. 2. the Rotation
in office will not prevent intrigue and dependence on the Legislature. The
man in office will look forward to the period at which he will become re-
eligible. The distance of the period, the improbability of such a protraction
of his life will be no obstacle. Such is the nature of man, formed by his
benevolent author no doubt for wise ends, that altho' he knows his existence
to be limited to a span, he takes his measures as if he were to live for ever.
But taking another supposition, the inefficacy of the expedient will be
manifest. If the magistrate does not look forward to his re-election to the
Executive, he will be pretty sure to keep in view the opportunity of his
going into the Legislature itself. He will have little objection then to an
extension of power on a theatre where he expects to act a distinguished part;
and will be very unwilling to take any step that may endanger his popularity
with the Legislature, on his influence over which the figure he is to make
will depend. 3. To avoid the third evil, impeachments will be essential. And
hence an additional reason agst an election by the Legislature. He
considered an election by the people as the best, by the Legislature as the
worst, mode. Putting both these aside, he could not but favor the idea of
Mr Wilson, of introducing a mixture of lot. It will diminish, if not destroy
both cabal & dependence.
Mr Williamson was sensible that strong objections lay agst an election of
the Executive by the Legislature, and that it opened a door for foreign
influence. The principal objection agst an election by the people seemed to
be, the disadvantage under which it would place the smaller States. He
suggested as a cure for this difficulty, that each man should vote for 3
candidates, one of them he observed would be probably of his own State,
the other 2. of some other States; and as probably of a small as a large one.
Mr Govr Morris liked the idea, suggesting as an amendment that each
man should vote for two persons one of whom at least should not be of his
own State.
Mr Madison also thought something valuable might be made of the
suggestion with the proposed amendment of it. The second best man in this
case would probably be the first, in fact. The only objection which occurred
was that each Citizen after havg given his vote for his favorite fellow
Citizen, wd throw away his second on some obscure Citizen of another
State, in order to ensure the object of his first choice. But it could hardly be
supposed that the Citizens of many States would be so sanguine of having
their favorite elected, as not to give their second vote with sincerity to the
next object of their choice. It might moreover be provided in favor of the
smaller States that the Executive should not be eligible more than –— times
in –— years from the same State.
Mr Gerry. A popular election in this case is radically vicious. The
ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some one set of men
dispersed through the Union & acting in Concert to delude them into any
appointment. He observed that such a Society of men existed in the Order
of the Cincinnati. They are respectable, united, and influential. They will in
fact elect the chief Magistrate in every instance, if the election be referred
to the people. His respect for the characters composing this Society could
not blind him to the danger & impropriety of throwing such a power into
their hands.
Mr Dickinson. As far as he could judge from the discussions which had
taken place during his attendance, insuperable objections lay agst an
election of the Executive by the Natl Legislature; as also by the Legislatures
or Executives of the States. He had long leaned towards an election by the
people which he regarded as the best & purest source. Objections he was
aware lay agst this mode, but not so great he thought as agst the other
modes. The greatest difficulty in the opinion of the House seemed to arise
from the partiality of the States to their respective Citizens. But might not
this very partiality be turned to a useful purpose. Let the people of each
State chuse its best Citizen. The people will know the most eminent
characters of their own States, and the people of different States will feel an
emulation in selecting those of which they will have the greatest reason to
be proud. Out of the thirteen names thus selected, an Executive Magistrate
may be chosen either by the Natl Legislature, or by Electors appointed by it.
On a Question which was moved for postponing Mr Pinkney's motion, in
order to make way for some such proposition as had been hinted by
Mr Williamson & others, it passed in the negative.
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On Mr Pinkney's motion that no person shall serve in the Executive more
than 6 years in 12. years, it passed in the negative.
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On a motion that the members of the Committee be furnished with
copies of the proceedings it was so determined; S. Carolina alone being in
the negative.
It was then moved that the members of the House might take copies of
the Resolutions which had been agreed to; which passed in the negative.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Con. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay.
Maryd no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Gerry & Mr Butler moved to refer the resolution relating to the
Executive (except the clause making it consist of a single person) to the
Com̃ittee of detail.
Mr Wilson hoped that so important a branch of the System wd not be
committed untill a general principle shd be fixed by a vote of the House.
Mr Langdon. was for the commitment–Adjd.
T        J   . 26.    C         . [12]
[12] "The affairs of the federal government are, I believe, in the utmost
confusion: The convention is an expedient that will produce a decisive effect. It
will either recover us from our present embarrassments or complete our ruin; for
I do suspect that if what they recommend shod be rejected this wod be the case.
But I trust that the presence of Genl Washington will have great weight in the
body itself so as to overawe & keep under the demon of party, & that the
signature of his name to whatever act shall be the result of their deliberations
will secure its passage thro' the union."–Monroe to Jefferson, July 27, 1787
(Writings of Monroe, i., 173).
Col. Mason. In every stage of the Question relative to the Executive, the
difficulty of the subject and the diversity of the opinions concerning it have
appeared. Nor have any of the modes of constituting that department been
satisfactory. 1. It has been proposed that the election should be made by the
people at large; that is that an act which ought to be performed by those
who know most of Eminent characters, & qualifications, should be
performed by those who know least. 2. that the election should be made by
the Legislatures of the States. 3. by the Executives of the States. Agst these
modes also strong objections have been urged. 4. It has been proposed that
the election should be made by Electors chosen by the people for that
purpose. This was at first agreed to: But on further consideration has been
rejected. 5. Since which, the mode of Mr Williamson, requiring each
freeholder to vote for several candidates has been proposed. This seemed
like many other propositions, to carry a plausible face, but on closer
inspection is liable to fatal objections. A popular election in any form, as
Mr Gerry has observed, would throw the appointment into the hands of the
Cincinnati, a Society for the members of which he had a great respect, but
which he never wished to have a preponderating influence in the Govt. 6.
Another expedient was proposed by Mr Dickinson, which is liable to so
palpable & material an inconvenience that he had little doubt of its being by
this time rejected by himself. It would exclude every man who happened
not to be popular within his own State; tho' the causes of his local
unpopularity might be of such a nature as to recommend him to the States at
large. 7. Among other expedients, a lottery has been introduced. But as the
tickets do not appear to be in much demand, it will probably, not be carried
on, and nothing therefore need be said on that subject. After reviewing all
these various modes, he was led to conclude, that an election by the Natl
Legislature as originally proposed, was the best. If it was liable to
objections, it was liable to fewer than any other. He conceived at the same
time that a second election ought to be absolutely prohibited. Having for his
primary object for the pole-star of his political conduct, the preservation of
the rights of the people, he held it as an essential point, as the very
palladium of civil liberty, that the Great officers of State, and particularly
the Executive should at fixed periods return to that mass from which they
were at first taken, in order that they may feel & respect those rights &
interests, Which are again to be personally valuable to them. He concluded
with moving that the constitution of the Executive as reported by the Come
of the whole be reinstated, viz. "that the Executive be appointed for seven
years, & be ineligible a 2d time."
Mr Davie seconded the motion.
Docr Franklin. It seems to have been imagined by some that the
returning to the mass of the people was degrading the magistrate. This he
thought was contrary to republican principles. In free Governments the
rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors & sovereigns. For the
former therefore to return among the latter was not to degrade but to
promote them. And it would be imposing an unreasonable burden on them,
to keep them always in a State of servitude, and not allow them to become
again one of the Masters.
Question on Col. Masons motion as above; which passed in the
affirmative
N. H. ay. Massts not on floor. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no.
Del. no. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Govr Morris was now agst the whole paragraph. In answer to Col.
Mason's position that a periodical return of the great officers of the State
into the mass of the people, was the palladium of Civil liberty he wd
observe that on the same principle the Judiciary ought to be periodically
degraded; certain it was that the Legislature ought on every principle, yet no
one had proposed, or conceived that the members of it should not be re-
eligible. In answer to Docr Franklin, that a return into the mass of the
people would be a promotion, instead of a degradation, he had no doubt that
our Executive like most others would have too much patriotism to shrink
from the burthen of his office, and too much modesty not to be willing to
decline the promotion.
On the question on the whole resolution as amended in the words
following–"that a National Executive be instituted–to consist of a single
person–to be chosen by the Natl legislature–for the term of seven years–to
be ineligible a 2d time–with power to carry into execution the natl laws–to
appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for–to be removable on
impeachment & conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty–to receive a
fixt compensation for the devotion of his time to the public service, to be
paid out of the Natl treasury"–it passed in the affirmative
N. H. ay. Mass. not on floor. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no.
Del. no. Md no. Va divd. Mr Blair & Col. Mason ay. Genl
Washington & Mr Madison no. Mr Randolph happened
to be out of the House. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Mason moved "that the Com̃ittee of detail be instructed to receive a
clause requiring certain qualifications of landed property & citizenship of
the U. States, in members of the Legislature, and disqualifying persons
having unsettled Accts with or being indebted to the U. S., from being
members of the Natl Legislature."–He observed that persons of the latter
descriptions had frequently got into the State Legislatures, in order to
promote laws that might shelter their delinquencies; and that this evil had
crept into Congs if Report was to be regarded.
Mr Pinckney seconded the motion.
Mr. Govr Morris. If qualifications are proper, he wd prefer them in the
electors rather than the elected. As to debtors of the U. S. they are but few.
As to persons having unsettled accounts he believed them to be pretty
many. He thought however that such a discrimination would be both odious
& useless, and in many instances, unjust & cruel. The delay of settlemt had
been more the fault of the Public than of the individuals. What will be done
with those patriotic Citizens who have lent money, or services or property
to their Country, without having been yet able to obtain a liquidation of
their claims? Are they to be excluded?
Mr Ghorum was for leaving to the Legislature the providing agst such
abuses as had been mentioned.
Col. Mason mentioned the parliamentary qualifications adopted in the
Reign of Queen Anne, which he said had met with universal approbation.
Mr Madison had witnessed the zeal of men having accts with the public,
to get into the Legislatures for sinister purposes. He thought however that if
any precaution were taken for excluding them, the one proposed by Col.
Mason ought to be new modelled. It might be well to limit the exclusion to
persons who had recd money from the public, and had not accounted for it.
Mr Govr Morris. It was a precept of great antiquity as well as of high
authority that we should not be righteous overmuch. He thought we ought
to be equally on our guard agst being wise overmuch. The proposed
regulation would enable the Governt to exclude particular persons from
office as long as they pleased. He mentioned the case of the Com̃ander in
Chief's presenting his account for secret services, which he said was so
moderate that every one was astonished at it; and so simple that no doubt
could arise on it. Yet had the Auditor been disposed to delay the settlement,
how easily he might have effected it, & how cruel wd it be in such a case to
keep a distinguished & meritorious Citizen under a temporary disability &
disfranchisement. He mentioned this case merely to illustrate the
objectionable nature of the proposition. He was opposed to such minutious
regulations in a Constitution. The parliamentary qualifications quoted by
Col. Mason, had been disregarded in practice; and was but a scheme of the
landed agst the monied interest.
Mr Pinckney & Genl Pinckney moved to insert by way of amendmt the
words Judiciary & Executive so as to extend the qualifications to those
departments which was agreed to nem con.
Mr Gerry thought the inconveniency of excluding a few worthy
individuals who might be public debtors or have unsettled accts ought not to
be put in the scale agst the public advantages of the regulation, and that the
motion did not go far enough.
Mr King observed that there might be great danger in requiring landed
property as a qualification since it would exclude the monied interest,
whose aids may be essential in particular emergencies to the public safety.
Mr Dickinson, was agst any recital of qualifications in the Constitution. It
was impossible to make a compleat one, and a partial one wd by implication
tie up the hands of the Legislature from supplying the omissions. The best
defence lay in the freeholders who were to elect the Legislature. Whilst this
Source should remain pure, the Public interest would be safe. If it ever
should be corrupt, no little expedients would repel the danger. He doubted
the policy of interweaving into a Republican constitution a veneration for
wealth. He had always understood that a veneration for poverty & virtue,
were the objects of republican encouragement. It seemed improper that any
man of merit should be subjected to disabilities in a Republic where merit
was understood to form the great title to public trust, honors & rewards.
Mr Gerry if property be one object of Government, provisions to secure
it cannot be improper.
Mr Madison moved to strike out the word landed, before the word
"qualifications." If the proposition sd be agreed to he wished the Committee
to be at liberty to report the best criterion they could devise. Landed
possessions were no certain evidence of real wealth. Many enjoyed them to
a great extent who were more in debt than they were worth. The unjust
Laws of the States had proceeded more from this class of men, than any
others. It had often happened that men who had acquired landed property on
credit, got into the Legislatures with a view of promoting an unjust
protection agst their Creditors. In the next place, if a small quantity of land
should be made the standard, it would be no security; if a large one, it
would exclude the proper representatives of those classes of Citizens who
were not landholders. It was politic as well as just that the interests & rights
of every class should be duly represented & understood in the public
Councils. It was a provision every where established that the Country
should be divided into districts & representatives taken from each, in order
that the Legislative Assembly might equally understand & sympathize with
the rights of the people in every part of the Community. It was not less
proper that every class of Citizens should have an opportunity of making
their rights be felt & understood in the public Councils. The three principal
classes into which our citizens were divisible, were the landed the
commercial, & the manufacturing. The 2d & 3d class, bear as yet a small
proportion to the first. The proportion however will daily increase. We see
in the populous Countries in Europe now, what we shall be hereafter. These
classes understand much less of each others interests & affairs, than men of
the same class inhabiting different districts. It is particularly requisite
therefore that the interests of one or two of them should not be left entirely
to the care, or impartiality of the third. This must be the case if landed
qualifications should be required; few of the mercantile, & scarcely any of
the manufacturing class chusing whilst they continue in business to turn any
part of their Stock into landed property. For these reasons he wished if it
were possible that some other criterion than the mere possession of land
should be devised. He concurred with Mr Govr Morris in thinking that
qualifications in the Electors would be much more effectual than in the
elected. The former would discriminate between real & ostensible property
in the latter; But he was aware of the difficulty of forming any uniform
standard that would suit the different circumstances & opinions prevailing
in the different States.
Mr Govr Morris 2ded the motion.
On the Question for striking out "landed"
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On Question on 1st part of Col. Masons proposition as to "qualification
of property & citizenship," as so amended
N. H. ay. Masts ay. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
"The 2d part, for disqualifying debtors, and persons having unsettled
accounts," being under consideration
Mr Carrol moved to strike out "having unsettled accounts"
Mr Ghorum seconded the motion; observing that it would put the
commercial & manufacturing part of the people on a worse footing than
others as they would be most likely to have dealings with the public.
Mr L. Martin, if these words should be struck out, and the remaining
words concerning debtors retained, it will be the interest of the latter class
to keep their accounts unsettled as long as possible.
Mr Wilson was for striking them out. They put too much power in the
hands of the Auditors, who might combine with rivals in delaying
settlements in order to prolong the disqualifications of particular men. We
should consider that we are providing a Constitution for future generations,
and not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the moment. The time has
been, and will again be, when the public safety may depend on the
voluntary aids of individuals which will necessarily open accts with the
public, and when such accts will be a characteristic of patriotism. Besides a
partial enumeration of cases will disable the Legislature from disqualifying
odious & dangerous characters.
Mr Langdon [13] was for striking out the whole clause for the reasons
given by Mr Wilson. So many exclusions he thought too would render the
system unacceptable to the people.
[13] "Mr Langdon is a man of considerable fortune, possesses a liberal mind,
and a good plain understanding–about 40 years old."–Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist.
Rev., iii., 325.
Mr Gerry. If the argumts used today were to prevail, we might have a
Legislature composed of Public debtors, pensioners, placemen &
contractors. He thought the proposed qualifications would be pleasing to the
people. They will be considered as a security agst unnecessary or undue
burdens being imposed on them. He moved to add "pensioners" to the
disqualified characters which was negatived.
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Con. no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Maryd ay. Va no. N. C. divided. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Mr Govr Morris. The last clause, relating to public debtors will exclude
every importing merchant. Revenue will be drawn it is foreseen as much as
possible, from trade. Duties of course will be bonded, and the Merchts will
remain debtors to the public. He repeated that it had not been so much the
fault of individuals as of the public that transactions between them had not
been more generally liquidated & adjusted. At all events to draw from our
short & scanty experience rules that are to operate through succeeding ages,
does not savour much of real wisdom.
On question for striking out, "persons having unsettled accounts with the
U. States."
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Mr Elseworth was for disagreeing to the remainder of the clause
disqualifying Public debtors; and for leaving to the wisdom of the
Legislature and the virtue of the Citizens, the task of providing agst such
evils. Is the smallest as well as the largest debtor to be excluded? Then
every arrear of taxes will disqualify. Besides how is it to be known to the
people when they elect who are or are not public debtors. The exclusion of
pensioners & placemen in Engld is founded on a consideration not existing
here. As persons of that sort are dependent on the Crown, they tend to
increase its influence.
Mr Pinkney sd he was at first a friend to the proposition, for the sake of
the clause relating to qualifications of property; but he disliked the
exclusion of public debtors; it went too far. It wd exclude persons who had
purchased confiscated property or should purchase Western territory of the
public, and might be some obstacle to the sale of the latter.
On the question for agreeing to the clause disqualifying public debtors
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Col. Mason, observed that it would be proper, as he thought, that some
provision should be made in the Constitution agst choosing for the Seat of
the Genl Govt the City or place at which the Seat of any State Govt might be
fixt. There were 2 objections agst having them at the same place, which
without mentioning others, required some precaution on the subject. The 1st
was that it tended to produce disputes concerning jurisdiction. The 2d &
principal one was that the intermixture of the two Legislatures tended to
give a provincial tincture to ye Natl deliberations. He moved that the Come
be instructed to receive a clause to prevent the seat of the Natl Govt being in
the same City or town with the Seat of the Govt of any State longer than
untill the necessary public buildings could be erected.
Mr Alex. Martin 2ded the motion.
Mr Govr Morris did not dislike the idea, but was apprehensive that such
a clause might make enemies of Philada & N. York which had expectations
of becoming the Seat of the Genl Govt.
Mr Langdon approved the idea also: but suggested the case of a State
moving its seat of Govt to the natl Seat after the erection of the Public
buildings.
Mr Ghorum. The precaution may be evaded by the Natl Legislre by
delaying to erect the Public buildings.
Mr Gerry conceived it to be the genl sense of America, that neither the
Seat of a State Govt nor any large commercial City should be the seat of the
Genl Govt.
Mr Williamson liked the idea, but knowing how much the passions of
men were agitated by this matter, was apprehensive of turning them agst the
System. He apprehended also that an evasion, might be practised in the way
hinted by Mr Ghorum.
Mr Pinkney thought the Seat of a State Govt ought to be avoided; but
that a large town or its vicinity would be proper for the Seat of the Genl
Govt.
Col. Mason did not mean to press the motion at this time, nor to excite
any hostile passions agst the system. He was content to withdraw the motion
for the present.
Mr Butler was for fixing by the Constitution the place, & a central one,
for the seat of the Natl Govt.
The proceedings since Monday last were referred unanimously to the
Come of detail, and the Convention then unanimously adjourned till
Monday, Augst 6. that the Come of detail might have time to prepare &
report the Constitution. The whole proceedings as referred are as follow
[14]:
[14] Madison's note says: "here copy them from the Journal p. 207." In the
Journal they are given as having been "collected from the proceedings of the
convention, as they are spread over the journal from June 19th to July 26th."—
Journal of Federal Convention, 207. The dates show when the resolutions were
agreed to, and are correct.
June 20.  I. R       , That the Government of the United States
ought to consist of a supreme legislative, judiciary, and executive.
June 21. II. R       , That the legislature consist of two
branches.
June 22. III. R       , That the members of the first branch of
the legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several states,
for the term of two years; to be paid out of the publick treasury; to
receive an adequate June 23.  compensation for their services; to be
of the age of twenty-five years at least; to be ineligible and incapable
of holding any office under the authority of the United States (except
those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch) during
the term of service of the first branch.
June 25. IV. R       , That the members of the second branch of
the legislature of the United States ought to be chosen by the
individual legislatures; to be of June 26. the age of thirty years at
least; to hold their offices for six years, one third to go out biennally;
to receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to the publick
service; to be ineligible to and incapable of holding any office, under
the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to
the functions of the second branch) during the term for which they are
elected, and for one year thereafter.
V. R       , That each branch ought to possess the right of
originating acts.
Postponed 27.
July 16.  VI. R       , That the national legislature ought to possess
the legislative rights vested in Congress by the confederation; and
moreover, to legislate in all cases for the general interests July 17.
of the union, and also in those to which the states are separately
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.
July 17 VII. R       , That the legislative acts of the United
States, made by virtue and in pursuance of the articles of union, and all
treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the respective states, as far as those acts or
treaties shall relate to the said states, or their citizens and inhabitants;
and that the judiciaries of the several states shall be bound thereby in
their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual States
to the contrary, notwithstanding.
July 16. VIII. R       , That in the original formation of the
legislature of the United States, the first branch thereof shall consist of
sixty-five members; of which number
New Hampshire shall send . three,
Massachusetts . . . . . . . eight,
Rhode Island . . . . . . . one,
Connecticut . . . . . . . . five,
New York . . . . . . . . . six,
New Jersey . . . . . . . . four,
Pennsylvania . . . . . . . eight,
Delaware . . . . . . . . . one,
Maryland . . . . . . . . . six,
Virginia . . . . . . . . . ten,
North Carolina . . . . . . five,
South Carolina . . . . . . five,
Georgia . . . . . . . . . . three.
But as the present situation of the states may probably alter in the
number of their inhabitants, the legislature of the United States shall be
authorized, from time to time, to apportion the number of
representatives; and in case any of the states shall hereafter be divided,
or enlarged by addition of territory, or any two or more states united,
or any new states created within the limits of the United States, the
legislature of the United States shall possess authority to regulate the
number of representatives, in any of the foregoing cases, upon the
principle of their number of inhabitants according to the provisions
hereafter mentioned, namely–Provided always, that representation
ought to be proportioned to direct taxation. And in order to ascertain
the alteration in the direct taxation, which may be required from time
to time by the changes in the relative circumstances of the states—
IX. R       , That a census be taken within six years from the first
meeting of the legislature of the United States, and once within the
term of every ten years afterwards, of all the inhabitants of the United
States, in the manner and according to the ratio recommended by
Congress in their resolution of April 18, 1783; and that the legislature
of the United States shall proportion the direct taxation accordingly.
X. R       , That all bills for raising or appropriating money, and
for fixing the salaries of the officers of the government of the United
States, shall originate in the first branch of the legislature of the United
States, and shall not be altered or amended by the second branch; and
that no money shall be drawn from the publick treasury, but in
pursuance of appropriations to be originated by the first branch.
XI. R       , That in the second branch of the legislature of the
United States, each state shall have an equal vote.
July 26.  XII. R       , That a national executive be instituted,
to consist of a single person; to be chosen by the national legislature,
for the term of seven years; to be ineligible a second time; with power
to carry into execution the national laws; to appoint to offices in cases
not otherwise provided for; to be removable on impeachment, and
conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty; to receive a fixed
compensation for the devotion of his time to the publick service; to be
paid out of the publick treasury.
July 21.  XIII. R       , That the national executive shall have a
right to negative any legislative act, which shall not be afterwards
passed, unless by two third parts of each branch of the national
legislature.
July 18. XIV. R       , That a national judiciary be established,
to consist of one supreme tribunal, the judges of which shall be
appointed by the second branch July 21.  of the national legislature;
to hold their offices during good July 18.  behaviour; to receive
punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in
which no diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually
in office at the time of such diminution.
XV. R       , That the national legislature be empowered to
appoint inferior tribunals.
XVI. R       , That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall
extend to cases arising under laws passed by the general legislature;
and to such other questions as involve the national peace and harmony.
XVII. R       , That provision ought to be made for the admission
of states lawfully arising within the limits of the United States,
whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or
otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national
legislature less than the whole.
XVIII. R       , That a republican form of government shall be
guarantied to each state; and that each state shall be protected against
foreign and domestick violence.
July 23.  XIX. R       , That provision ought to be made for the
amendment of the articles of union, whensoever it shall seem
necessary.
XX. R       , That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers
within the several states, and of the national government, ought to be
bound, by oath, to support the articles of union.
XXI. R       , That the amendments which shall be offered to the
confederation by the convention ought, at a proper time or times after
the approbation of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly or
assemblies of representatives, recommended by the several
legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and
decide thereon.
XXII. R       , That the representation in the second branch of the
legislature of the United States consist of two members from each
state, who shall vote per capita.
July 26.
XXIII. R       , That it be an instruction to the committee, to
whom were referred the proceedings of the convention for the
establishment of a national government, to receive a clause or clauses,
requiring certain qualifications of property and citizenship, in the
United States, for the executive, the judiciary, and the members of both
branches of the legislature of the United States.
With the above resolutions were referred the propositions offered by
Mr C. Pinckney on the 29th of May, & by Mr Patterson on the 15th of June.
[15]
[15]"Aug 1. 1787 W        .
D    C  .
"We are here & I believe every where all Impatience to know something of
your conventional Deliberations. If you cannot tell us what you are doing, you
might at least give us some Information of what you are not doing. This wd
afford food for political conjecture, and perhaps be sufficient to satisfy present
Impatience. I hope you have already discovered the means of preserving the
American Empire united–& that the scheme of a Disunion has been found
pregnant with ye greatest Evils–But we are not at this distance able to judge with
any accuracy upon subjects so truly important & interesting as those wch must
engage you at present–We can only hope, that you will all resemble Cæsar, at
least in one particular: 'nil actum reputans si quid superesset agendum';–& that
your Exertions will be commensurate to ye great Expectations wch have been
formed....
"J. M      ." [A]
[A] President of William and Mary College, and the first Bishop
of the Episcopal Church in Virginia. He was a second cousin of
James Madison, of Orange.
(Mad. MSS.)
R        Augt 5. 87.
"D    S  ,
"I am much obliged to you for your communication of the proceedings of ye
Convention, since I left them; for I feel that anxiety about ye result, which it's
Importance must give to every honest citizen. If I thought that my return could
contribute in the smallest degree to it's Improvement, nothing should Keep me
away. But as I know that the talents, knowledge, & well-established character, of
our present delegates have justly inspired the country with ye most entire
confidence in their determinations; & that my vote could only operate to
produce a division, & so destroy ye vote of ye State, I think that my attendance
now would certainly be useless, perhaps injurious.
"I am credibly inform'd that Mr Henry has openly express'd his
disapprobation of the circular letter of Congress, respecting ye payment of
British debts; & that he has declared his opinion that ye Interests of this state
cannot safely be trusted with that body. The doctrine of three confederacies, or
great Republics, has its advocates here. I have heard Hervie support it, along
with ye extinction of State Legislatures within each great Department. The
necessity of some independent power to controul the Assembly by a negative,
seems now to be admitted by ye most zealous republicans–they only differ about
ye mode of constituting such a power. B. Randolph seems to think that a
magistrate annually elected by ye people might exercise such a controul as
independently as ye King of G. B. I hope that our representative, Marshall, will
be a powerful aid to Mason in the next Assembly. He has observ'd the actual
depravation of mens manners, under ye corrupting Influence of our Legislature;
and is convinc'd that nothing but ye adoption of some efficient plan from ye
Convention can prevent anarchy first, & civil convulsions afterwards. Mr H–—y
has certainly converted a majority of Prince Edward, formerly ye most averse to
paper money, to ye patronage of it....
"Your friend & humble servt.
"J     M      ."
(Mad. MSS.)
M      A      6TH.    C         
Mr John Francis Mercer from Maryland took his seat.
Mr Rutlidge delivered in the Report of the Committee of detail as
follows: a printed copy being at the same time furnished to each member
[16]:
"We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-
Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and
establish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves
and our Posterity.
[16] Madison's printed copy is marked: "As Reported by Come of Detail viz of
five. Aug. 6. 1787." It is a large folio of seven pages. In the enumeration of the
Articles by a misprint VI. was repeated, and the alterations in Article VII. and
succeeding articles were made by Madison. In Sect. II of Article VI., as it was
printed, it appeared: "The enacting stile of the laws of the United States shall be.
'Be it enacted and it is hereby enacted by the House of Representatives, and by
the Senate of the United States, in Congress assembled,'" which Madison altered
to read: "The enacting stile of the laws of the United States shall be. 'Be it
enacted by the Senate & representatives, in Congress assembled.'" The printed
copy among the Madison papers is a duplicate of the copy filed by General
Washington with the papers of the Constitution, and Sec. II is there given as
actually printed.—Journal of the Federal Convention, 219. (Const. MSS.)
Madison accurately transcribed the report for his journal and it is this copy
which is used in the text.
A       I
The stile of the Government shall be, "The United States of
America."
II
The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive, and
judicial powers.
III
The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress, to consist of
two separate and distinct bodies of men, a House of Representatives
and a Senate; each of which shall in all cases have a negative on the
other. The Legislature shall meet on the first Monday in December in
every year.
IV
Sect. 1. The members of the House of Representatives shall be
chosen every second year, by the people of the several States
comprehended within this Union. The qualifications of the electors
shall be the same, from time to time, as those of the electors in the
several States, of the most numerous branch of their own legislatures.
Sect. 2. Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of
the age of twenty five years at least; shall have been a citizen in the
United States for at least three years before his election; and shall be,
at the time of his election, a resident of the State in which he shall be
chosen.
Sect. 3. The House of Representatives shall, at its first formation,
and until the number of citizens and inhabitants shall be taken in the
manner hereinafter described, consist of sixty-five Members, of whom
three shall be chosen in New-Hampshire, eight in Massachusetts, one
in Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, five in Connecticut, six in
New-York, four in New-Jersey, eight in Pennsylvania, one in
Delaware, six in Maryland, ten in Virginia, five in North-Carolina, five
in South-Carolina, and three in Georgia.
Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in different States will alter
from time to time; as some of the States may hereafter be divided; as
others may be enlarged by addition of territory; as two or more States
may be united; as new States will be erected within the limits of the
United States, the Legislature shall, in each of these cases, regulate the
number of representatives by the number of inhabitants, according to
the provisions herein after made, at the rate of one for every forty
thousand.
Sect. 5. All bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing
the salaries of the officers of Government, shall originate in the House
of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate.
No money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance
of appropriations that shall originate in the House of Representatives.
Sect. 6. The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment. It shall choose its Speaker and other officers.
Sect. 7. Vacancies in the House of Representatives shall be supplied
by writs of election from the executive authority of the State, in the
representation from which they shall happen.
V
Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall be chosen by the
Legislatures of the several States. Each Legislature shall chuse two
members. Vacancies may be supplied by the Executive until the next
meeting of the Legislature. Each member shall have one vote.
Sect. 2. The Senators shall be chosen for six years; but immediately
after the first election they shall be divided, by lot, into three classes,
as nearly as may be, numbered one, two and three. The seats of the
members of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the
second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, of
the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that a third part of
the members may be chosen every second year.
Sect. 3. Every member of the Senate shall be of the age of thirty
years at least; shall have been a citizen in the United States for at least
four years before his election; and shall be, at the time of his election,
a resident of the State for which he shall be chosen.
Sect. 4. The Senate shall chuse its own President and other officers.
VI
Sect. 1. The times and places and manner of holding the elections of
the members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of
each State; but their provisions concerning them may, at any time, be
altered by the Legislature of the United States.
Sect. 2. The Legislature of the United States shall have authority to
establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each House,
with regard to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem expedient.
Sect. 3. In each House a majority of the members shall constitute a
quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day.
Sect. 4. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its own members.
Sect. 5. Freedom of speech and debate in the Legislature shall not
be impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of the
Legislature; and the members of each House shall, in all cases, except
treason felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at Congress, and in going to and returning from
it.
Sect. 6. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings;
may punish its members for disorderly behaviour; and may expel a
member.
Sect. 7. The House of Representatives, and the Senate, when it shall
be acting in a legislative capacity, shall keep a journal of their
proceedings, and shall, from time to time, publish them: and the yeas
and nays of the members of each House, on any question, shall at the
desire of one-fifth part of the members present, be entered on the
journal.
Sect. 8. Neither House, without the consent of the other, shall
adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that at
which the two Houses are sitting. But this regulation shall not extend
to the Senate, when it shall exercise the powers mentioned in the –—
article.
Sect. 9. The members of each House shall be ineligible to, and
incapable of holding any office under the authority of the United
States, during the time for which they shall respectively be elected:
and the members of the Senate shall be ineligible to, and incapable of
holding any such office for one year afterwards.
Sect. 10. The members of each House shall receive a compensation
for their services, to be ascertained and paid by the State, in which they
shall be chosen.
Sect. 11. The enacting stile of the laws of the United States shall be,
"Be it enacted by the Senate and Representatives in Congress
assembled."
Sect. 12. Each House shall possess the right of originating bills,
except in the cases beforementioned.
Sect. 13. Every bill, which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be
presented to the President of the United States for his revision: if, upon
such revision, he approve of it, he shall signify his approbation by
signing it: But if, upon such revision, it shall appear to him improper
for being passed into a law, he shall return it, together with his
objections against it, to that House in which it shall have originated,
who shall enter the objections at large on their journal and proceed to
reconsider the bill. But if after such reconsideration, two thirds of that
House shall, notwithstanding the objections of the President, agree to
pass it, it shall together with his objections, be sent to the other House,
by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two
thirds of the other House also, it shall become a law. But in all such
cases, the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays;
and the names of the persons voting for or against the bill shall be
entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not
be returned by the President within seven days after it shall have been
presented to him, it shall be a law, unless the legislature, by their
adjournment, prevent its return; in which case it shall not be a law.
VII
Sect. 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to
lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises;
To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States;
To establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United
States;
To coin money;
To regulate the value of foreign coin;
To fix the standard of weights and measures;
To establish Post-offices;
To borrow money, and emit bills on the credit of the United States;
To appoint a Treasurer by ballot;
To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;
To make rules concerning captures on land and water;
To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting the
coin of the United States, and of offences against the law of nations;




To build and equip fleets;
To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws of the
Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;
And to make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested, by
this Constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof;
Sect. 2. Treason against the United States shall consist only in
levying war against the United States, or any of them; and in adhering
to the enemies of the United States, or any of them. The Legislature of
the United States shall have power to declare the punishment of
treason. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the
testimony of two witnesses. No attainder of treason shall work
corruption of blood, nor forfeiture, except during the life of the person
attainted.
Sect. 3. The proportions of direct taxation shall be regulated by the
whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of
every age, sex and condition, including those bound to servitude for a
term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in
the foregoing description, (except Indians not paying taxes) which
number shall, within six years after the first meeting of the Legislature,
and within the term of every ten years afterwards, be taken in such
manner as the said Legislature shall direct.
Sect. 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the Legislature on articles
exported from any State; nor on the migration or importation of such
persons as the several States shall think proper to admit; nor shall such
migration or importation be prohibited.
Sect. 5. No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the
Census hereinbefore directed to be taken.
Sect. 6. No navigation act shall be passed without the assent of two
thirds of the members present in each House.
Sect. 7. The United States shall not grant any title of Nobility.
VIII
The acts of the Legislature of the United States made in pursuance
of this Constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the
United States shall be the supreme law of the several States, and of the
citizens and inhabitants; and the judges in the several States shall be
bound thereby in their decisions; any thing in the Constitutions or laws
of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding.
IX
Sect 1. The Senate of the United States shall have power to make
treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme
Court.
Sect. 2. In all disputes and controversies now subsisting, or that may
hereafter subsist between two or more States, respecting jurisdiction or
territory, the Senate shall possess the following powers. Whenever the
Legislature, or the Executive authority, or lawful agent of any State, in
controversy with another, shall by memorial to the Senate, state the
matter in question, and apply for a hearing; notice of such memorial
and application shall be given by order of the Senate, to the Legislature
or the Executive authority of the other State in Controversy. The
Senate shall also assign a day for the appearance of the parties, by their
agents, before the House. The Agents shall be directed to appoint, by
joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a Court for
hearing and determining the matter in question. But if the Agents
cannot agree, the Senate shall name three persons out of each of the
several States; and from the list of such persons each party shall
alternately strike out one, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen;
and from that number not less than seven nor more than nine names, as
the Senate shall direct, shall in their presence, be drawn out by lot; and
the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them shall
be commissioners or Judges to hear and finally determine the
controversy; provided a majority of the Judges, who shall hear the
cause, agree in the determination. If either party shall neglect to attend
at the day assigned, without shewing sufficient reasons for not
attending, or being present shall refuse to strike, the Senate shall
proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and the Clerk of
the Senate shall strike in behalf of the party absent or refusing. If any
of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such Court; or
shall not appear to prosecute or defend their claim or cause, the Court
shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce judgment. The judgment shall
be final and conclusive. The proceedings shall be transmitted to the
President of the Senate, and shall be lodged among the public records
for the security of the parties concerned. Every Commissioner shall,
before he sit in judgment, take an oath, to be administered by one of
the Judges of the Supreme or Superior Court of the State where the
cause shall be tried, "well and truly to hear and determine the matter in
question according to the best of his judgment, without favor,
affection, or hope of reward."
Sect. 3. All controversies concerning lands claimed under different
grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions, as they respect such
lands, shall have been decided or adjusted subsequent to such grants,
or any of them, shall, on application to the Senate, be finally
determined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before
prescribed for deciding controversies between different States.
X
Sect. 1. The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in
a single person. His stile shall be, "The President of the United States
of America;" and his title shall be, "His Excellency." He shall be
elected by ballot by the Legislature. He shall hold his office during the
term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second time.
Sect. 2. He shall, from time to time, give information to the
Legislature, of the state of the Union: he may recommend to their
consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary, and
expedient: he may convene them on extraordinary occasions. In case
of disagreement between the two Houses, with regard to the time of
adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he thinks proper: he
shall take care that the laws of the United States be duly and faithfully
executed: he shall commission all the officers of the United States; and
shall appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided for by this
Constitution. He shall receive Ambassadors, and may correspond with
the supreme Executives of the several States. He shall have power to
grant reprieves and pardons; but his pardon shall not be pleadable in
bar of an impeachment. He shall be commander in chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States.
He shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation,
which shall neither be increased nor diminished during his continuance
in office. Before he shall enter on the duties of his department, he shall
take the following oath or affirmation, "I –— solemnly swear, (or
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the
United States of America." He shall be removed from his office on
impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction in the
Supreme Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case of his
removal as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disability to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the President of the Senate shall
exercise those powers and duties, until another President of the United
States be chosen, or until the disability of the President be removed.
XI
Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall, when
necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the
United States.
Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the Inferior
Courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour. They shall, at
stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office.
Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all
cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the United States;
to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and
Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of officers of the United States;
to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies
between two or more States, (except such as shall regard Territory or
Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of another State, between
Citizens of different States, and between a State or the Citizens thereof
and foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment, cases
affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those
in which a State shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In all
the other cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with such
exceptions and under such regulations as the Legislature shall make.
The Legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction
abovementioned (except the trial of the President of the United States)
in the manner, and under the limitations which it shall think proper, to
such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute from time to time.
Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except in cases of
impeachments) shall be in the State where they shall be committed;
and shall be by Jury.
Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of Impeachment, shall not extend further
than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
office of honour, trust or profit, under the United States. But the party
convicted shall, nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial,
judgment and punishment according to law.
XII
No State shall coin money; nor grant letters of marque and reprisal;
nor enter into any Treaty, alliance, or confederation; nor grant any title
of Nobility.
XIII
No State, without the consent of the Legislature of the United
States, shall emit bills of credit, or make any thing but specie a tender
in payment of debts; nor lay imposts or duties on imports; nor keep
troops or ships of war in time of peace; nor enter into any agreement or
compact with another State, or with any foreign power; nor engage in
any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the danger
of invasion be so imminent, as not to admit of a delay, until the
Legislature of the United States can be consulted.
XIV
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States.
XV
Any person charged with treason, felony or high misdemeanor in
any State, who shall flee from justice, and shall be found in any other
State, shall, on demand of the Executive power of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having
jurisdiction of the offence.
XVI
Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislatures,
and to the records and judicial proceedings of the Courts and
magistrates of every other State.
XVII
New States lawfully constituted or established within the limits of
the United States may be admitted, by the Legislature, into this
government; but to such admission the consent of two thirds of the
members present in each House shall be necessary. If a new State shall
arise within the limits of any of the present States, the consent of the
Legislatures of such States shall be also necessary to its admission. If
the admission be consented to, the new States shall be admitted on the
same terms with the original States. But the Legislature may make
conditions with the new States, concerning the Public debt which shall
be then subsisting.
XVIII
The United States shall guaranty to each State a Republican form of
Government; and shall protect each State against foreign invasions,
and, on the application of its Legislature, against domestic violence.
XIX
On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in
the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of
the United States shall call a convention for that purpose.
XX
The members of the Legislatures, and the Executive and Judicial
officers of the United States, and of the several States, shall be bound
by oath to support this Constitution.
XXI
The ratification of the Conventions of –— States shall be sufficient
for organizing this Constitution.
XXII
This Constitution shall be laid before the United States in Congress
Assembled, for their approbation; and it is the opinion of this
Convention, that it should be afterwards submitted to a Convention
chosen, under the recommendation of its legislature, in order to receive
the ratification of such Convention.
XXIII
To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this Convention,
that each assenting Convention should notify its assent and ratification
to the United States in Congress assembled; that Congress, after
receiving the assent and ratification of the Conventions of –— States,
should appoint and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a
place, for commencing proceedings under this Constitution; that after
such publication, the Legislatures of the several States should elect
members of the Senate, and direct the election of members of the
House of Representatives; and that the members of the Legislature
should meet at the time and place assigned by Congress, and should, as
soon as may be, after their meeting, choose the President of the United
States, and proceed to execute this Constitution.
A motion was made to adjourn till Wednesday, in order to give leisure to
examine the Report; which passed in the negative—
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. Pa ay. Md ay. Virg. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no.
The House then adjourned till to-morrow 11 OC.
T       A      7. [17] I  C         
[17] Although the secrecy of the proceedings was guarded carefully, the reason
of the long adjournment was generally known outside of the Convention.
"The Convention adjourned about three weeks ago and appointed a
Committee consisting of Mr Rutlege, Mr Randolph, Mr Wilson, Mr Elsworth, &
Mr Gorham to draw into form the measures which had been agreed upon–they
reassembled last Monday sen'night to receive the report–I suppose we shall have
the result of this great business in a few weeks more."–Edward Carrington to
Monroe, August 7, 1787.
Monroe MSS.
Cf. King's account of the debate confirming the accuracy of Madison's report
(King's Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, i., 617).
The Report of the Committee of detail being taken up,
Mr Pinkney moved that it be referred to a Committee of the whole. This
was strongly opposed by Mr Ghorum & several others, as likely to produce
unnecessary delay; and was negatived, Delaware Maryd & Virga only being
in the affirmative.
The preamble of the Report was agreed to nem. con. So were Art: I & II.
Art: III considered. Col. Mason doubted the propriety of giving each
branch a negative on the other "in all cases." There were some cases in
which it was he supposed not intended to be given as in the case of
balloting for appointments.
Mr Govr Morris moved to insert "legislative acts" instead of "all cases."
Mr Williamson 2ds him.
Mr Sherman. This will restrain the operation of the clause too much. It
will particularly exclude a mutual negative in the case of ballots, which he
hoped would take place.
Mr Ghorum contended that elections ought to be made by joint ballot. If
separate ballots should be made for the President, and the two branches
should be each attached to a favorite, great delay contention & confusion
may ensue. These inconveniences have been felt in Masts in the election of
officers of little importance compared with the Executive of the U. States.
The only objection agst a joint ballot is that it may deprive the Senate of
their due weight; but this ought not to prevail over the respect due to the
public tranquility & welfare.
Mr Wilson was for a joint ballot in several cases at least; particularly in
the choice of the President, and was therefore for the amendment. Disputes
between the two Houses during & concerng the vacancy of the Executive
might have dangerous consequences.
Col. Mason thought the amendment of Mr Govr Morris extended too far.
Treaties are in a subsequent part declared to be laws, they will therefore be
subjected to a negative; altho' they are to be made as proposed by the
Senate alone. He proposed that the mutual negative should be restrained to
"cases requiring the distinct assent" of the two Houses.
Mr Govr Morris thought this but a repetition of the same thing; the
mutual negative and distinct assent, being equivalent expressions. Treaties
he thought were not laws.
Mr Madison moved to strike out the words each of which shall in all
cases, have a negative on the other; the idea being sufficiently expressed in
the preceding member of the article; vesting the "legislative power" in
"distinct bodies," especially as the respective powers and mode of
exercising them were fully delineated in a subsequent article.
Genl Pinkney 2ded the motion.
On question for inserting legislative Acts as moved by Mr Govr Morris
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va no.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On question for agreeing to Mr M's motion to strike out &c.–—
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Madison wished to know the reasons of the Come for fixing by ye
Constitution the time of Meeting for the Legislature; and suggested, that it
be required only that one meeting at least should be held every year leaving
the time to be fixed or varied by law.
Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out the sentence. It was improper to tie
down the Legislature to a particular time, or even to require a meeting every
year. The public business might not require it.
Mr Pinkney concurred with Mr Madison.
Mr Ghorum. If the time be not fixed by the Constitution, disputes will
arise in the Legislature; and the States will be at a loss to adjust thereto, the
times of their elections. In the N. England States the annual time of meeting
had been long fixed by their Charters & Constitutions, and no
inconvenience had resulted. He thought it necessary that there should be
one meeting at least every year as a check on the Executive department.
Mr Elseworth was agst striking out the words. The Legislature will not
know till they are met whether the public interest required their meeting or
not. He could see no impropriety in fixing the day, as the Convention could
judge of it as well as the Legislature.
Mr Wilson thought on the whole it would be best to fix the day.
Mr King could not think there would be a necessity for a meeting every
year. A great vice in our system was that of legislating too much. The most
numerous objects of legislation belong to the States. Those of the Natl
Legislature were but few. The chief of them were commerce & revenue.
When these should be once settled alterations would be rarely necessary &
easily made.
Mr Madison thought if the time of meeting should be fixed by a law it
wd be sufficiently fixed & there would be no difficulty then as had been
suggested, on the part of the States in adjusting their elections to it. One
consideration appeared to him to militate strongly agst fixing a time by the
Constitution. It might happen that the Legislature might be called together
by the public exigencies & finish their Session but a short time before the
annual period. In this case it would be extremely inconvenient to
reassemble so quickly & without the least necessity. He thought one annual
meeting ought to be required; but did not wish to make two unavoidable.
Col. Mason thought the objections against fixing the time insuperable:
but that an annual meeting ought to be required as essential to the
preservation of the Constitution. The extent of the Country will supply
business. And if it should not, the Legislature, besides legislative, is to have
inquisitorial powers, which cannot safely be long kept in a state of
suspension.
Mr Sherman was decided for fixing the time, as well as for frequent
meetings of the Legislative body. Disputes and difficulties will arise
between the two Houses, & between both & the States, if the time be
changeable–frequent meetings of Parliament were required at the
Revolution in England as an essential safeguard of liberty. So also are
annual meetings in most of the American charters & constitutions. There
will be business eno' to require it. The Western Country, and the great
extent and varying state of our affairs in general will supply objects.
Mr Randolph was agst fixing any day irrevocably; but as there was no
provision made any where in the Constitution for regulating the periods of
meeting, and some precise time must be fixed, untill the Legislature shall
make provision, he could not agree to strike out the words altogether.
Instead of which he moved to add the words following–"unless a different
day shall be appointed by law."
Mr Madison 2ded the motion, & on the question
N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out Decr & insert May. It might
frequently happen that our measures ought to be influenced by those in
Europe, which were generally planned during the Winter and of which
intelligence would arrive in the Spring.
Mr Madison 2ded the motion, he preferred May to Decr because the latter
would require the travelling to & from the seat of Govt in the most
inconvenient seasons of the year.
Mr Wilson. The Winter is the most convenient season for business.
Mr Elseworth. The summer will interfere too much with private
business, that of almost all the probable members of the Legislature being
more or less connected with agriculture.
Mr Randolph. The time is of no great moment now, as the Legislature
can vary it. On looking into the Constitutions of the States, he found that
the times of their elections with which the election of the Natl
Representatives would no doubt be made to coincide, would suit better with
Decr than May. And it was advisable to render our innovations as little
incommodious as possible.
On the question for "May" instead of "Decr"
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Read moved to insert after the word "Senate," the words, "subject to
the Negative to be hereafter provided." His object was to give an absolute
Negative to the Executive–He considered this as so essential to the
Constitution, to the preservation of liberty, & to the public welfare, that his
duty compelled him to make the Motion.
Mr Govr Morris 2ded him. And on the question
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Rutlidge. Altho' it is agreed on all hands that an annual meeting of
the Legislature should be made necessary, yet that point seems not to be
free from doubt as the clause stands. On this suggestion, "Once at least in
every year," were inserted, nem. con.
Art. III with the foregoing alterations was agd to nem. con., and is as
follows: "The Legislative power shall be vested in a Congress to consist of
2 separate & distinct bodies of men; a House of Reps & a Senate. The
Legislature shall meet at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be
on the 1st Monday in Decr unless a different day shall be appointed by law."
"Article IV. Sect. 1. taken up."
Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out the last member of the section
beginning with the words "qualifications of Electors," in order that some
other provision might be substituted which wd restrain the right of suffrage
to freeholders.
Mr Fitzsimons 2ded the motion.
Mr Williamson was opposed to it.
Mr Wilson. This part of the Report was well considered by the
Committee, and he did not think it could be changed for the better. It was
difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the States.
Unnecessary innovations he thought too should be avoided. It would be
very hard & disagreeable for the same persons at the same time, to vote for
representatives in the State Legislature and to be excluded from a vote for
those in the Natl Legislature.
Mr Govr Morris. Such a hardship would be neither great nor novel. The
people are accustomed to it and not dissatisfied with it, in several of the
States. In some the qualifications are different for the choice of the Govr &
Representatives; In others for different Houses of the Legislature. Another
objection agst the clause as it stands is that it makes the qualifications of the
Natl Legislature depend on the will of the States, which he thought not
proper.
Mr Elseworth. thought the qualifications of the electors stood on the
most proper footing. The right of suffrage was a tender point, and strongly
guarded by most of the State Constitutions. The people will not readily
subscribe to the Natl Constitution if it should subject them to be
disfranchised. The States are the best Judges of the circumstances & temper
of their own people.
Col. Mason. The force of habit is certainly not attended to by those
Gentlemen who wish for innovations on this point. Eight or nine States
have extended the right of suffrage beyond the freeholders. What will the
people there say, if they should be disfranchised. A power to alter the
qualifications would be a dangerous power in the hands of the Legislature.
Mr Butler. There is no right of which the people are more jealous than
that of suffrage. Abridgments of it tend to the same revolution as in Holland
where they have at length thrown all power into the hands of the Senates,
who fill up vacancies themselves, and form a rank aristocracy.
Mr Dickinson. had a very different idea of the tendency of vesting the
right of suffrage in the freeholders of the Country. He considered them as
the best guardians of liberty; And the restriction of the right to them as a
necessary defence agst the dangerous influence of those multitudes without
property & without principle with which our Country like all others, will in
time abound. As to the unpopularity of the innovation it was in his opinion
chimerical. The great mass of our Citizens is composed at this time of
freeholders, and will be pleased with it.
Mr Elseworth. How shall the freehold be defined? Ought not every man
who pays a tax, to vote for the representative who is to levy & dispose of
his money? Shall the wealthy merchants & manufacturers, who will bear a
full share of the public burthens be not allowed a voice in the imposition of
them. Taxation & representation ought to go together.
Mr Govr Morris. He had long learned not to be the dupe of words. The
sound of aristocracy therefore had no effect on him. It was the thing, not the
name, to which he was opposed, and one of his principal objections to the
Constitution as it is now before us, is that it threatens this Country with an
aristocracy. The aristocracy will grow out of the House of Representatives.
Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to
the rich who will be able to buy them. We should not confine our attention
to the present moment. The time is not distant when this Country will
abound with mechanics & manufacturers who will receive their bread from
their employers. Will such men be the secure & faithful guardians of
liberty? Will they be the impregnable barrier agst aristocracy?–He was as
little duped by the association of the words, "taxation & Representation."
The man who does not give his vote freely is not represented. It is the man
who dictates the vote. Children do not vote. Why? because they want
prudence, because they have no will of their own. The ignorant & the
dependent can be as little trusted with the public interest. He did not
conceive the difficulty of defining "freeholders" to be insuperable. Still less
that the restriction could be unpopular. 9/10 of the people are at present
freeholders and these will certainly be pleased with it. As to Merchts. &c. if
they have wealth & value the right they can acquire it. If not they don't
deserve it.
Col. Mason. We all feel too strongly the remains of antient prejudices,
and view things too much through a British medium. A Freehold is the
qualification in England, & hence it is imagined to be the only proper one.
The true idea in his opinion was that every man having evidence of
attachment to & permanent common interest with the Society ought to share
in all its rights & privileges. Was this qualification restrained to
freeholders? Does no other kind of property but land evidence a common
interest in the proprietor? does nothing besides property mark a permanent
attachment. Ought the merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number of
children whose fortunes are to be pursued in his own Country to be viewed
as suspicious characters, and unworthy to be trusted with the common
rights of their fellow Citizens.
Mr Madison. the right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental
articles of republican Government, and ought not to be left to be regulated
by the Legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has been the mode in
which aristocracies have been built on the ruins of popular forms. Whether
the Constitutional qualification ought to be a freehold, would with him
depend much on the probable reception such a change would meet with in
States where the right was now exercised by every description of people. In
several of the States a freehold was now the qualification. Viewing the
subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the
safest depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great majority of
the people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of property.
These will either combine, under the influence of their common situation:
in which case, the rights of property & the public liberty, will not be secure
in their hands: or which is more probable, they will become the tools of
opulence & ambition, in which case there will be equal danger on another
side. The example of England has been misconceived (by Col. Mason.) A
very small proportion of the Representatives are there chosen by
freeholders. The greatest part are chosen by the Cities & boroughs, in many
of which the qualification of suffrage is as low as it is in any one of the
U. S. and it was in the boroughs & Cities rather than the Counties, that
bribery most prevailed, & the influence of the Crown on elections was most
dangerously exerted. [18]
[18] "Note to speech of J. M. in Convention of 1787, August 7th.:
"As appointments for the General Government here contemplated will, in
part, be made by the State Govts, all the Citizens in States where the right of
suffrage is not limited to the holders of property, will have an indirect share of
representation in the General Government. But this does not satisfy the
fundamental principle that men cannot be justly bound by laws in making which
they have no part. Persons & property being both essential objects of
Government, the most that either can claim, is such a structure of it as will leave
a reasonable security for the other. And the most obvious provision, of this
double character, seems to be that of confining to the holders of property the
object deemed least secure in popular Govts the right of suffrage for one of the
two Legislative branches. This is not without example among us, as well as other
constitutional modifications, favouring the influence of property in the
Government. But the U. S. have not reached the stage of Society in which
conflicting feelings of the Class with, and the Class without property, have the
operation natural to them in Countries fully peopled. The most difficult of all
political arrangements is that of so adjusting the claims of the two Classes as to
give security to each and to promote the welfare of all. The federal principle,–
which enlarges the sphere of power without departing from the elective basis of
it and controuls in various ways the propensity in small republics to rash
measures & the facility of forming & executing them, will be found the best
expedient yet tried for solving the problem."–Madison's Note.
"Note to the speech of J. M. on the [7th.] day of [August].
"These observations (in the speech of J. M. see debates in the Convention of
1787, on the [7th.] day of [August]) do not convey the speaker's more full &
matured view of the subject, which is subjoined. He felt too much at the time the
example of Virginia.
"The right of suffrage is a fundamental Article in Republican Constitutions.
The regulation of it is, at the same time, a task of peculiar delicacy. Allow the
right exclusively to property, and the rights of persons may be oppressed. The
feudal polity, alone sufficiently proves it. Extend it equally to all, and the rights
of property, or the claims of justice, may be overruled by a majority without
property or interested in measures of injustice. Of this abundant proof is afforded
by other popular Govts and is not without examples in our own, particularly in
the laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
"In civilized communities, property as well as personal rights is an essential
object of the laws, which encourage industry by securing the enjoyment of its
fruits; that industry from which property results, & that enjoyment which
consists not merely in its immediate use, but in its posthumous destination to
objects of choice and of kindred affection.
"In a just & a free Government, therefore, the rights both of property & of
persons ought to be effectually guarded. Will the former be so in case of a
universal & equal suffrage? Will the latter be so in case of a suffrage confined to
the holders of property?
"As the holders of property have at stake all the other rights common to those
without property, they may be the more restrained from infringing, as well as the
less tempted to infringe the rights of the latter. It is nevertheless certain, that
there are various ways in which the rich may oppress the poor; in which property
may oppress liberty; and that the world is filled with examples. It is necessary
that the poor should have a defence against the danger.
"On the other hand, the danger to the holders of property cannot be disguised,
if they be undefended against a majority without property. Bodies of men are not
less swayed by interest than individuals, and are less controlled by the dread of
reproach and the other motives felt by individuals. Hence the liability of the
rights of property, and of the impartiality of laws affecting it, to be violated by
Legislative majorities having an interest real or supposed in the injustice: Hence
agrarian laws, and other leveling schemes: Hence the cancelling or evading of
debts, and other violations of contracts. We must not shut our eyes to the nature
of man, nor to the light of experience. Who would rely on a fair decision from
three individuals if two had an interest in the case opposed to the rights of the
third? Make the number as great as you please, the impartiality will not be
increased; nor any further security against injustice be obtained, than what may
result from the greater difficulty of uniting the wills of a greater number.
"In all Govts there is a power which is capable of oppressive exercise. In
Monarchies and Aristocracies oppression proceeds from a want of sympathy &
responsibility in the Govt towards the people. In popular Governments the
danger lies in an undue sympathy among individuals composing a majority, and
a want of responsibility in the majority to the minority. The characteristic
excellence of the political System of the U. S. arises from a distribution and
organization of its powers, which at the same time that they secure the
dependence of the Govt on the will of the nation, provides better guards than are
found in any other popular Govt against interested combinations of a Majority
against the rights of a Minority.
"The U. States have a precious advantage also in the actual distribution of
property particularly the landed property; and in the universal hope of acquiring
property. This latter peculiarity is among the happiest contrasts in their situation
to that of the old world, where no anticipated change in this respect, can
generally inspire a like sympathy with the rights of property. There may be at
present, a Majority of the Nation, who are even freeholders, or the heirs or
aspirants to Freeholds. And the day may not be very near when such will cease
to make up a Majority of the community. But they cannot always so continue.
With every admissible subdivision of the Arable lands, a populousness not
greater than that of England or France will reduce the holders to a Minority. And
whenever the majority shall be without landed or other equivalent property and
without the means or hope of acquiring it, what is to secure the rights of property
agst the danger from an equality & universality of suffrage, vesting compleat
power over property in hands without a share in it: not to speak of a danger in
the meantime from a dependence of an increasing number on the wealth of a
few? In other Countries this dependence results in some from the relations
between Landlords & Tenants in others both from that source & from the
relations between wealthy capitalists and indigent labourers. In the U. S. the
occurrence must happen from the last source; from the connection between the
great Capitalists in Manufactures & Commerce and the numbers employed by
them. Nor will accumulations of Capital for a certain time be precluded by our
laws of descent & of distribution; Such being the enterprise inspired by free
Institutions, that great wealth in the hands of individuals and associations may
not be unfrequent. But it may be observed, that the opportunities may be
diminished, and the permanency defeated by the equalizing tendency of our
laws.
"No free Country has ever been without parties, which are a natural offspring
of Freedom. An obvious and permanent division of every people is into the
owners of the soil, and the other inhabitants. In a certain sense the country may
be said to belong to the former. If each landholder has an exclusive property in
his share, the Body of Landholders have an exclusive property in the whole. As
the Soil becomes subdivided, and actually cultivated by the owners, this view of
the subject derives force from the principle of natural law, which vests in
individuals an exclusive right to the portions of ground with which he has
incorporated his labour & improvements. Whatever may be the rights of others
derived from their birth in the Country, from their interest in the highways &
other parcels left open for common use, as well as in the national edifices and
monuments; from their share in the public defence, and from their concurrent
support of the Govt, it would seem unreasonable to extend the right so far as to
give them when become the majority, a power of Legislation over the landed
property without the consent of the proprietors. Some barrier agst the invasion of
their rights would not be out of place in a just and provident System of Govt.
The principle of such an arrangement has prevailed in all Govts where peculiar
privileges or interests held by a part were to be secured agst violation, and in the
various associations where pecuniary or other property forms the stake. In the
former case a defensive right has been allowed; and if the arrangement be
wrong, it is not in the defense but in the kind of privilege to be defended. In the
latter case, the shares of suffrage, allotted to individuals have been with
acknowledged justice apportioned more or less to their respective interests in the
Common Stock.
"These reflections suggest the expediency of such a modification of Govt as
would give security to the part of the Society having most at stake and being
most exposed to danger. Three modifications present themselves.
"1. Confining the right of suffrage to freeholders, & to such as hold an
equivalent property, convertible of course into freeholds. The objection to this
regulation is obvious. It violates the vital principle of free Govt that those who
are to be bound by laws, ought to have a voice in making them. And the
violation wd be more strikingly unjust as the law makers become the minority.
The regulation would be as unpropitious, also, as it would be unjust. It would
engage the numerical & physical force in a constant struggle agst the public
authority; unless kept down by a standing army fatal to all parties.
"2. Confining the right of suffrage for one Branch to the holders of property,
and for the other Branch to those without property. This arrangement which wd
give a mutual defence, where there might be mutual danger of encroachment,
has an aspect of equality & fairness. But it wd not be in fact either equal or fair,
because the rights to be defended would be unequal, being on one side those of
property as well as of persons, and on the other those of persons only. The
temptation also to encroach tho' in a certain degree mutual, wd be felt more
strongly on one side than on the other: It would be more likely to beget an abuse
of the Legislative Negative in extorting concessions at the expence of property,
than the reverse. The division of the State into two Classes, with distinct &
independt Organs of power, and without any intermingled agency whatever,
might lead to contests & antipathies not dissimilar to those between the
Patricians & Plebeians at Rome.
"3. Confining the right of electing one Branch of the Legislature to
freeholders, and admitting all others to a common right with holders of property
in electing the other Branch. This wd give a defensive power to holders of
property, and to the class also without property when becoming a majority of
electors, without depriving them in the meantime of a participation in the Public
Councils. If the holders of property would thus have a two-fold share of
representation, they wd have at the same time a two-fold stake in it, the rights of
property as well as of persons, the two-fold object of political Institutions. And if
no exact & safe equilibrium can be introduced, it is more reasonable that a
preponderating weight shd be allowed to the greater interest than to the lesser.
Experience alone can decide how far the practice in this case would correspond
with the Theory. Such a distribution of the right of suffrage was tried in N. York
and has been abandoned whether from experienced evils, or party calculations,
may possibly be a question. It is still on trial in N. Carolina, with what practical
indications is not known. It is certain that the trial, to be satisfactory ought to be
continued for no inconsiderable period; untill in fact the non-freeholders should
be the majority.
"4. Should experience or public opinion require an equal & universal suffrage
for each branch of the Govt such as prevails generally in the U. S., a resource
favorable to the rights of the landed & other property, when its possessors
become the minority, may be found in an enlargement of the Election Districts
for one branch of the Legislature, and an extension of its period of service. Large
districts are manifestly favorable to the election of persons of general
respectability, and of probable attachment to the rights of property, over
competitors depending on the personal solicitation practicable on a contracted
theatre. And altho' an ambitious candidate, of personal distinction, might
occasionally recommend himself to popular choice by espousing a popular
though unjust object, it might rarely happen to many districts at the same time.
The tendency of a longer period of service would be, to render the Body more
stable in its policy, and more capable of stemming popular currents taking a
wrong direction, till reason & justice could regain their ascendancy.
"5. Should even such a modification as the last be deemed inadmissible, and
universal suffrage and very short periods of elections within contracted spheres,
be required for each branch of the Govt, the security for the holders of property
when the minority, can only be derived from the ordinary influence possessed by
property, & the superior information incident to its holders; from the popular
sense of justice enlightened & enlarged by a diffusive education; and from the
difficulty of combining & effectuating unjust purposes throughout an extensive
country; a difficulty essentially distinguishing the U. S. & even most of the
individual States, from the small communities where a mistaken interest or
contagious passion, could readily unite a majority of the whole under a factious
leader, in trampling on the rights of the minor party.
"Under every view of the subject, it seems indispensable that the Mass of
Citizens should not be without a voice, in making the laws which they are to
obey, & in chusing the Magistrates who are to administer them, and if the only
alternative be between an equal & universal right of suffrage for each branch of
the Govt and a confinement of the entire right to a part of the Citizens, it is better
that those having the greater interest at stake namely that of property & persons
both, should be deprived of half their share in the Govt than, that those having
the lesser interest, that of personal rights only, should be deprived of the
whole."–Madison's Note.
Docr Franklin. It is of great consequence that we shd not depress the
virtue & public spirit of our common people; of which they displayed a
great deal during the war, and which contributed principally to the favorable
issue of it. He related the honorable refusal of the American seamen who
were carried in great numbers into the British Prisons during the war, to
redeem themselves from misery or to seek their fortunes, by entering on
board the Ships of the Enemies to their Country; contrasting their patriotism
with a contemporary instance in which the British seamen made prisoners
by the Americans, readily entered on the ships of the latter on being
promised a share of the prizes that might be made out of their own Country.
This proceeded he said from the different manner in which the common
people were treated in America & G. Britain. He did not think that the
elected had any right in any case to narrow the privileges of the electors. He
quoted as arbitrary the British Statute setting forth the danger of tumultuous
meetings, and under that pretext narrowing the right of suffrage to persons
having freeholds of a certain value; observing that this Statute was soon
followed by another under the succeeding Parliamt subjecting the people
who had no votes to peculiar labors & hardships. He was persuaded also
that such a restriction as was proposed would give great uneasiness in the
populous States. The sons of a substantial farmer, not being themselves
freeholders, would not be pleased at being disfranchised, and there are a
great many persons of that description.
Mr Mercer. The Constitution is objectionable in many points, but in none
more than the present. He objected to the footing on which the qualification
was put, but particularly to the mode of election by the people. The people
can not know & judge of the characters of Candidates. The worse possible
choice will be made. He quoted the case of the Senate in Virga as an
example in point. The people in Towns can unite their votes in favor of one
favorite; & by that means always prevail over the people of the Country,
who being dispersed will scatter their votes among a variety of candidates.
Mr Rutlidge thought the idea of restraining the right of suffrage to the
freeholders a very unadvised one. It would create division among the
people & make enemies of all those who should be excluded.
On the question for striking out as moved by Mr Govr Morris, from the
word "qualifications" to the end of the III article
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md divd.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not prest.
Adjourned
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Art: IV. sect. 1.–Mr Mercer expressed his dislike of the whole plan, and
his opinion that it never could succeed.
Mr Ghorum. he had never seen any inconveniency from allowing such as
were not freeholders to vote, though it had long been tried. The elections in
Phila, N. York & Boston where the Merchants & Mechanics vote are at least
as good as those made by freeholders only. The case in England was not
accurately stated yesterday (by Mr Madison). The Cities & large towns are
not the seat of Crown influence & corruption. These prevail in the
Boroughs, and not on account of the right which those who are not
freeholders have to vote, but of the smallness of the number who vote. The
people have been long accustomed to this right in various parts of America,
and will never allow it to be abridged. We must consult their rooted
prejudices if we expect their concurrence in our propositions.
Mr Mercer did not object so much to an election by the people at large
including such as were not freeholders, as to their being left to make their
choice without any guidance. He hinted that Candidates ought to be
nominated by the State Legislatures.
On the question for agreeing to Art: IV–Sect, 1 it passd nem. con.
Art. IV. Sect. 2. taken up.
Col. Mason was for opening a wide door for emigrants; but did not
chuse to let foreigners and adventurers make laws for us & govern us.
Citizenship for three years was not enough for ensuring that local
knowledge which ought to be possessed by the Representative. This was the
principal ground of his objection to so short a term. It might also happen
that a rich foreign Nation, for example Great Britain, might send over her
tools who might bribe their way into the Legislature for insidious purposes.
He moved that "seven" years instead of "three," be inserted.
Mr Govr Morris 2ded the Motion, & on the question, all the States agreed
to it except Connecticut.
Mr Sherman moved to strike out the word "resident" and insert
"inhabitant," as less liable to misconstruction.
Mr Madison 2ded the motion, both were vague, but the latter least so in
common acceptation, and would not exclude persons absent occasionally
for a considerable time on public or private business. Great disputes had
been raised in Virga concerning the meaning of residence as a qualification
of Representatives which were determined more according to the affection
or dislike to the man in question, than to any fixt interpretation of the word.
Mr Wilson preferred "inhabitant."
Mr Govr Morris, was opposed to both and for requiring nothing more
than a freehold. He quoted great disputes in N. York occasioned by these
terms, which were decided by the arbitrary will of the majority. Such a
regulation is not necessary. People rarely chuse a nonresident–It is improper
as in the 1st branch, the people at large, not the States, are represented.
Mr Rutlidge urged & moved, that a residence of 7 years shd be required
in the State Wherein the Member shd be elected. An emigrant from
N. England to S. C. or Georgia would know little of its affairs and could not
be supposed to acquire a thorough knowledge in less time.
Mr Read reminded him that we were now forming a Natl Govt and such
a regulation would correspond little with the idea that we were one people.
Mr Wilson. enforced the same consideration.
Mr Madison suggested the case of new States in the West, which could
have perhaps no representation on that plan.
Mr Mercer. Such a regulation would present a greater alienship among
the States than existed under the old federal system. It would interweave
local prejudices & State distinctions in the very Constitution which is meant
to cure them. He mentioned instances of violent disputes raised in Maryland
concerning the term "residence."
Mr Elseworth thought seven years of residence was by far too long a
term: but that some fixt term of previous residence would be proper. He
thought one year would be sufficient, but seemed to have no objection to
three years.
Mr Dickinson proposed that it should read "inhabitant actually resident
for –— years." This would render the meaning less indeterminate.
Mr Wilson. If a short term should be inserted in the blank, so strict an
expression might be construed to exclude the members of the Legislature,
who could not be said to be actual residents in their States whilst at the Seat
of the Genl Government.
Mr Mercer. It would certainly exclude men, who had once been
inhabitants, and returning from residence elsewhere to resettle in their
original State; although a want of the necessary knowledge could not in
such cases be presumed.
Mr Mason thought 7 years too long, but would never agree to part with
the principle. It is a valuable principle. He thought it a defect in the plan
that the Representatives would be too few to bring with them all the local
knowledge necessary. If residence be not required, Rich men of
neighbouring States, may employ with success the means of corruption in
some particular district and thereby get into the public Councils after having
failed in their own State. This is the practice in the boroughs of England.
On the question for postponing in order to consider Mr Dickinsons
motion
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On the question for inserting "inhabitant" in place of "resident"–agd to
nem. con.
Mr Elseworth & Col. Mason move to insert "one year" for previous
inhabitancy.
Mr Williamson liked the Report as it stood. He thought "resident" a good
eno' term. He was agst requiring any period of previous residence. New
residents if elected will be most zealous to conform to the will of their
constituents, as their conduct will be watched with a more jealous eye.
Mr Butler & Mr Rutlidge moved "three years" instead of "one year" for
previous inhabitancy.
On the question for 3 years,
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On the question for "1 year"
N. H. no.–Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no.
Md divd. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Art. IV. Sect. 2. as amended in manner preceding, was agreed to nem.
con.
Art. IV. Sect. 3. taken up.
Genl Pinkney & Mr Pinkney moved that the number of Representatives
allotted to S. Carola be "six." On the question,
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Delaware ay.
Md no. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The 3. Sect of Art: IV, was then agreed to.
Art: IV. Sect. 4. taken up.
Mr Williamson moved to strike out "according to the provisions
hereinafter made" and to insert the words "according to the rule hereafter to
be provided for direct taxation."–See Art. VII. Sect. 3.
On the question for agreeing to Mr Williamson's amendment
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr King wished to know what influence the vote just passed was meant
to have on the succeeding part of the Report, concerning the admission of
Slaves into the rule of Representation. He could not reconcile his mind to
the article if it was to prevent objections to the latter part. The admission of
slaves was a most grating circumstance to his mind, & he believed would
be so to a great part of the people of America. He had not made a strenuous
opposition to it heretofore because he had hoped that this concession would
have produced a readiness which had not been manifested, to strengthen the
Genl Govt and to mark a full confidence in it. The Report under
consideration had by the tenor of it, put an end to all those hopes. In two
great points the hands of the Legislature were absolutely tied. The
importation of slaves could not be prohibited–exports could not be taxed. Is
this reasonable? What are the great objects of the Genl System? 1. defence
agst foreign invasion. 2. agst internal sedition. Shall all the States then be
bound to defend each; & shall each be at liberty to introduce a weakness
which will render defence more difficult? Shall one part of the U. S. be
bound to defend another part, and that other part be at liberty not only to
increase its own danger, but to withhold the compensation for the burden? If
slaves are to be imported shall not the exports produced by their labor,
supply a revenue the better to enable the Genl Gova to defend their Masters?
There was so much inequality & unreasonableness in all this, that the
people of the Northern States could never be reconciled to it. No candid
man could undertake to justify it to them. He had hoped that some
accommodation wd have taken place on this subject; that at least a time wd
have been limited for the importation of slaves. He never could agree to let
them be imported without limitation & then be represented in the Natl
Legislature. Indeed he could so little persuade himself of the rectitude of
such a practice, that he was not sure he could assent to it under any
circumstances. At all events, either slaves should not be represented, or
exports should be taxable.
Mr Sherman regarded the slave trade as iniquitous; but the point of
representation having been settled after much difficulty & deliberation, he
did not think himself bound to make opposition; especially as the present
article as amended did not preclude any arrangement whatever on that point
in another place of the Report.
Mr Madison objected to 1 for every 40.000 inhabitants as a perpetual
rule. The future increase of population if the Union shd be permanent, will
render the number of Representatives excessive.
Mr Ghorum. It is not to be supposed that the Govt will last so long as to
produce this effect. Can it be supposed that this vast Country including the
Western territory will 150 years hence remain one nation?
Mr Elseworth. If the Govt should continue so long, alterations may be
made in the Constitution in the manner proposed in a subsequent article.
Mr Sherman & Mr Madison moved to insert the words "not exceeding,"
before the words "1 for every 40.000." which was agreed to nem. con.
Mr Govr Morris moved to insert "free" before the word inhabitants.
Much he said would depend on this point. He never would concur in
upholding domestic slavery. It was a nefarious institution. It was the curse
of heaven on the States where it prevailed. Compare the free regions of the
Middle States, where a rich & noble cultivation marks the prosperity &
happiness of the people, with the misery & poverty which overspread the
barren wastes of Va Maryd & the other States having slaves. Travel thro' ye
whole Continent & you behold the prospect continually varying with the
appearance & disappearance of slavery. The moment you leave ye E. States
& enter N. York, the effects of the institution become visible, passing thro'
the Jerseys & entering Pa every criterion of superior improvement witnesses
the change. Proceed southwdly. & every step you take thro' ye great regions
of slaves presents a desert increasing, with ye increasing [word is illegible]
proportion of these wretched beings. Upon what principle is it that the
slaves shall be computed in the representation? Are they men? Then make
them Citizens and let them vote. Are they property? Why then is no other
property included? The Houses in this city (Philada) are worth more than all
the wretched Slaves which cover the rice swamps of South Carolina. The
admission of slaves into the Representation when fairly explained comes to
this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S. C. who goes to the Coast of
Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity tears away his
fellow creatures from their dearest connections & damns them to the most
cruel bondages, shall have more votes in a Govt instituted for protection of
the rights of mankind, than the Citizen of Pa or N. Jersey who views with a
laudable horror, so nefarious a practice. He would add that Domestic
slavery is the most prominent feature in the aristocratic countenance of the
proposed Constitution. The vassalage of the poor has ever been the favorite
offspring of Aristocracy. And What is the proposed compensation to the
Northern States for a sacrifice of every principle of right, of every impulse
of humanity. They are to bind themselves to march their militia for the
defence of the S. States; for their defence agst those very slaves of whom
they complain. They must supply vessels & seamen in case of foreign
Attack. The Legislature will have indefinite power to tax them by excises,
and duties on imports: both of which will fall heavier on them than on the
Southern inhabitants; for the bohae tea used by a Northern freeman, will
pay more tax than the whole consumption of the miserable slave, which
consists of nothing more than his physical subsistence and the rag that
covers his nakedness. On the other side the Southern States are not to be
restrained from importing fresh supplies of wretched Africans, at once to
increase the danger of attack, and the difficulty of defence; nay they are to
be encouraged to it by an assurance of having their votes in the Natl Govt
increased in proportion, and are at the same time to have their exports &
their slaves exempt from all contributions for the public service. Let it not
be said that direct taxation is to be proportioned to representation. It is idle
to suppose that the Genl Govt can stretch its hand directly into the pockets
of the people scattered over so vast a Country. They can only do it through
the medium of exports imports & excises. For What then are all the
sacrifices to be made? He would sooner submit himself to a tax for paying
for all the negroes in the U. States, than saddle posterity with such a
Constitution.
Mr Dayton 2ded the motion. He did it he said that his sentiments on the
subject might appear whatever might be the fate of the amendment.
Mr Sherman, did not regard the admission of the Negroes into the ratio
of representation, as liable to such insuperable objections. It was the
freemen of the Southn States who were in fact to be represented according
to the taxes paid by them, and the Negroes are only included in the Estimate
of the taxes. This was his idea of the matter.
Mr Pinkney, considered the fisheries & the Western frontier as more
burthensome to the U. S. than the slaves. He thought this could be
demonstrated if the occasion were a proper one.
Mr Wilson, thought the motion premature. An agreement to the clause
would be no bar to the object of it.
Question On motion to insert "free" before "inhabitants,"
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the suggestion of Mr Dickinson the words, "provided that each State
shall have one representative at least,"–were added nem. con.
Art. IV. Sect. 4. as amended was agreed to con. nem.
Art. IV. Sect. 5. taken up.
Mr Pinkney moved to strike out Sect. 5. As giving no peculiar advantage
to the House of Representatives, and as clogging the Govt. If the Senate can
be trusted with the many great powers proposed, it surely may be trusted
with that of originating money bills.
Mr Ghorum. was agst allowing the Senate to originate; but only to
amend.
Mr Govr Morris. It is particularly proper that the Senate shd have the
right of originating money bills. They will sit constantly, will consist of a
smaller number, and will be able to prepare such bills with due correctness;
and so as to prevent delay of business in the other House.
Col. Mason was unwilling to travel over this ground again. To strike out
the Section, was to unhinge the compromise of which it made a part. The
duration of the Senate made it improper. He does not object to that duration.
On the Contrary he approved of it. But joined with the smallness of the
number, it was an argument against adding this to the other great powers
vested in that body. His idea of an Aristocracy was that it was the governt of
the few over the many. An aristocratic body, like the screw in mechanics,
workg its way by slow degrees, and holding fast whatever it gains, should
ever be suspected of an encroaching tendency. The purse strings should
never be put into its hands.
Mr Mercer, considered the exclusive power of originating Money bills as
so great an advantage, that it rendered the equality of votes in the Senate
ideal & of no consequence.
Mr Butler was for adhering to the principle which had been settled.
Mr Wilson was opposed to it on its merits without regard to the
compromise.
Mr Elseworth did not think the clause of any consequence, but as it was
thought of consequence by some members from the larger States, he was
willing it should stand.
Mr Madison was for striking it out; considering it as of no advantage to
the large States as fettering the Govt and as a source of injurious
altercations between the two Houses.
On the question for striking out "Sect. 5, Art. IV".
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Adjd.
T       , A     9.    C         
Art: IV. Sect. 6. Mr Randolph expressed his dissatisfaction at the
disagreement yesterday to Sect. 5. concerning money bills, as endangering
the success of the plan, and extremely objectionable in itself; and gave
notice that he should move for a reconsideration of the vote.
Mr Williamson said he had formed a like intention.
Mr Wilson, gave notice that he shd move to reconsider the vote, requiring
seven instead of three years of Citizenship as a qualification of candidates
for the House of Representatives.
Art. IV. Sec. 6. & 7. Agreed to nem. con.
Art. V. Sect. 1. taken up.
Mr Wilson objected to vacancies in the Senate being supplied by the
Executives of the States. It was unnecessary as the Legislatures will meet so
frequently. It removes the appointment too far from the people; the
Executives in most of the States being elected by the Legislatures. As he
had always thought the appointment of the Executives by the Legislative
department wrong; so it was still more so that the Executive should elect
into the Legislative department.
Mr Randolph thought it necessary in order to prevent inconvenient
chasms in the Senate. In some States the Legislatures meet but once a year.
As the Senate will have more power & consist of a smaller number than the
other House, vacancies there will be of more consequence. The Executives
might be safely trusted he thought with the appointment for so short a time.
Mr Elseworth. It is only said that the Executive may supply vacancies.
When the Legislative meeting happens to be near, the power will not be
exerted. As there will be but two members from a State vacancies may be of
great moment.
Mr Williamson. Senators may resign or not accept. This provision is
therefore absolutely necessary.
On the question for striking out "vacancies shall be supplied by the
Executives"
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Md divd.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Williamson moved to insert after "vacancies shall be supplied by the
Executives," the following words "unless other provision shall be made by
the Legislature" (of the State).
Mr Elseworth. He was willing to trust the Legislature, or the Executive
of a State, but not to give the former a discretion to refer appointments for
the Senate to whom they pleased.
Question on Mr Williamson's motion
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Md ay. Va no.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Madison in order to prevent doubts whether resignations could be
made by Senators, or whether they could refuse to accept, moved to strike
out the words after "vacancies," & insert the words "happening by refusals
to accept, resignations or otherwise, may be supplied by the Legislature of
the State in the representation of which such vacancies shall happen, or by
the Executive thereof until the next meeting of the Legislature."
Mr Govr Morris this is absolutely necessary, otherwise, as members
chosen into the Senate are disqualified from being appointed to any office
by Sect. 9. of this art: it will be in the power of a Legislature by appointing
a man a Senator agst his consent, to deprive the U. S. of his services.
The motion of Mr Madison was agreed to nem. con.
Mr Randolph called for division of the Section, so as to leave a distinct
question on the last words "each member shall have one vote." He wished
this last sentence to be postponed until the reconsideration should have
taken place on Sect. 5. Art. IV. concerning money bills. If that section
should not be reinstated his plan would be to vary the representation in the
Senate.
Mr Strong concurred in Mr Randolph's ideas on this point.
Mr Read did not consider the section as to money bills of any advantage
to the larger States and had voted for striking it out as being viewed in the
same light by the larger States. If it was considered by them as of any value,
and as a condition of the equality of votes in the Senate, he had no objection
to its being re-instated.
Mr Wilson–Mr Elseworth & Mr Madison urged that it was of no
advantage to the larger States, and that it might be a dangerous source of
contention between the two Houses. All the principal powers of the Natl
Legislature had some relation to money.
Docr Franklin, considered the two clauses, the originating of money
bills, and the equality of votes in the Senate, as essentially connected by the
compromise which had been agreed to.
Col. Mason said this was not the time for discussing this point. When the
originating of money bills shall be reconsidered, he thought it could be
demonstrated that it was of essential importance to restrain the right to the
House of Representatives the immediate choice of the people.
Mr Williamson. The State of N. C. had agreed to an equality in the
Senate, merely in consideration that money bills should be confined to the
other House: and he was surprised to see the smaller States forsaking the
condition on which they had received their equality.
Question on the section 1. down to the last sentence
N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa [19] no. Del. ay.
Md ay. Virga ay. N. C. no. S. C. divd. Geo. ay.
[19] "In the printed Journal Pennsylvania ay."–Madison's Note.
Mr Randolph moved that the last sentence "each member shall have one
vote," be postponed.
It was observed that this could not be necessary; as in case the sanction
as to originating money bills should not be reinstated, and a revision of the
Constitution should ensue, it wd still be proper that the members should
vote per Capita. A postponement of the preceding sentence allowing to each
State 2 members wd have been more proper.
Mr Mason, did not mean to propose a change of this mode of voting per
capita in any event. But as there might be other modes proposed, he saw no
impropriety in postponing the sentence. Each State may have two members,
and yet may have unequal votes. He said that unless the exclusive
originating of money bills should be restored to the House of
Representatives, he should, not from obstinacy but duty and conscience,
oppose throughout the equality of Representation in the Senate.
Mr Govr Morris. Such declarations were he supposed, addressed to the
smaller States in order to alarm them for their equality in the Senate, and
induce them agst their judgments, to concur in restoring the section
concerning money bills. He would declare in his turn that as he saw no
prospect of amending the Constitution of the Senate & considered the
section relating to money bills as intrinsically bad, he would adhere to the
section establishing the equality at all events.
Mr Wilson. It seems to have been supposed by some that the section
concerning money bills is desirable to the large States. The fact was that
two of those States (Pa & Va) had uniformly voted agst it without reference
to any other part of the system.
Mr Randolph, urged as Col. Mason had done that the sentence under
consideration was connected with that relating to Money bills, and might
possibly be affected by the result of the motion for reconsidering the latter.
That the postponement was therefore not improper.
Question for postponing "each member shall have one vote,"
N. H. divd. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The words were then agreed to as part of the section.
Mr Randolph then gave notice that he should move to reconsider this
whole Sect: 1. Art. V. as connected with the 5. Sect. Art. IV. as to which he
had already given such notice.
Art. V. Sect. 2d taken up.
Mr Govr Morris moved to insert after the words, "immediately after," the
following "they shall be assembled in consequence of," which was agreed
to nem. con. as was then the whole sect. 2.
Art: V. Sect. 3. taken up.
Mr Govr Morris moved to insert 14 instead of 4 years citizenship as a
qualification for Senators: urging the danger of admitting strangers into our
public Councils. Mr Pinkney 2d him.
Mr Elseworth, was opposed to the motion as discouraging meritorious
aliens from emigrating to this Country.
Mr Pinkney. As the Senate is to have the power of making treaties &
managing our foreign affairs, there is peculiar danger and impropriety in
opening its door to those who have foreign attachments. He quoted the
jealousy of the Athenians on this subject who made it death for any stranger
to intrude his voice into their Legislative proceedings.
Col. Mason highly approved of the policy of the motion. Were it not that
many not natives of this Country had acquired great merit during the
revolution, he should be for restraining the eligibility into the Senate, to
natives.
Mr Madison was not averse to some restrictions on this subject; but
could never agree to the proposed amendment. He thought any restriction
however in the Constitution unnecessary, and improper, unnecessary;
because the Natl Legislre is to have the right of regulating naturalization,
and can by virtue thereof fix different periods of residence or conditions of
enjoying different privileges of Citizenship: Improper; because it will give a
tincture of illiberality to the Constitution: because it will put it out of the
power of the Natl Legislature even by special acts of naturalization to
confer the full rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers & because it will
discourage the most desirable class of people from emigrating to the
U. S. Should the proposed Constitution have the intended effect of giving
stability & reputation to our Govts great numbers of respectable Europeans;
men who love liberty and wish to partake its blessings, will be ready to
transfer their fortunes hither. All such would feel the mortification of being
marked with suspicious incapacitations though they sd not covet the public
honors. He was not apprehensive that any dangerous number of strangers
would be appointed by the State Legislatures, if they were left at liberty to
do so: nor that foreign powers would make use of strangers as instruments
for their purposes. Their bribes would be expended on men whose
circumstances would rather stifle than excite jealousy & watchfulness in the
public.
Mr Butler was decidedly opposed to the admission of foreigners without
a long residence in the Country. They bring with them, not only attachments
to other Countries; but ideas of Govt so distinct from ours that in every
point of view they are dangerous. He acknowledged that if he himself had
been called into public life within a short time after his coming to America,
his foreign habits opinions & attachments would have rendered him an
improper agent in public affairs. He mentioned the great strictness observed
in Great Britain on this subject.
Docr Franklin was not against a reasonable time, but should be very
sorry to see any thing like illiberality inserted in the Constitution. The
people in Europe are friendly to this Country. Even in the Country with
which we have been lately at war, we have now & had during the war, a
great many friends not only among the people at large but in both houses of
Parliament. In every other Country in Europe all the people are our friends.
We found in the course of the Revolution, that many strangers served us
faithfully, and that many natives took part agst their Country. When
foreigners after looking about for some other Country in which they can
obtain more happiness, give a preference to ours, it is a proof of attachment
which ought to excite our confidence & affection.
Mr Randolph did not know but it might be problematical whether
emigrations to this Country were on the whole useful or not: but he could
never agree to the motion for disabling them for 14 years to participate in
the public honours. He reminded the Convention of the language held by
our patriots during the Revolution, and the principles laid down in all our
American Constitutions. Many foreigners may have fixed their fortunes
among us under the faith of these invitations. All persons under this
description, with all others who would be affected by such a regulation,
would enlist themselves under the banners of hostility to the proposed
System. He would go as far as seven years, but no further.
Mr Wilson said he rose with feelings which were perhaps peculiar;
mentioning the circumstance of his not being a native, and the possibility, if
the ideas of some gentlemen should be pursued, of his being incapacitated
from holding a place under the very Constitution, which he had shared in
the trust of making. He remarked the illiberal complexion which the motion
would give to the System & the effect which a good system would have in
inviting meritorious foreigners among us, and the discouragement &
mortification they must feel from the degrading discrimination now
proposed. He had himself experienced this mortification. On his removal
into Maryland, he found himself, from defect of residence, under certain
legal incapacities which never ceased to produce chagrin, though he
assuredly did not desire & would not have accepted the offices to which
they related. To be appointed to a place may be matter of indifference. To
be incapable of being appointed, is a circumstance grating and mortifying.
Mr Govr Morris. The lesson we are taught is that we should be governed
as much by our reason, and as little by our feelings as possible. What is the
language of Reason on this subject? That we should not be polite at the
expence of prudence. There was a moderation in all things. It is said that
some tribes of Indians, carried their hospitality so far as to offer to strangers
their wives & daughters. Was this a proper model for us? He would admit
them to his house, he would invite them to his table, would provide for
them comfortable lodgings; but would not carry the complaisance so far as,
to bed them with his wife. He would let them worship at the same altar, but
did not choose to make Priests of them. He ran over the privileges which
emigrants would enjoy among us, though they should be deprived of that of
being eligible to the great offices of Government; observing that they
exceeded the privileges allowed to foreigners in any part of the world; and
that as every Society from a great nation down to a club had the right of
declaring the conditions on which new members should be admitted, there
could be no room for complaint. As to those philosophical gentlemen, those
Citizens of the World as they called themselves, He owned he did not wish
to see any of them in our public Councils. He would not trust them. The
men who can shake off their attachments to their own Country can never
love any other. These attachments are the wholesome prejudices which
uphold all Governments. Admit a Frenchman into your Senate, and he will
study to increase the commerce of France: an Englishman, he will feel an
equal bias in favor of that of England. It has been said that The Legislatures
will not chuse foreigners, at least improper ones. There was no knowing
what Legislatures would do. Some appointments made by them, proved that
every thing ought to be apprehended from the cabals practised on such
occasions. He mentioned the case of a foreigner who left this State in
disgrace, and worked himself into an appointment from another to
Congress.
Question on the motion of Mr Govr Morris to insert 14 in place of 4
years
N.H. ay. Mass. no. Ct no. N.J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On 13 years, moved by Mr Govr Morris
N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On 10 years moved by Genl Pinkney
N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Dr Franklin reminded the Convention that it did not follow from an
omission to insert the restriction in the Constitution that the persons in
question wd be actually chosen into the Legislature.
Mr Rutlidge. 7 years of Citizenship have been required for the House of
Representatives. Surely a longer time is requisite for the Senate, which will
have more power.
Mr Williamson. It is more necessary to guard the Senate in this case than
the other House. Bribery & cabal can be more easily practised in the choice
of the Senate which is to be made by the Legislatures composed of a few
men, than of the House of Represents who will be chosen by the people.
Mr Randolph will agree to 9 years with the expectation that it will be
reduced to seven if Mr Wilson's motion to reconsider the vote fixing 7 years
for the House of Representatives should produce a reduction of that period.
On a question for 9 years
N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The term "Resident" was struck out, & "inhabitant" inserted nem. con.
Art. V. Sect. 3. as amended agreed to nem. con.
Sect. 4. agreed to nem. con.
Article VI. Sect. 1. taken up.
Mr Madison & Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out "each House" & to
insert "the House of Representatives;" the right of the Legislatures to
regulate the times & places &c. in the election of Senators being involved
in the right of appointing them, which was disagreed to.
Division of the question being called, it was taken on the first part down
to "but their provisions concerning &c."
The first part was agreed to nem. con.
Mr Pinkney & Mr Rutlidge moved to strike out the remaining part viz
but their provisions concerning them may at any time be altered by the
Legislature of the United States. The States they contended could & must
be relied on in such cases.
Mr Ghorum. It would be as improper take this power from the Natl
Legislature, as to Restrain the British Parliament from regulating the
circumstances of elections, leaving this business to the Counties themselves
—
Mr Madison. [20] The necessity of a Genl Govt supposes that the State
Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common interest at
the expence of their local conveniency or prejudices. The policy of referring
the appointment of the House of Representatives to the people and not to
the Legislatures of the States, supposes that the result will be somewhat
influenced by the mode. This view of the question seems to decide that the
Legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrouled right of
regulating the times places & manner of holding elections. These were
words of great latitude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that
might be made of the discretionary power. Whether the electors should vote
by ballot or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that place; should be
divided into districts or all meet at one place, shd all vote for all the
representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district;
these & many other points would depend on the Legislatures, and might
materially affect the appointments. Whenever the State Legislatures had a
favorite measure to carry, they would take care so to mould their regulations
as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality of
the Representation in the Legislatures of particular States, would produce a
like inequality in their representation in the Natl Legislature, as it was
presumable that the Counties having the power in the former case would
secure it to themselves in the latter. What danger could there be in giving a
controuling power to the Natl Legislature? Of whom was it to consist? 1. of
a Senate to be chosen by the State Legislatures. If the latter therefore could
be trusted, their representatives could not be dangerous. 2. of
Representatives elected by the same people who elect the State
Legislatures; Surely then if confidence is due to the latter, it must be due to
the former. It seemed as improper in principle, though it might be less
inconvenient in practice, to give to the State Legislatures this great
authority over the election of the Representatives of the people in the Genl
Legislature, as it would be to give to the latter a like power over the election
of their Representatives in the State Legislatures.
[20] Madison wrote to Jefferson, July 18:
"I have taken lengthy notes of everything that has yet passed, and mean
to go on with the drudgery, if no indisposition obliges me to discontinue it.
It is not possible to form any judgment of the future duration of the Session.
I am led by sundry circumstances to guess that the residue of the work will
not be very quickly despatched. The public mind is very impatient for ye
event, and various reports are circulating which tend to inflame curiosity. I
do not learn however that any discontent is expressed at the concealment;
and have little doubt that the people will be as ready to receive as we shall
be able to propose, a Government that will secure their liberties &
happiness."–Mad. MSS.
Mr King. If this power be not given to the Natl Legislature, their right of
judging of the returns of their members may be frustrated. No probability
has been suggested of its being abused by them. Altho this scheme of
erecting the Genl Govt on the authority of the State Legislatures has been
fatal to the federal establishment, it would seem as if many gentlemen, still
foster the dangerous idea.
Mr Govr Morris observed that the States might make false returns and
then make no provisions for new elections.
Mr Sherman did not know but it might be best to retain the clause,
though he had himself sufficient confidence in the State Legislatures. The
motion of Mr P. & Mr R. did not prevail.
The word "respectively" was inserted after the word "State."
On the motion of Mr Read the word "their" was struck out, &
"regulations in such cases" inserted in place of "provisions concerning
them" the clause then reading–"but regulations in each of the foregoing
cases may at any time, be made or altered by the Legislature of the U. S."
This was meant to give the Natl Legislature a power not only to alter the
provisions of the States, but to make regulations in case the States should
fail or refuse altogether.
Art. VI. Sect. 1. as thus amended was agreed to nem. con.
Adjourned.
F      A     10.    C         
Art. VI. Sect. 2. taken up.
Mr Pinkney. The Committee as he had conceived were instructed to
report the proper qualifications of property for the members of the Natl
Legislature; instead of which they have referred the task to the Natl
Legislature itself. Should it be left on this footing, the first Legislature will
meet without any particular qualifications of property; and if it should
happen to consist of rich men they might fix such qualifications as may be
too favorable to the rich; if of poor men, an opposite extreme might be run
into. He was opposed to the establishment of an undue aristocratic influence
in the Constitution but he thought it essential that the members of the
Legislature, the Executive, and the Judges, should be possessed of
competent property to make them independent & respectable. It was
prudent when such great powers were to be trusted to connect the tie of
property with that of reputation in securing a faithful administration. The
Legislature would have the fate of the Nation put into their hands. The
President would also have a very great influence on it. The Judges would
have not only important causes between Citizen & Citizen but also where
foreigners are concerned. They will even be the Umpires between the U.
States and individual States as well as between one State & another. Were
he to fix the quantum of property which should be required, he should not
think of less than one hundred thousand dollars for the President, half of
that sum for each of the Judges, and in like proportion for the members of
the Natl Legislature. He would however leave the sums blank. His motion
was that the President of the U. S. the Judges, and members of the
Legislature should be required to swear that they were respectively
possessed of a cleared unincumbered Estate to the amount of –— in the
case of the President &c &c.
Mr Rutlidge seconded the motion, observing that the Committee had
reported no qualifications because they could not agree on any among
themselves, being embarrassed by the danger on one side of displeasing the
people by making them high, and on the other of rendering them nugatory
by making them low.
Mr Elseworth. The different circumstances of different parts of the
U. S. and the probable difference between the present and future
circumstances of the whole, render it improper to have either uniform or
fixed qualifications. Make them so high as to be useful in the S. States, and
they will be inapplicable to the E. States. Suit them to the latter, and they
will serve no purpose in the former. In like manner what may be
accommodated to the existing State of things among us, may be very
inconvenient in some future state of them. He thought for these reasons that
it was better to leave this matter to the Legislative discretion than to attempt
a provision for it in the Constitution.
Doctr Franklin expressed his dislike of every thing that tended to debase
the spirit of the common people. If honesty was often the companion of
wealth, and if poverty was exposed to peculiar temptation, it was not less
true that the possession of property increased the desire of more property.
Some of the greatest rogues he was ever acquainted with, were the richest
rogues. We should remember the character which the Scripture requires in
Rulers, that they should be men hating covetousness. This Constitution will
be much read and attended to in Europe, and if it should betray a great
partiality to the rich will not only hurt us in the esteem of the most liberal
and enlightened men there, but discourage the common people from
removing to this Country.
The Motion of Mr Pinkney was rejected by so general a no, that the
States were not called.
Mr Madison was opposed to the Section as vesting an improper &
dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of electors and
elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Govt and ought to be
fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of either, it
can by degrees subvert the Constitution. A Republic may be converted into
an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being
elected, as the number authorized to elect. In all cases where the
representatives of the people will have a personal interest distinct from that
of their Constituents, there was the same reason for being jealous of them,
as there was for relying on them with full confidence, when they had a
common interest. This was one of the former cases. It was as improper as to
allow them to fix their own wages, or their own privileges. It was a power
also which might be made subservient to the views of one faction agst
another. Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be devised, by
the stronger in order to keep out partizans of a weaker faction.
Mr Elseworth, admitted that the power was not unexceptionable; but he
could not view it as dangerous. Such a power with regard to the electors
would be dangerous because it would be much more liable to abuse.
Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out "with regard to property" in order to
leave the Legislature entirely at large.
Mr Williamson. This would surely never be admitted. Should a majority
of the Legislature be composed of any particular description of men, of
lawyers for example, which is no improbable supposition, the future
elections might be secured to their own body.
Mr Madison observed that the British Parliamt possessed the power of
regulating the qualifications both of the electors, and the elected; and the
abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention. They had
made the changes in both cases subservient to their own views, or to the
views of political or Religious parties.
Question on the motion to strike out with regard to property
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. [21] no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
[21] In the printed Journal Delaware did not vote–Madison's Note.
Mr Rutlidge was opposed to leaving the power to the Legislature–He
proposed that the qualifications should be the same as for members of the
State Legislatures.
Mr Wilson thought it would be best on the whole to let the Section go
out. A uniform rule would probably never be fixed by the Legislature, and
this particular power would constructively exclude every other power of
regulating qualifications.
On the question for agreeing to Art. VI. Sect. 2d
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Md no. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
On motion of Mr Wilson to reconsider Art: IV. Sect. 2; so as to restore 3
in place of seven years of citizenship as a qualification for being elected
into the House of Represents.
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Monday next was then assigned for the reconsideration; all the States
being ay. except Massts. & Georgia.
Art: VI. Sect. 3. taken up.
Mr Ghorum contended that less than a majority in each House should be
made a Quorum, otherwise great delay might happen in business, and great
inconvenience from the future increase of numbers.
Mr Mercer was also for less than a majority. So great a number will put it
in the power of a few by seceding at a critical moment to introduce
convulsions, and endanger the Governmt. Examples of secession have
already happened in some of the States. He was for leaving it to the
Legislature to fix the Quorum, as in Great Britain, where the requisite
number is small & no inconveniency has been experienced.
Col. Mason. This is a valuable & necessary part of the plan. In this
extended Country, embracing so great a diversity of interests, it would be
dangerous to the distant parts to allow a small number of members of the
two Houses to make laws. The Central States could always take care to be
on the Spot and by meeting earlier than the distant ones, or wearying their
patience, and outstaying them, could carry such measures as they pleased.
He admitted that inconveniences might spring from the secession of a small
number; But he had also known good produced by an apprehension, of it.
He had known a paper emission prevented by that cause in Virginia. He
thought the Constitution as now moulded was founded on sound principles,
and was disposed to put into it extensive powers. At the same time he
wished to guard agst abuses as much as possible. If the Legislature should
be able to reduce the number at all, it might reduce it as low as it pleased &
the U. States might be governed by a Juncto–A majority of the number
which had been agreed on, was so few that he feared it would be made an
objection agst the plan.
Mr King admitted there might be some danger of giving an advantage to
the Central States; but he was of opinion that the public inconveniency on
the other side was more to be dreaded.
Mr Govr Morris moved to fix the quorum at 33 members in the H. of
Reps & 14 in the Senate. This is a majority of the present number, and will
be a bar to the Legislature: fix the number low and they will generally
attend knowing that advantage may be taken of their absence, the Secession
of a small number ought not to be suffered to break a quorum. Such events
in the States may have been of little consequence. In the national Councils
they may be fatal. Besides other mischiefs, if a few can break up a quorum,
they may seize a moment when a particular part of the Continent may be in
need of immediate aid, to extort, by threatening a secession, some unjust &
selfish measure.
Mr Mercer 2ded the motion.
Mr King said he had just prepared a motion which instead of fixing the
numbers proposed by Mr Govr Morris as Quorums, made those the lowest
numbers, leaving the Legislature at liberty to increase them or not. He
thought the future increase of members would render a majority of the
whole extremely cumbersome.
Mr Mercer agreed to substitute Mr King's motion in place of Mr Morris's.
Mr Elseworth was opposed to it. It would be a pleasing ground of
confidence to the people that no law or burden could be imposed on them
by a few men. He reminded the movers that the Constitution proposed to
give such a discretion with regard to the number of Representatives that a
very inconvenient number was not to be apprehended. The inconveniency
of secessions may be guarded agst by giving to each House an authority to
require the attendance of absent members.
Mr Wilson concurred in the sentiments of Mr Elseworth.
Mr Gerry seemed to think that some further precautions than merely
fixing the quorum might be necessary. He observed that as 17 wd be a
majority of a quorum of 33, and 8 of 14, questions might by possibility be
carried in the H. of Reps by 2 large States, and in the Senate by the same
States with the aid of two small ones.–He proposed that the number for a
quorum in the H. of Reps should not exceed 50, nor be less than 33, leaving
the intermediate discretion to the Legislature.
Mr King. As the quorum could not be altered witht the concurrence of
the President by less than 2/3 of each House, he thought there could be no
danger in trusting the Legislature.
Mr Carrol. This would be no security agst a continuance of the quorums
at 33 & 14. when they ought to be increased.
On question on Mr King's motion "that not less than 33 in the H. of Reps
nor less than 14 in the Senate shd constitute a Quorum which may be
increased by a law, on additions of the members in either House.
N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Randolph & Mr Madison moved to add to the end of Art. VI. Sect. 3,
"and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members in
such manner & under such penalties as each House may provide." Agreed
to by all except Pena which was divided.
Art. VI. Sect. 3. agreed to as amended nem. con.
Sect. 4.
Sect. 5. } Agreed to nem. con.
Mr Madison observed that the right of expulsion (Art. VI. Sect. 6.) was
too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum: and in
emergencies of faction might be dangerously abused. He moved that, "with
the concurrence of 2/3," might be inserted between may & expel.
Mr Randolph & Mr Mason approved the idea.
Mr Govr Morris. This power may be safely trusted to a majority. To
require more may produce abuses on the side of the minority. A few men
from factious motives may keep in a member who ought to be expelled.
Mr Carrol thought that the concurrence of 2/3 at least ought to be
required.
On the question requiring 2/3 in cases of expelling a member.
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa divd. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Art. VI. Sect. 6. as thus amended agreed to nem. con.
Art: VI. Sect. 7. taken up.
Mr Govr Morris urged that if the yeas & nays were proper at all any
individual ought to be authorized to call for them; and moved an
amendment to that effect.–The small States may otherwise be under a
disadvantage, and find it difficult to get a concurrence of 1/5.
Mr Randolph 2ded ye motion.
Mr Sherman had rather strike out the yeas & nays altogether. They never
have done any good, and have done much mischief. They are not proper as
the reasons governing the voter never appear along with them.
Mr Elseworth was of the same opinion.
Col. Mason liked the Section as it stood, it was a middle way between
two extremes.
Mr Ghorum was opposed to the motion for allowing a single member to
call the yeas & nays, and recited the abuses of it in Massts. 1 in stuffing the
journals with them on frivolous occasions. 2 in misleading the people who
never know the reasons determing the votes.
The motion for allowing a single member to call the yeas & nays was
disagd to nem. con.
Mr Carrol. & Mr Randolph moved to strike out the words, "each House"
and to insert the words, "the House of Representatives" in Sect. 7. Art. 6.
and to add to the section the words "and any member of the Senate shall be
at liberty to enter his dissent."
Mr Govr Morris & Mr Wilson observed that if the minority were to have
a right to enter their votes & reasons, the other side would have a right to
complain, if it were not extended to them: & to allow it to both, would fill
the Journals, like the records of a Court, with replications, rejoinders &c.
Question on Mr Carrol's motion to allow a member to enter his dissent
N. H. no. Mass. no. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Gerry moved to strike out the words "when it shall be acting in its
legislative capacity" in order to extend the provision to the Senate when
exercising its peculiar authorities and to insert "except such parts thereof as
in their judgment require secrecy" after the words "publish them."—(It was
thought by others that provision should be made with respect to these when
that part came under consideration which proposed to vest those additional
authorities in the Senate.)
On this question for striking out the words "when acting in its legislative
capacity"
N. H. divd. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Adjourned.
S        A     11    C         
Mr Madison & Mr Rutlidge moved "that each House shall keep a journal
of its proceedings, & shall publish the same from time to time; except such
part of the proceedings of the Senate, when acting not in its Legislative
capacity as may be judged by that House to require secrecy."
Mr Mercer. This implies that other powers than legislative will be given
to the Senate which he hoped would not be given.
Mr Madison & Mr R's motion was disagd to by all the States except
Virga.
Mr Gerry & Mr Sherman moved to insert after the words "publish them"
the following "except such as relate to treaties & military operations." Their
object was to give each House a discretion in such cases.–On this question
N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Elseworth. As the clause is objectionable in so many shapes, it may
as well be struck out altogether. The Legislature will not fail to publish their
proceedings from time to time. The people will call for it if it should be
improperly omitted.
Mr Wilson thought the expunging of the clause would be very improper.
The people have a right to know what their Agents are doing or have done,
and it should not be in the option of the Legislature to conceal their
proceedings. Besides as this is a clause in the existing confederation, the not
retaining it would furnish the adversaries of the reform with a pretext by
which weak & suspicious minds may be easily misled.
Mr Mason thought it would give a just alarm to the people, to make a
conclave of their Legislature.
Mr Sherman thought the Legislature might be trusted in this case if in
any.
Question on 1st part of the section down to "publish them" inclusive:
Agreed to nem. con.
Question on the words to follow, to wit "except such parts thereof as
may in their Judgment require secrecy."
N. H. divd. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The remaining part as to yeas & nays,–agreed to nem. con.
Art VI. Sect. 8. taken up.
Mr King remarked that the section authorized the 2 Houses to adjourn to
a new place. He thought this inconvenient. The mutability of place had
dishonored the federal Govt and would require as strong a cure as we could
devise. He thought a law at least should be made necessary to a removal of
the Seat of Govt.
Mr Madison viewed the subject in the same light, and joined with
Mr King in a motion requiring a law.
Mr. Governr Morris proposed the additional alteration by inserting the
words, "during the Session" &c.
Mr Spaight. This will fix the seat of Govt at N. Y. The present Congress
will convene them there in the first instance, and they will never be able to
remove, especially if the Presidt should be [a] Northern Man.
Mr Govr Morris such a distrust is inconsistent with all Govt.
Mr Madison supposed that a central place for the seat of Govt was so just
and wd be so much insisted on by the H. of Representatives, that though a
law should be made requisite for the purpose, it could & would be obtained.
The necessity of a central residence of the Govt wd be much greater under
the new than old Govt. The members of the new Govt wd be more
numerous. They would be taken more from the interior parts of the States;
they wd not like members of ye present Congs come so often from the
distant States by water. As the powers & objects of the new Govt would be
far greater ye heretofore, more private individuals wd have business calling
them to the seat of it, and it was more necessary that the Govt should be in
that position from which it could contemplate with the most equal eye, and
sympathize most equally with, every part of the nation. These
considerations he supposed would extort a removal even if a law were made
necessary. But in order to quiet suspicions both within & without doors, it
might not be amiss to authorize the 2 Houses by a concurrent vote to
adjourn at their first meeting to the most proper place, and to require
thereafter, the sanction of a law to their removal.
The motion was accordingly moulded into the following form: "the
Legislature shall at their first assembling determine on a place at which
their future sessions shall be held; neither House shall afterwards, during
the session of the House of Reps without the consent of the other, adjourn
for more than three days, nor shall they adjourn to any other place than such
as shall have been fixt by law."
Mr Gerry thought it would be wrong to let the Presidt check the will of
the 2 Houses on this subject at all.
Mr Williamson supported the ideas of Mr Spaight.
Mr Carrol was actuated by the same apprehensions.
Mr Mercer, it will serve no purpose to require the two Houses at their
first meeting to fix on a place. They will never agree.
After some further expressions from others denoting an apprehension
that the seat of Govt might be continued at an improper place if a law
should be made necessary to a removal, and the motion above stated with
another for recommitting the section had been negatived, the section was
left in the shape in which it was reported as to this point. The words,
"during the session of the Legislature" were prefixed to the 8th section–and
the last sentence "But this regulation shall not extend to the Senate when it
shall exercise the powers mentioned in the –— article" struck out. The 8th
section as amended was then agreed to.
Mr Randolph moved according to notice to reconsider Art: IV. Sect. 5.
concerning money bills which had been struck out. He argued 1. that he had
not wished for this privilege whilst a proportional Representation in the
Senate was in contemplation, but since an equality had been fixed in that
house, the large States would require this compensation at least. 2. that it
would make the plan more acceptable to the people, because they will
consider the Senate as the more aristocratic body, and will expect that the
usual guards agst its influence be provided according to the example in G.
Britain. 3. the privilege will give some advantage to the House of Reps if it
extends to the originating only–but still more if it restrains the Senate from
amendg. 4. he called on the smaller States to concur in the measure, as the
condition by which alone the compromise had entitled them to an equality
in the Senate. He signified that he should propose instead of the original
section, a clause specifying that the bills in question should be for the
purpose of Revenue, in order to repel ye objection agst the extent of the
words, "raising money," which might happen incidentally, and that the
Senate should not so amend or alter as to increase or diminish the sum; in
order to obviate the inconveniences urged agst a restriction of the Senate to
a simple affirmation or negative.
Mr Williamson 2ded the motion.
Mr Pinkney was sorry to oppose the opportunity gentlemen asked to
have the question again opened for discussion, but as he considered it a
mere waste of time he could not bring himself to consent to it. He said that
notwithstanding what had been said as to the compromise, he always
considered this section as making no part of it. The rule of Representation
in the 1st branch was the true condition of that in the 2d branch.–Several
others spoke for & agst the reconsideration, but without going into the
merits.–On the Question to reconsider
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. [22] ay. Pa ay. Del. ay.
Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. divd. Geo. ay.–Monday was
then assigned—
[22] In the printed Journal N. Jersey–no.–Madison's Note.
Adjd. [23]
[23] The next day being Sunday, Madison wrote to his father:
"P       Augst 12, 1787.
"H    S  
"I wrote to you lately inclosing a few newspapers. I now send a few
more, not because they are interesting but because they may supply the
want of intelligence that might be more so. The Convention reassembled at
the time my last mentioned that they had adjourned to. It is not possible yet
to determine the period to which the Session will be spun out. It must be
some weeks from this date at least, and possibly may be computed by
months. Eleven states are on the ground, and have generally been so since
the second or third week of the Session. Rhode Island is one of the absent
States. She has never yet appointed deputies. N. H. till of late was the other.
That State is now represented. But just before the arrival of her deputies,
those of N. York left us.–We have till within a few days had very cool
weather. It is now pleasant, after a fine rain. Our accts from Virga give us
but an imperfect idea of the prospects with you. In particular places the
drouth we hear has been dreadful. Genl Washington's neighbourhood is
among the most suffering of them. I wish to know how your neighbourhood
is off. But my chief anxiety is to hear that your health is re-established. The
hope that this may procure me that information is the principal motive for
writing it, having as you will readily see not been led to it by any thing
worth communicating. With my love to my mother & the rest of the family
I remain Dear Sir
"Yr afft son."
(Mad. MSS.)
Edward Carrington wrote to Madison from New York, August 11, showing
the solicitude of federalist members of Congress:
"... The President has been requested to write to the states unrepresented,
pressing upon them the objects which require the attendance of their
delegations, & urging them to come forward, amongst the objects is that of
the report of the convention, which, it is supposed, is now in the State of
parturition–this bantling must receive the blessing of Congress this session,
or, I fear, it will expire before the new one will assemble; every experiment
has its critical stages which must be taken as they occur, or the whole will
fail–the peoples expectations are rising with the progress of this work, but
will desert it, should it remain long with Congress–permit me to suggest
one idea as to the mode of obtaining the accession of the States to the new
plan of government–let the convention appoint one day, say the 1st of May,
upon which a convention appointed by the people shall be held in each
state, for the purpose of accepting or rejecting in toto, the project–
supposing an act of the ordinary legislatures to be equally authentic, which
would not be true, yet many reasons present themselves in favor of–special
conventions–many men would be admitted who are excluded from the
legislatures–the business would be taken up unclogged with any other–and
it would effectually call the attention of all the people to the object as
seriously affecting them. All the States being in convention at the same
time, opportunities of speculating upon the views of each other would be
cut off–the project should be decided upon without an attempt to alter it–
you have doubtless found it difficult to reconcile the different opinions in
your body–will it not be impossible then, to reconcile those which will arise
amongst numerous assemblies in the different states? It is possible there
never may be a general consent to the project as it goes out; but it is
absolutely certain there will never be an agreement in amendments. It is the
lot of but few to be able to discern the remote principles upon which their
happiness & prosperity essentially depend—."—(Mad. MSS.)
M     , A     13. I  C         
Art. IV. Sect. 2. reconsidered—
Mr Wilson & Mr Randolph moved to strike out "7 years" and insert "4
years," as the requisite term of Citizenship to qualify for the House of Reps.
Mr Wilson said it was very proper the electors should govern themselves by
this consideration; but unnecessary & improper that the Constitution should
chain them down to it.
Mr Gerry wished that in future the eligibility might be confined to
Natives. Foreign powers will intermeddle in our affairs, and spare no
expence to influence them. Persons having foreign attachments will be sent
among us & insinuated into our councils, in order to be made instruments
for their purposes. Every one knows the vast sums laid out in Europe for
secret services. He was not singular in these ideas. A great many of the
most influential men in Massts reasoned in the same manner.
Mr Williamson moved to insert 9 years instead of seven. He wished this
Country to acquire as fast as possible national habits. Wealthy emigrants do
more harm by their luxurious examples, than good, by the money, they
bring with them.
Col. Hamilton was in general agst embarrassing the Govt with minute
restrictions. There was on one side the possible danger that had been
suggested. On the other side, the advantage of encouraging foreigners was
obvious & admitted. Persons in Europe of moderate fortunes will be fond of
coming here where they will be on a level with the first Citizens. He moved
that the section be so altered as to require merely citizenship & inhabitancy.
The right of determining the rule of naturalization will then leave a
discretion to the Legislature on this subject which will answer every
purpose.
Mr Madison seconded the motion. He wished to maintain the character
of liberality which had been professed in all the Constitutions &
publications of America. He wished to invite foreigners of merit &
republican principles among us. America was indebted to emigration for her
settlement & Prosperity. That part of America which had encouraged them
most had advanced most rapidly in population, agriculture & the arts. There
was a possible danger he admitted that men with foreign predilections
might obtain appointments but it was by no means probable that it would
happen in any dangerous degree. For the same reason that they would be
attached to their native Country, our own people wd prefer natives of this
Country to them. Experience proved this to be the case. Instances were rare
of a foreigner being elected by the people within any short space after his
coming among us. If bribery was to be practised by foreign powers, it
would not be attempted among the electors but among the elected, and
among natives having full Confidence of the people not among strangers
who would be regarded with a jealous eye.
Mr Wilson cited Pennsylva as a proof of the advantage of encouraging
emigrations. It was perhaps the youngest (except Georgia) settlemt on the
Atlantic; yet it was at least among the foremost in population & prosperity.
He remarked that almost all the Genl officers of the Pena line of the late
army were foreigners. And no complaint had ever been made against their
fidelity or merit. Three of her deputies to the Convention (Mr R. Morris,
Mr Fitzsimons & himself) were also not natives. He had no objection to
Col. Hamilton's motion & would withdraw the one made by himself.
Mr Butler was strenuous agst admitting foreigners into our public
Councils.
Question on Col. Hamilton's Motion
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no.
Md. ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Question on Mr Williamson's motion to insert 9 years instead of seven.
N. H. ay. Massts no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Wilson renewed the motion for 4 years instead of 7; & on question
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Govr Morris moved to add to the end of the section (Art IV. S. 2) a
proviso that the limitation of seven years should not affect the rights of any
person now a Citizen.
Mr Mercer 2ded the motion. It was necessary he said to prevent a
disfranchisement of persons who had become Citizens under and on the
faith & according to the laws & Constitution from being on a level in all
respects with natives.
Mr Rutlidge. It might as well be said that all qualifications are
disfranchisemts and that to require the age of 25 years was a
disfranchisement. The policy of the precaution was as great with regard to
foreigners now Citizens; as to those who are to be naturalized in future.
Mr Sherman. The U. States have not invited foreigners nor pledged their
faith that they should enjoy equal privileges with native Citizens. The
Individual States alone have done this. The former therefore are at liberty to
make any discriminations they may judge requisite.
Mr Ghorum. When foreigners are naturalized it wd seem as if they stand
on an equal footing with natives. He doubted then the propriety of giving a
retrospective force to the restriction.
Mr Madison animadverted on the peculiarity of the doctrine of
Mr Sherman. It was a subtilty by which every national engagement might
be evaded. By parity of reason, Whenever our public debts, or foreign
treaties become inconvenient nothing more would be necessary to relieve us
from them, than to new model the Constitution. It was said that the U. S. as
such have not pledged their faith to the naturalized foreigners, & therefore
are not bound. Be it so, & that the States alone are bound. Who are to form
the New Constitution by which the condition of that class of citizens is to
be made worse than the other class? Are not the States ye Agents? Will they
not be the members of it? Did they not appoint this Convention? Are not
they to ratify its proceedings? Will not the new Constitution be their Act? If
the new Constitution then violates the faith pledged to any description of
people will not the makers of it, will not the States, be the violaters? To
justify the doctrine it must be said that the States can get rid of their
obligation by revising the Constitution, though they could not do it by
repealing the law under which foreigners held their privileges. He
considered this a matter of real importance. It would expose us to the
reproaches of all those who should be affected by it, reproaches which wd
soon be echoed from the other side of the Atlantic; and would unnecessarily
enlist among the Adversaries of the reform a very considerable body of
Citizens: We should moreover reduce every State to the dilemma of
rejecting it or of violating the faith pledged to a part of its Citizens.
Mr Govr Morris considered the case of persons under 25 years, as very
different from that of foreigners. No faith could be pleaded by the former in
bar of the regulation. No assurance had ever been given that persons under
that age should be in all cases on a level with those above it. But with
regard to foreigners among us, the faith had been pledged that they should
enjoy the privileges of Citizens. If the restriction as to age had been
confined to natives, & had left foreigners under 25 years, eligible in this
case, the discrimination wd have been an equal injustice on the other side.
Mr Pinkney remarked that the laws of the States had varied much the
terms of naturalization in different parts of America; and contended that the
U. S. could not be bound to respect them on such an occasion as the
present. It was a sort of recurrence to first principles.
Col. Mason was struck not like (Mr. Madison) with the peculiarity, but
the propriety of the doctrine of Mr Sherman. The States have formed
different qualifications themselves, for enjoying different rights of
citizenship. Greater caution wd be necessary in the outset of the Govt than
afterwards. All the great objects wd then be provided for. Every thing would
be then set in motion. If persons among us attached to G. B. should work
themselves into our Councils, a turn might be given to our affairs &
particularly to our Commercial regulations which might have pernicious
consequences. The Great Houses of British Merchants will spare no pains
to insinuate the instruments of their views into the Govt.
Mr Wilson read the clause in the Constitution of Pena giving to
foreigners after two years residence all the rights whatsoever of Citizens.
Combined it with the article of Confederation making the Citizens of one
State Citizens of all, inferred the obligation Pena was under to maintain the
faith thus pledged to her citizens of foreign birth, and the just complaints
which her failure would authorize: He observed likewise that the Princes &
States of Europe would avail themselves of such breach of faith to deter
their subjects from emigration to the U. S.
Mr Mercer enforced the same idea of a breach of faith.
Mr Baldwin could not enter into the force of the arguments agst
extending the disqualification to foreigners now Citizens. The
discrimination of the place of birth, was not more objectionable than that of
age which all had concurred in the propriety of.
Question on the proviso of Mr Govr Morris in favor of foreigners now
Citizens
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no.
Maryd ay. Vt ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Carrol moved to insert "5 years" instead of "seven" in Sect. 2d Art:
IV
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa divd. Del. no.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The Section (Art IV. Sec. 2.) as formerly amended was then agreed to
nem. con.
Mr Wilson moved that (in Art: V. Sect. 3.) 9 years be reduced to seven,
which was disagd to and the 3d section (Art. V.) confirmed by the following
vote.
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Art. IV. Sec. 5. being reconsidered.
Mr Randolph moved that the clause be altered so as to read–"Bills for
raising money for the purpose of revenue or for appropriating the same shall
originate in the House of Representatives and shall not be so amended or
altered by the Senate as to increase or diminish the sum to be raised, or
change the mode of levying it, or the object of its appropriation."–He would
not repeat his reasons, but barely remind the members from the smaller
States of the compromise by which the larger States were entitled to this
privilege.
Col. Mason. This amendment removes all the objections urged agst the
section as it stood at first. By specifying purposes of revenue, it obviated
the objection that the section extended to all bills under which money might
incidentally arise. By authorizing amendments in the Senate it got rid of the
objections that the Senate could not correct errors of any sort, & that it
would introduce into the House of Reps the practice of tacking foreign
matter to money bills. These objections being removed, the arguments in
favor of the proposed restraint on the Senate ought to have their full force.
1. the Senate did not represent the people, but the States in their political
character. It was improper therefore that it should tax the people. The
reason was the same agst their doing it; as it had been agst Congs doing it.
Nor was it in any respect necessary in order to cure the evils of our
Republican system. He admitted that notwithstanding the superiority of the
Republican form over every other, it had its evils. The chief ones, were the
danger of the majority oppressing the minority, and the mischievous
influence of demagogues. The Genl Government of itself will cure them. As
the States will not concur at the same time in their unjust & oppressive
plans, the General Govt will be able to check & defeat them, whether they
result from the wickedness of the majority, or from the misguidance of
demagogues. Again, the Senate is not like the H. of Reps chosen frequently
and obliged to return frequently among the people. They are to be chosen
by the Sts for 6 years, will probably settle themselves at the seat of Govt
will pursue schemes for their own aggrandisement–will be able by wearyg
out the H. of Reps and taking advantage of their impatience at the close of a
long Session, to extort measures for that purpose. If they should be paid as
he expected would be yet determined & wished to be so, out of the Natl
Treasury, they will particularly extort an increase of their wages. A bare
negative was a very different thing from that of originating bills. The
practice in Engld was in point. The House of Lords does not represent nor
tax the people, because not elected by the people. If the Senate can
originate, they will in the recess of the Legislative Sessions, hatch their
mischievous projects, for their own purposes, and have their money bills
ready cut & dried (to use a common phrase) for the meeting of the H. of
Reps. He compared the case to Poyning's law–and signified that the House
of Reps might be rendered by degrees like the Parliament of Paris, the mere
depository of the decrees of the Senate. As to the compromise so much had
passed on that subject that he would say nothing about it. He did not mean
by what he had said to oppose the permanency of the Senate. On the
contrary he had no repugnance to an increase of it–nor to allowing it a
negative, though the Senate was not by its present constitution entitled to it.
But in all events he would contend that the purse-strings should be in the
hands of the Representatives of the people.
Mr Wilson was himself directly opposed to the equality of votes granted
to the Senate by its present Constitution. At the same time he wished not to
multiply the vices of the system. He did not mean to enlarge on a subject
which had been so much canvassed, but would remark that as an
insuperable objection agst the proposed restriction of money bills to the H.
of Reps that it would be a source of perpetual contentions where there was
no mediator to decide them. The Presidt here could not like the Executive
Magistrate in England interpose by a prorogation, or dissolution. This
restriction had been found pregnant with altercation in every State where
the Constitution had established it. The House of Reps will insert other
things in money bills, and by making them conditions of each other, destroy
the deliberate liberty of the Senate. He stated the case of a Preamble to a
money bill sent up by the House of Commons in the reign of Queen Anne,
to the H. of Lords, in which the conduct of the displaced Ministry, who
were to be impeached before the Lords, was condemned; the Com̃ons thus
extorting a premature judgmt without any hearing of the Parties to be tried,
and the H. of Lords being thus reduced to the poor & disgraceful expedient
of opposing to the authority of a law, a protest on their Journals agst its
being drawn into precedent. If there was anything like Poynings law in the
present case, it was in the attempt to vest the exclusive right of originating
in the H. of Reps and so far he was agst it. He should be equally so if the
right were to be exclusively vested in the Senate. With regard to the purse
strings, it was to be observed that the purse was to have two strings, one of
which was in the hands of the H. of Reps the other in those of the Senate.
Both houses must concur in untying, and of what importance could it be
which untied first, which last. He could not conceive it to be any objection
to the Senate's preparing the bills, that they would have leisure for that
purpose and would be in the habits of business. War, Commerce, &
Revenue were the great objects of the Genl Government. All of them are
connected with money. The restriction in favor of the H. of Represents
would exclude the Senate from originating any important bills whatever—
Mr Gerry considered this as a part of the plan that would be much
scrutinized. Taxation & representation are strongly associated in the minds
of the people, and they will not agree that any but their immediate
representatives shall meddle with their purses. In short the acceptance of the
plan will inevitably fail, if the Senate be not restrained from originating
money bills.
Mr Governr Morris. All the arguments suppose the right to originate & to
tax, to be exclusively vested in the Senate.–The effects commented on may
be produced by a Negative only in the Senate. They can tire out the other
House, and extort their concurrence in favorite measures, as well by
withholding their negative, as by adhering to a bill introduced by
themselves.
Mr Madison thought If the substitute offered by Mr Randolph for the
original section is to be adopted it would be proper to allow the Senate at
least so to amend as to diminish the sums to be raised. Why should they be
restrained from checking the extravagance of the other House? One of the
greatest evils incident to Republican Govt was the spirit of contention &
faction. The proposed substitute, which in some respects lessened the
objections agst the section, had a contrary effect with respect to this
particular. It laid a foundation for new difficulties and disputes between the
two houses. The word revenue was ambiguous. In many acts, particularly in
the regulation of trade, the object would be twofold. The raising of revenue
would be one of them. How could it be determined which was the primary
or predominant one; or whether it was necessary that revenue shd be the
sole object, in exclusion even of other incidental effects. When the Contest
was first opened with G. B. their power to regulate trade was admitted.
Their power to raise revenue rejected. An accurate investigation of the
subject afterwards proved that no line could be drawn between the two
cases. The words amend or alter form an equal source of doubt &
altercation. When an obnoxious paragraph shall be sent down from the
Senate to the House of Reps, it will be called an origination under the name
of an amendment. The Senate may actually couch extraneous matter under
that name. In these cases, the question will turn on the degree of connection
between the matter & object of the bill and the alteration or amendment
offered to it. Can there be a more fruitful source of dispute, or a kind of
dispute more difficult to be settled? His apprehensions on this point were
not conjectural. Disputes had actually flowed from this source in Virga
where the Senate can originate no bill. The words, "so as to increase or
diminish the sum to be raised," were liable to the same objections. In
levying indirect taxes, which it seemed to be understood were to form the
principal revenue of the new Govt the sum to be raised, would be increased
or diminished by a variety of collateral circumstances influencing the
consumption, in general, the consumption of foreign or of domestic
articles–of this or that particular species of articles and even by the mode of
collection which may be closely connected with the productiveness of a
tax.–The friends of the section had argued its necessity from the
permanency of the Senate. He could not see how this argumt applied. The
Senate was not more permanent now than in the form it bore in the original
propositions of Mr Randolph and at the time when no objection whatever
was hinted agst its originating money bills. Or if in consequence of a loss of
the present question, a proportional vote in the Senate should be reinstated
as has been urged as the indemnification the permanency of the Senate will
remain the same.–If the right to originate be vested exclusively in the House
of Reps either the Senate must yield agst its judgment to that House, in
which case the Utility of the check will be lost–or the Senate will be
inflexible & the H. of Reps must adapt its money bill to the views of the
Senate, in which case, the exclusive right will be of no avail.–As to the
Compromise of which so much had been said, he would make a single
observation. There were 5 States which had opposed the equality of votes in
the Senate, viz, Massts. Penna Virga N. Carolina & South Carola. As a
compensation for the sacrifice extorted from them on this head, the
exclusive origination of money bills in the other House had been tendered.
Of the five States a majority viz. Penna Virga & S. Carola have uniformly
voted agst the proposed compensation, on its own merits, as rendering the
plan of Govt still more objectionable. Massts has been divided. N. Carolina
alone has set a value on the compensation, and voted on that principle.
What obligation then can the small States be under to concur agst their
judgments in reinstating the section?
Mr Dickenson. Experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead
us. It was not Reason that discovered the singular & admirable mechanism
of the English Constitution. It was not Reason that discovered or ever could
have discovered the odd & in the eye of those who are governed by reason,
the absurd mode of trial by Jury. Accidents probably produced these
discoveries, and experience has given a sanction to them. This is then our
guide. And has not experience verified the utility of restraining money bills
to the immediate representatives of the people. Whence the effect may have
proceeded he could not say: whether from the respect with which this
privilege inspired the other branches of Govt to the H. of Com̃ons, or from
the turn of thinking it gave to the people at large with regard to their rights,
but the effect was visible & could not be doubted–Shall we oppose to this
long experience, the short experience of 11 years which we had ourselves,
on this subject. As to disputes, they could not be avoided any way. If both
Houses should originate, each would have a different bill to which it would
be attached, and for which it would contend.–He observed that all the
prejudices of the people would be offended by refusing this exclusive
privilege to the H. of Repress and these prejudices shd never be disregarded
by us when no essential purpose was to be served. When this plan goes
forth it will be attacked by the popular leaders. Aristocracy will be the
watchword; the Shiboleth among its adversaries. Eight States have inserted
in their Constitutions the exclusive right of originating money bills in favor
of the popular branch of the Legislature. Most of them however allowed the
other branch to amend. This he thought would be proper for us to do.
Mr Randolph regarded this point as of such consequence, that as he
valued the peace of this Country, he would press the adoption of it. We had
numerous & monstrous difficulties to combat. Surely we ought not to
increase them. When the people behold in the Senate, the countenance of an
aristocracy; and in the president, the form at least of a little monarch, will
not their alarms be sufficiently raised without taking from their immediate
representatives, a right which has been so long appropriated to them.–The
Executive will have more influence over the Senate, than over the H. of
Reps Allow the Senate to originate in this Case, & that influence will be
sure to mix itself in their deliberations & plans. The Declaration of War he
conceived ought not to be in the Senate composed of 26 men only, but
rather in the other House. In the other House ought to be placed the
origination of the means of war. As to Commercial regulations which may
involve revenue, the difficulty may be avoided by restraining the definition
to bills, for the mere or sole, purpose of raising revenue. The Senate will be
more likely to be corrupt than the H. of Reps and should therefore have less
to do with money matters. His principal object however was to prevent
popular objections against the plan, and to secure its adoption.
Mr Rutlidge. The friends of this motion are not consistent in their
reasoning. They tell us that we ought to be guided by the long experience of
G. B. & not our own experience of 11 years; and yet they themselves
propose to depart from it. The H. of Com̃ons not only have the exclusive
right of originating, but the Lords are not allowed to alter or amend a
money bill. Will not the people say that this restriction is but a mere tub to
the whale. They cannot but see that it is of no real consequence; and will be
more likely to be displeased with it as an attempt to bubble them, than to
impute it to a watchfulness over their rights. For his part, he would prefer
giving the exclusive right to the Senate, if it was to be given exclusively at
all. The Senate being more conversant in business, and having more leisure,
will digest the bills much better, and as they are to have no effect, till
examined & approved by the H. of Reps there can be no possible danger.
These clauses in the Constitutions of the States had been put in through a
blind adherence to the British model. If the work was to be done over now,
they would be omitted. The experiment in S. Carolina, where the Senate can
originate or amend money bills, has shewn that it answers no good purpose;
and produces the very bad one of continually dividing & heating the two
houses. Sometimes indeed if the matter of the amendment of the Senate is
pleasing to the other House they wink at the encroachment; if it be
displeasing, then the Constitution is appealed to. Every Session is distracted
by altercations on this subject. The practice now becoming frequent is for
the Senate not to make formal amendments; but to send down a schedule of
the alterations which will procure the bill their assent.
Mr Carrol. The most ingenious men in Maryd are puzzled to define the
case of money bills, or explain the Constitution on that point, tho it seemed
to be worded with all possible plainness & precision. It is a source of
continual difficulty & squabble between the two houses.
Mr McHenry [24] mentioned an instance of extraordinary subterfuge, to
get rid of the apparent force of the Constitution.
[24] "Mr. McHenry was bred a physician, but he afterwards turned Soldier and
acted as Aid to Genl Washington and the Marquis de la Fayette. He is a Man of
Specious talents, with nothing of genious to improve them. As a politician there
is nothing remarkable in him, nor has he any of the graces of the Orator. He is
however, a very respectable young Gentleman, and deserves the honor which his
country has bestowed on him. Mr. McHenry is about 32 years of age."–Pierce's
Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 330.
On Question on the first part of the motion as to the exclusive
originating of Money bills in the H. of Reps
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Virga ay. Mr Blair & Mr M. no. Mr R, Col.
Mason and Genl Washington [25] ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. no.
[25] He disapproved & till now voted agst the exclusive privilege, he gave up his
judgment he said because it was not of very material weight with him & was
made an essential point with others who if disappointed, might be less cordial in
other points of real weight.–Madison's Note.
Question on Originating by H. of Reps & amending by Senate, as
reported Art IV. Sect. 5.
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va [26] ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
[26] In the printed Journ Virga–no.–Madison's Note.
Question on the last clause of Sect. 5, Art: IV–viz "No money shall be
drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations that
shall originate in the House of Reps. It passed in the negative—
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Con. no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Adjd.
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[27] General Henry Knox wrote to Washington from New York under date of
August 14th:
"Influenced by motives of delicacy I have hitherto forborne the pleasure
my dear Sir of writing to you since my return from Philadelphia.
"I have been apprehensive that the stages of the business of the
convention, might leak out, and be made an ill use of, by some people. I
have therefore been anxious that you should escape the possibility of
imputation. But as the subjects seem now to be brought to a point, I take the
liberty to indulge myself in communicating with you.
"Although I frankly confess that the existence of the State governments
is an insuperable evil in a national point of view, yet I do not well see how
in this stage of the business they could be annihilated–and perhaps while
they continue the frame of government could not with propriety be much
higher toned than the one proposed. It is so infinitely preferable to the
present constitution, and gives such a bias to a proper line of conduct in
future that I think all men anxious for a national government should
zealously embrace it.
"The education, genius, and habits of men on this continent are so
various even at this moment, and of consequence their views of the same
subject so different, that I am satisfied with the result of the convention,
although it is short of my wishes and of my judgment.
"But when I find men of the purest intentions concur in embracing a
system which on the highest deliberation, seems to be the best which can be
obtained, under present circumstances, I am convinced of the propriety of
its being strenuously supported by all those who have wished for a national
republic of higher and more durable powers.
"I am persuaded that the address of the convention to accompany their
proposition will be couched in the most persuasive terms.
"I feel anxious that there should be the fullest representation in
Congress, in order that the propositions should receive their warmest
concurrence and strongest impulse...."–Wash. MSS.
Article VI. Sect. 9. taken up.
Mr Pinkney argued that the making the members ineligible to offices was
degrading to them, and the more improper as their election into the
Legislature implied that they had the confidence of the people; that it was
inconvenient, because the Senate might be supposed to contain the fittest
men. He hoped to see that body become a School of public Ministers, a
nursery of Statesmen: that it was impolitic, because the Legislature would
cease to be a magnet to the first talents and abilities. He moved to postpone
the section in order to take up the following proposition viz–"the members
of each House shall be incapable of holding any office under the U. S. for
which they or any of others for their benefit receive any salary, fees, or
emoluments of any kind–and the acceptance of such office shall vacate their
seats respectively."
Gens Mifflin [28] 2ded the motion.
[28] "General Mifflin is well known for the activity of his mind, and the
brilliancy of his parts. He is well-informed and a graceful Speaker. The General
is about 40 years of age and a very handsome man."–Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist.
Rev., iii., 328.
Col. Mason ironically proposed to strike out the whole section, as a more
effectual expedient for encouraging that exotic corruption which might not
otherwise thrive so well in the American Soil–for compleating that
Aristocracy which was probably in the contemplation of some among us,
and for inviting into the Legislative Service, those generous & benevolent
characters who will do justice to each other's merit, by carving out offices
& rewards for it. In the present state of American morals & manners, few
friends it may be thought will be lost to the plan, by the opportunity of
giving premiums to a mercenary & depraved ambition.
Mr Mercer. It is a first principle in political science, that whenever the
rights of property are secured, an aristocracy will grow out of it. Elective
Governments also necessarily become aristocratic, because the rulers being
few can & will draw emoluments for themselves from the many. The
Governments of America will become aristocracies. They are so already.
The public measures are calculated for the benefit of the Governors, not of
the people. The people are dissatisfied & complain. They change their
rulers, and the public measures are changed, but it is only a change of one
scheme of emolument to the rulers, for another. The people gain nothing by
it, but an addition of instability & uncertainty to their other evils.–
Governmts can only be maintained by force or influence. The Executive has
not force, deprive him of influence by rendering the members of the
Legislature ineligible to Executive offices, and he becomes a mere phantom
of authority. The Aristocratic part will not even let him in for a share of the
plunder. The Legislature must & will be composed of wealth & abilities,
and the people will be governed by a Junto. The Executive ought to have a
Council, being members of both Houses. Without such an influence, the
war will be between the aristocracy & the people. He wished it to be
between the Aristocracy & the Executive. Nothing else can protect the
people agst those speculating Legislatures which are now plundering them
throughout the U. States.
Mr Gerry read a Resolution of the Legislature of Massts passed before
the Act of Congs recommending the Convention, in which her deputies
were instructed not to depart from the rotation established in the 5th art: of
Confederation, nor to agree in any case to give to the members of Congs a
capacity to hold offices under the Government. This he said was repealed in
consequence of the Act of Congs with which the State thought it proper to
comply in an unqualified manner. The Sense of the State however was Still
the same. He could not think with Mr Pinkney that the disqualification was
degrading. Confidence is the road to tyranny. As to Ministers &
Ambassadors few of them were necessary. It is the opinion of a great many
that they ought to be discontinued, on our part; that none may be sent
among us, & that source of influence be shut up. If the Senate were to
appoint Ambassadors as seemed to be intended, they will multiply
embassies for their own sakes. He was not so fond of those productions as
to wish to establish nurseries for them. If they are once appointed, the
House of Reps will be obliged to provide salaries for them, whether they
approve of the measures or not. If men will not serve in the Legislature
without a prospect of such offices, our situation is deplorable indeed. If our
best Citizens are actuated by such mercenary views we had better chuse a
single despot at once. It will be more easy to satisfy the rapacity of one than
of many. According to the idea of one Gentleman (Mr Mercer) our
Government it seems is to be a Govt of plunder. In that case it certainly
would be prudent to have but one rather than many to be employed in it. We
cannot be too circumspect in the formation of this System. It will be
examined on all sides and with a very suspicious eye. The people who have
been so lately in arms agst G. B. for their liberties, will not easily give them
up. He lamented the evils existing at present under our Governments, but
imputed them to the faults of those in office, not to the people. The
misdeeds of the former will produce a critical attention to the opportunities
afforded by the new system to like or greater abuses. As it now stands it is
as compleat an aristocracy as ever was framed. If great powers should be
given to the Senate we shall be governed in reality by a Junto as has been
apprehended. He remarked that it would be very differently constituted
from Congs. 1. there will be but 2 deputies from each State, in Congs there
may be 7. and are generally 5.—2. they are chosen for six years, those of
Congress annually. 3. they are not subject to recall; those of Congs are. 4. In
Congress 9 States are necessary for all great purposes, here 8 persons will
suffice. Is it to be presumed that the people will ever agree to such a
system? He moved to render the members of the H. of Reps as well as of the
Senate ineligible not only during, but for one year after the expiration of
their terms.–If it should be thought that this will injure the Legislature by
keeping out of it men of abilities who are willing to serve in other offices it
may be required as a qualification for other offices, that the Candidate shall
have served a certain time in the Legislature.
Mr Govr Morris. Exclude the officers of the army & navy, and you form
a band having a different interest from & opposed to the civil power: you
stimulate them to despise & reproach those "talking Lords who dare not
face the foe." Let this spirit be roused at the end of a war, before your troops
shall have laid down their arms, and though the Civil authority "be
intrenched in parchment to the teeth" they will cut their way to it. He was
agst rendering the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices. He was
for rendering them eligible agn after having vacated their Seats by accepting
office. Why should we not avail ourselves of their services if the people
chuse to give them their confidence. There can be little danger of corruption
either among the people or the Legislatures who are to be the Electors. If
they say, we see their merits, we honor the men, we chuse to renew our
confidence in them, have they not a right to give them a preference; and can
they be properly abridged of it.
Mr Williamson; introduced his opposition to the motion by referring to
the question concerning "money bills." That clause he said was dead. Its
Ghost he was afraid would notwithstanding haunt us. It had been a matter
of conscience with him, to insist upon it as long as there was hope of
retaining it. He had swallowed the vote of rejection, with reluctance. He
could not digest it. All that was said on the other side was that the
restriction was not convenient. We have now got a House of Lords which is
to originate money-bills.–To avoid another inconveniency, we are to have a
whole Legislature at liberty to cut out offices for one another. He thought a
self-denying ordinance for ourselves would be more proper. Bad as the
Constitution has been made by expunging the restriction on the Senate
concerning money bills he did not wish to make it worse by expunging the
present Section. He had scarcely seen a single corrupt measure in the
Legislature of N. Carolina, which could not be traced up to office hunting.
Mr Sherman. The Constitution shd lay as few temptations as possible in
the way of those in power. Men of abilities will increase as the Country
grows more populous and as the means of education are more diffused.
Mr Pinkney. No State has rendered the members of the Legislature
ineligible to offices. In S. Carolina the Judges are eligible into the
Legislature. It cannot be supposed then that the motion will be offensive to
the people. If the State Constitutions should be revised he believed
restrictions of this sort wd be rather diminished than multiplied.
Mr Wilson could not approve of the section as it stood, and could not
give up his judgment to any supposed objections that might arise among the
people. He considered himself as acting & responsible for the welfare of
millions not immediately represented in this House. He had also asked
himself the serious question what he should say to his constituents in case
they should call upon him to tell them why he sacrificed his own Judgment
in a case where they authorized him to exercise it? Were he to own to them
that he sacrificed it in order to flatter their prejudices, he should dread the
retort: did you suppose the people of Penna had not good sense enough to
receive a good Government? Under this impression he should certainly
follow his own Judgment which disapproved of the section. He would
remark in addition to the objections urged agst it, that as one branch of the
Legislature was to be appointed by the Legislatures of the States, the other
by the people of the States, as both are to be paid by the States, and to be
appointable to State offices, nothing seemed to be wanting to prostrate the
Natl Legislature, but to render its members ineligible to Natl offices, & by
that means take away its power of attracting those talents which were
necessary to give weight to the Governt and to render it useful to the people.
He was far from thinking the ambition which aspired to Offices of dignity
and trust, an ignoble or culpable one. He was sure it was not politic to
regard it in that light, or to withhold from it the prospect of those rewards,
which might engage it in the career of public service. He observed that the
State of Penna which had gone as far as any State into the policy of fettering
power, had not rendered the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices
of Govt.
Mr Elsworth did not think the mere postponement of the reward would
be any material discouragement of merit. Ambitious minds will serve 2
years or 7 years in the Legislature for the sake of qualifying themselves for
other offices. This he thought a sufficient security for obtaining the services
of the ablest men in the Legislature, although whilst members they should
be ineligible to Public offices. Besides, merit will be most encouraged,
when most impartially rewarded. If rewards are to circulate only within the
Legislature, merit out of it will be discouraged.
Mr Mercer was extremely anxious on this point. What led to the
appointment of this Convention? The corruption & mutability of the
Legislative Councils of the States. If the plan does not remedy these, it will
not recommend itself; and we shall not be able in our private capacities to
support & enforce it: nor will the best part of our Citizens exert themselves
for the purpose.–It is a great mistake to suppose that the paper we are to
propose will govern the U. States. It is The men whom it will bring into the
Governt and interest in maintaining it that is to govern them. The paper will
only mark out the mode & the form. Men are the substance and must do the
business. All Govt must be by force or influence. It is not the King of
France–but 200,000 janisaries of power that govern that Kingdom. There
will be no such force here; influence then must be substituted; and he would
ask whether this could be done, if the members of the Legislature should be
ineligible to offices of State; whether such a disqualification would not
determine all the most influential men to stay at home, & prefer
appointments within their respective States.
Mr Wilson was by no means satisfied with the answer given by
Mr Elseworth to the argument as to the discouragement of merit. The
members must either go a second time into the Legislature, and disqualify
themselves–or say to their Constituents, we served you before only from the
mercenary view of qualifying ourselves for offices, and haveg answered this
purpose we do not chuse to be again elected.
Mr Govr Morris put the case of a war, and the Citizen the most capable
of conducting it, happening to be a member of the Legislature. What might
have been the consequence of such a regulation at the commencement, or
even in the Course of the late contest for our liberties?
On question for postponing in order to take up Mr Pinkney's motion, it
was lost,
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. divd.
Mr Govr Morris moved to insert, after "office," except offices in the
army or navy: but in that case their offices shall be vacated.
Mr Broom 2ds him.
Mr Randolph had been & should continue uniformly opposed to the
striking out of the clause; as opening a door for influence & corruption. No
arguments had made any impression on him, but those which related to the
case of war, and a co-existing incapacity of the fittest commanders to be
employed. He admitted great weight in these, and would agree to the
exception proposed by Mr Govr Morris.
Mr Butler & Mr Pinkney urged a general postponemt of 9. Sect. Art. VI.
till it should be seen what powers would be vested in the Senate, when it
would be more easy to judge of the expediency of allowing the officers of
State to be chosen out of that body.–A general postponement was agreed to
nem. con.
Art: VI. Sect. 10. taken up–"that members be paid by their respective
States."
Mr Elseworth said that in reflecting on this subject he had been satisfied
that too much dependence on the States would be produced by this mode of
payment. He moved to strike it out and insert that they should "be paid out
of the Treasury of the U. S. an allowance not exceeding ([blank]) dollars
per day or the present value thereof."
Mr Govr Morris, remarked that if the members were to be paid by the
States it would throw an unequal burden on the distant States, which would
be unjust as the Legislature, was to be a national Assembly. He moved that
the payment be out of the Natl Treasury; leaving the quantum to the
discretion of the Natl Legislature. There could be no reason to fear that they
would overpay themselves.
Mr Butler contended for payment by the States; particularly in the case
of the Senate, who will be so long out of their respective States, that they
will lose sight of their Constituents unless dependent on them for their
support.
Mr Langdon was agst payment by the States. There would be some
difficulty in fixing the sum; but it would be unjust to oblige the distant
States to bear the expence of their members in travelling to and from the
Seat of Govt.
Mr Madison. If the H. of Reps is to be chosen biennially–and the Senate
to be constantly dependent on the Legislatures which are chosen annually,
he could not see any chance for that stability in the Genl Govt the want of
which was a principal evil in the State Govts. His fear was that the
organization of the Govt supposing the Senate to be really independt for six
years, would not effect our purpose. It was nothing more than a
combination of the peculiarities of two of the State Govts which separately
had been found insufficient. The Senate was formed on the model of that of
Maryld. The Revisionary check, on that of N. York. What the effect of a
union of these provisions might be, could not be foreseen. The enlargement
of the sphere of the Government was indeed a circumstance which he
thought would be favorable as he had on several occasions undertaken to
show. He was however for fixing at least two extremes not to be exceeded
by the Natl Legislre in the payment of themselves.
Mr Gerry. There are difficulties on both sides. The observation of
Mr Butler has weight in it. On the other side, the State Legislatures may
turn out the Senators by reducing their salaries. Such things have been
practised.
Col. Mason. It has not yet been noticed that the clause as it now stands
makes the House of Represents also dependent on the State Legislatures: so
that both houses will be made the instruments of the politics of the States
whatever they may be.
Mr Broom could see no danger in trusting the Genl Legislature with the
payment of themselves. The State Legislatures had this power, and no
complaint had been made of it.
Mr Sherman was not afraid that the Legislature would make their own
wages too high; but too low, so that men ever so fit could not serve unless
they were at the same time rich. He thought the best plan would be to fix a
moderate allowance to be paid out of the Natl Treasy and let the States make
such additions as they might judge fit. He moved that 5 dollars per day be
the sum, any further emoluments to be added by the States.
Mr Carrol had been much surprised at seeing this clause in the Report.
The dependence of both Houses on the State Legislatures is compleat;
especially as the members of the former are eligible to State offices. The
States can now say: if you do not comply with our wishes, we will starve
you; if you do we will reward you. The new Govt in this form was nothing
more than a second edition of Congress in two volumes, instead of one, and
perhaps with very few amendments—
Mr Dickenson took it for granted that all were convinced of the necessity
of making the Genl Govt independent of the prejudices, passions, and
improper views of the State Legislatures. The contrary of This was effected
by the section as it stands. On the other hand there were objections agst
taking a permanent standard as wheat which had been suggested on a
former occasion, as well as against leaving the matter to the pleasure of the
Natl Legislature. He proposed that an Act should be passed every 12 years
by the Natl Legislre settling the quantum of their wages. If the Genl Govt
should be left dependent on the State Legislatures, it would be happy for us
if we had never met in this Room.
Mr Elseworth was not unwilling himself to trust the Legislature with
authority to regulate their own wages, but well knew that an unlimited
discretion for that purpose would produce strong, tho' perhaps not
insuperable objections. He thought changes in the value of money, provided
for by his motion in the words, "or the present value thereof."
Mr L. Martin. As the Senate is to represent the States, the members of it
ought to be paid by the States.
Mr Carrol. The Senate was to represent & manage the affairs of the
whole, and not to be the advocates of State interests. They ought then not to
be dependent on nor paid by the States.
On the question for paying the Members of the Legislature out of the
Natl Treasury,
N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Mr Elseworth moved that the pay be fixed at 5 dollrs or the present value
thereof per day during their attendance & for every thirty miles in travelling
to & from Congress.
Mr Strong preferred 4 dollars, leaving the Sts. at liberty to make
additions.
On question for fixing the pay at 5 dollars.
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Dickenson proposed that the wages of the members of both houses sd
be required to be the same.
Mr Broome seconded him.
Mr Ghorum. this would be unreasonable. The Senate will be detained
longer from home, will be obliged to remove their families, and in time of
war perhaps to sit constantly. Their allowance should certainly be higher.
The members of the Senates in the States are allowed more, than those of
the other house.
Mr Dickenson withdrew his motion.
It was moved & agreed to amend the section by adding–"to be
ascertained by law."
The section (Art. VI. Sect. 10) as amended, agreed to nem. con.
Adjd.
W         A      15.    C         .
Art: VI. Sect. 11. Agreed to nem. con.
Art: VI. Sect 12. taken up.
Mr Strong moved to amend the article so as to read–"Each House shall
possess the right of originating all bills, except bills for raising money for
the purposes of revenue, or for appropriating the same and for fixing the
salaries of the officers of the Govt which shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as
in other cases".
Col. Mason, 2ds the motion. He was extremely earnest to take this power
from the Senate, who he said could already sell the whole Country by
means of Treaties.
Mr Ghorum urged the amendment as of great importance. The Senate
will first acquire the habit of preparing money bills, and then the practice
will grow into an exclusive right of preparing them.
Mr Governr Morris opposed it as unnecessary and inconvenient.
Mr Williamson, some think this restriction on the Senate essential to
liberty, others think it of no importance. Why should not the former be
indulged. He was for an efficient and stable Govt: but many would not
strengthen the Senate if not restricted in the case of money bills. The friends
of the Senate would therefore lose more than they would gain by refusing to
gratify the other side. He moved to postpone the subject till the powers of
the Senate should be gone over.
Mr Rutlidge 2ds the motion.
Mr Mercer should hereafter be agst returning to a reconsideration of this
section. He contended (alluding to Mr Mason's observations) that the Senate
ought not to have the power of treaties. This power belonged to the
Executive department; adding that Treaties would not be final so as to alter
the laws of the land, till ratified by legislative authority. This was the case
of Treaties in Great Britain; particularly the late Treaty of Com̃erce with
France.
Col. Mason, did not say that a Treaty would repeal a law; but that the
Senate by means of treaty might alienate territory &c., without legislative
sanction. The cessions of the British Islands in W. Indies by Treaty alone
were an example. If Spain should possess herself of Georgia therefore the
Senate might by treaty dismember the Union. He wished the motion to be
decided now, that the friends of it might know how to conduct themselves.
On the question for postponing Sect: 12. it passed in the affirmative.
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pena no. Del: no.
Maryd no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Madison moved that all acts before they become laws should be
submitted both to the Executive and supreme Judiciary Departments, that if
either of these should object 2/3 of each House, if both should object, 3/4 of
each House, should be necessary to overrule the objections and give to the
acts the force of law. [29]
[29] Madison's Note says: "See the motion at large in the Journal of this date,
page 253, and insert it here." The Journal gives it as follows:
"It was moved by Mr. Madison, and seconded, to agree to the following
amendment of the thirteenth section of the sixth article:
"Every bill which shall have passed the two houses, shall, before it
become a law, be severally presented to the President of the United States,
and to the judges of the supreme court for the revision of each. If, upon
such revision, they shall approve of it, they shall respectively signify their
approbation by signing it; but if, upon such revision, it shall appear
improper to either, or both, to be passed into a law, it shall be returned, with
the objections against it, to that house, in which it shall have originated,
who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to
reconsider the bill: but if, after such reconsideration, two thirds of that
house, when either the President, or a majority of the judges shall object, or
three fourths, where both shall object, shall agree to pass it, it shall, together
with the objections, be sent to the other house, by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered; and, if approved by two thirds, or three fourths of the other
house, as the case may be, it shall become a law."
Mr Wilson seconds the motion.
Mr Pinkney opposed the interference of the Judges in the Legislative
business: it will involve them in parties, and give a previous tincture to their
opinions.
Mr Mercer heartily approved the motion. It is an axiom that the Judiciary
ought to be separate from the Legislative; but equally so that it ought to be
independent of that department. The true policy of the axiom is that
legislative usurpation and oppression may be obviated. He disapproved of
the Doctrine that the Judges as expositors of the Constitution should have
authority to declare a law void. He thought laws ought to be well and
cautiously made, and then to be uncontroulable.
Mr Gerry. This motion comes to the same thing with what has been
already negatived.
Question on the motion of Mr Madison
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay.
Maryd ay. Virga ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Govr Morris regretted that something like the proposed check could
not be agreed to. He dwelt on the importance of public Credit, and the
difficulty of supporting it without some strong barrier against the instability
of legislative Assemblies. He suggested the idea of requiring three fourths
of each house to repeal laws where the President should not concur. He had
no great reliance on the revisionary power as the Executive was now to be
constituted (elected by Congress.) The legislature will contrive to soften
down the President. He recited the history of paper emissions, and the
perseverance of the legislative assemblies in repeating them, with all the
distressing effects of such measures before their eyes. Were the National
legislature formed, and a war was now to break out, this ruinous expedient
would be again resorted to, if not guarded against. The requiring 3/4 to
repeal would, though not a compleat remedy, prevent the hasty passage of
laws, and the frequency of those repeals which destroy faith in the public,
and which are among our greatest calamities.
Mr Dickenson was strongly impressed with the remark of Mr Mercer as
to the power of the Judges to set aside the law. He thought no such power
ought to exist. He was at the same time at a loss what expedient to
substitute. The Justiciary of Arragon he observed became by degrees the
lawgiver.
Mr Govr Morris, suggested the expedient of an absolute negative in the
Executive. He could not agree that the Judiciary which was part of the
Executive, should be bound to say that a direct violation of the Constitution
was law. A controul over the legislature might have its inconveniences. But
view the danger on the other side. The most virtuous Citizens will often as
members of a legislative body concur in measures which afterwards in their
private capacity they will be ashamed of. Encroachments of the popular
branch of the Government ought to be guarded agst. The Ephori at Sparta
became in the end absolute. The Report of the Council of Censors in
Pennsylva points out the many invasions of the legislative department on
the Executive numerous as the latter [30] is, within the short term of seven
years, and in a State where a strong party is opposed to the Constitution,
and watching every occasion of turning the public resentments agst it. If the
Executive be overturned by the popular branch, as happened in England, the
tyranny of one man will ensue. In Rome where the Aristocracy overturned
the throne, the consequence was different. He enlarged on the tendency of
the legislative Authority to usurp on the Executive and wished the section
to be postponed, in order to consider of some more effectual check than
requiring 2/3 only to overrule the negative of the Executive.
[30] The Executive consists at this time of abt 20 members.–Madison's Note.
Mr Sherman. Can one man be trusted better than all the others if they all
agree? This was neither wise nor safe. He disapproved of Judges meddling
in politics and parties. We have gone far enough in forming the negative as
it now stands.
Mr Carrol. When the negative to be overruled by 2/3 only was agreed to,
the quorum was not fixed. He remarked that as a majority was now to be
the quorum, 17. in the larger, and 8 in the smaller house might carry points.
The advantage that might be taken of this seemed to call for greater
impediments to improper laws. He thought the controuling power however
of the Executive could not be well decided, till it was seen how the
formation of that department would be finally regulated. He wished the
consideration of the matter to be postponed.
Mr Ghorum saw no end to these difficulties and postponements. Some
could not agree to the form of Government before the powers were defined.
Others could not agree to the powers till it was seen how the Government
was to be formed. He thought a majority as large a quorum as was
necessary. It was the quorum almost every where fixt in the U. States.
Mr Wilson; after viewing the subject with all the coolness and attention
possible was most apprehensive of a dissolution of the Govt from the
legislature swallowing up all the other powers. He remarked that the
prejudices agst the Executive resulted from a misapplication of the adage
that the parliament was the palladium of liberty. Where the Executive was
really formidable, King and Tyrant, were naturally associated in the minds
of people; not legislature and tyranny. But where the Executive was not
formidable, the two last were most properly associated. After the
destruction of the King in Great Britain, a more pure and unmixed tyranny
sprang up in the parliament than had been exercised by the monarch. He
insisted that we had not guarded agst the danger on this side by a sufficient
self-defensive power either to the Executive or Judiciary department.
Mr Rutlidge was strenuous agst postponing; and complained much of the
tediousness of the proceedings.
Mr Elseworth held the same language. We grow more & more sceptical
as we proceed. If we do not decide soon, we shall be unable to come to any
decision.
The question for postponement passed in the negative: Del: & Maryd
only being in the affirmative.
Mr Williamson moved to change, "2/3 of each House" into "3/4" as
requisite to overrule the dissent of the President. He saw no danger in this,
and preferred giving the power to the Presidt alone, to admitting the Judges
into the business of legislation.
Mr Wilson 2ds the motion; referring to and repeating the ideas of
Mr Carroll.
On this motion for 3/4, instead of two-thirds; it passed in the affirmative.
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pena divd. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Mr Madison, observing that if the negative of the President was confined
to bills; it would be evaded by acts under the form and name of Resolutions,
votes &c., proposed that "or resolve" should be added after "bill" in the
beginning of sect 13. with an exception as to votes of adjournment &c.
After a short and rather confused conversation on the subject, the question
was put & rejected, the States being as follows,
N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pena no. Del. ay.
Md no. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
"Ten days (Sundays excepted)" instead of "seven" were allowed to the
President for returning bills with his objections N. H. & Mas: only voting
agst it.
The 13 Sect: of Art. VI as amended was then agreed to.
Adjourned.
T       . A      16.    C         .
Mr Randolph having thrown into a new form the motion putting votes,
Resolutions &c. on a footing with Bills, renewed it as follows–"Every order
resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate & House of Reps
may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment and in the cases
hereinafter mentioned) shall be presented to the President for his revision;
and before the same shall have force shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him shall be repassed by the Senate & House of Reps
according to the rules & limitations prescribed in the case of a Bill."
Mr Sherman thought it unnecessary, except as to votes taking money out
of the Treasury which might be provided for in another place.
On Question as moved by Mr Randolph
N. H. ay. Mass. not present. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay.
Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The Amendment was made section 14. of Art. VI.
Art: VII. Sect. 1. taken up.
Mr L. Martin asked what was meant by the Committee of detail in the
expression,–"duties" and "imposts." If the meaning were the same, the
former was unnecessary; if different, the matter ought to be made clear.
Mr Wilson. Duties are applicable to many objects to which the word
imposts does not relate. The latter are appropriated to commerce; the former
extend to a variety of objects, as stamp duties &c.
Mr Carroll reminded the Convention of the great difference of interests
among the States, and doubts the propriety in that point of view of letting a
majority be a quorum.
Mr Mason urged the necessity of connecting with the power of levying
taxes duties &c., the prohibition in Sect. 4 Art. VI that no tax should be laid
on exports. He was unwilling to trust to its being done in a future article. He
hoped the Northn States did not mean to deny the Southern this security. It
would hereafter be as desirable to the former when the latter should become
the most populous. He professed his jealousy for the productions of the
Southern or as he called them, the staple States. He moved to insert the
following amendment: "provided that no tax duty or imposition shall be laid
by the Legislature of the U. States on articles exported from any State."
Mr Sherman had no objection to the proviso here, other than it would
derange the parts of the report as made by the Committee, to take them in
such an order.
Mr Rutlidge. It being of no consequence in what order points are
decided, he should vote for the clause as it stood, but on condition that the
subsequent part relating to negroes should also be agreed to.
Mr Governeur Morris considered such a proviso as inadmissible any
where. It was so radically objectionable, that it might cost the whole system
the support of some members. He contended that it would not in some cases
be equitable to tax imports without taxing exports; and that taxes on exports
would be often the most easy and proper of the two.
Mr Madison. 1. the power of laying taxes on exports is proper in itself,
and as the States cannot with propriety exercise it separately, it ought to be
vested in them collectively. 2. it might with particular advantage be
exercised with regard to articles in which America was not rivalled in
foreign markets, as Tobo &c. The contract between the French Farmers Genl
and Mr Morris stipulating that if taxes sd be laid in america on the export of
Tobo they sd be paid by the Farmers, shewed that it was understood by
them, that the price would be thereby raised in America, and consequently
the taxes be paid by the European Consumer. 3. it would be unjust to the
States whose produce was exported by their neighbours, to leave it subject
to be taxed by the latter. This was a grievance which had already filled N.H.
Cont N. Jery Del: and N. Carolina with loud complaints, as it related to
imports, and they would be equally authorized by taxes by the States on
exports. 4. The Southn States being most in danger and most needing naval
protection, could the less complain if the burthen should be somewhat
heaviest on them. 5. we are not providing for the present moment only, and
time will equalize the situation of the States in this matter. He was for these
reasons agst the motion.
Mr Williamson considered the clause proposed agst taxes on exports as
reasonable and necessary.
Mr Elseworth was agst Taxing exports; but thought the prohibition stood
in the most proper place, and was agst deranging the order reported by the
Committee.
Mr Wilson was decidedly agst prohibiting general taxes on exports. He
dwelt on the injustice and impolicy of leaving N. Jersey Connecticut &c.
any longer subject to the exactions of their commercial neighbours.
Mr Gerry thought the legislature could not be trusted with such a power.
It might ruin the Country. It might be exercised partially, raising one and
depressing another part of it.
Mr Govr Morris. However the legislative power may be formed, it will if
disposed be able to ruin the Country. He considered the taxing of exports to
be in many cases highly politic. Virginia has found her account in taxing
Tobacco. All Countries having peculiar articles tax the exportation of them;
as France her wines and brandies. A tax here on lumber, would fall on the
W. Indies & punish their restrictions on our trade. The same is true of live
stock and in some degree of flour. In case of a dearth in the West Indies, we
may extort what we please. Taxes on exports are a necessary source of
revenue. For a long time the people of America will not have money to pay
direct taxes. Seize and sell their effects and you push them into Revolts.
Mr Mercer was strenuous against giving Congress power to tax exports.
Such taxes are impolitic, as encouraging the raising of articles not meant for
exportation. The States had now a right where their situation permitted, to
tax both the imports and the exports of their uncommercial neighbours. It
was enough for them to sacrifice one half of it. It had been said the
Southern States had most need of naval protection. The reverse was the
case. Were it not for promoting the carrying trade of the Northn States, the
Southn States could let the trade go into foreign bottoms, where it would not
need our protection. Virginia by taxing her tobacco had given an advantage
to that of Maryland.
Mr Sherman. To examine and compare the States in relation to imports
and exports will be opening a boundless field. He thought the matter had
been adjusted, and that imports were to be subject, and exports not, to be
taxed. He thought it wrong to tax exports except it might be such articles as
ought not to be exported. The complexity of the business in America would
render an equal tax on exports impracticable. The oppression of the
uncommercial States was guarded agst by the power to regulate trade
between the States. As to compelling foreigners, that might be done by
regulating trade in general. The Government would not be trusted with such
a power. Objections are most likely to be excited by considerations relating
to taxes & money. A power to tax exports would shipwreck the whole.
Mr Carrol was surprised that any objection should be made to an
exception of exports from the power of taxation.
It was finally agreed that the question concerning exports shd lie over for
the place in which the exception stood in the report: Maryd alone voting agst
it.
Sect: 1. (Art. VII) agreed to; Mr Gerry alone answering, no.
Clause for regulating commerce with foreign nations &c.
agreed to nem. con.
for coining money. agd to nem. con.
for regulating foreign coin. do do.
for fixing standard of weights & measures. do do.
"To establish post-offices," Mr Gerry moved to add, and post-roads.
Mr Mercer 2ded. & on question
N.H. no. Mass. ay. Ct no. N.J. no. Pena no. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va ay. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out "and emit bills on the credit of the
U. States"–If the United States had credit such bills would be unnecessary;
if they had not, unjust & useless.
Mr Butler, 2ds the motion.
Mr Madison, will it not be sufficient to prohibit the making them a
tender? This will remove the temptation to emit them with unjust views.
And promissory notes in that shape may in some emergencies be best.
Mr Govr Morris, striking out the words will leave room still for notes of
a responsible minister which will do all the good without the mischief. The
Monied interest will oppose the plan of Government, if paper emissions be
not prohibited.
Mr Ghorum was for striking out, without inserting any prohibition, if the
words stand they may suggest and lead to the measure.
Col. Mason had doubts on the subject. Congs he thought would not have
the power unless it were expressed. Though he had a mortal hatred to paper
money, yet as he could not forsee all emergencies, he was unwilling to tie
the hands of the Legislature. He observed that the late war could not have
been carried on, had such a prohibition existed.
Mr. Ghorum. The power as far as it will be necessary or safe, is involved
in that of borrowing.
Mr Mercer was a friend to paper money, though in the present state &
temper of America, he should neither propose nor approve of such a
measure. He was consequently opposed to a prohibition of it altogether. It
will stamp suspicion on the Government to deny it a discretion on this
point. It was impolitic also to excite the opposition of all those who were
friends to paper money. The people of property would be sure to be on the
side of the plan, and it was impolitic to purchase their further attachment
with the loss of the opposite class of Citizens.
Mr Elseworth thought this a favorable moment to shut and bar the door
against paper money. The mischiefs of the various experiments which had
been made, were now fresh in the public mind and had excited the disgust
of all the respectable part of America. By withholding the power from the
new Governt more friends of influence would be gained to it than by almost
any thing else. Paper money can in no case be necessary. Give the
Government credit, and other resources will offer. The power may do harm,
never good.
Mr Randolph, notwithstanding his antipathy to paper money, could not
agree to strike out the words, as he could not foresee all the occasions that
might arise.
Mr Wilson. It will have a most salutary influence on the credit of the U.
States to remove the possibility of paper money. This expedient can never
succeed whilst its mischiefs are remembered. And as long as it can be
resorted to, it will be a bar to other resources.
Mr Butler remarked that paper was a legal tender in no Country in
Europe. He was urgent for disarming the Government of such a power.
Mr Mason was still averse to tying the hands of the Legislature
altogether. If there was no example in Europe as just remarked it might be
observed on the other side, that there was none in which the Government
was restrained on this head.
Mr Read, thought the words, if not struck out, would be as alarming as
the mark of the Beast in Revelations.
Mr Langdon had rather reject the whole plan than retain the three words
("and emit bills").
On the motion for striking out
N.H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N.J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va ay. [31] N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.
[31] This vote in the affirmative by Virga was occasioned by the acquiescence of
Mr Madison who became satisfied that striking out the words would not disable
the Govt from the use of public notes as far as they could be safe & proper; &
would only cut off the pretext for a paper currency and particularly for making
the bills a tender either for public or private debts.–Madison's Note.
The clause for borrowing money, agreed to nem. con.
Adjd.
F      A      17.    C         
Art. VII. Sect. 1. resumed, on the clause, "to appoint Treasurer by
ballot,"
Mr Ghorum moved to insert "joint" before ballot, as more convenient as
well as reasonable, than to require the separate concurrence of the Senate.
Mr Pinkney 2ds the motion. Mr Sherman opposed it as favoring the larger
States.
Mr Read moved to strike out the clause, leaving the appointment of the
Treasurer as of other officers to the Executive. The Legislature was an
improper body for appointments. Those of the State legislatures were a
proof of it. The Executive being responsible would make a good choice.
Mr Mercer 2ds the motion of Mr Read.
On the motion for inserting the word "joint" before ballot
N.H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct no. N.J. no. Pa ay. Md no. Va ay.
N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.
Col. Mason in opposition to Mr Read's motion desired it might be
considered to whom the money would belong; if to the people, the
legislature representing the people ought to appoint the keepers of it.
On striking out the clause as amended by inserting "Joint"
N.H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no.
N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. no.
"To constitute inferior tribunals" agreed to nem. con.
"To make rules as to captures on land & water" do do.
"To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies &c &c."
considered.
Mr Madison moved to strike out "and punishment &c."
Mr Mason doubts the safety of it, considering the strict rule of
construction in criminal cases. He doubted also the propriety of taking the
power in all these cases wholly from the States.
Mr Governr Morris thought it would be necessary to extend the authority
further, so as to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting in general.
Bills of exchange for example might be forged in one State and carried into
another.
It was suggested by some other member that foreign paper might be
counterfeited by Citizens; and that it might be politic to provide by national
authority for the punishment of it.
Mr Randolph did not conceive that expunging "the punishment" would
be a constructive exclusion of the power. He doubted only the efficacy of
the word "declare."
Mr Wilson was in favor of the motion. Strictness was not necessary in
giving authority to enact penal laws; though necessary in enacting &
expounding them.
On motion for striking out "and punishment" as moved by Mr Madison
N.H. no. Mass. ay. Ct no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay.
N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out "declare the law" and insert
"punish" before "piracies," and on the question.
N.H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no.
N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Madison & Mr Randolph moved to insert "define &," before
"punish."
Mr Wilson thought "felonies" sufficiently defined by common law.
Mr Dickenson concurred with Mr Wilson.
Mr Mercer was in favor of the amendment.
Mr Madison. Felony at common law is vague. It is also defective. One
defect is supplied by Stat: of Anne as to running away with vessels which at
com̃on law was a breach of trust only. Besides no foreign law should be a
standard farther than is expressly adopted. If the laws of the States were to
prevail on this subject, the Citizens of different States would be subject to
different punishments for the same offence at Sea. There would be neither
uniformity nor stability in the law–The proper remedy for all these
difficulties was to vest the power proposed by the term "define" in the Natl
legislature.
Mr Govr Morris would prefer designate to define, the latter being as he
conceived, limited to the preexisting meaning.
It was said by others to be applicable to the creating of offences also, and
therefore suited the case both of felonies & of piracies. The motion of
Mr M. & Mr R. was agreed to.
Mr Elseworth enlarged the motion so as to read "to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, counterfeiting the
securities and current coin of the U. States, and offences agst the law of
Nations" which was agreed to nem. con.
"To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its legislature"
Mr Pinkney moved to strike out, "on the application of its legislature".
Mr Govr Morris 2ds.
Mr L. Martin opposed it as giving a dangerous & unnecessary power.
The consent of the State ought to precede the introduction of any
extraneous force whatever.
Mr Mercer supported the opposition of Mr Martin.
Mr Elseworth proposed to add after "legislature," "or Executive."
Mr Govr Morris. The Executive may possibly be at the head of the
Rebellion. The Genl Govt should enforce obedience in all cases where it
may be necessary.
Mr Elseworth. In many cases The Genl Govt ought not to be able to
interpose, unless called upon. He was willing to vary his motion so as to
read "or without it when the legislature cannot meet."
Mr Gerry was agst letting loose the myrmidons of the U. States on a State
without its own consent. The States will be the best Judges in such cases.
More blood would have been spilt in Massts in the late insurrection, if the
Genl Authority had intermeddled.
Mr Langdon was for striking out as moved by Mr Pinkney. The
apprehension of the national force, will have a salutary effect in preventing
insurrections.
Mr Randolph. If the Natl Legislature is to judge whether the State
legislature can or cannot meet, that amendment would make the clause as
objectionable as the motion of Mr Pinkney.
Mr Govr Morris. We are acting a very strange part. We first form a strong
man to protect us, and at the same time wish to tie his hands behind him.
The legislature may surely be trusted with such a power to preserve the
public tranquillity.
On the motion to add, "or without it (application) when the legislature
cannot meet"
N.H. ay. Mass. no. Ct ay. Pa divd. Del. no. Md no. Va ay.
N.C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. So agreed to.
Mr Madison and Mr Dickenson moved to insert as explanatory, after
"State"–"against the Government thereof". There might be a rebellion agst
the U. States–which was agreed to nem. con.
On the clause as amended
N.H. ay. Mass. [32] abst. Ct ay. Pen. abst. Del. no. Md no.
Va ay. N.C. no. S.C. no. Georg. ay.–so it was lost.
[32] In the printed Journal, Mas. no.–Madison's Note.
"To make war"
Mr Pinkney opposed the vesting this power in the Legislature. Its
proceedings were too slow. It wd meet but once a year, the Hs of Reps
would be too numerous for such deliberations. The Senate would be the
best depository, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most
capable of proper resolutions. If the States are equally represented in the
Senate, so as to give no advantage to the large States, the power will
notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their all at stake in such cases as
well as the large States. It would be singular for one authority to make war,
and another peace.
Mr Butler. The Objections agst the Legislature lie in a great degree agst
the Senate. He was for vesting the power in the President, who will have all
the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will
support it.
Mr Madison and Mr Gerry moved to insert "declare," striking out
"make" war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.
Mr Sherman thought it stood very well. The Executive shd be able to
repel and not to commence war. "Make" is better than "declare" the latter
narrowing the power too much.
Mr Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the
Executive alone to declare war.
Mr Elsworth. There is a material difference between the cases of making
war and making peace. It shd be more easy to get out of war, than into it.
War also is a simple and overt declaration, peace attended with intricate &
secret negociations.
Mr Mason was agst giving the power of war to the Executive because not
safely to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so constructed as to
be entitled to it. He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for
facilitating peace. He preferred "declare" to "make."
On the motion to insert "declare"–in place of "make," it was agreed to.
N.H. no. Mass, abst. Cont no. [33] Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.
[33] On the remark by Mr King that "make" war might be understood to
"conduct" it which was an Executive function. Mr Elsworth gave up his
objection, and the vote of Con. was changed to ay.–Madison's Note.
Mr Pinkney's motion to strike out whole clause, disagd to without call of
States.
Mr Butler moved to give the Legislature the power of peace, as they
were to have that of war.
Mr Gerry 2ds him. 8 Senators may possibly exercise the power if vested
in that body, and 14 if all should be present; and may consequently give up
part of the U. States. The Senate are more liable to be corrupted by an
Enemy than the whole Legislature.
On the motion for adding "and peace" after "war,"
N.H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no.
N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.
Adjourned.
S        A      18.    C         
Mr Madison submitted, in order to be referred to the Committee of detail
the following powers as proper to be added to those of the General
Legislature:
"To dispose of the unappropriated lands of the U. States."
"To institute temporary Governments for new States arising
therein."
"To regulate affairs with the Indians as well within as without the
limits of the U. States."
"To exercise exclusively Legislative authority at the seat of the
General Government, and over a district around the same, not
exceeding –— square miles; the Consent of the Legislature of the State
or States comprising the same, being first obtained."
"To grant charters of incorporation in cases where the public good
may require them, and the authority of a single State may be
incompetent"
"To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited time."
"To establish an University."
"To encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement of
useful knowledge and discoveries."
"To authorize the Executive to procure and hold for the use of the
U. S. landed property for the erection of Forts, magazines, and other
necessary buildings."
These propositions were referred to the Committee of detail which had
prepared the Report and at the same time the following which were moved
by Mr Pinkney:–in both cases unanimously:
"To fix and permanently establish the seat of Government of the
U. S. in which they shall possess the exclusive right of soil &
jurisdiction."
"To establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts
& sciences."
"To grant charters of incorporation."
"To grant patents for useful inventions."
"To secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain time."
"To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for the
promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades and manufactures."
"That funds which shall be appropriated for the payment of public
Creditors, shall not during the time of such appropriation, be diverted
or applied to any other purpose and that the Committee prepare a
clause or clauses for restraining the Legislature of the U. S. from
establishing a perpetual revenue."
"To secure the payment of the public debt."
"To secure all creditors under the new Constitution from a violation
of the public faith when pledged by the authority of the Legislature."
"To grant letters of mark and reprisal."
"To regulate Stages on the post roads."
Mr Mason introduced the subject of regulating the militia. He thought
such a power necessary to be given to the Genl Government. He hoped
there would be no standing army in time of peace, unless it might be for a
few garrisons. The Militia ought therefore to be the more effectually
prepared for the public defence. Thirteen States will never concur in any
one system, if the disciplining of the Militia be left in their hands. If they
will not give up the power over the whole, they probably will over a part as
a select militia. He moved as an addition to the propositions just referred to
the Comittee of detail, & to be referred in like manner, "a power to regulate
the militia."
Mr Gerry remarked that some provision ought to be made in favor of
public Securities, and something inserted concerning letters of marque,
which he thought not included in the power of war. He proposed that these
subjects should also go to a Committee.
Mr Rutlidge moved to refer a clause "that funds appropriated to public
creditors should not be diverted to other purposes."
Mr Mason was much attached to the principle, but was afraid such a
fetter might be dangerous in time of war. He suggested the necessity of
preventing the danger of perpetual revenue which must of necessity subvert
the liberty of any country. If it be objected to on the principle of
Mr Rutlidge's motion that public Credit may require perpetual provisions,
that case might be excepted; it being declared that in other cases, no taxes
should be laid for a longer term than –— years. He considered the caution
observed in Great Britain on this point as the paladium of public liberty.
Mr Rutlidge's motion was referred–He then moved that a Grand
Committee be appointed to consider the necessity and expediency of the U.
States assuming all the State debts–A regular settlement between the Union
& the several States would never take place. The assumption would be just
as the State debts were contracted in the common defence. It was necessary,
as the taxes on imports the only sure source of revenue were to be given up
to the Union. It was politic, as by disburdening the people of the State debts
it would conciliate them to the plan.
Mr King and Mr Pinkney seconded the motion. (Col. Mason interposed a
motion that the Committee prepare a clause for restraining perpetual
revenue, which was agreed to nem. con.)
Mr Sherman thought it would be better to authorize the Legislature to
assume the State debts, than to say positively it should be done. He
considered the measure as just and that it would have a good effect to say
something about the matter.
Mr Elseworth differed from Mr Sherman. As far as the State debts ought
in equity to be assumed, he conceived that they might and would be so.
Mr Pinkney observed that a great part of the State debts were of such a
nature that although in point of policy and true equity they ought, yet would
they not be viewed in the light of federal expenditures.
Mr King thought the matter of more consequence than Mr Elseworth
seemed to do; and that it was well worthy of commitment. Besides the
considerations of justice and policy which had been mentioned, it might be
remarked that the State Creditors an active and formidable party would
otherwise be opposed to a plan which transferred to the Union the best
resources of the States without transferring the State debts at the same time.
The State Creditors had generally been the strongest foes to the impost-
plan. The State debts probably were of greater amount than the federal. He
would not say that it was practicable to consolidate the debts, but he
thought it would be prudent to have the subject considered by a Committee.
On Mr Rutlidge's motion, that a Come be appointed to consider of the
assumption &c.
N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa divd. Del. no.
Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Gerry's motion to provide for public securities, for stages on post
roads, and for letters of marque & reprisal, were committed nem. con.
Mr King suggested that all unlocated lands of particular States ought to
be given up if State debts were to be assumed:–Mr Williamson concurred in
the idea.
A Grand Committee was appointed consisting of Mr Langdon, Mr King,
Mr Sherman, Mr Livingston, Mr Clymer, Mr Dickenson, Mr McHenry,
Mr Mason, Mr Williamson, Mr C. C. Pinkney, Mr Baldwin.
Mr Rutlidge remarked on the length of the Session, the probable
impatience of the public and the extreme anxiety of many members of the
Convention to bring the business to an end; concluding with a motion that
the Convention meet henceforward precisely at 10 Oc A.M. and that
precisely at 4 Oc P.M. the President adjourn the House without motion for
the purpose, and that no motion to adjourn sooner be allowed.
On this question
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Elseworth observed that a Council had not yet been provided for the
President. He conceived there ought to be one. His proposition was that it
should be composed of the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice, and
the ministers as they might be estabd for the departments of foreign &
domestic affairs, war finance and marine, who should advise but not
conclude the President.
Mr Pinkney wished the proposition to lie over, as notice had been given
for a like purpose by Mr Govr Morris who was not then on the floor. His
own idea was that the President shd be authorized to call for advice or not as
he might chuse. Give him an able Council and it will thwart him; a weak
one and he will shelter himself under their sanction.
Mr Gerry was agst letting the heads of the Departments, particularly of
finance have any thing to do in business connected with legislation. He
mentioned the Chief Justice also as particularly exceptionable. These men
will also be so taken up with other matters as to neglect their own proper
duties.
Mr Dickenson urged that the great appointments should be made by the
Legislature in which case they might properly be consulted by the
Executive, but not if made by the Executive himself–This subject by
general consent lay over; & the House proceeded to the clause "To raise
armies."
Mr Ghorum moved to add "and support" after "raise." Agreed to nem.
con. and then the clause was agreed to nem. con. as amended.
Mr Gerry took notice that there was no check here agst standing armies
in time of peace. The existing Congs is so constructed that it cannot of itself
maintain an army. This wd not be the case under the new system. The
people were jealous on this head, and great opposition to the plan would
spring from such an omission. He suspected that preparations of force were
now making agst it. (he seemed to allude to the activity of the Govr of
N. York at this crisis in disciplining the militia of that State.) He thought an
army dangerous in time of peace & could never consent to a power to keep
up an indefinite number. He proposed that there shall not be kept up in time
of peace more than –— thousand troops. His idea was that the blank should
be filled with two or three thousand.
Instead of "to build and equip fleets"–"to provide and maintain a navy"
agreed to nem. con. as a more convenient definition of the power.
"To make rules for the Government and regulation of the land & naval
forces," added from the existing Articles of Confederation.
Mr L. Martin and Mr Gerry now regularly moved "provided that in time
of peace the army shall not consist of more than –— thousand men."
Genl Pinkney asked whether no troops were ever to be raised untill an
attack should be made on us?
Mr Gerry. If there be no restriction, a few States may establish a military
Govt.
Mr Williamson, reminded him of Mr Mason's motion for limiting the
appropriation of revenue as the best guard in this case.
Mr Langdon saw no room for Mr Gerry's distrust of the Representatives
of the people.
Mr Dayton. Preparations for war are generally made in peace; and a
standing force of some sort may, for ought we know, become unavoidable.
He should object to no restrictions consistent with these ideas.
The motion of Mr Martin and Mr Gerry was disagreed to nem. con.
Mr Mason moved as an additional power "to make laws for the
regulation and discipline of the militia of the several States, reserving to the
States the appointment of the officers." He considered uniformity as
necessary in the regulation of the Militia throughout the Union.
Genl Pinkney mentioned a case during the war in which a dissimilarity in
the militia of different States had produced the most serious mischiefs.
Uniformity was essential. The States would never keep up a proper
discipline of their militia.
Mr Elseworth was for going as far in submitting the militia to the Genl
Government as might be necessary, but thought the motion of Mr Mason
went too far. He moved that the militia should have the same arms &
exercise and be under rules established by the Genl Govt when in actual
service of the U. States and when States neglect to provide regulations for
militia, it shd be regulated & established by the Legislature of U. S. The
whole authority over the militia ought by no means to be taken away from
the States whose consequence would pine away to nothing after such a
sacrifice of power. He thought the Genl Authority could not sufficiently
pervade the Union for such a purpose, nor could it accommodate itself to
the local genius of the people. It must be vain to ask the States to give the
Militia out of their hands.
Mr Sherman 2ds the motion.
Mr Dickenson. We are come now to a most important matter, that of the
sword. His opinion was that the States never would nor ought to give up all
authority over the Militia. He proposed to restrain the general power to one
fourth part at a time, which by rotation would discipline the whole Militia.
Mr Butler urged the necessity of submitting the whole Militia to the
general Authority, which had the care of the general defence.
Mr Mason. had suggested the idea of a select militia. He was led to think
that would be in fact as much as the Genl Govt could advantageously be
charged with. He was afraid of creating insuperable objections to the plan.
He withdrew his original motion, and moved a power "to make laws for
regulating and disciplining the militia, not exceeding one tenth part in any
one year, and reserving the appointment of officers to the States."
Genl Pinkney, renewed Mr Mason's original motion. For a part to be
under the Genl and a part under the State Govts wd be an incurable evil. he
saw no room for such distrust of the Genl Govt.
Mr Langdon 2ds General Pinkney's renewal. He saw no more reason to
be afraid of the Genl Govt than of the State Govts. He was more
apprehensive of the confusion of the different authorities on this subject,
than of either.
Mr Madison thought the regulation of the Militia naturally appertaining
to the authority charged with the public defence. It did not seem in its
nature to be divisible between two distinct authorities. If the States would
trust the Genl Govt with a power over the public treasure, they would from
the same consideration of necessity grant it the direction of the public force.
Those who had a full view of the public situation wd from a sense of the
danger, guard agst it: the States would not be separately impressed with the
general situation, nor have the due confidence in the concurrent exertions of
each other.
Mr Elseworth, considered the idea of a select militia as impracticable; &
if it were not it would be followed by a ruinous declension of the great body
of the Militia. The States would never submit to the same militia laws.
Three or four shillings as a penalty will enforce better obedience in New
England, than forty lashes in some other places.
Mr Pinkney thought the power such an one as could not be abused, and
that the States would see the necessity of surrendering it. He had however
but a scanty faith in Militia. There must be also a real military force. This
alone can effectually answer the purpose. The United States had been
making an experiment without it, and we see the consequence in their rapid
approaches toward anarchy. [34]
[34] This had reference to the disorders particularly that had occurred in
Massachts which had called for the interposition of the federal troops.–
Madison's Note.
Mr Sherman, took notice that the States might want their militia for
defence agst invasions and insurrections, and for enforcing obedience to
their laws. They will not give up this point. In giving up that of taxation,
they retain a concurrent power of raising money for their own use.
Mr Gerry thought this the last point remaining to be surrendered. If it be
agreed to by the Convention, the plan will have as black a mark as was set
on Cain. He had no such confidence in the Genl Govt as some gentlemen
possessed, and believed it would be found that the States have not.
Col. Mason, thought there was great weight in the remarks of
Mr Sherman, and moved an exception to his motion "of such part of the
militia as might be required by the States for their own use."
Mr Read doubted the propriety of leaving the appointment of the Militia
officers in the States. In some States they are elected by the Legislatures; in
others by the people themselves. He thought at least an appointment by the
State Executives ought to be insisted on.
On committing to the grand Committee last appointed, the latter motion
of Col. Mason, & the original one revived by Gel Pinkney
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay.
Md divd. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Adjourned.
M      A      20.    C         
Mr Pinkney submitted to the House, in order to be referred to the
Committee of detail, the following propositions–"Each House shall be the
judge of its own privileges, and shall have authority to punish by
imprisonment every person violating the same, or who, in the place where
the Legislature may be sitting and during the time of its Session, shall
threaten any of its members for any thing said or done in the House; or who
shall assault any of them therefor–or who shall assault or arrest any witness
or other person ordered to attend either of the Houses in his way going or
returning; or who shall rescue any person arrested by their order."
"Each branch of the Legislature, as well as the supreme Executive shall
have authority to require the opinions of the supreme Judicial Court upon
important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions."
"The privileges and benefit of the Writ of Habeas corpus shall be
enjoyed in this Government in the most expeditious and ample manner; and
shall not be suspended by the Legislature except upon the most urgent and
pressing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding –— months."
"The liberty of the Press, shall be inviolably preserved."
"No troops shall be kept up in time of peace, but by consent of the
Legislature."
"The military shall always be subordinate to the Civil power, and no
grants of money shall be made by the Legislature for supporting military
Land forces, for more than one year at a time."
"No soldier shall be quartered in any house in time of peace without
consent of the owner."
"No person holding the office of President of the U. S. a Judge of their
supreme Court, Secretary for the department of Foreign Affairs, of Finance,
of Marine, of War, or of –—, shall be capable of holding at the same time
any other office of Trust or emolument under the U. S. or an individual
State."
"No religious test or qualification shall ever be annexed to any oath of
office under the authority of the U. S."
"The U. S. shall be forever considered as one Body corporate and politic
in law, and entitled to all the rights privileges and immunities, which to
Bodies corporate ought to or do appertain."
"The Legislature of the U. S. shall have the power of making the Great
Seal which shall be kept by the President of the U. S. or in his absence by
the President of the Senate, to be used by them as the occasion may
require.–It shall be called the Great Seal of the U. S. and shall be affixed to
all laws."
"All commissions and writs shall run in the name of the U.S."
"The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be extended to all
controversies between the U. S. and an individual State, or the U. S. and the
Citizens of an individual State."
These propositions were referred to the Committee of detail without
debate or consideration of them by the House.
Mr Govr Morris 2ded by Mr Pinkney, submitted the following
propositions which were in like manner referred to the Committee of Detail.
"To assist the President in conducting the Public affairs there shall
be a Council of State composed of the following officers—1. The
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall from time to time
recommend such alterations of and additions to the laws of the U. S. as
may in his opinion be necessary to the due administration of Justice,
and such as may promote useful learning and inculcate sound morality
throughout the Union: He shall be President of the Council in the
absence of the President.
2. The Secretary of Domestic affairs who shall be appointed by the
President and hold his office during pleasure. It shall be his duty to
attend to matters of general police, the State of Agriculture and
manufactures, the opening of roads and navigations, and the
facilitating communications thro' the U. States; and he shall from time
to time recommend such measures and establishments as may tend to
promote those objects.
3. The Secretary of Commerce and Finance who shall also be
appointed by the President during pleasure. It shall be his duty to
superintend all matters relating to the public finances, to prepare &
report plans of revenue and for the regulation of expenditures, and also
to recommend such things as may in his Judgment promote the
commercial interests of the U. S.
4. The Secretary of foreign affairs who shall also be appointed by
the President during pleasure. It shall be his duty to correspond with all
foreign Ministers, prepare plans of Treaties, & consider such as may
be transmitted from abroad, and generally to attend to the interests of
the U. S. in their connections with foreign powers.
5. The Secretary of War who shall also be appointed by the
President during pleasure. It shall be his duty to superintend every
thing relating to the war Department, such as the raising and equipping
of troops, the care of military stores, public fortifications, arsenals &
the like–also in time of war to prepare & recommend plans of offence
and Defence.
6. The Secretary of the Marine who shall also be appointed during
pleasure–It shall be his duty to superintend every thing relating to the
Marine Department, the public ships, Dock Yards, naval Stores &
arsenals–also in the time of war to prepare and recommend plans of
offence and defence.
The President shall also appoint a Secretary of State to hold his
office during pleasure; who shall be Secretary to the Council of State,
and also public Secretary to the President. It shall be his duty to
prepare all Public dispatches from the President which he shall
countersign.
The President may from time to time submit any matter to the
discussion of the Council of State, and he may require the written
opinions of any one or more of the members: But he shall in all cases
exercise his own judgment, and either Conform to such opinions or not
as he may think proper; and every officer above mentioned shall be
responsible for his opinion on the affairs relating to his particular
Department.
Each of the officers above mentioned shall be liable to
impeachment & removal from office for neglect of duty malversation
or corruption."
Mr Gerry moved "that the Committee be instructed to report proper
qualifications for the President, and a mode of trying the Supreme Judges in
cases of impeachment."
The clause "to call forth the aid of the Militia &c. was postponed till
report should be made as to the power over the Militia referred yesterday to
the Grand Committee of eleven.
Mr Mason moved to enable Congress "to enact sumptuary laws." No
Government can be maintained unless the manners be made consonant to it.
Such a discretionary power may do good and can do no harm. A proper
regulation of excises & of trade may do a great deal but it is best to have an
express provision. It was objected to sumptuary laws that they were
contrary to nature. This was a vulgar error. The love of distinction it is true
is natural; but the object of sumptuary laws is not to extinguish this
principle but to give it a proper direction.
Mr Elseworth. The best remedy is to enforce taxes & debts. As far as the
regulation of eating & drinking can be reasonable, it is provided for in the
power of taxation.
Mr Govr Morris argued that sumptuary laws tended to create a landed
nobility, by fixing in the great-landholders and their posterity their present
possessions.
Mr Gerry, the law of necessity is the best sumptuary law.
On Motion of Mr Mason "as to sumptuary laws"
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
"And to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested, by this Constitution, in
the Government of the U. S. or any department or officer thereof."
Mr Madison and Mr Pinkney moved to insert between "laws" and
"necessary" "and establish all offices," it appearing to them liable to cavil
that the latter was not included in the former.
Mr Govr Morris, Mr Wilson, Mr Rutlidge and Mr Elseworth urged that
the amendment could not be necessary.
On the motion for inserting "and establish all offices"
N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The clause as reported was then agreed to nem. con.
Art: VII Sect. 2. concerning Treason which see.
Mr Madison, thought the definition too narrow. It did not appear to go as
far as the Stat. of Edwd III. He did not see why more latitude might not be
left to the Legislature. It wd be as safe as in the hands of State legislatures.
And it was inconvenient to bar a discretion which experience might
enlighten, and which might be applied to good purposes as well as be
abused.
Mr Mason was for pursuing the Stat: of Edwd III.
Mr Govr Morris was for giving to the Union an exclusive right to declare
what shd be treason. In case of a contest between the U. S. and a particular
State, the people of the latter must under the disjunctive terms of the clause,
be traitors to one or other authority.
Mr Randolph thought the clause defective in adopting the words, "in
adhering" only. The British Stat: adds, "giving them aid and comfort" which
had a more extensive meaning.
Mr Elseworth considered the definition as the same in fact with that of
the Statute.
Mr Govr Morris "adhering" does not go so far as "giving aid and
comfort" or the latter words may be restrictive of "adhering," in either case
the Statute is not pursued.
Mr Wilson held "giving aid and comfort" to be explanatory, not operative
words; and that it was better to omit them.
Mr Dickenson, thought the addition of "giving aid and comfort"
unnecessary & improper; being too vague and extending too far. He wished
to know what was meant by the "testimony of two witnesses" whether they
were to be witnesses to the same overt act or to different overt acts. He
thought also that proof of an overt act ought to be expressed as essential in
the case.
Docr Johnson considered "giving aid & comfort" as explanatory of
"adhering" & that something should be inserted in the definition concerning
overt acts. He contended that Treason could not be both agst the U. States–
and individual States; being an offence agst the Sovereignty which can be
but one in the same community.
Mr Madison remarked that "and" before "in adhering" should be changed
into "or" otherwise both offences viz. of "levying war," & of adhering to the
Enemy might be necessary to constitute Treason. He added that, as the
definition here was of treason against the U. S. it would seem that the
individual States wd be left in possession of a concurrent power so far as to
define & punish treason particularly agst themselves; which might involve
double punishmt.
It was moved that the whole clause be recommitted which was lost, the
votes being equally divided.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. divd. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Mr Wilson & Docr Johnson moved, that "or any of them," after "United
States" be struck out in order to remove the embarrassment; which was
agreed to nem. con.
Mr Madison. This has not removed the embarrassment. The same Act
might be treason agst the United States as here defined–and agst a particular
State according to its laws.
Mr Elseworth. There can be no danger to the genl authority from this; as
the laws of the U. States are to be paramount.
Docr Johnson was still of opinion there could be no Treason agst a
particular State. It could not even at present, as the Confederation now
stands, the Sovereignty being in the Union; much less can it be under the
proposed system.
Col. Mason. The United States will have a qualified sovereignty only.
The individual States will retain a part of the Sovereignty. An Act may be
treason agst a particular State which is not so agst the U. States. He cited the
Rebellion of Bacon in Virginia as an illustration of the doctrine.
Docr Johnson: That case would amount to Treason agst the Sovereign,
the Supreme Sovereign, the United States.
Mr King observed that the controversy relating to Treason might be of
less magnitude than was supposed; as the Legislature might punish capitally
under other names than Treason.
Mr Govr Morris and Mr Randolph wished to substitute the words of the
British Statute and moved to postpone Sect 2. art VII in order to consider
the following substitute–"Whereas it is essential to the preservation of
liberty to define precisely and exclusively what shall constitute the crime of
Treason, it is therefore ordained, declared & established, that if a man do
levy war agst the U. S. within their territories, or be adherent to the enemies
of the U. S. within the said territories, giving them aid and comfort within
their territories or elsewhere, and thereof be provably attainted of open deed
by the people of his condition, he shall be adjudged guilty of Treason."
On this question
N. H.–Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
It was then moved to strike out "agst United States" after "treason" so as
to define treason generally, and on this question
Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
It was then moved to insert after "two witnesses" the words "to the same
overt act."
Docr Franklin wished this amendment to take place. prosecutions for
treason were generally virulent; and perjury too easily made use of against
innocence.
Mr Wilson. much may be said on both sides. Treason may sometimes be
practised in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult–as in a
traitorous correspondence with an Enemy.
On the question–as to some overt act
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr King moved to insert before the word "power" the word "sole,"
giving the U. States the exclusive right to declare the punishment of
Treason.
Mr Broom 2ds the motion.
Mr Wilson in cases of a general nature, treason can only be agst the U—
States, and in such they shd have the sole right to declare the punishment–
yet in many cases it may be otherwise. The subject was however intricate
and he distrusted his present judgment on it.
Mr King this amendment results from the vote defining treason generally
by striking out agst the U. States, which excludes any treason agst particular
States. These may however punish offences as high misdemeanors.
On inserting the word "sole." It passed in the negative
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.—
Mr Wilson. the clause is ambiguous now. "Sole" ought either to have
been inserted, or "against the U. S." to be re-instated.
Mr King no line can be drawn between levying war and adhering to
enemy agst the U. States and agst an individual State–Treason agst the latter
must be so agst the former.
Mr Sherman, resistance agst the laws of the U. States as distinguished
from resistance agst the laws of a particular State, forms the line.
Mr Elseworth, the U. S. are sovereign on one side of the line dividing the
jurisdictions–the States on the other–each ought to have power to defend
their respective Sovereignties.
Mr Dickenson, war or insurrection agst a member of the Union must be
so agst the whole body; but the constitution should be made clear on this
point.
The clause was reconsidered nem. con–& then Mr Wilson &
Mr Elseworth moved to reinstate "agst the U. S." after "Treason–" on which
question
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Mr Madison was not satisfied with the footing on which the clause now
stood. As Treason agst the U. States involves treason agst particular States,
and vice versa, the same act may be twice tried & punished by the different
authorities. Mr Govr Morris viewed the matter in the same light—
It was moved & 2ded to amend the sentence to read–"Treason agst the
U. S. shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their
enemies" which was agreed to.
Col. Mason moved to insert the words "giving them aid and comfort," as
restrictive of "adhering to their Enemies &c." the latter he thought would be
otherwise too indefinite–This motion was agreed to: Cont: Del: & Georgia
only being in the Negative.
Mr L. Martin moved to insert after conviction &c.–"or on confession in
open court"–and on the question (the negative States thinking the words
superfluous) it was agreed to
N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P. ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. divd. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Art: VII. Sect. 2, as amended was then agreed to nem. con.
Sect. 3. taken up. "white & other" struck out nem. con. as superfluous.
Mr Elseworth moved to require the first census to be taken within "three"
instead of "six" years from the first meeting of the Legislature–and on
question
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr King asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation? No one
answd.
Mr Gerry moved to add to the 3d Sect. Art: VII. the following clause
"That from the first meeting of the Legislature of the U. S. until a Census
shall be taken all monies for supplying the public Treasury by direct
taxation shall be raised from the several States according to the number of
their Representatives respectively in the first branch".
Mr Langdon. This would bear unreasonably hard on N. H. and he must
be agst it.
Mr Carrol opposed it. The number of Reps did not admit of a proportion
exact enough for a rule of taxation.
Before any question the House
Adjourned.
T       A      21.    C         
Governour Livingston [35] from the Committee of Eleven to whom was
referred the propositions respecting the debts of the several States and also
the Militia entered on the 18th inst: delivered the following report:
[35] "Governor Livingston is confessedly a Man of the first rate talents, but he
appears to me rather to indulge a sportiveness of wit, than a strength of thinking.
He is however equal to anything, from the extensiveness of his education and
genius. His writings teem with satyr and a neatness of style. But he is no Orator,
and seems little acquainted with the guiles of policy. He is about 60 years old,
and remarkably healthy."–Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 327.
"The Legislature of the U. S. shall have power to fulfil the
engagements which have been entered into by Congress, and to
discharge as well the debts of the U. S. as the debts incurred by the
several States during the late war, for the common defence and general
welfare."
"To make laws for organizing arming and disciplining the militia,
and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service
of the U. S. reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the
officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the
discipline prescribed by the U. States."
Mr Gerry considered giving the power only, without adopting the
obligation, as destroying the security now enjoyed by the public creditors of
the U— States. He enlarged on the merit of this class of citizens, and the
solemn faith which had been pledged under the existing Confederation. If
their situation should be changed as here proposed great opposition would
be excited agst the plan. He urged also that as the States had made different
degrees of exertion to sink their respective debts, those who had done most
would be alarmed, if they were now to be saddled with a share of the debts
of States which had done least.
Mr Sherman. It means neither more nor less than the confederation as it
relates to this subject.
Mr Elseworth moved that the Report delivered in by Govr Livingston
should lie on the table.–Agreed to nem. con.
Art: VII. Sect. 3 resumed.–Mr Dickinson moved to postpone this in order
to reconsider Art: IV. Sect. 4. and to limit the number of representatives to
be allowed to the large States. Unless this were done the small States would
be reduced to entire insignificancy, and encouragement given to the
importation of slaves.
Mr Sherman would agree to such a reconsideration, but did not see the
necessity of postponing the section before the House.–Mr Dickenson
withdrew his motion.
Art: VII. Sect 3. then agreed to 10 ays, Delaware alone being no.
Mr Sherman moved to add to Sect 3. the following clause "And all
accounts of supplies furnished, services performed, and monies advanced
by the several States to the U. States, or by the U. S. to the several States
shall be adjusted by the same rule."
Mr Governr Morris 2ds the motion.
Mr Ghorum, thought it wrong to insert this in the Constitution. The
Legislature will no doubt do what is right. The present Congress have such
a power and are now exercising it.
Mr Sherman unless some rule be expressly given none will exist under
the new system.
Mr Elseworth. Though The contracts of Congress will be binding, there
will be no rule for executing them on the States; and one ought to be
provided.
Mr Sherman withdrew his motion to make way for one of Mr Williamson
to add to Sect. 3. "By this rule the several quotas of the States shall be
determined in settling the expences of the late war."
Mr Carrol brought into view the difficulty that might arise on this subject
from the establishment of the Constitution as intended without the
unanimous consent of the States.
Mr Williamson's motion was postponed nem. con.
Art: VI Sect. 12. which had been postponed of Aug: 15. was now called
for by Col. Mason, who wished to know how the proposed amendment as to
money bills would be decided, before he agreed to any further points.
Mr Gerry's motion of yesterday that previous to a census, direct taxation
be proportioned on the States according to the number of Representatives,
was taken up. He observed that the principal acts of Government would
probably take place within that period, and it was but reasonable that the
States should pay in proportion to their share in them.
Mr Elseworth thought such a rule unjust. There was a great difference
between the number of Represents and the number of inhabitants as a rule in
this case. Even if the former were proportioned as nearly as possible to the
latter, it would be a very inaccurate rule. A State might have one
Representative only that had inhabitants enough for 1-1/2 or more, if
fractions could be applied, &c.—. He proposed to amend the motion by
adding the words, "subject to a final liquidation by the foregoing rule when
a census shall have been taken."
Mr Madison. The last appointment of Congs on which the number of
Representatives was founded, was conjectural and meant only as a
temporary rule till a Census should be established.
Mr Read. The requisitions of Congs had been accommodated to the
impoverishment produced by the war; and to other local and temporary
circumstances.
Mr Williamson opposed Mr Gerry's motion.
Mr Langdon was not here when N. H. was allowed three members. If it
was more than her share; he did not wish for them.
Mr Butler contended warmly for Mr Gerry's motion as founded in reason
and equity.
Mr Elseworth's proviso to Mr Gerry's motion was agreed to nem. con.
Mr King thought the power of taxation given to the Legislature rendered
the motion of Mr Gerry altogether unnecessary.
On Mr Gerry's motion as amended
N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On a question, Shall Art: VI Sect. 12. with the amendment to it proposed
& entered on the 15 instant, as called for by Col. Mason be now taken up?
It passed in the negative.
N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr L. Martin. The power of taxation is most likely to be criticised by the
public. Direct taxation should not be used but in cases of absolute necessity;
and then the States will be the best Judges of the mode. He therefore moved
the following addition to Sect: 3: Art VII "And whenever the Legislature of
the U. S. shall find it necessary that revenue should be raised by direct
taxation, having apportioned the same, according to the above rule on the
several States, requisitions shall be made of the respective States to pay into
the Continental Treasury their respective quotas within a time in the said
requisitions specified; and in case of any of the States failing to comply
with such requisitions, then and then only to devise and pass acts directing
the mode, and authorizing the collection of the same."
Mr McHenry 2ded the motion–there was no debate, and on the question
N. H. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pena no. Del. no. Md divd.
(Jenifer & Carol no) Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Art. VII. Sect. 4.–Mr Langdon, by this section the States are left at
liberty to tax exports. N. H. therefore with other non-exporting States, will
be subject to be taxed by the States exporting its produce. This could not be
admitted. It seems to be feared that the Northern States will oppress the
trade of the Southn. This may be guarded agst by requiring the concurrence
of 2/3 or 3/4 of the legislature in such cases.
Mr Elseworth. It is best as it stands. The power of regulating trade
between the States will protect them agst each other. Should this not be the
case, the attempts of one to tax the produce of another passing through its
hands, will force a direct exportation and defeat themselves. There are solid
reasons agst Congs taxing exports. 1. it will discourage industry, as taxes on
imports discourage luxury. 2. The produce of different States is such as to
prevent uniformity in such taxes. There are indeed but a few articles that
could be taxed at all; as Tobo rice & indigo, and a tax on these alone would
be partial & unjust. 3. The taxing of exports would engender incurable
jealousies.
Mr Williamson. Tho' N. C. has been taxed by Virga by a duty on 12000
Hhs of her Tobo exported thro' Virga yet he would never agree to this power.
Should it take place, it would destroy the last hope of an adoption of the
plan.
Mr Govr Morris. These local considerations ought not to impede the
general interest. There is great weight in the argument, that the exporting
States will tax the produce of their uncommercial neighbours. The power of
regulating the trade between Pa & N. Jersey will never prevent the former
from taxing the latter. Nor will such a tax force a direct exportation from
N. Jersey. The advantages possessed by a large trading City, outweigh the
disadvantage of a moderate duty; and will retain the trade in that channel. If
no tax can be laid on exports, an embargo cannot be laid though in time of
war such a measure may be of critical importance. Tobacco, lumber and
live-stock are three objects belonging to different States, of which great
advantage might be made by a power to tax exports. To these may be added
Genseng and Masts for Ships by which a tax might be thrown on other
nations. The idea of supplying the West Indies with lumber from Nova
Scotia is one of the many follies of lord Sheffield's pamphlets. The State of
the Country also will change, and render duties on exports, as skins, beaver
& other peculiar raw materials, politic in the view of encouraging American
manufactures.
Mr Butler was strenuously opposed to a power over exports, as unjust
and alarming to the staple States.
Mr Langdon suggested a prohibition on the States from taxing the
produce of other States exported from their harbours.
Mr Dickenson. The power of taxing exports may be inconvenient at
present; but it must be of dangerous consequence to prohibit it with respect
to all articles and for ever. He thought it would be better to except particular
articles from the power.
Mr Sherman. It is best to prohibit the National legislature in all cases.
The States will never give up all power over trade. An enumeration of
particular articles would be difficult invidious and improper.
Mr Madison. As we ought to be governed by national and permanent
views, it is a sufficient argument for giving ye power over exports that a tax,
tho' it may not be expedient at present, may be so hereafter. A proper
regulation of exports may & probably will be necessary hereafter, and for
the same purposes as the regulation of imports; viz, for revenue–domestic
manufactures–and procuring equitable regulations from other nations. An
Embargo may be of absolute necessity, and can alone be effectuated by the
Genl authority. The regulation of trade between State and State cannot
effect more than indirectly to hinder a State from taxing its own exports; by
authorizing its Citizens to carry their commodities freely into a
neighbouring State which might decline taxing exports in order to draw into
its channel the trade of its neighbours. As to the fear of disproportionate
burthens on the more exporting States, it might be remarked that it was
agreed on all hands that the revenue wd principally be drawn from trade,
and as only a given revenue would be needed, it was not material whether
all should be drawn wholly from imports–or half from those, and half from
exports. The imports and exports must be pretty nearly equal in every
State–and relatively the same among the different States.
Mr Elseworth did not conceive an embargo by the Congress interdicted
by this section.
Mr McHenry conceived that power to be included in the power of war.
Mr Wilson. Pennsylvania exports the produce of Maryd N. Jersey,
Delaware & will by & by when the River Delaware is opened, export for
N. York. In favoring the general power over exports therefore, he opposed
the particular interest of his State. He remarked that the power had been
attacked by reasoning which could only have held good in case the Genl
Govt had been compelled, instead of authorized, to lay duties on exports. To
deny this power is to take from the Common Govt half the regulation of
trade. It was his opinion that a power over exports might be more effectual
than that over imports in obtaining beneficial treaties of commerce.
Mr Gerry was strenuously opposed to the power over exports. It might
be made use of to compel the States to comply with the will of the Genl
Government, and to grant it any new powers which might be demanded. We
have given it more power already than we know how will be exercised. It
will enable the Genl Govt to oppress the States as much as Ireland is
oppressed by Great Britain.
Mr Fitzimmons [36] would be agst a tax on exports to be laid
immediately; but was for giving a power of laying the tax when a proper
time may call for it. This would certainly be the case when America should
become a manufacturing Country. He illustrated his argument by the duties
in G. Britain on wool &c.
[36] "Mr. Fitzsimons is a Merchant of considerable talents, and speaks very well
I am told, in the Legislature of Pennsylvania. He is about 40 years old."–Pierce's
Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 328.
Col. Mason. If he were for reducing the States to mere corporations as
seemed to be the tendency of some arguments, he should be for subjecting
their exports as well as imports to a power of general taxation. He went on a
principle often advanced & in which he concurred, that "a majority when
interested will oppress the minority." This maxim had been verified by our
own Legislature (of Virginia). If we compare the States in this point of view
the 8 Northern States have an interest different from the five Southn States;
and have in one branch of the legislature 36 votes agst 29. and in the other
in the proportion of 8 agst 5. The Southern States had therefore ground for
their suspicions. The case of Exports was not the same with that of imports.
The latter were the same throughout the States; the former very different.
As to Tobacco other nations do raise it, and are capable of raising it as well
as Virga &c. The impolicy of taxing that article had been demonstrated by
the experiment of Virginia.
Mr Clymer [37] remarked that every State might reason with regard to its
particular productions, in the same manner as the Southern States. The
middle States may apprehend an oppression of their wheat flour, provisions
&c. and with more reason, as these articles were exposed to a competition
in foreign markets not incident to Tobo rice &c. They may apprehend also
combinations agst them between the Eastern & Southern States as much as
the latter can apprehend them between the Eastern & middle. He moved as
a qualification of the power of taxing Exports that it should be restrained to
regulations of trade by inserting after the word "duty" sect 4 art VII the
words, "for the purpose of revenue."
[37] "Mr. Clymer is a Lawyer of some abilities;–he is a respectable Man and
much esteemed. Mr. Clymer is about 40 years old."–Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist.
Rev., iii., 328.
On question on Mr Clymer's motion
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Madison. In order to require 2/3 of each House to tax exports, as a
lesser evil than a total prohibition moved to insert the words "unless by
consent of two thirds of the Legislature."
Mr Wilson 2ds and on this question, it passed in the Negative.
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va no (Col. Mason, Mr Randolph Mr Blair no. Genl
Washington & J. M. ay.) N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Question on Sect: 4. Art VII. as far as to "no tax shl be laid on exports"–
it passed in the affirmative.
N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. (Genl W. & J. M. no) N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr L. Martin, proposed to vary the Sect: 4. art VII so as to allow a
prohibition or tax on the importation of slaves. 1. as five slaves are to be
counted as 3 free men in the apportionment of Representatives; such a
clause would leave an encouragement to this trafic. 2. slaves weakened one
part of the Union which the other parts were bound to protect; the privilege
of importing them was therefore unreasonable. 3. it was inconsistent with
the principles of the revolution and dishonorable to the American character
to have such a feature in the Constitution.
Mr Rutlidge did not see how the importation of slaves could be
encouraged by this section. He was not apprehensive of insurrections and
would readily exempt the other States from the obligation to protect the
Southern against them. Religion & humanity had nothing to do with this
question. Interest alone is the governing principle with nations. The true
question at present is whether the Southn States shall or shall not be parties
to the Union. If the Northern States consult their interest, they will not
oppose the increase of slaves which will increase the commodities of which
they will become the carriers.
Mr Elseworth was for leaving the clause as it stands, let every State
import what it pleases. The morality or wisdom of slavery are
considerations belonging to the States themselves. What enriches a part
enriches the whole, and the States are the best judges of their particular
interest. The old confederation had not meddled with this point, and he did
not see any greater necessity for bringing it within the policy of the new
one.
Mr Pinkney. South Carolina can never receive the plan if it prohibits the
slave trade. In every proposed extension of the powers of Congress, that
State has expressly & watchfully excepted that of meddling with the
importation of negroes. If the States be all left at liberty on this subject,
S. Carolina may perhaps by degrees do of herself what is wished, as
Virginia & Maryland already have done.
Adjourned.
W         A      22.    C         .
Art VII sect 4. resumed. Mr Sherman was for leaving the clause as it
stands. He disapproved of the slave trade; yet as the States were now
possessed of the right to import slaves, as the public good did not require it
to be taken from them, & as it was expedient to have as few objections as
possible to the proposed scheme of Government, he thought it best to leave
the matter as we find it. He observed that the abolition of Slavery seemed to
be going on in the U. S. & that the good sense of the several States would
probably by degrees compleat it. He urged on the Convention the necessity
of despatching its business.
Col. Mason. This infernal traffic originated in the avarice of British
Merchants. The British Govt constantly checked the attempts of Virginia to
put a stop to it. The present question concerns not the importing States
alone but the whole Union. The evil of having slaves was experienced
during the late war. Had slaves been treated as they might have been by the
Enemy, they would have proved dangerous instruments in their hands. But
their folly dealt by the slaves, as it did by the Tories. He mentioned the
dangerous insurrections of the slaves in Greece and Sicily; and the
instructions given by Cromwell to the Commissioners sent to Virginia, to
arm the servants & slaves, in case other means of obtaining its submission
should fail. Maryland & Virginia he said had already prohibited the
importation of slaves expressly. N. Carolina had done the same in
substance. All this would be in vain, if s. Carolina & Georgia be at liberty to
import. The Western people are already calling out for slaves for their new
lands, and will fill that Country with slaves if they can be got thro'
S. Carolina & Georgia. Slavery discourages arts & manufactures. The poor
despise labor when performed by slaves. They prevent the immigration of
Whites, who really enrich & strengthen a Country. They produce the most
pernicious effect on manners. Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant.
They bring the judgment of heaven on a Country. As nations can not be
rewarded or punished in the next world they must be in this. By an
inevitable chain of causes & effects providence punishes national sins, by
national calamities. He lamented that some of our Eastern brethren had
from a lust of gain embarked in this nefarious traffic. As to the States being
in possession of the Right to import, this was the case with many other
rights, now to be properly given up. He held it essential in every point of
view that the Genl Govt should have power to prevent the increase of
slavery.
Mr Elseworth. As he had never owned a slave could not judge of the
effects of slavery on character. He said however that if it was to be
considered in a moral light we ought to go farther and free those already in
the Country.–As slaves also multiply so fast in Virginia & Maryland that it
is cheaper to raise than import them, whilst in the sickly rice swamps
foreign supplies are necessary, if we go no farther than is urged, we shall be
unjust towards S. Carolina & Georgia. Let us not intermeddle. As
population increases, poor laborers will be so plenty as to render slaves
useless. Slavery in time will not be a speck in our Country. Provision is
already made in Connecticut for abolishing it. And the abolition has already
taken place in Massachusetts. As to the danger of insurrections from foreign
influence, that will become a motive to kind treatment of the slaves.
Mr Pinkney. If slavery be wrong, it is justified by the example of all the
world. He cited the case of Greece Rome & other antient States; the
sanction given by France England, Holland & other modern States. In all
ages one half of mankind have been slaves. If the S. States were let alone
they will probably of themselves stop importations. He wd himself as a
citizen of S. Carolina vote for it. An attempt to take away the right as
proposed will produce serious objections to the Constitution which he
wished to see adopted.
General Pinkney declared it to be his firm opinion that if himself & all
his colleagues were to sign the Constitution & use their personal influence,
it would be of no avail towards obtaining the assent of their Constituents.
S. Carolina & Georgia cannot do without slaves. As to Virginia she will
gain by stopping the importations. Her slaves will rise in value, & she has
more than she wants. It would be unequal to require S. C. & Georgia to
confederate on such unequal terms. He said the Royal assent before the
Revolution had never been refused to S. Carolina as to Virginia. He
contended that the importation of slaves would be for the interest of the
whole Union. The more slaves, the more produce to employ the carrying
trade; The more consumption also, and the more of this, the more revenue
for the common treasury. He admitted it to be reasonable that slaves should
be dutied like other imports, but should consider a rejection of the clause as
an exclusion of S. Carola from the Union.
Mr Baldwin had conceived national objects alone to be before the
Convention, not such as like the present were of a local nature. Georgia was
decided on this point. That State has always hitherto supposed a Genl
Governmt to be the pursuit of the central States who wished to have a
vortex for every thing–that her distance would preclude her from equal
advantage–& that she could not prudently purchase it by yielding national
powers. From this it might be understood in what light she would view an
attempt to abridge one of her favorite prerogatives. If left to herself, she
may probably put a stop to the evil. As one ground for this conjecture, he
took notice of the sect of –— which he said was a respectable class of
people, who carried their ethics beyond the mere equality of men, extending
their humanity to the claims of the whole animal creation.
Mr Wilson observed that if S. C. & Georgia were themselves disposed to
get rid of the importation of slaves in a short time as had been suggested,
they would never refuse to Unite because the importation might be
prohibited. As the section now stands all articles imported are to be taxed.
Slaves alone are exempt. This is in fact a bounty on that article.
Mr Gerry thought we had nothing to do with the conduct of the States as
to Slaves, but ought to be careful not to give any sanction to it.
Mr Dickenson considered it as inadmissible on every principle of honor
& safety that the importation of slaves should be authorized to the States by
the Constitution. The true question was whether the national happiness
would be promoted or impeded by the importation, and this question ought
to be left to the National Govt not to the States particularly interested. If
Engd & France permit slavery, slaves are at the same time excluded from
both those kingdoms. Greece and Rome were made unhappy by their
slaves. He could not believe that the Southn States would refuse to
confederate on the account apprehended; especially as the power was not
likely to be immediately exercised by the Genl Government.
Mr Williamson stated the law of N. Carolina on the subject, to-wit that it
did not directly prohibit the importation of slaves. It imposed a duty of £5
on each slave imported from Africa, £10 on each from elsewhere, & £50 on
each from a State licensing manumission. He thought the S. States could
not be members of the Union if the clause shd be rejected, and that it was
wrong to force any thing down not absolutely necessary, and which any
State must disagree to.
Mr King thought the subject should be considered in a political light
only. If two States will not agree to the Constitution as stated on one side,
he could affirm with equal belief on the other, that great & equal opposition
would be experienced from the other States. He remarked on the exemption
of slaves from duty whilst every other import was subjected to it, as an
inequality that could not fail to strike the commercial sagacity of the Northn
& Middle States.
Mr Langdon was strenuous for giving the power to the Genl Govt. He cd
not with a good conscience leave it with the States who could then go on
with the traffic, without being restrained by the opinions here given that
they will themselves cease to import slaves.
Genl Pinkney thought himself bound to declare candidly that he did not
think S. Carolina would stop her importations of slaves in any short time,
but only stop them occasionally as she now does. He moved to commit the
clause that slaves might be made liable to an equal tax with other imports
which he thought right & wch wd remove one difficulty that had been
started.
Mr Rutlidge. If the Convention thinks that N. C. S. C. & Georgia will
ever agree to the plan, unless their right to import slaves be untouched, the
expectation is vain. The people of those States will never be such fools as to
give up so important an interest. He was strenuous agst striking out the
section, and seconded the motion of Genl Pinkney for a commitment.
Mr Govr Morris wished the whole subject to be committed including the
clauses relating to taxes on exports & to a navigation act. These things may
form a bargain among the Northern & Southern States.
Mr Butler declared that he never would agree to the power of taxing
exports.
Mr Sherman said it was better to let the S. States import slaves than to
part with them, if they made that a sine qua non. He was opposed to a tax
on slaves imported as making the matter worse, because it implied they
were property. He acknowledged that if the power of prohibiting the
importation should be given to the Genl Government that it would be
exercised. He thought it would be its duty to exercise the power.
Mr Read was for the commitment provided the clause concerning taxes
on exports should also be committed.
Mr Sherman observed that that clause had been agreed to & therefore
could not be committed.
Mr Randolph was for committing in order that some middle ground
might, if possible, be found. He could never agree to the clause as it stands.
He wd sooner risk the constitution. He dwelt on the dilemma to which the
Convention was exposed. By agreeing to the clause, it would revolt the
Quakers, the Methodists, and many others in the States having no slaves.
On the other hand, two States might be lost to the Union. Let us then, he
said, try the chance of a commitment.
On the question for committing the remaining part of Sect. 4 & 5. of Art:
7.
N. H. no. Mass. abtt Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no.
Maryd ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Pinkney & Mr Langdon moved to commit Sect. 6. as to navigation
act by two thirds of each House.
Mr Gorham did not see the propriety of it. Is it meant to require a greater
proportion of votes? He desired it to be remembered that the Eastern States
had no motive to Union but a commercial one. They were able to protect
themselves. They were not afraid of external danger, and did not need the
aid of the Southn States.
Mr Wilson wished for a commitment in order to reduce the proportion of
votes required.
Mr Elseworth was for taking the plan as it is. This widening of opinions
has a threatening aspect. If we do not agree on this middle & moderate
ground he was afraid we should lose two States, with such others as may be
disposed to stand aloof, should fly into a variety of shapes & directions, and
most probably into several confederations and not without bloodshed.
On Question for committing 6 Sect. as to navigation act to a member
from each State—
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The Committee appointed were Mr Langdon, King, Johnson, Livingston,
Clymer, Dickenson, L. Martin, Madison, Williamson, C. C. Pinkney, &
Baldwin.
To this committee were referred also the two clauses above mentioned,
of the 4 & 5. Sect: of Art. 7.
Mr Rutlidge from the Committee to whom were referred on the 18 &
20th instant the propositions of Mr Madison & Mr Pinkney made the Report
following: [38]
[38] Madison's Note says: ("Here insert Report from Journal of the Convention
of the date.") It is found on p. 227, 228, of the Journal and is as above.
"The committee report, that in their opinion the following additions
should be made to the report now before the convention, namely,
"At the end of the first clause of the first section of the seventh
article add, 'for payment of the debts and necessary expenses of the
United States; provided that no law for raising any branch of revenue,
except what may be specially appropriated for the payment of interest
on debts or loans, shall continue in force for more than –— years.'
"At the end of the second clause, second section, seventh article,
add, 'and with Indians, within the limits of any state, not subject to the
laws thereof.'
"At the end of the sixteenth clause of the second section, seventh
article, add, 'and to provide, as may become necessary, from time to
time, for the well managing and securing the common property and
general interests and welfare of the United States in such manner as
shall not interfere with the governments of individual states, in matters
which respect only their internal police, or for which their individual
authority may be competent.'
"At the end of the first section, tenth article, add, 'he shall be of the
age of thirty-five years, and a citizen of the United States, and shall
have been an inhabitant thereof for twenty-one years.'
"After the second section of the tenth article, insert the following as
a third section:
"'The President of the United States shall have a privy council,
which shall consist of the president of the senate, the speaker of
the house of representatives, the chief justice of the supreme
court, and the principal officer in the respective departments of
foreign affairs, domestic affairs, war, marine, and finance, as such
departments of office shall from time to time be established,
whose duty it shall be to advise him in matters respecting the
execution of his office, which he shall think proper to lay before
them: but their advice shall not conclude him, nor affect his
responsibility for the measures which he shall adopt.'
"At the end of the second section of the eleventh article, add, 'the
judges of the supreme court shall be triable by the senate, on
impeachment by the house of representatives.'
"Between the fourth and fifth lines of the third section of the
eleventh article, after the word 'controversies,' insert, 'between the
United States and an individual state, or the United States and an
individual person.'"
A motion to rescind the order of the House respecting the hours of
meeting & adjourning, was negatived:
Mass: Pa Del. Mard ay. N. H. Con: N. J. Va N. C. S. C.
Geo. no.
Mr Gerry and Mr McHenry moved to insert after the 2d Sect. Art: 7, the
clause following, to wit, "The Legislature shall pass no bill of attainder nor
any ex post facto law." [39]
[39] The proceedings on this motion involving the two questions on "attainders
and ex post facto laws," are not so fully stated in the printed Journal.–Madison's
Note.
Mr Gerry urged the necessity of this prohibition, which he said was
greater in the National than the State Legislature, because the number of
members in the former being fewer, they were on that account the more to
be feared.
Mr Govr Morris thought the precaution as to ex post facto laws
unnecessary; but essential as to bills of attainder.
Mr Elseworth contended that there was no lawyer, no civilian who would
not say that ex post facto laws were void of themselves. It cannot then be
necessary to prohibit them.
Mr Wilson was against inserting any thing in the Constitution as to ex
post facto laws. It will bring reflections on the Constitution–and proclaim
that we are ignorant of the first principles of Legislation, or are constituting
a Government that will be so.
The question being divided, the first part of the motion relating to bills
of attainder was agreed to nem contradicente.
On the second part relating to ex post facto laws—
Mr Carrol remarked that experience overruled all other calculations. It
had proved that in whatever light they might be viewed by civilians or
others, the State Legislatures had passed them, and they had taken effect.
Mr Wilson. If these prohibitions in the State Constitutions have no effect,
it will be useless to insert them in this Constitution. Besides, both sides will
agree to the principle, and will differ as to its application.
Mr Williamson. Such a prohibitory clause is in the Constitution of
N. Carolina, and tho it has been violated, it has done good there & may do
good here, because the Judges can take hold of it.
Docr Johnson thought the clause unnecessary, and implying an improper
suspicion of the National Legislature.
Mr Rutlidge was in favor of the clause.
On the question for inserting the prohibition of ex post facto laws.
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay.
Md ay. Virga ay. N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The report of the committee of 5. made by Mr Rutlidge, was taken up
and then postponed that each member might furnish himself with a copy.
The Report of the Committee of Eleven delivered in & entered on the
Journal of the 21st inst. was then taken up, and the first clause containing
the words "The Legislature of the U. S. shall have power to fulfil the
engagements which have been entered into by Congress" being under
consideration,
Mr Elseworth argued that they were unnecessary. The U. S. heretofore
entered into Engagements by Congs who were their Agents. They will
hereafter be bound to fulfil them by their new agents.
Mr Randolph thought such a provision necessary: for though the U.
States will be bound, the new Govt will have no authority in the case unless
it be given to them.
Mr Madison thought it necessary to give the authority in order to prevent
misconstruction. He mentioned the attempts made by the Debtors to British
subjects to shew that contracts under the old Government, were dissolved
by the Revolution which destroyed the political identity of the Society.
Mr Gerry thought it essential that some explicit provision should be
made on this subject, so that no pretext might remain for getting rid of the
public engagements.
Mr Govr Morris moved by way of amendment to substitute–"The
Legislature shall discharge the debts & fulfil the engagements of the U.
States."
It was moved to vary the amendment by striking out "discharge the
debts" & to insert "liquidate the claims," which being negatived,
The amendment moved by Mr Govr Morris was agreed to all the States
being in the affirmative.
It was moved & 2ded to strike the following words out of the 2d clause of
the report "and the authority of training the militia according to the
discipline prescribed by the U. S." Before a question was taken
The House adjourned.
T        I  C          A  : 23, 1787
The Report of the Committee of Eleven made Aug: 21. being taken up,
and the following clause being under consideration to wit "To make laws
for organizing, arming & disciplining the Militia, and for governing such
parts of them as may be employed in the service of the U. S. reserving to
the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and authority of
training the militia according to the discipline prescribed."
Mr Sherman moved to strike out the last member "and authority of
training" &c. He thought it unnecessary. The States will have this authority
of course if not given up.
Mr Elseworth doubted the propriety of striking out the sentence. The
reason assigned applies as well to the other reservation of the appointment
to offices. He remarked at the same time that the term discipline was of vast
extent and might be so expounded as to include all power on the subject.
Mr King, by way of explanation, said that by organizing, the Committee
meant, proportioning the officers & men–by arming, specifying the kind
size & caliber of arms–& by disciplining, prescribing the manual exercise
evolutions &c.
Mr Sherman withdrew his motion.
Mr Gerry. This power in the U. S. as explained is making the States drill-
sergeants. He had as lief let the Citizens of Massachusetts be disarmed, as
to take the command from the States, and subject them to the Genl
Legislature. It would be regarded as a system of Despotism.
Mr Madison observed that "arming" as explained did not extend to
furnishing arms; nor the term "disciplining" to penalties & Courts Martial
for enforcing them.
Mr King added to his former explanation that arming meant not only to
provide for uniformity of arms, but included the authority to regulate the
modes of furnishing, either by the militia themselves, the State
Governments, or the National Treasury; that laws for disciplining, must
involve penalties and every thing necessary for enforcing penalties.
Mr Dayton moved to postpone the paragraph, in order to take up the
following proposition.
"To establish an uniform & general system of discipline for the
Militia of these States, and to make laws for organizing, arming,
disciplining & governing such part of them as may be employed in the
service of the U. S., reserving to the States respectively the
appointment of the officers, and all authority over the militia not herein
given to the General Government."
On the question to postpone in favor of this proposition: it passed in the
Negative.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. P. no. Del. no.
Maryd ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Mr Elseworth & Mr Sherman moved to postpone the 2d clause in favor
of the following
"To establish an uniformity of arms, exercise & organization for the
militia, and to provide for the Government of them when called into
the service of the U. States."
The object of this proposition was to refer the plan for the Militia to the
General Govt but to leave the execution of it to the State Govts.
Mr. Langdon said he could not understand the jealousy expressed by
some Gentlemen. The General & State Govts were not enemies to each
other, but different institutions for the good of the people of America. As
one of the people he could say, the National Govt is mine, the State Govt is
mine. In transferring power from one to the other, I only take out of my left
hand what it cannot so well use, and put it into my right hand where it can
be better used.
Mr Gerry thought it was rather taking out of the right hand & putting it
into the left. Will any man say that liberty will be as safe in the hands of
eighty or a hundred men taken from the whole continent, as in the hands of
two or three hundred taken from a single State.
Mr Dayton was against so absolute a uniformity. In some States there
ought to be a greater proportion of cavalry than in others. In some places
rifles would be most proper, in others muskets &c.
Genl Pinkney preferred the clause reported by the Committee, extending
the meaning of it to the case of fines &c.
Mr Madison. The primary object is to secure an effectual discipline of
the Militia. This will no more be done if left to the States separately than
the requisitions have been hitherto paid by them. The States neglect their
Militia now, and the more they are consolidated into one nation, the less
each will rely on its own interior provisions for its safety & the less prepare
its Militia for that purpose; in like manner as the militia of a State would
have been still more neglected than it has been if each county had been
independently charged with the care of its Militia. The Discipline of the
Militia is evidently a National concern, and ought to be provided for in the
National Constitution.
Mr L. Martin was confident that the States would never give up the
power over the Militia; and that, if they were to do so, the militia would be
less attended to by the Genl than by the State Governments.
Mr Randolph asked what danger there Could be that the Militia could be
brought into the field and made to commit suicide on themselves. This is a
power that cannot from its nature be abused, unless indeed the whole mass
should be corrupted. He was for trammelling the Genl Govt whenever there
was danger, but here there could be none. He urged this as an essential
point; observing that the Militia were every where neglected by the State
Legislatures, the members of which courted popularity too much to enforce
a proper discipline. Leaving the appointment of officers to the States
protects the people agst every apprehension that could produce murmur.
On Question on Mr Elsworth's Motion
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
A motion was then made to recommit the 2d clause which was
negatived.
On the question to agree to the 1st part of the clause, namely
"To make laws for organizing arming & disciplining the Militia, and
for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of
the U. S."
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Madison moved to amend the next part of the clause so as to read
"reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, under
the rank of General officers."
Mr Sherman considered this as absolutely inadmissible. He said that if
the people should be so far asleep as to allow the most influential officers of
the militia to be appointed by the Genl Government, every man of
discernment would rouse them by sounding the alarm to them.
Mr Gerry. Let us at once destroy the State Govts have an Executive for
life or hereditary, and a proper Senate, and then there would be some
consistency in giving full powers to the Genl Govt but as the States are not
to be abolished, he wondered at the attempts that were made to give powers
inconsistent with their existence. He warned the Convention agst pushing
the experiment too far. Some people will support a plan of vigorous
Government at every risk. Others of a more democratic cast will oppose it
with equal determination, and a Civil war may be produced by the conflict.
Mr Madison. As the greatest danger is that of disunion of the States, it is
necessary to guard agst it by sufficient powers to the Common govt and as
the greatest danger to liberty is from large standing armies, it is best to
prevent them by an effectual provision for a good Militia.
On the Question to agree to Mr Madison's motion
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [40]
[40] In the printed Journal, Geo: no.–Madison's Note.
On the question to agree to the "reserving to the States the appointment
of the officers." It was agreed to nem: contrad:
On the question on the clause "and the authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by the U. S."—
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question to agree to Art. VII. Sect. 7. as reported it passed nem:
contrad.
Mr Pinkney urged the necessity of preserving foreign Ministers & other
officers of the U. S. independent of external influence and moved to insert,
after Art. VII Sect 7. the clause following–"No person holding any office of
profit or trust under the U. S. shall without the consent of the Legislature,
accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever, from
any King, Prince or foreign State", which passed nem: contrad:
Mr Rutlidge moved to amend Art: VIII to read as follows,
"This Constitution & the laws of the U. S. made in pursuance
thereof, and all the Treaties made under the authority of the U. S. shall
be the supreme law of the several States and of their citizens and
inhabitants; and the Judges in the several States shall be bound thereby
in their decisions, any thing in the Constitutions or laws of the several
States, to the contrary notwithstanding."
which was agreed to, nem: contrad:
Art: IX being next for consideration,
Mr Govr Morris argued agst the appointment of officers by the Senate.
He considered the body as too numerous for the purpose; as subject to
cabal; and as devoid of responsibility. If Judges were to be tried by the
Senate according to a late report of a Committee it was particularly wrong
to let the Senate have the filling of vacancies which its own decrees were to
create.
Mr Wilson was of the same opinion & for like reasons.
The art. IX. being waved, and Art. VII. Sect. 1. resumed,
Mr Govr Morris moved to strike the following words out of the 18 clause
"enforce treaties" as being superfluous, since treaties were to be "laws"–
which was agreed to nem: contrad:
Mr Govr Morris moved to alter 1st part. of 18. clause Sect. 1. art VII so
as to read "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions"–which was agreed to
nem: contrad:
On the question then to agree to the 18 clause of Sect. 1. Art: 7. as
amended it passed in the affirmative nem: contrad.
Mr C. Pinkney moved to add as an additional power to be vested in the
Legislature of the U. S. "To negative all laws passed by the several States
interfering in the opinion of the legislature with the general interests and
harmony of the Union; provided that two thirds of the members of each
House assent to the same." This principle he observed had formerly been
agreed to. He considered the precaution as essentially necessary. The
objection drawn from the predominance of the large States had been
removed by the equality established in the Senate. [41]
[41]
"R        A  t 22. 87.
"D    S  ,
"I have still some hope that I shall hear from you of ye reinstatement of ye
negative–as it is certainly ye only means by which the several Legislatures can
be restrained from disturbing ye order & harmony of ye whole, & ye governmt
render'd properly national, & one. I should suppose yt some of its former
opponents must by this time have seen ye necessity of advocating it, if they wish
to support their own principles."
(James McClurg to Madison–Mad. MSS.)
Mr Broome 2ded the proposition.
Mr Sherman thought it unnecessary; the laws of the General Government
being supreme & paramount to the State laws according to the plan, as it
now stands.
Mr Madison proposed that it should be committed. He had been from the
beginning a friend to the principle; but thought the modification might be
made better.
Mr Mason wished to know how the power was to be exercised. Are all
laws whatever to be brought up? Is no road nor bridge to be established
without the Sanction of the General Legislature? Is this to sit constantly in
order to receive & revise the State Laws?–He did not mean by these
remarks to condemn the expedient, but he was apprehensive that great
objections would lie agst it.
Mr Williamson thought it unnecessary, having been already decided, a
revival of the question was a waste of time.
Mr Wilson considered this as the key-stone wanted to compleat the wide
arch of Government we are raising. The power of self-defence had been
urged as necessary for the State Governments. It was equally necessary for
the General Government. The firmness of Judges is not of itself sufficient.
Something further is requisite. It will be better to prevent the passage of an
improper law, than to declare it void when passed.
Mr Rutlidge. If nothing else, this alone would damn and ought to damn
the Constitution. Will any State ever agree to be bound hand & foot in this
manner. It is worse than making mere corporations of them whose bye laws
would not be subject to this shackle.
Mr Elseworth observed that the power contended for wd require either
that all laws of the State Legislatures should previously to their taking effect
be transmitted to the Genl Legislature, or be repealable by the Latter; or that
the State Executives should be appointed by the Genl Government, and
have a controul over the State laws. If the last was meditated let it be
declared.
Mr Pinkney declared that he thought the State Executives ought to be so
appointed with such a controul, & that it would be so provided if another
Convention should take place.
Mr Governr Morris did not see the utility or practicability of the
proposition of Mr Pinkney, but wished it to be referred to the consideration
of a Committee.
Mr Langdon was in favor of the proposition. He considered it as
resolvable into the question whether the extent of the National Constitution
was to be judged of by the Genl or the State Governments.
On the question for commitment, it passed in the negative.
N. H. ay. Massts no. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Pinkney then withdrew his proposition.
The 1st sect. of Art: VII being so amended as to read "The Legislature
shall fulfil the engagements and discharge the debts of the U. S. & shall
have the power to lay & collect taxes duties imposts & excises," was agreed
to.
Mr Butler expressed his dissatisfaction lest it should compel payment as
well to the Blood-suckers who had speculated on the distresses of others, as
to those who had fought & bled for their country. He would be ready he
said to-morrow to vote for a discrimination between those classes of people,
and gave notice that he should move for a reconsideration.
Art IX Sect. 1. being resumed, to wit "The Senate of the U. S. shall have
power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the
Supreme Court."
Mr Madison observed that the Senate represented the States alone, and
that for this as well as other obvious reasons it was proper that the President
should be an agent in Treaties.
Mr Govr Morris did not know that he should agree to refer the making of
Treaties to the Senate at all, but for the present wd move to add, as an
amendment to the section after "Treaties"–"but no Treaty shall be binding
on the U. S. which is not ratified by a law."
Mr Madison suggested the inconvenience of requiring a legal ratification
of treaties of alliance for the purposes of war &c &c."
Mr Ghorum. Many other disadvantages must be experienced if treaties of
peace & all negotiations are to be previously ratified–and if not previously,
the Ministers would be at a loss how to proceed. What would be the case in
G. Britain if the King were to proceed in this manner. American Ministers
must go abroad not instructed by the same Authority (as will be the case
with other Ministers) which is to ratify their proceedings.
Mr Govr Morris. As to treaties of alliance, they will oblige foreign
powers to send their ministers here the very thing we should wish for. Such
treaties could not be otherwise made, if his amendment shd succeed. In
general he was not solicitious to multiply & facilitate Treaties. He wished
none to be made with G. Britain, till she should be at war. Then a good
bargain might be made with her. So with other foreign powers. The more
difficulty in making treaties, the more value will be set on them.
Mr Wilson. In the most important Treaties, the King of G. Britain being
obliged to resort to Parliament for the execution of them, is under the same
fetters as the amendment of Mr Morris' will impose on the Senate. It was
refused yesterday to permit even the Legislature to lay duties on exports.
Under the clause without the amendment, the Senate alone can make a
Treaty, requiring all the Rice of S. Carolina to be sent to some one
particular port.
Mr Dickinson concurred in the amendment, as most safe and proper, tho'
he was sensible it was unfavorable to the little States, wch would otherwise
have an equal share in making Treaties.
Docr Johnson thought there was something of solecism in saying that the
acts of a minister with plenipotentiary powers from one Body, should
depend for ratification on another Body. The Example of the King of G. B.
was not parallel. Full & compleat power was vested in him. If the
Parliament should fail to provide the necessary means of execution, the
Treaty would be violated.
Mr Ghorum in answer to Mr Govr Morris, said that negotiations on the
spot were not to be desired by us, especially if the whole Legislature is to
have any thing to do with Treaties. It will be generally influenced by two or
three men, who will be corrupted by the Ambassadors here. In such a
Government as ours, it is necessary to guard against the Government itself
being seduced.
Mr Randolph observing that almost every Speaker had made objections
to the clause as it stood, moved in order to a further consideration of the
subject, that the motion of Mr Govr Morris should be postponed, and on this
question It was lost the States being equally divided.
Massts no. Cont no. N. J. ay. Pena ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On Mr Govr Morris motion
Massts no. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no.
Va no. N. C. divd. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The several clauses of Sect: 1. Art IX, were then separately postponed
after inserting "and other public ministers" next after "ambassadors."
Mr Madison hinted for consideration, whether a distinction might not be
made between different sorts of Treaties–allowing the President & Senate to
make Treaties eventual and of alliance for limited terms–and requiring the
concurrence of the whole Legislature in other Treaties.
The 1st Sect Art IX. was finally referred nem: con: to the committee of
Five, and the House then
Adjourned.
F      A      24. 1787. I  C         
Governour Livingston, from the Committee of Eleven, to whom were
referred the two remaining clauses of the 4th Sect & the 5 & 6 Sect: of the
7th. Art: delivered in the following Report:
"Strike out so much of the 4th Sect: as was referred to the
Committee and insert–'The migration or importation of such persons as
the several States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Legislature prior to the year 1800, but a tax or duty
may be imposed on such migration or importation at a rate not
exceeding the average of the duties laid on imports.'"
"The 5 Sect: to remain as in the Report."
"The 6 Sect, to be stricken out."
Mr Butler, according to notice, moved that clause 1st sect. 1. of art VII,
as to the discharge of debts, be reconsidered tomorrow. He dwelt on the
division of opinion concerning the domestic debts, and the different
pretensions of the different classes of holders. Genl Pinkney 2ded him.
Mr Randolph wished for a reconsideration in order to better the
expression, and to provide for the case of the State debts as is done by
Congress.
On the question for reconsidering
N. H. no. Mass. ay. Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pena absent.
Del. ay. Md no. Va ay. N. C. absent. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.–
and tomorrow assigned for the reconsideration.
Sect: 2 & 3 of art: IX being taken up,
Mr Rutlidge said this provision for deciding controversies between the
States was necessary under the Confederation, but will be rendered
unnecessary by the National Judiciary now to be established, and moved to
strike it out.
Docr Johnson 2ded the motion.
Mr Sherman concurred: so did Mr Dayton.
Mr Williamson was for postponing instead of striking out, in order to
consider whether this might not be a good provision, in cases where the
Judiciary were interested or too closely connected with the parties.
Mr Ghorum had doubts as to striking out. The Judges might be
connected with the States being parties–He was inclined to think the mode
proposed in the clause would be more satisfactory than to refer such cases
to the Judiciary.
On the Question for postponing the 2d & 3d Section it passed in the
negative.
N. H. ay. Massts no. Cont no. N. J. no. Pena abst. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Mr Wilson urged the striking out, the Judiciary being a better provision.
On Question for striking out 2 & 3 Sections Art: IX
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa abst. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Art X. Sect. 1. "The Executive power of the U. S. shall be vested in a
single person. His stile shall be "The President of the U. S. of America" and
his title shall be "His Excellency." He shall be elected by ballot by the
Legislature. He shall hold his office during the term of seven years; but
shall not be elected a second time."
On the question for vesting the power in a single person–It was agreed to
nem: con: So also on the stile and title.
Mr Rutlidge moved to insert "joint" before the word "ballot," as the most
convenient mode of electing.
Mr Sherman objected to it as depriving the States represented in the
Senate of the negative intended them in that house.
Mr Ghorum said it was wrong to be considering at every turn whom the
Senate would represent. The public good was the true object to be kept in
view. Great delay and confusion would ensue if the two Houses shd vote
separately, each having a negative on the choice of the other.
Mr Dayton. It might be well for those not to consider how the Senate
was constituted, whose interest it was to keep it out of sight.–If the
amendment should be agreed to, a joint ballot would in fact give the
appointment to one House. He could never agree to the clause with such an
amendment. There could be no doubt of the two Houses separately
concurring in the same person for President. The importance & necessity of
the case would ensure a concurrence.
Mr Carrol moved to strike out "by the Legislature" and insert "by the
people." Mr Wilson 2ded. him & on the question
N. H. no. Massts no. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Brearly was opposed to the motion for inserting the word "joint." The
argument that the small States should not put their hands into the pockets of
the large ones did not apply in this case.
Mr Wilson urged the reasonableness of giving the larger States a larger
share of the appointment, and the danger of delay from a disagreement of
the two Houses. He remarked also that the Senate had peculiar powers
balancing the advantage given by a joint ballot in this case to the other
branch of the Legislature.
Mr Langdon. This general officer ought to be elected by the joint &
general voice. In N. Hampshire the mode of separate votes by the two
Houses was productive of great difficulties. The negative of the Senate
would hurt the feelings of the man elected by the votes of the other branch.
He was for inserting "joint" tho' unfavorable to N. Hampshire as a small
State.
Mr Wilson remarked that as the President of the Senate was to be the
President of the U. S. that Body in cases of vacancy might have an interest
in throwing dilatory obstacles in the way, if its separate concurrence should
be required.
Mr Madison. If the amendment be agreed to the rule of voting will give
to the largest State, compared with the smallest, an influence as 4 to 1 only,
altho the population is as 10 to 1. This surely cannot be unreasonable as the
President is to act for the people not for the States. The President of the
Senate also is to be occasionally President of the U. S. and by his negative
alone can make 3/4 of the other branch necessary to the passage of a law.
This is another advantage enjoyed by the Senate.
On the question for inserting "joint," it passed in the affirmative.
N. H. ay. Massts ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay.
Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Mr Dayton then moved to insert, after the word "Legislatures" the words
"each State having one vote." Mr Brearly 2ded him, and on the question it
passed in the negative.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Mr Pinkney moved to insert after the word "Legislature" the words "to
which election a majority of the votes of the members present shall be
required" & on this question, it passed in the affirmative.
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Read moved "that in case the numbers for the two highest in votes
should be equal, then the President of the Senate shall have an additional
casting vote," which was disagreed to by a general negative.
Mr Govr Morris opposed the election of the President by the Legislature.
He dwelt on the danger of rendering the Executive uninterested in
maintaining the rights of his Station, as leading to Legislative tyranny. If the
Legislature have the Executive dependent on them, they can perpetuate &
support their usurpations by the influence of tax-gatherers & other officers,
by fleets armies &c. Cabal & corruption are attached to that mode of
election: so also is ineligibility a second time. Hence the Executive is
interested in Courting popularity in the Legislature by sacrificing his
Executive Rights; & then he can go into that Body, after the expiration of
his Executive office, and enjoy there the fruits of his policy. To these
considerations he added that rivals would be continually intriguing to oust
the President from his place. To guard against all these evils he moved that
the President "shall be chosen by Electors to be chosen by the People of the
several States." Mr Carrol 2ded him & on the question it passed in the
negative
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Dayton moved to postpone the consideration of the two last clauses
of Sect. 1. art X. which was disagreed to without a count of the States.
Mr Broome moved to refer the two clauses to a Committee of a member
from each State, & on the question, it failed the States being equally
divided.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct divd. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question taken on the first part of Mr Govr Morris's motion to wit
"shall be chosen by electors" as an abstract question, it failed the States
being equally divided,
N. H. no. Mas. abst. Ct divd. N. Jersey ay. Pa ay. Del. ay.
Md divd. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The consideration of the remaining clauses of Sect. 1. art. X. was then
postponed till tomorrow at the instance of the Deputies of New Jersey.
Sect. 2. Art: X being taken up, the word information was transposed &
inserted after "Legislature."
On motion of Mr Govr Morris, "he may" was struck out, & "and"
inserted before "recommend" in the clause 2d sect 2d art: X. in order to
make it the duty of the President to recommend, & thence prevent umbrage
or cavil at his doing it.
Mr Sherman objected to the sentence "and shall appoint officers in all
cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution." He admitted it to be
proper that many officers in the Executive Department should be so
appointed–but contended that many ought not, as general officers in the
army in time of peace &c. Herein lay the corruption in G. Britain. If the
Executive can model the army, he may set up an absolute Government;
taking advantage of the close of a war and an army commanded by his
creatures. James 2d was not obeyed by his officers because they had been
appointed by his predecessors not by himself. He moved to insert "or by
law" after the word "Constitution."
On motion of Mr Madison "officers" was struck out and "to offices"
inserted, in order to obviate doubts that he might appoint officers without a
previous creation of the offices by the Legislature.
On the question for inserting "or by law" as moved by Mr Sherman
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pena no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. absent. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Dickinson moved to strike out the words "and shall appoint to offices
in all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution" and insert–"and
shall appoint to all offices established by this Constitution, except in cases
herein otherwise provided for, and to all offices which may hereafter be
created by law."
Mr Randolph observed that the power of appointments was a formidable
one both in the Executive & Legislative hands–and suggested whether the
Legislature should not be left at liberty to refer appointments in some cases,
to some State authority.
Mr Dickenson's motion, it passed in the affirmative.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. abst. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Mr Dickinson then moved to annex to his last amendment "except where
by law the appointment shall be vested in the Legislatures or Executives of
the several States." Mr Randolph 2ded the motion.
Mr Wilson. If this be agreed to it will soon be a standing instruction from
the State Legislatures to pass no law creating offices, unless the appts be
referred to them.
Mr Sherman objected to "Legislatures" in the motion, which was struck
out by consent of the movers.
Mr Govr Morris. This would be putting it in the power of the States to
say, "You shall be viceroys but we will be viceroys over you"—
The motion was negatived without a Count of the States—
Ordered unanimously that the order respecting the adjournment at 4
OClock be repealed, & that in future the House assemble at 10 OC. &
adjourn at 3 OC.
Adjourned.

S        A      25. 1787. I  C         
The 1st clause of 1 Sect. of art: VII being reconsidered
Col. Mason objected to the term "shall"–fullfil the engagements &
discharge the debts &c. as too strong. It may be impossible to comply with
it. The Creditors should be kept in the same plight. They will in one respect
be necessarily and properly in a better. The Government will be more able
to pay them. The use of the term shall will beget speculations and increase
the pestilent practice of stock-jobbing. There was a great distinction
between original creditors & those who purchased fraudulently of the
ignorant and distressed. He did not mean to include those who have bought
Stock in open market. He was sensible of the difficulty of drawing the line
in this case, but he did not wish to preclude the attempt. Even fair
purchasers at 4. 5. 6. 8 for 1 did not stand on the same footing with the first
Holders, supposing them not to be blameable. The interest they receive
even in paper, is equal to their purchase money. What he particularly
wished was to leave the door open for buying up the securities, which he
thought would be precluded by the term "shall" as requiring nominal
payment, & which was not inconsistent with his ideas of public faith. He
was afraid also the word "shall," might extend to all the old continental
paper.
Mr Langdon wished to do no more than leave the Creditors in statu quo.
Mr Gerry said that for himself he had no interest in the question being
not possessed of more of the securities than would, by the interest, pay his
taxes. He would observe however that as the public had received the value
of the literal amount, they ought to pay that value to some body. The frauds
on the soldiers ought to have been foreseen. These poor & ignorant people
could not but part with their securities. There are other creditors who will
part with any thing rather than be cheated of the capital of their advances.
The interest of the States he observed was different on this point, some
having more, others less than their proportion of the paper. Hence the idea
of a scale for reducing its value had arisen. If the public faith would admit,
of which he was not clear, he would not object to a revision of the debt so
far as to compel restitution to the ignorant & distressed, who have been
defrauded. As to stock-jobbers he saw no reason for the censures thrown on
them. They keep up the value of the paper. Without them there would be no
market.
Mr Butler said he meant neither to increase nor diminish the security of
the Creditors.
Mr Randolph moved to postpone the clause in favor of the following
"All debts contracted & engagements entered into, by or under the authority
of Congs shall be as valid agst the U. States under this constitution as under
the Confederation."
Docr Johnson. The debts are debts of the U. S. of the great Body of
America. Changing the Government cannot change the obligation of the
U. S. which devolves of course on the new Government. Nothing was in his
opinion necessary to be said. If any thing, it should be a mere declaration as
moved by Mr Randolph.
Mr Govr Morris, said he never had become a public Creditor that he
might urge with more propriety the compliance with public faith. He had
always done so and always would, and preferr'd the term "shall" as the most
explicit. As to buying up the debt, the term "shall" was not inconsistent with
it, if provision be first made for paying the interest: if not, such an
expedient was a mere evasion. He was content to say nothing as the New
Government would be bound of course, but would prefer the clause with the
term "shall," because it would create many friends to the plan.
On Mr Randolph's Motion
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay.
Maryd ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Sherman thought it necessary to connect with the clause for laying
taxes duties &c. an express provision for the object of the old debts &c.–
and moved to add to the 1st clause of 1st sect. art VII "for the payment of
said debts and for the defraying the expences that shall be incurred for the
common defence and general welfare."
The proposition, as being unnecessary was disagreed to, Connecticut
alone, being in the affirmative.
The Report of the Committee of eleven (see friday the 24th instant) being
taken up,
Genl Pinkney moved to strike out the words, "the year eighteen hundred"
as the year limiting the importation of slaves, and to insert the words "the
year eighteen hundred and eight."
Mr Ghorum 2ded the motion.
Mr Madison. Twenty years will produce all the mischief that can be
apprehended from the liberty to import slaves. So long a term will be more
dishonourable to the National character than to say nothing about it in the
Constitution.
On the motion; which passed in the affirmative,
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Govr Morris was for making the clause read at once, "the importation
of slaves into N. Carolina, S. Carolina & Georgia shall not be prohibited
&c." This he said would be most fair and would avoid the ambiguity by
which, under the power with regard to naturalization, the liberty reserved to
the States might be defeated. He wished it to be known also that this part of
the Constitution was a compliance with those States. If the change of
language however should be objected to by the members from those States,
he should not urge it.
Col. Mason was not against using the term "slaves" but agst naming
N. C. S. C. & Georgia, lest it should give offence to the people of those
States.
Mr Sherman liked a description better than the terms proposed, which
had been declined by the old Congs & were not pleasing to some people.
Mr Clymer concurred with Mr Sherman.
Mr Williamson said that both in opinion & practice he was against
slavery; but thought it more in favor of humanity, from a view of all
circumstances, to let in S. C. & Georgia on those terms, than to exclude
them from the Union.
Mr Govr Morris withdrew his motion.
Mr Dickenson wished the clause to be confined to the States which had
not themselves prohibited the importation of slaves, and for that purpose
moved to amend the clause so as to read "The importation of slaves into
such of the States as shall permit the same shall not be prohibited by the
Legislature of the U. S. until the year 1808"–which was disagreed to nem:
con: [42]
[42] In the printed Journals, Cont Virga & Georgia voted in the affirmative.–
Madison's Note.
The first part of the report was then agreed to, amended as follows. "The
migration or importation of such persons as the several States now existing
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Legislature prior
to the year 1808."
N. H. Mas. Con. Md N. C. S. C. Geo: ay. N. J. Pa Del.
Virga no.
Mr Baldwin in order to restrain & more explicitly define "the average
duty" moved to strike out of the 2d part the words "average of the duties
laid on imports" and insert "common impost on articles not enumerated"
which was agreed to nem: cont:
Mr Sherman was agst this 2d part, as acknowledging men to be property,
by taxing them as such under the character of slaves.
Mr King & Mr Langdon considered this as the price of the 1st part.
Genl Pinkney admitted that it was so.
Col. Mason. Not to tax, will be equivalent to a bounty on the importation
of slaves.
Mr Ghorum thought that Mr Sherman should consider the duty, not as
implying that slaves are property, but as a discouragement to the
importation of them.
Mr Govr Morris remarked that as the clause now stands it implies that
the Legislature may tax freemen imported.
Mr Sherman in answer to Mr Ghorum observed that the smallness of the
duty shewed revenue to be the object, not the discouragement of the
importation.
Mr Madison thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that
there could be property in men. The reason of duties did not hold, as slaves
are not like merchandize, consumed, &c.
Col. Mason (in answr to Govr Morris) the provision as it stands was
necessary for the case of convicts in order to prevent the introduction of
them.
It was finally agreed nem. contrad: to make the clause read "but a tax or
duty may be imposed on such importation not exceeding ten dollars for
each person," and then the 2d part as amended was agreed to.
Sect 5. art. VII was agreed to nem: con: as reported.
Sect. 6. art. VII. in the Report, was postponed.
On motion of Mr Madison 2ded by Mr Govr Morris Article VIII was
reconsidered and after the words "all treaties made," were inserted nem:
con: the words "or which shall be made." This insertion was meant to
obviate all doubt concerning the force of treaties preexisting, by making the
words "all treaties made" to refer to them, as the words inserted would refer
to future treaties.
Mr Carrol and Mr L. Martin expressed their apprehensions, and the
probable apprehensions of their constituents, that under the power of
regulating trade the General Legislature, might favor the ports of particular
States, by requiring vessels destined to or from other States to enter & clear
thereat, as vessels belonging or bound to Baltimore, to enter & clear at
Norfolk &c. They moved the following proposition
"The Legislature of the U. S. shall not oblige vessels belonging to
citizens thereof, or to foreigners, to enter or pay duties or imposts in
any other State than in that to which they may be bound, or to clear out
in any other than the State in which their cargoes may be laden on
board; nor shall any privilege or immunity be granted to any vessel on
entering or clearing out, or paying duties or imposts in one State in
preference to another."
Mr Ghorum thought such a precaution unnecessary; & that the revenue
might be defeated, if vessels could run up long rivers, through the
jurisdiction of different States without being required to enter, with the
opportunity of landing & selling their cargoes by the way.
Mr McHenry & Genl Pinkney made the following propositions
"Should it be judged expedient by the Legislature of the U. S. that
one or more port for collecting duties or imposts other than those ports
of entrance & clearance already established by the respective States,
should be established, the Legislature of the U. S. shall signify the
same to the Executives of the respective States, ascertaining the
number of such ports judged necessary; to be laid by the said
Executives before the Legislatures of the States at their next session;
and the Legislature of the U. S. shall not have the power of fixing or
establishing the particular ports for collecting duties or imposts in any
State, except the Legislature of such State shall neglect to fix and
establish the same during their first session to be held after such
notification by the Legislature of the U. S. to the Executive of such
State."
"All duties imposts & excises, prohibitions or restraints laid or
made by the Legislature of the U. S. shall be uniform & equal
throughout the U. S."
These several propositions were referred nem: con: to a committee
composed of a member from each State. The committee appointed by ballot
were Mr Langdon, Mr Ghorum, Mr Sherman, Mr Dayton, Mr Fitzimmons,
Mr Read, Mr Carrol, Mr Mason, Mr Williamson, Mr Butler, Mr Few.
On the question now taken on Mr Dickinson's motion of yesterday,
allowing appointments to offices, to be referred by the Genl Legislature to
the Executives of the several States as a further amendment to sect. 2. art.
X, the votes were
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md divided.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
In amendment of the same section, "other public Ministers" were
inserted after "ambassadors."
Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out of the section–"and may correspond
with the supreme Executives of the several States" as unnecessary and
implying that he could not correspond with others. Mr Broome 2ded him.
On the question
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
"Shall receive ambassadors & other public Ministers," agreed to, nem.
con.
Mr Sherman moved to amend the "power to grant reprieves & pardon"
so as to read "to grant reprieves until the ensuing session of the Senate, and
pardons with consent of the Senate."
On the question
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. Pa no. Md no. Va no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.
"except in cases of impeachment" inserted nem. con: after "pardon."
On the question to agree to–"but his pardon shall not be pleadable in
bar"
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va no.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Adjourned.
M      A     27  . 1787. I  C         
Art X. Sect 2. being resumed,
Mr L. Martin moved to insert the words "after conviction" after the
words "reprieves and pardons."
Mr Wilson objected that pardon before conviction might be necessary in
order to obtain the testimony of accomplices. He stated the case of forgeries
in which this might particularly happen.–Mr L. Martin withdrew his motion.
Mr Sherman moved to amend the clause giving the Executive the
command of the Militia, so as to read "and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual service of the U. S." and on the Question
N. H. ay. Mas. abst. Ct ay. N. J. abst. Pa ay. Del. no.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. abst. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The clause for removing the President on impeachment by the House of
Reps and conviction in the supreme Court, of Treason, Bribery or
corruption, was postponed nem: con: at the instance of Mr Govr Morris,
who thought the Tribunal an improper one, particularly, if the first Judge
was to be of the privy Council.
Mr Govr Morris objected also to the President of the Senate being
provisional successor to the President, and suggested a designation of the
Chief Justice.
Mr Madison added as a ground of objection that the Senate might retard
the appointment of a President in order to carry points whilst the
revisionary power was in the President of their own body, but suggested
that the Executive powers during a vacancy, be administered by the persons
composing the Council to the President.
Mr Williamson suggested that the Legislature ought to have power to
provide for occasional successors, & moved that the last clause (of 2 sect. X
art:) relating to a provisional successor to the President, be postponed.
Mr Dickinson 2ded the postponement, remarking that it was too vague.
What is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to be the judge of it?
The postponement was agreed to nem: con:
Col: Mason & Mr Madison moved to add to the oath to be taken by the
supreme Executive "and will to the best of my judgment and power
preserve protect and defend the Constitution of the U. S."
Mr Wilson thought the general provision for oaths of office, in a
subsequent place, rendered the amendment unnecessary.—
On the question
N. H. ay. Mas. abst. Ct ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. abst. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Art: XI. being taken up.
Docr Johnson suggested that the judicial power ought to extend to equity
as well as law–and moved to insert the words, "both in law and equity" after
the words "U. S." in the 1st line of sect 1.
Mr Read objected to vesting these powers in the same Court.
On the question
N. H. ay. Mas. absent. Ct ay. N. J. abst. P. ay. Del. no.
Md no. Virga ay. N. C. abst. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On the question to agree to Sect. 1. art. XI. as amended
N. H. ay. Mas. abst. Ct ay. Pa ay. N. J. abst. Del. no.
Md no. Va ay. N. C. abst. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Dickinson moved as an amendment to sect. 2. art XI after the words
"good behavior" the words "provided that they may be removed by the
Executive on the application by the Senate and House of Representatives."
Mr Gerry 2ded the motion.
Mr Govr Morris thought it a contradiction in terms to say that the Judges
should hold their offices during good behavior, and yet be removeable
without a trial. Besides it was fundamentally wrong to subject Judges to so
arbitrary an authority.
Mr Sherman saw no contradiction or impropriety if this were made a part
of the Constitutional regulation of the Judiciary establishment. He observed
that a like provision was contained in the British Statutes.
Mr Rutlidge. If the Supreme Court is to judge between the U. S. and
particular States, this alone is an insuperable objection to the motion.
Mr Wilson considered such a provision in the British Government as less
dangerous than here, the House of Lords & House of Commons being less
likely to concur on the same occasions. Chief Justice Holt, he remarked,
had successively offended by his independent conduct, both houses of
Parliament. Had this happened at the same time, he would have been
ousted. The Judges would be in a bad situation if made to depend on any
gust of faction which might prevail in the two branches of our Govt.
Mr Randolph opposed the motion as weakening too much the
independence of the Judges.
Mr Dickinson was not apprehensive that the Legislature composed of
different branches constructed on such different principles, would
improperly unite for the purpose of displacing a Judge.
On the question for agreeing to Mr Dickinson's Motion
N. H. no. Mas. abst. Ct ay. N. J. abst. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. abst. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Madison and Mr McHenry moved to reinstate the words "increased
or" before the word "diminished" in 2d sect, art. XI.
Mr Govr Morris opposed it for reasons urged by him on a former
occasion—
Col: Mason contended strenuously for the motion. There was no weight
he said in the argument drawn from changes in the value of the metals,
because this might be provided for by an increase of salaries so made as not
to affect persons in office, and this was the only argument on which much
stress seemed to have been laid.
Genl Pinkney. The importance of the Judiciary will require men of the
first talents: large salaries will therefore be necessary, larger than the
U. S. can allow in the first instance. He was not satisfied with the expedient
mentioned by Col: Mason. He did not think it would have a good effect or a
good appearance, for new Judges to come in with higher salaries than the
old ones.
Mr Govr Morris said the expedient might be evaded & therefore
amounted to nothing. Judges might resign, & then be re-appointed to
increased salaries.
On the question
N. H. no. Ct no. Pa no. Del. no. Md divd. Va ay. S. C. no.
Geo. abst also Masts. & N. J. & N. C.
Mr Randolph & Mr Madison then moved to add the following words to
art. XI sect. 2. "nor increased by any Act of the Legislature which shall
operate before the expiration of three years after the passing thereof."
On the question
N. H. no. Ct no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay. S. C. no.
Geo. abst also Mas. N. J. & N. C.
Sect. 3. art. XI. being taken up, the following clause was postponed viz,
"to the trial of impeachments of officers of the U. S." by which the
jurisdiction of the supreme Court was extended to such cases.
Mr Madison & Mr Govr Morris moved to insert after the word
"controversies" the words "to which the U. S. shall be a party," which was
agreed to nem: con:
Docr Johnson moved to insert the words "this Constitution and the"
before the word "laws."
Mr Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to extend the
jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising under the Constitution &
whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature. The right
of expounding the Constitution in cases not of this nature ought not to be
given to that Department.
The motion of Docr Johnson was agreed to nem: con: it being generally
supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a
Judiciary nature.
On motion of Mr Rutlidge the words "passed by the Legislature" were
struck out, and after the words "U. S." were inserted nem. con: the words
"and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority"
conformably to a preceding amendment in another place.
The clause "in cases of impeachment," was postponed.
Mr Govr Morris wished to know what was meant by the words "In all the
cases before-mentioned it (jurisdiction) shall be appellate with such
exceptions &c.," whether it extended to matters of fact as well as law–and
to cases of common law as well as civil law.
Mr Wilson. The Committee he believed meant facts as well as law &
Common as well as Civil law. The jurisdiction of the federal Court of
Appeals had he said been so construed.
Mr Dickinson moved to add after the word "appellate" the words "both
as to law & fact" which was agreed to nem: con:
Mr Madison & Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out the beginning of the
3d sect. "The jurisdiction of the supreme Court" & to insert the words "the
Judicial power" which was agreed to nem: con:
The following motion was disagreed to, to wit to insert "In all the other
cases beforementioned the Judicial power shall be exercised in such manner
as the Legislature shall direct" Del. Virga ay. N. H. Con. P. M. S. C. G. no.
On a question for striking out the last sentence of the sect. 3. "The
Legislature may assign &c."
N. H. ay. Ct ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.
Mr Sherman moved to insert after the words "between Citizens of
different States" the words, "between Citizens of the same State claiming
lands under grants of different States"–according to the provision in the 9th
Art: of the Confederation–which was agreed to nem: con:
Adjourned.
T       A      28 1787. I  C         
Mr Sherman from the Committee to whom were referred several
propositions on the 25th instant, made the following report:—
That there be inserted after the 4 clause of 7th. section
"Nor shall any regulation of commerce or revenue give preference
to the ports of one State over those of another, or oblige vessels bound
to or from any State to enter clear or pay duties in another and all
tonnage, duties, imposts & excises laid by the Legislature shall be
uniform throughout the U. S."
Art XI Sect. 3, It was moved to strike out the words "it shall be
appellate" to insert the words "the supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction,"–in order to prevent uncertainty whether "it" referred to the
supreme Court, or to the Judicial power.
On the question
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. abst. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Sect. 4. was so amended nem. con: as to read "The trial of all crimes
(except in cases of impeachment) shall be by jury, and such trial shall be
held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but
when not committed within any State, then the trial shall be at such place or
places as the Legislature may direct." The object of this amendment was to
provide for trial by jury of offences committed out of any State.
Mr Pinkney urged the propriety of securing the benefit of the Habeas
corpus in the most ample manner, moved "that it should not be suspended
but on the most urgent occasions, & then only for a limited time not
exceeding twelve months."
Mr Rutlidge was for declaring the Habeas Corpus inviolable. He did not
conceive that a suspension could ever be necessary at the same time
through all the States.
Mr Govr Morris moved that "The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended; unless where in cases of Rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it."
Mr Wilson doubted whether in any case a suspension could be necessary,
as the discretion now exists with Judges, in most important cases to keep in
Gaol or admit to Bail.
The first part of Mr Govr Morris' motion, to the word "unless" was
agreed to nem: con:–on the remaining part;
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Sec. 5. of art: XI. was agreed to nem: con. [43]
[43] The vote on this section as stated in the printed Journal is not unanimous:
the statement here is probably the right one.–Madison's Note.
Art: XII being taken up.
Mr Wilson & Mr Sherman moved to insert after the words "coin money"
the words "nor emit bills of credit, nor make any thing but gold & silver
coin a tender in payment of debts" making these prohibitions absolute,
instead of making the measures allowable (as in the XIII art:) with the
consent of the Legislature of the U. S.
Mr Ghorum thought the purpose would be as well secured by the
provisions of art: XIII which makes the consent of the Genl Legislature
necessary, and that in that mode no opposition would be excited; whereas
an absolute prohibition of paper money would rouse the most desperate
opposition from its partizans.
Mr Sherman thought this a favorable crisis for crushing paper money. If
the consent of the Legislature could authorize emissions of it, the friends of
paper money would make every exertion to get into the Legislature in order
to license it.
The question being divided; on the 1st part–"nor emit bills of credit"
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md divd. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.
The remaining part of Mr Wilson's & Sherman's motion was agreed to
nem: con:
Mr King moved to add, in the words used in the Ordinance of Congr
establishing new States, a prohibition on the States to interfere in private
contracts.
Mr Govr Morris. This would be going too far. There are a thousand laws,
relating to bringing actions–limitations, of actions & which affect contracts.
The Judicial power of the U. S. will be a protection in cases within their
jurisdiction; and within the State itself a majority must rule, whatever may
be the mischief done among themselves.
Mr Sherman. Why then prohibit bills of credit?
Mr Wilson was in favor of Mr King's motion.
Mr Madison admitted that inconveniences might arise from such a
prohibition but thought on the whole it would be overbalanced by the utility
of it. He conceived however that a negative on the State laws could alone
secure the effect. Evasions might and would be devised by the ingenuity of
the Legislatures.
Col: Mason. This is carrying the restraint too far. Cases will happen that
cannot be foreseen, where some kind of interference will be proper &
essential. He mentioned the case of limiting the period for bringing actions
on open account–that of bonds after a certain lapse of time–asking whether
it was proper to tie the hands of the States from making provision in such
cases?
Mr Wilson. The answer to these objections is that retrospective
interferences only are to be prohibited.
Mr Madison. Is not that already done by the prohibition of ex post facto
laws, which will oblige the Judges to declare such interferences null &
void.
Mr Rutlidge moved instead of Mr King's Motion to insert–"nor pass bills
of attainder nor retrospective [44] laws" on which motion
N. H. ay. Ct no. N J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Virga no.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
[44] In the printed Journal–ex post facto.–Madison's Note.
Mr Madison moved to insert after the word "reprisal" (art. XII) the words
"nor lay embargoes." He urged that such acts by the States would be
unnecessary–impolitic–and unjust.
Mr Sherman thought the States ought to retain this power in order to
prevent suffering & injury to their poor.
Col: Mason thought the amendment would be not only improper but
dangerous, as the Genl Legislature would not sit constantly and therefore
could not interpose at the necessary moments. He enforced his objection by
appealing to the necessity of sudden embargoes during the war, to prevent
exports, particularly in the case of a blockade.
Mr Govr Morris considered the provision as unnecessary; the power of
regulating trade between State & State already vested in the Genl
Legislature, being sufficient.
On the question
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Mr Madison moved that the words "nor lay imposts or duties on imports"
be transferred from art: XIII where the consent of the Genl Legislature may
license the act–into art: XII which will make the prohibition of the States
absolute. He observed that as the States interested in this power by which
they could tax the imports of their neighbors passing thro' their markets,
were a majority, they could give the consent of the Legislature, to the injury
of N. Jersey, N. Carolina &c.
Mr Williamson 2ded the motion.
Mr Sherman thought the power might safely be left to the Legislature of
the U. States.
Col: Mason observed that particular States might wish to encourage by
impost duties certain manufactures for which they enjoyed natural
advantages, as Virginia, the manufacture of Hemp &c.
Mr Madison. The encouragement of Manufactures in that mode requires
duties not only on imports directly from foreign Countries, but from the
other States in the Union, which would revive all the mischiefs experienced
from the want of a Genl Government over commerce. [45]
[45] August 28, 1787, New York, Hamilton wrote to King: "I wrote to you some
days since [August 20] to request you to inform me when there was a prospect of
your finishing, as I intended to be with you, for certain reasons, before the
conclusion.
"It is whispered here that some late changes in your scheme have taken place
which give it a higher tone. Is this the case?"–King's Life and Correspondence of
Rufus King, I, 258.
On the question
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Dela ay. Md no.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Art: XII as amended agreed to nem: con:
Art: XIII being taken up. Mr King moved to insert after the word
"imports" the words "or exports," so as to prohibit the States from taxing
either, & on this question it passed in the affirmative.
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. ay. P. ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Sherman moved to add after the word "exports"–the words "nor with
such consent but for the use of the U. S."–so as to carry the proceeds of all
State duties on imports & exports, into the common Treasury.
Mr Madison liked the motion as preventing all State imposts–but
lamented the complexity we were giving to the commercial system.
Mr Govr Morris thought the regulation necessary to prevent the Atlantic
States from endeavoring to tax the Western States–& promote their interest
by opposing the navigation of the Mississippi which would drive the
Western people into the arms of G. Britain.
Mr Clymer thought the encouragement of the Western Country was
suicide on the old States. If the States have such different interests that they
cannot be left to regulate their own manufactures without encountering the
interests of other States, it is a proof that they are not fit to compose one
nation.
Mr King was afraid that the regulation moved by Mr Sherman would too
much interfere with the policy of States respecting their manufactures,
which may be necessary. Revenue he reminded the House was the object of
the general Legislature.
On Mr Sherman's motion
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Art XIII was then agreed to as amended.
Art. XIV was taken up.
Genl Pinkney was not satisfied with it. He seemed to wish some
provision should be included in favor of property in slaves.
On the question on Art: XIV.
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. divided.
Art: XV. being taken up, the words "high misdemesnor," were struck out,
and "other crime" inserted, in order to comprehend all proper cases; it being
doubtful whether "high misdemeanor" had not a technical meaning too
limited.
Mr Butler and Mr Pinkney moved "to require fugitive slaves and servants
to be delivered up like criminals."
Mr Wilson. This would oblige the Executive of the State to do it at the
public expence.
Mr Sherman saw no more propriety in the public seizing and
surrendering a slave or servant, than a horse.
Mr Butler withdrew his proposition in order that some particular
provision might be made apart from this article.
Art XV as amended was then agreed to nem: con:
Adjourned.
W         A      29  . 1787. I  C         
Art: XVI. taken up.
Mr Williamson moved to substitute in place of it, the words of the
Articles of Confederation on the same subject. He did not understand
precisely the meaning of the article.
Mr Wilson and Docr Johnson supposed the meaning to be that Judgments
in one State should be the ground of actions in other States, & that acts of
the Legislatures should be included, for the sake of Acts of insolvency &c.
Mr Pinkney moved to commit Art XVI with the following proposition
"To establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies, and respecting
the damages arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange."
Mr Ghorum was for agreeing to the article, and committing the
proposition.
Mr Madison was for committing both. He wished the Legislature might
be authorized to provide for the execution of Judgments in other States,
under such regulations as might be expedient. He thought that this might be
safely done, and was justified by the nature of the Union.
Mr Randolph said there was no instance of one nation executing
judgments of the Courts of another nation. He moved the following
proposition:
Executive or Judiciary shall be attested & exemplified under the
seal thereof, such attestation and exemplification, shall be deemed in
other States as full proof of the existence of that act–and its operation
shall be binding in every other State, in all cases to which it may
relate, and which are within the cognizance and jurisdiction of the
State, wherein the said act was done."
On the question for committing Art: XVI with Mr Pinkney's motion
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. Pa ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The motion of Mr Randolph was also committed nem: con:
Mr Govr Morris moved to commit also the following proposition on the
same subject.
"Full faith ought to be given in each State to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other State; and the
Legislature shall by general laws, determine the proof and effect of
such acts, records, and proceedings" and it was committed nem.
contrad:
The Committee appointed for these references, were Mr Rutlidge,
Mr Randolph, Mr Gorham, Mr Wilson, & Mr Johnson.
Mr Dickenson mentioned to the House that on examining Blackstone's
Commentaries, he found that the term "ex post facto" related to criminal
cases only; that they would not consequently restrain the States from
retrospective laws in civil cases, and that some further provision for this
purpose would be requisite.
Art: VII Sect. 6 by ye Com̃ittee of eleven reported to be struck out (see
the 24 instant) being now taken up.
Mr Pinkney moved to postpone the Report in favor of the following
proposition–"That no act of the Legislature for the purpose of regulating the
commerce of the U. S. with foreign powers among the several States, shall
be passed without the assent of two thirds of the members of each House."
He remarked that there were five distinct commercial interests. 1. the
fisheries & W. India trade, which belonged to the N. England States. 2. the
interest of N. York lay in a free trade. 3. Wheat & flour the Staples of the
two middle States (N. J. & Penna). 4. Tobo the staple of Maryld & Virginia
& partly of N. Carolina. 5. Rice & Indigo, the staples of S. Carolina &
Georgia. These different interests would be a source of oppressive
regulations if no check to a bare majority should be provided. States pursue
their interests with less scruple than individuals. The power of regulating
commerce was a pure concession on the part of the S. States. They did not
need the protection of the N. States at present.
Mr Martin 2ded the motion.
Genl Pinkney said it was the true interest of the S. States to have no
regulation of commerce; but considering the loss brought on the commerce
of the Eastern States by the revolution, their liberal conduct towards the
views [46] of South Carolina, and the interest the weak Southn States had in
being united with the strong Eastern States, he thought it proper that no
fetters should be imposed on the power of making commercial regulations,
and that his constituents though prejudiced against the Eastern States,
would be reconciled to this liberality. He had himself, he said, prejudices
agst the Eastern States before he came here, but would acknowledge that he
had found them as liberal and candid as any men whatever.
[46] He meant the permission to import slaves. An understanding on the two
subjects of navigation and slavery, had taken place between those parts of the
Union, which explains the vote on the motion depending, as well as the language
of Genl Pinkney & others.–Madison's Note.
Mr Clymer. The diversity of commercial interests of necessity creates
difficulties, which ought not to be increased by unnecessary restrictions.
The Northern & middle States will be ruined, if not enabled to defend
themselves against foreign regulations.
Mr Sherman, alluding to Mr Pinkney's enumeration of particular
interests, as requiring a security agst abuse of the power; observed that the
diversity was of itself a security, adding that to require more than a majority
to decide a question was always embarrassing as had been experienced in
cases requiring the votes of nine States in Congress.
Mr Pinkney replied that his enumeration meant the five minute interests.
It still left the two great divisions of Northern & Southern interests.
Mr Govr Morris, opposed the object of the motion as highly injurious.
Preferences to american ships will multiply them, till they can carry the
Southern produce cheaper than it is now carried.–A navy was essential to
security, particularly of the S. States, and can only be had by a navigation
act encouraging american bottoms & seamen. In those points of view then
alone, it is the interest of the S. States that navigation acts should be
facilitated. Shipping he said was the worst & most precarious kind of
property, and stood in need of public patronage.
Mr Williamson was in favor of making two thirds instead of a majority
requisite, as more satisfactory to the Southern people. No useful measure he
believed had been lost in Congress for want of nine votes. As to the
weakness of the Southern States, he was not alarmed on that account. The
sickliness of their climate for invaders would prevent their being made an
object. He acknowledged that he did not think the motion requiring 2/3
necessary in itself, because if a majority of the Northern States should push
their regulations too far the S. States would build ships for themselves: but
he knew the Southern people were apprehensive on this subject and would
be pleased with the precaution.
Mr Spaight was against the motion. The Southern States could at any
time save themselves from oppression, by building ships for their own use.
Mr Butler differed from those who considered the rejection of the motion
as no concession on the part of the S. States. He considered the interest of
these and of the Eastern States, to be as different as the interests of Russia
and Turkey. Being notwithstanding desirous of conciliating the affections of
the East: States, he should vote agst requiring 2/3 instead of a majority.
Col: Mason. If the Govt is to be lasting, it must be founded in the
confidence & affections of the people, and must be so constructed as to
obtain these. The Majority will be governed by their interests. The Southern
States are the minority in both Houses. Is it to be expected that they will
deliver themselves bound hand & foot to the Eastern States, and enable
them to exclaim, in the words of Cromwell on a certain occasion–"the lord
hath delivered them into our hands."
Mr Wilson took notice of the several objections and remarked that if
every peculiar interest was to be secured, unanimity ought to be required.
The majority he said would be no more governed by interest than the
minority. It was surely better to let the latter be bound hand and foot than
the former. Great inconveniences had, he contended, been experienced in
Congress from the article of confederation requiring nine votes in certain
cases.
Mr Madison went into a pretty full view of the subject. He observed that
the disadvantage to the S. States from a navigation act, lay chiefly in a
temporary rise of freight, attended however with an increase of Southn as
well as Northern Shipping–with the emigration of Northern Seamen &
merchants to the Southern States–& with a removal of the existing &
injurious retaliations among the States on each other. The power of foreign
nations to obstruct our retaliating measures on them by a corrupt influence
would also be less if a majority shd be made competent than if 2/3 of each
House shd be required to legislative acts in this case. An abuse of the power
would be qualified with all these good effects. But he thought an abuse was
rendered improbable by the provision of 2 branches–by the independence of
the Senate, by the negative of the Executive, by the interest of Connecticut
& N. Jersey which were agricultural, not commercial States; by the interior
interest which was also agricultural in the most commercial States, by the
accession of Western States which wd be altogether agricultural. He added
that the Southern States would derive an essential advantage in the general
security afforded by the increase of our maritime strength. He stated the
vulnerable situation of them all, and of Virginia in particular. The increase
of the coasting trade, and of seamen, would also be favorable to the
S. States, by increasing, the consumption of their produce. If the wealth of
the Eastern should in a still greater proportion be augmented, that wealth wd
contribute the more to the public wants, and be otherwise a national benefit.
Mr Rutlidge was agst the motion of his colleague. It did not follow from
a grant of the power to regulate trade, that it would be abused. At the worst
a navigation act could bear hard a little while only on the S. States. As we
are laying the foundation for a great empire, we ought to take a permanent
view of the subject and not look at the present moment only. He reminded
the House of the necessity of securing the West India trade to this country.
That was the great object, and a navigation act was necessary for obtaining
it.
Mr Randolph said that there were features so odious in the constitution
as it now stands, that he doubted whether he should be able to agree to it. A
rejection of the motion would compleat the deformity of the system. He
took notice of the argument in favor of giving the power over trade to a
majority, drawn from the opportunity foreign powers would have of
obstructing retaliatory measures if two thirds were made requisite. He did
not think there was weight in that consideration. The difference between a
majority & two thirds did not afford room for such an opportunity. Foreign
influence would also be more likely to be exerted on the President who
could require three fourths by his negative. He did not mean however to
enter into the merits. What he had in view was merely to pave the way for a
declaration which he might be hereafter obliged to make if an accumulation
of obnoxious ingredients should take place, that he could not give his assent
to the plan.
Mr Gorham. If the Government is to be so fettered as to be unable to
relieve the Eastern States what motive can they have to join in it, and
thereby tie their own hands from measures which they could otherwise take
for themselves. The Eastern States were not led to strengthen the Union by
fear for their own safety. He deprecated the consequences of disunion, but if
it should take place it was the Southern part of the Continent that had most
reason to dread them. He urged the improbability of a combination against
the interest of the Southern States, the different situations of the Northern &
Middle States being a security against it. It was moreover certain that
foreign ships would never be altogether excluded especially those of
Nations in treaty with us.
On the question to postpone in order to take up Mr Pinkney's motion
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The Report of the Committee for striking out Sect. 6. requiring two
thirds of each House to pass a navigation act was then agreed to, nem: con:
Mr Butler moved to insert after Art: XV. "If any person bound to service
or labor in any of the U. States shall escape into another State, he or she
shall not be discharged from such service or labor, in consequence of any
regulations subsisting in the State to which they escape, but shall be
delivered up to the person justly claiming their service or labor," which was
agreed to nem: con:
Art: XVII being taken up, Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out the two
last sentences, to wit "If the admission be consented to, the new States shall
be admitted on the same terms with the original States. But the Legislature
may make conditions with the new States, concerning the public debt which
shall be then subsisting."–He did not wish to bind down the Legislature to
admit Western States on the terms here stated.
Mr Madison opposed the motion, insisting that the Western States neither
would nor ought to submit to a union which degraded them from an equal
rank with the other States.
Col: Mason. If it were possible by just means to prevent emigrations to
the Western Country, it might be good policy. But go the people will as they
find it for their interest, and the best policy is to treat them with that
equality which will make them friends not enemies.
Mr Govr Morris did not mean to discourage the growth of the Western
Country. He knew that to be impossible. He did not wish however to throw
the power into their hands.
Mr Sherman, was agst the motion & for fixing an equality of privileges
by the Constitution.
Mr Langdon was in favor of the motion, he did not know but
circumstances might arise which would render it inconvenient to admit new
States on terms of equality.
Mr Williamson was for leaving the Legislature free. The existing small
States enjoy an equality now, and for that reason are admitted to it in the
Senate. This reason is not applicable to new Western States.
On Mr Govr Morris's motion for striking out.
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr L. Martin & Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out of art XVII, "but to
such admission the consent of two thirds of the members present shall be
necessary." Before any question was taken on this motion,
Mr Govr Morris moved the following proposition as a substitute for the
XVII Art:
"New States may be admitted by the Legislature into this Union; but
no new State shall be erected within the limits of any of the present
States, without the consent of the Legislature of such State, as well as
of the Genl Legislature."
The first part to Union inclusive was agreed to nem: con:
Mr L. Martin opposed the latter part. Nothing he said would so alarm the
limited States as to make the consent of the large States claiming the
Western lands, necessary to the establishment of new States within their
limits. It is proposed to guarantee the States. Shall Vermont be reduced by
force in favor of the States claiming it? Frankland & the Western county of
Virginia were in a like situation.
On Mr Govr Morris's motion to substitute &c. it was agreed to.
N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no.
Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Art: XVII–before the House, as amended.
Mr Sherman was against it. He thought it unnecessary. The Union cannot
dismember a State without its consent.
Mr Langdon thought there was great weight in the argument of
Mr Luther Martin, and that the proposition substituted by Mr Govr Morris
would excite a dangerous opposition to the plan.
Mr Govr Morris thought on the contrary that the small States would be
pleased with the regulation, as it holds up the idea of dismembering the
large States.
Mr Butler. If new States were to be erected without the consent of the
dismembered States, nothing but confusion would ensue. Whenever taxes
should press on the people, demagogues would set up their schemes of new
States.
Docr Johnson agreed in general with the ideas of Mr Sherman, but was
afraid that as the clause stood, Vermont would be subjected to N. York,
contrary to the faith pledged by Congress. He was of opinion that Vermont
ought to be compelled to come into the Union.
Mr Langdon said his objections were connected with the case of
Vermont. If they are not taken in, & remain exempt from taxes, it would
prove of great injury to N. Hampshire and the other neighbouring States.
Mr Dickinson hoped the article would not be agreed to. He dwelt on the
impropriety of requiring the small States to secure the large ones in their
extensive claims of territory.
Mr Wilson. When the majority of a State wish to divide they can do so.
The aim of those in opposition to the article, he perceived was that the Genl
Government should abet the minority, & by that means divide a State
against its own consent.
Mr Govr Morris. If the forced division of the States is the object of the
new system, and is to be pointed agst one or two States, he expected the
Gentlemen from these would pretty quickly leave us.
Adjourned.
T        A      30   1787. I  C         
Art XVII resumed for a question on it as amended by Mr Govr Morris's
substitutes.
Mr Carrol moved to strike out so much of the article as requires the
consent of the State to its being divided. He was aware that the object of
this prerequisite might be to prevent domestic disturbances; but such was
our situation with regard to the Crown lands, and the sentiments of
Maryland on that subject, that he perceived we should again be at sea, if no
guard was provided for the right of the U. States to the back lands. He
suggested that it might be proper to provide that nothing in the Constitution
should affect the Right of the U. S. to lands ceded by G. Britain in the
Treaty of peace, and proposed a committment to a member from each State.
He assured the House that this was a point of a most serious nature. It was
desirable above all things that the act of the Convention might be agreed to
unanimously. But should this point be disregarded, he believed that all risks
would be run by a considerable minority, sooner than give their
concurrence.
Mr L. Martin 2ded the motion for a commitment.
Mr Rutlidge. Is it to be supposed that the States are to be cut up without
their own consent. The case of Vermont will probably be particularly
provided for. There could be no room to fear, that Virginia or N. Carolina
would call on the U. States to maintain their Government over the
Mountains.
Mr Williamson said that N. Carolina was well disposed to give up her
western lands, but attempts at compulsion was not the policy of the
U. S. He was for doing nothing in the constitution in the present case, and
for leaving the whole matter in Statu quo.
Mr Wilson was against the commitment. Unanimity was of great
importance, but not to be purchased by the majority's yielding to the
minority. He should have no objection to leaving the case of the new States
as heretofore. He knew nothing that would give greater or juster alarm than
the doctrine, that a political society is to be torn assunder without its own
consent.
On Mr Carrol's motion for commitment
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Sherman moved to postpone the substitute for Art: XVII agreed to
yesterday in order to take up the following amendment
"The Legislature shall have power to admit other States into the
Union, and new States to be formed by the division or junction of
States now in the Union, with the consent of the Legislature of such
States." (The first part was meant for the case of Vermont to secure its
admission.)
On the question, it passed in the negative.
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Docr Johnson moved to insert the words "hereafter formed or" after the
words "shall be" in the substitute for Art: XVII (the more clearly to save
Vermont as being already formed into a State, from a dependence on the
consent of N. York for her admission.) The motion was agreed to Del. & Md
only dissenting.
Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out the word "limits" in the substitute,
and insert the word "jurisdiction". (This also was meant to guard the case of
Vermont, the jurisdiction of N. York not extending over Vermont which was
in the exercise of sovereignty, tho' Vermont was within the asserted limits of
New York.)
On this question
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr L. Martin urged the unreasonableness of forcing & guaranteeing the
people of Virginia beyond the Mountains, the Western people of
N. Carolina & of Georgia, & the people of Maine, to continue under the
States now governing them, without the consent of those States to their
separation. Even if they should become the majority, the majority of
Counties, as in Virginia may still hold fast the dominion over them. Again
the majority may place the seat of Government entirely among themselves
& for their own conveniency, and still keep the injured parts of the States in
subjection, under the guarantee of the Genl Government agst domestic
violence. He wished Mr Wilson had thought a little sooner of the value of
political bodies. In the beginning, when the rights of the small States were
in question, they were phantoms, ideal beings. Now when the Great States
were to be affected, political societies were of a sacred nature. He repeated
and enlarged on the unreasonableness of requiring the small States to
guarantee the Western claims of the large ones.–It was said yesterday by
Mr Govr Morris, that if the large States were to be split to pieces without
their consent, their representatives here would take their leave. If the Small
States are to be required to guarantee them in this manner, it will be found
that the Representatives of other States will with equal firmness take their
leave of the Constitution on the table.
It was moved by Mr L. Martin to postpone the substituted article, in
order to take up the following.
"The Legislature of the U. S. shall have power to erect New States
within as well as without the territory claimed by the several States or
either of them, and admit the same into the Union: provided that
nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to affect the claim of the
U. S. to vacant lands ceded to them by the late treaty of peace, which
passed in the negative: N. J. Del. & Md only ay.
On the question to agree to Mr Govr Morris's substituted article as
amended in the words following.
"New States may be admitted by the Legislature into the Union: but
no new State shall be hereafter formed or erected within the
jurisdiction of any of the present States without the consent of the
Legislature of such State as well as of the General Legislature"
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Dickinson moved to add the following clause to the last—
"Nor shall any State be formed by the junction of two or more
States or parts thereof, without the consent of the Legislature of such
States, as well as of the Legislature of the U. States," which was
agreed to without a count of the votes.
Mr Carrol moved to add–"Provided nevertheless that nothing in this
Constitution shall be construed to affect the claim of the U. S. to vacant
lands ceded to them by the Treaty of peace." This he said might be
understood as relating to lands not claimed by any particular States, but he
had in view also some of the claims of particular States.
Mr Wilson was agst the motion. There was nothing in the Constitution
affecting one way or the other the claims of the U. S. & it was best to insert
nothing, leaving every thing on that litigated subject in statu quo.
Mr Madison considered the claim of the U. S. as in fact favored by the
jurisdiction of the Judicial power of the U. S. over controversies to which
they should be parties. He thought it best on the whole to be silent on the
subject. He did not view the proviso of Mr. Carrol as dangerous; but to
make it neutral & fair, it ought to go further & declare that the claims of
particular States also should not be affected.
Mr Sherman thought the proviso harmless, especially with the addition
suggested by Mr Madison in favor of the claims of particular States.
Mr Baldwin did not wish any undue advantage to be given to Georgia.
He thought the proviso proper with the addition proposed. It should be
remembered that if Georgia has gained much by the cession in the Treaty of
peace, she was in danger during the war of a Uti possidetis.
Mr Rutlidge thought it wrong to insert a proviso where there was nothing
which it could restrain, or on which it could operate.
Mr Carrol withdrew his motion and moved the following.
"Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to alter the claims
of the U. S. or of the individual States to the Western territory, but all
such claims shall be examined into & decided upon, by the Supreme
Court of the U. States."
Mr Govr Morris moved to postpone this in order to take up the
following.
"Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to alter the claims
of the U. S. or of the individual States to the Western territory, but all
such claims shall be examined into & decided upon, by the Supreme
Court of the U. States."
Mr L. Martin moved to amend the proposition of Mr Govr Morris by
adding–"But all such claims may be examined into & decided upon by the
supreme Court of the U. States."
Mr Govr Morris. this is unnecessary, as all suits to which the U. S. are
parties, are already to be decided by the Supreme Court.
Mr L. Martin. it is proper in order to remove all doubts on this point.
Question on Mr L. Martin's amendatory motion
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay.
Va no.–States not farther called the negatives being
sufficient & the point given up.
The Motion of Mr Govr Morris was then agreed to, Md alone dissenting.
Art: XVIII being taken up,–the word "foreign" was struck out nem: con:
as superfluous, being implied in the term "invasion."
Mr Dickinson moved to strike out "on the application of its Legislature,
against." He thought it of essential importance to the tranquility of the U. S.
that they should in all cases suppress domestic violence, which may
proceed from the State Legislature itself, or from disputes between the two
branches where such exist.
Mr Dayton mentioned the Conduct of Rho: Island as shewing the
necessity of giving latitude to the power of the U. S. on this subject.
On the question
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On a question for striking out "domestic violence" and insertg
"insurrections–" It passed in the negative.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Dickinson moved to insert the words, "or Executive" after the words
"application of its Legislature."–The occasion itself he remarked might
hinder the Legislature from meeting.
On this question
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md divd.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr L. Martin moved to subjoin to the last amendment the words "in the
recess of the Legislature." On which question
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On Question on the last clause as amended
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Art: XIX taken up.
Mr Govr Morris suggested that the Legislature should be left at liberty to
call a Convention, whenever they please.
The Art: was agreed to nem: con:
Art: XX. taken up.–"or affirmation" was added after "oath."
Mr Pinkney moved to add to the Art:–"but no religious test shall ever be
required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the authority of
the U. States."
Mr Sherman thought it unnecessary, the prevailing liberality being a
sufficient security agst such tests.
Mr Govr Morris & Genl Pinkney approved the motion.
The motion was agreed to nem: con: and then the whole Article; N. C.
only no–and Md divided.
Art: XXI. taken up, viz: "The ratifications of the Conventions of –—
States shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution."
Mr Wilson proposed to fill the blank with "seven" that being a majority
of the whole number & sufficient for the commencement of the plan.
Mr Carrol moved to postpone the article in order to take up the Report of
the Committee of Eleven (see Tuesday Augst 28)–and on the question
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Govr Morris thought the blank ought to be filled in a twofold way, so
as to provide for the event of the ratifying States being contiguous which
would render a smaller number sufficient, and the event of their being
dispersed, which wd require a greater number for the introduction of the
Government.
Mr Sherman observed that the States being now confederated by articles
which require unanimity in changes, he thought the ratification in this case
of ten States at least ought to be made necessary.
Mr Randolph was for filling the blank with "nine" that being a
respectable majority of the whole, and being a number made familiar by the
constitution of the existing Congress.
Mr Wilson mentioned "eight" as preferable.
Mr Dickinson asked whether the concurrence of Congress is to be
essential to the establishment of the system, whether the refusing States in
the Confederacy could be deserted–and whether Congress could concur in
contravening the system under which they acted?
Mr Madison, remarked that if the blank should be filled with "seven"
"eight," or "nine," the Constitution as it stands might be put in force over
the whole body of the people, tho' less than a majority of them should ratify
it.
Mr Wilson. As the Constitution stands, the States only which ratify can
be bound. We must he said in this case go to the original powers of Society.
The House on fire must be extinguished, without a scrupulous regard to
ordinary rights.
Mr Butler was in favor of "nine." He revolted at the idea, that one or two
States should restrain the rest from consulting their safety.
Mr Carrol moved to fill the blank with "the thirteen," unanimity being
necessary to dissolve the existing confederacy which had been unanimously
established.
Mr King thought this amendt necessary, otherwise as the Constitution
now stands it will operate on the whole though ratified by a part only.
Adjourned.
F      A      31   1787. I  C         .
Mr King moved to add to the end of Art: XXI the words "between the
said States" so as to confine the operation of the Govt to the States ratifying
it.
On the question
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Md no. Virga ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Madison proposed to fill the blank in the article with "any seven or
more States entitled to thirty three members at least in the House of
Representatives according to the allotment made in the 3 Sect: of Art: 4."
This he said would require the concurrence of a majority of both the States
and the people.
Mr Sherman doubted the propriety of authorizing less than all the States
to execute the Constitution, considering the nature of the existing
Confederation. Perhaps all the States may concur, and on that supposition it
is needless to hold out a breach of faith.
Mr Clymer and Mr Carrol moved to postpone the consideration of Art:
XXI in order to take up the Reports of Committees not yet acted on. On this
question, the States were equally divided.
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct divd. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. G. ay.
Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out "Conventions of the" after
"ratifications" leaving the States to pursue their own modes of ratification.
Mr Carrol mentioned the mode of altering the Constitution of Maryland
pointed out therein, and that no other mode could be pursued in that State.
Mr King thought that striking out "Conventions," as the requisite mode
was equivalent to giving up the business altogether. Conventions alone,
which will avoid all the obstacles from the complicated formation of the
Legislatures, will succeed, and if not positively required by the plan its
enemies will oppose that mode.
Mr Govr Morris said he meant to facilitate the adoption of the plan, by
leaving the modes approved by the several State Constitutions to be
followed.
Mr Madison considered it best to require Conventions; Among other
reasons, for this, that the powers given to the Genl Govt being taken from
the State Govts the Legislatures would be more disinclined than conventions
composed in part at least of other men; and if disinclined, they could devise
modes apparently promoting, but really thwarting the ratification. The
difficulty in Maryland was no greater than in other States, where no mode
of change was pointed out by the Constitution, and all officers were under
oath to support it. The people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by
resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They could alter
constitutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the Bills of rights, that
first principles might be resorted to.
Mr McHenry said that the officers of Govt in Maryland were under oath
to support the mode of alteration prescribed by the Constitution.
Mr Ghorum urged the expediency of "Conventions" also Mr Pinkney, for
reasons formerly urged on a discussion of this question.
Mr L. Martin insisted on a reference to the State Legislatures. He urged
the danger of commotions from a resort to the people & to first principles,
in which the Governments might be on one side and the people on the other.
He was apprehensive of no such consequences however in Maryland,
whether the Legislature or the people should be appealed to. Both of them
would be generally against the Constitution. He repeated also the
peculiarity in the Maryland Constitution.
Mr King observed that the Constitution of Massachusetts was made
unalterable till the year 1790, yet this was no difficulty with him. The State
must have contemplated a recurrence to first principles before they sent
deputies to this Convention.
Mr Sherman moved to postpone art. XXI. & to take up art: XXII on
which question,
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On Mr Govr Morris's motion to strike out "Conventions of the," it was
negatived.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
On filling the blank in Art: XXI with "thirteen" moved by Mr. Carrol &
Martin, N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no, all except Maryland.
Mr Sherman & Mr Dayton moved to fill the blank with "ten."
Mr Wilson supported the motion of Mr Madison, requiring a majority
both of the people and of States. Mr Clymer was also in favor of it.
Col: Mason was for preserving ideas familiar to the people. Nine States
had been required in all great cases under the Confederation & that number
was on that account preferable.
On the question for "ten"
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
On question for "nine"
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Art: XXI. as amended was then agreed to by all the States, Maryland
excepted, & Mr Jenifer being ay.
Art. XXII taken up, to wit, "This Constitution shall be laid before the
U. S. in Congs assembled for their approbation; and it is the opinion of this
Convention that it should be afterwards submitted to a Convention chosen,
in each State under the recommendation of its Legislature, in order to
receive the ratification of such Convention."
Mr Govr Morris & Mr Pinkney moved to strike out the words "for their
approbation." On this question
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. [47] Pa ay. Del. ay.
Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
[47] In the printed Journal N. Jersey–no.–Madison's Note.
Mr Govr Morris & Mr Pinkney then moved to amend the art: so as to
read
"This Constitution shall be laid before the U. S. in Congress
assembled; and it is the opinion of this Convention that it should
afterwards be submitted to a Convention chosen in each State, in order
to receive the ratification of such Convention; to which end the several
Legislatures ought to provide for the calling Conventions within their
respective States as speedily as circumstances will permit."
Mr Govr Morris said his object was to impress in stronger terms the
necessity of calling Conventions in order to prevent enemies to the plan,
from giving it the go by. When it first appears, with the sanction of this
Convention, the people will be favorable to it. By degrees the State officers,
& those interested in the State Govts will intrigue & turn the popular current
against it.
Mr L. Martin believed Mr Morris to be right, that after a while the people
would be agst it, but for a different reason from that alledged. He believed
they would not ratify it unless hurried into it by surprize.
Mr Gerry enlarged on the idea of Mr L. Martin in which he concurred,
represented the system as full of vices, and dwelt on the impropriety of
destroying the existing Confederation, without the unanimous consent of
the parties to it.
Question on Mr Govr Morris's & Mr Pinkney's motion
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Gerry moved to postpone art: XXII.
Col: Mason 2ded the motion, declaring that he would sooner chop off his
right hand than put it to the Constitution as it now stands. He wished to see
some points not yet decided brought to a decision, before being compelled
to give a final opinion on this article. Should these points be improperly
settled, his wish would then be to bring the whole subject before another
general Convention.
Mr Govr Morris was ready for a postponement. He had long wished for
another Convention, that will have the firmness to provide a vigorous
Government, which we are afraid to do.
Mr Randolph stated his idea to be, in case the final form of the
Constitution should not permit him to accede to it, that the State
Conventions should be at liberty to propose amendments to be submitted to
another General Convention which may reject or incorporate them, as may
be judged proper.
On the question for postponing
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question on Art: XXII
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Art: XXIII being taken up, as far as the words "assigned by Congress"
inclusive, was agreed to nem: con: the blank having been first filled with
the word "nine" as of course.
On a motion for postponing the residue of the clause, concerning the
choice of the President &c.
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Govr Morris then moved to strike out the words "choose the
President of the U. S. and"–this point, of choosing the President not being
yet finally determined, & on this question
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md divd.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. [48] Geo. ay.
[48] In printed Journal–S.–C.–no.–Madison's Note.
Art: XXIII as amended was then agreed to nem: con:
The Report of the Grand Committee of eleven made by Mr Sherman was
then taken up (see Aug: 28).
On the question to agree to the following clause, to be inserted after sect.
4. art: VII. "nor shall any regulation of commerce or revenue give
preference to the ports of one State over those of another." Agreed to nem:
con:
On the clause "or oblige vessels bound to or from any State to enter clear
or pay duties in another"
Mr Madison thought the restriction wd be inconvenient, as in the River
Delaware, if a vessel cannot be required to make entry below the
jurisdiction of Pennsylvania.
Mr Fitzimmons admitted that it might be inconvenient, but thought it
would be a greater inconvenience to require vessels bound to Philada to
enter below the jurisdiction of the State.
Mr Ghorum & Mr Langdon, contended that the Govt would be so
fettered by this clause, as to defeat the good purpose of the plan. They
mentioned the situation of the trade of Mas. & N. Hampshire, the case of
Sandy Hook which is in the State of N. Jersey, but where precautions agst
smuggling into N. York, ought to be established by the Genl Government.
Mr McHenry said the clause would not screen a vessel from being
obliged to take an officer on board as a security for due entry &c.
Mr Carrol was anxious that the clause should be agreed to. He assured
the House, that this was a tender point in Maryland.
Mr Jennifer urged the necessity of the clause in the same point of view.
On the question for agreeing to it
N. H. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The word "tonnage" was struck out, nem: con: as comprehended in
"duties."
On question On the clause of the Report "and all duties, imposts &
excises, laid by the Legislature shall be uniform throughout the U. S." It
was agreed to nem: con: [49]
[49] In printed Journal N. H. and S. C. entered as in the negative.–Madison's
Note.
On motion of Mr Sherman it was agreed to refer such parts of the
Constitution as have been postponed, and such parts of Reports as have not
been acted on, to a Committee of a member from each State; the Committee
appointed by ballot, being, Mr Gilman, Mr King, Mr Sherman, Mr Brearly,
Mr Govr Morris, Mr Dickinson, Mr Carrol, Mr Madison, Mr Williamson,
Mr Butler, & Mr Baldwin.
The House adjourned.
S        S    1. 1787 I  C         .
Mr Brearley from the Comme of eleven to which were referred yesterday
the postponed part of the Constitution, & parts of Reports not acted upon,
made the following partial report.
That in lieu of the 9th Sect: of Art: 6. the words following be inserted viz
"The members of each House shall be ineligible to any Civil office under
the authority of the U. S. during the time for which they shall respectively
be elected, and no person holding an office under the U. S. shall be a
member of either House during his continuance in office."
Mr Rutlidge from the Committee to whom were referred sundry
propositions (see Aug: 29), together with art: XVI reported that the
following additions be made to the Report–viz.
After the word "States" in the last line on the Margin of the 3d page (see
the printed Report),–add "to establish uniform laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies."
And insert the following as Art: XVI viz
"Full faith and credit ought to be given in each State to the public
acts, records, and Judicial proceedings of every other State, and the
Legislature shall, by general laws prescribe the manner in which such
acts, Records, & proceedings shall be proved, and the effect which
Judgments obtained in one State, shall have in another."
After receiving these reports
The House adjourned to 10OC on Monday next.
M      S    3 1787. I  C         
Mr Govr Morris moved to amend the Report concerning the respect to be
paid to Acts Records &c. of one State, in other States (see Sepr 1.) by
striking out "judgments obtained in one State shall have in another" and to
insert the word "thereof" after the word "effect."
Col: Mason favored the motion, particularly if the "effect" was to be
restrained to judgments & Judicial proceedings.
Mr Wilson remarked, that if the Legislature were not allowed to declare
the effect the provision would amount to nothing more than what now takes
place among all Independent Nations.
Docr Johnson thought the amendment as worded would authorize the
Genl Legislature to declare the effect of Legislative acts of one State in
another State.
Mr Randolph considered it as strengthening the general objection agst the
plan, that its definition of the powers of the Government was so loose as to
give it opportunities of usurping all the State powers. He was for not going
farther than the Report, which enables the Legislature to provide for the
effect of Judgments.
On the amendment, as moved by Mr Govr Morris
Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Md no. Va no. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On motion of Mr Madison, "ought to" were struck out, and "shall"
inserted; and "shall" between "Legislature" & "by general laws" struck out,
and "may" inserted, nem: con:
On the question to agree to the report as amended viz "Full faith & credit
shall be given in each State to the public acts, records & judicial
proceedings of every other State, and the Legislature may by general laws
prescribe the manner in which such acts records & proceedings shall be
proved, and the effect thereof." Agreed to witht a count of Sts.
The clause in the Report "To establish uniform laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies" being taken up.
Mr Sherman observed that Bankruptcies were in some cases punishable
with death by the laws of England, & He did not chuse to grant a power by
which that might be done here.
Mr Govr Morris said this was an extensive & delicate subject. He would
agree to it because he saw no danger of abuse of the power by the
Legislature of the U. S.
On the question to agree to the clause
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Pinkney moved to postpone the Report of the Committee of Eleven
(see Sepr 1.) in order to take up the following,
"The members of each House shall be incapable of holding any
office under the U. S. for which they or any other for their benefit,
receive any salary, fees or emoluments of any kind, and the acceptance
of such office shall vacate their seats respectively." He was strenuously
opposed to an ineligibility of members to office, and therefore wished
to restrain the proposition to a mere incompatibility. He considered the
eligibility of members of the Legislature to the honourable offices of
Government, as resembling the policy of the Romans, in making the
temple of virtue the road to the temple of fame.
On this question
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Md no. Va no.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr King moved to insert the word "created" before the word "during" in
the Report of the Committee. This he said would exclude the members of
the first Legislature under the Constitution, as most of the offices wd then
be created.
Mr Williamson 2ded the motion. He did not see why members of the
Legislature should be ineligible to vacancies happening during the term of
their election.
Mr Sherman was for entirely incapacitating members of the Legislature.
He thought their eligibility to offices would give too much influence to the
Executive. He said the incapacity ought at least to be extended to cases
where salaries should be increased, as well as created, during the term of
the member. He mentioned also the expedient by which the restriction could
be evaded to wit: an existing officer might be translated to an office created,
and a member of the Legislature be then put into the office vacated.
Mr Govr Morris contended that the eligibility of members to office wd
lessen the influence of the Executive. If they cannot be appointed
themselves, the Executive will appoint their relations & friends, retaining
the service & votes of the members for his purposes in the Legislature.
Whereas the appointment of the members deprives him of such an
advantage.
Mr Gerry, thought the eligibility of members would have the effect of
opening batteries agst good officers, in order to drive them out & make way
for members of the Legislature.
Mr Gorham was in favor of the amendment. Without it we go further
than has been done in any of the States, or indeed any other Country. The
experience of the State Governments where there was no such ineligibility,
proved that it was not necessary; on the contrary that the eligibility was
among the inducements for fit men to enter into the Legislative service.
Mr Randolph was inflexibly fixed against inviting men into the
Legislature by the prospect of being appointed to offices.
Mr Baldwin remarked that the example of the States was not applicable.
The Legislatures there are so numerous that an exclusion of their members
would not leave proper men for offices. The case would be otherwise in the
General Government.
Col: Mason. Instead of excluding merit, the ineligibility will keep out
corruption, by excluding office-hunters.
Mr Wilson considered the exclusion of members of the Legislature as
increasing the influence of the Executive as observed by Mr Govr Morris at
the same time that it would diminish, the general energy of the Government.
He said that the legal disqualification for office would be odious to those
who did not wish for office, but did not wish either to be marked by so
degrading a distinction.
Mr Pinkney. The first Legislature will be composed of the ablest men to
be found. The States will select such to put the Government into operation.
Should the Report of the Committee or even the amendment be agreed to,
The great offices, even those of the Judiciary Department which are to
continue for life, must be filled while those most capable of filling them
will be under a disqualification.
On the question on Mr King's motion
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The amendment being thus lost by the equal division of the States,
Mr Williamson moved to insert the words "created or the emoluments
whereof shall have been increased" before the word "during" in the Report
of the Committee.
Mr King 2ded the motion, & on the question
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. divided.
The last clause rendering a Seat in the Legislature & an office
incompatible was agreed to nem. con:
The Report as amended & agreed to is as follows.
"The members of each House shall be ineligible to any Civil office
under the authority of the U. States, created, or the emoluments
whereof shall have been increased during the time for which they shall
respectively be elected–And no person holding any office under the
U. S. shall be a member of either House during his continuance in
office."
Adjourned.
T       S    4. 1787. I  C         
Mr Brearly from the Committee of Eleven made a further partial Report
as follows
"The Committee of Eleven to whom sundry resolutions &c. were
referred on the 31st of August, report that in their opinion the following
additions and alterations should be made to the Report before the
Convention, viz. [50]
[50] This is an exact copy. The variations in that in the printed Journal are
occasioned by its incorporation of subsequent amendments. This remark is
applicable to other cases.–Madison's Note. The report was copied by the
Secretary of the Convention, William Jackson, into the Journal, after it had been
read. Afterwards two sentences were altered by interlining with lead pencil. The
alterations (indicated by italics) are as follows: Paragraph 4, "The person having
the greatest number of votes ... if such number be a majority of the whole
number of the electors appointed." Paragraph 7, "But no treaty, except treaties of
peace, shall be made," etc. The changes in paragraph 4 are unimportant: the
change in paragraph 7 was an amendment offered by Madison September 7th,
and adopted.–Const. MSS.—Journal of Federal Convention, p. 323, et seq.
(1.) The first clause of sect: 1. art. 7. to read as follows–'The
Legislature shall have power to lay and collect taxes duties imposts &
excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence &
general welfare of the U. S.'
(2.) At the end of the 2d clause of sect. 1. art. 7. add 'and with the
Indian tribes.'
(3.) In the place of the 9th art. Sect. 1. to be inserted 'The Senate of
the U. S. shall have power to try all impeachments; but no person shall
be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members
present.'
(4.) After the word 'Excellency' in sect. 1. art. 10. to be inserted. 'He
shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together with
the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected in the
following manner, viz. Each State shall appoint in such manner as its
Legislature may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole
number of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, to
which the State may be entitled in the Legislature. The Electors shall
meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for two persons, of
whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with
themselves; and they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and
of the number of votes for each, which list they shall sign and certify
and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Genl Government, directed to the
President of the Senate–The President of the Senate shall in that House
open all the certificates, and the votes shall be then & there counted.
The Person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President,
if such number be a majority of that of the electors; and if there be
more than one who have such a majority, and have an equal number of
votes, then the Senate shall immediately choose by ballot one of them
for President: but if no person have a majority, then from the five
highest on the list, the Senate shall choose by ballot the President, and
in every case after the choice of the President, the person having the
greatest number of votes shall be vice-president: but if there should
remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose
from them the Vice-President. The Legislature may determine the time
of choosing and assembling the Electors, and the manner of certifying
and transmitting their votes.'
(5) 'Sect. 2. No person except a natural born citizen or a Citizen of
the U. S. at the time of the adoption of this Constitution shall be
eligible to the office of President; nor shall any person be elected to
that office, who shall be under the age of thirty five years, and who has
not been in the whole, at least fourteen years a resident within the
U. S.'
(6) 'Sect. 3. The vice-president shall be ex officio President of the
Senate, except when they sit to try the impeachment of the President,
in which case the Chief Justice shall preside, and excepting also when
he shall exercise the powers and duties of President, in which case &
in case of his absence, the Senate shall chuse a President pro tempore–
The vice President when acting as President of the Senate shall not
have a vote unless the House be equally divided.'
(7) 'Sect. 4. The President by and with the advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties; and he shall nominate
and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint
ambassadors, and other public ministers, Judges of the Supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the U. S. whose appointments are not
otherwise herein provided for. But no Treaty shall be made without the
consent of two thirds of the members present.'
(8) After the words–'into the service of the U. S.' in sect. 2. art: 10.
add 'and may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in
each of the Executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the
duties of their respective offices.'
The latter part of Sect. 2. art: 10. to read as follows.
(9) 'He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the
House of Representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for Treason,
or bribery, and in case of his removal as aforesaid, death, absence,
resignation or inability to discharge the powers or duties of his office,
the vice-president shall exercise those powers and duties until another
President be chosen, or until the inability of the President be
removed.'"
The (1st) clause of the Report was agreed to, nem. con.
The (2) clause was also agreed to nem: con:
The (3) clause was postponed in order to decide previously on the mode
of electing the President.
The (4) clause was accordingly taken up.
Mr Gorham disapproved of making the next highest after the President,
the vice-President, without referring the decision to the Senate in case the
next highest should have less than a majority of votes. As the regulation
stands a very obscure man with very few votes may arrive at that
appointment.
Mr Sherman said the object of this clause of the report of the Committee
was to get rid of the ineligibility, which was attached to the mode of
election by the Legislature, & to render the Executive independent of the
Legislature. As the choice of the President was to be made out of the five
highest, obscure characters were sufficiently guarded against in that case;
and he had no objection to requiring the vice-President to be chosen in like
manner, where the choice was not decided by a majority in the first
instance.
Mr Madison was apprehensive that by requiring both the President &
vice President to be chosen out of the five highest candidates, the attention
of the electors would be turned too much to making candidates instead of
giving their votes in order to a definitive choice. Should this turn be given
to the business, The election would, in fact be consigned to the Senate
altogether. It would have the effect at the same time, he observed, of giving
the nomination of the candidates to the largest States.
Mr Govr Morris concurred in, & enforced the remarks of Mr Madison.
Mr Randolph & Mr Pinkney wished for a particular explanation &
discussion of the reasons for changing the mode of electing the Executive.
Mr Govr Morris said he would give the reasons of the Committee and his
own. The 1st was the danger of intrigue & faction if the appointmt should be
made by the Legislature. 2. The inconveniency of an ineligibility required
by that mode in order to lessen its evils. 3. The difficulty of establishing a
Court of Impeachments, other than the Senate which would not be so proper
for the trial nor the other branch for the impeachment of the President, if
appointed by the Legislature. 4. Nobody had appeared to be satisfied with
an appointment by the Legislature. 5. Many were anxious even for an
immediate choice by the people. 6. The indispensable necessity of making
the Executive independent of the Legislature.–As the Electors would vote at
the same time throughout the U. S. and at so great a distance from each
other, the great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be impossible also to
corrupt them. A conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the
Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the
President after the trial of the impeachment.
Col: Mason confessed that the plan of the Committee had removed some
capital objections, particularly the danger of cabal and corruption. It was
liable however to this strong objection, that nineteen times in twenty the
President would be chosen by the Senate, an improper body for the purpose.
Mr Butler thought the mode not free from objections, but much more so
than an election by the Legislature, where as in elective monarchies, cabal
faction & violence would be sure to prevail.
Mr Pinkney stated as objections to the mode 1. that it threw the whole
appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate. 2. The Electors will be
strangers to the several candidates and of course unable to decide on their
comparative merits. 3. It makes the Executive reeligible which will
endanger the public liberty. 4. It makes the same body of men which will in
fact elect the President his Judges in case of an impeachment.
Mr Williamson had great doubts whether the advantage of reeligibility
would balance the objection to such a dependence of the President on the
Senate for his reappointment. He thought at least the Senate ought to be
restrained to the two highest on the list.
Mr Govr Morris said the principal advantage aimed at was that of taking
away the opportunity for cabal. The President may be made if thought
necessary ineligible on this as well as on any other mode of election. Other
inconveniences may be no less redressed on this plan than any other.
Mr Baldwin thought the plan not so objectionable when well considered,
as at first view: The increasing intercourse among the people of the States,
would render important characters less & less unknown; and the Senate
would consequently be less & less likely to have the eventual appointment
thrown into their hands.
Mr Wilson. This subject has greatly divided the House, and will also
divide the people out of doors. It is in truth the most difficult of all on
which we have had to decide. He had never made up an opinion on it
entirely to his own satisfaction. He thought the plan on the whole a valuable
improvement on the former. It gets rid of one great evil, that of cabal &
corruption; & Continental Characters will multiply as we more & more
coalesce, so as to enable the electors in every part of the Union to know &
judge of them. It clears the way also for a discussion of the question of re-
eligibility on its own merits which the former mode of election seemed to
forbid. He thought it might be better however to refer the eventual
appointment to the Legislature than to the Senate, and to confine it to a
smaller number than five of the Candidates. The eventual election by the
Legislature wd not open cabal anew, as it would be restrained to certain
designated objects of choice, and as these must have had the previous
sanction of a number of the States; and if the election be made as it ought as
soon as the votes of the Electors are opened & it is known that no one has a
majority of the whole there can be little danger of corruption. Another
reason for preferring the Legislature to the Senate in this business was that
the House of Reps will be so often changed as to be free from the influence
& faction to which the permanence of the Senate may subject that branch.
Mr Randolph preferred the former mode of constituting the Executive,
but if the change was to be made, he wished to know why the eventual
election was referred to the Senate and not to the Legislature? He saw no
necessity for this and many objections to it. He was apprehensive also that
the advantage of the eventual appointment would fall into the hands of the
States near the seat of Government.
Mr Govr Morris said the Senate was preferred because fewer could then
say to the President, you owe your appointment to us. He thought the
President would not depend so much on the Senate for his reappointment as
on his general good conduct.
The further consideration of the Report was postponed that each member
might take a copy of the remainder of it.
The following motion was referred to the Committee of Eleven–to
wit,–"To prepare & report a plan for defraying the expences of the
Convention."
[51]Mr Pinkney moved a clause declaring "that each House should be
judge of the privilege of its own members." Mr Govr Morris 2ded the
motion.
[51] This motion not contained in the printed Journal–Madison's Note.
Mr Randolph & Mr Madison expressed doubts as to the propriety of
giving such a power, & wished for a postponement.
Mr Govr Morris thought it so plain a case that no postponement could be
necessary.
Mr Wilson thought the power involved, and the express insertion of it
needless. It might beget doubts as to the power of other public bodies, as
Courts &c. Every Court is the judge of its own privileges.
Mr Madison distinguished between the power of Judging of privileges
previously & duly established, and the effect of the motion which would
give a discretion to each House as to the extent of its own privileges. He
suggested that it would be better to make provision for ascertaining by law,
the privileges of each House, than to allow each House to decide for itself.
He suggested also the necessity of considering what privileges ought to be
allowed to the Executive.
Adjourned.
W         S    5. 1787. I  C         .
Mr Brearley from the Committee of Eleven made a farther report as
follows,
(1) To add to the clause "to declare war" the words "and grant letters
of marque and reprisal."
(2) To add to the clause "to raise and support armies" the words "but
no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than
two years."
(3) Instead of sect: 12. art 6. say–"All bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives, and shall be subject to
alterations and amendments by the Senate: no money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law."
(4) Immediately before the last clause of sect. 1. art. 7. insert "To
exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district
(not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by Cession of particular
States and the acceptance of the Legislature become the Seat of the
Government of the U. S. and to exercise like authority over all places
purchased for the erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock Yards,
and other needful buildings."
(5) "To promote the progress of Science and useful arts by securing
for limited times to authors & inventors, the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries."
This report being taken up,–The (1) clause was agreed to nem: con:
To the (2) clause Mr Gerry objected that it admitted of appropriations to
an army, for two years instead of one, for which he could not conceive a
reason, that it implied that there was to be a standing army which he
inveighed against as dangerous to liberty, as unnecessary even for so great
an extent of Country as this, and if necessary, some restriction on the
number & duration ought to be provided: Nor was this a proper time for
such an innovation. The people would not bear it.
Mr Sherman remarked that the appropriations were permitted only, not
required to be for two years. As the Legislature is to be biennially elected, it
would be inconvenient to require appropriations to be for one year, as there
might be no Session within the time necessary to renew them. He should
himself he said like a reasonable restriction on the number and continuance
of an army in time of peace.
The (2) clause was then agreed to nem: con:
The (3) clause, Mr Govr Morris moved to postpone. It had been agreed to
in the Committee on the ground of compromise, and he should feel himself
at liberty to dissent to it, if on the whole he should not be satisfied with
certain other parts to be settled.— Mr Pinkney 2ded the motion.
Mr Sherman was for giving immediate ease to those who looked on this
clause as of great moment, and for trusting to their concurrence in other
proper measures.
On the question for postponing
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
So much of the (4) clause as related to the seat of Government was
agreed to nem: con:
On the residue to wit, "to exercise like authority over all places
purchased for forts" &c.
Mr Gerry contended that this power might be made use of to enslave any
particular State by buying up its territory, and that the strongholds proposed
would be a means of awing the State into an undue obedience to the Genl
Government.
Mr King thought himself the provision unnecessary, the power being
already involved: but would move to insert after the word "purchased" the
words "by the consent of the Legislature of the State." This would certainly
make the power safe.
Mr Govr Morris 2ded the motion, which was agreed to nem: con: as was
then the residue of the clause as amended.
The (5) clause was agreed to nem: con:
The following Resolution & order being reported from the Committee of
eleven, to wit,
"Resolved that the U. S. in Congress be requested to allow and
cause to be paid to the Secretary and other officers of this Convention
such sums in proportion to their respective times of service, as are
allowed to the Secretary & similar officers of Congress."
"Ordered that the Secretary make out & transmit to the Treasury
office of the U. S. an account for the said services & for the incidental
expences of this Convention."
The resolution & order were separately agreed to nem: con:
Mr Gerry gave notice that he should move to reconsider articles XIX.
XX. XXI. XXII.
Mr Williamson gave like notice as to the article fixing the number of
Representatives, which he thought too small. He wished also to allow Rho:
Island more than one, as due to her probable number of people, and as
proper to stifle any pretext arising from her absence on the occasion.
The Report made yesterday as to the appointment of the Executive being
then taken up. Mr Pinkney renewed his opposition to the mode, arguing 1.
that the electors will not have sufficient knowledge of the fittest men, &
will be swayed by an attachment to the eminent men of their respective
States. Hence 2dly the dispersion of the votes would leave the appointment
with the Senate, and as the President's reappointment will thus depend on
the Senate he will be the mere creature of that body. 3. He will combine
with the Senate agst the House of Representatives. 4. This change in the
mode of election was meant to get rid of the ineligibility of the President a
second time, whereby he will become fixed for life under the auspices of
the Senate.
Mr Gerry did not object to this plan of constituting the Executive in
itself, but should be governed in his final vote by the powers that may be
given to the President.
Mr Rutlidge was much opposed to the plan reported by the Committee. It
would throw the whole power into the Senate. He was also against a re-
eligibility. He moved to postpone the Report under consideration & take up
the original plan of appointment by the Legislature, to wit. "He shall be
elected by joint ballot by the Legislature to which election a majority of the
votes of the members present shall be required: He shall hold his office
during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second time."
On this motion to postpone
N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Col. Mason admitted that there were objections to an appointment by the
Legislature as originally planned. He had not yet made up his mind, but
would state his objections to the mode proposed by the Committee. 1. It
puts the appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate; as it will rarely
happen that a majority of the whole votes will fall on any one candidate:
and as the existing President will always be one of the 5 highest, his
reappointment will of course depend on the Senate. 2. Considering the
powers of the President & those of the Senate, if a coalition should be
established between these two branches, they will be able to subvert the
Constitution–The great objection with him would be removed by depriving
the Senate of the eventual election. He accordingly moved to strike out the
words "if such number be a majority of that of the electors."
Mr Williamson 2ded the motion. He could not agree to the clause without
some such modification. He preferred making the highest tho' not having a
majority of the votes, President, to a reference of the matter to the Senate.
Referring the appointment to the Senate lays a certain foundation for
corruption & aristocracy.
Mr Govr Morris thought the point of less consequence than it was
supposed on both sides. It is probable that a majority of the votes will fall
on the same man. As each Elector is to give two votes, more than 1/4 will
give a majority. Besides as one vote is to be given to a man out of the State,
and as this vote will not be thrown away, 1/2 the votes will fall on
characters eminent & generally known. Again if the President shall have
given satisfaction, the votes will turn on him of course, and a majority of
them will reappoint him, without resort to the Senate: If he should be
disliked, all disliking him, would take care to unite their votes so as to
ensure his being supplanted.
Col. Mason those who think there is no danger of there not being a
majority for the same person in the first instance, ought to give up the point
to those who think otherwise.
Mr Sherman reminded the opponents of the new mode proposed that if
the small States had the advantage in the Senate's deciding among the five
highest candidates the large States would have in fact the nomination of
these candidates.
On the motion of Col: Mason
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay.
[52] Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
[52] In printed Journal Maryland–no–Madison's Note.
Mr Wilson moved to strike out "Senate" and insert the word
"Legislature."
Mr Madison considered it as a primary object to render an eventual
resort to any part of the Legislature improbable. He was apprehensive that
the proposed alteration would turn the attention of the large States too much
to the appointment of candidates, instead of aiming at an effectual
appointment of the officer, as the large States would predominate in the
Legislature which would have the final choice out of the candidates.
Whereas if the Senate in which the small States predominate should have
the final choice, the concerted effort of the large States would be to make
the appointment in the first instance conclusive.
Mr Randolph. We have in some revolutions of this plan made a bold
stroke for Monarchy. We are now doing the same for an aristocracy. He
dwelt on the tendency of such an influence in the Senate over the election
of the President in addition to its other powers, to convert that body into a
real & dangerous Aristocracy.
Mr Dickinson was in favor of giving the eventual election to the
Legislature, instead of the Senate. It was too much influence to be
superadded to that body.
On the question moved by Mr Wilson
N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no.
Md no. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Mr Madison & Mr Williamson moved to strike out the word "majority"
and insert "one-third" so that the eventual power might not be exercised if
less than a majority, but not less than 1/3 of the Electors should vote for the
same person.
Mr Gerry objected that this would put it in the power of three or four
States to put in whom they pleased.
Mr Williamson. There are seven States which do not contain one third of
the people. If the Senate are to appoint, less than one sixth of the people
will have the power.
On the question
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Gerry suggested that the eventual election should be made by six
Senators and seven Representatives chosen by joint ballot of both Houses.
Mr King observed that the influence of the Small States in the Senate
was somewhat balanced by the influence of the large States in bringing
forward the candidates, [53] and also by the Concurrence of the small States
in the Committee in the clause vesting the exclusive origination of Money
bills in the House of Representatives.
[53] This explains the compromise mentioned above by Mr Govr Morris. Col.
Mason, Mr Gerry & other members from large States set great value on this
privilege of originating money bills. Of this the members from the small States,
with some from the large States who wished a high mounted Govt endeavored to
avail themselves, by making that privilege, the price of arrangements in the
constitution favorable to the small States, and to the elevation of the
Government.–Madison's Note.
Col: Mason moved to strike out the word "five" and insert the word
"three" as the highest candidates for the Senate to choose out of.
Mr Gerry 2ded the motion.
Mr Sherman would sooner give up the plan. He would prefer seven or
thirteen.
On the question moved by Col: Mason & Mr Gerry
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Delaware [and]
Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Spaight and Mr Rutlidge moved to strike out "five" and insert
"thirteen"–to which all the States disagreed–except N. C. & S. C.
Mr Madison & Mr Williamson moved to insert after "Electors" the words
"who shall have balloted" so that the non voting electors not being counted
might not increase the number necessary as a majority of the whole to
decide the choice without the agency of the Senate.
On this question
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Dickinson moved, in order to remove ambiguity from the intention of
the clause as explained by the vote, to add, after the words "if such number
be a majority of the whole number of the Electors" the word "appointed."
On this motion
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Con. ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Delaware
[and] Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Col: Mason. As the mode of appointment is now regulated, he could not
forbear expressing his opinion that it is utterly inadmissible. He would
prefer the Government of Prussia to one which will put all power into the
hands of seven or eight men, and fix an Aristocracy worse than absolute
monarchy.
The words "and of their giving their votes" being inserted on motion for
that purpose, after the words "The Legislature may determine the time of
chusing and assembling the Electors."
The House adjourned.
T        S    6. 1787. I  C         
Mr King and Mr Gerry moved to insert in the (5) [54] clause of the Report
(see Sepr 4) after the words "may be entitled in the Legislature" the words
following–"But no person shall be appointed an elector who is a member of
the Legislature of the U. S. or who holds any office of profit or trust under
the U. S." which passed nem: con:
[54] This is a mistake and should be fourth clause. See p. 298.
Mr Gerry proposed as the President was to be elected by the Senate out
of the five highest candidates, that if he should not at the end of his term be
re-elected by a majority of the Electors, and no other candidate should have
a majority, the eventual election should be made by the Legislature. This he
said would relieve the President from his particular dependence on the
Senate for his continuance in office.
Mr King liked the idea, as calculated to satisfy particular members and
promote unanimity & as likely to operate but seldom.
Mr Read opposed it, remarking that if individual members were to be
indulged, alterations would be necessary to satisfy most of them.
Mr Williamson espoused it as a reasonable precaution against the undue
influence of the Senate.
Mr Sherman liked the arrangement as it stood, though he should not be
averse to some amendments. He thought he said that if the Legislature were
to have the eventual appointment instead of the Senate, it ought to vote in
the case by States, in favor of the small States, as the large States would
have so great an advantage in nominating the candidates.
Mr Govr Morris thought favorably of Mr Gerry's proposition. It would
free the President from being tempted in naming to offices, to Conform to
the will of the Senate, & thereby virtually give the appointments to office,
to the Senate.
Mr Wilson said that he had weighed carefully the report of the
Committee for remodelling the constitution of the Executive; and on
combining it with other parts of the plan, he was obliged to consider the
whole as having a dangerous tendency to aristocracy; as throwing a
dangerous power into the hands of the Senate. They will have in fact, the
appointment of the President, and through his dependence on them, the
virtual appointment to offices; among others the Officers of the Judiciary
Department. They are to make Treaties; and they are to try all
impeachments. In allowing them thus to make the Executive & Judiciary
appointments, to be the Court of impeachments, and to make Treaties which
are to be laws of the land, the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers are
all blended in one branch of the Government. The power of making Treaties
involves the case of subsidies, and here as an additional evil, foreign
influence is to be dreaded. According to the plan as it now stands, the
President will not be the man of the people as he ought to be, but the minion
of the Senate. He cannot even appoint a tide-waiter without the Senate. He
had always thought the Senate too numerous a body for making
appointments to office. The Senate will moreover in all probability be in
constant Session. They will have high salaries. And with all those powers,
and the President in their interest, they will depress the other branch of the
Legislature, and aggrandize themselves in proportion. Add to all this, that
the Senate sitting in conclave, can by holding up to their respective States
various and improbable candidates, contrive so to scatter their votes, as to
bring the appointment of the President ultimately before themselves. Upon
the whole, he thought the new mode of appointing the President, with some
amendments, a valuable improvement; but he could never agree to purchase
it at the price of the ensuing parts of the Report, nor befriend a system of
which they make a part.
Mr Govr Morris expressed his wonder at the observations of Mr Wilson
so far as they preferred the plan in the printed Report to the new
modification of it before the House, and entered into a comparative view of
the two, with an eye to the nature of Mr Wilsons objections to the last. By
the first the Senate he observed had a voice in appointing the President out
of all the Citizens of the U. S: by this they were limited to five candidates
previously nominated to them, with a probability of being barred altogether
by the successful ballot of the Electors. Here surely was no increase of
power. They are now to appoint Judges nominated to them by the President.
Before they had the appointment without any agency whatever of the
President. Here again was surely no additional power. If they are to make
Treaties as the plan now stands, the power was the same in the printed plan.
If they are to try impeachments, the Judges must have been triable by them
before. Wherein then lay the dangerous tendency of the innovations to
establish an aristocracy in the Senate? As to the appointment of officers, the
weight of sentiment in the House, was opposed to the exercise of it by the
President alone; though it was not the case with himself. If the Senate
would act as was suspected, in misleading the States into a fallacious
disposition of their votes for a President, they would, if the appointment
were withdrawn wholly from them, make such representations in their
several States where they have influence, as would favor the object of their
partiality.
Mr Williamson, replying to Mr Morris, observed that the aristocratic
complexion proceeds from the change in the mode of appointing the
President which makes him dependent on the Senate.
Mr Clymer said that the aristocratic part to which he could never accede
was that in the printed plan, which gave the Senate the power of appointing
to offices.
Mr Hamilton said that he had been restrained from entering into the
discussions by his dislike of the Scheme of Govt in General; but as he
meant to support the plan to be recommended, as better than nothing, he
wished in this place to offer a few remarks. He liked the new modification,
on the whole, better than that in the printed Report. In this the President was
a Monster elected for seven years, and ineligible afterwards; having great
powers, in appointments to office, & continually tempted by this
constitutional disqualification to abuse them in order to subvert the
Government. Although he should be made re-eligible, still if appointed by
the Legislature, he would be tempted to make use of corrupt influence to be
continued in office. It seemed peculiarly desirable therefore that some other
mode of election should be devised. Considering the different views of
different States, & the different districts Northern Middle & Southern, he
concurred with those who thought that the votes would not be concentered,
and that the appointment would consequently in the present mode devolve
on the Senate. The nomination to offices will give great weight to the
President. Here then is a mutual connexion & influence, that will perpetuate
the President, and aggrandize both him & the Senate. What is to be the
remedy? He saw none better than to let the highest number of ballots,
whether a majority or not, appoint the President. What was the objection to
this? Merely that too small a number might appoint. But as the plan stands,
the Senate may take the candidate having the smallest number of votes, and
make him President.
Mr Spaight & Mr Williamson moved to insert "seven" instead of "four"
years for the term of the President [55]—
[55] An ineligibility wd have followed (tho' it would seem from the vote not in
the opinion of all) this prolongation of the term.–Madison's Note.
On this motion
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Spaight & Mr Williamson, then moved to insert "six," instead of
"four". On which motion
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On the term "four" all the States were ay, except N. Carolina, no.
On the question (Clause 4. in the Report) for appointing President by
electors–down to the words,–"entitled in the Legislature" inclusive
N. H. ay. Mas: ay. Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.–ay.
It was moved that the Electors meet at the seat of the Genl Govt which
passed in the Negative N. C. only being ay.
It was moved to insert the words "under the seal of the State" after the
word "transmit" in the 4th. clause of the Report which was disagreed to; as
was another motion to insert the words "and who shall have given their
votes" after the word "appointed" in the 4th Clause of the Report as added
yesterday on motion of Mr Dickinson.
On several motions, the words "in presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives" were inserted after the word "counted" and the word
"immediately" before the word "choose;" and the words "of the Electors"
after the word "votes."
Mr Spaight said if the election by Electors is to be crammed down, he
would prefer their meeting altogether and deciding finally without any
reference to the Senate and moved "that the Electors meet at the seat of the
General Government."
Mr Williamson 2ded the motion, on which all the States were in the
negative except N: Carolina.
On motion the words "But the election shall be on the same day
throughout the U. S." were added after the words "transmitting their votes"
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.–ay.
On a question on the sentence in clause (4) "if such number be a
majority of that of the Electors appointed"
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va no. N.C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On a question on the clause referring the eventual appointment of the
President to the Senate
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Va ay.
N. C. no. Here the call ceased.
Mr Madison made a motion requiring 2/3 at least of the Senate to be
present at the choice of a President. Mr Pinkney 2ded the motion.
Mr Gorham thought it a wrong principle to require more than a majority
in any case. In the present case it might prevent for a long time any choice
of a President. On the question moved by Mr M. and Mr P.
N. H. ay. Mas. abst. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Williamson suggested as better than an eventual choice by the
Senate, that this choice should be made by the Legislature, voting by States
and not per capita.
Mr Sherman suggested the "House of Reps" as preferable to the
Legislature, and moved accordingly,
To strike out the words "The Senate shall immediately choose &c."
and insert "The House of Representatives shall immediately choose by
ballot one of them for President, the members from each State having
one vote."
Col: Mason liked the latter mode best as lessening the aristocratic
influence of the Senate.
On the motion of Mr Sherman
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Govr Morris suggested the idea of providing that in all cases, the
President in office, should not be one of the five Candidates; but be only re-
eligible in case a majority of the electors should vote for him. (This was
another expedient for rendering the President independent of the Legislative
body for his continuance in office.)
Mr Madison remarked that as a majority of members wd make a quorum
in the H. of Reps it would follow from the amendment of Mr Sherman
giving the election to a majority of States, that the President might be
elected by two States only, Virga & Pena which have 18 members, if these
States alone should be present.
On a motion that the eventual election of Presidt in case of an equality of
the votes of the electors be referred to the House of Reps
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr King moved to add to the amendment of Mr Sherman "But a quorum
for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of
the States, and also of a majority of the whole number of the House of
Representatives."
Col: Mason liked it as obviating the remark of Mr Madison–The motion
as far as "States" inclusive was agd to. On the residue to wit, "and also of a
majority of the whole number of the House of Repss." it passed in the
negative.
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The Report relating to the appointment of the Executive stands as
amended, as follows.
"He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together
with the vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected in the
following manner.
Each State shall appoint in such manner as its Legislature may
direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, to which the State may be
entitled in the Legislature:
But no person shall be appointed an Elector who is a member of the
Legislature of the U. S. or who holds any office of profit or trust under
the U. S.
The Electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by ballot
for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the
same State with themselves; and they shall make a list of all the
persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each, which list they
shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the General
Government, directed to the President of the Senate.
The President of the Senate shall in the presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives open all the certificates & the votes shall
then be counted.
The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the
President (if such number be a majority of the whole number of
electors appointed) and if there be more than one who have such
majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of
Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for
President, the Representation from each State having one vote. But if
no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list, the
House of Representatives shall in like manner choose by ballot the
President. In the choice of a President by the House of
Representatives, a Quorum shall consist of a member or members from
two thirds of the States, ( [56]and the concurrence of a majority of all
the States shall be necessary to such choice.)–And in every case after
the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of
votes of the Electors shall be the vice-president: But, if there should
remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose
from them the vice-President. [57]
[56] N   .–This clause was not inserted on this day, but on the 7th. of Sepr–See
Friday the 7th.–Madison's Note.
[57] September 6 Madison wrote to Jefferson (cipher represented by italics): "...
As the Convention will shortly rise I should feel little scruple in disclosing what
will be public here, before it could reach you, were it practicable for me to guard
by Cypher against an intermediate discovery. But I am deprived of this resource
by the shortness of the interval between the receipt of your letter of June 20 and
the date of this. This is the first day which has been free from Committee
service, both before & after the hours of the House, and the last that is allowed
me by the time advertised for the sailing of the packet.
"The Convention consists now as it has generally done of Eleven States.
There has been no intermission of its Sessions since a house was formed, except
an interval of about ten days allowed a Committee appointed to detail the
general propositions agreed on in the House. The term of its dissolution cannot
be more than one or two weeks distant. A Govermt will probably be submitted
to the people of the States, consisting of a President, cloathed with Executive
power; a Senate chosen by the Legislatures, and another House chosen by the
people of the States, jointly possessing the Legislative power; and a regular
Judiciary establishment. The mode of constituting the Executive is among the
few points not yet finally settled. The Senate will consist of two members from
each State, and appointed sexennially. The other, of members, appointed
biennially by the people of the States, in proportion to their number. The
Legislative power will extend to taxation, trade, and sundry other general
matters. The powers of Congress will be distributed, according to their nature,
among the several departments. The States will be restricted from paper money
and in a few other instances. These are the outlines. The extent of them may
perhaps surprize you. I hazard an opinion nevertheless that the plan, should it be
adopted, will neither effectually answer its national object, nor prevent the local
mischiefs which everywhere excite disgusts agst the State Governments. The
grounds of this opinion will be the subject of a future letter.
"I have written to a friend in Congs intimating in a covert manner the
necessity of deciding & notifying the intentions of Congs with regard to their
foreign Ministers after May next, and have dropped a hint on the
communications of Dumas.
"Congress have taken some measures for disposing of the public land, and
have actually sold a considerable tract. Another bargain I learn is on foot for a
further sale.
"Nothing can exceed the universal anxiety for the event of the meeting here.
Reports and conjectures abound concerning the nature of the plan which is to be
proposed. The public however is certainly in the dark with regard to it. The
Convention is equally in the dark as to the reception wch may be given to it on
its publication. All the prepossessions are on the right side, but it may well be
expected that certain characters will wage war against any reform whatever. My
own idea is that the public mind will now or in a very little time receive anything
that promises stability to the public Councils & security to private rights, and
that no regard ought to be had to local prejudices or temporary considerations. If
the present moment be lost, it is hard to say what may be our fate.
"Our information from Virginia is far from being agreeable. In many parts of
the Country the drought has been extremely injurious to the Corn. I fear, tho' I
have no certain information, that Orange & Albemarle share in the distress. The
people also are said to be generally discontented. A paper emission is again a
topic among them, so is an instalment of all debts in some places and the making
property a tender in others. The taxes are another source of discontent. The
weight of them is complained of, and the abuses in collecting them still more so.
In several Counties the prisons & Court Houses & Clerks' offices have been
wilfully burnt. In Green Briar the course of Justice has been mutinously stopped,
and associations entered into agst the payment of taxes. No other County has yet
followed the example. The approaching meeting of the Assembly will probably
allay the discontents on one side by measures which will excite them on another.
"Mr. Wythe has never returned to us. His lady whose illness carried him
away, died some time after he got home. The other deaths, in Virga are Col. A.
Cary and a few days ago, Mrs. Harrison, wife of Benjn Harrison, Junr, & sister
of J. F. Mercer. Wishing you all happiness.
"I remain, Dear sir, Yrs affectly.
"Give my best wishes to Mazzei. I have recd his letter & book and will write
by the next packet to him. Dorhman is still in Va Congs have done nothing for
him in his affair. I am not sure that 9 Sts have been assembled of late. At present,
it is doubtful whether there are seven."–Mad. MSS.
The Legislature may determine the time of choosing the Electors,
and of their giving their votes; and the manner of certifying and
transmitting their votes–But the election shall be on the same day
through-out the U. States."
Adjourned.
F      S    7 [58] 1787. I  C         
[58] The following letter was received on this day from Jonas Phillips, a Jew in
Philadelphia:
"S    
"With leave and submission I address myself To those in whome there is
wisdom understanding and knowledge. They are the honourable personages
appointed and Made overseers of a part of the terrestrial globe of the Earth,
Namely the 13 united states of america in Convention Assembled, the Lord
preserve them amen—
"I the subscriber being one of the people called Jews of the City of
Philadelphia, a people scattered and despersed among all nations do behold
with Concern that among the laws in the Constitution of Pennsylvania their
is a Clause Sect. 10 to viz–I do belive in one God the Creature and
governour of the universe the Rewarder of the good and the punisher of the
wicked–and I do acknowledge the scriptures of the old and New testement
to be given by a devine inspiration–to swear and believe that the new
testement was given by devine inspiration is absolutly against the Religious
principle of a Jew and is against his Conscience to take any such oath–By
the above law a Jew is deprived of holding any publick office or place of
Government which is a Contridectory to the bill of Right Sect 2. viz
"That all men have a natural and unalienable Right To worship almighty
God according to the dectates of their own Conscience and understanding,
and that no man aught or of Right can be compelled to attend any Religious
Worship or Erect or support any place of worship or Maintain any minister
contrary to or against his own free will and Consent nor Can any man who
acknowledges the being of a God be Justly deprived or abridged of any
Civil Right as a Citizen on account of his Religious sentiments or peculiar
mode of Religious Worship, and that no authority Can or aught to be vested
in or assumed by any power what ever that shall in any Case interfere or in
any manner Controul the Right of Conscience in the free Exercise of
Religious Worship—
"It is well known among all the Citizens of the 13 united States that the
Jews have been true and faithfull whigs, and during the late Contest with
England they have been foremost in aiding and assisting the States with
their lifes and fortunes, they have supported the Cause, have bravely faught
and bleed for liberty which they Can not Enjoy—
Therefore if the honourable Convention shall in ther Wisdom think fit
and alter the said oath and leave out the words to viz–and I do acknowledge
the scripture of the new testeraent to be given by devine inspiration then the
Israeletes will think them self happy to live under a government where all
Religious societys are on an Eaquel footing–I solecet this favour for my self
my Childreen and posterity and for the benefit of all the Israeletes through
the 13 united States of america.
"My prayers is unto the Lord. May the people of this States Rise up as a
great and young lion, May they prevail against their Enemies, May the
degrees of honour of his Excellencey the president of the Convention
George Washington, be Extollet and Raise up. May Every one speak of his
glorious Exploits. May God prolong his days among us in this land of
Liberty–May he lead the armies against his Enemys as he has done
hereuntofore–May God Extend peace unto the united States–May they get
up to the highest Prosperetys–May God Extend peace to them and their
Seed after them so long as the Sun and moon Endureth–and may the
almighty God of our father Abraham Isaac and Jacob endue this Noble
Assembly with wisdom Judgement and unamity in their Councells, and
may they have the Satisfaction to see that their present toil and labour for
the wellfair of the united States may be approved of, Through all the world
and perticular by the united States of america is the ardent prayer of Sires.
"Your Most devoted obed Servant
"J     P       
"Philadelphia 24th Ellul 5547 or Sepr 7th. 1787"–Const. MSS.
The mode of constituting the Executive being resumed, Mr Randolph
moved, to insert in the first section of the report made yesterday
"The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the U. S. shall
act as President in case of the death, resignation, or disability of the
President and Vice-President; and such officer shall act accordingly
until the time of electing a President shall arrive."
Mr Madison observed that this, as worded, would prevent a supply of the
vacancy by an intermediate election of the President, and moved to
substitute–"until such disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
[59] Mr Govr Morris 2ded the motion, which was agreed to.
[59] In the printed Journal this amendment is put into the original motion.–
Madison's Note.
It seemed to be an objection to the provision with some, that according
to the process established for chusing the Executive, there would be
difficulty in effecting it at other than the fixed periods; with others, that the
Legislature was restrained in the temporary appointment to "officers" of the
U. S.: They wished it to be at liberty to appoint others than such.
On the Motion of Mr Randolph as amended, it passed in the affirmative.
N. H. divided. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Gerry moved "that in the election of President by the House of
Representatives, no State shall vote by less than three members, and where
that number may not be allotted to a State, it shall be made up by its
Senators; and a concurrence of a majority of all the States shall be
necessary to make such choice." Without some such provision five
individuals might possibly be competent to an election; these being a
majority of two thirds of the existing number of States; and two thirds being
a quorum for this business.
Mr Madison 2ded the motion.
Mr Read observed that the States having but one member only in the
House of Reps would be in danger of having no vote at all in the election:
the sickness or absence either of the Representative or one of the Senators
would have that effect.
Mr Madison replied that, if one member of the House of Representatives
should be left capable of voting for the State, the states having one
Representative only would still be subject to that danger. He thought it an
evil that so small a number at any rate should be authorized to elect.
Corruption would be greatly facilitated by it. The mode itself was liable to
this further weighty objection that the representatives of a Minority of the
people, might reverse the choice of a majority of the States and of the
people. He wished some cure for this inconveniency might yet be provided.
Mr Gerry withdrew the first part of his motion; and on the, Question on
the 2d part viz: "and a concurrence of a majority of all the States shall be
necessary to make such choice" to follow the words "a member or members
from two thirds of the States"–It was agreed to nem: con:
The section 2. (see Sepr 4) requiring that the President should be a
natural-born Citizen &c., & have been resident for fourteen years, & be
thirty five years of age, was agreed to nem: con:
Section 3 (see Sepr 4). "The vice President shall be ex-officio President
of the Senate"
Mr Gerry opposed this regulation. We might as well put the President
himself at the head of the Legislature. The close intimacy that must subsist
between the President & vice-president makes it absolutely improper. He
was agst having any vice President.
Mr Govr Morris. The vice President then will be the first heir apparent
that ever loved his father. If there should be no vice president, the President
of the Senate would be temporary successor, which would amount to the
same thing.
Mr Sherman saw no danger in the case. If the vice-President were not to
be President of the Senate, he would be without employment, and some
member by being made President must be deprived of his vote, unless when
an equal division of votes might happen in the Senate, which would be but
seldom.
Mr Randolph concurred in the opposition to the clause.
Mr Williamson, observed that such an officer as vice-President was not
wanted. He was introduced only for the sake of a valuable mode of election
which required two to be chosen at the same time.
Col: Mason, thought the office of vice-President an encroachment on the
rights of the Senate; and that it mixed too much the Legislative &
Executive, which as well as the Judiciary departments, ought to be kept as
separate as possible. He took occasion to express his dislike of any
reference whatever of the power to make appointments, to either branch of
the Legislature. On the other hand he was averse to vest so dangerous a
power in the President alone. As a method for avoiding both, he suggested
that a privy Council of six members to the president should be established;
to be chosen for six years by the Senate, two out of the Eastern two out of
the middle, and two out of the Southern quarters of the Union, & to go out
in rotation two every second year; the concurrence of the Senate to be
required only in the appointment of Ambassadors, and in making treaties,
which are more of a legislative nature. This would prevent the constant
sitting of the Senate which he thought dangerous, as well as keep the
departments separate & distinct. It would also save the expence of constant
sessions of the Senate. He had he said always considered the Senate as too
unwieldy & expensive for appointing officers, especially the smallest, such
as tide waiters &c. He had not reduced his idea to writing, but it could be
easily done if it should be found acceptable.
On the question shall the vice President be ex officio President of the
Senate?
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Mar. no.
Va ay. N. C. abst. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The other parts of the same Section (3) were then agreed to.
The Section 4.–to wit. "The President by & with the advice and consent
of the Senate shall have power to make Treaties &c."
Mr Wilson moved to add after the word "Senate" the words, "and House
of Representatives." As treaties he said are to have the operation of laws,
they ought to have the sanction of laws also. The circumstance of secrecy in
the business of treaties formed the only objection; but this he thought, so far
as it was inconsistent with obtaining the Legislative sanction, was
outweighed by the necessity of the latter.
Mr Sherman thought the only question that could be made was whether
the power could be safely trusted to the Senate. He thought it could; and
that the necessity of secrecy in the case of treaties forbade a reference of
them to the whole Legislature.
Mr Fitzimmons 2ded the motion of Mr Wilson, & on the question
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The first sentence as to making treaties was then Agreed to; nem: con:
"He shall nominate &c. Appoint Ambassadors &c."
Mr Wilson objected to the mode of appointing, as blending a branch of
the Legislature with the Executive. Good laws are of no effect without a
good Executive; and there can be no good Executive without a responsible
appointment of officers to execute. Responsibility is in a manner destroyed
by such an agency of the Senate. He would prefer the council proposed by
Col: Mason, provided its advice should not be made obligatory on the
President.
Mr Pinkney was against joining the Senate in these appointments, except
in the instances of Ambassadors who he thought ought not to be appointed
by the President.
Mr Govr Morris said that as the President was to nominate, there would
be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be security.
As Congress now make appointments there is no responsibility.
Mr Gerry. The idea of responsibility in the nomination to offices is
Chimerical. The President cannot know all characters, and can therefore
always plead ignorance.
Mr King. As the idea of a Council proposed by Col. Mason has been
supported by Mr Wilson, he would remark that most of the inconveniences
charged on the Senate are incident to a Council of Advice. He differed from
those who thought the Senate would sit constantly. He did not suppose it
was meant that all the minute officers were to be appointed by the Senate,
or any other original source, but by the higher officers of the departments to
which they belong. He was of opinion also that the people would be
alarmed at an unnecessary creation of new Corps which must increase the
expence as well as influence of the Government.
On the question on these words in the clause viz–"He shall nominate &
by & with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors,
and other public ministers (and consuls) Judges of the Supreme Court".
Agreed to nem: con: the insertion of "and consuls" having first taken place.
On the question on the following words "And all other officers of U.S."
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
On motion of Mr Spaight–"that the President shall have power to fill up
all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate by granting
Commissions which shall expire at the end of the next Session of the
Senate." It was agreed to nem: con:
Section 4. "The President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate shall have power to make Treaties,—But no treaty shall be made
without the consent of two thirds of the members present"–this last clause
being before the House.
Mr Wilson thought it objectionable to require the concurrence of 2/3
which puts it into the power of a minority to controul the will of a majority.
Mr King concurred in the objection; remarking that as the Executive was
here joined in the business, there was a check which did not exist in
Congress where the concurrence of 2/3 was required.
Mr Madison moved to insert after the word "treaty" the words "except
treaties of peace" allowing these to be made with less difficulty than other
treaties–It was agreed to nem: con:
Mr Madison then moved to authorize a concurrence of two thirds of the
Senate to make treaties of peace, without the concurrence of the President.–
The President he said would necessarily derive so much power and
importance from a state of war that he might be tempted if authorized, to
impede a treaty of peace. Mr Butler 2ded the motion.
Mr Gorham thought the precaution unnecessary as the means of carrying
on the war would not be in the hands of the President, but of the
Legislature.
Mr Govr Morris thought the power of the President in this case harmless;
and that no peace ought to be made without the concurrence of the
President, who was the general Guardian of the National interests.
Mr Butler was strenuous for the motion, as a necessary security against
ambitious & corrupt Presidents. He mentioned the late perfidious policy of
the Statholder in Holland; and the artifices of the Duke of Marlbro' to
prolong the war of which he had the management.
Mr Gerry was of opinion that in treaties of peace a greater rather than
less proportion of votes was necessary, than in other treaties. In Treaties of
peace the dearest interests will be at stake, as the fisheries, territory &c. In
treaties of peace also there is more danger to the extremities of the
Continent of being sacrificed, than on any other occasions.
Mr Williamson thought that Treaties of peace should be guarded at least
by requiring the same concurrence as in other Treaties.
On the motion of Mr Madison & Mr Butler
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On the part of the clause concerning treaties amended by the exception
as to Treaties of peace,
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
"and may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of
the Executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their
respective offices," being before the House
Col: Mason [60] said that in rejecting a Council to the President we were
about to try an experiment on which the most despotic Government had
never ventured. The Grand Signor himself had his Divan. He moved to
postpone the consideration of the clause in order to take up the following.
[60] In the printed Journal, Mr Madison is erroneously substituted for Col:
Mason.–Madison's Note.
"That it be an instruction to the Committee of the States to prepare a
clause or clauses for establishing an Executive Council, as a Council
of State for the President of the U. States, to consist of six members,
two of which from the Eastern, two from the middle, and two from the
Southern States, with a Rotation and duration of office similar to those
of the Senate; such Council to be appointed by the Legislature or by
the Senate."
Doctor Franklin 2ded the motion. We seemed he said too much to fear
cabals in appointments by a number, and to have too much confidence in
those of single persons. Experience shewed that caprice, the intrigues of
favorites & mistresses, were nevertheless the means most prevalent in
monarchies. Among instances of abuse in such modes of appointment, he
mentioned the many bad Governors appointed in G. B. for the Colonies. He
thought a Council would not only be a check on a bad President but be a
relief to a good one.
Mr Govr Morris. The question of a Council was considered in the
Committee, where it was judged that the Presidt by persuading his Council
to concur in his wrong measures, would acquire their protection for them.
Mr Wilson approved of a Council in preference to making the Senate a
party to appointmts.
Mr Dickinson was for a Council. It wd be a singular thing if the measures
of the Executive were not to undergo some previous discussion before the
President.
Mr Madison was in favor of the instruction to the Committee proposed
by Col: Mason.
The motion of Mr Mason was negatived. Mayd ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.–N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no.
Pa no. Del. no. Va no. N. C. no.
On the question, "authorizing the President to call for the opinions of the
Heads of Departments, in writing": it passed in the affirmative N. H. only
being no. [61]
[61] Not so stated in the printed Journal; but conformable to the result afterwards
appearing.–Madison's Note.
The clause was then unanimously agreed to—
Mr Williamson & Mr Spaight moved "that no Treaty of peace affecting
Territorial rights shd be made without the concurrence of two thirds of the
members of the Senate present."
Mr King. It will be necessary to look out for securities for some other
rights, if this principle be established; he moved to extend the motion–"to
all present rights of the U. States."
Adjourned.
S        S         8   I  C         
The last Report of the Committee of Eleven (see Sepr 4) was resumed.
Mr King moved to strike out the "exception of Treaties of peace" from
the general clause requiring two thirds of the Senate for making Treaties.
Mr Wilson wished the requisition of two thirds to be struck out
altogether. If the majority cannot be trusted, it was a proof, as observed by
Mr Ghorum, that we were not fit for one Society.
A reconsideration of the whole clause was agreed to.
Mr Govr Morris was agst striking out the "exception of Treaties of
peace." If two thirds of the Senate should be required for peace, the
Legislature will be unwilling to make war for that reason, on account of the
Fisheries or the Mississippi, the two great objects of the Union. Besides, if a
majority of the Senate be for peace, and are not allowed to make it, they
will be apt to effect their purpose in the more disagreeable mode, of
negativing the supplies for the war.
Mr Williamson remarked that Treaties are to be made in the branch of
the Govt where there may be a majority of the States without a majority of
the people. Eight men may be a majority of a quorum, & should not have
the power to decide the conditions of peace. There would be no danger, that
the exposed States, as S. Carolina or Georgia, would urge an improper war
for the Western Territory.
Mr Wilson. If two thirds are necessary to make peace, the minority may
perpetuate war, against the sense of the majority.
Mr Gerry enlarged on the danger of putting the essential rights of the
Union in the hands of so small a number as a majority of the Senate,
representing perhaps, not one fifth of the people. The Senate will be
corrupted by foreign influence.
Mr Sherman was agst leaving the rights established by the Treaty of
peace, to the Senate, & moved to annex a proviso that no such rights shd be
ceded without the sanction of the Legislature.
Mr Govr Morris seconded the ideas of Mr Sherman.
Mr Madison observed that it had been too easy in the present Congress,
to make Treaties altho' nine States were required for the purpose.
On the question for striking "except Treaties of peace"
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Wilson & Mr Dayton move to strike out the clause requiring two
thirds of the Senate for making Treaties; on which,
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct divd. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Rutlidge & Mr Gerry moved that "no Treaty be made without the
consent of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate"–according to the example
in the present Congs.
Mr Ghorum. There is a difference in the case, as the President's consent
will also be necessary in the new Govt.
On the question
N. H. no. Mass. no. (Mr Gerry ay.) Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no.
Del. no. Md no. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Sherman movd that no Treaty be made without a Majority of the
whole number of the Senate. Mr Gerry seconded him.
Mr Williamson. This will be less security than 2/3 as now required.
Mr Sherman. It will be less embarrassing.
On the question, it passed in the negative.
N. H. no. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Madison moved that a Quorum of the Senate consist of 2/3 of all the
members.
Mr Govr Morris–This will put it in the power of one man to break up a
Quorum.
Mr Madison. This may happen to any Quorum.
On the Question it passed in the negative.
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Williamson & Mr Gerry movd "that no Treaty shd be made witht
previous notice to the members, & a reasonable time for their attending."
On the Question
All the States no; except N. C. S. C. & Geo. ay.
On a question on clause of the Report of the Come of Eleven relating to
Treaties by 2/3 of the Senate.
All the States were ay.–except Pa N. J. & Geo. no.
Mr Gerry movd that "no officer be appd but to offices created by the
Constitution or by law."–This was rejected as unnecessary by six no's &
five ays:
The Ayes. Mass. Ct N. J. N. C. Geo.–Noes. N. H. Pa Del.
Md Va S. C.
The clause referring to the Senate, the trial of impeachments agst the
President, for Treason & bribery, was taken up.
Col. Mason. Why is the provision restrained to Treason & bribery only?
Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach many great and
dangerous offences. Hastings is not guilty of Treason. Attempts to subvert
the Constitution may not be Treason as above defined. As bills of attainder
which have saved the British Constitution are forbidden, it is the more
necessary to extend the power of impeachments. He movd to add, after
"bribery" "or maladministration." Mr Gerry seconded him.
Mr Madison. so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during
pleasure of the Senate.
Mr Govr Morris, it will not be put in force & can do no harm. An
election of every four years will prevent maladministration.
Col. Mason withdrew "maladministration" & substitutes "other high
crimes & misdemesnors agst the State."
On the question thus altered
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. [62] Geo. ay.
[62] In the printed Journal, S. Carolina, no.–Madison's Note.
Mr Madison objected to a trial of the President by the Senate, especially
as he was to be impeached by the other branch of the Legislature, and for
any act which might be called a misdemesnor. The President under these
circumstances was made improperly dependent. He would prefer the
Supreme Court for the trial of impeachments, or rather a tribunal of which
that should form a part.
Mr Govr Morris thought no other tribunal than the Senate could be
trusted. The supreme Court were too few in number and might be warped or
corrupted. He was agst a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature,
considering the Legislative tyranny the great danger to be apprehended; but
there could be no danger that the Senate would say untruly on their oaths
that the President was guilty of crimes or facts, especially as in four years
he can be turned out.
Mr Pinkney disapproved of making the Senate the Court of
impeachments, as rendering the President too dependent on the Legislature.
If he opposes a favorite law, the two Houses will combine agst him, and
under the influence of heat and faction throw him out of office.
Mr Williamson thought there was more danger of too much lenity than of
too much rigour towards the President, considering the number of cases in
which the Senate was associated with the President.
Mr Sherman regarded the Supreme Court as improper to try the
President, because the Judges would be appointed by him.
On motion of Mr Madison to strike out the words–"by the Senate" after
the word "conviction"
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
In the amendment of Col: Mason just agreed to, the word "State" after
the words "misdemeanors against," was struck out, and the words "United
States," inserted unanimously, in order to remove ambiguity.
On the question to agree to clause as amended,
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On motion "The vice-President and other Civil officers of the U. S. shall
be removed from office on impeachment and conviction as aforesaid" was
added to the clause on the subject of impeachments.
The clause of the report made on the 5th Sepr & postponed was taken up
to wit–"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; and shall be subject to alterations and amendments by the
Senate. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of
appropriations made by law."
It was moved to strike out the words "and shall be subject to alterations
and amendments by the Senate" and insert the words used in the
Constitution of Massachusetts on the same subject–"but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments as in other bills" which was agreed too
nem: con:
On the question On the first part of the clause–"All bills for raising
revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives" [63]
[63] This was a conciliatory vote, the effect of the compromise formerly alluded
to. See Note Wednesday Sepr 5.–Madison's Note.
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Govr Morris moved to add to clause (3) of the report made on Sepr 4.
the words "and every member shall be on oath" which being agreed to, and
a question taken on the clause so amended viz–"The Senate of the
U. S. shall have power to try all impeachments; but no person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present;
and every member shall be on oath"
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del.–ay. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Gerry repeated his motion above made on this day, in the form
following: "The Legislature shall have the sole right of establishing offices
not heretofore provided for" which was again negatived: Mas. Cont & Geo.
only being ay.
Mr McHenry observed that the President had not yet been any where
authorized to convene the Senate, and moved to amend Art X. sect. 2. by
striking out the words "he may convene them (the Legislature) on
extraordinary occasions," & insert, "He may convene both or either of the
Houses on extraordinary occasions." This he added would also provide for
the case of the Senate being in Session, at the time of convening the
Legislature.
Mr Wilson said he should vote agst the motion, because it implied that
the senate might be in Session, when the Legislature was not, which he
thought improper.
On the question
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
A Committee was then appointed by Ballot to revise the stile of and
arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the House. The committee
consisted of Mr Johnson, Mr Hamilton, Mr Govr Morris, Mr Madison and
Mr King.
Mr Williamson moved that, previous to this work of the Committee the
clause relating to the number of the House of Representatives shd be
reconsidered for the purpose of increasing the number.
Mr Madison 2ded the Motion.
Mr Sherman opposed it he thought the provision on that subject amply
sufficient.
Col: Hamilton expressed himself with great earnestness and anxiety in
favor of the motion. He avowed himself a friend to a vigorous Government,
but would declare at the same time, that he held it essential that the popular
branch of it should be on a broad foundation. He was Seriously of opinion
that the House of Representatives was on so narrow a scale as to be really
dangerous, and to warrant a jealousy in the people for their liberties. He
remarked that the connection between the President & Senate would tend to
perpetuate him, by corrupt influence. It was the more necessary on this
account that a numerous representation in the other branch of the
Legislature should be established.
On the motion of Mr Williamson to reconsider, it was negatived [64]
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
[64] This motion & vote are entered on the Printed journal of the ensuing
morning.–Madison's Note.
Adjd.
M      S    10. 1787 I  C          [65]
[65] "There is said to be a disposition generally prevalent thro' this state to
comply with ye plan of ye convention without much scrutiny, Hervey, who has
been in Albemarle lately, says yt Nicholas is determined to support it however
contrary it may be to his own opinions. I am persuaded that those who sacrifice
solid and permanent advantages in this plan, to their idea of the transitory
disposition of the people, will condemn themselves hereafter."–James McClurg
to Madison, September 10, 1787.–Mad. MSS.
Mr Gerry moved to reconsider Art XIX. viz. "On the application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment of
this Constitution, the Legislature of the U. S. shall call a Convention for
that purpose," (see Aug 6).
This constitution he said is to be paramount to the State Constitutions. It
follows hence, from this article that two thirds of the States may obtain a
Convention, a majority of which can bind the Union to innovations that
may subvert the State Constitutions altogether. He asked whether this was a
situation proper to be run into.
Mr Hamilton 2ded the motion, but he said with a different view from
Mr Gerry. He did not object to the consequences stated by Mr Gerry. There
was no greater evil in subjecting the people of the U.S. to the major voice
than the people of a particular State. It had been wished by many and was
much to have been desired that an easier mode of introducing amendments
had been provided by the articles of the Confederation. It was equally
desirable now that an easy mode should be established for supplying defects
which will probably appear in the new System. The mode proposed was not
adequate. The State Legislatures will not apply for alterations but with a
view to increase their own powers. The National Legislature will be the first
to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity of amendments, and
ought also to be empowered, whenever two thirds of each branch should
concur to call a Convention. There could be no danger in giving this power,
as the people would finally decide in the case.
Mr Madison remarked on the vagueness of the terms, "call a Convention
for the purpose," as sufficient reason for reconsidering the article. How was
a Convention to be formed? by what rule decide? what the force of its acts?
On the motion of Mr Gerry to reconsider
N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Sherman moved to add to the article "or the Legislature may propose
amendments to the several States for their approbation, but no amendments
shall be binding until consented to by the several States."
Mr Gerry 2ded the motion.
Mr Wilson moved to insert, "two thirds of" before the words "several
States"–on which amendment to the motion of Mr Sherman
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Wilson then moved to insert "three fourths of" before "the several
Sts." which was agreed to nem: con:
Mr Madison moved to postpone the consideration of the amended
proposition in order to take up the following,
"The Legislature of the U. S. whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the
Legislatures of the several States, shall propose amendments to this
Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part
thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least
of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification may be
proposed by the Legislature of the U.S:"
Mr Hamilton 2ded the motion.
Mr Rutlidge said he never could agree to give a power by which the
articles relating to slaves might be altered by the States not interested in that
property and prejudiced against it. In order to obviate this objection, these
words were added to the proposition: [66] "provided that no amendments
which may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the 4
& 5 sections of the VII article."–The postponement being agreed to,
[66] The Printed Journal makes the succeeding proviso as to sections 4 & 5, of
the art: VII moved by Mr Rutlidge, part of the proposition of Mr Madison.–
Madison's Note.
On the question on the proposition of Mr Madison & Mr Hamilton as
amended
N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Gerry moved to reconsider Art: XXI and XXII. from the latter of
which "for the approbation of Congs" had been struck out. He objected to
proceeding to change the Government without the approbation of Congress,
as being improper and giving just umbrage to that body: He repeated his
objections also to an annulment of the confederation with so little scruple or
formality.
Mr Hamilton concurred with Mr Gerry as to the indecorum of not
requiring the approbation of Congress. He considered this as a necessary
ingredient in the transaction. He thought it wrong also to allow nine States
as provided by Art XXI. to institute a new Government on the ruins of the
existing one. He wd propose as a better modification of the two articles
(XXI & XXII) that the plan should be sent to Congress in order that the
same if approved by them, may be communicated to the State Legislatures,
to the end that they may refer it to State conventions; each Legislature
declaring that if the Convention of the State should think the plan ought to
take effect among nine ratifying States, the same shd take effect
accordingly.
Mr Gorham. Some States will say that nine States shall be sufficient to
establish the plan, others will require unanimity for the purpose. And the
different and conditional ratifications will defeat the plan altogether.
Mr Hamilton. No Convention convinced of the necessity of the plan will
refuse to give it effect on the adoption by nine States. He thought this mode
less exceptionable than the one proposed in the article, while it would attain
the same end.
Mr Fitzimmons remarked that the words "for their approbation" had been
struck out in order to save Congress from the necessity of an Act
inconsistent with the Articles of Confederation under which they held their
authority.
Mr Randolph declared, if no change should be made in this part of the
plan, he should be obliged to dissent from the whole of it. He had from the
beginning he said been convinced that radical changes in the system of the
Union were necessary. Under this conviction he had brought forward a set
of republican propositions as the basis and outline of a reform. These
Republican propositions had however, much to his regret, been widely, and,
in his opinion, irreconcileably departed from. In this state of things it was
his idea and he accordingly meant to propose, that the State Conventions
shd be at liberty to offer amendments to the plan; and that these should be
submitted to a second General Convention, with full power to settle the
Constitution finally. He did not expect to succeed in this proposition, but
the discharge of his duty in making the attempt, would give quiet to his own
mind.
Mr Wilson was against a reconsideration for any of the purposes which
had been mentioned.
Mr King thought it would be more respectful to Congress to submit the
plan generally to them; than in such a form as expressly and necessarily to
require their approbation or disapprobation. The assent of nine States he
considered as sufficient; and that it was more proper to make this a part of
the Constitution itself, than to provide for it by a supplemental or distinct
recommendation.
Mr Gerry urged the indecency and pernicious tendency of dissolving in
so slight a manner, the solemn obligations of the articles of confederation. If
nine out of thirteen can dissolve the compact. Six out of nine will be just as
able to dissolve the new one hereafter.
Mr Sherman was in favor of Mr King's idea of submitting the plan
generally to Congress. He thought nine States ought to be made sufficient:
but that it would be best to make it a separate act and in some such form as
that intimated by Col: Hamilton, than to make it a particular article of the
Constitution.
On the question for reconsidering the two articles, XXI & XXII—
N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Mr Hamilton then moved to postpone art XXI in order to take up the
following, containing the ideas he had above expressed, viz
Resolved that the foregoing plan of a Constitution be transmitted to
the U. S. in Congress assembled, in order that if the same shall be
agreed to by them, it may be communicated to the Legislatures of the
several States, to the end that they may provide for its final ratification
by referring the same to the Consideration of a Convention of Deputies
in each State to be chosen by the people thereof, and that it be
recommended to the said Legislatures in their respective acts for
organizing such convention to declare, that if the said Convention shall
approve of the said Constitution, such approbation shall be binding and
conclusive upon the State, and further that if the said Convention
should be of opinion that the same upon the assent of any nine States
thereto, ought to take effect between the States so assenting, such
opinion shall thereupon be also binding upon such a State, and the said
Constitution shall take effect between the States assenting thereto.
Mr Gerry 2ded the motion.
Mr Wilson. This motion being seconded, it is necessary now to speak
freely. He expressed in strong terms his disapprobation of the expedient
proposed, particularly the suspending the plan of the Convention on the
approbation of Congress. He declared it to be worse than folly to rely on the
concurrence of the Rhode Island members of Congs in the plan. Maryland
has voted on this floor; for requiring the unanimous assent of the 13 States
to the proposed change in the federal System. N. York has not been
represented for a long time past in the Convention. Many individual
deputies from other States have spoken much against the plan. Under these
circumstances can it be safe to make the assent of Congress necessary. After
spending four or five months in the laborious & arduous task of forming a
Government for our Country, we are ourselves at the close throwing
insuperable obstacles in the way of its success.
Mr Clymer thought that the mode proposed by Mr Hamilton would fetter
& embarrass Congs as much as the original one, since it equally involved a
breach of the articles of Confederation.
Mr King concurred with Mr Clymer. If Congress can accede to one
mode, they can to the other. If the approbation of Congress be made
necessary, and they should not approve, the State Legislatures will not
propose the plan to Conventions; or if the States themselves are to provide
that nine States shall suffice to establish the System, that provision will be
omitted, every thing will go into confusion, and all our labor be lost.
Mr Rutlidge viewed the matter in the same light with Mr King.
On the question to postpone in order to take up Col: Hamilton's motion
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
A Question being then taken on the article XXI. It was agreed to
unanimously.
Col: Hamilton withdrew the remainder of the motion to postpone art.
XXII, observing that his purpose was defeated by the vote just given.
Mr Williamson & Mr Gerry moved to re-instate the words "for the
approbation of Congress" in Art: XXII. which was disagreed to nem: con:
Mr Randolph took this opportunity to state his objections to the System.
They turned on the Senate's being made the Court of Impeachment for
trying the Executive–on the necessity of 3/4 instead of 2/3 of each house to
overrule the negative of the President–on the smallness of the number of the
Representative branch,–on the want of limitation to a standing army–on the
general clause concerning necessary and proper laws–on the want of some
particular restraint on navigation acts–on the power to lay duties on
exports–on the authority of the General Legislature to interpose on the
application of the Executives of the States–on the want of a more definite
boundary between the General & State Legislatures–and between the
General and State Judiciaries–on the unqualified power of the President to
pardon treasons–on the want of some limit to the power of the Legislature
in regulating their own compensations. With these difficulties in his mind,
what course he asked was he to pursue? Was he to promote the
establishment of a plan which he verily believed would end in Tyranny? He
was unwilling he said to impede the wishes and Judgment of the
Convention, but he must keep himself free, in case he should be honored
with a seat in the Convention of his State, to act according to the dictates of
his judgment. The only mode in which his embarrassments could be
removed, was that of submitting the plan to Congs to go from them to the
State Legislatures, and from these to State Conventions having power to
adopt reject or amend; the process to close with another General
Convention with full power to adopt or reject the alterations proposed by
the State Conventions, and to establish finally the Government. He
accordingly proposed a Resolution to this effect.
Docr Franklin 2ded the motion.
Col: Mason urged & obtained that the motion should lie on the table for
a day or two to see what steps might be taken with regard to the parts of the
system objected to by Mr Randolph.
Mr Pinkney moved "that it be an instruction to the Committee for
revising the stile and arrangement of the articles agreed on, to prepare an
address to the people, to accompany the present Constitution, and to be laid
with the same before the U. States in Congress."
[67]The motion itself was referred to the Committee nem: con:
[67]Mr Randolph moved to refer to the Committee also a motion relating
to pardons in cases of Treason–which was agreed to nem: con:
[67] These motions are not entered in the printed Journal.–Madison's Note.
Adjourned.
T       S    11. 1787. I  C         
The Report of the Committee of stile & arrangement not being made &
being waited for,
The House Adjourned.
W         S    12. 1787. I  C         
Docr Johnson from the Committee of stile &c. reported a digest of the
plan, of which printed copies were ordered to be furnished to the members.
He also reported a letter to accompany the plan, to Congress. [68]
[68] A note by Madison in the text says: "(here insert a transcript of the former
from the annexed sheet as printed and of the latter from the draft as finally
agreed to,)" and his footnote says: "This is a literal copy of the printed Report.
The Copy in the printed Journal contains some of the alterations subsequently
made in the House." No transcript of the report was, however, made by Madison,
but the printed copy is among his papers. It is a large folio of four pages printed
on one side of each page, and is accurately reproduced here. Madison's copy is
marked by him: "as reported by Come of revision, or stile and arrangement Sepr
12." The report is, in fact, correctly printed in the Journal of the Federal
Convention, 351, et seq., Madison's statement to the contrary being an error.
General Bloomfield furnished Brearley's copy to John Quincy Adams, and he
printed it without the alterations and amendments which Brearley had made. The
extent of Brearley's alterations and amendments may be seen in the copy printed
in the Documentary History of the Constitution, i., 362, et seq.
W ,                   U      S     ,                  a more
perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide
for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
A       I.
Sect. 1. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.
Sect. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of
members chosen every second year by the people of the several states,
and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.
No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to
the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that
state in which he shall be chosen.
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several states which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole number of free persons, including those bound to servitude for a
term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other
persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after
the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every
subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law
direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every
forty thousand, but each state shall have at least one representative:
and until such enumeration shall be made, the state of New-Hampshire
shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and
Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York, six, New-
Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia
ten, North-Carolina five, South-Carolina five, and Georgia three.
When vacancies happen in the representation from any state, the
Executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies.
The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other
officers; and they shall have the sole power of impeachment.
Sect. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
senators from each state, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six
years: and each senator shall have one vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the
first election, they shall be divided [69] as equally as may be into three
classes. The seats of the senators of the first class shall be vacated at
the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration
of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth
year, so that one-third may be chosen every second year: and if
vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the
Legislature of any state, the Executive thereof may make temporary
appointments until the next meeting of the Legislature.
[69] The words, "by lot," were not in the Report as printed; but were inserted in
manuscript, as a typographical error, departing from the text of the Report
referred to the Committee of style & arrangement.–Marginal note by Madison.
No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age
of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state for which he
shall be chosen.
The Vice-President of the United States shall be, ex officio, [70]
President of the senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally
divided.
[70] Ex officio struck out in Madison's copy.
The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a President pro
tempore, in the absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall
exercise the office of President of the United States.
The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When
sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath. When the President of
the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: and no person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the
members present.
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office
of honor, trust or profit under the United States: but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial,
judgment and punishment, according to law.
Sect. 4. The times, places and manner of holding elections for
senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the
legislature thereof: but the Congress may at any time by law make or
alter such regulations.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such
meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by
law appoint a different day.
Sect. 5. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall
constitute a quorum to do business: but a smaller number may adjourn
from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of
absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties as each
house may provide.
Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings; punish its
members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds, expel a member.
Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment
require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either house
on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be
entered on the journal.
Neither house, during the session of Congress, shall, without the
consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting.
Sect. 6. The senators and representatives shall receive a
compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out
of the treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except
treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in
either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the
United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments
whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no person
holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either
house during his continuance in office.
Sect. 7. The enacting stile of the laws shall be, "Be it enacted by the
senators and representatives in Congress assembled."
All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of
representatives: but the senate may propose or concur with
amendments as on other bills.
Every bill which shall have passed the house of representatives and
the senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the president
of the United States. If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall
return it, with his objections to that house in which it shall have
originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and
proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two-thirds of that
house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that house, it shall
become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses shall be
determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for
and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house
respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within
ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him,
the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the
Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall
not be a law.
Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a
question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the
United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved
by him, or, being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by [71] three-
fourths [72] of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to
the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.
[71] In the entry of this Report in the printed Journal "two-thirds" are substituted
for "three-fourths." This change was made after the Report was received.–
Madison's Note. This is a mistake. The printed Journal has it "three fourths."
[72] A marginal note says "two thirds."
Sect. 8. The Congress may by joint ballot appoint a treasurer. They
shall have power
To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to pay the
debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of
the United States. [73]
[73] "but all duties imposts & excises shall be uniform throughout the U. States,"
interlined by Madison.
To borrow money on the credit of the United States.
To regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes.
To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.
To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin,
and fix the standard of weights and measures.
To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities
and current coin of the United States.
To establish post offices and post roads.
To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries.
To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court.
To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, and [74] offences against the law of nations.
[74] (punish) a typographical omission.–Madison's Note.
To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make
rules concerning captures on land and water.
To raise and support armies: but no appropriations of money to
that use shall be for a longer term than two years.
To provide and maintain a navy.
To make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces.
To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of
the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.
To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia,
and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the
service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively,
the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the
militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over
such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession
of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the
seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like
authority over all places purchased by the consent of the
legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection
of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful
buildings–And
To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
powers vested by this constitution in the government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
Sect. 9. The migration or importation of such persons as the several
states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited
by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and
eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not
exceeding ten dollars for each person.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it.
No bill of attainder shall be passed, nor any ex post facto law.
No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census
herein before directed to be taken. [75]
[75] "No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to
the ports of one State over those of another–nor shall vessels bound to or from
one State be obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in another," interlined by
Madison.
No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State.
No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of
appropriations made by law.
No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States. And no
person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without
the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office,
or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.
Sect. 10. No state shall coin money, nor emit bills of credit, nor
make anything but gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts, nor
pass any bill of attainder, nor ex post facto laws, nor laws altering or
impairing the obligation of contracts; nor grant letters of marque and
reprisal, nor enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, nor grant
any title of nobility.
No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay imposts or
duties on imports or exports, nor with such consent, but to the use of
the treasury of the United States. [76] [77] Nor keep troops nor ships of
war in time of peace, nor enter into any agreement or compact with
another state, nor with any foreign power. Nor engage in any war,
unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of
invasion be so iminent, as not to admit of delay until the Congress can
be consulted.
[76] provided that no State shall be restrained from imposing the usual duties on
produce exported from such State for the sole purpose of defraying the charges
of inspecting packing storing & indemnifying the losses on such produce while
in the custody of public officers. But all such regulations shall in case of abuse
be subject to the revision & controul of Congress.–Marginal note by Madison.
[77] "No State shall without the consent of Congress," interlined by Madison.
II.
Sect. 1. The executive power shall be vested in a president of the
United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of
four years, and, altogether with the vice-president, chosen for the same
term, be elected in the following manner:
Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof
may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of
senators and representatives to which the state may be entitled in
Congress: but no senator or representative shall be appointed an
elector, nor any person holding an office of trust or profit under the
United States.
The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot
for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the
same state with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the
persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they
shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the general
government, directed to the president of the senate. The president of
the senate shall in the presence of the senate and house of
representatives open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be
counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the
president, if such number be a majority of the whole number of
electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such
majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the house of
representatives shall immediately chuse by ballot one of them for
president; and if no person have a majority, then from the five highest
on the list the said house shall in like manner choose the president. But
in choosing the president, the votes shall be taken by states and not per
capita, [78] the representation from each state having one vote. A
quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be
necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the president
by the representatives, [79] the person having the greatest number of
votes of the electors shall be the vice-president. But if there should
remain two or more who have equal votes, the senate shall choose
from them by ballot the vice-president.
[78] "and not per capita" struck out by Madison.
[79] "by the representatives" struck out by Madison.
The Congress may determine the time of chusing the electors, and
the time in [80] which they shall give their votes; but the election shall
be on the same day [81] throughout the United States.
[80] The words "day on" substituted by Madison.
[81] "but the election shall be on the same day" struck out & "which day shall be
the same" inserted by Madison.
No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United
States, at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible
to the office of president; neither shall any person be eligible to that
office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and
been fourteen years a resident within the United States.
In case of the removal of the president from office, or of his death,
resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said
office, the same shall devolve on the vice-president, and the Congress
may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or
inability, both of the president and vice-president, declaring what
officer shall then act as president, and such officer shall act
accordingly, until the disability be removed, or the period for chusing
another president arrive. [82]
[82] "the period for chusing another president arrive" struck out and "a president
be chosen" inserted by Madison.
The president shall, at stated times, receive a fixed compensation
for his services, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished
during the period for which he shall have been elected.
Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the
following oath or affirmation: "I –—, do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will faithfully execute the office of president of the United
States, and will to the best of my judgment and power, preserve,
protect and defend the constitution of the United States."
Sect. 2. The president shall be commander in chief of the army and
navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States: he
may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of
the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of
their respective offices, when called into the actual service of the
United States, [83] and he shall have power to grant reprieves and
pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of
impeachment.
[83] It so appears in the printed copy, but the clause "when called into the actual
service of the United States" was intended to follow immediately after "militia
of the several States."
He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the
senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present
concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent
of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the
United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for.
The president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may
happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which
shall expire at the end of their next session.
Sect. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress information
of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such
measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient: he may, on
extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, or either of them, and in
case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of
adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think
proper: he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers: he
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall
commission all the officers of the United States.
Sect. 4. The president, vice-president and all civil officers of the
United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
III.
Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States, both in law and
equity, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices
during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their
services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.
Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, both in law and
equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States,
and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. To all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. To all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. To controversies to which
the United States shall be a party. To controversies between two or
more States; between a state and citizens of another state; between
citizens of different States; between citizens of the same state claiming
lands under grants of different States, and between a state, or the
citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.
In cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and those in which a state shall be a party, the supreme court shall have
original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the
supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact,
with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall
make.
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by
jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall
have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the
trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have
directed.
Sect. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them
aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in
open court.
The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of
treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood nor
forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.
IV.
Sect. 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the
Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such
acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.
Sect. 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states.
A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime,
who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on
demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled be
delivered up, and removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.
No person legally held to service or labour in one state, escaping
into another, shall in consequence of regulations subsisting therein be
discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on
claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due.
Sect. 3. New states may be admitted by the Congress into this
union; but no new state shall be formed or erected within the
jurisdiction of any other state; nor any state be formed by the junction
of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the
legislatures of the states concerned as well as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States: and nothing in this Constitution shall
be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of
any particular state.
Sect. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this
union a Republican form of government, and shall protect each of
them against invasion; and on application of the legislature or
executive, against domestic violence.
V.
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem
necessary, or on the application of two-thirds [84] of the legislatures [85]
of the several states, shall propose amendments to this constitution,
which shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part thereof, when
the same shall have been ratified by three-fourths at least of [86] the
legislatures [87] of the several states, or by conventions in three-fourths
thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed
by the Congress: Provided, that no amendment which may be made
prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the –— [88] and [89] –
— section [90] of [91] article.
[84] "of two thirds" struck out by Madison.
[85] "of two-thirds" inserted by Madison.
[86] "three-fourths at least of" struck out by Madison.
[87] "of three-fourths" inserted by Madison.
[88] "1 & 4 clauses in the 9" inserted by Madison.
[89] "and" struck out by Madison.
[90] Changed to "sections" by Madison.
[91] "the first" inserted by Madison.
VI.
All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the
adoption of this Constitution shall be as valid against the United States
under this Constitution as under the confederation.
This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.
The senators and representatives beforementioned, and the members
of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers,
both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by
oath or affirmation, to support this constitution; but no religious test
shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust
under the United States.
VII.
The ratification of the conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient
for the establishment of this constitution between the States so
ratifying the same.
LETTER. [92]
[92] The draft of the letter accompanied the draft of the Constitution, but was not
printed with it. The Journal says (Sept. 12): "The draft of a letter to Congress
being at the same time reported, was read once throughout; and afterwards
agreed to by paragraphs." (Const. MSs. and Journal, p. 367.) The draft is in the
handwriting of Gouverneur Morris and was undoubtedly prepared by him. It was
turned over to Washington by Jackson with the other papers of the convention.
The draft of the Constitution must have been among those papers he destroyed.
Probably it too was written by Morris. The letter having been accepted
September 12, was printed with the final Constitution September 17. It does not
appear to have caused debate.
We have now the Honor to submit to the Consideration of the
United States in Congress assembled that Constitution which has
appeared to us the most advisable.
The Friends of our Country have long seen and desired that the
Power of making War Peace and Treaties, that of levying Money &
regulating Commerce and the correspondent executive and judicial
Authorities should be fully and effectually vested in the general
Government of the Union. But the Impropriety of delegating such
extensive Trust to one Body of Men is evident. Hence results the
Necessity of a different organization.
It is obviously impracticable in the fœderal Government of these
States to secure all Rights of independent Sovereignty to each and yet
provide for the Interest and Safety of all. Individuals entering into
Society must give up a Share of Liberty to preserve the Rest. The
Magnitude of the Sacrifice must depend as well on Situation and
Circumstances as on the Object to be obtained. It is at all times
difficult to draw with Precision the Line between those Rights which
must be surrendered and those which may be reserved. And on the
present Occasion this Difficulty was increased by a Difference among
the several States as to their Situation Extent Habits and particular
Interests.
In all our Deliberations on this Subject we kept steadily in our View
that which appears to us the greatest Interest of every true American
The Consolidation of our Union in which is involved our Prosperity
Felicity Safety perhaps our national Existence. This important
Consideration seriously and deeply impressed on our Minds led each
State in the Convention to be less rigid in Points of inferior Magnitude
than might have been otherwise expected. And thus the Constitution
which we now present is the Result of a Spirit of Amity and of that
mutual Deference & Concession which the Peculiarity of our political
Situation rendered indispensable.
That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every State is not
perhaps to be expected. But each will doubtless consider that had her
Interests been alone consulted the Consequences might have been
particularly disagreable or injurious to others. That it is liable to as few
Exceptions as could reasonably have been expected we hope and
believe. That it may promote the lasting Welfare of that Country so
dear to us all and secure her Freedom and Happiness is our most ardent
Wish—
Mr Williamson moved to reconsider the clause requiring three fourths of
each House to overrule the negative of the President, in order to strike out
3/4 and insert 2/3. He had he remarked himself proposed 3/4 instead of 2/3,
but he had since been convinced that the latter proportion was the best. The
former puts too much in the power of the President.
Mr Sherman was of the same opinion; adding that the States would not
like to see so small a minority and the President, prevailing over the general
voice. In making laws regard should be had to the sense of the people, who
are to be bound by them, and it was more probable that a single man should
mistake or betray this sense than the Legislature.
Mr Govr Morris. Considering the difference between the two proportions
numerically, it amounts in one House to two members only; and in the
others to not more than five; according to the numbers of which the
Legislature is at first to be composed. It is the interest moreover of the
distant States to prefer 3/4 as they will be oftenest absent and need the
interposing check of the President. The excess rather than the deficiency, of
laws was to be dreaded. The example of N. York shews that 2/3 is not
sufficient to answer the purpose.
Mr Hamilton added his testimony to the fact that 2/3 in N. York had been
ineffectual either where a popular object, or a legislative faction operated;
of which he mentioned some instances.
Mr Gerry. It is necessary to consider the danger on the other side also.
2/3 will be a considerable, perhaps a proper security. 3/4 puts too much in
the power of a few men. The primary object of the revisionary check in the
President is not to protect the general interest, but to defend his own
department. If 3/4 be required, a few Senators having hopes from the
nomination of the President to offices, will combine with him and impede
proper laws. Making the vice-President Speaker increases the danger.
Mr Williamson was less afraid of too few than of too many laws. He was
most of all afraid that the repeal of bad laws might be rendered too difficult
by requiring 3/4 to overcome the dissent of the President.
Col: Mason had always considered this as one of the most exceptionable
parts of the System. As to the numerical argument of Mr Govr Morris, little
arithmetic was necessary to understand that 3/4 was more than 2/3,
whatever the numbers of the Legislature might be. The example of New
York depended on the real merits of the laws. The Gentlemen citing it, had
no doubt given their own opinions. But perhaps there were others of
opposite opinions who could equally paint the abuses on the other side. His
leading view was to guard against too great an impediment to the repeal of
laws.
Mr Govr Morris dwelt on the danger to the public interest from the
instability of laws, as the most to be guarded against. On the other side
there could be little danger. If one man in office will not consent where he
ought, every fourth year another can be substituted. This term was not too
long for fair experiments. Many good laws are not tried long enough to
prove their merit. This is often the case with new laws opposed to old
habits. The Inspection laws of Virginia & Maryland to which all are now so
much attached were unpopular at first.
Mr Pinkney was warmly in opposition to 3/4 as putting a dangerous
power in the hands of a few Senators headed by the President.
Mr Madison. When 3/4 was agreed to, the President was to be elected by
the legislature and for seven years. He is now to be elected by the people
and for four years. The object of the revisionary power is two fold. 1. to
defend the Executive rights 2. to prevent popular or factious injustice. It
was an important principle in this & in the State Constitutions to check
legislative injustice and encroachments. The Experience of the States had
demonstrated that their checks are insufficient. We must compare the
danger from the weakness of 2/3 with the danger from the strength of 3/4.
He thought on the whole the former was the greater. As to the difficulty of
repeals it was probable that in doubtful cases the policy would soon take
place of limiting the duration of laws so as to require renewal instead of
repeal.
The reconsideration being agreed to. On the question to insert 2/3 in
place of 3/4.
N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no.
Md ay. Mr McHenry no. Va no. Genl Washington
Mr Blair, Mr Madison no. Col. Mason, Mr Randolph ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Williamson, observed to the House that no provision was yet made
for juries in Civil cases and suggested the necessity of it.
Mr Gorham. It is not possible to discriminate equity cases from those in
which juries are proper. The Representatives of the people may be safely
trusted in this matter.
Mr Gerry urged the necessity of Juries to guard agst corrupt Judges. He
proposed that the Committee last appointed should be directed to provide a
clause for securing the trial by Juries.
Col: Mason perceived the difficulty mentioned by Mr Gorham. The jury
cases cannot be specified. A general principle laid down on this and some
other points would be sufficient. He wished the plan had been prefaced with
a Bill of Rights, & would second a Motion if made for the purpose. It would
give great quiet to the people; and with the aid of the State declarations, a
bill might be prepared in a few hours.
Mr Gerry concurred in the idea & moved for a Committee to prepare a
Bill of Rights. Col: Mason 2ded the motion.
Mr Sherman, was for securing the rights of the people where requisite.
The State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution; and
being in force are sufficient. There are many cases where juries are proper
which cannot be discriminated. The Legislature may be safely trusted.
Col: Mason. The laws of the U. S. are to be paramount to State Bills of
Rights. On the question for a Come to prepare a Bill of Rights
N. H. no. Mas. abst. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The Clause relating to exports being reconsidered, at the instance of Col:
Mason, who urged that the restriction on the States would prevent the
incidental duties necessary for the inspection & safekeeping of their
produce, and be ruinous to the Staple States, as he called the five Southern
States, he moved as follows–"provided nothing herein contained shall be
construed to restrain any State from laying duties upon exports for the sole
purpose of defraying the charges of inspecting, packing, storing and
indemnifying the losses in keeping the commodities in the care of public
officers, before exportation." In answer to a remark which he anticipated, to
wit, that the States could provide for these expences, by a tax in some other
way, he stated the inconveniency of requiring the Planters to pay a tax
before the actual delivery for exportation.
Mr Madison 2ded the motion. It would at least be harmless; and might
have the good effect of restraining the States to bona fide duties for the
purpose, as well as of authorizing explicitly such duties; tho' perhaps the
best guard against an abuse of the power of the States on this subject, was
the right in the Genl Government to regulate trade between State & State.
Mr Govr Morris saw no objection to the motion. He did not consider the
dollar per Hhd laid on Tobo in Virga as a duty on exportation, as no
drawback would be allowed on Tobo taken out of the Warehouse for
internal consumption.
Mr Dayton was afraid the proviso wd enable Pennsylva to tax N. Jersey
under the idea of Inspection duties of which Pena would Judge.
Mr Gorham & Mr Langdon, thought there would be no security if the
proviso shd be agreed to, for the States exporting thro' other States, agst
these oppressions of the latter. How was redress to be obtained in case
duties should be laid beyond the purpose expressed?
Mr Madison. There will be the same security as in other cases. The
jurisdiction of the supreme Court must be the source of redress. So far only
had provision been made by the plan agst injurious acts of the States. His
own opinion was, that this was sufficient. A negative on the State laws
alone could meet all the shapes which these could assume. But this had
been overruled.
Mr Fitzimmons. Incidental duties on Tobo & flour never have been &
never can be considered as duties on exports.
Mr Dickinson. Nothing will save the States in the situation of
N. Hampshire N. Jersey Delaware &c. from being oppressed by their
neighbors, but requiring the assent of Congs to inspection duties. He moved
that this assent shd accordingly be required.
Mr Butler 2ded the motion.
Adjourned.
T        S    13. 1787. I  C         
Col. Mason. [93] He had moved without success for a power to make
sumptuary regulations. He had not yet lost sight of his object. After
descanting on the extravagance of our manners, the excessive consumption
of foreign superfluities, and the necessity of restricting it, as well with
œconomical as republican views, he moved that a Committee be appointed
to report articles of association for encouraging by the advice the influence
and the example of the members of the Convention, œconomy frugality and
american manufactures.
[93] The dissensions among the Virginia delegates had leaked out, for Joseph
Jones, Fredericksburg, September 13, 1787, wrote to Madison that a rumor of
their disagreement was current in Virginia.–Chicago Historical Society MSS.
Docr Johnson 2ded the motion which was without debate agreed to, nem:
con: and a Committee appointed, consisting of Col: Mason, Docr Franklin,
Mr Dickenson, Docr Johnson and Mr Livingston. [94]
[94] This motion, & appointment of the Com̃ittee, not in the printed Journal. No
report was made by the Come–Madison's Note.
Col: Mason renewed his proposition of yesterday on the subject of
inspection laws, with an additional clause giving to Congress a controul
over them in case of abuse–as follows:
"Provided that no State shall be restrained from imposing the usual
duties on produce exported from such State, for the sole purpose of
defraying the charges of inspecting, packing, storing, and
indemnifying the losses on such produce, while in the custody of
public officers: but all such regulations shall in case of abuse, be
subject to the revision and controul of Congress."
There was no debate & on the question
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The Report from the committee of stile & arrangement, was taken up, in
order to be compared with the articles of the plan as agreed to by the House
& referred to the Committee, and to receive the final corrections and
sanction of the Convention.
Art: 1, sect. 2. On motion of Mr Randolph the word "servitude" was
struck out, and "service" unanimously [95] inserted, the former being
thought to express the condition of slaves, & the latter the obligations of
free persons.
[95] See page 372 of the printed Journal.–Madison's Note.
Mr Dickenson & Mr Wilson moved to strike out, "and direct taxes," from
sect. 2, art. 1, as improperly placed in a clause relating merely to the
Constitution of the House of Representatives.
Mr Govr Morris. The insertion here was in consequence of what had
passed on this point; in order to exclude the appearance of counting the
negroes in the Representation. The including of them may now be referred
to the object of direct taxes, and incidentally only to that of Representation.
On the motion to strike out "and direct taxes" from this place
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J.. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Art. 1, sect. 7.–"if any bill shall not be returned by the president within
ten days (sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him &c."
Mr Madison moved to insert between "after" and "it" in sect. 7, Art. 1 the
words "the day on which," in order to prevent a question whether the day on
which the bill be presented ought to be counted or not as one of the ten
days.
Mr Randolph 2ded the motion.
Mr Governer Morris. The amendment is unnecessary. The law knows no
fractions of days.
A number of members being very impatient & calling for the question
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.—
Docr Johnson made a further report from the Committee of stile &c. of
the following resolutions to be substituted for 22 & 23 articles.
"Resolved that the preceding Constitution be laid before the U.
States in Congress assembled, and that it is the opinion of this
Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of
Delegates chosen in each State by the people thereof, under the
recommendation of its Legislature, for their assent & ratification; &
that each Convention assenting & ratifying the same should give
notice thereof to the U. S. in Congs assembled.
"Resolved that it is the opinion of this Convention that as soon as
the Conventions of nine States, shall have ratified this Constitution, the
U. S. in Congs assembled should fix a day on which electors should be
appointed by the States which shall have ratified the same; and a day
on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President; and
the time and place for commencing proceedings under this
Constitution–That after such publication the Electors should be
appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: That the
Electors should meet on the day fixed for the election of the President,
and should transmit their votes certified signed, sealed and directed, as
the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the U. States in Congs
assembled: that the Senators and Representatives should convene at
the time & place assigned: that the Senators should appoint a President
for the sole purpose of receiving, opening, and counting the votes for
President, and that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together
with the President should without delay proceed to execute this
Constitution."
Adjourned.
F      S    14  . 1787. I  C         
The Report of the Committee of stile & arrangement being resumed,
Mr Williamson moved to reconsider in order to increase the number of
Representatives fixed for the first Legislature. His purpose was to make an
addition of one half generally to the number allotted to the respective
States; and to allow two to the smallest States.
On this motion
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Art. I. sect. 3. the words "by lot" [96] were struck out nem: con: on
motion of Mr Madison, that some rule might prevail in the rotation that
would prevent both the members from the same State from going out at the
same time.
[96] "By lot" had been reinstated from the Report of five Aug. 6. as a correction
of the printed report by the Come of stile & arrangement.–Madison's Note.
"Ex officio" struck out of the same section as superfluous; nem: con; and
"or affirmation" after "oath" inserted also unanimously.
Mr Rutlidge and Mr Govr Morris moved "that persons impeached be
suspended from their office until they be tried and acquitted."
Mr Madison. The President is made too dependent already on the
Legislature by the power of one branch to try him in consequence of an
impeachment by the other. This intermediate suspension, will put him in the
power of one branch only. They can at any moment, in order to make way
for the functions of another who will be more favorable to their views, vote
a temporary removal of the existing magistrate.
Mr King concurred in the opposition to the amendment.
On the question to agree to it
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del.no. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Art. I. sect. 4. "except as to the places of choosing Senators" was added
nem: con: to the end of the first clause, in order to exempt the seats of Govt
in the States from the power of Congress.
Art. I. Sect. 5. "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their
judgment require secrecy."
Col: Mason & Mr Gerry moved to insert after the word "parts," the
words "of the proceedings of the Senate" so as to require publication of all
the proceedings of the House of Representatives.
It was intimated on the other side that cases might arise where secrecy
might be necessary in both Houses. Measures preparatory to a declaration
of war in which the House of Reps was to concur, were instanced.
On the question, it passed in the negative.
N. H. no. (Rh. I. abs.) Mas. no. Con: no,(N. Y. abs.)
N. J. no. Pen. ay. Del. no. Mary. ay. Virg. no. N. C. ay.
S. C. divd. Geor. no.
Mr Baldwin observed that the clause, Art. I. Sect. 6. declaring that no
member of Congs "during the time for which he was elected, shall be
appointed to any Civil office under the authority of the U. S. which shall
have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased
during such time," would not extend to offices created by the Constitution;
and the salaries of which would be created, not increased by Congs at their
first session. The members of the first Congs consequently might evade the
disqualification in this instance.–He was neither seconded nor opposed; nor
did any thing further pass on the subject.
Art. I. Sect. 8. The Congress "may by joint ballot appoint a Treasurer"
Mr Rutlidge moved to strike out this power, and let the Treasurer be
appointed in the same manner with other officers.
Mr Gorham & Mr King said that the motion, if agreed to, would have a
mischievous tendency. The people are accustomed & attached to that mode
of appointing Treasurers, and the innovation will multiply objections to the
system.
Mr Govr Morris remarked that if the Treasurer be not appointed by the
Legislature, he will be more narrowly watched, and more readily
impeached.
Mr Sherman. As the two Houses appropriate money, it is best for them to
appoint the officer who is to keep it; and to appoint him as they make the
appropriation, not by joint but several votes.
Genl Pinkney. The Treasurer is appointed by joint ballot in South
Carolina. The consequence is that bad appointments are made, and the
Legislature will not listen to the faults of their own officer.
On the motion to strike out
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Art I sect. 8. "but all such duties imposts & excises, shall be uniform
throughout the U. S." were unanimously annexed to the power of taxation.
To define & punish piracies and felonies on the high seas, and "punish"
offences against the law of nations.
Mr Govr Morris moved to strike out "punish" before the words "offences
agst the law of nations," so as to let these be definable as well as punishable,
by virtue of the preceding member of the sentence.
Mr Wilson hoped the alteration would by no means be made. To pretend
to define the law of nations which depended on the authority of all the
civilized nations of the world, would have a look of arrogance, that would
make us ridiculous.
Mr Govr Morris. The word define is proper when applied to offences in
this case; the law of nations being often too vague and deficient to be a rule.
On the question to strike out the word "punish" it passed in the
affirmative
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Docr Franklin moved [97] to add after the words "post roads" Art. I. Sect.
8. "a power to provide for cutting canals where deemed necessary."
[97] This motion by Dr Franklin not stated in the printed Journal, as are some
other motions.–Madison's Note.
Wilson 2ded the motion.
Mr Sherman objected. The expence in such cases will fall on the U.
States, and the benefit accrue to the places where the canals may be cut.
Mr Wilson. Instead of being an expence to the U. S. they may be made a
source of revenue.
Mr Madison suggested an enlargement of the motion into a power "to
grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the U. S. might require
& the legislative provisions of individual States may be incompetent." His
primary object was however to secure an easy communication between the
States which the free intercourse now to be opened, seemed to call for. The
political obstacles being removed, a removal of the natural ones as far as
possible ought to follow. Mr Randolph 2ded the proposition.
Mr King thought the power unnecessary.
Mr Wilson. It is necessary to prevent a State from obstructing the
general welfare.
Mr King. The States will be prejudiced and divided into parties by it. In
Philada & New York. It will be referred to the establishment of a Bank,
which has been a subject of contention in those Cities. In other places it will
be referred to mercantile monopolies.
Mr Wilson mentioned the importance of facilitating by canals, the
communication with the Western settlements. As to Banks he did not think
with Mr King that the power in that point of view would excite the
prejudices & parties apprehended. As to mercantile monopolies they are
already included in the power to regulate trade.
Col: Mason was for limiting the power to the single case of Canals. He
was afraid of monopolies of every sort, which he did not think were by any
means already implied by the Constitution as supposed by Mr Wilson.
The motion being so modified as to admit a distinct question specifying
& limited to the case of canals,
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The other part fell of course, as including the power rejected.
Mr Madison & Mr Pinkney then moved to insert in the list of powers
vested in Congress a power–"to establish an University, in which no
preferences or distinctions should be allowed on account of Religion."
Mr Wilson supported the motion.
Mr Govr Morris. It is not necessary. The exclusive power at the Seat of
Government, will reach the object.
On the question
N. H. no. Mas. no. Cont divd. Dr Johnson ay.
Mr Sherman no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Col: Mason, being sensible that an absolute prohibition of standing
armies in time of peace might be unsafe, and wishing at the same time to
insert something pointing out and guarding against the danger of them,
moved to preface the clause (Art. 1 sect. 8) "To provide for organizing,
arming and disciplining the militia &c." with the words "And that the
liberties of the people may be better secured against the danger of standing
armies in time of peace." Mr Randolph 2ded the motion.
Mr Madison was in favor of it. It did not restrain Congress from
establishing a military force in time of peace if found necessary; and as
armies in time of peace are allowed on all hands to be an evil, it is well to
discountenance them by the Constitution, as far as will consist with the
essential power of the Govt on that head.
Mr Govr Morris opposed the motion as setting a dishonorable mark of
distinction on the military class of Citizens.
Mr Pinkney & Mr Bedford concurred in the opposition.
On the question
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Mard no. Va ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Col: Mason moved to strike out from the clause (art. 1 sect 9.) "no bill of
attainder nor any ex post facto law shall be passed" the words "nor any ex
post facto law." He thought it not sufficiently clear that the prohibition
meant by this phrase was limited to cases of a criminal nature, and no
Legislature ever did or can altogether avoid them in Civil cases.
Mr Gerry 2ded the motion but with a view to extend the prohibition to
"civil cases," which he thought ought to be done.
On the question; all the States were–no.
Mr Pinkney & Mr Gerry, moved to insert a declaration "that the liberty of
the Press should be inviolably observed."
Mr Sherman. It is unnecessary. The power of Congress does not extend
to the Press. On the question, it passed in the negative
N. H. [98] no. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
[98] In the printed Journal N. Hampshire ay.–Madison's Note.
Art 1. Sect. 9. "no capitation tax shall be laid, unless &c."
Mr Read moved to insert after "capitation" the words, "or other direct
tax." He was afraid that some liberty might otherwise be taken to saddle the
States, with a readjustment by this rule, of past requisitions of Congs–and
that his amendment by giving another cast to the meaning would take away
the pretext. Mr Williamson 2ded the motion which was agreed to. On motion
of Col: Mason "or enumeration" inserted after, as explanatory of "Census"
Con. & S. C. only, no. [99]
[99] The words "Con. & S. C. only no" are in the handwriting of John C. Payne,
Madison's brother-in-law.
At the end of the clause "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported
from any State" was added the following amendment conformably to a vote
on the [31] of [August] viz–no preference shall be given by any regulation
of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another: nor
shall vessels bound to or from one State, be obliged to enter, clear or pay
duties in another.
Col. Mason moved a clause requiring "that an Account of the public
expenditures should be annually published" Mr Gerry 2ded the motion,
Mr Govr Morris urged that this wd be impossible in many cases.
Mr King remarked, that the term expenditures went to every minute
shilling. This would be impracticable. Congs might indeed make a monthly
publication, but it would be in such general statements as would afford no
satisfactory information.
Mr Madison proposed to strike out "annually" from the motion & insert
"from time to time," which would enjoin the duty of frequent publications
and leave enough to the discretion of the Legislature. Require too much and
the difficulty will beget a habit of doing nothing. The articles of
Confederation require halfyearly publications on this subject. A punctual
compliance being often impossible, the practice has ceased altogether.
Mr Wilson 2ded. & supported the motion. Many operations of finance
cannot be properly published at certain times.
Mr Pinkney was in favor of the motion.
Mr Fitzimmons. It is absolutely impossible to publish expenditures in the
full extent of the term.
Mr Sherman thought "from time to time" the best rule to be given.
"Annual" was struck out–& those words–inserted nem: con:
The motion of Col: Mason so amended was then agreed to nem: con: and
added after–"appropriations by law" as follows–"And a regular statement
and account of the receipts & expenditures of all public money shall be
published from time to time."
The first clause of Art. 1 Sect. 10–was altered so as to read–"no State
shall enter into any Treaty alliance or confederation; grant letters of marque
and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold &
silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of
nobility."
Mr Gerry entered into observations inculcating the importance of public
faith, and the propriety of the restraint put on the States from impairing the
obligation of contracts, alledging that Congress ought to be laid under the
like prohibitions, he made a motion to that effect. He was not 2ded.
Adjourned.
S        S    15  . 1787. I  C         
Mr Carrol reminded the House that no address to the people had yet been
prepared. He considered it of great importance that such an one should
accompany the Constitution. The people had been accustomed to such on
great occasions, and would expect it on this. He moved that a Committee be
appointed for the special purpose of preparing an address.
Mr Rutlidge objected on account of the delay it would produce and the
impropriety of addressing the people before it was known whether
Congress would approve and support the plan. Congress if an address be
thought proper can prepare as good a one. The members of the Convention
can also explain the reasons of what has been done to their respective
Constituents.
Mr Sherman concurred in the opinion that an address was both
unnecessary and improper.
On the motion of Mr Carrol
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. [100] abst. S. C.[100] no. Geo. no.
[100] In the printed Journal N. Carolina no–S. Carol: omitted.–Madison's Note.
Mr Langdon. Some gentlemen have been very uneasy that no increase of
the number of Representatives has been admitted. It has in particular been
thought that one more ought to be allowed to N. Carolina. He was of
opinion that an additional one was due both to that State and to Rho: Island,
& moved to reconsider for that purpose.
Mr Sherman. When the Committee of eleven reported the
apportionment–five Representatives were thought the proper share of
N. Carolina. Subsequent information however seemed to entitle that State to
another.
On the motion to reconsider
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pen. divd. Del. ay.
Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr Langdon moved to add 1 member to each of the Representations of
N. Carolina & Rho: Island. [101]
[101] The Ms. official Journal says: "It was moved and seconded to"–—and here
finally ends, and the minutes for September 15 are crossed out (Const. MSS.).
They are given in the printed Journal, and a note says the journal for that day and
Monday was completed from minutes furnished by Madison (p. 379). October
22, 1818, Adams wrote to Madison asking him to complete the Journal. He
replied from Montpelier, November 2:
"I have received your letter of 22 ult: and enclose such extracts from my
notes relating to the two last days of the Constitution, as may fill in the
chasm in the Journals, according to the mode in which the proceedings are
recorded."–State Dept. MSS., Miscl. Letters.
Later (June 18, 1819) Adams sent him lists of yeas and nays, and he replied
(Montpelier, June 27, 1819): "I return the list of yeas & nays in the Convention,
with the blanks filled in according to your request, as far as I could do it by
tracing the order of the yeas & nays & their coincidency with those belonging to
successive questions in my papers."–Mad. MSS.
Mr King was agst any change whatever as opening the door for delays.
There had been no official proof that the numbers of N. C. are greater than
before estimated, and he never could sign the Constitution if Rho: Island is
to be allowed two members that is one fourth of the number allowed to
Massts., which will be known to be unjust.
Mr Pinkney urged the propriety of increasing the number of Reps allotted
to N. Carolina.
Mr Bedford contended for an increase in favor of Rho: Island, and of
Delaware also it passed in the negative.
On the question for allowing two Reps to Rho: Island, it passed in the
negative.
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
On the question for allowing six to N. Carolina, it passed in the negative
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Art 1. Sect. 10. (paragraph 2) "No State shall, without the consent of
Congress lay imposts or duties on imports or exports; nor with such
consent, but to the use of the Treasury of the U. States."
In consequence of the proviso moved by Col: Mason; and agreed to on
the 13 Sepr, this part of the section was laid aside in favor of the following
substitute viz: "No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any
imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its Inspection laws; and the nett produce of all
duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the
use of the Treasury of the U. S.; and all such laws shall be subject to the
revision and controul of the Congress"
On a motion to strike out the last part "and all such laws shall be subject
to the revision and controul of the Congress" it passed in the negative.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa divd. Del. no.
Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The substitute was then agreed to; Virga alone being in the negative.
The remainder of the paragraph being under consideration–viz–"nor
keep troops nor ships of war in time of peace, nor enter into any agreement
or compact with another State, nor with any foreign power. Nor engage in
any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of
invasion be so imminent as not to admit of delay, until Congress can be
consulted."
Mr McHenry & Mr Carrol moved that "no State shall be restrained from
laying duties of tonnage for the purpose of clearing harbours and erecting
lighthouses."
Col. Mason in support of this explained and urged the situation of the
Chesapeak which peculiarly required expences of this sort.
Mr Govr Morris. The States are not restrained from laying tonnage as the
Constitution now stands. The exception proposed will imply the contrary,
and will put the States in a worse condition than the gentleman (Col.
Mason) wishes.
Mr Madison. Whether the States are now restrained from laying tonnage
duties, depends on the extent of the power "to regulate commerce." These
terms are vague, but seem to exclude this power of the States. They may
certainly be restrained by Treaty. He observed that there were other objects
for tonnage Duties as the support of seamen &c. He was more & more
convinced that the regulation of Commerce was in its nature indivisible and
ought to be wholly under one authority.
Mr Sherman. The power of the U. States to regulate trade being supreme
can controul interferences of the State regulations when such interferences
happen; so that there is no danger to be apprehended from a concurrent
jurisdiction.
Mr Langdon insisted that the regulation of tonnage was an essential part
of the regulation of trade, and that the States ought to have nothing to do
with it. On motion "that no State shall lay any duty on tonnage without the
consent of Congress."
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct divd. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
The remainder of the paragraph was then remoulded and passed as
follows viz–"No State shall without the consent of Congress, lay any duty
of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any
agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or
engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will
not admit of delay."
Art II. sect. 1. (paragraph 6) "or the period for chusing another president
arrive" were changed into "or a President shall be elected" conformably to a
vote of the –— of –—.
Mr Rutlidge and Docr Franklin moved to annex to the end of paragraph
7. Sect. 1. Art II–"and he (the President) shall not receive, within that
period, any other emolument from the U. S. or any of them." on which
question
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo.–ay.
Art: II. Sect. 2. "he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for
offences against the U. s. &c."
Mr Randolph moved to except "cases of treason." The prerogative of
pardon in these cases was too great a trust. The President may himself be
guilty. The Traitors may be his own instruments.
Col: Mason supported the motion.
Mr Govr Morris had rather there should be no pardon for treason, than let
the power devolve on the Legislature.
Mr Wilson. Pardon is necessary for cases of treason, and is best placed in
the hands of the Executive. If he be himself a party to the guilt he can be
impeached and prosecuted.
Mr King thought it would be inconsistent with the Constitutional
separation of the Executive & Legislative powers to let the prerogative be
exercised by the latter. A Legislative body is utterly unfit for the purpose.
They are governed too much by the passions of the moment. In
Massachusetts, one assembly would have hung all the insurgents in that
State: the next was equally disposed to pardon them all. He suggested the
expedient of requiring the concurrence of the Senate in acts of Pardon.
Mr Madison admitted the force of objections to the Legislature, but the
pardon of treasons was so peculiarly improper for the President that he
should acquiesce in the transfer of it to the former, rather than leave it
altogether in the hands of the latter. He would prefer to either an association
of the Senate as a Council of advice, with the President.
Mr Randolph could not admit the Senate into a share of the power. The
great danger to liberty lay in a combination between the President & that
body.
Col: Mason. The Senate has already too much power. There can be no
danger of too much lenity in legislative pardons, as the Senate must concur,
& the President moreover can require 2/3 of both Houses.
On the motion of Mr Randolph
N. H. no.–Mas. no. Ct divd. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Art II. Sect. 2. (paragraph 2) To the end of this, Mr Governr Morris
moved to annex "but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such
inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
law, or in the heads of Departments." Mr Sherman 2ded the motion.
Mr Madison. It does not go far enough if it be necessary at all. Superior
officers below Heads of Departments ought in some cases to have the
appointment of the lesser offices.
Mr Govr Morris. There is no necessity. Blank commissions can be sent—
On the motion
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no.
Md divd. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The motion being lost by an equal division of votes. It was urged that it
be put a second time some such provision being too necessary to be
omitted, and on a second question it was agreed to nem: con.
Art. II. Sect. 1. The words "and not per capita" were struck out as
superfluous and the words "by the Representatives" also–as improper, the
choice of President being in another mode as well as eventually by the
House of Reps.
Art II. Sect. 2. After "officers of the U. S. whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for," were added the words "and which shall be
established by law."
Art III. Sect. 2. parag: 3. Mr Pinkney & Mr Gerry moved to annex to the
end, "And a trial by jury shall be preserved as usual in civil cases."
Mr Gorham. The constitution of Juries is different in different States and
the trial itself is usual in different cases in different States.
Mr King urged the same objections.
Genl Pinkney also. He thought such a clause in the Constitution would
be pregnant with embarrassments.
The motion was disagreed to nem: con:
Art. IV. Sect. 2. parag: 3. the term "legally" was struck out, and "under
the laws thereof" inserted after the word "State" in compliance with the
wish of some who thought the term legal equivocal, and favoring the idea
that slavery was legal in a moral view.
Art. IV. Sect 3. "New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union: but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction
of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more
States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the
States concerned as well as of the Congs."
Mr Gerry moved to insert after "or parts of States" the words "or a State
and part of a State" which was disagreed to by a large majority; it appearing
to be supposed that the case was comprehended in the words of the clause
as reported by the Committee.
Art. IV. Sect. 4. After the word "Executive" were inserted the words
"when the Legislature cannot be convened."
Art. V. "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the
several States shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have
been ratified by three fourths at least of the Legislatures of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress: Provided that no
amendment which may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner
affect the 1 & 4 clauses in the 9. Section of article 1."
Mr Sherman expressed his fears that three fourths of the States might be
brought to do things fatal to particular States, as abolishing them altogether
or depriving them of their equality in the Senate. He thought it reasonable
that the proviso in favor of the States importing slaves should be extended
so as to provide that no State should be affected in its internal police, or
deprived of its equality in the Senate.
Col: Mason thought the plan of amending the Constitution exceptionable
& dangerous. As the proposing of amendments is in both the modes to
depend, in the first immediately, and in the second ultimately, on Congress,
no amendments of the proper kind would ever be obtained by the people, if
the Government should become oppressive, as he verily believed would be
the case.
Mr Govr Morris & Mr Gerry moved to amend the article so as to require
a Convention on application of 2/3 of the Sts.
Mr Madison did not see why Congress would not be as much bound to
propose amendments applied for by two thirds of the States as to call a
Convention on the like application. He saw no objection however against
providing for a Convention for the purpose of amendments, except only that
difficulties might arise as to the form, the quorum &c. which in
constitutional regulations ought to be as much as possible avoided.
The motion of Mr Govr Morris & Mr Gerry was agreed to nem: con: (see
the first part of the article as finally past).
Mr Sherman moved to strike out of art. V. after "legislatures" the words
"of three fourths" and so after the word "Conventions" leaving future
Conventions to act in this matter, like the present Conventions according to
circumstances.
On this motion
N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo–no.
Mr Gerry moved to strike out the words "or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof." On this motion
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Sherman moved according to his idea above expressed to annex to
the end of the article a further proviso "that no State shall without its
consent be affected in its internal police, or deprived of its equal suffrage in
the Senate."
Mr Madison. Begin with these special provisos, and every State will
insist on them, for their boundaries, exports &c.
On the motion of Mr Sherman
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md no.
Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Sherman then moved to strike out art. V altogether.
Mr Brearley 2ded the motion, on which
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del divd.
Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr Govr Morris moved to annex a further proviso–"that no State,
without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate."
This motion being dictated by the circulating murmurs of the small
States was agreed to without debate, no one opposing it, or on the question,
saying no.
Col: Mason expressing his discontent at the power given to Congress by
a bare majority to pass navigation acts, which he said would not only
enhance the freight, a consequence he did not so much regard–but would
enable a few rich merchants in Philada N. York & Boston, to monopolize
the Staples of the Southern States & reduce their value perhaps 50 Per Ct
moved a further proviso that no law in the nature of a navigation act be
passed before the year 1808, without the consent of 2/3 of each branch of
the Legislature.
On this motion
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. abst. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Mr Randolph animadverting on the indefinite and dangerous power
given by the Constitution to Congress, expressing the pain he felt at
differing from the body of the Convention, on the close of the great & awful
subject of their labours, and anxiously wishing for some accommodating
expedient which would relieve him from his embarrassments, made a
motion importing "that amendments to the plan might be offered by the
State Conventions, which should be submitted to and finally decided on by
another general Convention." Should this proposition be disregarded, it
would he said be impossible for him to put his name to the instrument.
Whether he should oppose it afterwards he would not then decide but he
would not deprive himself of the freedom to do so in his own State, if that
course should be prescribed by his final judgment.
Col: Mason 2ded & followed Mr Randolph in animadversions on the
dangerous power and structure of the Government, concluding that it would
end either in monarchy, or a tyrannical aristocracy; which, he was in doubt,
but one or other, he was sure. This Constitution had been formed without
the knowledge or idea of the people. A second Convention will know more
of the sense of the people, and be able to provide a system more consonant
to it. It was improper to say to the people, take this or nothing. As the
Constitution now stands, he could neither give it his support or vote in
Virginia; and he could not sign here what he could not support there. With
the expedient of another Convention as proposed, he could sign.
Mr Pinkney. These declarations from members so respectable at the
close of this important scene, give a peculiar solemnity to the present
moment. He descanted on the consequences of calling forth the
deliberations & amendments of the different States on the subject of
Government at large. Nothing but confusion & contrariety could spring
from the experiment. The States will never agree in their plans, and the
Deputies to a second Convention coming together under the discordant
impressions of their Constituents, will never agree. Conventions are serious
things, and ought not to be repeated. He was not without objections as well
as others to the plan. He objected to the contemptible weakness &
dependence of the Executive. He objected to the power of a majority only
of Congs over Commerce. But apprehending the danger of a general
confusion, and an ultimate decision by the sword, he should give the plan
his support.
Mr Gerry stated the objections which determined him to withhold his
name from the Constitution. 1. the duration and re-eligibility of the Senate.
2. the power of the House of Representatives to conceal their journals. 3.
the power of Congress over the places of election. 4. the unlimited power of
Congress over their own compensation. 5. Massachusetts has not a due
share of Representatives allotted to her. 6. 3/5 of the Blacks are to be
represented as if they were freemen. 7. Under the power over commerce,
monopolies may be established. 8. The vice president being made head of
the Senate. He could however he said get over all these, if the rights of the
Citizens were not rendered insecure 1. by the general power of the
Legislature to make what laws they may please to call necessary and proper.
2. raise armies and money without limit. 3. to establish a tribunal without
juries, which will be a Star-chamber as to Civil cases. Under such a view of
the Constitution, the best that could be done he conceived was to provide
for a second general Convention.
On the question on the proposition of Mr Randolph. All the States
answered no.
On the question to agree to the Constitution as amended. All the States
ay.
The Constitution was then ordered to be engrossed. and the House
adjourned.
M      S    17. 1787. I  C         
The engrossed Constitution being read.
Docr Franklin rose with a speech in his hand, which he had reduced to
writing for his own conveniency, and which Mr Wilson read in the words
following.
Mr President
I confess that there are several parts of this constitution which I do
not at present approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve them:
For having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being
obliged by better information or fuller consideration, to change
opinions even on important subjects, which I once thought right, but
found to be otherwise. It is therefore that the older I grow, the more apt
I am to doubt my own judgment, and to pay more respect to the
judgment of others. Most men indeed as well as most sects in Religion
think themselves in possession of all truth, and that wherever others
differ from them it is so far error. Steele a Protestant in a Dedication
tells the Pope, that the only difference between our Churches in their
opinions of the certainty of their doctrines is, the Church of Rome is
infallible and the Church of England is never in the wrong. But though
many private persons think almost as highly of their own infallibility
as of that of their sect, few express it so naturally as a certain french
lady, who in a dispute with her sister, said "I don't know how it
happens, Sister but I meet with nobody but myself, that is always in
the right—Il n'y a que moi qui a toujours raison."
In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all its
faults, if they are such; because I think a general Government
necessary for us, and there is no form of Government but what may be
a blessing to the people if well administered, and believe farther that
this is likely to be well administered for a course of years, and can only
end in Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people
shall become so corrupted as to need despotic Government, being
incapable of any other. I doubt too whether any other Convention we
can obtain may be able to make a better Constitution. For when you
assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their joint
wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men, all their prejudices,
their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their
selfish views. From such an assembly can a perfect production be
expected? It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system
approaching so near to perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish
our enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear that our councils
are confounded like those of the Builders of Babel; and that our States
are on the point of separation, only to meet hereafter for the purpose of
cutting one another's throats. Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution
because I expect no better, and because I am not sure, that it is not the
best. The opinions I have had of its errors, I sacrifice to the public
good. I have never whispered a syllable of them abroad. Within these
walls they were born, and here they shall die. If every one of us in
returning to our Constituents were to report the objections he has had
to it, and endeavor to gain partizans in support of them, we might
prevent its being generally received, and thereby lose all the salutary
effects & great advantages resulting naturally in our favor among
foreign nations as well as among ourselves, from our real or apparent
unanimity. Much of the strength & efficiency of any Government in
procuring and securing happiness to the people, depends, on opinion,
on the general opinion of the goodness of the Government, as well as
of the wisdom and integrity of its Governors. I hope therefore that for
our own sakes as a part of the people, and for the sake of posterity, we
shall act heartily and unanimously in recommending this Constitution
(if approved by Congress & confirmed by the Conventions) wherever
our influence may extend, and turn our future thoughts & endeavors to
the means of having it well administered.
On the whole, Sir, I cannot help expressing a wish that every
member of the Convention who may still have objections to it, would
with me, on this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility, and to
make manifest our unanimity, put his name to this instrument.–He then
moved that the Constitution be signed by the members and offered the
following as a convenient form viz: "Done in Convention by the
unanimous consent of the States present the 17th of Sepr &c.–In
witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names."
This ambiguous form had been drawn up by Mr G. M. in order to gain
the dissenting members, and put into the hands of Docr Franklin that it
might have the better chance of success.
Mr Gorham said if it was not too late he could wish, for the purpose of
lessening objections to the Constitution, that the clause declaring "the
number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every forty thousand"
which had produced so much discussion, might be yet reconsidered, in
order to strike out 40,000 & insert "thirty thousand." This would not he
remarked establish that as an absolute rule, but only give Congress a greater
latitude which could not be thought unreasonable.
Mr King & Mr Carrol seconded & supported the ideas of Mr Gorham.
When the President rose, for the purpose of putting the question, he said
that although his situation had hitherto restrained him from offering his
sentiments on questions depending in the House, and it might be thought,
ought now to impose silence on him, yet he could not forbear expressing his
wish that the alteration proposed might take place. It was much to be
desired that the objections to the plan recommended might be made as few
as possible. The smallness of the proportion of Representatives had been
considered by many members of the Convention an insufficient security for
the rights & interests of the people. He acknowledged that it had always
appeared to himself among the exceptionable parts of the plan, and late as
the present moment was for admitting amendments, he thought this of so
much consequence that it would give much satisfaction to see it adopted.
[102]
[102] This was the only occasion on which the President entered at all into the
discussions of the Convention.–Madison's Note.
No opposition was made to the proposition of Mr Gorham and it was
agreed to unanimously.
On the question to agree to the Constitution enrolled in order to be
signed. It was agreed to all the States answering ay.
Mr Randolph then rose and with an allusion to the observations of Docr
Franklin apologized for his refusing to sign the Constitution
notwithstanding the vast majority & venerable names that would give
sanction to its wisdom and its worth. He said however that he did not mean
by this refusal to decide that he should oppose the Constitution without
doors. He meant only to keep himself free to be governed by his duty as it
should be prescribed by his future judgment. He refused to sign, because he
thought the object of the convention would be frustrated by the alternative
which it presented to the people. Nine States will fail to ratify the plan and
confusion must ensue. With such a view of the subject he ought not, he
could not, by pledging himself to support the plan, restrain himself from
taking such steps as might appear to him most consistent with the public
good.
Mr Govr Morris said that he too had objections, but considering the
present plan as the best that was to be attained, he should take it with all its
faults. The majority had determined in its favor, and by that determination
he should abide. The moment this plan goes forth all other considerations
will be laid aside, and the great question will be, shall there be a national
Government or not? and this must take place or a general anarchy will be
the alternative. He remarked that the signing in the form proposed related
only to the fact that the States present were unanimous.
Mr Williamson suggested that the signing should be confined to the letter
accompanying the Constitution to Congress, which might perhaps do nearly
as well, and would be found satisfactory to some members [103] who
disliked the Constitution. For himself he did not think a better plan was to
be expected and had no scruples against putting his name to it.
[103] He alluded to Mr Blount for one.–Madison's Note.
Mr Hamilton expressed his anxiety that every member should sign. A
few characters of consequence, by opposing or even refusing to sign the
Constitution, might do infinite mischief by kindling the latent sparks which
lurk under an enthusiasm in favor of the Convention which may soon
subside. No man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his own were
known to be; but is it possible to deliberate between anarchy and
Convulsion on one side, and the chance of good to be expected from the
plan on the other.
Mr Blount [104] said he had declared that he would not sign, so as to
pledge himself in support of the plan, but he was relieved by the form
proposed and would without committing himself attest the fact that the plan
was the unanimous act of the States in Convention.
[104] "Mr. Blount is a character strongly marked for integrity and honor. He has
been twice a Member of Congress, and in that office discharged his duty with
ability and faithfulness. He is no Speaker, nor does he possess any of those
talents that make Men shine;–he is plain, honest, and sincere. Mr. Blount is
about 36 years of age."–Pierce's Notes, Amer. Hist. Rev., iii., 329.
Docr Franklin expressed his fears from what Mr Randolph had said, that
he thought himself alluded to in the remarks offered this morning to the
House. He declared that when drawing up that paper he did not know that
any particular member would refuse to sign his name to the instrument, and
hoped to be so understood. He possessed a high sense of obligation to
Mr Randolph for having brought forward the plan in the first instance, and
for the assistance he had given in its progress, and hoped that he would yet
lay aside his objections, and by concurring with his brethren, prevent the
great mischief which the refusal of his name might produce.
Mr Randolph could not but regard the signing in the proposed form, as
the same with signing the Constitution. The change of form therefore could
make no difference with him. He repeated that in refusing to sign the
Constitution he took a step which might be the most awful of his life, but it
was dictated by his conscience, and it was not possible for him to hesitate,
much less, to change. He repeated also his persuasion, that the holding out
this plan with a final alternative to the people, of accepting or rejecting it in
toto, would really produce the anarchy & civil convulsions which were
apprehended from the refusal of individuals to sign it.
Mr Gerry described the painful feelings of his situation, and the
embarrassments under which he rose to offer any further observations on
the subject wch. had been finally decided. Whilst the plan was depending,
he had treated it with all the freedom he thought it deserved. He now felt
himself bound as he was disposed to treat it with the respect due to the Act
of the Convention. He hoped he should not violate that respect in declaring
on this occasion his fears that a Civil war may result from the present crisis
of the U. S. In Massachusetts, particularly he saw the danger of this
calamitous event–In that State there are two parties, one devoted to
Democracy, the worst he thought of all political evils, the other as violent in
the opposite extreme. From the collision of these in opposing and resisting
the Constitution, confusion was greatly to be feared. He had thought it
necessary, for this & other reasons that the plan should have been proposed
in a more mediating shape, in order to abate the heat and opposition of
parties. As it had been passed by the Convention, he was persuaded it
would have a contrary effect. He could not therefore by signing the
Constitution pledge himself to abide by it at all events. The proposed form
made no difference with him. But if it were not otherwise apparent, the
refusals to sign should never be known from him. Alluding to the remarks
of Docr Franklin, he could not he said but view them as levelled at himself
and the other gentlemen who meant not to sign.
Genl Pinkney. We are not likely to gain many converts by the ambiguity
of the proposed form of signing. He thought it best to be candid and let the
form speak the substance. If the meaning of the signers be left in doubt, his
purpose would not be answered. He should sign the Constitution with a
view to support it with all his influence, and wished to pledge himself
accordingly.
Docr Franklin. It is too soon to pledge ourselves before Congress and our
Constituents shall have approved the plan.
Mr Ingersol [105] did not consider the signing, either as a mere attestation
of the fact, or as pledging the signers to support the Constitution at all
events; but as a recommendation, of what, all things considered, was the
most eligible.
[105] "Mr. Ingersol is a very able Attorney and possesses a clear legal
understanding. He is well educated in the Classic's, and is a Man of very
extensive reading. Mr. Ingersol speaks well, and comprehends his subject fully.
There is modesty in his character that keeps him back. He is about 36 years
old."–Pierce's Notes, Amer. Hist. Rev., iii., 329.
On the motion of Docr Franklin
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay.
Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. divd. [106] Geo. ay.
[106] Genl Pinkney & Mr Butler disliked the equivocal form of the signing, and
on that account voted in the negative.–Madison's Note.
Mr King suggested that the Journals of the Convention should be either
destroyed, or deposited in the custody of the President. He thought if
suffered to be made public, a bad use would be made of them by those who
would wish to prevent the adoption of the Constitution.
Mr Wilson preferd the second expedient, he had at one time liked the
first best; but as false suggestions may be propagated it should not be made
impossible to contradict them.
A question was then put on depositing the Journals and other papers of
the Convention in the hands of the President, on which,
N. H. ay. Mtts ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pena ay. Del. ay. Md no.
[107] Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [108]
[107] This negative of Maryland was occasioned by the language of the
instructions to the Deputies of that State, which required them to report to the
State, the proceedings of the Convention.–Madison's Note.
[108] "Major Jackson presents his most respectful compliments to General
Washington–
"He begs leave to request his signature to forty Diplomas intended for the
Rhode Island Society of the Cincinnati.
"Major Jackson, after burning all the loose scraps of paper which belong to
the Convention, will this evening wait upon the General with the Journals and
other papers which their vote directs to be delivered to His Excellency.
"Monday evening"
Endorsed in Washington's hand: "Majr Wm Jackson 17th Sep. 1787."–Wash.
MSS.
The President having asked what the Convention meant should be done
with the Journals &c. whether copies were to be allowed to the members if
applied for. It was Resolved nem. con: "that he retain the Journal and other
papers, subject to the order of Congress, if ever formed under the
Constitution."
The members then proceeded to sign the instrument.
Whilst the last members were signing it Doctr Franklin looking towards
the President's Chair, at the back of which a rising sun happened to be
painted, observed to a few members near him, that Painters had found it
difficult to distinguish in their art a rising from a setting sun. I have said he,
often and often in the course of the Session, and the vicissitudes of my
hopes and fears as to its issue, looked at that behind the President without
being able to tell whether it was rising or setting: But now at length I have
the happiness to know that it is a rising and not a setting Sun.
The Constitution being signed by all the members except Mr Randolph,
Mr Mason and Mr Gerry, who declined giving it the sanction of their names,
the Convention dissolved itself by an Adjournment sine die [109]—
[109] The few alterations and corrections made in these debates which are not in
my handwriting, were dictated by me and made in my presence by John C.
Payne. James Madison.–Madison's Note.
[Following is a literal copy of the engrossed Constitution as signed.
It is in four sheets, with an additional sheet containing the resolutions
of transmissal. The note indented at the end is in the original precisely
as reproduced here.]
W      P      of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.
Article. I.
Section. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.
Section. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the
Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of
the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the
Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in
which he shall be chosen.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The
actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting
of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of
ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each
State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration
shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three,
Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one,
Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight,
Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South
Carolina five, and Georgia three.
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the
Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such
Vacancies.
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other
Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.
Section. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years;
and each Senator shall have one Vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first
Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The
Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of
the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year,
and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third
may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation,
or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the
Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next
Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be
chosen.
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate,
but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro
tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the
Office of President of the United States.
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When
sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no
Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the
Members present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to Law.
Section. 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such
Meetings shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by
Law appoint a different Day.
Section. 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a
Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to
day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members,
in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds,
expel a Member.
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment
require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on
any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on
the Journal.
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
Section. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a
Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of
the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason,
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their
Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House,
they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall
have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office
under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office.
Section. 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments
as on other Bills.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with
his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall
enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.
If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the
Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of
that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both
Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the
Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of
each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President
within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to
him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless
the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it
shall not be a Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and
House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations
prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes;
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix
the Standard of Weights and Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and
current Coin of the United States;
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
Limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and Offences against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use
shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the
United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the
Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular
States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the
Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all
Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the
Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards,
and other needful Buildings;–And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof.
Section. 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by
the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a
Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars
for each Person.
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.
No bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to
the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or
Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels
bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in
another.
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time
to time.
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no
Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the
Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or
Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
Section. 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit
Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the
Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the
Revision and Controul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or
engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will
not admit of delay.
Article. II.
Section. 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four
Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be
elected, as follows.
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no
Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for
two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same
State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted
for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and
certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate
shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the
greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a
Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more
than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then
the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of
them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five
highest on the List the said House shall in like manner chuse the President.
But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the
Representation from each State having one Vote; a quorum for this Purpose
shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a
Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case,
after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of
Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain
two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by
Ballot the Vice President.
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the
Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same
throughout the United States.
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to
the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office
who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may
by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the
Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within
that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the
following Oath or Affirmation:–"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to
the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States."
Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall
expire at the End of their next Session.
Section. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information
of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such
Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on
extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in
Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper;
he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers
of the United States.
Section. 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
Article. III.
Section. 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Section. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;–to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;–to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;–to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;–to Controversies between two or more States;–
between a State and Citizens of another State;–between Citizens of different
States,–between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall
have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
Section. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid
and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason,
but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture
except during the Life of the Person attainted.
Article. IV.
Section. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Section. 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime,
who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand
of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up,
to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be
due.
Section. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union;
but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any
other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States,
or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to
prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
Section. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when
the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
Article. V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call
a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions
in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be
made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any
Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first
Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of it's equal
Suffrage in the Senate.
Article. VI.
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption
of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this
Constitution, as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members
of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers,
both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath
or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever
be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States.
Article. VII.
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for
the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
Same.
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done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the
Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven
hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of
America the Twelfth In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our
Names,
Attest W       J       Secretary
Go W         –Presidt and deputy from Virginia
New Hampshire {J    L       }
{N        G     }
Massachusetts { N         G     
{ R     K   
Connecticut { W : S    J      
{ R     S      
New York A         H       












Delaware { G  : R   




Maryland { J     M H    
{ D      S  T    J      
{ D    C      
Virginia { J    B    —
{ J     M       Jr.
North Carolina { W  B     
{ R     D     S      
{ H  W         
South Carolina { J. R       
{ C       C          P       
{ C       P       
{ P      B     
Georgia { W       F  
{ A   B      
I  C          Monday September 17th. 1787.
Present
The States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr Hamilton from New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.
Resolved,
That the preceeding Constitution be laid before the United States in
Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of this Convention, that it
should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in
each State by the People thereof, under the Recommendation of its
Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each Convention
assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof to the
United States in Congress assembled.
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as soon as the
Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this Constitution, the United
States in Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be
appointed by the States which shall have ratified the same, and a Day on
which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and the Time
and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Constitution. That after
such Publication the Electors should be appointed, and the Senators and
Representatives elected: That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for
the Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of
the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and
Representatives should convene at the Time and Place assigned; that the
Senators should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole Purpose of
receiving, opening and counting the Votes for President; and, that after he
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without
Delay, proceed to execute this Constitution.






See Expenditures of government.
Acts, originating of.
See Legislature, national, acts of.
Address to accompany constitution, moved, ii., 347;
considered, 377.
Adjournment of legislature.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Age,
Of executive.
See Executive, national, age of.
Of Representatives.
See Legislature, national, House of
Representatives.
Of Senators.
See Legislature, national, Senate.
Allen, Paul, signs address from Rhode Island, i., 11, n.




agreed to, 137, ii., 30;
motion to reconsider clause, 339;
moved that states agree to, 340.
Appointment, power of.
See Executive, national, power of;
Judiciary, national, supreme;
Legislature, national. Senate.
Appropriations, originating of, see Legislature, national,
money bills;
accounts of, see Expenditures of government.
Aristocracy, fear of, expressed by Mason, i., 310;
defended by G. Morris, 310, ii., 98;
probability of, 159.
Armies, power to raise and support.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Arnold, Welcome, signs address from Rhode Island, i., 11,
n.
Arsenals, Forts, etc.
See Forts, Arsenals, etc.
Articles of Confederation, amendments to, proposed by
Dickinson, i., 166.
B
Baldwin, Abraham, Ga., attends convention, i., 114;
favors representation in Senate by wealth of states,
271;
Pierce's sketch of, 271, n.;
on compromise committee on representation, 292;
thinks foreigners should be excluded from
government, ii., 145;
thinks provisions on citizenship should not extend to
those already citizens, 148;
appointed on grand committee, 193;
thinks slave trade not a national question, 222;
on committee on navigation acts, 225;
moves that duty on slaves be uniform, 251;
thinks public lands should be guaranteed to states,
281;
on committee of August 31, 292;
thinks members of legislature should be ineligible to
other offices,
296;
approves plan of electing executive by electors, 302;
moves to exclude from new offices members of first
legislature, 371.
Bankruptcy, uniform law of.
See Legislature, national, power of;
House of Representatives.
Barton, William, signs address from Rhode Island, i., 11, n.
Bassett, Richard, Del., attends convention, i., 1;
Pierce's sketch of, 1, n.
Bedford, Gunning, Del., attends convention, i., 5;
favors short term for executive, 54;
Pierce's sketch of, 54, n.;
opposes absolute veto in executive, 72;
opposes negative of state laws by legislature, 105;
threatens foreign alliance of small states, 283;
on compromise committee on representation, 292;
explains threat of foreign alliance, 300;
moves that national legislature make laws when
harmony would be interrupted by state
legislation, 372;
prefers appointment of judges by Senate, 386;
opposes provision against standing army, ii., 374;
favors increase in representation of Rhode Island and
Delaware, 379.
Bill of Rights, inclusion of, debated, ii., 364.
Bills of attainder.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Bills of credit, power to emit.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Blair, John, Va., attends convention, i., 1;
Pierce's sketch of, 1, n.
Blount, William, N. C., attends convention, i., 189;
announces he will sign constitution, ii., 394;
Pierce's sketch of, 394, n.
Bowen, Jabez, signs address from Rhode Island, i., 11, n.
Brearley, David, N. J., attends convention, i., 1;
favors equal vote of states in national legislature, 109;
Pierce's sketch of, 109, n.;
moves that New Hampshire delegates be sent for, 272;
opposes election of executive by joint ballot, ii., 243;
seconds motion to elect executive by states, 244;
on committee of August 31, 292;
reports from committee, 292, 296, 304;
seconds motion against amendments, 386.
Broome, Jacob, Del., attends convention, i., 1;
favors nine years' term for Senators, 238;
insists upon equal representation for New Jersey in
Senate, 327;
opposes adjournment on question of representation,
368;
opposes seven years' term for executive, 379;
Pierce's sketch of, ii., 8, n.;
seconds motion to postpone clause fixing term of
executive, 44;
seconds motion to except army and navy from
disqualification from legislature, 166;
thinks legislature can fix their own compensation,
168;
favors same compensation for both houses of
legislature, 170;
thinks national government should punish for treason,
206;
seconds motion in favor of national negative of state
laws, 236;
moves reference of question of term of executive, 245.
Brown, John, signs address from Rhode Island, i., 11, n.
Brown, Nicholas, signs address from Rhode Island, i., 11, n.
Butler, Pierce, S. C., attends convention, i., 2;
moves secrecy of proceedings, 10;
Pierce's sketch of, 11, n.;
moves debate on national government, 33;
wants explanation of personnel of Senate, 43;
fears deprivation of state powers, 46;
favors single executive, 66;
opposes absolute negative in executive, 72;
proposes power of suspending legislation for
executive, 75;
opposed to institution of inferior judiciary, 83, 388;
opposes indefinite negative of state laws by
legislature, 106;
favors wealth as basis of representation, 115, 120,
307, 321;
thinks Senators should have no compensation, 129;
thinks Senate should have power to originate money
bills, 132;
moves vote on compensation of legislature, 213;
favors ineligibility to all other offices of
Representatives, 214;
opposes ineligibility of Representatives to offices
created during their term, 218;
thinks candidates for office will not be wanting, 222;
moves question of representation in Senate, 235;
opposes ineligibility of Senators to state offices, 246;
opposes report of compromise committee on
representation, 298;
moves increase in representation of South Carolina,
325;
insists upon inclusion of blacks in representation, 331;
thinks slave labor as productive as free labor, 331;
favors representation by population, 341;
demands security for slavery, 352;
thinks powers of legislature loosely defined, 366;
opposes frequent elections of executive, ii., 9;
favors election of executive by electors chosen by
state legislatures, 52;
opposes re-eligibility of executive, 52;
moves to refer question of executive to committee of
detail, 56;
favors fixing plan for national capital, 67;
thinks question of suffrage should be left to states, 97;
moves three years' inhabitancy for Representatives,
110;
thinks money bills should originate in House, 115;
favors long inhabitancy for Senators, 122;
urges postponement of clause concerning eligibility of
members of legislature to other offices, 166;
favors state compensation for members of legislature,
167;
opposes power to emit bills of credit, 181, 183;
thinks President should have power to declare war,
188;
moves that legislature have power to declare peace,
189;
thinks militia should be under national control, 196;
favors adjustment of taxation to representation, 212;
opposes federal power over exports, 214, 224;
moves discrimination in paying creditors, 238;
moves reconsideration of question of discharging
debts, 241;
thinks creditors should stand where they are, 249;
on committee of August 25, 254;
moves that fugitive slaves and servants be
surrendered, 267, 274;
favors commercial regulations to be made by two-
thirds vote, 271;
thinks new states should not be made without consent
of old states, 276;
thinks nine states may ratify constitution, 285;
on committee of August 31, 292;
thinks election of executive by electors objectionable,
302;
favors making treaties of peace without President,
330;
thinks Congress must sanction state export duties,
366;
dislikes form of signing, 396, n.
C
Canals, provision for, proposed.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Capital, national.




See Legislature, national, power of.
Carrington, Edward, to Jefferson, on progress of
convention, i., 107, n.;
to Madison, 130, n.;
to Monroe, ii., 90, n.;
to Madison, 142, n.
Carroll, Daniel, Md., attends convention, i., 318;
favors national power to suppress insurrection, 392;
Pierce's sketch of, ii., 38, n.;
doubts propriety of per capita voting in Senate, 38;
favors election of executive by electors chosen by lot
from national legislature, 47;
thinks direct taxation should depend on census, 47;
opposes disqualification from legislature of persons
having unsettled government accounts, 63;
thinks number for quorum cannot be fixed, 135;
thinks right of expulsion should be with two-thirds of
legislature, 136;
moves Senators be permitted to enter dissent to
measures, 136;
fears New York will be capital, 140;
moves five years' citizenship for Representatives, 148;
explains provision as to money bills in Maryland, 157;
favors national compensation for members of
legislature, 168, 169;
thinks greater checks to bad laws necessary, 174;
thinks a quorum should be more than a majority, 177;
thinks exports should not be taxed, 181;
opposes taxation by congressional representation, 209;
thinks prohibition of ex post facto laws necessary,
228;
moves election of executive by the people, 243, 245;
moves provision to prevent favoring ports of entry,
252;
on committee of August 25, 254;
objects to requiring consent of states to
dismemberment, 277;
moves that right of U. S. to public lands be confirmed,
280;
moves that land question go to Supreme Court, 281;
moves to postpone question of ratification, 284, 286;
thinks all the states must ratify, 286;
thinks Maryland must ratify as required by Maryland
law, 286;
thinks vessels should enter and clear in their own
states, 291;
on committee of August 31, 292;
proposes an address to the people, 377;
moves states have power to lay tonnage taxes, 380;
urges larger representation, 392.
Census, taking of, debated, i., 327, 340;
every fifteen years, vote on, 340;
two years after meeting of legislature, 344;
ordered within six years after meeting of legislature,
346;
every ten years, 347;
every twenty years, 346;
first to be in three years, ii., 208.
Charters, power to grant, proposed.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Citizenship, of Representatives, see Legislature, national,
House of Representatives, Senate;
uniformity of, in the several states, agreed to, ii., 266.
Clymer, George, Pa., attends convention, i., 5;
appointed on grand committee, ii., 193;
thinks power to tax exports should exist for revenue
only, 217;
Pierce's sketch of, 217, n.;
on committee on navigation acts, 225;
disapproves slave-trade arrangement, 251;
thinks states should regulate their own manufactures,
266;
favors commercial regulations, 270;
moves to postpone ratification question, 286;
favors ratification by a majority of the people and the
states, 287;
objects to Senate's power, 315;




Committee, grand, appointed, ii., 193.
Committee of the whole, convention goes into, i., 32;
reports, 134;
last session, 165.
Committee on detail, resolutions referred to, ii., 67;
report of, 76;
debated, 90.
Committee on plan of compromise, appointed, i., 292;
reports, 293.
Committee on rules, appointed, i., 5;
reports, 7.
Committee on style and arrangement, appointed, ii., 338;
report of, 347, 369;
debated, 367, 368.
Committee on sumptuary legislation, appointed, ii., 366.
Compensation of executive.
See Executive, national, compensation of.
Compensation of judiciary.
See Judiciary, national, compensation of.
Compensation of legislature.
See Legislature, national, compensation of.
Compromise on representation, debate on, i., 287;
report of committee on, 294.
Confederation, articles of.
See Articles of Confederation.
Congress.
See Legislature, national.
Constitution, engrossed, read, ii., 389;
text of, 398.
Continental Congress, continuance of, till constitution goes
into effect, proposed, i., 79;
agreed to, 137;
debate on, 390.
Contracts, impairment of, prohibited, ii., 377.
Copyright law.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Council, executive.
See Executive council.
Council of revision of laws, debate on, i., 69; ii., 17.
Counterfeiting, power to punish, debated, ii., 185.
Courts.
See Judiciary.
Credentials of delegates read, i., 4.
D
Davie, William Richardson, N. C., attends convention, i., 2;
Pierce's sketch of, 65, n.;
opposes unequal representation in Senate, 279;
on committee on compromise on representation, 292;
insists that blacks be included in basis of
representation, 342;
favors impeachability of executive, ii., 11;
proposes eight years' term for executive, 43.
Dayton, Jonathan, N. J., attends convention, i., 200;
opposes compensation of Senators by state
legislatures, 245;
Pierce's sketch of, 245, n.;
favors voting in House by states, 252;
favors equal representation in Senate, 282;
insists on equality of small states, 356;
favors representation by free inhabitants, ii., 114;
thinks a standing army necessary, 195;
proposes mixed control of militia, 231, 232;
thinks judiciary will decide controversies between
states, 241;
opposes election of executive by joint ballot, 243;
moves election of executive by states, 244;
on committee of August 25, 254;
thinks tranquillity of states should be guaranteed, 282;
moves ratification by ten states, 287;
moves that treaties be made without two-thirds of
Senate, 334;
objects to state export duties, 365.
Debt, national, report on, ii., 209;
debate on, 210;
proposition for settling, 210;
provision for payment of, 226, 238;
reconsideration of, proposed, 241;
motion to make payment obligatory, debated, 249.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Delaware, increase in representation of, moved, ii., 379.
Detail, committee on.
See Committee on detail.
Dickinson, John, Del., attends convention, i., 12;
moves removability of executive by state legislatures,
62;
Pierce's sketch of, 62, n.;
favors separation of branches of government, 63;
favors institution of inferior judiciary, 83;
favors election of Representatives by people, 89;
favors negative over laws by executive, 93;
moves that Senators be elected by legislatures, 94;
thinks Senate should resemble House of Lords, 95;
thinks preservation of states necessary, 97;
favors negative by legislature over state laws, 105;
favors representation by wealth, 115;
proposes postponement of Jersey plan, 151;
proposes amendment of articles of confederation, 152;
favors three years' term for Representatives, 207;
favors election of executive by the people, ii., 55;
opposes property qualification for legislature, 61;
favors restriction of suffrage to freeholders, 97;
proposes –— years' residency for Representatives,
108;
thinks provision as to money bills should stand, 154;
proposes fixed payment for members of legislature
every twelve years, 169;
moves both branches of legislature receive the same
pay, 170;
thinks judiciary should not have power to set a law
aside, 173;
moves that rebellion against government be
suppressed, 187;
appointed on grand committee, 193;
thinks great appointments should be made by
legislature, 194;
thinks treason should be defined, 204;
thinks war against one state the same as against all,
207;
moves that representation of large states be limited,
210;
favors power over exports, 214;
on committee on navigation acts, 225;
thinks President should share in treaty-making power,
239;
moves executive have power to appoint to future
offices, 246;
moves executive appoint officers not to be appointed
by states, 247;
moves to permit slave trade in states permitting it,
251;
favors postponement of question of executive
succession, 256;
thinks legislature will not improperly ask removal of
judges, 257;
moves that judiciary have equity power, 260;
explains meaning of ex post facto laws, 268;
thinks small states should not secure claims of large
states, 276;
moves that legislatures consent to formation of new
states, 280;
thinks tranquillity of states should be guaranteed, 282,
283;
asks if Congress is to concur in constitution, 284;
on committee of August 31, 292;
thinks eventual election of President should be with
whole legislature, 310;
moves that vote of presidential electors be from all
who are appointed, 312;
favors an executive council, 332;
objects to state export duties, 366;
on committee on sumptuary legislation, 366;







See Executive, national, election of.
Of Representatives.
See Legislature, national, House of
Representatives, election of.
Of Senators.
See Legislature, national, Senate, election of.
Electors.
See Executive, national, election of.
Ellsworth, Oliver, Conn., attends convention, i., 5;
Pierce's sketch of, 120, n.;
opposes ratification by conventions, 189;
favors one-year term for Representatives, 207;
favors payment of Representatives by states, 209;
favors payment of Senators by states, 245;
favors election of Senators by legislatures, 234;
favors equal state representation in Senate, 269, 275,
285;
on committee on compromise on representation, 292;
favors compromise on representation, 301;
opposes increase in representation, 325;
favors free inhabitants and three-fifths of slaves as
basis of taxation, 343;
favors representation by free inhabitants and three-
fifths slaves, 344;
opposes adjustment of taxation and representation
after census, 349;
insists upon state equality in Senate, 363;
moves election of executive by electors appointed by
legislatures, ii., 7;
favors six years' term for executive, 9;
moves increase in electors of New Hampshire and
Georgia, 10;
favors inclusion of judiciary in revisionary power, 18;
favors appointment of judges by Senate with power
negative of appointment by executive, 27;
favors ratification of constitution by state legislatures,
31, 34;
favors voting per capita in Senate, 37;
favors re-eligibility of executive, 42;
on committee to report constitution, 48;
moves election of executive by legislature and re-
election by electors named by state legislatures,
48;
opposes election of executive by the people, 51;
opposes disqualification of public debtors from
legislature, 65;
thinks time of meeting of legislature ought to be fixed,
93;
thinks legislature ought to meet in winter, 95;
thinks question of suffrage should be left to states, 96;
thinks suffrage should be liberal, 97;
thinks Representatives should reside in their states,
108;
moves that Representatives be residents of their states
for a year, 109;
thinks ratio of Representatives to inhabitants may
change, 112;
thinks originating money bills in House unimportant,
116, 118;
thinks state executives should fill vacancies in Senate,
117;
opposes fourteen years' citizenship for Senators, 121;
thinks property qualification for members of
government should not be fixed, 130, 131;
thinks number for quorum should not be small, 134;
thinks no provision necessary for yeas and nays, 136;
thinks provision for journal unnecessary, 138;
favors ineligibility of members of legislature to other
offices, 165;
favors national compensation for members of
legislature, 166;
thinks members of legislature may fix their pay, 169;
moves $5 per day as payment for legislature, 169;
urges necessity of reaching a decision, 175;
thinks exports should not be taxed, 179;
opposes power to emit bills of credit, 182;
moves to enlarge power over piracies, felonies, etc.,
186;
thinks executive should have power to suppress
rebellion in a state, 186;
defines power of making war and peace, 188;
thinks state debts may be assumed by nation, 192;
urges consideration of President's council, 193;
thinks states should have partial control over militia,
195, 197;
thinks power of taxation includes sumptuary power,
202;
thinks treason sufficiently defined, 203, 205, 207;
moves census in three years, 208;
moves report on state debts lie on table, 210;
thinks adjustment of debts necessary, 211;
thinks taxation by representation unjust, 211;
thinks states may tax exports, 213;
thinks an embargo permissible, 215;
thinks slave trade a question for the states, 218, 220;
favors accepting constitution as it stands, 225;
thinks prohibition of ex post facto laws unnecessary,
227;
thinks requirement of fulfilment of old government's
engagements unnecessary, 229;
favors national power to train militia, 230;
proposes mixed control of militia, 231;
opposes national negative of state laws, 237.
Emancipation.
See Slavery.
Embargo, power to lay, debated, ii., 214, 215;
by states, debated, 264.
Executive council, proposed, i., 68;
debated, ii., 193, 331, 332.
Executive, national, debate on, i., 49;
provisions reconsidered, ii., 7;
referred to committee on detail, 56;
vote on, 59.
Age, nativity, and residence of, agreed to, ii., 336.
Compensation of, Franklin proposes no salary, i., 57,
ii., 381;
mode of payment, 16.
Correspondence of, with states, debated, ii., 248.
Election of, proposed by district electors, i., 55, 56;
by national legislature for seven years, proposed,
57;
mode of, reconsidered, 53, 101, 107, 108, ii., 44,
46, 47, 48, 52, 53;
by state conventions, proposed, i., 109;
by national legislature, 374, 378, 379, ii., 40, 42,
55, 242;
by electors chosen by state legislatures, i., 377,
ii., 8;
ratio of electors considered, 10;
electors not to be officials, 16;
by electors, debated, 38, 39, 297, 301, 307, 310,
322;
term of electors debated, 47;
re-election of electors considered, 52;
regulations as to age and residence debated, 226;
by states, proposed, 244;
by electors, defeated, 245;
when to take place, proposed, 290;
to be at seat of government, proposed, 317;
how vote is to be counted, debated, 317;
to fill vacancy, considered, 381;
verbal amendment of clause, 383.
Eligibility of, to re-election, debated, i., 67, 378, 383,
ii., 1, 8, 40, 42.
Exclusion from, of those indebted to government,
considered, ii., 61.
Foreign ambassadors to be received by, ii., 254.
Impeachability of, agreed to, i., 65;
method of, debated, 385, 386, ii., 11, 15, 16,
335, 337;
moved to postpone question, 15;
House to have power of, 116.
Militia to be commanded by, when in active service,
ii., 255.
Native citizens only to be eligible, ii., 299.
Negative of, on national legislation, debated, i., 54,
69, 74, 385, ii., 174, 175, 361;
qualified, agreed to, i., 75, ii., 25;
inclusion of judiciary in, proposed, i., 75;
absolute, debated, ii., 12;
ten days allowed for, 176;
agreed to, 176;
moved to extend to resolutions, 176.
Oath of, prescribed, ii., 256.
Power of, debated, i., 52, 53, 58, 91, 378, ii., 17, 46,
254, 299;
to make appointments, i., 379, ii., 246, 328, 329,
334, 383;
to revise legislation, 17, 25, 246;
to pardon criminals, 254, 381;
to make treaties, 327, 329;
to demand opinions of heads of departments,
330;
to convene either house of legislature, 338.
Removability of, on request of state legislatures,
debated, i., 62, 65;
question postponed, ii., 256, 299;
debated, 299.
Single, proposed, i., 51, 65, 69;
agreed to, 374, ii., 242;
debate on, 41.
Succession in, debated and postponed, ii., 256.
Term of, debated, i., 54, 155, 379, ii., 9, 42, 58, 59,
80;
seven years', proposed, i., 54, 378, 383, ii., 9,
316;
during good behavior, proposed, i., 382;
six years', proposed, ii., 9, 316;
six years in twelve, proposed, 56.
Expenditures of government, moved that an account of be
published, ii., 376, 377.
Expenses of convention, provision for, ii., 303, 306.
Exports, tax on, debated, ii., 177, 213, 254;
state power to tax, debated, 266, 364.
Ex post facto laws.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Expulsion from legislature.
See Legislature, national, expulsion from.
F
Federal or national government, debate on, i., 32.
Felonies.
See Piracies and felonies.
Few, William, Ga., attends convention, i., 2;
Pierce's sketch of, 2, n.;
on committee of August 25, ii., 254.
Fitzsimmons, Thomas, Pa., attends convention, i., 1;
favors restriction of suffrage to freeholders, ii., 96;
opposes power to tax exports, 216;
on committee of August 25, 254;
admits inconvenience to require vessels to enter and
clear in their own state, 291;
seconds motion to include House of Representatives
in treaty-making power, 327;
thinks old Congress need not sanction constitution,
343;
favors incidental state export duties, 365;
thinks publication expenditures impossible, 376.
Forts, arsenals, etc., provision for acquisition of, ii., 306.
Franklin, Benj., Pa., attends convention, i., 5;
Pierce's sketch of, 49, n.;
moves that executive receive no salary, 57;
opposes negative in executive, 70;
favors executive council, 71;
opposes single executive, 74;
suggests method for choosing judges, 77;
appeals for harmony in convention, 115;
favors proportional representation, 115;
objects to liberal compensation for legislature, 126;
favors no salary for Senators, 244;
thinks voting in Senate not a separate question, 259;
proposes prayers in convention, 260;
favors compromise on representation, 280;
on committee on compromise on representation, 292;
thinks money bills should originate in House, 311;
favors power to increase judges' salaries, 387;
favors impeachability of executive, ii., 12, 14;
thinks executive returning to private life no
degradation, 68;
favors general suffrage, 100;
thinks compromise on representation should stand,
118;
opposes long residence in the states for Senators, 122;
thinks new citizens will not be elected to Senate, 125;
opposes property qualification for officers of
government, 130;
thinks two witnesses necessary in treason cases, 206;
favors executive council, 331;
seconds motion for second convention, 347;
on committee on sumptuary legislation, 366;
moves legislature have power to cut canals, 372;
moves to limit President's emoluments, 381;
proposes plan for signing constitution, 389;
disclaims personal reflections on non-signatories, 394;
thinks members cannot pledge themselves, 396;
remarks on signing, 397.




See Legislature, national, power of.
Georgia, increase in representation of, moved, i., 324.
Gerry, Elbridge, Mass., attends convention, i., 12;
doubts if convention can form national government,
34;
Pierce's sketch of, 34, n.;
opposes election of Representatives by the people, 40,
42, 84;
favors an executive council, 51;
opposes election of executive by national legislature,
56;
opposes inclusion of judiciary in council of revision,
69, 92;
favors single executive, 69;
favors qualified negative on legislation by executive,
70;
favors provision for amendments, 79;
opposes ratification of constitution by the people, 80;
favors election of Senators by state legislatures, 97,
99;
moves reconsideration of question of choosing
executive, 101;
moves indefinite negative on state laws by national
legislature, 103;
moves election of executive by state executives, 107,
ii., 49;
favors representation based on free population, i., 120;
opposes requiring oath to national government from
state officers, 123;
favors one-year term for Representatives, 124;
proposes that Senate shall not originate money bills,
132;
thinks maximum and minimum for quorum should be
fixed, 134;
favors ineligibility of Representatives to other offices,
220, 223;
opposed to monarchy, 242;
favors four or five years' term for Senators, 243;
opposes equal state representation, 268;
favors committee to compromise representation, 292;
on committee to arrange compromise on
representation, 292;
offers report of committee of compromise on
representation, 293;
favors compromise on representation, 302;
favors representation on basis of population and
wealth, 305;
thinks originating money bills in House a concession,
310;
moves to postpone question of voting in Senate, 313;
favors increase in representation, 326;
thinks three-fifths of blacks sufficient proportion as
basis of representation, 331;
thinks taxation and representation cannot be arranged,
347;
favors direct taxation according to representation, 347,
350;
favors originating money bills in House, 356;
favors compromise on representation in Senate, 357;
opposes adjournment on question of representation,
368;
opposes re-eligibility of executive, ii., 7, 42, 43;
favors election of executive by electors appointed by
state legislatures, 8;
moves ratio for electors for executive, 10;
favors impeachability of executive, 13;
moves that electors for executive be not officials, 16;
opposes inclusion of judiciary in revisionary power,
19, 24;
favors appointment of judges by Senate, 28;
moves that officers take oath of allegiance, 30;
thinks constitution should be ratified by legislatures,
32;
moves appointment of committee to report
constitution, 39;
moves election of executive by legislatures, 42;
suggests fifteen years' term for executive, 43;
proposes referring term of executive to committee, 44,
46;
opposes election of executive by electors chosen by
lot from national legislatures, 47;
favors election of executive for not more than six
years in twelve, 53;
opposes popular election of executive, 54;
favors exclusion from office of those indebted to
government, 61, 64;
favors exclusion from legislature of pensioners, 64;
favors prohibiting state and national capital at same
place, 66;
thinks quorum should be fixed, 134;
moves to permit Senate to publish journal, 137, 138;
thinks executive should not influence place of meeting
of legislature, 140;
thinks none but natives should be Representatives,
143;
declares his state opposes members of legislature
holding any other offices, 161;
points out objections to both national and state
legislatures, 202;
thinks exports should not be taxed, 179;
moves to include post roads in power of legislature,
181;
thinks rebellion should be suppressed on state
application, 186;
moves legislature have power to declare war, 188;
favors giving legislature power to make peace, 189;
thinks letters of marque should be considered, 191;
thinks executive should not interfere in legislation,
194;
favors provision against large army in time of peace,
194, 195, 198;
moves committee be instructed to report on
qualifications
for executive and impeachment of judges, 202;
opposes power to make sumptuary laws, 202;
moves that taxation be by congressional
representation, 208, 211;
thinks states should pay their debts, 209;
opposes power to tax exports, 216;
thinks slave trade should not be sanctioned, 222;
moves prohibition of ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder, 227;
thinks government should have power to fulfil
engagements of old government, 229;
thinks national government should not control militia,
230;
thinks liberty will not be as safe in national as state
government, 232;
warns convention against depriving states of their
powers, 233;
thinks actual debts should be paid, 248;
seconds motion to remove judges on application of
legislature, 257;
moves to postpone question of ratification, 289;
thinks members of legislature should not hold other
offices, 295;
objects to appropriations for army for more than one
year, 305;
objects to power to buy forts, etc., 305;
moves to reconsider four articles, 306;
objects to powers given President, 307;
objects to less than majority electing President, 310;
suggests eventual election of President by six Senators
and seven Representatives, 310;
seconds motion to permit Senate to choose President
from three candidates, 311;
moves that electors be not office-holders, 312;
moves change of clause for re-electing President, 312;
moves that states vote for President in legislature with
at least three members, 325;
withdraws motion, 325;
objects to Vice-President being President of Senate,
326;
thinks President will not be responsible for his
appointments, 328;
thinks treaties of peace must be carefully guarded,
330;
thinks it dangerous to put too much power in Senate,
333;
moves two-thirds vote of Senate for treaties, 333;
seconds motion for majority for treaties of whole
number of Senators, 334;
proposes that notice of treaties to Senators be
required, 334;
moves no appointments be allowed except as
authorized by law, 335;
thinks impeachability of President should be
extended, 335;
moves legislature have sole right to create offices,
338;
moves reconsideration of provision for amendments,
339;
seconds motion for states' consent to amendments,
341;
moves sanction of old Congress to constitution be
asked, 342;
thinks ratification should be made difficult, 344, 346;
seconds a plan of ratification, 345;
favors two-thirds vote to override President's negative,
362;
urges clause requiring jury trials, 363;
moves bill of rights be prepared, 364;
moves that all proceedings of House be published,
370;
approves prohibition of ex post facto laws, 375;
moves liberty of press be guaranteed, 375;
seconds motion for annual publication of accounts,
376;
moves prohibition of violation of contracts, 377;
moves jury trial be preserved in civil cases, 384;
moves verbal amendment relative to admission of
states, 384;
moves convention be required to make amendments,
385;
favors a second constitutional convention, 388;
defends action in not signing constitution, 395;
refuses to sign, 398.
Gilman, Nicholas, N. H., attends convention, ii., 29;
Pierce's sketch of, 29, n.
Gorham, Nathaniel, Mass., attends convention, i., 5;
elected chairman of committee of the whole, 32;
favors national payment of Representatives, 210;
Pierce's sketch of, 210, n.;
opposed to ineligibility of Representatives to other
offices, 214;
favors compromise on representation, 232;
opposes readjustment of land cession, 233;
favors four years' term for Senators, 236;
moves six years' term and rotation for Senators, 237;
thinks small states equally interested with large states
in union, 262;
favors representation by population, 305;
on committee to arrange representation, 307;
defends report on representation, 319;
thinks standard of representation should be fixed, 334;
favors population as basis of representation, 339;
opposes defining legislature's powers, 366;
favors appointment of judges by Senate, 384;
favors appointment of judges by the people, 385;
favors appointment of judges by executive, 386;
moves appointment of judges by executive with
consent of Senate, 387;
favors institution of inferior judicial tribunals, 389;
favors power to suppress insurrections, 391;
opposes inclusion of judiciary in revisionary power,
ii., 18, 24;
thinks oath of allegiance no bar to amendments to
constitution, 30;
opposed to ratification of constitution by legislatures,
33;
favors two Senators from each state, 37;
on committee to report constitution, 48;
favors prohibition of national capital at state capital,
66;
thinks constitution should fix time of meeting of
legislature, 93;
favors voting by non-freeholders, 106;
thinks the new government will not last, 112;
thinks Senate should not originate money bills, 115;
thinks mode of electing Representatives should not be
left to state legislatures, 126;
thinks less than a majority may be a quorum of
legislature, 132;
thinks yeas and nays need not be required, 136;
thinks provision concerning citizenship need not be
retroactive, 146;
thinks Senate should be paid more than House, 170;
insists that money bills originate in House, 171;
urges necessity for action, 211;
opposes power to emit bills of credit, 181, 182;
moves appointment of treasurer by joint ballot of
legislature, 183;
favors national support of army, 194;
thinks adjustment of debts may be left to national
legislature, 210;
thinks union only of commercial advantage, 225;
suggests difficulties of ratifying treaties by legislature,
239;
thinks treaties should be negotiated in this country,
241;
doubts if judiciary can impartially decide
controversies between states, 242;
favors election of executive by joint ballot of
legislature, 242;
seconds motion to extend period of slave trade, 250;
thinks duty on slaves may discourage importation,
252;
thinks precaution against discrimination in ports of
entry unnecessary, 253;
on committee of August 25, 254;
thinks prohibition of paper money dangerous, 262;
favors article providing for validity of state acts, 267;
on committee on interstate acts, 268;
thinks New England's motive for union dependent on
commercial arrangements, 273;
favors convention for ratification, 287;
thinks vessels should not be obliged to enter and clear
in their own states, 291;
thinks members of legislature may be eligible to other
offices, 295;
thinks majority of Senate may elect President, 318;
thinks separate provision for treaties of peace
unnecessary, 330;
thinks treaties need not require two-thirds of Senate,
334;
opposes conditional ratification, 343;
thinks jury question need not be included, 363;
objects to state export duties, 365;
thinks legislature should choose treasurer, 371;
thinks provision as to jury trials unnecessary, 384;
urges additional representation, 392.
Grand committee.
See Committee, grand.
Grayson, William, to Madison, i., 5, n.;
to Monroe, 32, n.
H
Habeas corpus, necessity for preserving right of, debated,
ii., 261.
Hall, Levi, signs address from Rhode Island, i., 11, n.
Halsey, Thomas Lloyd, signs address from Rhode Island, i.,
11, n.
Hamilton, Alexander, N. Y., attends convention, i., 1;
nominates William Jackson for secretary of the
convention, 4;
Pierce's sketch of, 4, n.;
on committee on rules, 4;
moves representation by free inhabitants, 37;
favors absolute negative of executive on legislation,
70;
moves proportional voting in Senate, 121;
presents his plan of government, 152;
explains views on powers of the states, 185, 189;
opposes election of Representatives by state
legislatures, 205;
favors three years' term for Representatives, 209;
opposes fixing compensation for Representatives,
211;
opposes ineligibility of Representatives to other
offices, 215, 223;
favors centralized government, 241;
opposes prayers in convention, 260;
writes to Washington about public sentiment, 293, n.;
thinks citizenship and inhabitancy alone necessary for
Representatives, iv., 144;
thinks President may be elected by a plurality of
electors, 315;
appointed on committee on style and arrangement,
338;
favors increase in representation, 339;
favors easily made amendments, 340, 341;
thinks old Congress should sanction constitution, 342;
thinks constitution will be effective if ratified by nine
states, 343;
moves a plan for ratification, 344;
withdraws it, 346;
favors two-thirds vote to override President's negative,
361;
urges members to sign constitution, 394.
Hamilton plan, presented, i., 152;
provisions of, 162;
text of, 164, n.
House of Representatives.
See Legislature, national, House of Representatives.
Houston, William, Ga., attends convention, i., 49;
moves increase in representation of Georgia, 325;
opposes continuance of existing state constitutions,
391;
favors additional representation of electors for New
Hampshire and Georgia, ii., 10;
moves consideration of appointment of executive by
electors, 39;
Pierce's sketch of, 39, n.;
moves election of executive by national legislature,
40.
Houstoun, William Churchill, N.J., attends convention, i., 1.
I
Impeachment, of executive.
See Executive, national, impeachability of;
Legislature, national, Senate.
Of judiciary.
See Judiciary, national, impeachment of.
Of national officers, provision for, struck out, i., 389;
to be suspended during trial, ii., 270.
Trials of, debated, i., 384, 385, ii., 259, 260, 297,
338.
Imports, power of states to tax, debated, ii., 264, 330;
duties on, uniformity of, agreed to, 291, 372.
Indians, power to legislate for, proposed, ii., 226.
Ingersoll, Jared, Pa., attends convention, i., 5;
considers signing to be recommending constitution,
ii., 396;
Piezrce's sketch of, 396, n.
Insurrections, power to suppress.
See Republican government, guaranty of.
J
Jackson, William, nominated for secretary of convention, i.,
3;
elected, 4.
Jay, John, writes Washington against foreigners, ii., 48, n.
Jefferson, Thomas, Monroe to, ii., 56, n.;
Madison to, 126, n., 320, n.
Jenckes, John, signs address from Rhode Island, i., 2, n.
Jenifer, Daniel, of St. Thomas, Md., attends convention, i.,
55;
favors three years' term for Representatives, 124;
Pierce's sketch of, 124, n.;
favors ineligibility of Representatives to other offices,
223;
moves postponement of question of voting in Senate,
225;
favors requirement that vessels must enter and clear in
their own states, 295.
Jersey plan, the, submitted, i., 138;
text of, 139;
vote on, 185.
Jews, letter of, i., 323, n.
Johnson, William Samuel, Conn., attends convention, i., 55;
suggests compromise between Virginia and Jersey
plans, 200;
Pierce's sketch of, 200, n.;
favors elections to Senate by state legislatures, 234;
favors representation by states in Senate, 261;
favors inclusion of blacks in basis of representation,
342;
thinks treason should be defined, ii., 204;
thinks there can be no treason against a state, 205;
on committee on navigation acts, 225;
thinks prohibition of ex post facto laws unnecessary,
228;
thinks double control of treaties difficult, 239;
thinks judiciary will decide controversies between
states, 241;
thinks obligations of old government binding on new,
249;
suggests judiciary have power over equity cases, 256;
moves extension of judicial power to cases arising
under the constitution, 259;
thinks acts of one state valid in courts of another state,
267;
on committee on interstate acts, 268;
thinks states cannot be dismembered, 276;
moves admission of states hereafter formed, 278;
thinks legislature may declare effect of state acts in
states, 293;
appointed on committee on style and arrangement,
338;
submits report, 347;
favors provision for sumptuary legislation, 366;
on committee on sumptuary legislation, 366;
offers further report of committee on style and
arrangement, 368.
Jones, Joseph, writes to Madison, ii., 366, n.
Journal of legislature's proceedings.
See Legislature, national, journal of, House of
Representatives, Senate.
Journals of convention, disposition of, ii., 396, 397.
Judiciary, national, supreme, agreed to, i., 75;
consideration of, postponed, 130;
debated, 384.
Appointment to, debated, i., 76, 130, 136, 384, ii., 25;
by legislature, vote on, i., 78;
by Senate, agreed to, 132;
by executive, vote on, 386, ii., 29;
by executive with consent of Senate, debate on,
i., 385;
exclusion from, of those indebted to
government, ii., 61, 235.
Compensation of, fixed, agreed to, i., 375;
power to increase, vote on, 387;
debated, ii., 258.
Impeachment of, trial by Senate proposed, ii., 227.
Impeachment, power of, struck out, i., 388;
debated, ii., 260.
Inferior tribunals, debate on instituting, i., 81, 83, 84,
387, 388, ii., 184;
power of legislature to refer cases to, struck out,
260.
Jurisdiction of, debated, i., 129, 130, 136, 388, ii.,
227;
over controversies between states, debated, 241;
to cases in equity proposed, 256;
over controversies in which United States is a
party, debated, 259;
to cases arising under the constitution, debated,
259;
appellate, debated, 259, 260;
to be directed by legislature, proposed, 260;
extension of, to land grants proposed, 261;
to land claims, 281, 282;
to impeachment trials proposed, 335, 336.
Negative of, inclusion with executive proposed, i., 69,
75, 91, 93;
over state laws, debated, 374;
debated, ii., 174, 256.
Revisionary power of, debated, i., 69, ii., 17, 175.
State, power of, over national laws, debate on, 372;
will be bound by national laws, 374.
Tenure of, i., 76, 385, ii., 256.
Jury trial, right of, provided for, ii., 261;
in civil cases debated, 363;
motion to preserve, 367.
K
King, Rufus, Mass., attends convention, i., 1;
objects to report of committee on rules, 5;
Pierce's sketch of, 5, n.;
opposes representation by quotas of contributions, 36,
115;
notes of proceedings of convention, 39, n.;
opposes election of Senators by state legislatures, 44;
opposes inclusion of judiciary in council of revision,
69;
favors ratification of constitution by conventions, 81;
moves question of proportional representation, 115;
thinks Senate should have power to originate money
bills, 133;
opposes sovereignty of the states, 186, 285;
insists upon election of Representatives by the people,
206;
favors national compensation for Representatives,
211;
opposes ineligibility of Representatives to other
offices, 214, 219;
thinks New Hampshire deputies will attend, 272;
favors proportional representation in Senate, 281, 357;
thinks representation cannot be permanently fixed,
360;
on committee on question of representation, 307;
thinks slaves should count in representation, 322;
brings in report of committee on representation, 323;
thinks representation of the south too large, 323;
defends report on representation, 323;
opposes inclusion of three-fifths of blacks in
representation, 338;
opposes representation by population, 345;
opposes ineligibility of executive to re-election, ii., 5,
42;
opposes short term for executive, 9;
opposes impeachability of executive, 13, 15;
favors ratification of constitution by legislatures, 35;
moves voting in Senate per capita, 37;
favors election of executive by state legislatures, 42;
proposes term of twenty years for executive, 43;
opposes election of executive by electors chosen by
lot from legislature, 47;
opposes freehold qualification for electors, 61;
thinks legislature need not meet annually, 93;
thinks representation should exclude slaves, 110;
opposes leaving time and mode of election of
Representatives to state legislatures, 128;
thinks less than a majority should be a quorum of
legislature, 133;
thinks lowest number for a quorum may be fixed, 134,
135;
thinks legislature should not have power to change
place of meeting, 139;
thinks state debts should be assumed by nation, 192,
193;
thinks state lands ought to be given up, 193;
appointed on grand committee, 193;
thinks states may punish treason under a different
name, 205;
thinks national government should punish for treason,
206;
thinks treason against a state same as against nation,
207;
thinks slaves should be taxed, 223;
on committee on navigation acts, 225;
explains provisions as to militia, 230;
admits duty on slaves part of compromise agreement,
251;
moves to prohibit states from violating private
contracts, 263;
moves to prohibit states from taxing exports, 266;
thinks states should regulate their own manufactures,
265;
thinks all the states must ratify constitution, 285;
moves that only states ratifying be operated on by
constitution, 285;
thinks constitution must be ratified by conventions,
286;
thinks state constitution no bar to ratification, 287;
on committee of August 31, 292;
moves ineligibility of members of legislature to
offices created during their term, 295, 296;
moves to obtain consent of state legislatures to
purchases of lands for national purposes, 306;
thinks eventual election of President will be with
Senate, 311;
moves that electors be not office-holders, 312;
favors change of clause relative to re-election of
President, 313;
moves increase of number necessary to elect
President, 319;
thinks Senate may share in appointments, 328;
objects to participation of two-thirds of Senate in
treaties, 329;
opposes special provision for treaties of peace, 332;
moves special provision for treaties affecting national
rights, 332;
thinks old Congress should consider constitution, 336;
on committee of style and arrangement, 338;
thinks old Congress need not sanction constitution,
345;
thinks President ought not to be suspended if
impeached, 370;
thinks legislature should choose treasurer, 371;
thinks power to grant charters unnecessary, 373;
thinks publication of public expenditures impossible,
376;
opposes change in representation, 378;
thinks executive may pardon for treason, 382;
thinks guaranty of jury trials not necessary, 384;
urges additional representation, 392;
proposes journals of convention be disposed of, 396.
Knox, General Henry, writes to Washington on prospects of
convention, ii., 158, n.
L
Land cession, question of, i., 232.
Lands, public.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Langdon, John, N. H., attends convention, ii., 29;
opposes disqualification from legislature of persons
having unsettled accounts, 64;
Pierce's sketch of, 64, n.;
opposes prohibition against placing national capital at
state capital, 66;
favors national compensation of legislature, 167;
opposes power to emit bills of credit, 183;
favors suppression of rebellion without state's consent,
187;
appointed on grand committee, 193;
thinks Representatives must be trusted, 195;
thinks national control of militia necessary, 196;
opposes taxation by congressional representation, 208;
asks only fair representation for New Hampshire, 212;
objects to state power to tax exports, 213, 214;
opposes leaving slave trade to states, 223;
moves to commit question of navigation acts, 225;
on committee on navigation acts, 225;
thinks state and national governments need not be
jealous, 231;
favors national power of negative on state laws, 237;
thinks executive should be elected by joint ballot of
legislature, 243;
thinks creditors of government should not be
disturbed, 248;
admits duty on slaves is part of compromise
agreement, 251;
on committee of August 25, 254;
doubts if new states should be admitted on an equality
with old, 275;
thinks new states may be created, 276;
thinks Vermont should be brought into the Union,
276;
thinks vessels should not be made to enter and clear in
their state, 291;
objects to export duties by states, 365;
moves increase in representation of North Carolina
and Rhode Island, 378;
thinks commercial regulations should be national,
381.
Lansing, John, N. Y., attends convention, i., 55;
Pierce's sketch of, 138, n.;
supports Jersey plan, 143;
opposes Virginia plan, 194;
opposes legislature of two branches, 190;
favors voting in House by states, 252;
leaves convention, 298, n.
Legislature, national,
acts of, may originate in both houses, i., 248, ii., 170;
enacting style, 170.
Compensation of members, considered, i., 125, 209,
244, 245;
to be fixed, 126;
and eligibility to re-election, debated, 130;
to be ascertained by members, 212;
by state legislatures, 213;
vote on, 217;
agreed to, 336;
debated, ii., 166, 169.
Constitution of, considered, ii., 8;
agreed to, 96.
Disqualification of debtors from, debated, ii., 63, 65,
66;
of pensioners from, 65;
of persons having unsettled accounts with, 65;
of members from other offices, 158, 294, 297,
371.
Elections to, by popular vote, debated, i., 53;
mode of, debated, 81, 134;
eligibility to re-election, debated, 127;
eligibility of state officers to, 127.
Expulsion from, debated, ii., 135, 136.
Journal of proceedings, debate on, ii., 136, 137, 370.
Money bills in, originating of, debated, i., 309, 312,
ii., 149, 153, 157, 210, 212.
Negative of, on state laws, considered, i., 47, 101,
107, 372, 374;
on acts of executive, vote on, ii., 95;
debated, 361;
verbal amendment offered, 367.
Place of meeting, debated, ii., 139.
Power of, debated, i., 45, 135, 366, ii., 177;
coercion on delinquent states, i., 47;
to legislate where states not competent, i., 47,
371, 372;
over state police, 370, 371;
over state judiciary, 374, 375;
members of, in debate, ii., 135;
expulsion of members of, ii., 135;
to compel attendance of members, ii., 135;
to judge of elections of members, ii., 135;
to adjourn, 138;
limits of, debated, 172, 173;
to regulate captures, debated, 184;
over Indians, debated, 226;
over general welfare, proposed, 226;
to pass ex post factolaws and bills of attainder,
prohibited, 227, 375;
to fulfil engagements of old Congress, debated,
229, 237;
over militia, debated, 230, 235;
to enforce treaties, debated, 235;
negative on state laws, debated, 236;
to pass tax laws, debated, 241, 371;
to pay public debts, debated, 247, 297;
to regulate ports of entry, 252;
to refer appointments to state legislatures, 254;
to pay debts with anything but coin, debated,
262;
report of committee of eleven taken up, 269;
over public lands, proposed, 280, 282;
to make national bankruptcy law, debated, 293;
to judge privileges of members, 304;
to grant letters of marque and reprisal, 304;
to govern seat of government, 305;
to grant copyrights, 305;
to create offices, proposed, 338;
to appoint treasurer, debated, 371;
to punish piracies, etc., debated, 372;
to make canals, proposed, 373;
to grant charters, proposed, 373;
to establish a university, proposed, 374;
to be limited in providing for standing army,
375.
Property qualifications for members of, debated, ii.,
59, 63, 128, 132, 147.
Qualifications for members of, debated, i., 42,
ii., 131.
Quorum in, debated, ii., 132, 135, 177.
Representation in, debated, i., 36, 109, 114, 120, 134,
232, 302, 327, 331, 338, 341, 342, ii., 110, 114;
compromise proposed, i., 114;
enumeration of blacks and whites, debated, 258,
338, 340, 344, 346, 347, 350;
question postponed, 318;
referred to committee, 322;
report of committee, 322;
motion to increase, debated, 325;
census for, debated, 328, 338, 340, 341;
taxation as basis of, debated, 342, 347, 348, 371;
moved that, of large states be limited, 378;
increase of, debated, ii., 318, 323, 393.
Rules to be regulated by each house, ii., 170.
Term of members of, debated, i., 126.
Time of meeting, debated, ii., 93, 94, 95.
Two branches of, agreed to, i., 39, 134;
debate on, 190, 199, 204.
House of Representatives,
mode of election to, debated, i., 39, 40, 42, 84,
91, 204, 224;
classification of states to determine
representation in, proposed, 106;
term of members, debated, 124, 126;
age for members, debated, 125, 213, 214;
elections to, by state legislatures, proposed, 206,
247;
three years' term in, proposed, 207, 209;
eligibility of members to other offices debated,
214, 217, 218, 223, 224, ii., 292;
committee report on representation in, i., 318,
319;
constitution of, debated, ii., 96, 301;
who may vote for members of, debated, 106;
seven years' citizenship for members of,
proposed, 107, 131, 132;
qualifications for members of, debated, 107;
clause relative to, agreed to, 110;
money bills to originate in, debate on, 115, 305,
337;
power of impeachment of, agreed to, 116;
time and mode of election to, debate on, 126,
128;
power of, over elections in states, debated, 128;
citizenship and residence for members, debated,
144, 145;
four years' citizenship for members of, proposed,
145;
nine years' citizenship for members of, proposed,
145;
citizenship requirements not to apply to those
already citizens, 145, 148;
five years' citizenship for members of, proposed,
148;
clause for citizenship and age of members
agreed to, 148;
representation by direct taxation, debate on, 151;
power to make bankruptcy laws, proposed, 292;
power of, to make treaties, proposed, 327;
increase in representation in, proposed, 339;
moved to strike out apportionment by "direct
taxes," 367;
proposed that all journals of, be printed, 371.
Senate
mode of election to, debated, i., 43, 233, ii., 116;
to be a check on democracy, i., 44;
election to, by state legislatures, debated, i., 44,
94, 101, 236;
elections to, by the people, debated, 100;
mode of voting in, debated, 121, 234, 248, 309,
313, 347;
age for members of, debated, 127, 236;
term of members of, debated, 128, 130, 236,
237, 243;
compensation of members of, debated, 130, 244,
246, 247;
originating money bills in, debated, 132, 134,
355;
representation in, debated, 235, 236, 356, 364,
367, 368, 369, ii., 37, 304;
property qualification for members of, debated,
i., 246;
eligibility of members of, to state offices,
considered, 246;
eligibility of members of, to any offices,
considered, 297;
voting in, by states, debated, 314;
citizenship for members of, debated, ii., 124,
125;
age and citizenship for members of, debated,
126, 148;
moved that members of, be permitted to enter
dissent to measures, 136;
moved that journal of, be published, 136;
choosing officers of, agreed to, 180;
power of appointment by, 235, 238;
treaty-making power of, debated, 238, 240;
power of, to appoint ambassadors, etc.,
considered, 240;
power of, in controversies between states,
considered, 241;
power to try impeachments, proposed, 298;
power of, objected to, 315;
to vote on President, 318;
power of, in treaty making, debated, 327, 329;
in appointments, 328;
quorum of, debated, 335;
power of, in impeachment of President, debated,
335, 336;
power of, to amend money bills, 337;
to be under oath in impeachment trials, 338.
Letters of marque, power to issue, debated, ii., 191.
Liberty of the press, guaranty of, proposed, ii., 375.
Livingston, William, N. J., attends convention, i., 96;
appointed on grand committee, ii., 193;
Pierce's sketch of, 209, n.;
delivers report on state debts and militia, 209;
on committee on navigation acts, 225;
submits report on slave importation and navigation
acts, 240;
on committee on sumptuary legislation, 366.
M
Madison, James, Va., attends convention, i., 2;
moves question of representation in legislature, 36;
Pierce's sketch of, 36, n.;
favors proportional representation, 36, 38, 253;
favors election to House by popular vote, 41, 86;
opposes district elections to Senate, 44;
opposes defining powers of national legislature, 47;
opposes use of force against recalcitrant states, 47;
moves consideration of powers of executive, 52;
opposes removability of executive on motion of state
legislatures, 63;
favors qualified negative of executive on legislation,
71;
favors inclusion of judiciary with executive in
negative on legislation, 75, 91;
opposes appointment
of judges by legislature, 77, 131;
favors ratification of constitution by popular vote, 80,
ii., 36;
favors creation of inferior judicial tribunals, i., 83;
opposes elections to Senate by state legislatures, 99;
favors a small Senate elected by the people, 96;
favors negative by national legislature of state laws,
102, 106, 373;
favors three years' term for Representatives, 124;
favors national compensation of members of national
legislature, 125, 212;
favors seven years' term for Senators, 128;
moves to define jurisdiction of judiciary, 130;
thinks Senate should have power to originate money
bills, 133;
opposes Jersey plan, 167;
thinks national government in danger from state
governments, 202;
opposes annual elections of Representatives, 208;
favors compensation of Representatives by fixed
standard, 211;
favors ineligibility of Representatives to other offices,
218;
favors partial ineligibility of Representatives to other
offices, 221;
moves debate on mode of voting in Senate, 235;
sets forth objects of Senate, 238;
opposes compensation of Senators by state
legislatures, 345;
opposes equal state representation, 264, 276, 357,
363;
would preserve state rights, 282;
opposes compromise committee on representation in
Senate, 292, 296;
thinks question of representation vital, 315;
suggests representation by free population in House
and by free and slaves in Senate, 321;
moves increase in representation of all states, 325;
thinks basis of representation should be fixed, 335;
favors census at least every fifteen years, 340;
favors adjustment of taxation to representation, 348;
favors independence of executive, 380;
thinks tendency is to give executive too little power,
382;
favors appointment of judges by executive and one-
third of Senate, 385;
moves appointment of judges by executive and two-
thirds of Senate, 387;
objects to power to increase judges' salaries, 388;
favors continuance of old Congress to prevent
interregnum, 390;
favors national guaranty against domestic violence,
391;
favors election of executive by the people, ii., 6;
favors varying ratio for electors to choose executive,
10;
favors impeachability of executive, 12;
seconds motion to include judiciary in revisionary
power, 18, 22;
moves appointment of judges by executive and
Senate, 26;
is willing to allow a majority of Senate to reject
appointment of judges, 28;
speaks on mode of election of executive, 49;
thinks each voter may vote for two persons for
executive, 54;
thinks persons indebted to government should be
excluded from legislature, 60;
moves that property qualification be not confined to
landed property, 62;
opposes mutual negative of each branch of legislature
over acts of the other, 92;
suggests that time of meeting of legislature be not
fixed in constitution, 92, 93;
favors fixing time of meeting of legislature
provisionally, 94;
favors changing time of meeting of legislature from
December to May, 95;
favors power of suffrage by freeholders, 99;
views on suffrage, 100, n.;
favors requiring Representatives to be inhabitants of
their states, 107;
opposes proposition that Representatives be required
to reside seven years in their states, 108;
objects to fixed ratio of Representatives to inhabitants,
111;
moves representation of not more than 1 to 40,000
inhabitants, 136;
opposed to originating money bills in House, 116;
moves that vacancies in Senate must happen by
refusals, resignations, etc., 117;
thinks provision as to money bills valueless to large
states, 118;
opposes fourteen years' citizenship as necessary for
Senators, 121;
opposes leaving time and mode of electing
Representatives wholly to state legislatures,
126;
writes to Jefferson on progress of the convention, 126,
n.;
thinks property qualification for members of
government should be fixed in constitution, 130,
131;
moves that expulsion from legislature be by two-
thirds vote, 135;
moves legislature have power to compel attendance,
135;
moves that Senate shall publish its legislative journal,
137;
insists upon central location for capital, 139;
thinks legislature should not have power to change
place of meeting, 138;
writes to his father, 142, n.;
thinks citizenship and inhabitancy alone necessary for
Representatives, 144;
thinks government responsible for what states have
done, 146;
thinks Senate may decrease money bills, 152;
thinks constitution should regulate compensation of
legislature, 167;
moves that laws be revised by executive and judiciary,
172;
thinks power to tax exports desirable, 176;
opposes power to emit bills of credit, 181;
thinks punishment of piracies, etc., ought not to be
fixed by legislature, 184;
moves that legislature define piracies, etc., 185;
moves that rebellion to be suppressed be against
government, 187;
moves to give legislature power to declare war, 188;
submits power over public lands, Indians, seat of
government, charters, copyrights, university,
forts, 189;
favors national control of militia, 197;
moves power to create offices in legislature, 203;
thinks treason should be broadly defined, 203, 204;
thinks treason may be against nation and a state, 205;
thinks treason should not be twice punishable, 207;
thinks present representation temporary, 211;
favors power to tax exports, 215;
favors taxation of exports by two-thirds legislature,
217;
on committee on navigation acts, 226;
thinks new government should have power to fulfil
engagements of old government, 229;
explains provisions as to militia, 230;
favors national control of militia, 232;
proposes states appoint militia officers under rank of
general, 233;
thinks disunion the greatest danger, 234;
moves to commit question of negative of state laws,
236;
moves to include President in treaty-making power,
238;
suggests inconvenience of legal ratification of treaties,
238;
suggests varying participation of legislature in
different treaties, 240;
thinks larger states should have larger vote in election
of executive, 244;
moves extension of appointing power of executive,
246;
opposes slave-trade extension, 250;
opposes admitting property in men in constitution,
252;
moves that treaties be supreme law, 252;
thinks president of Senate should not be in executive
succession, 256;
moves amendment to oath of executive, 256;
favors fixed salaries for judges, 258;
proposes salaries of judges be not changed for three
years, 258;
moves judiciary have jurisdiction over cases in which
U. S. is a party, 259;
thinks judicial power should not extend to all cases
under constitution, 259;
moves verbal change in judiciary clause, 260;
thinks states should not have power to interfere in
private contracts, 263;
thinks retrospective laws are prohibited, 263;
moves states be forbidden to pass embargoes, 264;
moves to forbid states to lay imposts, 264, 265;
objects to imposts by states, 266;
favors committing clause on state acts, 267;
thinks commercial regulations not injurious to south,
272;
thinks western states entitled to an equality with
others, 274;
opposes guaranty of public lands, 281;
thinks constitution may go into operation without a
majority in favor, 284;
moves ratification by seven states and thirty-three
Representatives, 285;
thinks ratification conventions necessary, 286;
thinks it inconvenient if vessels must enter and clear
at their own ports, 291;
on committee of August 31, 292;
offers amendment strengthening interstate validity of
state acts, 293;
fears election of President will be thrown on Senate,
300;
doubts if legislature should judge of privileges of its
members, 304;
thinks legislature should not participate in electing
President, 309;
proposes that election of President may be by one-
third of whole number of electors, 310;
moves that electors not voting be not counted, 311;
moves that two-thirds Senate be present when voting
for President, 318;
shows President may be elected by two states, 319;
moves that election of President by legislature when
Vice-president also dies be temporary, 323;
seconds motion that no state vote for President in
legislature by less than three Representatives,
325;
thinks some cure required to prevent minority in
legislature electing President, 325;
proposes treaties of peace be by majority of Senate,
330;
proposes two-thirds Senate make treaties of peace
without President, 330;
favors executive council, 332;
thinks treaties have been too easily made in past, 334;
moves quorum of Senate be two-thirds, 406;
thinks impeachment of President should not be on
vague grounds, 335;
moves supreme court try President, 335;
seconds motion to increase representation, 339;
thinks clause relative to amendments should be
reconsidered, 340, 341;
favors three-quarter vote to override President's
negative, 363;
favors state export duties, 365;
thinks supreme court can negative state laws, 365;
moves verbal amendment to clause relative to
negative of bills, 368;
moves words "by lot" be struck out for classifying
Senators, 369;
thinks President ought not to be suspended when
impeached, 370;
favors national charters where states are incompetent,
372;
moves power to establish university, 374;
favors limiting standing army, 374;
moves public accounts be published from time to
time, 376;
writes to J. Q. Adams, 378, n.;
favors national control of commercial regulations,
380;
thinks Senate may participate in pardons for treason,
382;
thinks superior officers may make appointments, 383;
thinks legislature may propose amendments, 385;
opposes special provisos in constitution, 386.
Madison, Rev. James, of William and Mary, writes to James
Madison on prospects of convention, ii., 75, n.
Manufactures, encouragement of, by imposts, debate on. ii.,
264, 265;
regulation of, debated, 265.
Marque and reprisal, letters of, power to grant, proposed,
iv., 366.
Martin, Alexander, N. C., attends convention, i., 2;
insists upon equal power of states, 188;
favors elections of Representatives regulated by state
legislatures, 204;
favors ineligibility of Representatives to other offices,
218;
Pierce's sketch of, 218, n.;
on compromise committee on representation, 292;
moves increase in representation of North Carolina,
325;
opposes fixing national capital at same place with a
state capital, ii., 66;
seconds motion for commercial regulations, 269.
Martin, Luther, Md., attends convention, i., 107;
opposes oath from state officers to national
government, 123;
Pierce's sketch of, 189;
opposes legislature of two branches, 195;
wishes to preserve state governments, 248, 250;
insists on state sovereignty, 268, 287;
favors two confederacies if states cannot have equal
vote in Senate, 356;
opposes national negative on state laws, 373;
moves that national laws be binding on state judiciary,
374;
favors election of executive by electors chosen by
state legislatures, 378;
moves to consider question of re-eligibility of
executive, 383;
favors appointment of judges by Senate, 384;
opposes creation of inferior judicial tribunals, 384;
opposes power in national government to suppress
rebellion in states, 391;
moves ineligibility of executive to re-election, 8, 42;
opposes inclusion of judiciary in revisionary power,
21;
opposes voting in Senate per capita, 38;
favors disqualification from legislature of debtors to
government, 64;
moves eleven years' term for executive, 43;
favors state compensation of Senate, 169;
asks definition of "duties" and "imposts," 176;
opposes power to subdue rebellion in a state without
its consent, 186;
favors provision against large army in time of peace,
195;
moves treason be punishable on confession, 208;
proposes direct taxation by quotas from states, 212;
moves that states be permitted to tax migration of
slaves, 218;
on committee on navigation acts, 225;
favors state control of militia, 232;
moves clause to prevent discrimination in ports of
entry, 252;
moves to restrict executive power of pardoning, 255;
withdraws motion, 255;
opposes requiring large states to consent to forming
new states, 275;
opposes admission of new states by two-thirds vote,
275;
favors committing motion to require consent of states
to dismemberment, 277;
thinks new states should be formed without consent of
old states, 279;
moves that land claims be examined by supreme
court, 282;
moves guaranty of domestic tranquillity on state
executive's application, 283;
insists upon ratification by state legislatures, 289;
thinks the people will not vote for constitution, 289.
Mason, George, Va., attends convention, i., 2;
objects to report of committee on rules, 6;
Pierce's sketch of, 6, n.;
thinks government should operate on individuals, 34;
favors seven years' term for executive, 54;
favors election of executive by the people, 55;
opposes subordinating executive to legislature, 63;
opposes single executive, 72;
favors election of Representatives by the people, 86,
205;
favors separation of purse from sword, 93;
favors election of Senators by state legislatures, 100;
favors provision for amendments to constitution, 122;
favors national compensation of Representatives, 126;
favors two branches of legislature, 192;
favors biennial elections of Representatives, 208;
moves that Representatives be at least twenty-five
years of age, 213;
favors ineligibility of Representatives to other offices,
215, 222;
opposes ineligibility of Representatives to other
offices, 218;
favors representation in Senate by states, 235;
favors property qualification for Senate, 246;
on compromise committee on representation, 292;
supports report of compromise committee on
representation, 302;
moves to refer question of voting in Senate to
committee, 308;
thinks money bills should originate in House, 309, ii.,
115, 118;
favors an increase in representation, i., 326;
favors representation based on population, 329;
thinks slaves should have proportion in representation,
332;
thinks legislature ought not to fix representation, 334;
thinks constitution ought to fix representation, 338;
thinks taxation should be according to representation,
344;
opposed to direct taxation proportioned to number of
Representatives, 349;
opposes election of executive by the people, 377;
opposes election of executive to serve during good
behavior, 381;
opposes appointment of judges by executive, 384, ii.,
28;
favors institution of inferior judicial tribunals, i., 389;
favors guaranty of republican government to the
states, 391;
favors impeachability of executive, ii., 11;
favors inclusion of judiciary in revisionary power, 19,
23;
thinks constitution should be ratified by the people,
31;
opposes three Senators from each State, 38;
favors election by legislature of executive for not
more than six years in twelve, 52;
moves seven years' term and ineligibility for
executive, 59;
proposes property qualification for legislature, 59;
moves to exclude from legislature debtors to United
States, 59;
moves that national capital be not at a state capital,
66;
withdraws the motion, 67;
doubts propriety of mutual negative of each branch of
legislature on the other, 91, 92;
thinks time of meeting of legislature should not be
fixed by constitution, 94;
thinks suffrage question should be left to the states,
97;
favors free general suffrage, 98;
thinks seven years' citizenship should be required of
Representatives, 107;
moves that Representatives be required to be
inhabitants of their states for one year, 109;
favors postponing question of voting in Senate, 118;
favors postponing question of originating money bills,
120;
thinks aliens should not be in legislature, 121;
thinks quorum in legislature should be a majority,
133;
approves expulsion from legislature by two-thirds
vote, 135;
thinks yeas and nays should be required, 136;
thinks publication of journal of legislature necessary,
138;
thinks government not bound by state laws on
naturalization, 149;
thinks first money bills should originate in House,
149;
moves to allow members of legislature to hold any
office, 159;
thinks Representatives should be independent of state
legislatures, 168;
thinks revenue bills should originate in House, 170;
thinks Senate may alienate territory, 171;
moves that no tax be laid on exports, 179;
favors power to emit bills of credit, 181, 183;
favors appointment of treasurer by legislature, 184;
thinks punishment may be fixed in cases of piracy,
etc., 184;
opposes giving power of war to executive, 188;
thinks general government should regulate militia,
190;
thinks funds may be diverted in time of war, 191;
appointed on grand committee, 193;
favors partial national control of militia, 195, 196;
favors power to make sumptuary laws, 202;
thinks treason may be against a state, 205;
thinks treason should be defined, 208;
calls up amendment as to money bills, 211;
thinks states should retain power over exports, 216;
denounces slavery and slave trade, 219;
asks how legislature can negative state laws, 231;
objects to compelling settlement of old debts, 347;
opposes naming slave-importing states, 250;
thinks tax on importation of men necessary, 252;
on committee of August 25, 254;
moves amendment to executive's oath, 256;
thinks judges' salaries should be fixed, 258;
thinks states may interfere in private contracts, 263;
thinks states may lay embargoes, 264;
thinks states may wish to encourage industries by
imposts, 265;
thinks two-thirds vote necessary for commercial
regulations, 271;
thinks western people should be treated with equality,
274;
thinks nine states may ratify constitution, 288;
declares he will not sign constitution, 289;
approves amendment relative to interstate validity of
state acts, 293;
thinks members of legislature should not hold other
offices, 296;
thinks President will usually be chosen by Senate,
301;
thinks election of President by electors objectionable,
308;
thinks President may be elected by minority, 309;
moves that Senate choose President from three highest
candidates, 311;
thinks system of electors autocratic, 312;
prefers eventual election of President by House of
Representatives, 318;
approves increasing number for quorum to elect
President, 319;
thinks Vice-President will encroach on Senate's rights,
326;
favors an executive council, 331;
moves to extend reasons for impeaching President,
335;
moves to postpone motion for second convention,
347;
thinks two-thirds vote may override President's
negative, 362;
thinks bill of rights necessary, 364;
moves states may levy export duties, 364;
moves clause for sumptuary laws, 366;
on committee on sumptuary legislation, 366;
favors state tax on exports, 367;
moves publication of all proceedings of House, 370;
favors power to cut canals, 373;
opposed to standing armies, 374;
moves to strike out prohibition of ex post facto laws,
375;
moves verbal amendment to capitation tax clause,
375;
moves annual publication of expenditures, 376;
thinks states may lay tonnage dues, 380;
thinks President should not have power to pardon for
treason, 382;
thinks legislature should have pardoning power for
treason, 382;
disapproves provision for amendments, 385;
objects to navigation acts by majority, 387;
announces he cannot sign constitution, 387;
refuses to sign, 398.
McClurg, James, Va., attends convention, i., 2;
moves that term of executive be for good behavior,
379;
insists upon necessity for independence of executive,
382;
Pierce's sketch of, ii., 16, n.;
suggests ascertaining how executive is to act, 16;
writes to Madison, 75, n., 91, n., 236, n., 340. n.
McHenry, James, Md., attends convention, i., 5;
Pierce's sketch of, ii., 167, n.;
appointed on grand committee, 193;
thinks direct taxation should be by quotas from states,
213;
thinks embargo power embraced in war power, 215;
moves prohibition of ex post facto laws or bills of
attainder, 227;
proposes plan for choosing ports of entry, 253;
moves judges receive fixed salaries, 258;
thinks Maryland must ratify according to her law, 287;
thinks vessels will take officers as security of entry
dues, 291;
moves President have power to convene either house
of legislature, 338;
moves states may lay tonnage dues, 380.
Mercer, John Francis, Md., attends convention, ii., 75;
opposes election of Representatives by the people,
105;
opposes whole plan of constitution, 106;
thinks the people ought to be guided in their voting,
107;
suggests that candidates for Representatives be
nominated by state legislatures, 107;
opposes requirement of seven years' residence of
Representatives in their states, 108, 109;
thinks Senate should have power to originate money
bills, 115;
thinks less than a majority should be quorum of
legislature, 132;
seconds motion to fix quorum at few, 134;
thinks Senate should have only legislative power, 137;
thinks two houses will not agree on place of meeting,
140;
thinks provisions as to citizenship should not apply to
those now citizens, 145;
thinks government bound by state laws on
naturalization, 148;
thinks aristocracies will arise, 160;
fears good men will not serve in legislature, 165;
thinks Senate ought not to make treaties, 171;
thinks judiciary should not be included in revisionary
power, 172;
opposes taxing exports, 182;
declares himself friendly to paper money, 182;
favors appointment of treasurer by executive, 184;
favors defining of piracies, felonies, etc., 185;
opposes power to subdue rebellion without request of
state legislature, 186.
Mifflin, Thomas, Pa., attends convention, i., 5;
seconds motion that acceptance of other office shall
vacate seat in legislature, ii., 159;
Pierce's sketch of, 159, n.
Militia, power of regulating, debated, ii., 191, 195;
report on, command of, debated, 255.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Money bills, originating of.
See Legislature, national, money bills, House of
Representatives, Senate.
Monroe, James, to Jefferson, on prospects of the
convention, ii., 56. n.
Morris, Gouverneur, Pa., attends convention, i., 1;
offers address from citizens of Rhode Island, 8;
Pierce's sketch of, 8, n.;
objects to committee on minutes, 13;
moves question of federal or national government, 32;
explains difference between federal and national
government, 34;
favors compromise committee on question of
representation, 287;
favors election of Senators for life, 287;
opposes report of compromise committee on
representation, 298;
thinks representation should be according to wealth,
303, 319;
thinks representation should not be definitely fixed,
304, 334;
on committee on representation question, 307;
favors originating money bills in both houses, 309,
310;
opposes equal representation of small states, 316;
submits report on representation in House, 318;
favors referring question of representation to
committee, 320;
moves consideration of question of fixing
representation, 320;
favors property and population as basis of
representation, 324;
thinks southern states sufficiently represented, 324;
objects to requiring legislature to take census, 328;
fears preponderance of western states, 328;
opposes inclusion of slaves in basis of representation,
332, 340, 350;
moves that taxation be according to representation,
341, 342, 348;
thinks legislature should adjust basis of
representation, 343;
moves reconsideration of question of representation in
Senate, 370;
opposes taxation by quotas, 371;
opposes forbidding national government to interfere
with state police, 371;
favors power in legislature where harmony would be
disturbed by state legislation, 372;
opposes negative of state laws by legislature, 372,
374;
thinks judiciary will have power to set aside laws,
374;
favors election of executive by the people, 375, 376;
opposes ineligibility of executive, 379;
favors election of executive during good behavior,
379;
disclaims friendliness to monarchy, 382;
favors appointment of judges by executive, 384;
thinks impeachment trials should not be before the
judges, 385;
favors appointment of judges by executive with
consent of Senate, 387;
favors power to increase judges' salaries, 387, 389;
favors institution of inferior judicial tribunals, 389;
opposes continuance of old Congress, 390;
opposes guaranteeing existing laws to the states, 390;
favors a vigorous executive, ii., 1;
favors re-eligibility of executive, 3, 58;
favors short term for executive, 9;
thinks executive ought not to be impeachable, 11;
admits executive ought to be impeachable in some
cases, 12, 15;
moves that electors for executive be not officials, 15;
thinks revisionary power requires more than the
executive, 20;
thinks judiciary and executive may exercise
revisionary power jointly, 24;
favors appointment of judges by executive, 27;
favors ratification of constitution by the people, 35;
moves that voting in Senate be per capita, 37;
moves ratification of constitution by a general
convention, 37;
moves that there be three Senators from each state, 37;
opposes election of executive by members of national
legislature chosen by lot, 44;
opposes election of executive by national legislature,
45;
opposes apportionment of direct taxation by
representation, 47;
favors election of executive by the people, 53;
thinks each voter for executive may vote for two
persons, 54;
opposes property qualification for members of
legislature, 60;
thinks debtors of government need not be excluded
from legislature, 60, 65;
seconds motion to strike out "landed" property as
requirement in executive, 63;
opposes prohibiting national capital at state capital,
66;
moves to restrict mutual negative of each branch of
legislature on the other to legislative acts, 91;
thinks treaties are not laws, 92;
moves to strike out provision for time of meeting of
legislature, 93;
moves to change time of meeting of legislature from
December to May, 94;
favors absolute negative in executive on legislature,
95;
moves restriction of suffrage to freeholders, 96;
thinks suffrage should be fixed by legislature, 96;
thinks general suffrage will produce aristocracy, 98;
favors seven years' citizenship for representatives,
127;
opposes requirement that Representatives
be residents of their states, 108;
moves that representation be by free population, 112;
opposes slavery and the slave trade, 112;
thinks Senate should have right to originate money
bills, 115, 152;
agrees that vacancies in Senate must be by refusals,
resignations, etc., 117;
favors equal vote in Senate, 119;
moves fourteen years' citizenship for Senators, 120;
opposes admission of aliens into government, 123;
moves that state legislatures fix time and mode of
electing Representatives, 126;
opposes leaving time and mode of electing
Representatives exclusively to state legislatures,
128;
moves to strike out property qualification, 131;
moves to fix quorum at few, 133;
thinks any member may call for yeas and nays, 135;
thinks majority may expel from legislature, 135;
thinks citizenship requirements ought not to apply to
those already citizens, 145, 147;
thinks members of legislature may hold some other
offices, 162, 166;
thinks members of legislature may serve in army and
navy, 166;
favors national compensation of legislature, 167;
thinks revenue bills need not be confined to House,
171;
thinks some check on legislative acts necessary, 173;
moves that executive power of negative extend to
resolutions, 176;
thinks exports may be taxed, 178, 179;
opposes power to emit bills of credit, 181;
thinks legislature should punish counterfeiting, 184;
moves that legislature punish piracies, etc., 185;
thinks legislature should designate piracies, etc., 186;
thinks legislature should have power to subdue
rebellions, 186;
opposes inclusion of executive in power to subdue
rebellions in states, 186;
thinks power to subdue rebellions necessary, 187;
submits propositions for committee of the whole, 200;
opposes power to make sumptuary laws, 202;
thinks treason should be defined, 203, 204;
moves British statute for treason, 205;
thinks treason should not be twice punishable, 207;
thinks debts should be adjusted with taxation, 210;
favors power to tax exports, 214;
moves slave-trade question be committed, 224;
thinks prohibition of ex post facto laws unnecessary,
227;
favors prohibiting bills of attainder, 227;
moves new government discharge engagements of old
government, 229;
moves that Senate shall not have power of
appointment, 235;
moves that power to enforce treaties be not specified,
285;
moves clause giving power over militia, 235;
thinks national appointment of state executives should
be committed, 237;
doubts if treaties should be referred to Senate, 238;
suggests that treaties will be negotiated in this
country, 239;
opposes election of executive by legislature, 244;
moves election of executive by electors, 245;
moves executive be required to make
recommendations to legislature, 246;
objects to state power to appoint federal officers, 247;
thinks debts of old government should be paid by new
government, 249;
moves that slave-importing states be named, 250;
withdraws motion, 251;
thinks freemen may be taxed, 252;
seconds motion to make treaties supreme law, 252;
moves that executive have power to correspond with
states, 254;
moves chief justice succeed as executive, 255;
objects to removability of judges upon legislature's
application, 257;
moves judicial power extend to cases in which U. S. is
party, 259;
asks what is appellate power of judiciary, 259;
moves verbal change in judiciary clause, 259;
opposes power to suspend habeas corpus except in
emergency, 261;
opposed to forbidding states to interfere in private
contracts, 263;
thinks prohibiting embargoes by states unnecessary,
264;
thinks states should not tax exports, 266;
favors commercial regulations, 270;
moves interstate validity of acts of states, 268;
opposes admission of western states on an equality,
275;
does not wish power to pass to western states, 275;
proposes method of admitting new states, 275;
opposes admission of new states by two-thirds vote,
275;
thinks states must consent to division, 277;
thinks question of new states is one of jurisdiction
rather than limits, 279;
moves that legislature control public lands, 282;
thinks supreme court has jurisdiction in land cases,
282;
thinks legislatures may call convention to amend
constitution, 283;
approves motion prohibiting religious test for office,
283;
thinks contiguous states must ratify, 284;
thinks states may choose method of ratification, 286;
moves Congress be not required to approve
constitution, 288;
favors a second convention, 351;
on committee of August 31, 292;
moves amendment on the subject of interstate validity
of state acts, 293;
favors national bankruptcy laws, 294;
thinks members of legislature may hold other offices,
295;
fears election of President will devolve on Senate,
301;
defends system of electors, 301, 314;
thinks election of President should be free from cabal,
302;
prefers eventual election of President by Senate to
whole legislature, 303;
thinks each House should be judge of privileges of its
own members, 304;
moves postponement of clause relative to revenue
bills, 306;
seconds motion to require state legislature's consent to
national purchase of forts, etc., 306;
does not think Senate will elect President, 309;
favors separate provision for re-election of President,
313, 318;
thinks Vice-President will not be in accord with
President, 326;
thinks President must concur in treaties of peace, 330;
thinks executive council unnecessary, 331;
opposes special provision for treaties of peace, 333;
thinks whole legislature should participate in treaties
of peace, 334;
objects to two-thirds of Senate being a quorum, 335;
favors impeachment for maladministration, 335;
thinks Senate should try impeachments, 336, 337;
on committee on style and arrangement, 338;
favors three-quarters vote to override President's
negative, 361;
points out danger from unstable laws, 362;
favors state power to collect export duties, 365;
explains words "direct taxes" in report, 367;
approves verbal amendment on negative of bills, 368;
moves suspension from office of persons impeached,
370;
thinks legislature may appoint treasurer, 371;
moves offences against law of nations be definable,
372;
thinks government can establish university, 374;
opposes provision against standing army, 374;
thinks publication of expenditures impossible, 376;
thinks states may lay tonnage dues, 380;
opposes power of legislature to pardon for treason,
382;
moves executive and others have power of
appointment, 383;
moves amendments by general convention, 385;
moves states have equal suffrage in Senate, 386;
announces he will sign constitution, 393.
Morris, Robert, Pa., attends convention, i., 1;
Pierce's sketch of, 2, n.;
moves Washington's election as president of
convention, 3;
thinks Senate should be chosen by the people, 95;
favors life term for Senators, 236.
N
National government of three branches agreed to, i., 35.
"National" in Virginia plan, word struck out, i., 190.
Naturalized citizens, rights of debated, ii., 145.





Navy, provision for, debated, ii., 194.
Negative on legislative acts.
See Executive, national, negative of;
Judiciary, national, supreme, negative of.
Negative on state laws.
See Legislature, national, negative of.
New Hampshire, moved that governor of, be requested to
send delegates, i., 272;
representation of, 322, 324;
delegates from, attend convention, ii., 29.
New Jersey plan.
See Jersey plan.
Nightingale, Jos., signs address from Rhode Island, i., 11, n.
North Carolina, representation of, i., 325, ii., 378.
O
Oath to support national government from state officers,
debated, i., 79, 122, 123, 137, ii., 30;
to support constitution, affirmation permitted, 284.
Olney, Jeremiah, signs address from Rhode Island, i., 11, n.
P
Pardons and reprieves.
See Executive, national, power of.
Patents and copyrights.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Patterson plan.
See Jersey plan.
Patterson, William, N. J., attends convention, i., 1;
Pierce's sketch of, 79, n.;
moves to consider mode of voting in legislature, 109;
favors equal vote by states in legislature, 111, 315;
offers plan of government, 137;
on committee on representation, 292;
defends small states, 302;
opposes inclusion of blacks in representation, 321;
favors adjournment to consider representation in
Senate, 367;
opposes ineligibility of executive, ii., 6.
Peace, power to declare, debated, ii., 188.
Pensioners, disqualification of, from legislature, proposed,
ii., 64.
Phillips, Jonas, letter of, ii., 322, n.
Pierce, William, Ga., notes of convention, i., 1, n.;
sketch of Yates, 1, n.;
sketch of Robert Morris, 2, n.;
sketch of Few, 2, n.;
sketch of Blair, 1, n.;
sketch of Bassett, 1, n.;
sketch of Washington, 3, n.;
sketch of Wilson, 3, n.;
sketch of Hamilton, 4, n.;
sketch of Wythe, 5, n.;
sketch of King, 5, n.;
sketch of Mason, 6, n.;
sketch of Gouverneur Morris, 8, n.;
sketch of Butler, 11, n.;
sketch of Spaight, 11, n.;
sketch of Charles Pinckney, 13, n.;
sketch of Randolph, 13, n.;
sketch of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 33, n.;
sketch of Gerry, 34, n.;
sketch of Sherman, 34, n.;
sketch of Read, 35, n.;
sketch of Madison, 36, n.;
attends convention, 39;
sketch of Rutledge, 46, n.;
sketch of Franklin, 49, n.;
sketch of Bedford, 54, n.;
sketch of Williamson, 57, n.;
sketch of Dickinson, 62, n.;
sketch of Davey, 65, n.;
sketch of Patterson, 79, n.;
favors election of Representatives by people and to
Senate by legislatures, 89;
sketch of Pierce, 89, n.;
sketch of Brearley, 109, n.;
sketch of Ellsworth, 120, n.;
proposes three years' term for Senators, 128;
sketch of Jenifer, 124, n.;
sketch of Lansing, 138, n.;
sketch of Johnson, 200, n.;
sketch of Strong, 207, n.;
sketch of Gorham, 210, n.;
sketch of Alexander Martin, 218, n.;
sketch of Dayton, 245, n.;
opposes equal state representation, 268;
sketch of Baldwin, 271, n.;
sketch of Broome, ii., 8, n.;
sketch of McClurg, 16, n.;
sketch of Gilman, 29, n.;
sketch of Houston, 38, n.;
sketch of Carroll, 39, n.;
sketch of Langdon, 64, n.;
sketch of McHenry, 157, n.;
sketch of Mifflin, 159, n.;
sketch of Livingston, 209, n.;
sketch of Blount, 394, n.;
sketch of Ingersoll, 396.
Pinckney, Charles, S. C., attends convention, i., 2;
appointed on committee on rules, 4;
moves a committee on minutes, 13;
Pierce's sketch of, 13, n.;
submits plan of constitution, 19;
letters of concerning draft, 19, n.;
asks if state governments are to be abolished, 33;
favors enumerating powers of national legislature, 45;
favors vigorous executive, 56;
favors seven years' term for national executive, 54;
favors single executive, 66;
favors appointment of judiciary by executive, 78;
opposes provision for amendments of constitution, 79;
favors ratification by nine states, 81;
moves election of Representatives by state
legislatures, 84;
opposes inclusion of judiciary in revisionary power,
93;
moves consideration of negative on state laws, 94;
favors election of Senators by state legislatures, 100;
favors negative by legislature on all laws, 101;
moves classification of states to determine
representation, 107;
favors representation by free population, 120;
proposes selection of judges by legislature, 131;
favors election of representatives by the people, 224;
opposes equal state representation in Senate, 286;
favors representation by population, 307;
thinks originating money bills in House no
concession, 310;
favors representation of blacks equal with whites, 346;
proposes proportional representation in Senate, 356;
favors negative by legislature of state laws, 374;
favors election of executive by the people, 376;
opposes impeachability of executive, ii., 11, 13;
favors appointment of judges by Senate, 26;
moves that executive be elected by legislature for not
more than six years in twelve, 52;
moves exclusion from executive and judiciary of
debtors of government, 61;
opposes disqualification of debtors from legislature,
65;
thinks national capital ought not to be at state capital,
67;
moves reference to committee of whole of report of
committee of detail, 91;
thinks time of meeting of legislature need not be fixed
in constitution, 93;
moves increase in representation of South Carolina,
110;
thinks fisheries and western frontier more burdensome
than slavery, 114;
moves to strike out requirement as to money bills,
115;
favors fourteen years' citizenship for Senators, 121;
thinks no strangers should be in legislature, 121;
moves that time and mode of election of
Representatives be fixed by state legislatures,
126;
insists on property qualification for officers of
government, 128;
opposes considering question of money bills, 141;
thinks government not bound to respect state laws on
naturalization, 147;
opposes ineligibility of members of legislature to
other offices, 158, 163;
moves that acceptance of other office shall vacate seat
in legislature, 159;
favors postponement of clause relating to eligibility of
members of legislature to other offices, 166;
thinks judiciary should not be included in revisionary
power, 172;
favors appointment of treasurer by joint ballot, 184;
moves legislature subdue rebellions without
application to state legislatures, 186;
thinks Senate should have power to declare war, 187;
thinks state debts may be assumed by government,
192;
opposes executive council, 193;
favors national control of militia, 197;
submits propositions for committee of detail, 198;
seconds Morris's propositions for committee of detail,
200;
moves power to create necessary offices, 203;
declares constitution will fail if slave trade is
prohibited, 218;
defends slavery, 221;
moves to commit question of navigation acts, 225;
moves officers be forbidden to accept presents from
foreign states, 234, 235;
moves national power to negative state laws, 236;
thinks state executives should be appointed by
national government, 237;
moves election of executive by majority of legislature,
244;
thinks rights of habeas corpus should be assured, 261;
proposes that fugitive slaves be surrendered, 267;
moves to recommit question of interstate validity of
state acts, 267;
favors commercial regulations, 269;
moves that no religious test be required for office,
283;
moves that Congress be not required to approve
constitution, 288;
moves ineligibility of members of legislature to other
offices with emoluments, 294;
thinks they should be eligible to other offices, 296;
asks why mode of electing President is to be changed,
301;
thinks electors objectionable, 301, 307;
moves each house of legislature judge privileges of its
own members, 304;
agrees to postponement of clause relative to revenue
bills, 306;
seconds motion that two-thirds of Senate be present
when electing President, 318;
thinks Senate should not share in appointments,
except of ambassadors, 328;
opposes power of impeaching President, 336;
moves an address to accompany constitution, 347;
opposes three-quarter vote to override President's
negative, 363;
moves power to establish a university, 374;
thinks legislature should not name treasurer, 371;
opposes provision against standing armies, 374;
moves guaranty of liberty of the press, 375;
favors publication of accounts from time to time, 376;
favors increase of North Carolina representation, 379;
moves preservation of jury trials in civil cases, 384;
announces he will sign constitution, 388;
urges unequivocal signing, 396.
Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth, S. C., attends convention, i.,
1;
Pierce's sketch of, 23, n.;
opposes election of Representatives by the people, 90;
thinks Senate should have power to originate money
bills, 134;
favors election of Representatives by state
legislatures, 204, 206;
opposes ineligibility of Representatives to state
offices, 217;
favors four years' term for Senators, 236, 238;
favors no salary for Senators, 244;
thinks Senate should be dependent on states, 247;
favors compromise on representation, 287;
thinks originating money bills in House no
concession, 312;
favors equality of representation for southern states,
323;
favors greater representation for southern states, 324;
moves increase of representation for North and South
Carolina, and Georgia, 325;
insists upon inclusion of blacks in basis of
representation, 331;
opposes tax on exports, 342;
thinks slave property should be protected, 343;
favors first census as basis of representation, 346;
opposes adjournment on representation question, 367;
insists constitution must provide against
emancipation, ii., 39;
moves exclusion from judiciary and executive of
public debtors, 61;
seconds motion to strike out provision for mutual
negative of one branch of government over
another, 92;
moves that representation of South Carolina be
increased, 110;
moves ten years' citizenship for Senators, 125;
asks whether there is to be no army, 135;
favors national control of militia, 196, 197;
declares constitution will fail if it interferes with
slavery, 221;
declares South Carolina will not soon stop slave trade,
223;
on committee on navigation acts, 225;
favors effective control of militia, 232;
seconds motion to reconsider question of discharge of
debts, 241;
favors extension of slave trade, 250;
proposes plan for selecting ports of entry, 253;
thinks judges' salaries may be raised, 258;
favors compromise on commercial regulations, 269;
praises New England men, 269;
approves motion that no religious test be required for
office, 283;
opposes clause as to juries in civil cases, 384;
dislikes form of signing, 396, n.
Pinckney plan, real date of, i., xvi.;
letters concerning, i., 19, n;
submitted, 20;
facsimile of, 21;
referred to committee of detail, ii., 48, 74.
Piracies and felonies, power to declare, debated, ii., 184.
Ports of entry, method of choosing, debate on, ii., 253.
Post-offices, power to establish.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Prayers in convention proposed by Franklin, i., 259, 260.




President of the convention, Washington elected, i., 3.
Property qualification.
See Executive, national, compensation of;
Judiciary, national, compensation of;
Legislature, national, property qualification for;
Senate.
Proportional representation.
See Legislature, national, representation in.
Q
Quorum.
See Legislature, national, quorum in.
R
Randolph, Edmund, Va., attends convention, i., 1;
offers Virginia plan, 13;
Pierce's sketch of, 13, n.;
explains design of Senate, 43;
opposes indefinite power of legislature, 47;
opposes single executive, 51, 63;
opposes election of executive by state executives, 109;
favors provision for amendment of constitution, 122;
favors oath of allegiance to national government from
state officers, 122;
favors seven years' term for Senators, 128;
moves extent of supreme court's jurisdiction, 130;
opposes Jersey plan, 150;
favors two years' term for representatives, 207;
favors national compensation for Representatives,
210;
favors rotation in personnel of Senate, 236;
moves that sermon be preached to convention, 261;
favors committee of compromise on representation,
291;
on committee of compromise on representation, 307;
objects to submitting question of voting in Senate to
committee of small states, 308;
opposes reduction of representation of New
Hampshire, 324;
moves that census be required, 327, 331, 344;
moves representation by free inhabitants and three-
fifths slaves, 344-350;
favors adjournment on representation in Senate, 367,
368;
opposes power to legislate where state legislation
would interrupt harmony, 372;
favors appointment of judges by Senate, 386;
favors guaranty of republican government to states,
391;
favors ineligibility to re-election of executive, ii., 4;
favors impeachability of executive, 14;
favors appointment of judges by executive, 27;
thinks constitution should be ratified by the people,
31;
favors fixing time of meeting of legislature
provisionally, 44;
thinks it unimportant when legislature meets, 95;
revives question of money bills originating, 116;
thinks state executives may safely fill vacancies in
Senate, 117;
moves to postpone question of voting in Senate, 118,
119;
favors postponement of question of originating money
bills, 120;
opposes fourteen years' residence for Senators, 123;
favors nine years' citizenship for Senators, 125;
moves legislature have power to compel attendance of
members, 135;
approves expulsion from legislature by two-thirds
vote, 135;
thinks yeas and nays may be ordered by any member
of legislature, 136;
moves Senators may dissent from any measure, 136;
thinks originating money bills ought to be
reconsidered, 140;
moves four years' citizenship for Representatives,
142;
moves bills to raise revenue shall originate in House
without power of amendment in Senate, 149;
thinks provision as to money bills should stand, 155;
favors disqualification of members of legislature from
other offices, 166, 296;
moves that power of negative extend to resolutions,
177;
favors power to emit bills of credit, 182;
doubts whether legislature may declare law of
piracies, 185;
moves that legislature define piracies, etc., 185;
opposes suppression of rebellion without request of
state, 187;
favors extended definition of treason, 203;
moves British statute on treason, 205;
favors commitment of question of slave trade, 224;
thinks power to fulfil engagements or old government
unnecessary, 229;
favors national control of militia, 232;
moves postponement of question of treaty-making,
240;
favors reconsideration of question of discharge of
debts, 241;
suggests states appoint some federal officers, 246;
moves obligations of old government be binding on
new, 249;
opposed to removability of judges on application of
legislature, 257;
moves judges' salaries be fixed for three years, 258;
on committee on interstate validity of state acts, 268;
favors interstate validity of state acts, 268;
announces objection to features of constitution, 273;
moves that ratification from nine states be required,
284;
favors second convention to consider amendments,
289;
thinks declaration as to state acts defective, 294;
asks why the mode of electing President is to be
changed, 301;
thinks eventual election of executive should be by
whole legislature, 303;
doubts whether each House should judge of the
privileges of its members, 304;
thinks mode of choosing President aristocratic, 310;
moves that legislature name President when both
President and Vice-President die, 323;
thinks Vice-President should not be President of
Senate, 326;
thinks state conventions may offer amendments to
constitution, 343;
states his objections to the constitution, 346;
proposes second convention, 346;
moves pardons in treason cases be considered, 347;
moves use of word "service" for "servitude," 367;
seconds verbal amendment to clause on negative of
bills, 368;
moves suspension of officers impeached, 370;
favors power to grant charters, 373;
seconds motion against standing armies, 374;
moves to except treason from President's power to
pardon, 382;
thinks President and Senate should not combine, 382;
announces he cannot sign constitution, 387;
proposes second federal convention, 388;
thinks second convention feasible, 395;
does not sign, 398.
Ratification of constitution, method of, debated, i., 80, ii.,
32, 254, 342, 344;
by conventions, proposed, i., 79;
by people of states, 122, 135, 187;
by assemblies chosen by the people, debated, ii, 38;
resolutions concerning, offered, 368.
Read, George, Del., attends convention, i., 2;
moves debate on three branches of government, 35;
Pierce's sketch of, 35;
moves to postpone question of representation, 37;
favors national government, 89;
moves Senate be named by executive, 95;
opposes guaranty of territory to the states, 121;
favors forbidding Senate from originating money
bills, 133;
thinks injustice was done small states in land cession,
237;
supports small states on question of representation,
232;
favors life term for Senators, 236;
moves nine years' term for Senators, 238;
thinks the United States ought to be one people, 241;
favors abolishing states, 263;
favors increase in representation, 326;
thinks representation ought to be fixed by legislature,
334;
thinks taxation and representation may be adjusted,
348;
moves absolute negative by executive on legislature,
ii., 95;
opposes requirement that Representatives live in the
states they represent, 108;
opposes provision as to money bills, 118;
moves that national legislature have power over
elections if states make no provision, 128;
opposes power to emit bills of credit, 183;
moves that treasurer be appointed by executive, 184;
doubts national control of militia, 198;
thinks requisitions were accommodated to poverty of
states, 212;
favors commitment of question of taxing exports, 224;
moves President of Senate have additional casting
vote for executive, 244;
on committee of August 25, 254;
objects to same court having equity and law
jurisdiction, 256;
opposed to separate provision for re-election of
President, 313;
thinks small states should have vote for President in
legislature, 325;
moves prohibition of direct tax, 375.
Rebellion in states, power to subdue, debated, ii., 186.
Representation in legislature.
See Legislature, national, representation in, House of
Representatives, Senate.
Republican government, guaranty of, to states, debate on, i.,
79, 121, 137, 390, ii., 282;
amendment adopted, 384.
Rhode Island, address from citizens of, i., 8, n.;
moved representation of, be increased, ii., 378.




See Legislature, national, rules of.
Russell, William, signs address from Rhode Island; i., 11, n.
Rutledge, John, S. C., attends convention, i., 2;
seconds motion for Washington's election as
President, 3;
wants enumeration of powers of legislature, 46;
Pierce's sketch of, 46, n.;
favors single executive, 66;
opposes appointment of judges by executive, 77;
opposes inferior judicial tribunals, 82;
moves classification of states to determine
representation, 107;
favors representation according to wealth, 115, 120,
364;
favors two years' term for Representatives, 124;
thinks Senators should receive no compensation, 129;
favors election of Representatives by state
legislatures, 205;
favors ineligibility of Representatives to other offices,
218, 223;
opposes sending for New Hampshire delegates, 272;
on committee on compromise on representation, 292,
307;
moves fixing representation, 319;
opposes increase in representation, 327;
moves that representation be by wealth and
population, 333;
proposes to reconsider originating of money bills,
355;
thinks powers of legislature loosely defined, 366;
opposes adjournment to consider representation, 368;
opposes guaranteeing republican government to states,
392;
favors election of executive by state legislatures, ii., 8;
opposes inclusion of judiciary in revisionary power,
25;
on committee to report constitution according to
resolutions, 58;
submits report of committee, 75;
moves annual meeting of legislature, 95;
opposes confining suffrage to freeholders, 106;
favors seven years' residence in their states of
Representatives, 108;
favors three years' residence in their states of
Representatives, 110;
insists on longer than seven years' citizenship for
Senators, 125;
moves mode of election of Representatives be left to
state legislatures, 126;
insists on property qualification for officers of
government, 129, 132;
moves publication of Senate journals, 137;
thinks provision as to citizenship should apply to
those already citizens, 146;
opposes provision as to money bills, 156;
seconds motion to postpone provision as to money
bills, 171;
urges progress, 175;
opposes tax on exports, 178;
moves that funds for public creditors be not diverted,
191;




declares South Carolina and Georgia will not accept
constitution if it prohibits slave trade, 224;
submits report on Madison and Pinckney propositions,
225;
thinks prohibition of ex post facto laws unnecessary,
228;
reports constitution according to resolutions, 228;
moves constitution be the supreme law, 235;
opposes power of negative of state laws, 237;
thinks judiciary will decide controversies between
states, 241;
moves election of executive by joint ballot of
legislature, 242;
opposed to removability of judges on legislature's
application, 257;
moves judiciary have power over treaties, 259;
thinks rights of habeas corpus should be inviolable,
261;
moves to prohibit bills of attainder and retrospective
laws, 263;
on committee on interstate validity of state acts, 268;
favors commercial regulations, 272;
thinks there is no danger of dismemberment of states,
278;
thinks it unnecessary to guarantee public lands, 281;
presents committee report, 292;
opposes plan for executive, 308;
moves Senate choose President from thirteen
candidates, 311;
moves two-thirds of whole Senate concur in treaties,
334;
objects to general power against slavery, 341;
opposes legislature appointing treasurer, 371;
opposes address to people, 377;
moves to limit President's emoluments, 381.
S
Seat of government, not to be at same place with state
capital, ii., 66;
at central point proposed, 67;
provisions for, 140.
Second branch of legislature.
See Legislature, national, Senate.
Senate.
See Legislature, national, Senate.
Sermon for members of convention agreed to, i., 261.
Sherman, Roger, Conn., attends convention, i., 32;
favors conservative course toward states, 34;
Pierce's sketch of, 34, n.;
opposes election of Representatives by the people, 39;
favors election of one Senator from each state, 45;
favors election of executive by state legislatures, 50,
54, 375;
favors three years' term for executive, 54;
thinks legislature should have power to remove
executive, 63;
favors an executive council, 68;
opposes negative by executive, 71;
opposes ratification of constitution by conventions,
80;
opposes creation of inferior judiciary tribunals, 82;
favors election of Representatives by state
legislatures, 85;
favors elections to Senate by state legislatures, 94, 99;
favors limiting power of negative on state laws, 104;
proposes proportional representation in House and by
states in Senate, 114;
proposes each state have one vote in Senate, 120;
opposes oath to national government by state officers,
122;
proposes one-year term for Representatives, 124;
proposes five years' term for Senators, 128;
opposes leaving time and mode or electing
Representatives to state legislatures, 129;
proposes election of judges by national legislature,
131;
thinks money bills may originate in Senate, 133;
opposes two branches of legislature, 196;
favors election of Representatives by state
legislatures, 205;
consents to two years' term for Representatives, 208;
favors compensation of Representatives by states,
211;
opposes ineligibility of Representatives to state
offices, 217, 220, 223;
favors six years' term for Senators, 237;
favors six or four years' term for Senators, 240;
favors rights of small states, 258;
proposes committee on representation, 287, 320;
favors vote by states in Senate, 313;
moves to postpone question of representation, 318;
opposes increase in representation, 325, 326;
opposes periodical census, 329;
thinks representation should be fixed by census, 333;
thinks representation fairly apportioned, 339;
favors leaving question of taxation to state
legislatures, 349;
thinks Senators may vote per capita, 357;
thinks government should have coercive power over
states, 363;
thinks government will act on states in requiring tax
quotas, 363;
moves that government should not interfere with
internal policy of states, 371;
opposes direct taxation by national government, 371;
thinks state courts will consider state laws
contravening national authority invalid, 372;
opposes negative by legislature of state laws, 372;
opposes ineligibility of executive to second term, 379;
opposes tenure of executive for good behavior, 380;
favors appointment of judges by Senate, 382;
favors appointment of judges by executive with
consent of Senate, 387;
opposes creation of inferior judicial tribunals, 389;
favors negative of each branch of legislature on the
other, ii., 91;
thinks time of meeting of legislature should be
specified, 94;
moves Representatives be inhabitants of their states,
107;
thinks representation should stand, 111;
moves that representation not exceed 1 to 40,000, 112;
thinks slaves should be included in representation,
114;
thinks yeas and nays may not be required, 136;
moves publication of journal of legislature, 138;
thinks general government can make any regulations
as to citizenship, 146;
thinks those in power should be free from temptation,
163;
favors payment of legislature partly by states and
partly by nation, 168;
thinks power of negative should not be extended, 174;
thinks revision of acts by President unnecessary, 177;
favors no tax on exports, 178, 180;
opposes appointment of treasurer by joint ballot, 184;
thinks executive should not have power to commence
war, 188;
thinks state debts may be assumed by government,
192;
appointed on grand committee, 193;
thinks states should partially control militia, 196, 197;
thinks resistance to national laws treason, 207;
thinks report on state debts meaningless, 210;
favors limiting representation of large states, 210;
moves settlement of debts on basis of taxation, 211;
thinks provision as to slave trade may stand, 218, 224;
thinks question of taxing exports settled, 224;
moves that states have power to train militia, 230;
withdraws motion, 230;
proposes mixed control of militia, 231;
thinks states should appoint militia officers, 233;
thinks negative of state laws by general government
unnecessary, 236;
thinks judiciary will decide controversies between
states, 241;
opposes election of executive by joint ballot of
legislature, 242;
objects to executive appointing all officers, 246;
objects to legislatures of states appointing federal
officers, 247;
moves express provision for paying debts, 249;
opposed to taxing men as property, 251;
thinks revenue the object of import tax on slaves, 252;
on committee of August 25, 254;
moves amendment to pardoning power, 254;
moves militia be under executive when in active
service, 255;
favors removability of judges on application of
legislature, 257;
moves judicial power extend to land grants, 260;
reports amendments on commercial regulations and
judicial power, 260;
moves to prohibit bills of credit or payments in
anything but coin, 262;
wishes to crush paper money, 262, 263;
thinks states should have power to lay embargoes,
264;
thinks state legislatures may deal with impost
question, 265;
moves that states may tax exports for national
treasury, 265;
opposes surrender of fugitive slaves and servants, 266;
desires commercial regulations by majority vote, 270;
declare all should have equal privileges, 275;
thinks Union cannot dismember a state, 276;
moves admission of new states by consent of state
legislatures, 278;
thinks constitution may guarantee public lands, 281;
thinks no religious test will be applied for office, 283;
thinks ratification should be from ten states, 284, 287;
thinks ratification should be by all states, 285;
moves to postpone ratification question, 287;
moves to take up report of committee of eleven, 290;
moves to refer draft of constitution to committee, 292;
on committee, 292;
opposes national bankruptcy law, 294;
favors ineligibility of members of legislature to other
offices, 295;
does not object to election of Vice-President by
majority, 300;
thinks army in time of peace should be restricted, 305;
willing to defer to those who think revenue bills vital,
306;
thinks large states will have advantage in nominating
candidates for President, 309;
thinks President should not be chosen from three
candidates, 311;
thinks when legislature votes for President it should
vote by states, 313;
moves eventual election of President by House of
Representatives, 318;
approves of Vice-President being President of Senate,
326;
favors inclusion of Senate in treaty-making, 327;
thinks whole legislature should participate in treaties
of peace, 333;
moves that majority of whole Senate vote for treaties,
334;
thinks supreme court should not try President, 336;
thinks representation large enough, 339;
moves states be required to consent to amendments,
341;
favors submitting constitution to Congress, 344;
favors two-thirds vote to override President's negative,
361;
thinks state bills of rights sufficient, 364;
thinks legislature should appoint treasurer, 371;
objects to power to cut canals, 372;
thinks provision for liberty of press unnecessary, 375;
thinks accounts may be published from time to time,
376;
opposes address to states, 378;
favors additional representation for North Carolina,
378;
thinks states and nation may have concurrent
commercial jurisdiction, 381;
seconds motion to vest appointments in President and
others, 383;
thinks three-quarter states may oppress others by
amendments, 385;
thinks conventions may act on amendments, 386;
moves that states be preserved, 386;
moves to strike out clause concerning amendments,
386.
Signing constitution, mode proposed, ii., 391;
takes place, 393.
Slavery and slave trade, debate on, ii., 218, 250;
compromise on, brought in, 269;
power to prohibit, objected to, 366.
Slaves, import tax on, agreed to, ii., 252;
delivery up of fugitive, proposed, 267;
agreed to, 274;
verbal amendment made, 384.
South Carolina, motion that representation of, be increased,
ii., 110.
Spaight, Richard Dobbs, N. C., attends convention, i., 2;
moves rule for revision of questions, 11;
Pierce's sketch of, 11, n.;
seconds motion for representation by free inhabitants,
37;
favors election to Senate by free population, 43;
withdraws motion for elections to Senate by state
legislatures, 44;
moves reconsideration of appointment of executive by
electors, ii., 39;
seconds motion to elect executive by national
legislature, 40;
fears capital will be located at New York, 139;
favors commercial regulations by majority vote, 271;
moves Senate choose President from thirteen
candidates, 311;
moves seven years' term for executive, 316;
moves six years' term, 316;
moves electors meet at seat of government, 317;
proposes President make appointments during recess
of Senate, 329;
moves special provision respecting territorial rights,
332.
State acts, validity of, debated, ii., 267, 293;
certain, prohibited, 377.
State debts, debate on assumption of, ii., 192.
State laws, negative of.
See Legislature, national, negative of.
State police, non-interference in, by national government,
debated, i., 371.
State representation, equal in House, debated, i., 268;
in Senate, 273, 286;
committee to arrange, debated, 287, 292;
report of committee, 293.
See Legislature, national, representation in.
States, admission of new, provision for, agreed to, i., 78,
137, 390;
debated, ii., 274, 275, 277, 278, 279, 280, 384.
Strong, Caleb, Mass., attends convention, i., 5;
favors one-year term for Representatives, 207;
Pierce's sketch of, 207, n.;
favors committee on representation, 291;
favors equal representation by states in Senate, 359;
opposes inclusion of judiciary in revisionary power,
ii., 20;
thinks executive will not be re-elected, 40;
thinks question of voting in Senate should be
postponed, 118;
favors $4 per day as payment for legislature, 170;
moves revenue bills originate in House, 170.
Style and arrangement, committee on.
See Committee on style and arrangement.
Sumptuary laws, debate on, ii., 202, 366;
committee on, see Committee on sumptuary laws.
Supreme Court.
See Judiciary, national supreme.
T
Taxation, by representation, debated, i., 342, 349, ii., 47;
basis of, by free and slave population, debated, i., 343;
direct on states in proportion to representation,
debated, 350;
direct by national government, opposed, 371;
proposed that it be by quotas, ii., 207;
according to congressional representation, debated,
208, 211;
definition of direct, asked, 208;
by population, proportion agreed to, 210;
power of, on exports, debated, 217, 218, 376;
on migration of slaves, debated, 218;
on slaves, debated, 219, 241;
capitation and direct, debated, 375.
See Legislature, national, representation in.
Term of members of legislature.
See Legislature, national, term of.
Territory, guaranty of, to each state, debated, i., 121.
Tonnage dues.
See Navigation acts.
Treason, debate on, ii., 202.
Treasurer, appointment of.
See Legislature, national, power of.
Treaties, power to make, debated, i., 242, 243, ii., 238, 327;
force of, debated, 252;
power to interpret, by judiciary, debated, 259;
of peace, how to be made, 330, 332, 333;
provision for, reconsidered, 333;
proposed that they require two-thirds Senate, 334,
335;
proposed that they require majority, 335;
notice of, to Senators, proposed, 335.
See Legislature, national, Senate.
U
University, national.
See Legislature, national, power of.
V
Varnum, J. M., letter from, with address from Rhode Island,
i., 9, n.
Vermont, admission of, to Union, debated, ii., 276.
Veto power.
See Executive, national, negative of.
Vice-President, duties of, defined, ii., 299, 300, 326.
Virginia plan, the, presented to convention, i., 13;
debated in committee of the whole, 32;
debated, 39;
reported on from committee of the whole, 134, 184;
vote on, 185.
Voting, restriction of, to freeholders, debated, ii., 96.
W
War, power to declare, debated, ii., 187.
Washington, George, Va., attends convention, i., 1;
elected president of convention, 3;
thanks convention for election, 3;
Pierce's sketch of, 3, n.;
rebukes member for losing his notes, 48, n.;
John Jay's letter to, ii., 48, n.;
Knox's letter to, 158, n.;
urges increase in representation, iv., 392;
asks instructions concerning journals, 397.
Williamson, Hugh, N. C., attends convention, i., 2;
objects to election of executive by districts, 57;
Pierce's sketch of, 57, n.;
moves impeachability of executive, 65;
favors limiting Senate to twenty-five members, 95;
opposes indefinite power of negative on state laws,
103;
favors proportional representation, 114;
favors states paying representatives, 210;
moves that number in Senate be fixed, 235;
favors six years' term for Senators, 236;
thinks rights of small states not menaced, 253;
favors committee on representation in Senate, 291;
opposes compromise proposed, 361;
thinks Senate better able to consider money bills than
House, 309;
thinks proposed representation unfair to southern
states, 324;
favors reducing representation of northern states, 324;
amends motion fixing periodical census, 330;
thinks New Hampshire representation too large, 348;
opposes election of executive by people, 378;
opposes eligibility of executive to re-election, ii., 8,
41;
opposes election of executive by electors, 8;
favors six years' term for executive, 9;
moves number of electors be based on
Representatives, 10;
moves electors be paid out of national treasury, 17;
suggests national officers take oath to support state
governments, 30;
favors ratification of constitution by conventions, 35;
favors voting per capita in Senate, 38;
dislikes single executive, 41;
suggests voting for three persons for executive, 54;
favors forbidding national capital at state capital, 66;
seconds motion to limit negative of each branch of
legislature on the other, 91;
moves representation in House based on taxation, 110;
favors reconsidering question of money bills, 116;
thinks provision for filling vacancies in Senate
necessary, 117;
insists upon guarding qualifications of Senators, 125,
131;
thinks provision on money bills should be retained,
141;
moves nine years' citizenship for Representatives,
144;
opposes eligibility of members of legislature to other
offices, 163;
moves postponement of question of money bills, 171;
moves to make three-quarters of legislature necessary
to overcome executive negative, 176;
thinks exports should not be taxed, 179;
thinks state lands ought to be given up, 193;
appointed on grand committee, 193;
favors restrictions on army, 195;
moves quotas of states be determined, 211;
opposes apportionment of taxation by representation,
212;
thinks states should not have power to tax exports,
213;
thinks slave trade should be left to states, 223;
on committee on navigation acts, 225;
thinks prohibition of ex post facto laws unnecessary,
228;
thinks discussion of negative of state laws
unnecessary, 237;
doubts if judiciary can impartially decide
controversies between states, 241;
opposes slavery, but wishes union, 251;
on committee of August 25, 254;
moves to postpone question of executive succession,
256;
seconds motion to make it impossible for states to
levy imposts, 265;
moves clause of articles of confederation as to state
acts, 267;
favors commercial regulations by two-thirds vote,
270;
thinks question of new states should be left to
legislature, 275, 278;
on committee of August 31, 292;
thinks ineligibility of members of legislature should
extend to offices created during their term, 295,
296;
objects to President's dependence on Senate in
appointments, 302;
moves to reconsider representation, 307;
objects to Senate electing President, 308, 310, 315;
moves election of President by one-third of all
electors, 310;
moves electors voting be the only ones counted, 311;
favors separate provision for re-electing President,
313;
moves seven years' term for President, 316;
moves six years' term for President, 316;
thinks electors should meet at seat of government,
317;
suggests eventual election of President by whole
legislature, voting by states, 318;
thinks Vice-President unnecessary, 326;
thinks treaties of peace important, 330, 332;
thinks treaties may be made without majority of
people, 333;
opposes requirement that treaties be ratified by
majority of whole Senate, 334;
proposes that notice of treaties to Senators be
required, 335;
thinks Senate will lean towards President, 336;
moves increase in representation in House of
Representatives, 338;
moves that old Congress sanction constitution, 346;
favors two-thirds vote to override President's negative,
361;
fears too many laws, 362;
moves provision for juries in civil suits, 363;
moves increase of representation, 369;
seconds motion against direct tax, 375;
suggests signing letter only, 393.
Wilson, James, Pa., attends convention, i., 1;
nominates William Temple Franklin for secretary of
convention, 3;
Pierce's sketch of, 3, n.;
favors election of Representatives by the people, 41,
205;
favors election of Senators by the people, 44, 95;
favors a single executive, 49, 50, 67;
favors election of executive by the people, 53, 55, ii.,
6, 47;
favors three years' term for executive, i., 54;
moves election of executive by district electors, 56;
opposes an executive council, 68;
favors negative by executive on legislature, 69, 71;
favors creation of inferior judiciary, 73, 82;
favors inclusion of judiciary in power of negative, 75;
opposes appointment of judges by legislature, 77;
favors ratification by plurality of States, 81;
favors election of Representatives by the people, 84;
favors preservation of state governments for local
purposes, 90;
favors inclusion of judiciary in revisionary power, 91,
ii., 17, 25;
favors election to Senate by districts, i., 98;
favors absolute negative in legislature, 104;
favors proportional representation, 113, 115, 257;
favors representation by free inhabitants, 119;
thinks voting in Senate should be on same plan as in
House, 121;
opposes Jersey plan, 146;
opposes Hamilton plan, 185;
insists that states are dependent on each other, 188;
favors two branches of legislature, 198;
thinks state governments may encroach on national
government, 201;
favors one-year term for Representatives, 207;
favors national compensation of Representatives, 211;
moves that compensation be fixed by legislature, 212;
opposes age limit for Representatives, 214;
opposes ineligibility of Representatives to other
offices, 214, 220;
opposes elections to Senate by state legislatures, 233;
favors six years' term for Senators, 237;
favors nine years' term for Senators, 243;
opposes eligibility of Senators to state offices, 247;
opposes sending for New Hampshire delegates, 272;
opposes representation by states in Senate, 273;
admits question of number of Senators is
embarrassing, 280;
opposes committee on representation in Senate, 291;
moves question of voting in Senate, 308;
opposes originating money bills in House, 309, 312;
opposes yielding equal vote in Senate to small states,
314;
thinks representation of western states should be
based on property, 320;
thinks wealth an impracticable rule of representation,
334;
opposes inclusion of three-fifths of blacks as basis of
representation, 339;
favors guaranty of republican government to the
states, 342;
moves that representation be according to direct
taxation, 344;
favors representation based on free inhabitants and
three-fifths of slaves, 344;
favors adjusting taxation to representation, 349;
thinks equal vote in Senate favored by minority, 355;
insists that numbers are correct basis for
representation, 355;
thinks small states would abandon plea of equality in
taxes and troops, 356;
thinks originating money bills in House of little
consequence, 356;
insists on proportional representation in Senate, 362;
favors non-interference of national government with
state police, 371;
opposes election of executive by the people, 375;
opposes election of executive by legislature, 377;
favors appointment of judges by executive, 384;
favors continuance of old Congress till new
government starts, 390;
favors guaranty to states of republican government
and against violence, 392;
favors impeachability of executive, ii., 11;
thinks departments should act separately, 24;
thinks oath of allegiance unnecessary, 30;
opposes election of executive by legislature, 43;
suggests election of executive by members of national
legislature selected by lot, 44, 47;
on committee to report constitution according to
resolutions, 48;
favors specifying general principles for executive, 56;
opposes disqualification from legislature of persons
having unsettled accounts, 64;
thinks time of meeting of legislature should be fixed,
93;
favors winter as time for meeting of legislature, 95;
thinks suffrage in the States should not be prescribed
by legislature, 96;
favors requiring Representatives to be inhabitants,
108;
opposes requirement of seven years' inhabitancy for
Representatives, 108, 109;
thinks question of representation by free inhabitants
premature, 114;
opposed to originating money bills in House, 115;
reviews question of citizenship of Representatives,
116;
objects to vacancies in Senate being filled by state
executives, 116;
thinks provision as to money bills of no value to large
states, 118, 120;
opposes fourteen years' residence as necessary for
Senators, 123;
moves to reconsider requirement of seven years for
Representatives, 132;
thinks number for quorum should not be small, 134;
thinks publication of legislative journal necessary,
138;
moves four years' citizenship for Representatives,
142;
insists Representatives need not be natives, 145;
thinks new government bound by Pennsylvania's
promises to foreigners, 148;
moves seven years' citizenship for Senators, 149;
thinks people will disapprove members of legislature
holding other offices, 164;
thinks good men will refuse legislature if debarred
from other offices, 165;
seconds motion to have acts revised by executive and
judiciary, 172;
thinks legislature will swallow up powers of
government, 175;
favors making three-fourths of legislature necessary to
overcome executive negative, 176;
explains difference between "duties" and "imposts,"
177;
thinks exports may be taxed, 179;
opposed to power to emit bills of credit, 182;
thinks it unnecessary to define felonies, etc., 185;
thinks law of felonies, etc., ought to be declared, 185;
moves that treason be against United States, 205;
thinks treason may be against a state, 206;
thinks proof of treason may be difficult, 207;
favors power to tax exports, 215;
seconds motion to tax exports by two-thirds of
legislature, 217;
thinks slaves should be taxed, 222;
favors commitment of question of navigation acts,
225;
thinks prohibition of ex post facto laws unnecessary,
228;
thinks Senate should not make appointments, 235;
thinks negative of state laws unnecessary, 237;
objects to Senate's power to make treaties, 239;
thinks judiciary may decide controversies between
states, 242;
seconds motion for election of executive by the
people, 243;
thinks larger states should have larger share in
election of executive, 295;
thinks Senate should not have separate voice in
election of executive, 246;
thinks state legislatures will order federal offices filled
by state appointment if permitted, 247;
thinks pardon before conviction may be necessary,
255;
opposes removability of judges on application of
legislature, 257;
explains appellate power of judiciary, 260;
doubts if suspension of right of habeas corpus is ever
necessary, 262;
moves legislature be prohibited from paying debts in
anything but coin, 262;
thinks states should not interfere with contracts, 263;
objects to treating fugitive slaves as criminals, 267;
favors interstate validity of state acts, 267;
on committee to consider subject, 268;
favors commercial regulations by majority vote, 271;
thinks majority may regulate formation of new states,
277;
thinks new states may be formed without consent of
old, 278;
opposes motion to guarantee public lands, 281;
proposes ratification by seven states, 284;
prefers ratification by eight states to nine, 285;
thinks constitution binding only on ratifying states,
285;
moves that ratification be by majority of people and
states, 287;
thinks state power over other states' acts not unusual,
293;
opposes ineligibility of members
of legislature to other offices, 296;
approves plan of electing executive, 302;
thinks it unnecessary to give each House power over
privileges of its members, 304;
moves eventual election of President by whole
legislature, 309;
thinks eventual election of President by Senate
dangerous, 313;
moves to include House of Representatives in treaty-
making power, 327;
objects to Senate's participation in appointments, 328;
objects to participation of two-thirds Senate on
treaties, 329, 334;
favors executive council, 332;
favors ratification of treaties with majority of Senate,
333;
thinks less than two-thirds Senate may ratify treaties
of peace, 333;
opposed to President convening either house of
legislature, 338;
moves amendments be with consent of two-thirds of
states, 341;
substitutes three-fourths, 341;
opposes reconsideration of ratification clause, 343;
thinks old Congress need not sanction constitution,
345;
moves to strike out "direct taxes," 367;
thinks legislature should not define offences against
law of nations, 372;
seconds motion in favor of canals, 372, 373;
favors national university, 374;
thinks accounts should be published from time to
time, 376;
thinks executive may pardon for treason, 382;
favors depositing convention journal with president,
397.
Wythe, George, Va., attends convention, i., 2;
appointed on committee on rules, 4;
submits report of committee on rules, 5;
Pierce's sketch of, 5, n.;
offers additional rules, 12.
Y
Yates, Robert, N. Y., attends convention, i., 1;
Pierce's sketch of, 1, n.;
on committee on compromise on representation, 292;
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I N T R O D U C T I O N .
I  I had been guided by my judgment alone it is not probable that these
notes of the debates in the Conference, held upon the invitation of Virginia,
at Washington, in the month of February, 1861, would have been made
public. From the commencement of its sessions, a portion of the members
were in favor of the daily publication of the proceedings. I was disposed to
go farther and have the sessions open to the public; but this proposition was
opposed by a large majority. Strong reasons were urged for excluding the
multitude which in the excitement of the time would have thronged the hall
wherein the Conference held its sessions. But these reasons did not apply to
the publication of the debates, and a considerable minority were strongly of
opinion that the people should be informed daily, of the votes and remarks
of their representatives in that body.
I commenced taking notes on the first day of the session. For the first few
days, and until the reports were presented from the general committee, there
was but little discussion, and that related to questions incidental to the
general subject. On the 15th of February, and before the committee
reported, Mr. O    offered a resolution authorizing the admission of
reporters, which, after some discussion, by a close vote was laid upon the
table. On the 18th, finding the labor of taking notes greater than I had
anticipated, and desiring that a complete record should be preserved; I
introduced a resolution providing for the appointment of an official
stenographer, who should report the proceedings and hold them subject to
the order of the Conference. I urged the adoption of this resolution as
strenuously as was proper, but the feeling of the majority appeared to be
still adverse to its passage, and it shared the fate of its predecessor. I then
revised the notes already taken, and finding them more complete than I had
anticipated, determined to make as accurate a report as I was able of the
general discussion. I could not then anticipate whether such a report would
be useful to the country or not; but I thought if the Conference should
propose amendments to the Constitution, and these should be ultimately
submitted to the States for adoption, a knowledge of the motives and
reasons which influenced the action of the Conference as well as the
construction which the members gave to the propositions themselves, might
become of as great importance as the same subjects were in the convention
which framed the present Constitution. I attended every session of the
Conference, and, so far as my strength would permit, made as full and
accurate notes as I could, both of the action of the Conference and the
observations of its members.
These notes were carefully examined and revised immediately after the
close of each daily session. After the passage of the resolution introduced
by Mr. B        , removing the injunction of secrecy and authorizing
their publication, I determined to write them out for the press. I was
engaged in this work when the rebellion commenced, and was shortly after
called to the performance of the duties of an official position, which for
many months left me no leisure for other employments.
My notes were then laid aside. As it was known by every member of the
Conference that I had taken them, I was often pressed to permit selections
from them to be made. These requests I invariably declined, as I desired the
publication, if made at all, to be entire, as well as accurate. As time passed,
these appeals became more frequent and pressing, and claims were made in
relation to the course of several of the members which could only be
sustained or refuted by a publication of their remarks. At length I was
earnestly requested to write out one of these speeches, and after some
weeks of delay consented to do so.
After the publication of this speech, which took place about the time of the
fall elections of 1863, previous to which the action of the Conference had
been much discussed, the desire to see a full report of the proceedings of
that body appeared to be excited anew. Letters and personal interviews upon
this subject became very numerous. I finally determined to take the advice
of a number of gentlemen who were prominent in the convention and the
country, as to the propriety of yielding to this desire, and to be guided by it.
I did so, and found among them a remarkable unanimity of expression in
favor of making the history of the Conference public.
When this question was settled, I desired to avail myself of every
opportunity to secure the highest degree of accuracy and fidelity. I
addressed notes to such of the members as were accessible, asking them to
transmit to me such memoranda of the proceedings of the Conference as
they had preserved. The response to these letters was very gratifying; not
because the materials furnished were very full, but because so general a
purpose was shown by all the members thus addressed, to furnish me every
facility and aid in their power.
I have found much difficulty in determining what control each member
ought to be permitted to exercise over his own remarks. The most agreeable
course to me would have been, to have written out each speech and
submitted it to its author for correction or revision; but to this there was a
decisive objection. It would have depreciated, if not destroyed, the accuracy
of the report. Although I do not believe that any gentleman would have
been tempted to change the tenor of his remarks by subsequent events, the
view of the public might not have been so charitable.
I have therefore made my own notes the standard of authority, and have
admitted nothing into the report which has not been justified by them aided
by my own recollection. The manuscript has not been changed or added to,
except by my own hands. The few instances in which I have availed myself
of the materials furnished by others, are distinctly stated either in the notes
or the appendix.
During the sessions of the Conference I was able to secure but little
practical assistance from the members. Although many of them desired that
my purpose should be accomplished, and some were taking brief and
general notes, I soon discovered that an accurate report of a speech required
an amount of labor and a degree of attention to the subject, which few
gentlemen were inclined to give. The work, therefore, was thrown almost
exclusively upon myself. Some idea of its amount and severity may be
formed when it is stated, that the sessions usually commenced at about ten
o'clock in the morning, and with a brief intermission were continued late in
the evening, in one instance as late as the hour of two o'clock,  . . The
necessity of these long daily sessions, arose from the fact, that the Congress
then in existence terminated on the fourth of March, and but few days
remained in which to discuss and perfect the report, and to submit it to that
body for its action.
I do not claim to have furnished a verbatim report of the speeches delivered
in the Conference of 1861, but I insist that I have given an accurate account
of all its official proceedings, and the substance of the remarks made in the
course of those proceedings. I think, also, that I have preserved nearly all
the propositions made in the course of the debate, and generally have
presented the ideas in the very language used. The gentlemen who have
critically examined the report, all concur upon the question of its general
accuracy, and I am content in this respect to rely upon their testimony.
I have suggested these considerations simply by way of explanation, and
not for the purpose of avoiding criticism. I have endeavored to follow, so
far as was in my power, the example of the illustrious Reporter of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787; and while my notes lack the beauty and
felicity which characterize his, I trust they are not less full and accurate. I
submit them to the country as the best contribution which I can make to its
history, at a most important and interesting period of our national existence.
The three short years which have passed since the Conference of 1861, have
witnessed singular vicissitudes among its members. Many of them have
entered into the military or civil service of the country, or of the rebellion
which it was the avowed purpose of some members of that Conference to
nourish into vigorous life. Death, also, has been busy with the roll.
B      , B      , S    , W      , T    , and C   , are no more.
Z           fell at the head of a rebel army. H         sealed with his
blood his devotion to the principles he advocated upon the field of Corinth,
and now, while I am writing these pages in a morning of beautiful spring,
when tree, and shrub, and grass, and flower, are bursting into life and
beauty; from the roar of cannon, the rattle of musketry, and the deadly
storm of lead and iron, which bearing destruction upon its wings is waking
the echoes of the "Wilderness," comes the mournful tidings that
WADSWORTH has fallen. In that Conference or in the world, there was
never a purer or a more ardent patriot. Those of us who were associated
with him politically, had learned to love and respect him. His opponents
admired his unflinching devotion to his country, and his manly frankness
and candor. He was the type of a true American, able, unselfish, prudent,
unambitious, and good. Other pens will do justice to his memory, but I
thought as I heard the last account of him alive, as he lay within the rebel
lines, his face wearing that calm serenity which grew more beautiful the
nearer death approached, after having given so abundantly of his goods,
now yielding his life to his country in the hour of her trial, that hereafter the
good and true men of the nation would emulate the illustrious example of
his patriotism, and would prize the blessings of a free government the more
highly, as they remembered that it could only be maintained and
perpetuated by such expensive sacrifices.
L.E.C.
May, 1864.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE,
Washington, D.C.
M     , February 4th, 1861.
C             representing a number of the States, assembled at Willard's
Hall, in the City of Washington, D.C., on the fourth day of February,  . .
1861, at 12 o'clock  ., in pursuance of the following preamble and
resolutions, adopted by the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, on
the nineteenth day of January,  . . 1861:
Whereas, It is the deliberate opinion of the General Assembly of Virginia,
that unless the unhappy controversy which now divides the States of this
confederacy, shall be satisfactorily adjusted, a permanent dissolution of
Union is inevitable; and the General Assembly, representing the wishes of
the people of the commonwealth, is desirous of employing every reasonable
means to avert so dire a calamity, and determined to make a final effort to
restore the Union and the Constitution, in the spirit in which they were
established by the fathers of the Republic: Therefore,
Resolved, That on behalf of the commonwealth of Virginia, an invitation is
hereby extended to all such States, whether slaveholding or non-
slaveholding, as are willing to unite with Virginia in an earnest effort to
adjust the present unhappy controversies, in the spirit in which the
Constitution was originally formed, and consistently with its principles, so
as to afford to the people of the slaveholding States adequate guarantees for
the security of their rights, to appoint commissioners to meet on the fourth
day of February next, in the City of Washington, similar commissioners
appointed by Virginia, to consider, and if practicable, agree upon some
suitable adjustment.
Resolved, That ex-President J    T    , W       C. R    , Judge J   
W. B            , G      W. S      , and J     A. S      are
hereby appointed commissioners, whose duty it shall be to repair to the City
of Washington, on the day designated in the foregoing resolution, to meet
such commissioners as may be appointed by any of said States, in
accordance with the foregoing resolution.
Resolved, That if said commissioners, after full and free conference, shall
agree upon any plan of adjustment requiring amendments to the Federal
Constitution, for the further security of the rights of the people of the
slaveholding States, they be requested to communicate the proposed
amendments to Congress, for the purpose of having the same submitted by
that body, according to the forms of the Constitution, to the several States
for ratification.
Resolved, That if said commissioners cannot agree on such adjustment, or if
agreeing, Congress shall refuse to submit for ratification, such amendments
as may be proposed, then the commissioners of this State shall immediately
communicate the result to the executive of this commonwealth, to be by
him laid before the convention of the people of Virginia and the General
Assembly: Provided, That the said commissioners be subject at all times to
the control of the General Assembly, or if in session, to that of the State
convention.
Resolved, That in the opinion of the General Assembly of Virginia, the
propositions embraced in the resolutions presented to the Senate of the
United States by the Hon. J    J. C         , so modified as that the first
article proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
shall apply to all the territory of the United States now held or hereafter
acquired south of latitude thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes, and provide
that slavery of the African race shall be effectually protected as property
therein during the continuance of the territorial government, and the fourth
article shall secure to the owners of slaves the right of transit with their
slaves between and through the non-slaveholding States and territories,
constitute the basis of such an adjustment of the unhappy controversy which
now divides the States of this confederacy, as would be accepted by the
people of this commonwealth.
Resolved, That ex-President J    T     is hereby appointed, by the
concurrent vote of each branch of the General Assembly, a commissioner to
the President of the United States, and Judge J    R         is hereby
appointed, by a like vote, a commissioner to the State of South Carolina,
and the other States that have seceded or shall secede, with instructions
respectfully to request the President of the United States and authorities of
such States to agree to abstain, pending the proceedings contemplated by
the action of this General Assembly, from any and all acts calculated to
produce a collision of arms between the States and the Government of the
United States.
Resolved, That copies of the foregoing resolutions be forthwith telegraphed
to the executives of the several States, and also to the President of the
United States, and the Governor be requested to inform, without delay, the
commissioners of their appointment by the foregoing resolutions.
[A copy from the rolls.]
WM. F. GORDON, J .,
C.H.D. and K.R. of Va.
The Conference was called to order by Mr. M       , of Kentucky, who
proposed the name of the honorable J    C. W     , of Ohio, as
temporary Chairman.
The motion of Mr. M        was unanimously adopted.
Mr. WRIGHT was conducted to the Chair by Mr. M       , of
Pennsylvania, and Mr. C    , of Ohio, and proceeded to address the
Conference as follows:
My warmest thanks are due to you, Gentlemen, for the undeserved honor
which you have conferred upon me, in selecting me for the purpose of
temporarily presiding over your deliberations. We have come together to
secure a common and at the same time a most important object—to agree if
we can upon some plan for adjusting the unhappy differences which distract
the country, which will be satisfactory to ourselves and those we represent.
We have assembled as friends, as brothers, each, I doubt not, animated by
the most friendly sentiments.
If we enter upon, and with these sentiments carry through, a patient
examination of the difficulties which now surround the Government, the
result will be, it must be, a success, earnestly hoped for by every lover of
his country; a result which will establish the Union according to the spirit of
the Constitution.
For myself, I may say that I have come here with the earnest purpose of
doing justice to all sections of the Union. I will hear with a patient and
impartial mind all that may be said in favor of, or against such amendments
of the Constitution as may be proposed. Such of them as will give to the
Government permanence, strength, and stability, as will tend to secure to
any State, or any number of States, the quiet and unmolested enjoyment of
their rights under it, shall receive my cordial support. My confidence in
republican institutions, in the capacity of the people for self-government,
has been increased with every year of a life which has been protracted
beyond the term usually allotted to man. That life is now drawing to a close,
and I hope, when it ends, I may leave the Government more firmly
established in the affections of my countrymen than it ever was before. To
this end I have always labored, and shall continue to labor while I live. I
pray GOD that He will be with us during our deliberations, and that He may
guide them to a happy and wise conclusion.
Mr. B        C. H     , a commissioner from the State of Maryland,
was unanimously appointed temporary Secretary.
The Roll of the States was then called over, and commissioners representing
the following were found to be present:
New Hampshire, Delaware, Kentucky,
Rhode Island, Maryland, Ohio,
New Jersey, Virginia, Indiana.
Pennsylvania, North Carolina,  
Mr. PRICE, of New Jersey:—I am informed that a number of Reporters for
the press are at the door of the hall, desiring admittance to this Conference,
for the purpose of reporting our proceedings. Whatever may be the ultimate
action of the Conference in this respect, I can see no objection to the
admission of reporters to-day, for our business will relate wholly to
organization. I hope we shall admit them, and I make that motion.
Mr. SEDDON, of Virginia:—I hope this motion will not prevail. I do not
see that any good can possibly come of giving publicity now, to our
proceedings. On the contrary, in the present excited condition of the
country, I can see how much harm might result from that publicity. It is not
unlikely that wide differences of opinion will be found to exist among us at
the outset. These we shall attempt to harmonize, and if we succeed, it will
only be by mutual concessions and compromises. Every one should be left
free to make these concessions, and not subject himself to unfavorable
public criticism by doing so. If our deliberations are to attain the successful
conclusion we so much desire, it certainly is the course of wisdom that we
should follow the illustrious example of the framers of the present
Constitution, and sit with closed doors.
The motion was thereupon, by viva voce vote, decided in the negative.
Mr. MEREDITH:—I move the appointment of a committee to consist of
one member from each delegation present, to be named by the delegation
and appointed by the President, who shall recommend permanent officers of
this, body, and also report rules for its government.
Which motion was agreed to.
The following gentlemen were then appointed such Committee on Rules
and Organization:
Kentucky, Charles A. Wickliffe, Chairman; New Hampshire, Amos Tuck;
Rhode Island, William W. Hoppin; New Jersey, Joseph F. Randolph;
Pennsylvania, Thomas E. Franklin; Delaware, George B. Rodney;
Maryland, John W. Crisfield; Virginia, William C. Rives; North Carolina,
Thomas Ruffin; Ohio, Reuben Hitchcock; Indiana, Godlove S. Orth.
The Conference then adjourned to meet at 12 o'clock  . to-morrow.
S E C O N D  D A Y .
W         , T      , February 5th, 1861.
T   Conference was called to order by the Chairman pro tem., pursuant to
adjournment, and the journal of the proceedings of the first day was read
and approved.
Mr. FRANKLIN, of Pennsylvania:—It is usual in bodies of this description
to take measures to ascertain who are and who are not duly accredited
members. We should have the names of all the Commissioners present
brought on to our records. I therefore move that a Committee of five be
appointed by the Chairman, to whom all credentials of members shall be
referred for examination and report.
The motion of Mr. F        was adopted unanimously, and the Chairman
announced as such Committee Mr. Summers, of Virginia; Mr. Franklin, of
Pennsylvania; Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky; Mr. Morehead, of North Carolina,
and Mr. Smith, of Indiana.
Mr. WICKLIFFE, of Kentucky:—I rise at this time for the purpose of
making the report of the Committee on Organization. I am instructed to
report that we recommend that the permanent officers of the Convention be
a President and Secretary, and that the Secretary have leave to appoint
assistants, not exceeding two in number, to assist him in the discharge of his
duties; and that the President of this Convention be J    T    , of
Virginia, and that C      J. W     , of Ohio, be its Secretary. The
committee also report a series of rules for the government of the
Convention.
Mr. CLAY, of Kentucky:—I move that the question upon accepting the
report be divided, and that it be first taken on that part of the report which
relates to the officers of the Convention.
Which was agreed to without objection.
It was then moved, and unanimously voted, that the part of the report
relating to officers, be accepted, and the officers designated be appointed.
The President pro tem. then appointed Mr. E    , of Ohio, and Mr.
M       , of Pennsylvania, to conduct the President elect to the chair.
President TYLER upon taking his seat proceeded to address the Convention
as follows:
Gentlemen, I fear you have committed a great error in appointing me to the
honorable position you have assigned me. A long separation from all
deliberative bodies has rendered the rules of their proceedings unfamiliar to
me, while I should find, in my own state of health, variable and fickle as it
is, sufficient reason to decline the honor of being your presiding officer.
But, in times like these, one has but little option left him. Personal
considerations should weigh but lightly in the balance. The country is in
danger; it is enough; one must take the place assigned him in the great work
of reconciliation and adjustment. The voice of Virginia has invited her co-
States to meet her in council. In the initiation of this Government, that same
voice was heard and complied with, and the results of seventy-odd years
have fully attested the wisdom of the decisions then adopted. Is the urgency
of her call now less great than it was then? Our godlike fathers created, we
have to preserve. They built up, through their wisdom and patriotism,
monuments which have eternized their names. You have before you,
gentlemen, a task equally grand, equally sublime, quite as full of glory and
immortality. You have to snatch from ruin a great and glorious
Confederation, to preserve the Government, and to renew and invigorate the
Constitution. If you reach the height of this great occasion, your children's
children will rise up and call you blessed. I confess myself to be ambitious
of sharing in the glory of accomplishing this grand and magnificent result.
To have our names enrolled in the Capitol, to be repeated by future
generations with grateful applause—this is an honor higher than the
mountains, more enduring than the monumental alabaster. Yes, Virginia's
voice, as in the olden time, has been heard. Her sister States meet her this
day at the council board. Vermont is here, bringing with her the memories
of the past, and reviving in the memories of all, her Ethan Allen and his
demand for the surrender of Ticonderoga, in the name of the Great Jehovah
and the American Congress. New Hampshire is here, her fame illustrated by
memorable annals, and still more lately as the birthplace of him who won
for himself the name of defender of the Constitution, and who wrote that
letter to John Taylor which has been enshrined in the hearts of his
countrymen. Massachusetts is not here. (Some member said "She is
coming.") I hope so, said Mr. T    , and that she will bring with her her
daughter Maine. I did not believe it could well be that the voice which in
other times was so familiar to her ears had been addressed to her in vain.
Connecticut is here, and she comes, I doubt not, in the spirit of R    
S      , whose name with our very children has become a household
word, and who was in life the embodiment of that sound practical sense
which befits the great lawgiver and constructer of governments. Rhode
Island, the land of R     W       , is here, one of the two last States, in
her jealousy of the public liberty, to give in her adhesion to the Constitution,
and among the earliest to hasten to its rescue. The great Empire State of
New York, represented thus far but by one delegate, is expected daily in
fuller force to join in the great work of healing the discontents of the times
and restoring the reign of fraternal feeling. New Jersey is also here, with the
memories of the past covering her all over. Trenton and Princeton live
immortal in story, the plains of the last incrimsoned with the hearts blood of
Virginia's sons. Among her delegation I rejoice to recognize a gallant son of
a signer of the immortal Declaration which announced to the world that
thirteen Provinces had become thirteen independent and sovereign States.
And here, too, is Delaware, the land of the B       and the R      ,
whose soil at Brandywine was moistened by the blood of Virginia's
youthful M     . Here is Maryland, whose massive columns wheeled into
line with those of Virginia in the contest for glory, and whose state house at
Annapolis was the theatre of the spectacle of a successful Commander,
who, after liberating his country, gladly ungirthed his sword, and laid it
down upon the altar of that country. Then comes Pennsylvania, rich in
revolutionary lore, bringing with her the deathless names of F        and
M     , and, I trust, ready to renew from the belfry of Independence Hall
the chimes of the old bell, which announced Freedom and Independence in
former days. All hail to North Carolina! with her Mecklenberg Declaration
in her hand, standing erect on the ground of her own probity and firmness in
the cause of public liberty, and represented in her attributes by her M    ,
and in this assembly by her distinguished son at no great distance from me.
Four daughters of Virginia also cluster around the council board on the
invitation of their ancient mother—the eldest, Kentucky, whose sons, under
the intrepid warrior A       W    , gave freedom of settlement to the
territory of her sister, Ohio. She extends her hand daily and hourly across la
belle riviere, to grasp the hand of some one of kindred blood of the noble
states of Indiana, and Illinois, and Ohio, who have grown up into powerful
States, already grand, potent, and almost imperial. Tennessee is not here,
but is coming—prevented only from being here by the floods which have
swollen her rivers. When she arrives, she will wear the badges on her
warrior crest of victories won in company with the Great West on many an
ensanguined plain, and standards torn from the hands of the conquerors at
Waterloo. Missouri, and Iowa, and Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota,
still linger behind, but it may be hoped that their hearts are with us in the
great work we have to do.
Gentlemen, the eyes of the whole country are turned to this assembly, in
expectation and hope. I trust that you may prove yourselves worthy of the
great occasion. Our ancestors, probably, committed a blunder in not having
fixed upon every fifth decade for a call of a general convention to amend
and reform the Constitution. On the contrary, they have made the
difficulties next to insurmountable to accomplish amendments to an
instrument which was perfect for five millions of people, but not wholly so
as to thirty millions. Your patriotism will surmount the difficulties, however
great, if you will but accomplish one triumph in advance, and that is, a
triumph over party. And what is party, when compared to the work of
rescuing one's country from danger? Do that, and one long, loud shout of
joy and gladness will resound throughout the land.
Mr. EWING:—I move that the remaining portion of the report of the
Committee on Organization be postponed until to-morrow.
The motion of Mr. E     was agreed to.
Mr. WICKLIFFE. I offer the following resolution:
Resolved, That the Conference shall be opened with prayer, and that the
clergymen of the city of Washington be requested to perform that service.
The resolution offered by Mr. W         was adopted, and prayer was then
offered by the Rev. Dr. P.D. G     , of Washington.
The PRESIDENT:—I have received a communication from the Messrs.
Willard, placing the Hall in which the Conference is now sitting at the
service of the Conference, while its sessions may continue; also, a
communication from the Mayor and Common Council of the City of
Washington, offering police officers to attend our sittings.
It was moved, and agreed to, that these offers be severally accepted.
Mr. JOHNSON, of Maryland:—I move that the President of the Conference
be requested to furnish a copy of his address to the Conference upon taking
the Chair, that it be entered upon the journal as a part of this day's
proceedings, and that the same be published.
Which motion was unanimously agreed to.
Mr. GRIMES, of Iowa:—I have received from the Governor of the State of
Iowa a communication, requesting myself and my colleague in the Senate
of the United States, and also the members representing that State in the
House of Representatives, to represent the State of Iowa here. I desire to
present his communication, that it may be referred to the Committee on
Credentials.
The communication was so referred, and on motion of Mr. W     , of
Ohio, the Conference adjourned.
T H I R D  D A Y .
W         , W        , February 6th, 1861.
T   Conference met at twelve o'clock, at noon, and was called to order by
the P        .
The Journal of yesterday was read, and after amendment, was approved.
Mr. SUMMERS:—I am instructed by the Committee on Credentials to
make a report. That committee has examined the credentials which have
been submitted to it, and finds the following-named gentlemen duly
accredited as members of this Conference:
New Hampshire.—Amos Tuck, Levi Chamberlain, Asa Fowler.
Vermont.—Hiland Hall, Lucius E. Chittenden, Levi Underwood, H. Henry
Baxter, B.D. Harris.
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations.—Samuel Ames, Alexander
Duncan, William W. Hoppin, George H. Browne, Samuel G. Arnold.
Connecticut.—Roger S. Baldwin, Chauncey F. Cleveland, Charles J.
McCurdy, James T. Pratt, Robbins Battell, Amos S. Treat.
New Jersey.—Charles S. Olden, Peter D. Vroom, Robert F. Stockton,
Benjamin Williamson, Joseph F. Randolph, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen,
Rodman M. Price, William C. Alexander, Thomas J. Stryker.
Pennsylvania.—Thomas White, James Pollock, William M. Meredith,
David Wilmot, A.W. Loomis, Thomas E. Franklin, William McKennan.
Delaware.—George B. Rodney, Daniel M. Bates, Henry Ridgely, John W.
Houston, William Cannon.
Maryland.—John F. Dent, Reverdy Johnson, John W. Crisfield, Augustus
W. Bradford, William T. Goldsborough, J. Dixon Roman, Benjamin C.
Howard.
Virginia.—John Tyler, William C. Rives, John W. Brockenbrough, George
W. Summers, James A. Seddon.
North Carolina.—George Davis, Thomas Ruffin, David S. Reid, Daniel M.
Barringer, J.M. Morehead.
Kentucky.—William O. Butler, James B. Clay, Joshua F. Bell, Charles S.
Morehead, James Guthrie, Charles A. Wickliffe.
Ohio.—John C. Wright, Salmon P. Chase, William S. Groesbeck, Franklin
C. Backus, Reuben Hitchcock, Thomas Ewing, Valentine B. Horton.
Indiana.—Caleb B. Smith, Pleasant A. Hackleman, Godlove S. Orth,
E.W.H. Ellis, Thomas C. Slaughter.
Iowa.—James W. Grimes, Samuel H. Curtis, William Vandever.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I move that the Secretary be authorized to employ one
or more assistants. I am advised that the Secretary cannot perform his duties
without assistance, and I see no objection to giving him this authority.
The motion of Mr. W         was agreed to.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I now desire to call up the remaining portion of the
report of the Committee on Rules and Organization, and to move its
adoption at the present time. These Rules are substantially the same as those
which were adopted by the convention which proposed our present
Constitution. The rule which we have reported securing secrecy, so far as
our proceedings are concerned, has been made the subject of much
discussion in the committee; and it was at first thought best to recommend a
modification of it. But upon reflection and consideration, and in view of the
fact that, while the rule reported requires that secrecy should be preserved
in regard to all that is said or done in this Conference, it does not prevent
any member from expressing his own hopes or predictions upon the final
result of our deliberations, we have thought best to let it remain as it is.
Mr. SEDDON:—I desire to offer an amendment to this portion of the report
of the committee, which I will read for the information of the Conference. It
is as follows:
"Resolved, That no part of the Journal be published without the order or
leave of the Conference, and that no copies of the whole or any part be
furnished or allowed, except to members, who shall be privileged to
communicate the same to the authorities or deliberative assemblies of their
respective States, when deemed judicious or appropriate, under their
instructions, and that nothing spoken in the House be printed or otherwise
published; but private communications respecting the proceedings and
debates, while recommended to be with caution and reserve, are allowed at
the discretion of each member."
It may be thought, that in offering this resolution, I am seeking a different
end from the one I proposed yesterday, when I advocated the proposition of
excluding reporters from our sessions, and insisted that our proceedings
should be at all times under the seal of secrecy. Such, however, is not my
purpose. But some discretion must be allowed us, in order that we may
conform to and carry out the spirit of the resolutions under which we
respectively act. This is especially true in relation to myself and my
colleagues. The resolutions under which we are acting, require that we
should from time to time communicate to the legislature of Virginia the
proceedings of this body, and to express our own opinions of the prospect
which may exist of the settlement of existing difficulties. The
Commissioners from Virginia would be placed in a delicate, not to say an
awkward position, by the adoption of a rule here which would absolutely
prohibit such communications. I hope my amendment may be adopted.
Mr. TUCK:—Would not the purpose of the gentleman from Virginia be
answered by giving any delegation leave to communicate any action
actually taken by the Conference, with their own opinions as to the probable
result of our deliberations?
Mr. SEDDON:—Those opinions would possess no value, unless the facts
and circumstances are communicated upon which they are founded. It is
very clear to me, that the best course will be to entrust to the discretion of
each member the privilege of making these communications, trusting that
he will not abuse the confidence thus given.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I hope we have all come here with an earnest desire to
harmonize our conflicting opinions, and to unite upon some plan which will
settle our troubles and save the union of the States. The South has spoken of
the North in very severe terms, and the North has not been slow in returning
the compliment. If we come finally, to any definite result satisfactory to
either side, it must be by mutual concessions, by confessing our sins to each
other, and endeavoring to live harmoniously together in future. In my
judgment, secrecy is absolutely indispensable to successful action here. I do
not wish to be precluded from abandoning a position to-morrow, if I see
cause for it, which I have taken to-day. If the proceedings, and especially
the debates of this Conference, are made public from day to day, they will
go into the newspapers and be made the subject of comment, favorable or
otherwise. The necessary result will be, that when a member is understood
to have committed himself to a particular proposition, or any special course
of policy, that pride of opinion, which we all possess, will render any
change of policy on his part difficult, if not impossible. I should sincerely
regret the adoption of the resolution of the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—I move that the portion of the committee's report under
consideration, together with the resolution of Mr. S     , be recommitted
to the Committee on Rules and Organization.
The motion of Mr. R        was agreed to.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I have an idea relating to the plan which should be
adopted to carry into effect the purpose of this Conference. I wish to
propose it. We have come together upon the invitation of the glorious old
commonwealth of Virginia, the mother of States and Statesmen. We have
come from the North and the South, from the East and the West, to see
whether our wisdom can devise some means to avert the dangers which
threaten to destroy this noble Republic, founded by the wisdom and
patriotism of our ancestors. I hope we are animated by a common purpose.
The storm is threatening. The horizon is covered with dark and portentous
clouds. Section is arrayed against section, and already seven of our sister
States have separated from us and are proceeding to establish an
independent Confederation. War! Civil War! is impending over us. It must
be averted! Who does not know that such a war, among such a people, must
be, if it comes, a war of extermination.
Mr. P        , I move the adoption of the resolution which I now send to
the chair.
The resolution of Mr. G       was read as follows:
Resolved, That a committee of one from each State be appointed by the
Commissioners thereof, to be nominated to the President, and to be
appointed by him, to whom shall be referred the resolutions of the State of
Virginia, and the other States represented, and all propositions for the
adjustment of existing difficulties between States, with authority to report
what they may deem right, necessary, and proper to restore harmony and
preserve the Union, and that they report on or before Friday next.
Mr. SEDDON:—It appears to me that the mode pointed out by the
resolution introduced by the gentleman from Kentucky, is neither the one
most appropriate nor expeditious for accomplishing the result desired. We
are convened under the invitation of the State of Virginia; and the same
invitation that brings us here, proposes the basis for our deliberation and
action. Virginia has stated what will be satisfactory to her; not as an
ultimatum, but as a basis of adjustment. It appears to me that the proper
course would be, to take up the propositions of Virginia—propose
amendments to them—discuss them, and in the end determine how far they
shall be adopted. The adoption of the resolution proposed, transfers the
labors of this Conference, not in itself too large for convenient deliberation,
to a committee. That committee is to discuss the various propositions
offered and report the result. What, in the mean time, is this Conference to
do? Nothing whatever! We are to meet here from day to day and adjourn,
no one knows how long, until this committee reports, and then the
discussion will commence which ought to commence now. Mr. P        ,
if any thing is accomplished, it must be accomplished speedily. Events are
on the wing. Already in my State the delegates are elected to a Convention,
which is to meet next week, to consider the subject which now engrosses
the minds of the American people. I hope my suggestion may meet with
favor in the Conference.
Mr. EWING:—I cannot agree with the gentleman from Virginia, for reasons
which must be obvious to all. I do not think Virginia intended to dictate the
terms upon which we were to act. I am in favor of the resolution, but would
make one suggestion in relation to it. By its terms the committee is to report
on Friday, if it can properly do so. I suggest that the committee should have
leave to sit during the sessions of the Conference. In this way our business
may be greatly expedited.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—It gives me pleasure to accept the modification proposed
by the gentleman from Ohio. I should have incorporated it into my
resolution.
The resolution as modified was then adopted by the Conference without a
division.
The PRESIDENT:—I will take this occasion to announce a committee to
carry into effect the determination of the Conference relating to the
obtaining of the services of clergymen to open the proceedings of the
Conference daily with prayer. The Chair appoints as such committee, Mr.
R       , of New Jersey, Mr. W        , of Kentucky, and Mr. J      ,
of Maryland.
Mr. JOHNSON:—It appears to me very appropriate, in view of the occasion
which has brought us together, that the members of this Conference should
pay their respects in a body to the President of the United States. I therefore
move that we call upon him in a body at such a time as will be most
agreeable to him; such time to be ascertained by the President of this
Conference.
Which motion was unanimously agreed to.
Mr. CLAY:—I move the reconsideration of the vote by which the portion of
the report of the Committee on Rules and Organization not yet adopted was
recommitted to that committee. I do this in order that the Conference may
now proceed to the consideration of those rules which may be adopted
without much difference of opinion.
The vote was thereupon reconsidered, and the following rules were
severally read and adopted. The remaining rules recommended were
recommitted to the committee:
RULES.
I. A Convention to do business, shall consist of the Commissioners of not
less than seven States; and all questions shall be decided by the greater
number of those which be fully represented. But a less number than seven
may adjourn from day to day.
II. Immediately after the President shall have taken the chair, and the
members their seats, the minutes of the preceding day shall be read by the
Secretary.
III. Every member, rising to speak, shall address the President; and while he
shall be speaking none shall pass between them, or hold discourse with
another, or read a book, pamphlet, or paper, printed or manuscript; and of
two members rising to speak at the same time, the President shall name him
who shall first be heard.
IV. A member shall not speak oftener than twice, without special leave upon
the same question; and not a second time before every other who had been
silent shall have been heard, if he choose to speak upon the subject.
V. A motion made and seconded, shall be repeated; and if written, as it shall
be when any member shall so require, read aloud by the Secretary before it
shall be debated; and may be withdrawn at any time before the vote upon it
shall have been declared.
VI. Orders of the day shall be read next after the minutes, and either
discussed or postponed, before any other business shall be introduced.
VII. When a debate shall arise upon a question, no motion, other than to
amend the question, to commit it, or to postpone the debate, shall be
received.
VIII. A question which is complicated, shall, at the request of any member,
be divided and put separately upon the propositions of which it is
compounded.
IX. A writing which contains any matter brought on to be considered, shall
be read once, throughout, for information; then by paragraphs, to be
debated, and again with the amendments, if any, made on the second
reading, and afterwards the question shall be put upon the whole, as
amended or approved in the original form, as the case may be.
X. Committees shall be appointed by the President, unless otherwise
ordered by the Convention.
XI. A member may be called to order by another member, as well as by the
President, and may be allowed to explain his conduct or expressions
supposed to be reprehensible. And all questions of order shall be decided by
the President, without appeal or debate.
XII. Upon a question to adjourn for the day, which may be made at any
time, if it be seconded, the question shall be put without debate.
XIII. When the Convention shall adjourn, every member shall stand in his
place until the President pass him.
XIV. That no member be absent from the Convention, so as to interrupt the
representation of the State, without leave.
XV. That Committees do not sit while the Convention shall be, or ought to
be sitting, without leave of the Convention.
XVI. That no copy be taken of any entry on the Journal, during the sitting
of the Convention, without leave of the Convention.
XVII. That members only be permitted to inspect the Journal.
XVIII. Mode of Voting. All votes shall be taken by States, and each State to
give one vote. The yeas and nays of the members shall not be given or
published—only the decision by States.
After the adoption of the foregoing Rules, the Conference adjourned until
10 o'clock to-morrow morning.
F O U R T H  D A Y .
W         , T       , February 7th, 1861.
T   Conference convened, pursuant to the adjournment yesterday, at 10
o'clock  . .
It was called to order by President T    , and prayer was offered by Rev.
Dr. P   , of Washington.
The Journal of yesterday was read, and after sundry amendments, was
approved.
Messrs. J.H. P       , J    S      , W.W. H     , Jr., and —— Olcott,
took their places as Assistant Secretaries.
President TYLER:—Gentlemen of the Conference, as directed by the
resolution which you adopted yesterday, I addressed a note to the President
of the United States, asking at what hour it would be agreeable to him that
this Conference should call on him in a body. To this note I have received a
reply which will be read by the Secretary.
The Secretary then read the following note from the President:
E         M      , February 6th, 1861.
My D    S  :—I shall feel greatly honored to receive the gentlemen
composing the Convention of Commissioners from the several States, on
any day and at any hour most convenient to themselves. I shall name to-
morrow (Thursday) at 11 or 3 o'clock, though any other time would be




His Excellency, J    T    .
The PRESIDENT:—What order will the Conference take upon the subject?
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I move that the members of this Conference call in a
body upon the President of the United States this morning, at 11 o'clock.
Mr. G      '  motion was adopted unanimously.
Mr. SUMMERS:—I am instructed by the Committee on Credentials further
to report, that the committee have examined the credentials of the following
gentlemen, and find them duly accredited as members of this body:
New York.—William E. Dodge.
Tennessee.—Samuel Milligan, Josiah M. Anderson, Robert L. Carruthers,
Thomas Martin, Isaac R. Hawkins, R.J. McKinney, Alvin Cullom, William
P. Hickerson, George W. Jones, F.K. Zollicoffer, William H. Stephens,
A.W.O. Totten.
Illinois.—John Wood, Stephen T. Logan, John M. Palmer, Burton C. Cook,
Thomas J. Turner.
Which report was accepted, and the names of the Commissioners were
entered upon the record.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—Certain printing has been ordered, but no provision has
been made for paying for it. The Committee on Rules have therefore
requested me to report the following resolution:
Resolved, That the Secretary procure for the use of the Convention the
necessary stationery, and also provide for such printing as may be ordered.
That the Journal, up to and including this day's proceeding, as well as the
Rules, be printed for the use of the members.
The resolution of Mr. W         was agreed to.
The PRESIDENT:—The respective delegations have recommended, and
the Chair announces the names of the following gentlemen to compose the
committee ordered to be raised under the resolution of Mr. G      , which
was adopted yesterday:—New Hampshire, Asa Fowler; Vermont, Hiland
Hall; Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Samuel Ames; Connecticut,
Roger S. Baldwin; New Jersey, Joseph F. Randolph; Pennsylvania, Thomas
White; Delaware, Daniel M. Bates; North Carolina, Thomas Ruffin;
Kentucky, James Guthrie; Ohio, Thomas Ewing; Indiana, Caleb B. Smith;
Illinois, Stephen T. Logan; Iowa, James Harlan; Maryland, Reverdy
Johnson; Virginia, James A. Seddon.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—The Committee on Rules have further considered the
rule relating to the secrecy of the debates and proceedings of this body, and
their convictions as to the necessity and propriety of its adoption remain
unchanged. The prospect of an ultimate agreement among the
Commissioners composing this body, in the opinion of the committee,
would be materially lessened if all or any of its debates should be made
public, for reasons which have already been stated. If any gentleman should
desire to communicate with the Executive or Legislative authorities of his
State any facts, during the progress of our business, I apprehend little
difficulty would be experienced in obtaining the leave of the Convention.
We therefore recommend the following Rule:
XIX. That nothing spoken in the Convention be printed, or otherwise
published or communicated, without leave.
Mr. SEDDON:—I do not desire to discuss the adoption of the rule under
consideration any further than I have already. The Commissioners from the
State of Virginia are appointed under resolutions which make it their duty to
communicate from time to time with her deliberative assemblies. We do not
wish to have our right to do so subject to the action of this or any other
body. It is no answer to this to say, that there is no doubt that the leave to
make the necessary communications will be accorded to us when we ask it.
We do not wish to ask it. We insist upon our rights in this respect, as it is
our duty to the State that sent us here to do.
The rule was adopted upon a count of the members voting.
On motion, the Convention adjourned.
After the adjournment, the Convention in a body called upon the P        
of the U      S     , when the several delegations were introduced by
President T    , and the several Commissioners were presented by the
chairmen of the several delegations.
F I F T H  D A Y .
W         , F     , February 8th, 1861.
T   Convention was called to order at 12 o'clock by President T    .
Prayer was offered by Rev. Dr. B     . After sundry amendments, the
Journal was approved.
Mr. SUMMERS:—I am directed by the Committee on Credentials to report
that they find the following gentlemen duly accredited as members of the
Convention:
New York.—David Dudley Field, William Curtis Noyes, James S.
Wadsworth, Erastus Corning, Amaziah B. James, James C. Smith, Addison
Gardner, Greene C. Bronson, John A. King, John E. Wool.
Massachusetts.—John Z. Goodrich, John M. Forbes, Richard P. Waters,
Theophilus P. Chandler, Francis B. Crowninshield, George S. Boutwell,
Charles Allen.
Missouri.—John D. Coalter, Alexander W. Doniphan, Waldo P. Johnson,
Aylett H. Buckner, Harrison Hough.
On motion of the respective delegations the following gentlemen were




Mr. GUTHRIE:—I am instructed by the committee raised upon the
resolution introduced by myself, to inform the Convention that that body is
not able to report to-day, agreeable to the suggestion made at the time they
were appointed. Several States are yet unrepresented on the committee, and
delegations from some of them have only arrived this morning. I am
therefore directed to ask for further time to make a report, assuring the
Convention, at the same time, that a report will be made at soon as a proper
regard to the interests of all sections will permit it to be done.
Mr. CLAY:—I move that the time for the report of the committee be
extended until Monday next. As in the mean time there will be little
business for the Convention to do, and that of a formal character, it might
be as well to adjourn from this time until Monday; and I move further, that
if delegates arrive from States now unrepresented, they may present their
credentials to the committee, and if no question arises on them, they may
then select a member of the committee on Mr. G      '  resolution, and
report his name to the Secretary of that committee.
Mr. SEDDON:—I object to an adjournment until Monday. We can meet
here to-morrow and do any business which may come before us.
The several motions of Mr. C   , with the alteration suggested by Mr.
S     , were then agreed to without a division.
Mr. ELLIS:—I move that the President be requested to issue cards of
admission to the members and officers of this Convention.
Which motion was adopted.
Mr. HITCHCOCK:—I would like to understand whether we all construe the
rule referring to the secrecy of our transactions alike. I am told that different
constructions are placed upon it by different members, and would suggest
the propriety of the P        '  giving his views of the meaning of the rule.
The PRESIDENT:—I understand, by the correct interpretation of the rule,
that nothing which is said or done in the Convention having reference to
any subject of business in it, can be spoken of or disclosed to any but
members.
The Convention then adjourned.
S I X T H  D A Y .
W         , S       , February 9th, 1861.
T   Convention was called to order by the P        . Prayer was offered
by Rev. Dr. B      . The Journal was read, corrected, and approved.
Mr. SUMMERS:—I am directed by the Committee on Credentials to report
as members of this Convention the names of the following gentlemen from
the State of Maine:—William P. Fessenden, Lot M. Morrill, Daniel E.
Somes, John J. Perry, Ezra B. French, Freeman H. Morse, Stephen Coburn,
Stephen C. Foster.
Mr. M      , of Maine, and Mr. C            , of Massachusetts, were
announced as members of the committee under the resolution of Mr.
G      .
Mr. TUCK:—I offer certain resolutions, which I desire to have printed and
referred to the Committee on Resolutions.
The resolutions of Mr. T    were read, ordered to be printed, and referred.
(These resolutions will be found on a subsequent page.)
Mr. CLAY:—I hold in my hand the proceedings of a very large Democratic
meeting recently held at New Haven, in the State of Connecticut. Among
them are certain resolutions, breathing a spirit of fervent devotion to the
Union, and expressing an anxious desire for the settlement of the difficult
questions now before the country. They have been sent to me with a request
that I should lay them before this Convention. Why I was selected by them
for the performance of this duty, I do not know, unless it was because, from
my name and associations, they thought an assurance might be found that I
participated in the sentiments expressed in the resolutions. I present them
with great pleasure, and ask that they may be referred to the Committee on
Resolutions.
The motion of Mr. C    was agreed to.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—I move that the Secretary be requested to furnish for
the use of the members a printed list of the delegates to and officers of this
Convention.
Which motion was adopted, and the Convention adjourned.
S E V E N T H  D A Y .
W         , M     , February 11th, 1861.
T   Convention was called to order by the P        . Prayer was offered
by Rev. Dr. G     .
After the reading and amendment of the Journal, Mr. G      , from the
Committee on Resolutions, asked for further time to make a general report
of the matters submitted to them, which was given; and thereupon Mr.
G      , from the same Committee, made the following report upon the
resolutions of a meeting in the State of Connecticut, which were referred to
that committee on motion of Mr. C   :
The committee to whom were referred certain resolutions of the Democratic
party of the State of Connecticut, report that in the opinion of the committee
it is inexpedient for this Convention to act upon any resolution purporting
to emanate from any political party whatever; and that the member of the
Convention by whom they were presented have leave to withdraw the same.
The PRESIDENT:—I take this opportunity to announce to the Convention
that the Door-keeper of the House of Representatives has transmitted to the
Chair cards admitting members of this body on to the floor of the House.
These cards will be delivered by the Secretary to such members as call for
them.
Mr. CHASE:—I move that any propositions or resolutions which members
of this Convention desire to have considered by the Committee on
Resolutions and Propositions, may be presented to the committee through
the Secretary, without being presented in Convention.
The motion was agreed to, and on motion the Convention adjourned until
Wednesday the 13th instant, at 12 o'clock  .
E I G H T H  D A Y .
W         , W        , February 13th, 1861.
T   Convention was called to order by the P        , and prayer was
offered by Rev. Dr. E      . The Journal, after sundry amendments, was
approved.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—The Committee on Resolutions, &c., have labored
diligently, and held protracted sessions, in the hope of being able to make
their report to-day. This they find themselves unable to do. They are fully
impressed with the necessity of immediate action, in view of the short time
that will remain for Congress to consider the action of this Convention, if it
shall become necessary to submit any proposition of this body to be acted
upon by that. I have no doubt we shall be able to report on Friday, and I ask
that we may have until that time to make a report.
The request of Mr. G       was acceded to.
Mr. SEDDON:—The time has now arrived when, as one of the
Commissioners from the State of Virginia, I find it necessary to ask the
leave of the Convention to communicate to the Legislative authorities of
Virginia, and to her Convention now in session, the state of the proceedings
before this body, and the committee. I ask for liberty to do so, and believe
that a proper regard to the instructions of the Legislature of the State under
which my appointment is made, requires that my request should be granted.
Mr. BARRINGER offered the following resolution:
Resolved, That the Commissioners of any State represented in this
Convention, upon their joint application, have leave to communicate to the
Legislature, Governor, or Convention of said State, the proceedings of this
body, or so much thereof as they may deem expedient.
Mr. SEDDON:—The passage of this resolution is all I ask.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN:—I move to amend the resolution by adding
thereto: "But not to communicate what has transpired in the committee,
before said committee has reported to the Convention."
Mr. SEDDON:—I do not deem the passage of the resolution at this moment
as very important. At the suggestion of several gentlemen, I will move to
lay it on the table, subject to be called up after Friday.
The Convention then adjourned to Friday at 12 o'clock.
On the evening of February 13th, the members of the Conference were
informed of the death of Hon. J    C. W     , of Ohio, who officiated as
temporary chairman previous to the permanent organization. In view of the
anxious desire of all the members to recognize their appreciation of this act
of Divine Providence, in removing from the sphere of his earthly labors one
of the most valued Commissioners in attendance, President T     was
requested to summon a special meeting of the Conference. In pursuance of
his invitation, all the members attended on the morning of February 14th,
when the following proceedings were had:
T       , W          C   , February 14th, 1861.
The Convention met in special session, pursuant to the call of the President.
The proceedings were opened with prayer by the Rev. Dr. H   .
The following letter from the Secretary, C      J. W     , was read, and
ordered to be entered upon the minutes:
W      '  H    , }W          C   , February 13th, 1861.
Hon. J    T    , President of Conference Convention.
D    S  :—I grieve to communicate to you the fact, that the delegate from
Ohio to this Conference Convention, the Hon. J    C. W     , departed
this life this day, the 13th February, at half-past one o'clock.
Judge W      came to this Convention with a heart filled with fear for the
safety of the Union. Though at an advanced age and nearly blind, he was
filled with an earnest desire to add his efforts to that of others of the
Convention called by the State of Virginia, and seek to agree on some
measures honorable to each and all, to effect the object. Since the arrival of
my father in Washington, he has been constant in his efforts to effect the
end in view, and he has had his heart cheered with the belief that the object
would be accomplished. Almost the last words that he uttered were, that he
believed the Union would be preserved. He desired me to say, if the Union
were preserved, he would die content. He called me to read to him, at 12
o'clock, the sections in the Constitution in regard to counting the votes, and
this request, and this reading, terminated his knowledge on earth. In this
desire of my father to do what he could, he pressed me to accompany him
on account of his blindness. Since the Convention honored me with the
appointment of Secretary, he required of me a promise that I would not
leave the position. When I read the section of the Constitution to him, he
required me then to leave him for the Convention. Whatever my personal
feelings may be, I deem the pledge made sacred. I therefore ask that I may




P.S.—J. H     P        will act for me in my absence.
The P         informed the Convention that the request of the Secretary
had been complied with. The P         asked what action the Convention
proposed to take on the subject for which they had been specially
assembled.
The Hon. SALMON P. CHASE, of Ohio, then said:—Mr. P        , since
we assembled yesterday in this Hall, it has pleased God to remove one of
our number from all participation in the concerns of earth. It is my painful
duty to announce to the Convention that J    C. W     , one of the
Commissioners from Ohio, is no more. Full of years, honored by the
confidence of the people, rich in large experience and ripened wisdom, and
devoted in all his affections and all his powers to his country, and his whole
country, he has been called from our midst at the very moment when the
prudence and patriotism of his counsels seemed most needed. Such are the
mysterious ways of Divine Providence. Judge W      was born in
Wethersfield, Connecticut, on the 10th of August, 1784. The death of his
parents made him an orphan in infancy; and he had little to depend upon in
youth and early manhood, save his own energies and God's blessing. He
was married, while young, to a daughter of Thomas Collier, of Litchfield,
and for several years after resided at Troy, New York. When about twenty-
six years old he removed to Steubenville, in Ohio, where he commenced the
practice of the law, and rapidly rose to distinction in the profession. In 1822
he was elected a representative in Congress, where he became the associate
and friend of Clay and Webster, and proved himself, on many occasions,
worthy of their association and friendship.
After serving several terms in Congress, he was elected a Judge of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, and, in 1834, removed from Steubenville to the
city of Cincinnati. Resigning his seat soon afterwards, he resumed the
labors of the bar, and, ever zealous for the improvement and elevation of the
profession, established, in association with others, the Cincinnati law
school.
In 1840, upon the dying request of C       H      , the veteran editor
of the "Cincinnati Gazette," Judge W      assumed the editorial control of
that Journal, and retained that position until impaired vision, in 1853,
admonished him of the necessity of withdrawing from labors too severe.
Thenceforward engaged in moderate labors, surrounded by affectionate
relatives, enjoying the respect and confidence of his fellow-citizens, and
manifesting always the liveliest concern in whatever related to the welfare
and honor of his State and his country, he lived in tranquil retirement, until
called by the Governor of Ohio, with the approbation of the Senate, to take
part in the deliberations of this Conference Convention.
It was but a just tribute, sir, to his honored age, illustrated by abilities, by
virtues, and by services, that he was unanimously selected as its temporary
President. His interest in the great purpose of our assembling was profound
and earnest. His labors to promote an auspicious result of its deliberations
were active and constant. And when fatal disease assailed his life, and his
enfeebled powers yielded to its virulence, his last utterances were of the
Constitution and the Union.
Mr. P        , Judge W      was my friend. His approval cheered and
encouraged my own humble labors in the service of the State. Pardon me if
I mingle private with public grief. He has gone from his last great labor. He
was not permitted to witness upon earth the result of the mission upon
which he and his associates, who here mourn his loss, were sent. God grant
that the clouds which now darken over us may speedily disperse, and that
through generous counsels and patriotic labors, guided by that good
Providence which directed our fathers in its original formation, the Union
of our States may be more than ever firmly cemented and established.
Mr. P        , I offer the following resolutions:
Resolved, That in the death of our late venerable colleague, the Hon. J   
C. W     , we mourn the loss to the State of Ohio, and to the nation at
large, of one of our most sagacious statesmen and distinguished patriots;
and to the cause of Union and conciliation, one of its most illustrious
supporters.
Resolved, That while we deplore with saddened hearts the affliction with
which an All-wise Providence has visited us, we know that no transition
from life to immortality could have been more grateful to him who has
fallen than this, in which his life has been offered a willing sacrifice in an
effort to restore harmony to his distracted country.
Resolved, That the members of this Convention tender their heartfelt
sympathies to the family of the deceased in this their great affliction.
Resolved, That these resolutions be spread upon the records of this body,
and a copy of the same be transmitted to the family of the deceased.
Mr. C       A. W        , of Kentucky, moved the adoption of the
resolutions, and said:
Mr. P        , I rise to tender my most cordial sanction and second to the
resolutions which have just been read.
Mr. W      and myself entered the councils of this nation thirty-seven
years ago. We served together during a period when party excitement ran
high upon questions more of a personal than a constitutional character. I can
bear witness not only to his ability, but to his personal integrity, and his
purity of political action through our term of service in the House of
Representatives. I have seldom met him since we separated at the
termination of his service and mine in that body, which occurred at pretty
near the same period; but whenever I have met him, I have found him the
same stern advocate of the Union and of constitutional liberty. I rejoiced,
therefore, when I found him in this hall on the day we first assembled here.
I knew his conservative disposition and principles, and I promised myself
that with his aid I could be more useful to my country and to my State than
without him. In conversing with him upon the difficulties which now divide
and distract our common country, I found him ready and willing,
conscientiously and patriotically, to do that which I thought that portion of
the country which I represent has a right to demand and expect of those
who represent a different portion of our Union. And if my friend from Ohio
(Mr. C    ) and his colleagues will permit me to mingle my sorrow at the
public loss, I will say nothing of the private bereavement of the family of
our deceased colleague. I leave him to his country, and to you, with this
testimony which I leave to his memory, his honesty of purpose and his
patriotic love of country.
The Hon. A.W. L     , of Pennsylvania, said:
Mr. P        , I desire to mingle my sincere regrets with those of the
members of this assemblage at the sad and unexpected occurrence which
deprived us of an able, experienced, and patriotic associate. My relations
with the deceased were, for many years, probably more intimate than those
which existed between him and any other member of this Convention. Forty
years have elapsed since I first made his acquaintance. He was then in full,
active, and extensive practice; a learned lawyer, an accomplished, skilful,
and successful advocate. During the succeeding year I came to the bar, and
resided and practiced in the same judicial circuit with our departed friend.
For many years the most kind and intimate relations existed between us—
sometimes colleagues, but usually opponents. So kind and genial was his
nature, so fair and liberal his practice, that during our entire intercourse not
an unkind word was uttered, and, so far as I know or believe, not an
unpleasant feeling existed in the bosom of either.
Though not gifted with the highest order of eloquence, he was clear,
distinct, and persuasive. His style of speaking resembled not the babbling
brook or the dashing cataract, but usually the limpid stream, gliding
gracefully amid fields and fruits and flowers, though sometimes assuming
the power and proportions of the majestic river, cutting its sure and certain
way to the mighty ocean.
His professional position, his kindness of heart, and genial humor, made
him an object of high respect and warm regard among his professional
brethren. And now, sir, as memory passes in review the pleasant incidents
which marked our social and professional intercourse, the smitten heart
shrinks in sadness and sorrow from the contemplation of our bereavement.
He adorned, sir, the bar, the bench, and the halls of Legislation. He
discharged, in all the relations of life, his obligations with fidelity. Of him it
might be truly said:
His life hath flowed a sacred stream, in
whose calm depths
The beautiful and pure alone are
mirrored;
Which, though shapes of ill may hover
o'er the surface,
Glides in light, and takes no shadows
from them.
But, sir, the great crowning virtue and glory of his life was his acceptance
of the mission which brought him here. Though whitened by the frosts of
nearly eighty winters, neither lofty mountains nor intervening space could
restrain his patriotic heart from a prompt response to the call of his country
to mingle his influence in a sincere and sacred effort to save the
Constitution and perpetuate the Union. He accepted the great trust; he
mingled in our deliberations, and has fallen in the discharge of his duty. He
has justly earned a title to the gratitude and respect of his country. May we
not, sir, fondly hope that he, who was called from the discharge of such
duties to the presence of his God, has passed from the sorrows of earth to
the happiness of Heaven, and to the full fruition of joys pure, perfect, and
eternal?
The Hon. THOMAS EWING, of Ohio, said:—I rise to bear my tribute of
respect to the memory of the deceased. I have known him long. On my first
entrance into active life, at the bar, I found him an able and distinguished
member. Since that time down to the present day, he has been largely
associated, in mind and person, with all the acts and progress, professional
and political, of my life. I feel his loss intensely; and I feel it with more
regret, because I know that on this occasion his voice would have been
potential in our counsels, and would have been united with all of us who
labor most earnestly for the preservation of the Union.
I tender my sympathies to the family of the deceased. I unite with them in
their regrets and in their hopes of the happy future to which he may have
attained.
The Hon. WILLIAM C. RIVES, of Virginia, said:—Though wholly
unprepared to say any thing worthy of the solemnity of this occasion, I feel
that I should be wanting, sir, in that sentiment of respect which is due to the
character of a distinguished citizen, if I were not to add to what has been so
eloquently spoken by others, a few words of personal recollection in regard
to our deceased friend Judge W     . It so happened that we entered the
public councils of the country at the same moment, and continued in them
for the same period of time. It is now just thirty-seven years since I had the
pleasure of meeting Judge W     , for the first time, in the House of
Representatives of the United States. I may be permitted to say, that there
were giants in those days. My honorable friend from Kentucky (Governor
W        ), who has already so feelingly addressed the Convention, will
recollect that on the roll of the House of Representatives at that time stood
the names of W       and E      , of O      and S     , of S       
and of H       , of L     M L   , of the immortal C   , and B      
and R      , and other gentlemen known to fame from the State which I
have the honor to represent in this body, and L          of Louisiana,
M D      and H        of South Carolina, and other gentlemen who, on
the spur of the occasion, I am not now able to recall, but whose names will
forever shine upon the rolls of their country's glory. And yet in that body
Judge W     , then in the maturity of his powers, though not previously
known to the nation, vindicated an equal rank in debate with those
gentlemen whose names I have mentioned. Sir, I shall never forget with
what earnestness, with what manliness, with what integrity, with what
ability, he ever uttered his convictions of public duty, whatever they were,
in that consecrated hall.
After remaining here, I think, for six years, he retired to his own State for
the purpose of assuming the duties of a highly-important and dignified
office, which was soon followed by his retirement into the bosom of private
life, where he met a rich and ample solace for the storms of his public
career. He was followed there by the respect of his fellow-citizens
throughout the country, and the confidence of his own State, as we have
recently seen, by his being called from that honorable retirement to take
part in the grave and solemn duties of this assembly. Sir, he came among us
in obedience to the solemn call of patriotic duty, at a most exigent and
distressing period in our national annals. He came here on an errand of
peace, in the spirit of peace and conciliation. Such was the feeling
entertained toward him by the whole of this assembly, that without the
slightest preconcert, so far as I know, he was invited by general consent to
preside during the preliminary stages of the organization of this
Convention. I had an opportunity, from time to time, of private conversation
with the aged statesman. I found no member of the assembly I met here,
and, indeed, I have found nowhere any citizen of this wide Republic of
ours, whose heart was more deeply imbued with the spirit of conciliation
and of peace—of that spirit which was so solemnly and impressively
uttered in his last prayer, "May the Union be preserved." Sir, it is not given
to mortal man to choose the manner of his death; but if such were the
privilege accorded to any human being, what more glorious end could he,
appreciating a true fame, covet, than that which has been the lot of our
departed friend? Sir, I speak what I feel, and I dare say I express a sentiment
which has impressed itself upon many other bosoms in this assembly, when
I say that his sudden death in the midst of our deliberations, seems to me to
exalt—in some degree to canonize—our labors. This manifestation of the
visible hand of God among us, brings us in the immediate presence of those
solemn responsibilities which attach themselves to the discharge of our
duties here. I doubt not that every member of this assembly is already
deeply impressed with the solemnity of those duties, and I feel convinced
that there are few, if any, in this assembly, who would not lay down their
fleeting and feverish existence, and follow our deceased brother to his final
account, if by doing so they could restore peace and harmony to this
glorious Republic of ours.
It does not become me to make any professions of devotion to my country
—to my whole country—but this I will say, in the spirit of the last prayer of
my friend, that I should regard my poor life, such as it is, a cheap purchase
—the cheapest imaginable purchase—for that great boon to our country, the
restoration of its peace, of its harmony, of its unity, of its ancient
confederated strength and glory.
The question was taken, and the resolutions were unanimously adopted.
The body of Judge W      was then brought into the hall, preceded by
Rev. Dr. H   , who read the impressive service of the Episcopal Church. A
number of the members of the family, and of the friends of the deceased,
were present during the services.
The funeral cortege proceeded from the hall to the depot of the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad.
The following gentlemen were designated to act as pall-bearers on the
occasion:
Mr. Ewing, Mr. Chase,
Mr. Hitchcock, Mr. Loomis,
Mr. Backus, Mr. Groesbeck,
Mr. Wolcott, Mr. Stanton,
Mr. Sherman, Mr. Harlan,
Mr. Vinton, Mr. Gurley.
The proceedings upon the death of Judge W      were, by the Conference,
ordered to be published, and the special session closed.
N I N T H  D A Y .
W         , F     , February 15th, 1861.
T   Convention was called to order by President T    , and prayer was
offered by Rev. Mr. R     . The Journals of the 13th and 14th were read
and approved.
The PRESIDENT:—I have this morning received several communications
from different persons, which will be laid before the Convention. One is an
invitation from H       S    , inviting the members of the Convention to
visit his studio; also, a resolution of the House of Representatives,
authorizing the admission of members of this Convention to the floor of the
House. Also, a letter from J.E. S    , offering to the Convention certain
flags which possess historical interest, from the fact that they were used in
the convention which adopted the present Constitution of the United States.
Also, a communication from H       G. W     .
The communications were severally read and laid upon the table.
Mr. SUMMERS:—I am instructed by the Committee on Credentials to
inform the Convention that the committee has received satisfactory
evidence of the appointment by the Executive of Ohio of C.P. W      , as
a delegate to this Convention, in the place of J    C. W     , deceased.
Mr. ORTH:—I desire to offer the following resolutions, which I ask to have
read for the information of the Convention. I have no purpose to admit
spectators to seats on this floor, but in my judgment it is the right of the
country to know what we are doing here. My constituents will not be
satisfied with my course, unless I take means to give the public knowledge
of all our transactions. I am aware that this is an invasion of the rule already
adopted, requiring secrecy, but in my opinion no possible harm can come
from the daily publication of our debates. It is far better that true reports of
these debates should be made, than that the distorted and perverted accounts
which we see daily in the New York papers should be continued.
The resolutions were read, and are as follows:
Resolved, That Rules Sixteen (16) and Eighteen (18) of this Convention be,
and the same hereby are, rescinded.
Resolved, That the President is hereby authorized to grant cards of
admission to reporters of the press, not exceeding —— in number, which
shall entitle them to seats on the floor of the Convention, for the purpose of
reporting its proceedings.
Resolved, That no person be admitted to the floor of the Convention, except
the members, officers, or reporters.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I do not wish to prolong this discussion myself, nor to
cause it to be prolonged by others. I am sure that if we permit our debates to
be reported, we shall never reach a conclusion which will in the slightest
degree benefit the country. Every member will in that event wish to make a
set speech, some of them three or four. I wish to have our time used in
consultation and in action, not consumed in political speech-making. I do
not care what the newspapers say of us. I know their accounts are distorted;
but they would be distorted if we admitted reporters. Some of them assail us
as a convention of compromisers—as belonging to the sandstone stratum of
politics.
Mr. CHASE:—That is the formation which supports all others.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I know it, and I hope this Convention will prove to be
the stratum which supports and preserves the Union and the country. Let us
go on as we have begun, preserving secrecy; keeping our own counsels;
making no speeches for outside consumption or personal reputation. Let us
all keep steadily in mind the accomplishment of the great and good purpose
which brought us here, and nothing else.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—New Jersey does not wish to have time consumed in
making speeches. I think we should proceed at once to hear the report of the
committee. I move that the resolutions offered be laid upon the table.
Mr. ORTH:—I suppose this motion cuts off debate. I should much have
preferred to discuss the resolutions. I hope the motion will not prevail.
The motion to lay on the table passed in the affirmative by a viva voce vote.
The PRESIDENT:—Is the General Committee upon Propositions prepared
to report? If it is, their report is now in order.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—That committee has given earnest and careful
consideration to the subjects and propositions which have from time to time
been presented to it. It has held numerous and protracted sessions, and the
differences of opinion naturally existing between the members have been
discussed in a spirit of candor and conciliation. The committee have not
been so fortunate as to arrive at an unanimous conclusion. A majority of its
members, however, have agreed upon a report which we think ought to be
satisfactory to all sections of the Union, one which if adopted will, we
believe, accomplish the purpose so much desired by every patriotic citizen.
We think it will give peace to the country. In their behalf I have now the
honor to submit, for the consideration of the Conference, the following:
PROPOSALS OF AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES.
A       1. In all the territory of the United States not embraced within the
limits of the Cherokee treaty grant, north of a line from east to west on the
parallel of 36 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, involuntary servitude,
except in punishment of crime, is prohibited whilst it shall be under a
Territorial government; and in all the territory south of said line, the status
of persons owing service or labor, as it now exists, shall not be changed by
law while such territory shall be under a Territorial government; and neither
Congress nor the Territorial government shall have power to hinder or
prevent the taking to said territory of persons held to labor or involuntary
service, within the United States, according to the laws or usages of the
State from which such persons may be taken, nor to impair the rights
arising out of said relations, which shall be subject to judicial cognizance in
the federal courts, according to the common law; and when any territory
north or south of said line, within such boundary as Congress may
prescribe, shall contain a population required for a member of Congress,
according to the then federal ratio of representation, it shall, if its form of
government be republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing
with the original States, with or without involuntary service or labor, as the
Constitution of such new State may provide.
A       2. Territory shall not be acquired by the United States, unless by
treaty; nor, except for naval and commercial stations and depots, unless
such treaty shall be ratified by four-fifths of all members of the Senate.
A       3. Neither the Constitution, nor any amendment thereof, shall be
construed to give Congress power to regulate, abolish, or control within any
State or Territory of the United States, the relation established or recognized
by the laws thereof touching persons bound to labor or involuntary service
therein, nor to interfere with or abolish involuntary service in the District of
Columbia without the consent of Maryland and without the consent of the
owners, or making the owners who do not consent just compensation; nor
the power to interfere with or prohibit representatives and others from
bringing with them to the City of Washington, retaining, and taking away,
persons so bound to labor; nor the power to interfere with or abolish
involuntary service in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States within those States and Territories where the same is established or
recognized; nor the power to prohibit the removal or transportation, by land,
sea, or river, of persons held to labor or involuntary service in any State or
Territory of the United States to any other State or Territory thereof where it
is established or recognized by law or usage; and the right during
transportation of touching at ports, shores, and landings, and of landing in
case of distress, shall exist. Nor shall Congress have power to authorize any
higher rate of taxation on persons bound to labor than on land.
A       4. The third paragraph of the second section of the fourth article of
the Constitution shall not be construed to prevent any of the States, by
appropriate legislation, and through the action of their judicial and
ministerial officers, from enforcing the delivery of fugitives from labor to
the person to whom such service or labor is due.
A       5. The foreign slave-trade and the importation of slaves into the
United States and their Territories, from places beyond the present limits
thereof, are forever prohibited.
A       6. The first, second, third, and fifth articles, together with this
article of these amendments, and the third paragraph of the second section
of the first article of the Constitution, and the third paragraph of the second
section of the fourth article thereof, shall not be amended or abolished
without the consent of all the States.
A       7. Congress shall provide by law that the United States shall pay to
the owner the full value of his fugitive from labor, in all cases where the
marshal or other officer, whose duty it was to arrest such fugitive, was
prevented from so doing by violence or intimidation, or when, after arrest,
such fugitive was rescued by force, and the owner thereby prevented and
obstructed in the pursuit of his remedy for the recovery of such fugitive.
Mr. BALDWIN:—I have not been able to concur in opinion with those
members of the committee who have presented the propositions just
submitted. I do not deem them fair or equitable to the Free States, nor do I
think they are likely to secure approval in those States. As one member of
the minority, I have drawn up a report embodying my own views and
perhaps those of some of my colleagues, which I now present for the
consideration of the Conference:
MR. BALDWIN'S MINORITY REPORT.
The undersigned, one of the minority of the committee of one from each
State, to whom was referred the consideration of the resolutions of the State
of Virginia, and the other States represented, and all propositions for the
adjustment of existing differences between the States, with authority to
report what they deem right, necessary, and proper to restore harmony and
preserve the Union, and report thereon, entered upon the duties of the
committee with an anxious desire that they might be able to unite in the
recommendation of some plan which, on due deliberation, should seem best
adapted to maintain the dignity and authority of the Government of the
United States, and at the same time secure to the people of every section
that perfect equality of right to which they are entitled.
Convened, as we are, on the invitation of the Governor of Virginia, in
pursuance of the resolutions of the General Assembly of that State, with an
accompanying expression of the deliberate opinion of that body that, unless
the unhappy controversy which now divides the States shall be
satisfactorily adjusted, a permanent dissolution of the Union is inevitable;
and, being earnestly desirous of an adjustment thereof, in concurrence with
Virginia, in the spirit in which the Constitution was originally formed, and
consistently with its principles, so as to afford to the people of all the States
adequate security for all their rights, the attention of the undersigned was
necessarily led to the consideration of the extent and equality of our powers,
and to the propriety and expediency, under existing circumstances, of a
recommendation by this Conference Convention of any specific action by
Congress, whether of ordinary legislation, or in reference to constitutional
amendments to be proposed by Congress on its own responsibility to the
States.
A portion of the members of this Convention are delegated by the
Legislatures of their respective States, and are required to act under their
supervision and control, while others are the representatives only of the
Executives of their States, and, having no opportunity of consulting the
immediate representatives of the people, can only act on their individual
responsibility.
Among the resolutions and propositions suggesting modes of adjustment
appropriate to this occasion which were brought to the notice of the
committee, were the resolutions of the State of Kentucky recommending to
her sister States to unite with her in an application to Congress for the
calling of a Convention in the mode prescribed by the Constitution for
proposing amendments thereto.
The undersigned, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying resolution,
and others which have been herein indicated, is of opinion that the mode of
adjustment by a General Convention, as proposed by Kentucky, is the one
which affords the best assurance of an adjustment acceptable to the people
of every section, as it will afford to all the States which may desire
amendments, an opportunity of preparing them with care and deliberation,
and in such form as they may deem it expedient to prescribe, to be
submitted to the consideration and deliberate action of delegates duly
chosen and invested with equal powers from all the States.
The undersigned did not, therefore, deem it expedient that any of the
measures of adjustment proposed by the majority of the committee, should
be reported to this body to be discussed or acted upon by them, and he
respectfully submits as a substitute for the articles of amendment to the
Constitution, reported by the majority of the committee, the following
preamble and resolution, and respectfully recommends the adoption thereof.
ROGER S. BALDWIN.
Whereas, unhappy differences exist which have alienated from each other
portions of the people of the United States to such an extent as seriously to
disturb the peace of the nation, and impair the regular and efficient action of
the Government within the sphere of its constitutional powers and duties;
And whereas, the Legislature of the State of Kentucky has made application
to Congress to call a Convention for proposing amendments to the
Constitution of the United States;
And whereas, it is believed to be the opinion of the people of other States
that amendments to the Constitution are or may become necessary to secure
to the people of the United States, of every section, the full and equal
enjoyment of their rights and liberties, so far as the same may depend for
their security and protection on the powers granted to or withheld from the
General Government, in pursuance of the national purposes for which it
was ordained and established;
And whereas, it may be expedient that such amendments as any of the
States may desire to have proposed, should be presented to the Convention
in such form as the respective States desiring the same may deem proper;
This Convention does, therefore, recommend to the several States to unite
with Kentucky in her application to Congress to call a convention for
proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States, to be
submitted to the Legislatures of the several States, or to conventions
therein, for ratification, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be
proposed by Congress, in accordance with the provision in the fifth article
of the Constitution.
Mr. FIELD:—I do not concur in the conclusions to which the majority of
the committee have arrived. I may say that I wholly dissent from them. I
have not deemed it necessary to make a separate report. At a suitable time I
shall endeavor to make known to the Conference my views upon the topics
which have occupied the attention of the committee.
Mr. CROWNINSHIELD:—I occupy substantially the same position as Mr.
F    , and shall make my views known at a proper time.
Mr. SEDDON:—The report presented by the majority, I think, is a wide
departure from the course we should have adopted. Virginia has prepared
and presented a plan, and has invited this Conference to consider it. I think
we ought to take up her propositions, amend and perfect them, if need be,
and then adopt or reject them. To avoid all misconstruction as to my
individual opinions or position, I have reduced my views to writing, which,
with the leave of the Conference, I will now read.
No objection being made, Mr. S      proceeded to read the following:
REPORT OF MR. SEDDON.
The undersigned, acting on the recommendation of the Commissioners
from the State of Virginia, as a member of the committee appointed by this
Convention to consider and recommend propositions of adjustment, has not
been so happy as to accord with the report submitted by the majority; and as
he more widely dissents from the opinions entertained by the other
dissenting members, he feels constrained, in vindication of his position and
opinions, to present on his part this brief report, recommending, as a
substitute for the report of the majority, a proposition subjoined. To this
course he feels the more impelled, by deference to the resolutions of the
General Assembly of his State, inviting the assemblage of this Convention,
and suggesting a basis of adjustment.
These resolutions declare, that "in the opinion of the General Assembly of
Virginia the propositions embraced in the resolutions presented to the
Senate of the United States by the Hon. J    J. C         , so modified
as that the first article proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States shall apply to all the territory of the United States now held or
hereafter acquired south of latitude 36° 30´, and provided that slavery of the
African race shall be effectually protected as property therein during the
continuance of the territorial government, and the fourth article shall secure
to the owners of slaves the right of transit with their slaves between and
through the non-slaveholding States or Territories, constitute the basis of
such an adjustment of the unhappy controversy which now divides the
States of this Confederacy, as would be accepted by the people of this
Commonwealth."
From this resolution, it is clear that the General Assembly, in its declared
opinion of what would be acceptable to the people of Virginia, not only
required the Crittenden propositions as a basis, but also held the
modifications suggested in addition essential. In this the undersigned fully
concurs. But, in his opinion, the propositions reported by the majority do
not give, but materially weaken the Crittenden propositions themselves, and
fail to accord the modifications suggested. The undersigned therefore, feels
it his duty to submit and recommend, as a substitute, the resolutions
referred to, as proposed by the Hon. J    J. C         , with the
incorporation of the modifications suggested by Virginia explicitly
expressed, and with some alterations on points which, he is assured, would
make them more acceptable to that State, and, as he hopes, to the whole
Union. The propositions submitted are appended, marked No. 1.
The undersigned, while contenting himself, in the spirit of the action taken
by the General Assembly of his State, with the proposal of that substitute
for the majority report, would be untrue to his own convictions, shared, as
he believes, by the majority of the commissioners from Virginia, and to his
sense of duty, if he did not emphatically declare, as his settled and
deliberate judgment, that for permanent safety in this Union, to the
slaveholding States, and the restoration of integrity to the Union and
harmony and peace to the country, a guarantee of actual power in the
Constitution and in the working of the Government to the slaveholding and
minority section is indispensable. How such guarantee might be most
wisely contrived and judiciously adjusted to the frame of the Government,
the undersigned forbears now to inquire. He is not exclusively addicted to
any special plan, but believing that such guarantee might be adequately
afforded by a partition of power in the Senate between the two sections, and
by a recognition that ours is a Union of freedom and consent, not constraint
and force, he respectfully submits, for consideration by members of the
Convention, the plan hereto appended, marked No. 2.
Whether he shall feel bound to invoke the action of the Convention upon it,
may depend on the future manifestations of sentiment in this body.





Joint Resolutions proposing certain amendments to the Constitution
of the United States.
Whereas, serious and alarming dissensions have arisen between the
Northern and Southern States, concerning the rights and security of the
rights of the slaveholding States, and especially their rights in the common
territory of the United States; and whereas, it is eminently desirable and
proper that those dissensions, which now threaten the very existence of this
Union, should be permanently quieted and settled by constitutional
provisions, which shall do equal justice to all sections, and thereby restore
to the people that peace and good will which ought to prevail between all
the citizens of the United States: Therefore,
Resolved, by this Convention, that the following articles are hereby
approved and submitted to the Congress of the United States, with the
request that they may, by the requisite constitutional majority of two-thirds,
be recommended to the respective States of the Union, to be, when ratified
by Conventions of three-fourths of the States, valid and operative as
amendments of the Constitution of the Union.
A       1. In all the territory of the United States, now held or hereafter
acquired, situate north of latitude thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes,
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, is
prohibited, while such territory shall remain under territorial government. In
all the territory south of said line of latitude, slavery of the African race is
hereby recognized as existing, and shall not be interfered with by Congress,
but shall be protected as property by all the departments of the territorial
government during its continuance; and, when any territory, north or south
of said line, within such boundaries as Congress may prescribe, shall
contain the population requisite for a member of Congress, according to the
then federal ratio of representation of the people of the United States, it
shall, if its form of government be republican, be admitted into the Union
on an equal footing with the original States, with or without slavery, as the
Constitution of such new State may provide.
A       2. Congress shall have no power to abolish slavery in places under
its exclusive jurisdiction, and situate within the limits of States that permit
the holding of slaves.
A       3. Congress shall have no power to abolish slavery within the
District of Columbia, so long as it exists in the adjoining States of Virginia
and Maryland, or either, nor without the consent of the free white
inhabitants, nor without just compensation first made to such owners of
slaves as do not consent to such abolishment. Nor shall Congress at any
time prohibit officers of the Federal Government, or members of Congress,
whose duties require them to be in said District, from bringing with them
their slaves, and holding them as such during the time their duties may
require them to remain there, and afterwards taking them from the District.
A       4. Congress shall have no power to prohibit or hinder the
transportation of slaves from one State to another, or to a Territory in which
slaves are by law permitted to be held, whether that transportation be by
land, navigable rivers, or by the sea. And if such transportation be by sea,
the slaves shall be protected as property by the Federal Government. And
the right of transit by the owners with their slaves, in passing to or from one
slaveholding State or Territory to another, between and through the non-
slaveholding States and Territories, shall be protected. And in imposing
direct taxes pursuant to the Constitution, Congress shall have no power to
impose on slaves a higher rate of tax than on land, according to their just
value.
A       5. That, in addition to the provisions of the third paragraph of the
second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States,
Congress shall provide by law, that the United States shall pay to the owner
who shall apply for it, the full value of his fugitive slave, in all cases, when
the marshal, or other officer, whose duty it was to arrest said fugitive, was
prevented from so doing by violence or intimidation, or when, after arrest,
said fugitive was rescued by force, and the owner thereby prevented and
obstructed in the pursuit of his remedy for the recovery of his fugitive slave,
under the said clause of the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance
thereof. And in all such cases, when the United States shall pay for such
fugitive, they shall reimburse themselves by imposing and collecting a tax
on the county or city in which said violence, intimidation, or rescue was
committed, equal in amount to the sum paid by them, with the addition of
interest and the costs of collection; and the said county or city, after it has
paid said amount to the United States, may, for its indemnity, sue and
recover from the wrong-doers, or rescuers, by whom the owner was
prevented from the recovery of his fugitive slave, in like manner as the
owner himself might have sued and recovered.
A       6. No future amendment of the Constitution shall affect the five
preceding articles, nor the third paragraph of the second section of the first
article of the Constitution, nor the third paragraph of the second section of
the fourth article of said Constitution, and no amendment shall be made to
the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress any power to
abolish or interfere with slavery in any of the States, by whose laws it is or
may be allowed or permitted.
A       7, Sec. 1. The elective franchise and the right to hold office,
whether federal, State, territorial, or municipal, shall not be exercised by
persons who are, in whole or in part, of the African race.
And whereas, also, besides those causes of dissension embraced in the
foregoing amendments proposed to the Constitution of the United States,
there are others which come within the jurisdiction of Congress, and may be
remedied by its legislative power: and whereas it is the desire of this
Convention, as far its influence may extend, to remove all just cause for the
popular discontent and agitation which now disturb the peace of the
country, and threaten the stability of its institutions: Therefore,
1. Resolved, That the laws now in force for the recovery of fugitive slaves
are in strict pursuance of the plain and mandatory provisions of the
Constitution, and have been sanctioned as valid and constitutional by the
judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States; that the slaveholding
States are entitled to the faithful observance and execution of those laws,
and that they ought not to be repealed, or so modified or changed as to
impair their efficiency; and that laws ought to be made for the punishment
of those who attempt, by rescue of the slave or other illegal means, to
hinder or defeat the due execution of said laws.
2. That all State laws which conflict with the fugitive slave acts, or any
other constitutional acts of Congress, or which in their operation impede,
hinder, or delay the free course and due execution of any of said acts, are
null and void by the plain provisions of the Constitution of the United
States. Yet those State laws, void as they are, have given color to practices,
and led to consequences which have obstructed the due administration and
execution of acts of Congress, and especially the acts for the delivery of
fugitive slaves, and have thereby contributed much to the discord and
commotion now prevailing. This Convention, therefore, in the present
perilous juncture, does not deem it improper, respectfully and earnestly to
recommend the repeal of those laws to the several States which have
enacted them, or such legislative corrections or explanations of them as
may prevent their being used or perverted to such mischievous purposes.
3. That the act of the 18th of September, 1850, commonly called the
Fugitive Slave Law, ought to be so amended as to make the fee of the
Commissioner, mentioned in the eighth section of the act, equal in amount,
in the cases decided by him, whether his decision be in favor of or against
the claimant. And to avoid misconstructions, the last clause of the fifth
section, of said act, which authorizes the person holding a warrant for the
arrest or detention of a fugitive slave, to summon to his aid the posse
comitatus, and which declares it to be the duty of all good citizens to assist
him in its execution, ought to be so amended as to expressly limit the
authority and duty to cases in which there shall be resistance, or danger of
resistance or rescue.
4. That the laws for the suppression of the African slave-trade, and
especially those prohibiting the importation of slaves into the United States,
ought to be made effectual, and ought to be thoroughly executed, and all
further enactments necessary to those ends ought to be promptly made.
No. 2.
Proposed Amendments by Mr. Seddon.
To secure concert and promote harmony between the slaveholding and non-
slaveholding sections of the Union, the assent of the majority of the
Senators from the slaveholding States, and of the majority of the Senators
from the non-slaveholding States, shall be requisite to the validity of all
action of the Senate, on which the ayes and noes may be called by five
Senators.
And on a written declaration, signed and presented for record on the Journal
of the Senate by a majority of Senators from either the non-slaveholding or
slaveholding States, of their want of confidence in any officer or appointee
of the Executive, exercising functions exclusively or continuously within
the class of States, or any of them, which the signers represent, then such
officer shall be removed by the Executive; and if not removed at the
expiration of ten days from the presentation of such declaration, the office
shall be deemed vacant and open to new appointment.
The connection of every State with the Union is recognized as depending
on the continuing assent of its people, and compulsion shall in no case, nor
under any form, be attempted by the Government of the Union against a
State acting in its collective or organic capacity. Any State, by the action of
a convention of its people, assembled pursuant to a law of its Legislature, is
held entitled to dissolve its relation to the Federal Government, and
withdraw from the Union; and, on due notice given of such withdrawal to
the Executive of the Union, he shall appoint two Commissioners, to meet
two Commissioners to be appointed by the Governor of the State, who, with
the aid, if needed from the disagreement of the Commissioners, of an
umpire, to be selected by a majority of them, shall equitably adjudicate and
determine finally a partition of the rights and obligations of the withdrawing
State; and such adjudication and partition being accomplished, the
withdrawal of such State shall be recognized by the Executive, and
announced by public proclamation to the world.
But such withdrawing State shall not afterwards be readmitted into the
Union without the assent of two-thirds of the States constituting the Union
at the time of the proposed readmission.
Mr. COALTER:—It is proper that I should say a word in relation to the
position of Missouri in this Conference. It is expressly referred to in the
resolution under which we hold our appointment, passed by the Senate and
House of Representatives. It is believed by the people of Missouri that the
rights and privileges of the slaveholding States are in danger, and that the
time has arrived when they should be secured by additional guarantees.
Those guarantees must be such as will secure the honor and equal rights of
the slaveholding States.
I wish to say, further, that we, as Commissioners, must act at all times under
the control of the General Assembly or the State Convention of our State.
Before we can act definitely upon either of the propositions submitted, I
think it will be our duty to transmit them to the General Assembly for
instructions.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—The several reports are now before the Conference. I
presume it will be the desire of every member to give them a careful
examination. In order to prevent all unnecessary delay, I move that the
several reports be laid upon the table, that they be printed at once and
distributed to the members, and made the special order of the Conference
for 12 o'clock to-morrow.
The motion of Mr. W         was agreed to.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I have drawn up a preamble and a resolution which I
wish to offer for the consideration of the Conference. I shall not press action
upon them to-day, but desire to have them laid on the table and printed. I
shall call them up after the report of the General Committee is disposed of.
It would gratify me much, and I think greatly tend to the peace and
harmony of the country, if they could be adopted at once, and published. It
is well known to most of you that there is nothing in all the legislation or
action of the Free States, which has created so much excitement and alarm
among the people of the slaveholding States, as the passage of the so called
"personal liberty" acts. They are regarded as deliberate infractions and
breaches of the Constitution, and as attempts to nullify the operation of a
constitutional enactment of Congress. But I do not wish to invite discussion
upon the subject now; I hope my motion will not meet with objection.
The motion of Mr. W         was adopted, and the preamble and resolution
were presented as follows:
MR. WICKLIFFE'S PREAMBLE AND RESOLUTION.
Whereas, the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the
United States declares, "that no person held to service or labor in one State,
under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any
law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall
be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be
due."
This clause is one of the compromises without which no Constitution would
have been adopted. It was a guarantee to the States in which such labor and
service existed by law, that their rights should be respected and regarded by
all the States; and it is not within the competency of any State to disregard
the obligation it imposes, or to render it valueless by legislative enactments.
And whereas, the House of Representatives of the United States did, on the
—— day of February, by unanimous vote, declare that neither the Congress
of the United States nor the people or government of any non-slaveholding
State, has the constitutional right to legislate upon, or to interfere with
slavery in any slaveholding State in the Union.
This declaration is regarded by this Convention as an admission that the
statutes of those States, passed for the purpose of defeating the provision of
the Constitution aforesaid, and the laws of Congress made to enforce the
just and proper execution of this constitutional guarantee, are in violation of
the supreme law of the land.
The provisions of the statutes in many of the non-slaveholding States,
commonly known and called "personal liberty bills," amount in their
consequences to a practical nullification of the acts of Congress of February
12th, 1793, and September 18th, 1850, and are in violation of the second
section of the fourth article of the Constitution, as before stated. That the
spirit of those statutes appears to be repugnant to the principles of
compromise and mutual and liberal concessions which dictated the section
of the Constitution in question, and which pervades every part of that
instrument. It is, therefore, respectfully requested by this Convention that
the several States abrogate all such obnoxious enactments.
That the spirit of comity between the States, and the spirit of unity and
fraternity which should actuate all the people of these United States, require
that complete right and security of transit with all persons who owe them
service or labor should be allowed to the citizens of each State by the laws
of every other State.
Resolved, That a copy of the foregoing be sent by the President of this
Convention to the Governors of each of the free States, as the deliberate
judgment and opinion of this Convention, and that he request the same be
laid before their respective Legislatures.
Mr. CHASE:—I move that all the resolutions, of the States, under which
Commissioners have been appointed, or relating to subjects to come before
this Conference, be printed. I think this course convenient and necessary,
and one reason that I may assign is this: The opinion of the Legislature of
the State of Ohio, as expressed in one of the resolutions adopted by that
body, is, that it would have been wiser and better if the time for holding this
Conference had been deferred until a later period. Ohio has expressly said
in her resolutions that she is not prepared to assent to the terms of
settlement proposed by Virginia, and has expressed the opinion that the
Constitution as it now stands, if fairly interpreted and obeyed, contains
ample provision for the correction of all the evils which are claimed to
exist. Nevertheless she is willing to meet in a friendly spirit and consult
with her sister States. But the opinion extensively prevails that this
Conference ought not to have been called upon so short a notice and before
the inauguration of the incoming administration. We, the Commissioners
from that State, are instructed in the resolutions, to which I have referred, to
use our influence to procure an adjournment of this Conference, before final
action is taken, to the 4th of April next. I shall feel it my duty, at some
future time, to make a motion to that effect. The extent to which I shall urge
its adoption will depend in some measure upon the course of events and the
opinions of my colleagues. In the mean time I wish to see all the resolutions
printed.
The motion of Mr. C     was agreed to. The resolutions as printed will be
found in the appendix.
Mr. ALLEN, of Massachusetts:—Before the adjournment to-day I desire to
know what will be the order of business when these various reports come
up for discussion. By the general rules governing parliamentary
proceedings, to which I suppose we are subject, I understand the first
question will be upon the substitution of the minority report presented by
the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. B      ) for the report of the
majority; and that, upon that question, amendments may be offered, and
either accepted or rejected, both to the reports of the majority and the
minority. I think it would be well to have this matter understood. Am I right
in this?
The PRESIDENT:—The Chair understands that the gentleman from
Massachusetts has correctly pointed out the manner of proceeding.
On motion of Mr. H        , the Conference then adjourned until 12
o'clock to-morrow.
T E N T H  D A Y .
W         , S       , February 16th, 1861.
T   Conference was called to order by the P         at 12 o'clock  .
Prayer was offered by Rev. Dr. S         .
The Journal was read by the Assistant Secretary, Mr. P       , and, being
corrected, was approved.
The PRESIDENT:—I have received a communication from Mr. W.C.
J     , which I am requested to lay before the Conference. Should any
member desire to have it read, it will be presented upon motion. I am not
inclined to occupy the time of the Conference by reading it, unless some
member specially requests that it be read.
Mr. SEDDON:—Let it be laid on the table without reading.
The PRESIDENT:—That disposition will be made of it.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I am instructed, by the Committee on Rules and
Organization, to propose an amendment to the Eleventh Rule which has
been adopted. As the Rule now stands, no appeal is allowed from the
decision of the Chair upon questions of order. It is not probable that either
the Chair or the Conference would wish to be bound in that way. The
purpose of the resolution is to assimilate the Rule in this respect to the
practice in parliamentary bodies, and to allow an appeal from the decision
of the Chair to the Conference itself. I offer the following resolution:
"Resolved, That the Eleventh Rule of this Convention be so amended as to
allow an appeal from the decision of the P        , which appeal shall be
decided without debate."
On the passage of this resolution a division was called for, and upon a count
by the Secretaries, the P         declared it adopted.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I now offer another resolution—the following:
"Resolved, That in the discussions which may take place in this Convention,
no member shall be allowed to speak longer than thirty minutes."
We must all by this time be impressed with the necessity of prompt,
immediate, and efficient action. I do not charge any member of the body
with any purpose unnecessarily to consume the time of the Convention in
making speeches. I have no reason to believe that any such purpose exists.
But the present Congress is rapidly drawing to a close. If any plan is
adopted it will be nugatory, unless recommended by Congress. If we are to
sit here until each member of the Conference has spoken upon each
question presented, as many times and as long as he pleases, I fear the
Congress will close its labors before we do ours.
Mr. DAVIS:—I think thirty minutes quite too long. Our opinions are
formed. Before this time probably every member has determined his course
of action, and it will not be changed by debate. I move to strike out the
word "thirty," and insert the word "ten."
Mr. HITCHCOCK:—I am altogether opposed to this attempt in advance to
cut off or limit debate. I am sure it cannot meet with favor from the
Conference, for reasons so obvious that I will not occupy time in stating
them. I move to lay the resolution on the table.
Several gentlemen here interposed and appealed to Mr. H         to
withdraw his motion, as it would cut off all debate upon the merits of the
resolution. Mr. H         accordingly withdrew it.
Mr. SEDDON:—We have one rule already which prohibits any member
from speaking more than twice upon any question without special leave,
and a member cannot speak a second time until every other, who desires to
speak, has spoken. This was the rule, I believe, in the Convention that
formed our present Constitution, and no one complained of its operation
there. I am as much impressed with the necessity of expediting our action as
any one can be, and should be among the last to protract our sessions. But
this resolution looks too much like suppressing discussion—like cutting off
debate. I desire at the proper time to be heard upon the report which I have
submitted. It will be impossible to discuss the grave questions involved in it
in the space of a brief half hour.
Mr. CHASE:—I hope Governor W         will consent to a postponement
of his resolution for the present. It is anticipating a necessity that may not
arise. As yet no one has abused the privileges of debate. It is not well to
assume in advance that any one will do so.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I have no wish to press this resolution upon the
Convention, and it may be as well to postpone it for the present. I will move
its postponement until Tuesday morning next.
The motion to postpone was unanimously agreed to.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—I move that the hour of meeting hereafter be ten o'clock
in the morning.
Mr. JOHNSON, of Maryland:—I am sure that we shall all agree that this
hour is quite too early. I wish to make all reasonable progress, but I think
we shall find it difficult to secure a quorum at that hour. I move to amend
by inserting eleven o'clock.
Mr. EWING:—I think we had better let the hour of meeting remain where
our rules leave it. We shall find our labors severe enough if we commence
at twelve o'clock.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—I will accept the amendment of my colleague. Let the
time of meeting be eleven o'clock.
The motion of Mr. C         as amended was agreed to without a division.
Mr. CHASE:—I have a motion which I desire to make, and as I do not wish
to press it to a vote at the present time, I will move to lay it on the table. But
I wish to have it before the Conference. It is apparent to me that we ought to
pass it at some time, in order to give members who may belong to
delegations in which differences of opinion exist, an opportunity of
appearing on the record as they personally wish to vote. I move to amend
the first rule by inserting after the word "representing," the words, "The
yeas and nays of the delegates from each State, on any question, shall be
entered on the Journal when it is desired by any delegate."
On motion of Mr. C    , the amendment was laid upon the table.
The PRESIDENT:—The Conference will now proceed to the order of the
day, the question being upon the several reports presented by the General
Committee of one from each State.
The chair was taken, at the request of the P        , by Mr. A        , of
New Jersey.
Mr. BALDWIN:—I move to substitute the report presented by myself for
the report of the majority of the Committee. I will consent to strike out that
part of it which relates to—
Mr. TURNER:—Before the gentleman from Connecticut proceeds with his
argument I trust he will give way for the introduction of a resolution. I am
sure the time has come when we ought to pass such a resolution as I now
offer. I am unwilling to sit here longer unless some means are taken to
secure a report of our proceedings.
The PRESIDENT:—A resolution is not now in order.
Mr. TURNER:—I ask that the resolution may be read for the information of
the Conference, and also ask the leave of the Conference for its
introduction.
The resolution was read. It provided for the appointment of a stenographer.
The question was taken, and upon a division the leave to introduce it was
refused.
Mr. BALDWIN:—I rise for the purpose of supporting my motion to
substitute the report presented by myself for that presented by the majority
of the committee. As I was about to remark, when the resolution just
disposed of was introduced, I will consent to strike out all that portion of
my report which precedes the words "whereas unhappy differences," &c., in
order that the substitute offered may conform more nearly in substance to
the proposition of the majority. It seems desirable on all hands that
whatever we adopt here should be presented to Congress; and if it receives
the sanction of that body, should be by it presented to the States for their
approval. My report when thus amended will be in a proper form for such a
disposition.
My report, it will be noticed, is based mainly upon the action of the
Legislature of Kentucky. I have adopted those resolutions of Kentucky as
the basis of my recommendation, on account of the short time which
remains for any action at all, and because it appears to me that the kind of
proceeding indicated in them is best calculated to meet with favor in the
States which must approve any action taken here before it can be made
effectual.
The resolutions of Virginia, under which this Convention is called, were
adopted on the 19th of January last. The resolutions of Kentucky to which I
have referred were adopted on the 25th of the same month. It is not only the
necessary presumption that the latter were passed with a full knowledge of
the action of Virginia, but I understand from their reading that they were
adopted in consequence of the proposition of the latter State. I am disposed
to favor the line of policy initiated in the resolutions of the State of
Kentucky.
There are two ways of presenting amendments to the Constitution provided
in that instrument. By the first, by Congress whenever two-thirds of both
Houses shall deem such amendments necessary: or by the second, the same
body, upon the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the States,
may call a convention for the purpose of proposing amendments. These two
are the only modes in which, under that instrument, amendments can be
proposed to the Constitution. Either of these is adequate, and it was the
manifest intention of its framers to secure due consideration of any changes
which might be proposed to the fundamental law of our Government.
It is conceded on all hands that our action here will amount to nothing,
unless it meets the approval of Congress, and such proposals of amendment
as we shall agree upon are recommended by that body to the States for
adoption. The session of the present Congress is drawing to a close. There
remain only fifteen or sixteen days during which it can transact business.
Can any one suppose that in the present state of the country, with the large
number of important measures before Congress and awaiting its action, any
proposition of real importance emanating from this Conference could be
properly considered by either House in this short time? I am assuming just
now that this is a Convention which has the right, under the Constitution or
by precedent, to make such propositions. But if we do not remember, most
certainly Congress will, that however respectable this body may be,
however large may be the constituency which it represents, it is, after all,
one which has no existence under, and is not recognized by the
Constitution. In a recent speech in the Senate, Judge C       , of
Vermont, one of the ablest lawyers in that body, has more than intimated a
doubt whether Congress could, under the Constitution, entertain proposals
of amendment presented to it by such a body as this. But, waiving all
technicalities, the substantial objection which influences my mind is, that
the course of action proposed by the majority of the committee is contrary
to the spirit of the Constitution. When the people adopted that instrument
and subjected themselves to its operation, they intended and had a right to
understand that it should be amended only in the manner provided by the
Constitution itself. They did not intend that amendments should be
proposed under, or the existence of the Constitution endangered by any
extraneous pressure whatever. They wisely provided a way in which
amendments might be proposed, or rather two ways. Under either of them,
due examination and consideration was secured. They would not have
consented to any other way of proposing amendments. The General
Government, on the adoption of the Constitution, for all national purposes,
took the place of the State Governments. The people of the United States
from that time, in the language of a distinguished Senator from Kentucky,
owed a paramount allegiance to the General Government, and a subordinate
allegiance only to the State Governments. Changes in the Constitution,
then, can only be properly made in the manner provided by the
Constitution. Propositions for changes in it must come from the people, or
their representatives in Congress. Any attempt to coerce Congress, or to
influence its action in a manner not provided by the Constitution, is a
disregard of the rights of the people.
Why are we assembled here to urge these amendments upon Congress? to
induce Congress to recommend them to the people for adoption? Are we
the representatives of the people of the United States? Are we acting for
them, and as their authorized agents, in this endeavor to press amendments
upon the attention of Congress? Because, if our action is to have any effect
at all, it must be to induce Congress to conform to our wishes—to propose
the very amendments which we prepare.
The members of the House of Representatives were elected by the people.
They were selected to perform, and they do perform, their duties and
functions under the obligations of their official oaths. There is no question
about their agency, or their right to act in the premises. The Constitution
makes them the agents of the people. The Legislature of the State of
Kentucky, well understanding and appreciating the only true method in
which constitutional amendments should be proposed, with all the formality
of a legislative act approved by the Executive of that State, has applied to
Congress for the call of a convention for proposing amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, and has requested the President to lay
those resolutions immediately before Congress. She wishes other States to
unite with her in the preparing and proposing of amendments to the
Constitution. This is the correct, the legal, the patriotic course. This was
what Kentucky had the right to ask, and this is all she has asked.
Mr. B       here read the Kentucky resolutions, as follows:
Resolutions recommending a call for a Convention of the United States.
Whereas, The people of some of the States feel themselves deeply
aggrieved by the policy and measures which have been adopted by some of
the people of the other States; and whereas an amendment of the
Constitution of the United States is deemed indispensably necessary to
secure them against similar grievances in the future: Therefore,
Resolved, by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
that application to Congress to call a Convention for proposing amendments
to the Constitution of the United States, pursuant to the fifth article thereof,
be, and the same is hereby, now made by this General Assembly of
Kentucky; and we hereby invite our sister States to unite with us, without
delay, in a similar application to Congress.
Resolved, That the Governor of this State forthwith communicate the
foregoing resolution to the President of the United States, with the request
that he immediately place the same before Congress and the Executives of
the several States, with a request that they lay them before their respective
Legislatures.
Resolved, If the Convention be called in accordance with the provisions of
the foregoing resolutions, the Legislature of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky suggest for the consideration of that Convention, as a basis for
settling existing difficulties, the adoption, by way of amendments to the
Constitution, of the resolutions offered in the Senate of the United States by
the Hon. J    J. C         .
DAVID MERIWETHER,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
THOMAS P. PORTER,
Speaker of the Senate.
Approved January 25, 1861.
B. MAGOFFIN.
By the Governor:
THOMAS B. MONROE, J .,
Secretary of State.
Mr. BALDWIN continued:—Now, what are we asked to do by the majority
of the committee? It is not to unite with Kentucky or to accede to her
wishes for a convention of the States, under the Constitution, but to thwart
the wishes of Kentucky, and to induce Congress itself to originate and
propose amendments, or to propose those which we may originate.
Kentucky asks that the people of the States themselves might elect
delegates to a convention, who should carefully consider the whole subject.
The Kentucky resolutions were transmitted to the President, who sent them
to Congress, as he said, with great pleasure. Kentucky stated that she was in
favor of the so-called Crittenden resolutions, but she did not request
Congress to propose them as amendments to the Constitution.
How is this body constituted? Do we, its members, represent the people of
the several States? Have they had an opportunity to elect delegates, to select
those in whom they had confidence and whom they could trust? Not at all.
Why should we assemble here and express our wishes to Congress in
reference to the Constitution without permitting California, Oregon, or
many other States not here represented, to unite in our deliberations? I
cannot assent to such an unfair proceeding toward other States.
Suppose one-half the States should request Congress to propose
amendments, will Congress agree to it? No, sir. The Constitution provides
that Congress shall not propose amendments without the consent of two-
thirds of the States. Congress has not deemed any amendments necessary,
so far as we know, and yet a majority of the committee of this body ask
Congress to propose the amendments on our responsibility alone. It appears
to me, then, that this proceeding must be regarded not as one known to the
Constitution, but as a revolutionary proceeding. All the States are not
represented here, nor have all had an opportunity to be so represented.
Some of us are acting under the appointment of the Legislatures of our
States; other delegates are simply appointed by the Executives of their
States and are acting without any legal authority. We are not standing upon
equal ground; some are only acting upon their own judgment; others are
acting under instructions from their several Legislatures. If the Virginia
Legislature itself were here, its action would differ materially from the
present views of the delegates from that State.
But how is this? The Resolutions of the Legislature of Virginia make the
statement that unless these questions are settled, and settled soon, there is
danger of the disruption of the Union. Admit this to be so, and it furnishes
no reason for changing the mode of proposing constitutional amendments.
The Constitution knows no such danger. It is a self-sustaining Constitution,
and was supposed to contain within itself the power to secure its own
preservation. The Constitution ought not to be amended without the
deliberate action of the people themselves. I cannot and I will not disregard
their rights. I cannot recognize the claim that the secession of a State, by an
ordinance of its Convention, can carry either the State or its people out of
the Union. There is no such thing as legal secession, for there is no power
anywhere to take the people out of the protecting care of the Government,
or to relieve them from their obligations to it.
And where is the clause in the Constitution that authorizes the call upon
Congress to do what Congress is asked to do here? The Constitution was
adopted "to form a more perfect Union." The people were not to be allowed
to alter it, except in the two modes prescribed in it. The Convention which
adopted it did not propose that changes should be made in it without ample
time for deliberation and discussion. We are here, then, simply as conferees
from States expressing our individual opinions. We are now asked to
recommend to Congress amendments to our fundamental law; we have no
more right to do so than members of the so-called Southern Confederacy.
We, a mere fraction of the people, propose to unite in bringing a pressure
upon Congress, which shall induce it to propose these amendments. This
was not one of the modes contemplated or provided by the framers of that
sacred instrument.
General W          presided over the Convention which prepared our
Constitution. None knew better than he the reasons which made its adoption
necessary to the preservation of the Government—none knew better the
dangers which would probably surround it in after years. In that last counsel
of his to the American people—his Farewell Address—a paper drawn up
with the greatest deliberation, embodying opinions which he entertained as
the result of a long life of active study and reflection, he warns us against
all such proceedings as those contemplated by the majority of the
committee. I am sure the delegates from Virginia will not now refuse to
listen to the words of that illustrious man, uttered upon the most solemn and
momentous occasion of his life. Hear his words:
"Here, perhaps, I ought to stop. But a solicitude for your welfare, which
cannot end but with my life, and the apprehension of danger natural to that
solicitude, urge me on an occasion like the present to offer to your solemn
contemplation, and to recommend to your frequent review, some sentiments
which are the result of much reflection, of no inconsiderable observation,
and which appear to me all-important to the permanency of your felicity as
a people. These will be offered to you with more freedom, as you can only
see in them the disinterested warnings of a parting friend, who can possibly
have no personal motive to bias his counsel."
Again:
"But as it is easy to foresee, that from different causes and from different
quarters much pains will be taken, many artifices employed, to weaken in
your minds the conviction of this truth; as this is the point in your political
fortress, against which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be
most constantly and actively (though often covertly and insidiously)
directed, it is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate the
immense value of your national union to your collective and individual
happiness; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable
attachment to it; accustoming yourselves to think and speak of it as the
Palladium of your political safety and prosperity; watching for its
preservation with jealous anxiety; discountenancing whatever may suggest
even a suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned; and indignantly
frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of
our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link
together the various parts."
Are not these admonitions at the present moment peculiarly worthy of our
attention? And with them before us, can we invoke the action of Congress
for the alteration of the fundamental law of the Government in any other
ways than those provided in the Constitution? I earnestly hope not. If we act
at all, let us act in that regular method which gives time for consultation, for
consideration, and for action among the people of all the States. It appears
to me, that in adopting the line of policy proposed by the majority of the
committee, we are doing the very thing which W          warned us not
to do.
He said further:
"To the efficacy and permanency of your Union, a government for the
whole is indispensable. No alliances, however strict, between the parts, can
be an adequate substitute; they must inevitably experience the infractions
and interruptions which all alliances in all times have experienced. Sensible
of this momentous truth, you have improved upon your first essay, by the
adoption of a Constitution of Government better calculated than your
former for an intimate union, and for the efficacious management of your
common concerns. This Government, the offspring of our own choice,
uninfluenced and unmoved, adopted upon full investigation and mature
deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the distribution of its
powers, uniting security with energy, and containing within itself a
provision for its own amendment, has a just claim to your confidence and
your support. Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws,
acquiescence in its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental
maxims of true liberty. The basis of our political systems is the right of the
people to make and to alter their Constitutions of Government. But the
Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and
authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all."
And again:
"Toward the preservation of your Government, and the permanency of your
present happy state, it is requisite, not only that you should steadily
discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but also
that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however
specious the pretexts. One method of assault may be to affect in the forms
of the Constitution alterations which will impair the energy of the system,
and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the
changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at
least as necessary to fix the true character of governments, as of other
human institutions."
And still further:
"If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the
constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an
amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be
no change by usurpation; for though this in one instance may be the
instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments
are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent
evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield."
If we adopt the majority report here, we attempt to correct the Constitution
by an amendment in a way which, the Constitution does not designate.
W          says if there is any thing wrong, let it be corrected in a
constitutional way; and that, sir, is just what Kentucky has said, and that is
what every loyal State will say. Kentucky has inaugurated this proceeding,
and it is one eminently worthy of her—true as she has always been to the
Union. I cannot disregard this action of her Legislature. I do not think any
exigency exists which requires us to disregard it. I am ready, and my State
is ready, to confer with other States in reference to the Constitution, when
asked to do so in any of the modes pointed out by that instrument.
Entertaining these opinions, and with these convictions, I should be untrue
to my sense of duty to the Government and the State I represent, and to the
people of the United States, if I should consent to disregard the Constitution
and my obligations to it.
I have stated these considerations because they are powerful enough to
influence and control my course. Others must act upon their own
convictions. I have come to the conclusion that I ought to submit this
minority report with distrust, and with distrust only, because so many of the
able statesmen composing the majority of the committee have seen fit to
adopt different views. My report leaves every thing to the people, where I
think every such question should be left. When they consult together and
decide in the constitutional way I shall bow to their decision, whatever it
may be.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I do not propose to follow the gentleman (Mr. B      )
through all the ramifications of his speech. I have made the Constitution my
study for many years, and I have looked at the causes which give it strength
and the causes which give it weakness. I believe that our fathers organized
this Government in great wisdom. Its strength was in the affections of the
people. It never had any other strength, and it was never intended it should
have. It was not intended to be sustained by standing armies. Its strength
was intended to be placed in the affections of the people, and I had hoped it
would endure forever. Without the affections of the people it is the weakest
Government ever established. The people! What a spectacle do we witness
now! One portion of the people has lost confidence in the Government, and
now seven States have left it. The Government cannot realize that they are
gone. We have established the right of revolution, and that right gave to the
world this splendid Government. This was the first precedent; it will stand
for all time. It will always be acted upon when the people have lost
confidence in the Government. I hate that word secession, because it is a
cheat! Call things by their right names! The Southern States have framed
another Government; they have originated a revolution. There is no warrant
for it in the Constitution, but it is like the right of self-defence, which every
man may exercise. The gentleman from Connecticut has forgotten that the
Government made Congress the recipient of petitions. Why was this? It was
that Congress might be influenced by the wishes of the people and act upon
them.
We are twenty States assembled here. Congress has been in session more
than two months. The Government is falling to pieces. Congress has not
had the sagacity to give the necessary guarantees, the proper assurances to
the slaveholding States. This session will make a shameful chapter in the
history of this Government, to be hereafter written. Why should this
Congress refuse to give the people guarantees? The proudest Governments
in the world have been compelled to give their people guarantees.
We are assembled here to consult, and see what can be done; to consult as
representatives of the States. Is there any impropriety in our stating what
would restore confidence, to our putting this in writing, and to our
proposing the plan of restoration we think should be adopted to Congress,
and asking Congress to submit that plan to the people? Are we not the
representatives of the people, sent here to do what we think ought to be
done, and to ask Congress by way of petition to repair the foundations of
the Government? It is all legitimate, and legitimate in the most technical
sense.
Suppose we ask Congress to act on this proposition. We come directly from
the people. We ask Congress to submit a plan which we think will save the
Government, to the people. Is this taking any advantage of the States? They
can take all the time they wish for deliberation, and we can bring no
pressure to bear on them. In these times of great peril and trouble, we ask
Congress, backed by the moral force of the States we represent, to act and
save the country.
Two or three years hence will not answer. The foundations of the
Government are undermined and growing weaker every day, and if the
people who may give to it the necessary repair and strength do not do so,
they will be called to a fearful account. When the building is on fire, it is no
time to inquire who set it on fire. The North say the South did it, and the
South say the North did it.
We are all interested in this Government; we love the Constitution; we love
the Union; we want to repair it—we want to lay the foundation for bringing
back the States who have left us, by reason and not by the sword. The delay
which the gentleman proposes is too long; the Constitution has provided a
shorter way. In adopting that we are only recognizing the right of petition.
I, sir, will answer to Kentucky; I don't want the gentleman to come between
me and the people of Kentucky. He has no right to speak for the people of
that State—her representatives here have that right and will exercise it.
Why were these resolutions passed? Because Congress had failed to
provide the means needful to our safety. The resolutions under which the
Kentucky delegation came here were passed on the 29th, not the 25th of
January. They were passed after the resolutions to which the gentleman
refers. They ought to be regarded, as they are in fact, as the deliberate
expression of the Legislature of Kentucky in favor of this Conference. In
them it is stated that Kentucky heartily accepts the invitation of her old
mother Virginia. She acts in no unwilling spirit, she hastens to avail herself
of any opportunity to save the Government. She believes a favorable
opportunity is offered by this Conference. I repeat again: Adopt the report
of the majority of the committee and I will answer to Kentucky. I will go
farther. I will answer that Kentucky herself will adopt the very proposals of
amendment to the Constitution contained in the committee's report.
But the gentleman insists that the action proposed is not only improper but
that it is revolutionary. I deny that it is revolutionary. It is no more
revolutionary than any other form of petition. It is a petition sustained by
the moral force of twenty States—a petition which Congress will not
disregard.
But if the report of the majority is revolutionary, what of the gentleman's
report? Is that provided for by the Constitution? Is that according to the
forms of the Constitution? No, sir. Every argument he has brought against
the report of the majority, applies with equal force to his own. His views
will answer for those who are willing to stand by and see this Government
drift toward destruction—to see this country involved in civil war. It will
answer for those who will oppose all action, and who wish to do nothing at
all. His report is a new excuse for inaction. It will not answer for us.
Sir, we are acting under a fearful responsibility. The eyes of every true
patriot in the nation are turned toward this body. The people are awaiting
our action, with anxious and painful solicitude. They know and we know
that, unless the wisdom of this Conference shall devise some plan to satisfy
the people of the slaveholding States—to quiet their apprehensions, a
disruption of the Government is inevitable. If we adopt the gentleman's
views, go home and do nothing, we take the responsibility of breaking up
the Government.
I do not propose to discuss the merits of the majority report at the present
time. I have only sought to answer the arguments of the gentleman against
our acting at all. But I claim that this way of proceeding is entirely irregular.
The report of the gentleman is not in order. The report of the majority was
first presented, and should be first acted upon. I move to lay the report of
the gentleman from Connecticut upon the table.
Mr. LOGAN:—I would ask Mr. G       to withdraw his motion. If the
motion were adopted it would prevent discussion. It was expected that we
were to discuss the subject to-day. It is not of much consequence which
report is first acted upon. They are all before the Conference, and the merits
of all of them are under discussion.
Mr. G       withdrew the motion to lay on the table.
Mr. M       , of Kentucky, took the chair.
Mr. CURTIS:—I am a member of the present Congress; I have faithfully
attended its deliberations, and have anxiously watched its course. Mr.
G       will find that there are other and different objections to the line of
policy he proposes, to which he has not alluded, and which he does not
understand. But they are objections which have determined, and will
determine, the action of Congress. I would ask Mr. G       if the adoption
of his propositions, previous to their action, would have prevented the
States which have already seceded from going out.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I think it would have prevented them; all but South
Carolina. I did not intend to assail Congress, or any member of it,
personally.
Mr. CURTIS:—I do not agree with the gentleman. We know, and the
gentleman knows, that there has been for a long time a purpose, a great
conspiracy in this country, to begin and carry out a revolution. That has
been avowed over and over again in the halls of Congress. Can you expect a
member of Congress to do more than reflect the will of his constituents, the
will of his people? Would you have him do any thing different? There were
forty or fifty different propositions before the Congressional Committee of
Thirty-three. There are many here. There are many difficulties attending the
solution of this question in every respect. But we may as well speak plainly.
I cannot go for the majority report of the committee, and among other
reasons, for this reason: Their proposition makes all territory we may
hereafter acquire slave territory.
Mr. JOHNSON:—No; such is not the fact.
Mr. CURTIS:—I have read it, and such is my construction.
Mr. JOHNSON:—Such is not the intention.
Mr. CURTIS:—Any future territory which we acquire must be from the
south; we have extended as far as we can to the north and the northwest.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—Will you agree to divide all future territory?
Mr. CURTIS:—I will do almost any thing to save the Union. I will reflect
the will of my constituents. I think it ought not to be divided equally, but the
South ought to have its share. There is another trouble. Look at the
difficulty of getting any proposition through Congress. Congress has only
fifteen days of life. I ask you, even with general unanimity, if you can hope
to pass at this session any new proposals of amendments? If you do, you
will get along faster than is generally the case. There is one proposition
before Congress that I believe can pass. It is the Adams proposition, to
admit all the territories south at once. It is already slave territory. It is now
applying for admission. If this is acceptable to the South, I will go for it. We
are bound to admit it under the ordinance of 1789.
Mr. GOODRICH:—Do I understand my friend to claim that the ordinance
of 1789 involves a proposition to divide the territory?
Mr. CURTIS:—I understand that in connection with the subsequent
legislation it does.
Mr. GOODRICH:—The concession of territory from North Carolina
contains a prohibition from acting on the subject of slavery in the territory
ceded.
Mr. CURTIS:—I agree entirely with the gentleman. I am opposed to
slavery, but we must divide the territory. Let us leave slavery where it is,
and admit the territory for the purpose of settling the question. I do not
agree with Mr. G       that this Government depends on the will of the
people. It is a self-supporting government; it will support itself. There is no
justification for the action of the seceded States, and I cannot agree that
Congress is responsible for their action. The secession plot was formed
before Congress assembled. There was a power to check it. If our President
had acted as Jackson did, there would have been an end of it. The day for
hanging for treason has gone by. We must look at things as they are. Even
in battle the white flag must be respected. Let this subject be frankly
discussed in a conciliatory manner. If any State has the right to go out of the
Union at its own volition, then this Government, in my opinion, is not
worth the trouble of preserving. The President is sworn to protect and
uphold the Government. So long as there is a navy, an army, and a militia, it
is his sworn duty to uphold it—to uphold it as well against an attack from
States as from individuals. The Government is one of love and affection, it
is true, but it is also one of strength, and power. Where was there ever a
more indulgent people than ours? Our forts have been taken, our flag has
been fired upon, our property seized, and as yet nothing has been done. But
they will not be indulgent forever. Beware, gentlemen, how you force them
further. Gentlemen talk about the inefficiency of Congress; I wish there was
some efficiency in the Executive. If there was, or had been, our present
troubles would have been avoided.
Mr. TURNER:—I do not understand that the report of the majority is
applicable to future territory. I move the recommitment of the report, to
have that question settled.
Mr. JOHNSON:—It is true there are different constructions which may be
placed on the report. I think if it had been understood to apply to future
territory, it could not have received the support of a majority of the
committee. Mr. C         '  proposition applies to future territory. I
submitted a proposition to the committee also intended to apply to future
territory. A majority of the committee was opposed to it. Mr. E     drew
this part of the amendment, and there is some difference of opinion about it.
In my opinion the amendment would not apply to future territory, and I
intended at the proper time to offer an amendment which should make it
plain, and not leave it open to construction. Personally, I should be glad to
apply it to future territory, but I shall yield. I think if we can settle the
question now, there will be no further trouble. I do not believe any territory
will be acquired hereafter without great unanimity. It is not quite true,
although it may be probable, that the future territory will be south of the
line proposed.
Mr. TURNER:—I am still more confirmed that it was the intention of the
committee to have the amendment only apply to existing territory. If this is
settled now, it will shorten the debate. If the gentleman will move to amend
now, I will withdraw my motion.
Mr. JOHNSON:—I move to amend by inserting the word present before the
word territory in the first line of Section I., with such other verbal
amendments as may make the sense conform, and to adopt that amendment
now. This covers the whole ground. I wish to discuss these amendments,
but am physically unable to speak to-day, and would prefer to have the
discussion deferred.
Mr. JOHNSON then moved an adjournment, which was carried on a
division, and the Convention adjourned at two o'clock and fifty minutes.
E L E V E N T H  D A Y .
W         , M     , February 18th, 1861.
T   Convention was opened with prayer by Rev. P.D. G     .
The Journal of yesterday was read and approved.
Mr. C          offered the following resolution:
Resolved, That the rules of this Convention be so far modified as to require
the Secretary to employ a competent stenographer, who shall write down
and preserve accurate notes of the debates and other proceedings of this
body, which notes shall not be communicated to any person, nor shall
copies thereof be taken, nor shall the same be made public until after the
final adjournment of this Convention, except in pursuance of a vote
authorizing their publication.
Mr. CHITTENDEN:—I have no desire to occupy time in debating this
resolution, much less to waste it in a fruitless attempt to oppose what seems
to be the settled purpose of a majority of this Convention. But if this body
will consider the purpose which the resolution seeks to attain, it may,
perhaps, be found less objectionable than other similar ones which have
been defeated. The objection heretofore made is, that a publication of what
transpires here would lead to an excited criticism in the country, which
would be unfavorable to the calmness and ultimate success which should
attend our deliberations. While I entertain no such apprehensions, permit
me to observe that this resolution contemplates no present publication of
our debates, but a publication at such a time, and in such a manner, as will
be unobjectionable. That time may not come till after our adjournment. I am
free to say, that when we are dealing with the important issues now before
us, I prefer to have our action, our words, our whole conduct, all that we do
and say, open and public. We should fear no criticism when we are right; we
ought to be held to account when we are wrong. But if gentlemen will not
consent to this, at least let the daily record of each of us be made up now:
let it be full and perfect. When a question comes up hereafter which
concerns the sentiments or the action of a member, let its decision depend
upon no uncertain recollection, a recollection which must fade and grow
dim with each one of us, as the time of this Convention recedes into the
past. Such a record can injure no one; it may be of infinite service hereafter.
I could not justify myself to my conscience, or to those who have a right to
hold me responsible for my acts here, if I failed to do all that lays in my
power to have the true history of this Convention laid before the country. A
naked journal amounts to nothing. It is a skeleton. Our discussions alone
will give it form and comeliness. I have prepared this resolution upon
consultation with many members, whose ideas of what should be done here
agree with mine. They concur with me in the propriety of offering it. If it
fails, the responsibility of keeping our discussions from the people will not
rest with us.
Mr. POLLOCK:—I move to lay the resolution on the table.
Mr. CHITTENDEN:—Let the vote be taken by States.
The vote was so taken, and the following States voted in the affirmative:
Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky,
Tennessee, North Carolina, Missouri, Virginia, and Pennsylvania—11.
The following States voted in the negative: Maine, Vermont, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and New York—8.
So the motion to lay on the table prevailed.
When the State of Ohio was called, a member of her delegation stated that it
was equally divided.
Mr. TUCK:—I ask the unanimous consent of the Conference to introduce a
proposition in the form of an address to the people of the United States. I do
so after having consulted a considerable number of members; and having
found that it meets their approval, I desire to read it, and will then move that
it be laid on the table and printed.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—Is the gentleman's motion in order?
Mr. EWING:—I object to the reading.
Mr. CLAY:—Certainly; I object also.
Mr. TUCK:—I will acquiesce with a single word. I certainly hoped no curt
objection would be made to the reading of any proposition which any
member might deem it his duty to offer. As gentlemen differ from me in
this respect, I will hand the paper to the Chair. I hope at least it may be
permitted to lay on the table.
The PRESIDENT:—I hold it the gentleman's undoubted right to read the
paper if he chooses.
Mr. TUCK:—Very well.
He commenced reading when he was interrupted by
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I hope Mr. T    will withdraw this paper. If the
Convention agrees to any result, I shall favor its submission to the people
with an address. I will pledge myself to suggest the gentleman's name as
one of a committee to prepare the address at the proper time.
The PRESIDENT:—The gentleman from New Hampshire has the floor.
Mr. T    then completed the reading of the paper, as follows:
T      P             U      S     :
This Convention of Conference, composed in part of Commissioners
appointed in accordance with the legislative action of sundry States, and in
part of Commissioners appointed by the Governors of sundry other States,
in compliance with an invitation by the General Assembly of Virginia, met
in Washington on the 4th of February, 1861. Although constituting a body
unknown to the Constitution and laws, yet being delegated for the purpose,
and having carefully considered the existing dangers and dissensions, and
having brought their proceedings to a close, publish this address, and the
accompanying resolutions, as the result of their deliberations.
We recognize and deplore the divisions and distractions which now afflict
our country, interrupt its prosperity, disturb its peace, and endanger the
Union of the States; but we repel the conclusion, that any alienations or
dissensions exist which are irreconcilable, which justify attempts at
revolution, or which the patriotism and fraternal sentiments of the people,
and the interests and honor of the whole nation, will not overcome.
In a country embracing the central and most important portion of a
continent, among a people now numbering over thirty millions, diversities
of opinion inevitably exist; and rivalries, intensified at times by local
interests and sectional attachments, must often occur; yet we do not doubt
that the theory of our Government is the best which is possible for this
nation, that the Union of the States is of vital importance, and that the
Constitution, which expresses the combined wisdom of the illustrious
founders of the Government, is still the palladium of our liberties, adequate
to every emergency, and justly entitled to the support of every good citizen.
It embraces, in its provisions and spirit, all the defence and protection
which any section of the country can rightfully demand, or honorably
concede.
Adopted with primary reference to the wants of five millions of people, but
with the wisest reference to future expansion and development, it has
carried us onward with a rapid increase of numbers, an accumulation of
wealth, and a degree of happiness and general prosperity never attained by
any nation.
Whatever branch of industry, or whatever staple production, shall become,
in the possible changes of the future, the leading interest of the country,
thereby creating unforeseen complications or new conflicts of opinion and
interest, the Constitution of the United States, properly understood and
fairly enforced, is equal to every exigency, a shield and defence to all, in
every time of need. If, however, by reason of a change in circumstances, or
for any cause, a portion of the people believe they ought to have their rights
more exactly defined or more fully explained in the Constitution, it is their
duty, in accordance with its provisions, to seek a remedy by way of
amendment to that instrument; and it is the duty of all the States to concur
in such amendments as may be found necessary to insure equal and exact
justice to all.
In order, therefore, to announce to the country the sentiments of this
Convention, respecting not only the remedy which should be sought for
existing discontents, but also to communicate to the public what we believe
to be the patriotic sentiment of the country, we adopt the following
resolutions:
1st. Resolved, That this Convention recognize the well-understood
proposition that the Constitution of the United States gives no power to
Congress, or any branch of the Federal Government, to interfere in any
manner with slavery in any of the States; and we are assured by abundant
testimony, that neither of the great political organizations existing in the
country contemplates a violation of the spirit of the Constitution in this
regard, or the procuring of any amendment thereof, by which Congress, or
any department of the General Government, shall ever have jurisdiction
over slavery in any of the States.
2d. Resolved, That the Constitution was ordained and established, as set
forth in the preamble, by the people of the United States, in order to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide
for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity; and when the people
of any State are not in full enjoyment of all the benefits intended to be
secured to them by the Constitution, or their rights under it are disregarded,
their tranquillity disturbed, their prosperity retarded, or their liberty
imperilled by the people of any State, full and adequate redress can and
ought to be provided for such grievances.
3d. Resolved, That this Convention recommend to the Legislatures of the
States of the Union to follow the example of the Legislatures of the States
of Kentucky and of Illinois, in applying to Congress to call a Convention
for the proposing of amendments to the Constitution of the United States,
pursuant to the fifth article thereof.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I object to printing this paper. If that course is taken,
every member may offer his disquisitions on the Constitution, and they will
be printed at our expense.
Mr. TUCK:—Unanimous consent was given that it be read, laid on the
table, and printed.
The PRESIDENT:—There were three motions involved in one. Now the
question is upon laying the paper on the table and printing it.
Mr. ALEXANDER:—I call for a division of the question.
The PRESIDENT:—The question will be on the motion to lay it on the
table.
Mr. TUCK:—Are we not entitled to have the question taken on the motion
to print? I supposed all these questions would be taken in a spirit of
conciliation. But if not, I will withdraw the motion to lay on the table, and
move that the paper be printed.
Mr. MOREHEAD, of Kentucky:—I came here in a spirit of conciliation,
and I shall act in that spirit. Let us all do so. I disagree entirely with Mr.
T    and his proposition, but I am in favor of receiving every proposition
that is offered, of printing them all, and at the proper time of considering
them all. I trust that unanimous consent will be given to printing this paper.
The P         then put the motion upon printing the address, and it was
carried upon a division.
Mr. G       offered the following resolution, which was adopted
unanimously:
Resolved, That if the President shall choose to speak on any question, he
may, for the occasion, call any member to preside.
Mr. MEREDITH:—I wish to offer a proposition, and hope for the present it
may lie on the table, and be considered hereafter. I do not desire to move it
as an amendment to the report of the committee, but think it better to
present it as a direct and independent proposition. I present it now only for
the purpose of having it before the Convention. It is as follows:
A      .—That Congress shall divide all the territory of the United States
into convenient portions, each containing not less than sixty thousand
square miles, and shall establish in each a territorial government; the
several territorial legislatures, whether heretofore constituted, or hereafter
to be constituted, shall have all the legislative powers now vested in the
respective States of this Union; and whenever any territory having a
population sufficient, according to the ratio existing at the time, to entitle it
to one member of Congress, shall form a republican constitution, and apply
to Congress for admission as a State, Congress shall admit the same as a
State accordingly.
The proposition of Mr. M        was laid on the table without objection.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—There appears to be a misunderstanding between the
Secretary and myself upon the question of printing the Journal. To avoid
question, I move that the Journal be printed up to and including to-day.
Mr. GOODRICH:—I move to amend by adding "and from day to day
during the session."
The amendment and the motion were adopted without objection.
Mr. A        , of New Jersey, took the chair.
The PRESIDENT:—The Convention will now proceed to the order of the
day—the consideration of the report of the committee.
Mr. REID, of North Carolina:—I wish to move an amendment to the
amendment offered by Mr. J      . It is to add to his the words "and
future." If adopted, the language will be "present and future territory."
Mr. EWING:—This will render a division of the question necessary. The
gentleman had better withdraw his amendment for the time.
Mr. REID:—I am instructed by the Legislature of North Carolina to offer it,
and I think best to do so in this regular manner.
Mr. CLEVELAND:—I think the motion of Mr. R    is out of order. I
suggest that if adopted, with Mr. J      '  amendment, the sense of the
proposition as it now stands will not be changed.
Mr. RUFFIN:—I rise merely to make a suggestion to my colleague. This
motion must be made at some time, by some one, so that we may have a
regular vote upon it. Now, as it is not certain how the report of the majority
of the committee is to be construed, I propose at a suitable time to move an
amendment which will make the proposition applicable to territory
hereafter acquired. If this will suit my colleague, I hope he will withdraw
his motion.
Mr. REID:—I came here not to deceive the North or the South. I intend to
be plain and unambiguous. Why should we send forth a proposition that is
uncertain, vague, and, as gentlemen admit, open to different constructions?
If we are to pour oil upon the troubled waters, let us do so to some purpose;
above all, let us be definite, plain, and certain. I cannot consent to withdraw
my motion. I must insist upon its consideration.
Mr. LOGAN:—I had hoped the question on Mr. J      '  amendments
would have been taken on Saturday. It is an important one, and one which
must be met. I would suggest that it would be best to let the question be
taken on Mr. J      '  amendments now. The subject presents itself to my
mind in this way: The proposition of the majority, as it now stands, is
uncertain. The friends of the proposition ought to be allowed to perfect it, to
make it satisfactory to themselves. If there is a doubt about it, let us make it
clear that it applies only to the present territory. Then we can have a clear
and decisive vote upon it. The substance of the proposition is what I wish to
arrive at, and it will be more in order if the vote is not taken till we know
what that substance is. I shall not object to its application to future territory.
I hope the gentleman from North Carolina will withdraw his amendment,
and let the question be taken on that of Mr. J      .
Mr. SEDDON:—One word only. I fear we are being placed in an awkward
position. I am desirous to have the language of the proposition clear and not
delusive. The amendment of Mr. J       embarrasses me; I hardly know
how to vote upon it. If I vote for Mr. J      '  motion, I shall have the
semblance of favoring the limitation of the proposition to present territory.
Mr. R      and myself both want the same thing, but on Mr. J      ' 
motion he will vote one way and I the other.
Mr. RUFFIN:—Will the gentleman allow me to explain? I voted against the
proposition in committee because, as it now stands, it applies only to
existing territory. I wish to carry this proposition, but not by the vote of the
South alone. I want Northern votes, and assurances that the people of the
North will vote for the proposition and adopt it.
Mr. SEDDON:—I shall feel disposed to vote against Mr. J      '  motion.
The question was here stated by the President as follows:
The vote will be taken upon the motion of Mr. R    to amend the
amendment offered by Mr. J      .
Mr. REID:—It strikes me that the question is this: My proposition is to add
the words "and future," but Mr. J      '  amendment is to add the word
"present." Can this be treated as an amendment to his motion? I must say
that my duty to my country and State will prevent my voting for the
proposition as he proposes to limit it.
Mr. COALTER:—I think the committee ought to be permitted to amend and
complete their report. Let us, by general consent, agree to have the word
"present" inserted.
Mr. REID:—I object to that all the time.
Mr. TURNER:—I move that the report be recommitted for amendment.
Mr. COALTER:—Shall we adjourn over simply for this? That will use up
another day.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I hope it will not be recommitted. We can settle the
question here in a moment.
The PRESIDENT:—The vote will now be taken.
Mr. McCURDY:—I call for the individual names of members voting.
The PRESIDENT:—The call is not in order.
The question was then taken on the amendment of Mr. R   , and resulted as
follows:
A   —New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, North
Carolina, Missouri, and Virginia—8.
N   —Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Rhode Island, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New York, and Iowa—
12.
So the amendment failed.
The PRESIDENT:—The question now recurs on the motion of the
gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. JOHNSON:—I trust that I shall not trespass upon the time of the
Conference, but the subject now before it is one of great importance, and it
involves the consideration of many important questions. The amendment
which I offer is for the purpose of making the proposition of the committee
clear and plain. I was aware that a construction might be placed upon it
different from that which the committee intended; and it is due to the
frankness which is manifested here, that the purposes of the committee
should be made plain. There ought to be no ambiguity in a constitutional
provision. Some of the most important constitutional questions decided by
the Supreme Court have been questions of construction. Lawyers would
differ about the construction to be given the committee's proposition. I think
the Supreme Court has placed a construction upon the terms used here,
which would be conclusive. A similar question arose in the Dred Scott case.
There the question was upon that article in the Constitution which confers
on Congress the power "to dispose of and to make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territories or other property belonging to the
United States." The Court in that case decided that the provision had no
bearing on the controversy in that case, because the power given by that
provision, whatever it might be, was confined, and was intended to be
confined, to the territory which, upon the adoption of the Constitution,
belonged to or was claimed by the United States, and was within their
boundaries, as settled by the treaty with Great Britain. With this clause in
the Constitution, therefore, it could have no influence upon the territory
afterward acquired from a foreign government. I think this decision
conclusive, and that the proposition, if incorporated into the Constitution,
would refer only to the territory now owned by the United States.
It was the wish of the representatives of some States in the committee that
the word "future" should be inserted in the report. I was opposed to it: it
was so odious to me to put words into the Constitution, or to propose to do
so, which should go forth to the world as an indication that this Government
proposes to acquire new territory in any way. I have said that the Supreme
Court in the Dred Scott case decided that the words "the territories" in the
Constitution only applied to the then existing territory. I think they decided
wrong in this respect, though I agree to the correctness of the decision in
that case in the main; but such as it is, the decision is binding upon this
Conference and the people.
Mr. J       here read a portion of the opinion of Judge T     delivered in
the Dred Scott case, and continued:
You perceive that Judge T     turns the question upon the construction of
the word "the." Had the word "any" been used in its place, he must have
held that the provision applied to future, as well as the then existing
territory.
Knowing that it was the purpose of the majority of the committee to
exclude future territory from the operation of this proposition, and that it
was due to the committee and the Convention that their purposes should be
carried out, I offer my amendment as applicable to the sixth line of the
proposition as well as the first.
In discussing the merits of this report, in its application to the existing
condition of the country, I have to say a word to my Southern friends. You
have sought to extend this provision to territory which shall be hereafter
acquired. You have had a decisive vote and have been beaten in this
Conference. The fight has been a fair one; the question has been thoroughly
understood. We ought to acquiesce in the decision of the majority. We
cannot change this decision if we would; and if we could change it, the
proposition amended as you would prefer to have it, would never pass
Congress. The repeated action of that body, during its present session,
shows this conclusively. Accepting this decision then, as definitive, can we
not settle the question with reference to existing territory? Shall we settle it?
Settle it fairly—recognizing and acknowledging the rights of all, and
remain brethren forever with the Free States! From my very heart, I say yes.
(Applause.) The proposition as it now stands covers all the territory we
have. The whole ground, the whole trouble, which has brought this country
into its present lamentable condition—has arisen over this question. I
believe if it had been disposed of or settled in some way before, many
States would have been kept in the Union that have now gone out. And why
should we not settle it?
We have now a territory extensive enough to sustain two hundred millions
of people—embracing almost every climate, fruitful in almost every species
of production—rich in all the elements of national wealth, and governed by
a Constitution that has raised us to an elevation of grandeur that the world
has never before witnessed. That we should separate to the destruction of
such a Government, on account of territory we have not got, and territory
that we do not want, is not, I believe, the patriotic sense of the South.
But this proposition does not stand by itself alone. It is connected, and must
be construed, with the provision relating to the acquisition of future
territory. The second section of the committee's proposition provides that
territory shall not be acquired by the United States, unless by treaty, nor,
with unimportant exceptions, unless such treaty shall be ratified by four-
fifths of all the members of the Senate. Is not that guaranty enough for us?
Should we not act unreasonably if we required further guaranty in this
respect? For myself, I should have preferred that the consent of two-thirds
of the Senate only should be required, and that that two-thirds should
comprise a majority both from the free and slave States.
Mr. RUFFIN:—At the proper time I shall move such an amendment.
Mr. JOHNSON:—If such an amendment is proposed I shall vote for it. I
know there will be objections raised to it, but they will be far outweighed
by the advantages it will give to the South.
But the objection of Mr. B       is opposed here, and it is one which must
be answered. He says this is the wrong way to propose amendments to the
Constitution—that our action is inconsistent with that instrument. He does
not claim that it is prohibited by the letter, but by the spirit of the
Constitution. Where does he get the spirit but from the letter? There are two
methods of proposing amendments to the Constitution provided by that
instrument. Let us see what they are.
Mr. J       here read the article of the Constitution providing for
amendments, and continued:
One is where two-thirds of Congress deem it advisable to propose
amendments; the other is where the States themselves propose them. My
learned brother would have us believe that the members of Congress, acting
under their official oaths, must each be satisfied that each amendment
proposed is proper to be incorporated in the instrument, before they should
propose them; and he maintains that there is a difference, in fact, in the two
methods prescribed. What right has this body, if there is any force in this
objection, to submit his proposition to the States? If what we propose is
revolutionary, then what he proposes is revolutionary. I reply to him, with
all respect for his legal ability, and with all the humility which becomes me,
and insist that he is wrong. He refers to the opinion of Judge C       . I
hold Judge C        in much respect, and his opinion in great honor here,
but his statements are at war with the objections made by the gentleman
from Connecticut. Judge C        maintains that it is the duty of
Congress to propose amendments, not to recommend them. It would be
entirely proper, according to his opinion, for Congress to propose
amendments which they would not adopt themselves. I go somewhat
farther, and insist that it is the duty of Congress to propose amendments
whenever desired by any State or any considerable section of the Union. If
we have no right to suggest a line of action to Congress, no right to petition
Congress, no right to ask Congress to propose amendments, as the
gentleman insists, we had better go home, or rather, I should say, we should
never have come here.
There are twenty States represented in this Conference. I have no doubt
other States would have been here, but for the shortness of the time. But
how and why are we here? We have come here on the invitation of Virginia;
her resolutions are our constitution. We have come here at her instance. For
what purpose did she ask us to come here? under what circumstances did
she pass these resolutions? Virginia saw that the country was going to ruin
—that one State had already seceded, and several others were about to
follow. She saw there were circumstances affecting the condition of the
South which aroused her to frenzy—not madness, but the frenzy which falls
on every patriotic mind when it witnesses a country going to destruction.
She saw the country was going to ruin with rapid steps, and that its ruin
must be accomplished unless her friends in the free States would come
forward, and consent to put into the Constitution additional guarantees
which would satisfy the people of the slave States that their rights were
secure. See what she did—what she said. She expresses it as her deliberate
opinion, "that unless the unhappy controversy which now divides the States
of this Confederacy shall be satisfactorily adjusted, a permanent dissolution
of the Union is inevitable; and the General Assembly, representing the
wishes of the people of the Commonwealth, is desirous of employing every
reasonable means to avert so dire a calamity, and determined to make a final
effort to restore the Union and the Constitution, in the spirit in which they
were established by the fathers of the Republic."
Therefore she invites all States, whether slaveholding or non-slaveholding,
who were willing to unite with her in an earnest effort to adjust the unhappy
controversies in the spirit of the Constitution, to come together to secure
that adjustment. She asks us to agree to some suitable adjustment. She does
not leave us to suggest what that adjustment shall be. She tells us herself.
She requests us to adopt it, and to submit it to Congress. She does not ask
that Congress should call a convention, for Congress could not. Try, if we
can, says Virginia, to come to some settlement of these unhappy
controversies, and send that settlement to Congress, that Congress may
submit it to the country.
Virginia invited you here. She told you just what she wanted. She says if
you cannot consent to that, then let her commissioners come home and
report the result. If this cannot be done, if the mode of adjustment indicated
by her cannot be substantially carried out, then our whole authority is at an
end.
This matter of amending the Constitution is not as intricate and difficult a
work as gentlemen imagine. Are there not twelve amendments to the
Constitution already? Were they submitted to the people by each member of
Congress acting under his official oath? Or were they submitted in the very
way the gentleman would avoid? Were they not brought into the
Constitution by outside pressure?
The Constitution has been amended. I wish to mark how it was done, and
then note why it was done.
There was a time when fears were entertained that wrongs might be done to
different sections of the Union under the Constitution as it then stood.
Congress listened to those fears, and did not hesitate to propose
amendments suggested from outside its own body—to submit them to the
people for adoption. It was necessary, in the judgment of Congress, to do
this, in order to restore confidence. It was done, and confidence was
restored. Is not that precisely our case now? Is not confidence lost in the
North and in the South?—not exactly lost, perhaps, but shaken. The credit
of the Government is gone. Even our naval commanders are unable to
negotiate Government bills abroad—are reduced to the degrading
alternative of asking the endorsement of foreign States, in order to such
negotiation. Some brilliant individuals have suggested that we have already
become so poor that our widows and wives must bring out their stockings.
Our last loan was negotiated at twelve per cent. discount. The present loan
is not to be taken at any rate, unless the Government descends to the
humiliating alternative of securing State endorsements. Our credit is going
lower and lower every day, and it will soon come to the point where our
bonds will be worth no more than Continental money was.
Suppose we do nothing here. Are gentlemen blind to the consequences?
Gentlemen, honest and patriotic as I know you are, have you no love for
this Union?—have you no care for the preservation of this Government?
God forbid that I should say you have none! I know you too well. My
relations have been too intimate with you, and have existed too long, for me
to suppose it. You do love the Union. I speak for the South and to the South.
I know that we can still labor to keep this Government together. If we
follow the plain dictates of our judgment, any other course would be
impossible.
The Virginia Convention is even now in session, and what a convention it
is! Disguise as we may, deceive ourselves as we will, it is a convention
which proposes to consider the question of withdrawing the State from the
Union. Kentucky and Missouri, if we do nothing, will soon follow. If there
ever was a time in the history of the Government for conciliation, for
patriotic concession, that time is now. The time has come when parties must
be forgotten. Let not the word party be mentioned here. It is not worthy of
us. Representatives of the States, you are above party—high above. The
cords that bind you together are a hundred times as strong as those which
ever bound any party. Unless we do something, and something very quickly,
before the incoming President is inaugurated, in all human probability he
will have only the States north of Mason and Dixon to govern—that is, if he
is to govern them in peace.
I think there is no right of secession; such is my individual opinion. But
there is a right higher than all these—the right of self-defence, the right of
revolution. It is recognized by the Constitution itself. The Constitution was
adopted by nine of the States only. What right had those nine States to
separate from the other four?
Mr. SEDDON:—The right of secession.
Mr. JOHNSON:—I won't dispute about terms. In all such discussions,
Heaven save me from a Virginia politician!
The opinions of Mr. M       upon the Constitution are certainly entitled to
value. He had more to do with making it than any other statesman of the
time. I desire to read an opinion of his, which will be found in number
forty-two of the Federalist:
"Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves on this
occasion:—1. On what principle the Confederation, which stands in the
solemn form of a compact among the States, can be superseded without the
unanimous consent of the parties to it? 2. What relation is to subsist
between the nine or more States ratifying the Constitution, and the
remaining few who do not become parties to it?
"The first question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute
necessity of the case, to the great principle of self-preservation, to the
transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the
safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political
institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed."
Now, apply these principles to the present condition of the country. The
cases are exactly parallel. Mr. M       says in substance, that if one
section of the Union refuses to recognize and protect the rights of another—
in other words, if the free States now refuse to guarantee the rights of the
South, that there is a right of self-preservation, a law of nature and nature's
God, which is above all Constitutions. I am not here to inquire whether the
South has a right to go out if these guarantees are not given. That is a
question which I will not argue. Some of the States have already gone. I
hold that to be a fact established.
Now, I put it to my friends of the North: Do you want us to go out? You are
a great people, a great country—a powerful people, a rich country. No
threat or intimidation shall ever come from me to such a people. I ask you
in all sadness whether, in the light of all our glory, of all our happiness and
prosperity, whether you will, by withholding a thing that it will not harm
you to grant, suffer us, compel us to depart? Let me read what was said by
the same great man of Virginia, in anticipation of the existence of the
present state of things:
"I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full
confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your decisions
will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you will never suffer
difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or however fashionable the
error on which they may be founded, to drive you into the gloomy and
perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion would conduct you.
Hearken not to the unnatural voice, which tells you that the people of
America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no
longer live together as members of the same family; can no longer continue
the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellow-
citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire. Hearken not to
the voice which petulantly tells you that the form of government
recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world; that it
has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors; that it
rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen,
shut your ears against this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against
the poison which it conveys. The kindred blood which flows in the veins of
American citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defence of
their sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of
their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to be shunned,
believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild of all projects,
the most rash of all attempts, is that of rending us in pieces, in order to
preserve our liberties, and promote our happiness."
Grant us then, gentlemen of the North, what we are willing to stand upon—
what we will try to stand upon, and what we believe we can. At least, this
will save the rest of the States to yourselves and to us. The States that are
now in the Union will continue there.
What is it we ask you to do? It is to settle this question as to our present
territory. To settle it—how? By dividing it. And how by dividing it? By the
line of 36° 30´. Apparently, you think we are asking the North to yield
something. I tell you it is we who are yielding. By the decision of the
Supreme Court we have the right to go North of this line with our slaves.
Now, all we ask you to give us here is the territory south of that line; and
even as to that, we give you the right to destroy slavery there whenever a
State organized out of it chooses to do so. We are, in fact, yielding to you.
We abandon our rights North. Will you not let us retain what is already
ours, South?
Is it quite certain that the territory south of the line will be slave territory?
Those who repealed the Missouri Compromise, believed that Kansas would
be a slave State. It did not turn out so. All we ask is, that you should leave
the territory south of the line where it has been left by the decision of the
Supreme Court. We freely yield you all the rest.
I do not propose to discuss all the amendments proposed. I confine myself
to the single one which, if satisfactorily disposed of, will settle all our
troubles.
In conclusion, I ask, oppressed by a consciousness which almost
overmasters me—which renders me unfit to do any thing but feel—will you
not settle this question here? I feel, and I cannot escape the feeling, that on
your decision hangs the question, whether we shall be preserved an united
people, or be broken to atoms. The States now remaining in the Union may
possibly get on for a few years with something like prosperity; but if this
question is not settled in some way, man must change his nature or war in
the end will come. War! What a word to be used here! War between whom?
There is not a family at the South which has not its associations with the
North—not a Northern family which has not its Southern ties! War in the
midst of such a people! God grant that the future, that the events which
must inevitably follow dissension here, may at least spare this agony to
ourselves, our families, and our posterity.
Mr. SEDDON:—It is very clear to me that I ought not to make a prolonged
address upon a question which I favor. The only question now before us is:
Shall this amendment be made plain? We should deal honestly among
ourselves; there should be no cheat—no uncertainty—no delusion here. Our
language should be so clear that it will breed no new nests of trouble.
But the address of the gentleman from Maryland requires a brief notice
from me. I listened with sadness to many parts of it. I bemoan that tones so
patriotic could not rise to the level of the high ground of equality and right
upon which we all ought to stand.
I appeal not to forbearance—I ask not for pity. I feel proud to represent the
grand old commonwealth of Virginia here, and prouder still that I only
come here to demand right and justice in her behalf. Aye! and it is more
complimentary to you to have it so. I ask for such guarantees only as
Virginia needs, and as she has the right to demand. It is far more
complimentary to you to appeal to your sense of justice, to your sense of
right, than to your forbearance or pity.
Virginia comes forward in a great national crisis. When support after
support of this glorious temple of our Government has been torn away, she
comes—proud of her memories of the past—happy in the part she had in
the construction of this great system—she comes to present to you, calmly
and plainly, the question, whether new and additional guarantees are not
needed for her rights; and she tells you what those guarantees ought to be.
Nor does she stand alone. She is supported by all her border sisters. The
propositions she makes are familiar to the country. They were made by a
patriot of the olden time, a time near to that of the foundation of our
Government. They were such as he thought suited to the exigencies of his
time. They have since then received a larger meed of approval, north and
south, than any other plan of arrangement.
My State offers these resolutions of her Legislature as a basis for our action
here, with certain modifications acceptable to her people. One of these
modifications has since been accepted by the mover of these resolutions
himself. Most important among them is the provision as to future territory.
The gentleman seems to think that Virginia would not insist on this
provision as applicable to territory we may never have. It behooves not me
to answer such a momentous question. I am only the mouthpiece of
Virginia. She insists on the provision for future territory. She and her sister
States plant themselves upon it. What right have I to strike out a clause
which she makes specific? What right have I to esteem it of so little weight
that it may be thrown aside and disregarded? I do not propose to give my
reasons, though they would not be troublesome to give. It was an element in
the Missouri Compromise that it should apply to future as well as to
existing territory.
Does not the gentleman assert that under the laws as they now stand, we
have the right to go north of the compromise line with our slaves? What,
then, is our position? Under the decision of the Supreme Court we are
entitled to participate in all the territory of the United States. We are
offering to give up the great part and the best part of it, and in payment we
are to take the naked chance of getting a little piece of the worthless
territory south of the proposed line! Such an idea was never entertained by
those who made the Compromise. The idea which governed their action
was, beyond all doubt, not that present territory alone should be thus
divided, but that the question should be removed from doubt and difficulty
for all time, and to give us at the South a chance whatever change might
come.
Shall we be rewarded for all we give up, and find full compensation in a
clause which itself prevents the acquisition of future territory? The
statement is in itself a sufficient answer to the question.
But there was another element in the propositions of the Legislature of
Virginia. That, was security against the principles of the North, and her
great and now dominant party; it was intended to put an end to the
discussions that have convulsed the country and jeopardized our
institutions.
It was the policy of our fathers to settle these questions. They determined to
make a final and decisive line of demarkation, and to let that be conclusive.
But this young people could not be restrained, and when new territory was
acquired the same question arose again. It now comes up once more.
Virginia early saw the seeds of trouble in it, because she saw that the tide of
emigration would continue to press toward the fertile lands of the South.
She saw and she acted. In consequence of her action we are here. Would it
not be wise and well as statesmen and as patriots, that you should do what
you can for adjustment? do what you can to bring back your sisters of the
South who have departed? It is the part of wisdom to settle. Virginia was
wise to ask it.
There is another thing. A great and mighty party has arisen at the North that
is determined to exclude the institution of slavery, not only from all future,
but from all present territory. We know that in all ways this party has
declared that it would not consent to let slavery go where it does not now
exist. More heated zealots, also animated and sustained by this same party,
have determined that this natural and patriarchal institution of the South
should be surrounded by a cordon of free States, and in the end be
extinguished altogether.
Is it not wise in Virginia, that she should see that this project of surrounding
the South with free States should be guarded against—most effectually
guarded against now and in time to come, and so preserve her dignity and
power?
This amendment adopted, and the proposition to Virginia will be a farce.
Gentlemen, we hold that as the soul is to man, so is honor to a nation.
Honor is the soul of nations. Without it, no nation can have a place in
history or among the nations. We of Virginia must have in this
Confederation the position of an equal. Equal in dignity—equal in right. In
the Congress of the States of this Union, we insist on this as our right. We
must have the same protection as the States of the North. Otherwise we are
a dishonored people. We might live for a time otherwise, but we should be
unworthy a place among the nations. We hold property, yes, our property in
slaves, as rightful and as honorable as any property to be found in the broad
expanse between ocean and ocean.
We feel that in the existence, the perpetuity, the protection of the African
race, we have a mission to perform, and not a mission only, but a right and a
duty.
Upon this subject I have a word to say in all seriousness. Think not,
gentlemen of the North, that we propose to deceive or mislead you. We of
the South are earnest in what we say. This is a question which we answer to
ourselves. We hold that these colored barbarians have been withdrawn from
a country of native barbarism, and under the benignant influence of a
Christian rule, of a Christian civilization, have been elevated, yes, elevated
to a standing and position which they could never have otherwise secured.
In respect to the colored race we challenge comparison with San Domingo,
with the freed regions of Jamaica, with those who have been transferred to
the coast of Africa. Ask the travellers who have visited those distant shores
to contrast the condition of the colored people there with that of those on
our Southern plantations, and they will give you but one answer—they will
say, we have redeemed and kept well our high and our holy trust.
But this is a matter with our own consciences, not with yours. We appeal to
you to leave it where it is, to leave the colored people where they are. Why
should you undertake to interfere with the policy of a neighboring State
concerning a people about which you know nothing? We feel, we know that
we have done that race no wrong. Deep into the Southern heart has this
feeling penetrated. For scores of years we have been laboring earnestly in
our mission. In all this time we have contributed far more to the greatness
of the North than to our own. Yet all this time we have been assailed,
attacked, vilified and defamed, by the people of the North, from the cradle
to the grave, and you have educated your children to believe us monsters of
brutality, lust and iniquity.
I tell you, that from the time the abolition societies aroused the latent anti-
slavery spirit of the North until now, nothing but evil has come of the
excitement and discussion. It has spread a horrid influence far and wide; it
has for years distilled, and is now distilling its poison and venom all over
the land.
It was under English, yes, British, Anglo-Saxon instigation that it first
commenced. By this instigation it has been fed, been given life, continuity
and power. Think you the English authors of this instigation had any
purpose but to disrupt this Republic? They professed to regard slavery as an
evil and a sin. The fruits of their action were first manifested in religious
societies—first in the largest churches in New England, in the Presbyterian
or Congregational churches, next the Methodist, then the Baptist, and
finally, the venom spread so widely, its influence separated other churches.
What has the moral influence of this power done? It has made the
abstraction of our slaves a virtue. Societies have been formed for that very
purpose, inciting their members and others, by the vilest motives, to steal
our slaves, to destroy our property.
Nor have they been sufficiently modest to cloak their designs under the veil
of secrecy. These people advocated their pernicious doctrines openly in
your leading cities, even within the consecrated walls of Fanueil Hall.
Openly among your people, in the very light of day, these efforts were
carried on for the destruction of your sister States. There has not been an
effort of the law nor an exertion of public opinion to put them down.
These efforts culminated in the actual invasion of my own old honored
State, and your people thought they were doing GOD service in signing a
petition to our authorities for mercy to John Brown and his ruffian invaders
of our soil. And when these men met the just reward of their crime, there
was, throughout the North, in your meetings and your public prints,
expressions of sympathy for these robbers and murderers. They were
looked upon as the victims of oppression, as martyrs to a holy and righteous
cause. Gentlemen, consider these things, and tell me, is there not to-day
reason for suspicion; on the part of the South for grave apprehension?
But the half is yet to be told; I have looked only at the moral aspect of the
question. Dangerous enough hitherto, it becomes far more dangerous when
it culminates on the arena of politics, and asks, with the powerful aid of a
majority, the interference and the aid of the Government.
As soon as it became the party of one idea it began to draw to it, first the
support of one, then another political party. It went on securing the
assistance of one after another until it demoralized, until it brought each to
ruin. It destroyed the grand old Whig party. Fanatic enough before, when it
had brought that party to its grave, it thrust upon the arena of politics this
question of slavery in the territories. Then for the first time it raised the cry
of "Free Soil," and brought to its support the hearts of a majority of the
people of the northern States.
The people of the North and Northwest have long been noted for their
acquisitive disposition, especially for the acquisition of lands. This has been
manifested in every form. Carried into effect it has made them powerful,
until, not long since, they thought they might get entire dominion at no
distant day. Then arose in their hearts a desire greater than the greed of land
—the greed of office and power. They then saw that perhaps the North
alone might control the national government, and with it the South. Then,
too, the great class of protected interests at the North—always greater at the
North than at the South—joined with them. All these protected classes,
whose advantages had been diverted from other classes to which they
belonged, joined with landseekers to secure power. Influence after influence
of this sort combined, until it produced your great Republican party; in
other words, your great Sectional party, which has at length come to
majority and power.
I do not wish to dwell upon the principles of that party, or to discuss them; I
simply assert that their principles involve all the sentiments of abolitionism.
They may be summed up in this: you determine to oppose the admission of
slave States in the future.
You say that the whole power of the country, the whole power of the
administration, shall be used in future for the final extinction of slavery.
This, now, is the ruling idea of your great sectional party. It is simply the
rule of one portion of the country over another. There is no difference
between attacking slavery in the States and keeping it out of the territories.
It is only drawing a parallel around the citadel at a more remote point.
Now, see how the South is placed. The South has forborne as long as it can,
just as long as party organization existed, and as long as the South could
keep it in existence. It was only when we saw that the whole united
Government was to be turned against us, that we began to think of taking
the subject into our own hands.
What are we to expect now, when the power, direct and indirect, of this
great Government is to be used in the most effective manner against us? A
power which claims that we shall not exercise the rights of States even, a
power which seeks to coerce us, when we propose to protect ourselves
against this lowering and impending danger. You of the North are
descended from men who honored the scaffold for the very rights we now
seek to exercise. So are we. You would deserve to be spurned by the maids
and matrons among you, if you refused to protect yourselves against the
dangers thus drawing around you. Can you expect less of us?
Do you tell me that this is an artificial crisis? Would seven States have
abandoned all the grand interest they possessed in a glorious and happy
Confederacy like ours, but for more serious and vital interests, the interests
of safety, security, and honor? Think well of these things, gentlemen!
I have hastily endeavored to show you where I conceive we of the South
stand. The feelings which I express are entertained likewise by the border
States, by all the citizens of the South, by every householder of my State in
a greater or less degree.
The State to which I refer, Virginia, is now met in solemn convocation to
consider whether she shall remain in the Union or go out of it; and with the
most earnest desire to secure to herself a longer connection with the
American Union, a Union of so much honor and pride, and with an equally
earnest desire to bring back the wandering States of the South which have
already left us, she, my own, my native State, comes here to ask for these
guarantees. In my deliberate judgment, the Union and the Constitution, as
they now stand, are unsafe for the people of the South, unsafe without other
guarantees which will give them actual power instead of mere paper rights.
Her stake in this controversy is too deep. In my judgment she has asked too
little; I think fuller and greater guarantees ought to be required, and that this
Convention should not stand upon ceremony, but in a free and liberal spirit
of concession should yield to us all that we ask. Be assured we shall ask
none but adequate guarantees.
But I am told that Virginia is content with the Crittenden Resolutions—I say
this because I am instructed to say so—that is, if we are to treat these
resolutions, not as the principles of the man who offers them, but as the
principles of the great party just come into power.
Gentlemen, remember that we of the South are already stripped of one-half
our sister States; our system is dislocated; the Union is disrupted.
How can you expect now to retain Virginia, to retain the border States,
when they stand in the face of such a great, such an immense party? How
can you expect Virginia to remain in the Union without these added
guarantees?
I told you I would make no appeals to your pity. If we are not entitled to the
guarantees we ask, according to the principles of sound philosophy, of right
and justice, then we do not ask them at all.
Mr. BOUTWELL:—I have not been at all clear in my own mind as to
when, and to what extent, Massachusetts should raise her voice in this
Convention. She heard the voice of Virginia, expressed through her
resolutions in this crisis of our country's history. Massachusetts hesitated,
not because she was unwilling to respond to the call of Virginia, but
because she thought her honor touched by the manner of that call and the
circumstances attending it. She had taken part in the election of the sixth of
November. She knew the result. It accorded well with her wishes. She knew
that the Government whose political head for the next four years was then
chosen, was based upon a Constitution which she supposed still had an
existence. She saw that State after State had left that Government—seceded
is the word used; had gone out from this great Confederacy, and were
defying the Constitution and the Union.
Charge after charge has been vaguely made against the North. It is
attempted here to put the North on trial. I have listened with grave attention
to the gentleman from Virginia to-day, but I have heard no specification of
these charges. Massachusetts hesitated I say; she has her own opinions of
the Government and the Union. I know Massachusetts; I have been into
every one of her more than three hundred towns. I have seen and conversed
with her men and her women, and I know there is not a man within her
borders who would not to-day gladly lay down his life for the preservation
of the Union.
Massachusetts has made war upon slavery wherever she had the right to do
it; but much as she abhors the institution, she would sacrifice everything
rather than assail it where she has not the right to assail it.
Can it be denied, gentlemen, that we have elected a President in a legal and
constitutional way? It cannot; and yet you tell us in tones that cannot be
misunderstood, that as a precedent condition of his inauguration we must
give you these guarantees.
Massachusetts hesitated, not because her blood was not stirred, but because
she insisted that the Government and the inauguration should go on, in the
same manner they would have done had Mr. Lincoln been defeated. She felt
that she was touched in a tender point when invited here under such
circumstances.
It is true, and I confess it frankly, that there are a few men at the North who
have not yielded that support to the grand idea upon which this
confederated Union stands, that they should have done; who have been
disposed to infringe upon, to attack certain rights which the entire North,
with these exceptions, accords to you. But are you of the South free from
the like imputations? The John Brown invasion was never justified at the
North. If, in the excitement of the time, there were those to be found who
did not denounce it as gentlemen think they should, it was because they
knew it was a matter wholly outside the Constitution—that it was a crime to
which Virginia would give adequate punishment.
Gentlemen, I believe, yes, I know, that the people of the North are as true to
the Government and the Union of the States now, as our fathers were when
they stood shoulder to shoulder upon the field, fighting for the principles
upon which that Union rests. If I thought the time had come when it would
be fit or proper to consider amendments to the Constitution at all, I should
believe that we would have no trouble with you except upon this question
of slavery in the territories. You cannot demand of us at the North any thing
that we will not grant, unless it involves a sacrifice of our principles. These
we shall not sacrifice—these you must not ask us to abandon. I believe
further, and I speak in all frankness, for I wish to delude no one, that if the
Constitution and the Union cannot be preserved and effectually maintained
without these new guarantees for slavery, that the Union is not worth
preserving.
The people of the North have always submitted to the decisions of the
proper constituted powers. This obedience has been unpleasant enough
when they thought these powers were exercised for sectional purposes; but
it has always been implicitly yielded. I am ready, even now, to go home and
say that, by the decision of the Supreme Court, slavery exists in all the
territories of the United States. We submit to the decision and accept its
consequences. But in view of all the circumstances attending that decision,
was it quite fair—was it quite generous for the gentleman from Maryland to
say that, under it, by the adoption of these propositions, the South was
giving up every thing, the North giving up nothing? Does he suppose the
South is yielding the point in relation to any territory, which by any
probability would become slave territory? Something more than the
decision of the Supreme Court is necessary to establish slavery anywhere.
The decision may give the right to establish it, other influences must control
the question of its actual establishment.
I am opposed, further, to any restrictions on the acquisition of territory.
They are unnecessary. The time may come when they would be
troublesome. We may want the Canadas. The time may come when the
Canadas may wish to unite with us. Shall we tie up our hands so that we
cannot receive them, or make it forever your interest to oppose their
annexation? Such a restriction would be, by the common consent of the
people, disregarded.
There are seven States out of the Union already. They have organized what
they claim is an independent Government. They are not to be coerced back,
you say. Are the prospects very favorable that they will return of their own
accord? But they will annex territory. They are already looking to Mexico.
If left to themselves they would annex her and all her neighbors, and we
should lose our highway to the Pacific coast. They would acquire it, and to
us it would be lost forever.
The North will consider well before she consents to this—before she even
permits it. Ever since 1820 we have pursued, in this respect, a uniform
policy. The North will hesitate long before, by accepting the condition you
propose, she deprives the nation of the valuable privilege, the
unquestionable right, of acquiring new territory in an honorable way.
I have tried to look upon these propositions of the majority of the
committee, as true measures of pacification. I have listened patiently to all
that has been said in their favor. But I am still unconvinced, or rather I am
convinced that they will do nothing for the Union. They will prove totally
inadequate; may, perhaps, be positively mischievous. The North, the free
States, will not adopt them—will not consent to these new endorsements of
an institution which they do not like, which they believe to be injurious to
the best interests of the Republic; and if they did adopt them, as they could
only do by a sacrifice of principles which you should not expect, the South
would not be satisfied; she would not fail to find pretexts for a course of
action upon which I think she has already determined. I see in these
propositions any thing but true measures of pacification.
But the North will never consent to the separation of the States. If the South
persists in the course on which she has entered we shall march our armies to
the Gulf of Mexico, or you will march yours to the Great Lakes. There can
be no peaceful separation. There is one way by which war may be avoided
and the Union preserved. It is a plain and a constitutional way. If the slave
States will abandon the design, which we must infer from the remarks of
the gentleman from Virginia they have already formed, will faithfully abide
by their constitutional obligations, and remain in the Union until their rights
are in fact invaded, all will be well. But if they take the responsibility of
involving the country in a civil war; of breaking up the Government which
our fathers founded and our people love, but one course remains to those
who are true to that Government. They must and will defend it at every
sacrifice—if necessary, to the sacrifice of their lives.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I came here with my colleagues representing a Southern
State. I have had full and free communication with the people of all
portions of the South, before, during, and since the election of the sixth of
November, and I state here, that I have never dreamed that there was the
slightest objection anywhere to the inauguration of Mr. L      . To-day is
the first time I ever heard the question raised, and yet I do not believe that
any such objection now exists.
It is said that this is not a fit time to hold such a conference—not a suitable
time to consider the questions now before us. Is there any reason why we
should not consider the rights of any section of the country, whether a
President is going out or coming in? As one delegate I will not consent to
postpone the action necessary to secure our rights for any such reason as
this.
Now, as to this question of slavery in the Territories. It is true that the
Supreme Court has decided it in favor of the South. It is equally true that
parties have repudiated that decision both in platforms and on the stump.
When territory has been acquired by the blood and treasure of the common
Union, you cannot exclude one portion of the cestuis que trust from its
rights. The Supreme Court so decided, and its decision was just and
equitable.
At the South, we ask for our rights under the Constitution. We say, let all
questions which affect or concern them be decided. The gentleman from
Massachusetts says he will not give them up, that his State will not yield.
Well, if this is so, let us go to the ballot box. If the question is decided in the
gentleman's favor there, we know how to take care of ourselves.
The gentleman from Massachusetts does not understand this question. He
does not understand why we of the South want it—why we must have it
settled. There was a time when the embargo law threw our slaves out of
employment. The North then contemplated a dissolution of the Union.
Why? Because she thought the Government wanted power—was
inefficient. Now, there is a sense of insecurity felt throughout the South.
Our property is depreciating, going down every day. We feel this want of
security very deeply, this want of faith in the Government under which we
live. The South is in agitation.
Suppose some event should in some way strike down the value of your
property at the North. Would you not wish to have its security restored?
Would you not call for guarantees? If you would not, you are not men. This
is all we want; all we ask for, is security. There is nothing in the territorial
question that we may not settle by a fair compromise.
The commonwealth of Virginia called this Conference in high patriotism. I
have an earnest faith in her sincerity and her purity in doing so. She hoped
to meet her sisters animated by the same patriotism—that they would join
with her in granting the assurances, in giving the securities we need.
Gentlemen, you can give us these securities—these assurances. We shall
then go home and tell our people that we can still live on together, in
security. Will it do to say that this cannot be done before the inauguration of
Mr. L      ? No! No such answer should go to the people of any of the
States—no such answer will satisfy them. Give us the guarantees here. We
will satisfy the people of the whole nation as to the appropriateness of the
time.
There is no truth in the assertions of the gentleman from Massachusetts. We
are willing to go before the old commonwealth of Massachusetts with all
her glorious memories, willing to go before New York with her half million
of voters, confident that both will do us justice. Why stand between us and
the people? At least, let us ask their judgment upon our propositions.
We come here to confer, to propitiate, not to awaken old troubles and
differences. If there are such existing and which must be settled, why
should we not settle them here? We all wish to bring back the seven States
which have left us; we have a common interest in them. I think they should
not have deserted us; that they should have consulted us first, and then there
would have been no necessity. If they were here, their presence surely
would not have weakened us, nor would their presence have disturbed the
North. We come not here to widen our separation—to drive them further
off. We come to consult together, to give and receive justice.
I confess I am not much in favor of the second proposition of amendment.
We must regard this as a progressive country. From four millions of people
we have risen to thirty millions! Where will we be in eighty years more?
There will be in that time a great population in our now unsettled territory
—perhaps greater than all our present population. I thought the amendment
unwise, but I consented to it, for if we would agree we must all yield
something.
And now I hope, and hope most earnestly, that without crimination or
recrimination we shall vote in good temper and in good time, so that our
proposals may in due time go before Congress and before the people.
Do not let us give up to revolution anywhere, in any section of the Union!
Do not you of the North impose upon us the necessity of fleeing our
country! God knows this same necessity may come to you of the North, and
sooner than you expect it. If disruption—if war must come, one-half your
merchants, one-half your mechanics will become bankrupt. You are
marching that way with hasty steps. Not one man, North or South, but must
suffer if the sad conclusion comes. Our products will depreciate. Next year
not one-half the fields now whitened by the rich growth of cotton will be
cultivated if this unhappy contest goes on.
The people of my section, the people of the South, are restless and
impatient. They are already in the way of revolution—all these influences
are leading them on. Can they remain quiet when the fortunes of one-half of
them are struck down? Can you at the North remain quiet under like
provocations? And yet harmony may even yet be restored. All these
differences may be settled harmoniously. We believe they may be settled
now.
Mr. TUCK:—If we should agree to all your propositions, and Congress still
should not act upon them, would not these difficulties be still more
complicated?
Mr. GUTHRIE:—No, sir! No! We would then tell our people that this
Conference would, but Congress would not do any thing to save the
country. In such an event we would wait for the ballot box and a new
Congress.
Mr. GOODRICH:—Permit me one question to the gentleman from
Kentucky. Would this Convention, in his opinion, have been called by
Virginia, if either Mr. D       or Mr. B            had been elected?
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I do not think it would have been called in that event. Let
me say, however, one thing which escaped me. It is not a divided
Democracy—not the existence of a Whig party, but it is the union of all
discordant elements combined, which have brought the abolitionists into
power, which has produced this sense of insecurity in the South. It is their
combined power which the people of the South feel, and which they wish to
guard against.
Mr. CLEVELAND:—I feel bound to say to all here present, that unless this
debate stops now, we might as well go home. I have pondered much upon
the remark of my worthy friend from Kentucky, that if we could not do
good here, at least we ought not to do harm. Why should we do any thing to
aggravate these unhappy circumstances? Let us not widen our dissensions;
let us do nothing to postpone or destroy the only hope we have for the
settlement of our troubles.
Let us be gentle and pleasant. Let us love one another. Let us not try to find
out who is the smartest or the keenest. Let us vote soon, and without any
feeling or any quarrelling.
Mr. SEDDON:—I fear from some remarks that have been made during this
discussion, that not only my motives, but the terms in which I have
expressed them, have been misapprehended. I have been untrue to every
purpose of my mind, if I have spoken with any bitterness or acrimony. I
thought it was my duty to be plain—at the same time temperate though
emphatic. I thought I had been so. Nothing is farther from my purpose than
the irritation of any section, much less of any member here. Most assuredly
I did not intend to create dissension or to give the slightest occasion for
personal feeling or recrimination.
The PRESIDENT finding it necessary to leave the Conference, now called
Mr. A         to the chair.
Mr. CLEVELAND:—I did not mean to stir up anybody. I want to settle
these unhappy points of difference here. I want to settle them to-day, now,
this very hour. Suppose we do not settle them! Does not border war follow?
does not civil war come? I speak to all of you, both North and South. What
becomes of your property in such a case? Who wants to stake it all on such
a hazard? We settled this question once fairly, and, as everybody thought,
finally. That was in 1850. Why was not that settlement permitted to stand?
Nothing but the ambition that has sent so many angels down to hell could
have ever brought it up again.
It is too late to bring charges against either section now—too late to bring
charges against individuals. The question now before us is,—Which is the
way to lead the country out of her present danger? We want faith and good
works—these alone will do it. If these fail, we have no hope elsewhere. I
am in favor of the propositions of amendment submitted. These we can
stand upon throughout the land. The people will adopt them. In the name of
all that is good and holy let us settle these differences here.
Why talk about territory to be acquired hereafter? We have just the same
title to it that the devil had to the territory he offered our Saviour on a
certain remarkable occasion—just the same title, at all events, no better. For
Heaven's sake, gentlemen, let us act for the good of the country! let us give
to every section its rights—to every man his rights, and let this be
remembered through all time as the Convention of Patriots which sacrificed
every selfish and personal consideration to save the country!
Mr. GOODRICH:—I wish to make one remark to the Conference, and
especially to the gentleman from Kentucky. Much is said here about equal
rights. We have always believed in that doctrine. We believe this to be a
country of equals. We went into the last Presidential contest as equals—and
as such we elected Mr. L      . Now, when we have the right to do so, we
wish to come into power as equals—with that superiority only which our
majority gives us. When we are in power and disturb or threaten to disturb
the rights of any portion of the Union, then ask us for security, for
guarantees, and if need be you shall have both. How would you have treated
us if we had come to you with such a request at the commencement of any
Democratic administration?
Mr. LOGAN:—I want to refer the report of the majority, and the substitute
proposed by the minority, back to the committee. I believe that it is better to
have action upon all these questions at the earliest possible moment. The
question now is, not which section of the Union is suffering most—all
sections are suffering; all are feeling the influence of this agitation; all look
with fear and trembling to the future; all desire a speedy and a peaceful
conclusion of our differences. If we cannot settle them here—if we cannot
induce Congress to submit our propositions of amendment to the people,
then I pray from my heart, I hope and believe, that our friends in every
section will wait patiently until these propositions can go before the State
Legislatures and receive proper consideration there.
The PRESIDENT here stated the proposition, to refer the reports of the
majority and the minority of the committee back to the committee, with
instructions.
Several members objected to the motion, declaring it not in order.
The motion was thereupon withdrawn.
The PRESIDENT:—The question recurs upon the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Maryland, to insert the word "present" before the word
territories, in the first line and the fifth line of the propositions of the
amendment to the Constitution submitted by the majority of the committee.
The amendment was adopted without a count of the yeas and nays, and the
first section of the majority report, after the adoption of the amendment, is
as follows:
ARTICLE 1. In all the present territory of the United States, not embraced
within the limits of the Cherokee treaty grant, north of a line from east to
west on the parallel of 36° 30´ north latitude, involuntary servitude, except
in punishment of crime, is prohibited whilst it shall be under a Territorial
Government; and in all the present territory south of said line, the status of
persons owing service or labor as it now exists, shall not be changed by law
while such territory shall be under a Territorial Government; and neither
Congress nor the Territorial Government shall have power to hinder or
prevent the taking to said territory of persons held to labor or involuntary
service, within the United States, according to the laws or usages of the
State from which such persons may be taken, nor to impair the rights
arising out of said relations, which shall be subject to judicial cognizance in
the Federal Courts, according to the common law; and when any territory
north or south of said line, within such boundary as Congress may
prescribe, shall contain a population required for a member of Congress,
according to the then Federal ratio of representation, it shall, if its form of
government be republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing
with the original States, with or without involuntary service or labor, as the
Constitution of such new State may provide.
Mr. ROMAN:—I move that when this Conference adjourn, it adjourn to
meet at seven o'clock this evening.
Mr. CHITTENDEN:—I move an adjournment of the Conference.
Mr. ROMAN:—Is not my motion first in order?
The PRESIDENT:—The question is on the motion of the gentleman from
Vermont.
The motion to adjourn was put and carried.
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W         , T      , February 19th, 1861.
T   Conference was called to order by the P         at eleven o'clock.
The proceedings were opened with prayer.
The Journal was read by Assistant Secretary P       , and, after sundry
amendments, was approved.
Mr. SUMMERS:—The Committee on Credentials have received and
considered the credentials of Mr. F       G      , of New York,
appointed to fill a vacancy in the delegation from that State, occasioned by
the resignation of Mr. A       G       . They are satisfactory, and if no
objection is made, the list of delegates from New York will be altered
accordingly.
No objection was made, and Mr. G      '  name was added to the list of
delegates from New York.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I ask now that the resolution limiting the time to be
occupied by each member in debate be taken up. I have become satisfied
that unless we place some restrictions, in this respect, upon the discussions,
we shall occupy much more time than we wish to have expended in that
way. The session of the present Congress will soon terminate. Our labors
will be useless, unless we submit the result of them to Congress in time to
secure the approval of that body. The propositions will be debated there,
and that debate must necessarily occupy time. I am sure no gentleman
wishes to defeat the main purpose of the Conference by delay. The
resolution is as follows:
Resolved, That in the discussions which may take place in this Convention
upon any question, no member shall be allowed to speak more than thirty
minutes.
Mr. DAVIS:—I move to amend the resolution by inserting ten minutes
instead of thirty minutes.
Mr. FIELD:—Is it seriously contemplated now, after gentlemen upon one
side have spoken two or three times, and at great length—after the
questions involved in the committee's reports have been thoroughly and
exhaustively discussed on the part of the South—and when only one
gentleman from the North has been heard upon the general subject, to cut us
off from all opportunity of expressing our views? Such a course will not
help your propositions.
Mr. BOUTWELL:—Massachusetts will never consent to this.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—If we cannot get Massachusetts to help us, we will help
ourselves. We got along without her in the war of 1812; we can get on
without her again. The disease exists in the nation now. It is of no use, or
rather it is too late to talk about the cause, we had much better try to cure
the disease.
Mr. FIELD:—New York has not occupied the time of the Conference for
three minutes. Kentucky has been heard twice, her representative speaking
as long as he wished. I insist upon the same right for New York. I insist
upon the discussion of these questions without restriction or limitation.
Mr. DODGE:—I wish to speak for the commercial interests of the country.
I cannot do them justice in ten minutes.
Mr. MOREHEAD, of North Carolina:—I am very desirous to reach an early
decision, and yet I do not quite like to restrict debate in this way. Suppose,
after holding one morning session, we have another commencing at half-
past seven in the evening?
Mr. CARRUTHERS:—We have come here for the purpose of acting; not to
hear speeches. There is no use in talking over these things; our minds are all
made up, and talking will not change them. I want to make an end of these
discussions. I move that all debate shall close at three o'clock to-day, and
that the Conference then proceed to vote upon the propositions before it.
Mr. ALLEN:—The object which brought us together I presume we shall not
disagree about. We came here for the purpose of consultation over the
condition of the country. If this is true, nothing but harm can come from
these limitations upon the liberty of speech. The questions before us are the
most important that could possibly arise. Before our present Constitution
was adopted it was discussed and examined in Convention for more than
three months. We are now practically making a new Constitution. Though
we as members differed widely when we came here, I think progress has
been made toward our ultimate agreement. I think the general effect of our
discussions is to bring us nearer together. I think our acquaintance and our
association as members lead to the same end.
The gentleman from Kentucky says that we have come here to heal disease.
I don't quite agree with him as to the disease. I differ widely from him as to
the proper method of treating it. He seems disposed to apply a plaster to the
foot, to cure a disease in the head. If these debates should continue for a
week, the time would not be lost, the effect would be favorable. We should
have more faith in each other, a more kindly feeling would be produced. Do
not let us hurry. You may force a vote to-day, but the result will satisfy
none. Such a course will give good ground for dissatisfaction. You may
even carry your propositions by a majority, but what weight will such a vote
have in Congress or with the people?
Mr. CHITTENDEN:—We who represent smaller States intend to be very
modest here, but you will need our votes when you seek to place new and
important limitations upon a Constitution with which we are now satisfied.
I will answer for one State, and tell you that she will not listen to a
proposition that comes to her with a taint of suspicion about it. If you will
not allow her representatives to participate in the examination and
discussion of these propositions here, her people will reject them without
discussion, if they are ever called to act on them. She has not occupied the
time of this Conference for one minute upon the general subject. She may
not wish to do so. I submit whether it is wise for you to cut off her right to
be heard here, if she chooses to exercise it.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—I agree with the gentleman from Tennessee, that we
came here to act and not to talk. We have had talking enough, perhaps too
much already. I have drawn up a resolution which I think covers the whole
subject, I move its adoption. The resolution was read as follows:
Resolved, That this Convention will hold two sessions daily, viz., from ten
o'clock,  . ., to four o'clock,  . .; and from eight to ten o'clock,  . .; and
that no motion to adjourn prior to said hours of four and ten,  . ., shall be in
order, if objection be made; and that on Thursday next, at twelve o'clock,
noon, all debate shall cease, and the Convention proceed to vote upon the
questions or propositions before them in their order.
The P         commenced a statement of the various propositions relating
to the subject now pending, when Mr. A         moved to lay the whole
subject on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was negatived by the following vote:—ayes,
48; nays, 54.
Mr. GOODRICH:—I call for the division of the question.
The PRESIDENT:—So many motions have been made that it is somewhat
difficult to decide, by the rules of Parliamentary law, which is in order.
I will divide the questions as follows:
1st. Will the Conference hold two sessions daily?
2d. Shall the debate be closed on Thursday at twelve o'clock?
3d. Shall each member be limited to ten minutes in the discussion?
Mr. JOHNSON, of Missouri:—I hope the questions will be decided
affirmatively.
Mr. CHASE:—It appears to me that we can arrange this whole subject
without serious difficulty. If Mr. W         will adhere to his resolution,
and the other proposals are withdrawn, we can then proceed. If any
gentleman finds it necessary to ask for an extension of his time, it will no
doubt be granted to him. Mr. R       '  proposition exacts too much
labor. I think the Conference had better limit the time of each member. I am
opposed to fixing a time for terminating the discussion. It will not be
agreeable to many who may be cut off. It is contrary to the spirit of the rules
we have already adopted. I hope we shall not be compelled to vote on the
questions one by one, and I will suggest to Mr. R        whether it would
not be better that his resolution should be withdrawn.
Mr. HOPPIN:—I hope the resolution will pass as it is. We have come here
to act. We are all ready to take the vote now. The sooner we vote the better.
There is every necessity for prompt action.
Mr. MOREHEAD:—If the proposition had emanated from another quarter,
I should feel at liberty to urge its adoption. As it is, I would pay the highest
respect to it. I regret extremely to hear the talk about sides in this
Conference. I came here to act for the Union—the whole Union. I recognize
no sides—no party. If any come here for a different purpose I do not wish to
act with them; they are wrong. I hope from my heart that we can all yet live
together in peace; but if we are to do so we must act, and act speedily.
Mr. C     again stated his proposition.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—If I understand rightly, the question should be on
striking out the latter clause of the resolution, so as to perfect it and make it
meet the case. I make the point and—
Mr. RANDOLPH:—I think the gentleman from Maryland is right.
Mr. ALEXANDER:—I desire to ask whether a resolution to supersede the
motion to adjourn is in order?
The PRESIDENT:—I think the question should first be taken on the motion
to strike out the last clause in the resolution.
Mr. STOCKTON:—If the Conference felt as I do, it would at once establish
such peremptory orders as would bring a speedy termination to this whole
business. Upon what, let me ask gentlemen, does the salvation of the Union
depend at this moment? What is it alone that prevents civil war now? I
answer, it is the session of this Convention—this august Convention! We
stand in the presence of an awful danger! We feel the throes of an
earthquake which threatens to bring down ruin on the whole magnificent
fabric of our Government! Is it possible that we should suffer this ruin to
take place? Would it not impeach the wisdom and good sense of our day
and generation to permit the edifice which our fathers constructed—to
crumble to pieces? No! fellow countrymen, it is necessary that we, by
trusting in God, who guided our ancestors through the stormy vicissitudes
of the Revolution, should this day resolve that the Union shall be preserved!
In the execution of that resolve let us unfold a new leaf in our national
history, and write thereon words of peace. Peace or war is in our hands—an
awful alternative! Peace alone is the object of our mission; to restore peace
to a distracted country. I have spent my whole life in the service of my
country. I love the people of every State in it. They have been under my
command and I have been under theirs. I know them, and I know that this
Union can never be dissolved without a struggle. Will you hasten the time
when we shall begin to shed each other's blood? No! gentlemen, no!
There seems to be but one question which gives us any difficulty in
adjusting. That is, about the right of the South to take their slaves into the
territories. Is it possible that we can permit this Union to be broken up
because of any difference on such a question as this? Better that the
territories were buried in the deep sea beyond the plummet's reach, than that
they should be the cause of such a deplorable result.
But it is not the value of the territories which is in dispute; it is not whether
the North or the South shall colonize them, because, as the gentleman from
New York has said, that though the territory south of 36° 30´ had been ten
years open to Southern colonization, only twenty-four slaves had been
introduced into it. No, the real question is, whether pride of opinion shall
succumb to the necessities of the crisis.
The Premier of the incoming administration has declared that parties and
platforms are subordinate to, and must disappear in the presence of the great
question of the Union. This gives me hope. Let him and his friends act upon
that, and this Conference can in six hours, in conjunction with a committee
of his political friends, adjust such terms of settlement as will save the
Union.
The Roman Curtius offered himself as a sacrifice to save Rome, when
informed by the oracle that the loss of his life would save his country. We
are now in greater danger than Rome was then; but is there no Curtius for
our salvation? We are not called upon to give up life, property, or honor, but
to concede justice and equal rights to our Southern brethren. We only want
the courage to yield extreme opinions. What power, after victory, refuses to
lower the lofty terms which were asserted on the eve of the battle for the
sake of peace? But the Republicans say, shall we surrender the fruits of
victory to the vanquished? I answer, how are you to enjoy your fruits
without pacification? You expected to govern the whole country. You
aspired to the control of the whole empire. Without peace you will not
succeed in establishing possession of that magnificent country which your
predecessors governed, but you will govern a little more than half of it, and
with that you have to provide for war.
It is easy to dispose of the threatening attitude of the South by denouncing it
as a rebellion—as treason. It is idle to disguise the danger. The revolt of a
whole people, covering a territory equal to half of Europe, is a revolution.
You cannot dwarf the movement by stigmatizing it as treason. Its magnitude
and proportions make the sword, and not the law, its arbiter. Is it possible
that people can be so infatuated as to contemplate the use of the sword to
conquer secession? Will you hasten the time when we shall begin to shed
each other's blood? Coerce! force fifteen States! Why, you cannot force
New Jersey alone! Force the South? They won't stop to count forces—
neither side can be frightened. Don't think of it. You cannot frighten either,
no more than the hero could be frightened whom the Roman poet has
immortalized. Suppose after the expenditure of a thousand millions you
shall have stopped dismemberment and subjugated the South, what is to
become of the country then? what is to become of the army and its chiefs
who have conquered? When the Long Parliament had murdered Charles,
subdued Ireland and Scotland, and compelled the deference of all Europe,
they supposed they would enjoy the fruits of their victories. They began to
discuss the expenses of the army, and the expediency of its reduction. They
had hardly commenced when Cromwell entered Westminster Hall and
turned out the Republican party of that day. The whole country, tired of war,
crouched under the iron heel of the Puritan soldier. The Republican party of
England succumbed; Cromwell died; his son resigned the Protectorate, and
the Republican party of England rose to the surface and made its last
struggle for its power. General Monk and his army approached London, and
Parliament with servility waited the pleasure of the army. The army
declared for the King, and the King was restored.
When men meet to save the country, they must be prepared to give up every
thing—to give their lives if necessary. How can men stop for party
platforms when their country is in danger? But will the country consent to
be dragged into civil war to maintain the Chicago Platform? It will not.
That Platform was erected upon a perishable foundation. In the language of
the New York Senator, it must "disappear."
I appeal to the brotherhood, to the fraternity of the North. My friends, peace
or war is in your hands. You hold the keys of peace or war. You tell us not
to hasten in this matter. But you do not realize the facts—no one does. It is
said that the South challenges and invites war. No such thing. The mad
action of South Carolina does not truly represent the South. There are
disunionists South as well as North. It is the duty of patriotic men to
checkmate the disunionists of both sections. By a proclamation of war, we
shall effectually play into the hands and gratify the disunionists of both
extremes. Civil war consolidates the South as a unit for disunion. The
gallant southern men who have so nobly battled for the Union against great
odds, will then be overpowered and forced into the ranks of the defenders
of the South. While the South will thus be undivided and stand in solid
phalanx, what will be our condition here at the North?
Can it be supposed that the Union men of the Democracy of of the North
will stand by and see the country plunged into civil war to maintain the
Chicago Platform? Will they acquiesce in the demolition of this Union by
these means, when it can be preserved by peace? No, sir! Do you talk here
about regiments for invasion, for coercion—you, gentlemen of the North?
You know better; I know better. For every regiment raised there for
coercion, there will be another raised for resistance to coercion. If no other
State will raise them, remember New Jersey. The Republican leaders of the
North, with hot haste, have worked through the Legislatures of the several
States resolutions of a belligerent character, offering the military power of
those States to the Government to subdue the South. Did the people of the
North authorize those Legislatures to make any such tenders? Would the
people of the North sanction any such nefarious policy? I know well the
enormous bribe with which the Republican leaders would seduce the North
into fratricidal war. The expenditure of uncounted millions, the distribution
of epaulets and military commissions for an army of half a million of men,
the immense patronage involved in the letting of army contracts, the
inflation of prices and the rise of property which would follow the
excessive issue of paper money, made necessary by the lavish expenditure;
—these, indeed, are the enormous bribes which the Republican party offers.
How arrogant it is for the Republican leaders to tender the military power of
their States! Who gave them or their States authority to raise armies? For
national purposes the whole militia of the Union is subject to Congress.
Congress alone has power to declare war and to call out the militia, and
Congress can only call upon the militia to suppress insurrection or repel
invasion. Pause, gentlemen! Stop where you are! You will bring strife to
your own doors, to your very hearthstones—bloody, disheartening strife.
War will be in your own homes, among your own families. Under ordinary
circumstances you would hesitate. If the question was about tariff, you
would hesitate and look at the awful consequences. That there is a diversity
between us is very true. What of it? It lies in a nutshell. We can fix it in a
minute, if you will be calm and act like brothers.
The only question, as I understand it, for I have thought and studied upon it,
is this: You of the North will not yield to the South the small privilege of
taking their slaves into the territories of the common Union. You will not
give them a fair chance with you, even in the Government property—the
territories. When the territories become States they will have to take care of
themselves. You cannot theorize slave soil into free soil, nor vice versâ. Am
I not right? Does the South ask any control or power over these territories
after they have become States? No, gentlemen; the South demands no such
thing. It is not demanded by her, and never will be. All I ask for the South,
and all she asks for herself, is this: Let us be free to come with our slaves
into all your territories, and hold them there until the territory is made up
into States.
I have shown that if peace be not secured, the uprising of the South would
be a revolution, and cannot be treated as mere insurrection. The bravado,
therefore, of offering armies to the Government, can only have the effect, at
this crisis, of preventing a peaceful adjustment. Against all such
demonstrations we must fix our faces like flint. Peace we must have. The
Union can only be preserved by peace. The South asks no more than the
North will concede, if the people of the North can express their sentiments.
The South only asks for equal rights, and to be let alone. For thirty years
she has asked no more. The South will soon present its cause in an
authoritative shape. Their conventions will soon declare their propositions.
Let the North be prepared to consider them in conventions representing
their people fairly. If this is done, there is no doubt the present crisis will
pass without danger. Until time for these results can be taken, let warlike
demonstrations be resisted. Let the Government abstain from collision, even
with South Carolina. There is as much of loyalty to the Union at the South
as anywhere. It has only disappeared in the presence of danger which
threatened their domestic tranquillity, their safety, and their honor. Let the
hostile attitude which the North assumed at Chicago give place to the
recognition of the rights of the South, and we shall see an outburst of
loyalty to the Union throughout the entire South, like that which welcomed
to old England its constitutional sovereign after a long and bloody civil war,
forced upon the English people by the Puritans. It is the spirit of the same
fanatic intolerance which has caused our present troubles.
Intelligent citizens should abandon platforms and stand up for peace. Peace
with all nations has been the master policy. It has elevated our country to its
present condition of power and prosperity. Do not let us sacrifice peace, and
suffer violence and discord to usurp its reign. We have a magnificent future
if we can only preserve the Union as our fathers constructed it. While it
lasts there is a great light in the firmament in which all may walk in
security, hope, and happiness. It is a light reaching far down the depths of
futurity cheering and guiding the steps of our children. It is a light shining
to the remotest corner of the earth—raising up the down-trodden and
illuminating the homes of the victims of oppression. But let that light be
now eclipsed, go out in blood and darkness, and the hopes of mankind are
forever blasted.
Gentlemen, will you not consider? Shall we not settle the question here, and
not trouble the rest of the Union with it? We will settle it fairly and
squarely. It is too small a matter to get mad about—to set about destroying
the Union. Why quarrel over such a simple question? No, gentlemen, you
shall not do it. I am going to talk to you as individuals—as men—as
patriots. I know too many of you and too much about you. You love your
country too well to destroy her for such a cause. You are too patriotic. The
North will never dissolve this Union on any such pretexts. You cannot
destroy your country for that. You love it too much. I call on you,
W         and K   , F     and C     and M      —as able men, as
brothers—as good patriots—to give up every thing else if it is necessary, to
save your country. But we don't ask you to give up any thing in the way of
principles.
Now that Chicago Platform of yours is a nice paper. It has many good
things in it. But it must not control this question. You can keep that platform
and save your country: but you must save your country. Shall we go into
war upon this little question about the Territories. No! No!!
Under the most favorable circumstances possible for the experiment of self-
government, with every possible inducement to preserve our country, we
must not give it up. The years of civil war which will succeed
dismemberment of the Union will cause true men to seek refuge and
security, from military despotism, in some other country. Some Cæsar or
Napoleon will spring from the vortex of revolution and war, and with his
sword cleave his way to supreme command. If all history is not a failure,
and if mankind are now what they have always been, such will be the fate
of free government in the United States, in the event of war. Shall we bring
such a catastrophe upon us to vindicate the Chicago Platform? No! the
American people will rise in their omnipotence and trample into dust the
man who dared to put in jeopardy this Union, in order to maintain such
demagogism. Away with parties and platforms and every thing else which
would obstruct the free and patriotic efforts now making for the salvation of
the Union. It shall not be destroyed. I tell you, friends, I am going to stand
right in the way. You shall not go home; you shall never see your wives and
families again, until you have settled these matters, and saved your good
old country, if I can help it. Spread aloft the banner of stripes and stars, let
the whole country rally beneath its glorious folds, with no other slogan on
their lips but the unanimous cry, T   U    ,            P        !
Mr. GRANGER:—New Jersey has addressed New York as though she
supposed the delegation from that State to be united in its opinions, and its
action. Let me set the gentleman himself and the Conference right on that
point at the commencement. The members composing that delegation do
not agree; very far from it. The vote of that delegation hitherto has been
determined by a majority only; a majority reduced to the very smallest point
possible now, since the delegation is full. It may be said that New York
voted at the last Presidential election against us by a majority of fifty
thousand; but let me assure you that if the noble propositions of the
majority of your committee, which I read for the first time yesterday, could
be submitted to them, the people of New York would adopt them by even a
larger majority.
These are noble propositions; they are worthy the eminent and patriotic
committee from which they have emanated. They present a fair and
equitable basis for the adjustment of our difficulties; they are a shield and a
sure defence against the dangers which threaten us. They are such as the
people expect and such as they want. They know that the politicians who
have brought the country to the verge of ruin can be trusted no longer. The
time has come when they must act for themselves. Be assured, gentlemen,
they will do so.
I wish to say a few words about the last election in New York, for it has
been widely misrepresented and misunderstood. How did we go into that
canvass? Upon what principles was it conducted? What representations
were made? I am one of the men who have struggled to meet and oppose
this Republican party from the outset—to avert, if possible, the adoption of
its pernicious principles by the people of New York. I took my stand upon
the Compromise of 1850, and separated myself politically from all men
who could not stand with me on that platform. We struggled on until that
Compromise was adopted by the Baltimore Convention.
The Kansas bill was introduced at a most fatal hour. It was distasteful to the
whole country; satisfactory nowhere. In due time the Charleston
Convention was assembled, and the Democratic party was broken up
forever.
What next? Next came the Chicago Convention. It may have been
conducted with dignity, and it nominated a candidate. I differ widely from
that candidate in my principles and my policy. And yet I believe in him
although I opposed his election. I would trust his Kentucky blood to the
end, if all else failed. I think he is honest. I have no idea that he will permit
the policy of his administration to be controlled by the hotheaded zealots
who have been so conspicuous in the last canvass. I expect to see him call
to his council board, cool, dispassionate, and conservative men; not men
who are driven to the verge of insanity upon this question of slavery.
What next? The Baltimore Convention was held. The tragedy was
consummated; the contest was ended. The mere scuffle to secure the control
of the Convention which ended in its division, has brought the country into
all its present difficulties. If that Convention had presented to the people a
good conservative Democrat, there were seventy-five thousand good old
line Whigs who would have buckled on their armor and would have won
the battle for him.
When the Southern papers began to threaten disunion because L       did
not suit the South, I was not one who abused or denounced them. I knew the
temper of some of the politicians in the free States. I knew the action of the
South was not impulsive. I knew there was a reason for it. They said their
capital was to be rendered worthless—their property to be destroyed, and
their country made desolate. God forbid that I should chide them for
thinking so!
The Northern mind is in some respects very different from the Southern. It
is not started by slight scratches, but strike the rowel deep, and there is a
purpose in it that nothing can conquer or restrain. The people of the North
will carry that purpose into execution, with a power as fierce as that of the
maddest chivalry of South Carolina. The rowel was struck deep and the
consequences were not considered.
Subjects have been introduced into this discussion which I should have
been glad to have avoided, which it would have been better every way to
have avoided. The gentleman from Virginia has referred to the J   
B     invasion. That is one of those subjects. He spoke of the feeling at
the North regarding insurrections. I assure you that the North regarded the
invader in that case as a foe in your homes—uncurbed and unrestrained—a
terrible enemy. I would say to the gentleman from Virginia, that although
too many instances among extreme men may have been found of attempts
to justify that invasion, such was not the general feeling at the North. Those
instances were rare exceptions; and because they were so few and so
exceptional, acquired a degree of notoriety and received a degree of
attention to which they were never entitled. Such instances as these have
always served to prejudice the South improperly against the North. Men are
too much given to forming opinions of us from the intemperate acts of a
few meddling men.
How do we stand at the present moment in this respect. You will find a few
men among us, even now, rash enough to say, "Let these Southern
slaveholders go. The 'nigger' will rise upon them and cut their throats!" The
action of such men, I admit, gives some color and justification to your
charges and prejudices against the whole Northern people.
I agree with you, gentlemen, that this is now a question of peace or war. I
believe it to be so from my very soul. The North has been much to blame in
bringing it upon us. What has been the language used at the North? Men
have used such expressions as this, "The South secede? Why, you can't kick
out the South." And men who knew no better believed the statement to be
true. I appeal to northern men to say whether this has not been so. I myself
thought four States would go, but I believed secession would stop there. We
had more to hope from Louisiana than from any other Gulf State. She has
gone, and has now taken up a most offensive and threatening position.
Virginia to-day is in more danger of immediate secession than Louisiana
was a few short months ago.
My friend from New Jersey says that if this Convention does not prevent it,
there must be war. I agree with him. War! what a fearful alternative to
contemplate? War is a fearful calamity at best, sometimes necessary I
admit, but always terrible. It cannot come to this country without a fearful
expenditure of blood and treasure. It will leave us, if it leaves us a nation at
all, with an awful legacy of widows' tears—of the blighted hopes of orphans
—with a catalogue of suffering, misery, and woe, too long to be enumerated
and too painful to be contemplated. For God's sake! let such a fate be
averted at any cost, from the country. If it comes at all, it will be such a war
as the world never saw. War is commonly, and almost universally, between
nations foreign to each other—whose individuals are strangers to each
other, and whose interests are widely separated. But we are a nation of
brothers, of a common ancestry, and bound together by a thousand
memories of the past—a thousand ties of interest and blood. It will be a war
between brothers—between you who come to us in summer, and we who
visit you in winter. It will be a war between those who have been connected
in business—associated in pleasures, and who have met as brothers in the
halls of legislation and the marts of commerce. Save us from such a war!
Let not the mad anger of such a people be aroused. And, gentlemen, if war
comes it must be long and terrible. You will see both parties rise in their
majesty at both ends of the line. They will slough off every other
consideration and devote themselves, with terrible energy, to the work of
death. Oh ye! who bring such a calamity as this upon this once happy
country! Pause, gentlemen, before you do it, and think of the fearful
accountability that awaits you in time and in eternity.
But I am here to answer for the State of New York; the Empire State and the
people of the Empire State. I have never been classed with the rash men of
that State who have aided in bringing about this condition of things. I will
not be classed with those who now thrust themselves between the Empire
State and those glorious propositions of your committee. They are in the
smallest possible majority even in our delegation. All I ask is, that we may
have the judgment of the people upon these propositions, and I will be
answerable for the rest; and these gentlemen who rely upon the fifty
thousand (50,000) majority of last November, will have a fearful waiting for
of judgment. Fifty thousand majority! Who does not know how that
majority was made up? It was not a majority upon the question of slavery at
all. It came in this wise: The opposite party was divided and distracted. The
Republican party united all sorts of discordant elements; men voted for Mr.
L       from a great variety of motives. Some, because they wanted the
Homestead law; some because they wanted a change in the Tariff; and,
gentlemen, let me assure you, there were more men who voted for Mr.
L      —solely on account of the Tariff—than would have made up this
fifty thousand majority. I know the people of New York, and I know I can
answer for them when I say, Give us these fair and noble propositions and
we will accept them with an unanimity that will gratefully surprise the
nation.
How does the nation stand to-day? Look at Kansas! She is a State and yet in
beggary. She is stretching out her hands to us for relief. We have relieved
her for the time, but she will need more aid again. The whole country is
excited and agitated. The press, North and South, is full of
misrepresentation and vituperation. Sections are arrayed against each other.
Men fear to trust each other. The very air is full of anxiety and
apprehension. Such, gentlemen, is the miserable condition of the country.
The nation is in great peril. Its interests, its institutions, its property, are all
in great and common peril. Paralysis has seized upon the whole country. In
vain now shall we argue about causes. The effect is upon us. Business is
stagnated. Those who have capital do not dare to move it. But we here must
do something. Mr. L       is coming, and all along the route the people
are doing him honor. But that triumphal march is insignificant compared
with the anxiety felt throughout the country that this Convention should
agree upon some plan that will save the Government and the Union.
In one thing, under other circumstances, I would agree with the gentleman
(Mr. B       ) from Massachusetts. Had the border States elected their
members of Congress, I would wait. But the elections in the border States
are yet to be held. And upon what idea? Why, sir, upon the idea that their
whole interests and their whole property are in danger. Aspiring and
dangerous men will go before an excited people full of anxiety and
uncertainty for the future, and by them be elected instead of the sound,
wise, and conservative gentlemen usually selected to represent those States.
Those elections would be a mad scene of aspersion and vituperation. I
cannot, I will not trust them. Rather give me in those States the glorious
results of years gone by.
I say, and I am proud to declare here, that I had no association with the
dominant party in the old Empire State at the last election. I struck every
other name from the ticket, except those who voted for Bell and Everett.
Glorious names! which received the triumphant endorsement of the mother
of Presidents—the grand old commonwealth of Virginia.
Sometimes I meet with men who tell me what is going to be done. They
talk of retaking forts now held by seceded States by force, of restoring
things to their former condition, as they would about sending a vessel for a
cargo of oranges to Havana. But they forget that the next administration,
like the philosopher who would move the world with a lever, has no holding
spot—no place whereon to stand. It is one thing to hold a fort where you
have it, but quite another thing to take it when held by the enemy.
Who can magnify the importance of this Conference to all the nation? It is
the most important ever held in this country. It holds the key of peace or
war. The eyes of the whole people are turned hopefully upon it. By every
consideration that should move a patriot, let us agree. Let us act for the
salvation of our common country. I came here very unexpectedly to myself.
Long withdrawn from political circles, living in comparative retirement, at
peace with the world and myself, I would have preferred to remain there;
but when I heard of my appointment as a delegate to this Conference, I felt
it my duty to come here and say these few things to you.
And now let me close by again assuring you, that if all you ask of New
York is the adoption of the propositions which I heard here yesterday as the
propositions of a majority of your committee, New York will do you justice.
She will answer "Y  " by a most triumphant majority—a majority
compared with which any heretofore given will seem insignificant! I will
occupy time no farther. There is much which I would add, but this is a time
for action and not for words.
Mr. RUFFIN:—There are few members of this Conference who attend its
sessions with greater interest than myself. I presume that we have come
together influenced by various considerations. There are some, I have no
doubt, who do not desire the preservation of the Union—who do not care
for the safety of the Government which our fathers founded. They may not
avow their purposes, they may even conceal them under specious words,
but their purpose will be disclosed when we see them arrayed against all
projects of settlement—all measures to quiet the existing excitement.
Others may think there is no necessity for any action at all, may think so
honestly. But let me assure them they are mistaken—sadly mistaken.
Now, I do not care what motives influence others. It is of no consequence to
me what their designs or purposes may be, I have no concealment and no
deception. I came here for a purpose which I openly and distinctly avow. I
proclaim it here and everywhere. I will labor to carry it into execution with
all the strength and ability which my advanced years and enfeebled health
have left me. I came to maintain and preserve this glorious Government! I
came here for Union and peace! (Applause.)
My health is such that if I could avoid it, I would not mingle in this
discussion. I would not say one word, if I did not know perfectly well that
life or death to my part of the country was involved in the action of this
Conference. If gentlemen felt as as deeply as I do, they would deprecate as I
do the introduction of party or politics into this discussion, or the slightest
reference to them. Of what importance is party, compared with the great
questions involved here? Parties or men may go up or down, and yet our
country is safe. But such Conferences as this, in such emergencies as the
present, must act, if our country is to be saved. Let us discard politics and
party—let us be brethren and friends.
A gentlemen asked yesterday whether the Convention would have been
called, if a Democrat had been elected President. Certainly not. But
considerations of a party character would not have prevented it. The true
necessity that called us here, is that a President has been elected by a large
majority, and a new and strong party is coming into power, which our
people believe entertain views and designs hostile to our institutions. Do
not understand me as charging the fact upon the new Government. Perhaps
I might say that I do not believe it myself.
But that will not answer. Our people are agitated and excited, and we have
come here to tell you all, with sorrow in our hearts, that if you will not do
something to restore a confidence that is shaken, we are ruined, and we
must see this noble Government go down.
We ask you for new constitutional guarantees; and what are the propositions
we make? Is there any thing in them which you cannot grant? Is there any
thing which it would be dishonorable for you to yield? You reply to us, that
you will consent to call a convention to discuss and adjust matters. That
will not do. We must act on the existing state of facts. Seven States are
already in rebellion—in revolution! I don't care which you call it; either
word is bad enough. Tennessee and North Carolina already form fourteen
hundred miles of what is virtually a frontier. We are now the border States;
we are to be the theatre of war, if it comes. The slave property we speak of
will be in still greater peril than it is now. Now think of these things, and
tell us whether we can wait for all this complicated machinery of a
convention to be put into operation. At the very shortest, it will take three or
four years to accomplish any thing.
But my friend from Massachusetts says he does not wish to do any thing at
all; that the North is under duress, and her people would despise themselves
if they acted under duress. No! no! This is not true in any sense. We respect
the people of the North too much to attempt to drive them, or to secure what
we need by threats or intimidation. We want the aid of the people of
Massachusetts, and we will appeal to their sense of right and justice.
I believe that these propositions, if adopted, will not only satisfy and quiet
the loyal States of the South, but that they will bring back the seven States
which have gone out. I must be frank and outspoken here. We cannot
answer for these States. We cannot say whether they will be satisfied. But
we can even stand their absence. We can get on without them, if you will
give us what will quiet our people, and what at the same time will not injure
you.
Gentlemen, we of North Carolina are not hostile to you; we are your friends
—brothers in a common cause—citizens of a common country. We are
loyal to our country and to our Constitution. We lose both of them, unless
you will aid us now.
As for me, I am an old man. My heart is very full when I look upon the
present unhappy and distracted condition of our affairs. I was born before
the present Constitution was adopted. May God grant that I do not outlive
it. I cannot address you on this subject without manifesting a feeling which
fills my heart. Let me assure you, in terms as strong as I can make them,
that we cannot stand as we are; that unless you will do something for us,
our people will be drawn into that mad career of open defiance, which is
now opening so widely against the Government. All I ask of you is to let
these propositions go to the people—to submit them at once to their
conventions, and not wait the action of the Legislatures of all the States. We
want the popular voice—the decision of the people, and the whole people;
and if it is to avail us at all, we must have it at once and speedily.
Mr. NOYES:—I did not design to trespass upon the time of the Conference
at this stage of the debate. But statements have been made upon this floor
to-day which I cannot permit for a single hour to remain unanswered. I
should be recreant to my conscience, and especially to my State, if I did not
answer them here and now.
I came here for peace, prepared to do that justice to every section of the
Union which would secure peace—prepared to go to the farthest limit
which propriety and principle, and my obligations to the Constitution,
would permit me, to satisfy our southern friends. I did not wish to commit
myself to any thing, until I had patiently seen and heard all that was to be
said and proposed. Even now I regret that this incidental discussion upon a
subject entirely collateral has arisen. How thoroughly it shows the idleness
and folly of attempting to limit, or trammel, or hamper discussion upon the
general questions which are presented for our action!
Sir, I speak for New York! Not New York of a time gone by! Not New York
of an old fossiliferous era, remembered only in some chapter of her ancient
history, but young, breathing, living New York, as she exists to-day. Full of
enterprise, patriotism, energy—her living self, with her four millions of
people, among whom there is scarcely to be found a heart not beating with
loyalty to the Constitution and the Government.
In behalf of that New York, the one and only one alive now, I propose to
reply to some of the statements made here by one of her representatives.
In the name of the popular voice of that State, recently uttered in tones that
I supposed any one could understand, I tell you, gentlemen of this
Convention, beware of false prophets. This day, the Scripture is fulfilled
among you. [Pointing to Mr. G      .] "A prophet is not without honor
save in his own country, and in his own house!"
New York must stand upon this floor, and upon every other floor, as the
peer of every other State. Her representatives must have the same rights as
any other—and they must be treated like any other. If, in her judgment,
New York ought not to give her assent to these propositions, that assent
shall not be given; it can never be secured by threats or intimidations. She
must have the same rights as any other State, certainly the same rights as
New Jersey.
Mr. STOCKTON:—I am sure the gentleman is mistaken; I said nothing
intended as a threat or an intimidation.
Mr. NOYES:—Well, let me say it once for all, New York will yield nothing
to intimidation.
Now, what is the question which has led to this most extraordinary
discussion? It is simply whether debate shall be hampered, or practically cut
off, by short limitations as to time, after one section has had an opportunity
of expressing its views.
Virginia has called this Conference together. We thought she had no right to
do so, and that no possible good could come from her doing it. But we
waived all considerations of that kind, and upon her invitation we came
here.
She asks us to consider new and important amendments to the Constitution,
alterations of our fundamental law; and in the same breath we are told that
we must not discuss them—that we must take them as they are offered to
us, without change or alteration.
We take time to make treaties. We do not even enter into private contracts
without taking time for consideration and reflection. We have been here a
little more than a week. The greater part of that time has been occupied by
the committee in preparing these propositions. The discussion has scarcely
commenced. I submit to the Conference, is it kind, is it generous, is it
proper to stop here? Is it best to do so?
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—The gentleman seems to think my resolution was
aimed at the delegation from New York. That is not true in any sense. I did
not wish to cut off debate at all. I thought we might economize time and
still have debate enough to satisfy everybody.
Mr. NOYES:—I believe I perfectly understand your proposition.
Mr. CHASE:—I have agreed to support the resolution, and must adhere to
my agreement.
Mr. NOYES:—Personally I might be in favor of the adoption of the half-
hour rule, for I think I could say all I desire to say in relation to these
propositions within that time. I have certainly no desire that this discussion
should be unreasonably protracted. But such limitations are always
embarrassing. Other gentlemen do not wish to have them imposed. Mr.
F     objects to them; and if gentlemen really think they need more time, I
think it ungenerous not to yield to their wishes. And I insist that such a
course is least calculated to promote conciliation. The more free and full
you make this discussion, the more will your results find favor elsewhere. It
has been my belief from the beginning, that by careful comparison of our
views, by a discussion of all our points of difference, we should, in the end,
come to an agreement. I had hoped that such sentiments would have
universally prevailed, and that no desire would be shown to force the action
of any delegation. I am willing to say for myself that if the thirty minute
rule be adopted I will give way at once.
But I must proceed to notice some statements which have been urged here
as reasons why we must adopt—
Mr. FIELD:—Will my colleague yield to me for one moment? I have a
communication to make which I think will make every lover of his country
in this Conference rejoice. It is news from a slaveholding State. It shows
that her heart beats true to the Union.
Missouri has just elected delegates to a convention to consider the questions
now agitating the Country. I hold in my hands a telegram, stating that a very
large proportion of the delegates elected are true Union men.
The PRESIDENT:—I will assume it to be the pleasure of the Conference
that the telegram be read.
Mr. FIELD then read the telegram announcing that Union delegates to the
Convention in Missouri had been elected by heavy majorities. The
announcement was received with much applause.
Mr. NOYES:—This news is indeed cheering. It is an additional evidence of
the depth to which love for our country has struck into the hearts of its
people—another inducement to make us agree—another reason why we
should not be led off upon false issues.
The Constitution has provided the only proper way in which amendments
may be made to it. If these methods are followed, amendments will be
thoroughly discussed and considered, and they will not be adopted unless
the interests of the nation shall be found to require their adoption.
The State of Virginia seeks to precipitate action; to secure these vital
changes in our fundamental law in a manner unknown to it, and in a manner
which, in my judgment, it is not advisable to adopt. I make no complaint of
Virginia. It is the right and privilege of any State to make such a request,
but it is none the less unconstitutional.
Shall we be told that Virginia cannot wait, that her people are so impatient
that they will not give the country time to consider these important changes
in its form of Government? Why should there be such indecent haste? Why
not wait a week—month, and even six months, if that time is necessary? Be
assured, gentlemen, that no substantial alteration of the fundamental law of
this Government will ever be made until it has been discussed and
considered by the Press and the people in all its details. The thing is
impossible!
I have a few words to say for New York, as I said in the commencement—
for the New York of the present day. Where, I ask, is the gentleman's (Mr.
G      ) warrant of attorney to speak for the people of that State? Where
is the evidence upon which he founds the assertion which he makes on this
floor that New York will adopt the propositions to which he refers? Let me
assure you, gentlemen, that the political principles of the people of New
York do not sit thus lightly upon their consciences. They gave a heavy
republican majority at the last Presidential election, not because they were
carried away upon collateral issues, but because the principles of the
Chicago Platform met their approval—because they thought the time had
come when the destinies of this nation should no longer be left in the hands
of men who would use them only to promote the interests of one section of
the Union. Do not mistake, sir, the effect of that great demonstration! The
people of New York were in earnest; they went into the election with a
strong, determined purpose, and it is too late now to misconstrue or
misunderstand that purpose. They were not influenced by collateral issues.
Their action was upon the great principles involved. They believed that the
platform of the Republican party embodied the true principles upon which
the Government should be conducted, and they said so. You will find that
their minds are to-day unchanged.
But the gentleman says, the result of recent elections shows that a change in
their minds has taken place; that it indicates a strong wish on their part for
conciliation and peace. Sir, I deny that such a change has taken place. There
may have been slight changes in a few cities where the whole power and
strength of the Democratic party has been put forth. But the country, upon
the great issues before it, is unchanged. The county of St. Lawrence has just
elected every Republican candidate for supervisor. In other counties, nearly
the same unanimity prevails. The great heart of the country is still loyal and
Republican.
And, sir, these threats of dissolution will all react against you. They
operated in the Presidential election only in one way. I have no doubt that
these threats gave Mr. L       five thousand votes in New York City
alone. The people are sick of them. They know that if they once yielded to
them, they would be forced to do so again. They do not like these
insinuations against the Government involved in the propositions made
here. If you wish them to be considered favorably by the people of New
York, you must send them out free from all suspicion of duress or
intimidation; you must permit them to be examined, discussed, and
dissected here, by the representatives of New York and of every other State.
I am opposed decidedly to cutting off or limiting these discussions. Let all
parties be heard; give them time, and time enough, to deliberate, and the
result will be peace and harmony to the country.
Mr. RIVES:—I rise for the purpose of answering some of the observations
of the gentleman from New York; and first of all I wish to say a word about
the motives and purposes of Virginia in calling this Convention. She has
called this Convention together because she believed it would exert a
powerful influence for the safety and honor of the country, and the
perpetuity of its institutions. She is met in limine with the reproach that her
action is unconstitutional. How unconstitutional?
Is not our Government based upon the sovereignty of the people? Is not that
the idea upon which this Government rests? And when the people act, are
they to be told that their action is unconstitutional or improper? Cannot
Virginia and her people, acting through their representatives, suggest the
means of amendment or improvement in our Constitution to Congress?—
the Congress which represents the people, and whose members are servants
only of the people? Can she not call together a convention of this kind and
suggest measures to be considered by it for the purpose of saving an
imperilled country? Virginia knew well that this was to be an advisory
Conference merely. She invited commissioners from all the States to come
here and present their views, to compare and discuss them, to devise
measures for the benefit of the country, in the same way that any
assemblage of the people may lawfully do. Has the gentleman looked into
the history of our present Constitution? Virginia did the same thing previous
to the adoption of that Constitution, which she is doing now.
Some State must invite a Conference, if one is to be had. If it was proper
that Virginia should do it before the adoption of our present Constitution, it
is eminently proper that she should do it now. There are occasions, sir, in
the history of nations, when men should rise far above the rules of special
pleading. This is one of them. Let the gentleman look into the history of the
old articles of Confederation; let him read the debates which arose upon
their adoption. Virginia originated measures then, far more important than
any before us now; and there were gentlemen then, who took the same
ground that gentlemen do now, who sought by the use of dilatory pleas, by
interposing objections, temporary in their nature, to prevent and delay
action upon the great national questions then under consideration. Now, in a
time of great peril, when the whole country is convulsed, when the
existence and perpetuity of the Government is in danger, Virginia has
invoked her sister States to come here and see whether they cannot devise
some method to avoid the danger and save the country.
In the preamble to the first ten articles of Confederation, there is to be found
an express reference to the action of the State Legislatures in initiating
proposals of amendment. Every amendment that has hitherto been made to
our Constitution originated with the people, and directly or indirectly
through the action of State Legislatures. What purpose can gentlemen have
in interposing these dilatory pleas, objections merely for delay, when we all
know that Congress is now waiting for—actually inviting the action of this
Conference?
Senator C       , in his speech already referred to, makes the distinct
proposition, that when any considerable portion of the people (certainly a
much smaller portion than is here represented) desire to have amendments
submitted, it is the duty of Congress to propose them, and to do so without
committing that body either for or against them. Governor C     , also of
the Congressional Committee of Thirty-three, having this subject in charge,
is understood to have stated that the committee desire to consider the
propositions which may here be adopted.
Now, as I said, these dilatory objections were interposed previous to the
adoption of our present Constitution.
Mr. NOYES:—Are we to understand that Virginia then asked for a General
Convention to consider amendments to the Constitution?
Mr. RIVES:—No! The Annapolis Convention met. The invitation under
which that body was convened was addressed to all the States. Five only
responded, and they proposed a General Convention of all the States, to
meet at Philadelphia. Virginia was the first to act and to appoint her
delegates. I repeat, that the same objection was then urged, that Congress or
the States should propose the amendments. The first Convention was just as
unconstitutional as this. The two cases were perfectly alike. The crisis is
infinitely more important now than it was then. Then, there was no
disintegration of the States. They still held firmly together. How are we
now? Seven States are out of the Union. The Union is dissolved! Virginia
loves the Union. She cherishes all its glorious memories. She is proud of its
history and of her own connection with it. But Virginia has no apprehension
as to her future destiny. She can live in the Union or out of it. She can stand
in her own strength and power if necessary. Her delegates come here in no
spirit of supplication, nor do they propose to offer any intimidation. She has
called you here as brothers, as friends, as patriots. If the future has suffering
in store for Virginia, be assured all her sister States must suffer equally.
Mr. P        , the position of Virginia must be understood and
appreciated. She is just now the neutral ground between two embattled
legions, between two angry, excited, and hostile portions of the Union. To
expect that her people are not to participate in the excitement by which they
are surrounded; to expect that they should not share in the apprehensions
which pervade the country; to expect that they should not begin to look
after the safety of their interests and their institutions, were to expect
something superhuman. Something must be done to save the country, to
allay these apprehensions, to restore a broken confidence. Virginia steps in
to arrest the progress of the country on its road to ruin. She steps in to save
the country. I am here in part to represent her. I utter no menace;
intimidation would be unworthy of Virginia, but if I perform my duty I must
speak freely. The danger is imminent, very imminent.
Our national affairs cannot longer remain in their present condition; it is
impossible, absolutely impossible that they should. My Republican friends,
will you not take warning? Were there not pretended prophets of old, who
cried, "Peace! Peace! when there was no peace"? Political prophets to-day
say there is no danger. Have their counsels been wise heretofore? Can you
not see that there is danger, and imminent danger in them, now?
Look, sir, at our position! I mean the position of the loyal South. By the
secession of these States we are reduced to an utterly helpless minority; a
minority of seven or eight States to stand in your national councils against
an united North! It is not in the nature of the Anglo-Saxon race thus to stand
in the face of a dominant and opposition party. Were the case reversed, you
would not do it yourselves. We cannot hold our rights by mere sufferance,
and we will not; we do not ask you to hold yours in that way. If the other
States had kept on with us—had remained in the Union—we might have
secured our rights in a fair contest. Now other paths are open to us, and one
of these we must follow.
I desire to say a word in answer to the propositions of my honorable friend
from Connecticut. What did he tell us? He said that this was a self-
sustaining Government; a Government that possessed the power of securing
its own perpetuity, and one that must not yield or make concessions. Sir, let
me say that ideas, that principles, that statements of that kind have led to the
downfall of every Government on earth which has ever fallen. What but
ideas and language of this kind, forced our colonies into rebellion, and lost
America to the British crown?
Sir, I have had some experience in revolutions in another hemisphere—in
revolutions produced by the same causes that are now operating among us.
What causes but these led to the two revolutions in France? One of them I
saw myself, where interest was arrayed against interest, friend against
friend, brother against brother. I have seen the pavements of Paris covered,
and her gutters running with fraternal blood! God forbid that I should see
this horrid picture repeated in my own country; and yet it will be, sir, if we
listen to the counsels urged here!
It is too late to theorize, too late to differ theoretically. I do not believe in
the constitutional right of secession. I proclaimed that, thirty years ago in
Congress. I have always adhered to my opinions since. But we are not now
discussing theories; we are in the presence of a great fact. The South is in
danger; her institutions are in danger. If other excuses were necessary, she
might justify her action in the eyes of the world upon the ground of self-
defence alone.
I condemn the secession of States. I am not here to justify it. I detest it. But
the great fact is still before us. Seven States have gone out from among us,
and a President is actually inaugurated to govern the new Confederation.
With this fact the nation must deal. Right or wrong, it exists. The country is
divided. Wide dissensions exist. A people have separated from another
people. Force will never bring them together. Coercion is not a word to be
used in this connection. There must be negotiation. Virginia presents herself
as a mediator to bring back those who have left us.
The border States are not in revolt; and by border States I mean States on
both sides of the border. They are here, and they came here to unite with
you in measures that will reunite the country, and save it from irredeemable
ruin.
There was one observation of the gentleman from Massachusetts that
surprised me. He complained of Virginia for thrusting herself between the
Republican party and its victory. It is not so.
Mr. BOUTWELL:—I said that Massachusetts thought her action had that
appearance.
Mr. RIVES:—Let me say to you, Republican gentlemen, we wish to make
your victory worthy of you. We wish to inaugurate your power and your
administration over the whole Union. We wish to give you a nation worth
governing. Do us at least the justice of supposing we are in earnest in this.
We are laboring to relieve you from the difficulties that hang over you. War
is impending. Do you wish to govern a country convulsed by civil war? The
country is divided. Do you wish to govern a fraction of the country? Behold
the difficulties that you must encounter. You cannot carry on your
Government without money. Where is the capitalist who will advance you
money under existing circumstances?
Gentlemen, believe me, as one who has given no small amount of time and
careful reflection to this subject, when I tell you that you cannot coerce
sovereign States. It is impossible. Mr. H       '  great foresight made him
assert that our strength lay in the Government of the States—of the
undivided States. Look at New York. She herself is a match for the whole
army of the United States. Look at the South. She stands now almost upon
an equality with you. You may spend millions of treasure, you may shed
oceans of blood, but you cannot conquer any five or seven States of this
Union. The proposition is an utter absurdity. You must find some other way
to deal with them. In the wisdom of the country some other way must be
found.
Several gentlemen have referred to our army and our navy. As a citizen of
the United States, I am proud of both. I am proud of the country they serve.
I have enjoyed at times her honors, at others endured her chastisements. I
respect the power which our army and our navy give to our nation, but our
army and navy are impotent in such a crisis as this.
Mr. P        , even England herself has been shaken to her centre by
rebellions in her North with which she has been forced to contend. In Paris,
too, I have myself seen regiment after regiment throw down their arms and
rush into the arms of the people, of their fellow-citizens, and thus oppose,
by military strength, the government under which their organization was
formed. Will you repeat such occurrences here? Will you 'destroy the
imperishable renown of this nation'? No! I answer for you all—you will not.
Now, we, representatives of the South and of Virginia, ask of this
Convention, the only body under heaven that can do it, to interpose and
save us from a repetition of the scenes of blood which some of us have
witnessed.
Our patriotic committee have labored for two weeks—have labored
earnestly and zealously. Their report, though not satisfactory to Virginia in
all respects, will yet receive her sanction, and the sanction of the border
States. The representatives of Virginia know they are yielding much, when
they tell you that they will support these propositions. We will do it because
they will give peace to the country. Now, sir, when we are just in sight of
land, when we are just entering a safe harbor, shall we turn about and
circumnavigate the ocean to find an unknown shore? No, sir! no! Let us
enter the harbor of safety now opened before us.
Mr. P        , I know Massachusetts well. She is a powerful
Commonwealth. She has added largely to the wealth, the power, and glory
of this Union. I respect the gentleman who has addressed this Convention in
her behalf; but when he went out of his way and stated that he abhorred
slavery, the statement grated harshly on my ears. We of the South, we of
Virginia, may not and do not like many of the institutions of Massachusetts,
but we cannot and we will not say that we abhor them.
Let me recall to the gentleman from Massachusetts who has addressed us, a
fact from history. Let me show him that his own State was powerful in
colonial times in extending the time for the importation of slaves! Let me
tell him that his State has helped to fasten the institution of slavery upon a
portion of this nation. Is it for a son of Massachusetts now to complain of
the result of the acts of his own State? Is it for him to use these reproaches,
which, if not ungrateful, are at least wanting in charity? It was a
representative of Massachusetts, Mr. G     , through whose motion and
influence the time for the importation of slaves was extended in that period
of our colonial history. Virginia ever, in every period of her colonial
existence, exerted herself to close her ports against the importation of
slaves. It was the veto of her Royal Master alone that rendered her efforts
nugatory. It was New England that fastened this institution upon us. Shall
she reproach us for its existence now?
Mr. BALDWIN:—At the time of the adoption of our present Constitution, it
was well understood that Georgia and South Carolina would not enter the
Union without slavery. The only question then was, should slavery have an
existence inside the Union or out of it.
Mr. RIVES:—No, sir! The gentleman is mistaken. In the Constitution, as
first proposed to the Convention, an unlimited right was given to import
slaves. Mr. E         declared that it would be an infraction of State
rights to prohibit this importation. New England, engaged in commerce,
found an advantage in the right of importation, and she endeavored to force
it upon the South.
I regard the present course of New England as very unfair. She is herself
responsible for the existence of slavery—she is now our fiercest opponent;
and yet New Jersey and Pennsylvania, who have not this responsibility,
have always stood by the South, and I believe they always will.
It is not by abhorring slavery that you can put an end to the institution. You
must let it alone. We are responsible for it now, and we are willing to stand
responsible for it before the world. We understand the subject better than
you do. It has occupied the attention of the wisest men of our time. In fact,
it is not a question of slavery at all. It is a question of race. We know that
the very best position for the African race to occupy is one of unmitigated
legal subjection. We have the negroes with us; you have not. We must deal
with them as our experience and wisdom dictate; with that you have
nothing to do. The gentleman from Massachusetts may congratulate himself
that there are no negroes in that Commonwealth. I ask him what he would
do, if he had the race to deal with in Massachusetts as we have it in
Virginia?
I said, twenty years ago, in the Senate of the United States, and my whole
experience since having confirmed the truth of the statement I repeat it now,
that candid minds cannot differ upon this proposition, that the present
position of the negroes of the United States is the best one they could
occupy, both for the superior and inferior race.
And to the people of New England I have this to say: Your ancestors were
most powerful and influential in fastening slavery upon us. You are the very
last who ought to reproach us for its existence now. We do not indulge
reproaches toward you. It is unpleasant for us to receive them from you.
Their use by either can only serve to widen the unhappy differences existing
between us. Let us all drop them, and, so far as we can, let us close up every
avenue through which dissensions may come. We call upon you to make no
sacrifices for us. It will cost you nothing to yield what we ask. Say, and let
it be said in the Constitution, that you will not interfere with slavery in the
District, or in the States, or in the Territories. Permit the free transit of our
slaves from one State to another, and in the language of the patriarch, "let
there be peace between you and me."
Let us all agree that there shall be landmarks between us; the same which
our fathers erected. Let us say that they shall never be removed. I think
upon this point I can cite an authority that will command universal respect.
I discovered it in my researches into the history of the very Constitution we
are now considering.
Mr. R     here read an extract from a letter written by Mr. M       after
his retirement from public life. I have not a copy of this letter, but the
substance of the portion read by Mr. R     was a statement by Mr.
M      , that upon the passage of the Missouri Compromise, President
M      was much embarrassed with the question of the constitutionality
of the prohibition clause; that he took counsel with Mr. M     , who
declared that, in his judgment, Congress had no power over the subject of
slavery in the territories.
Mr. JAMES:—Will you leave that question just where the Constitution
leaves it, upon your construction of that instrument? If so, we will agree to
give you all necessary guarantees against interference.
Mr. RIVES:—No! I will not leave it there, for it would always remain a
question of construction. I prefer to put the prohibition into the
Constitution.
The gentleman from Massachusetts speaks for the North. Massachusetts
does not constitute the North. I venerate the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. I have many friends there. I look with pride upon her
connection with the Revolution; upon her public men, her manufactures,
her public institutions. Her people who have accomplished so much, will
not turn a deaf ear to our wants now. We wish to go to her people and obtain
their judgment upon our propositions. But Massachusetts is not all the
North. Rhode Island constitutes a part of it. She has always spoken for us.
She will speak for us to-day. What does New Jersey say? What does the
great State of Pennsylvania and the greater Northwest say? Surely they do
not echo the sentiments of the gentleman from Massachusetts. They are
with us, and we will trust to them.
I dislike this way of answering for sections of the country. I have heard
similar language from Mr. C      . He was fond of saying, "The South
says—The South thinks—The South will do," this or that. I did not like it
then. It stirred up all the rebellious sentiments of my nature; for I knew the
statement was not true. I do not like such language better now. Let the
people of Massachusetts speak. I know they will not refuse to fulfil the
compact of their fathers.
We are brothers. I feel we can settle this important question which portends
over us like an eclipse; we can leave this glorious country to our posterity.
Once more let me refer to the noble and eloquent counsels of M      , and
I am done. As children of the same family, as fellow-citizens of a great,
glorious, and proud Republic, he invoked the kindred blood of our people to
consecrate our common Union, and to banish forever the thought of our
becoming aliens.
Mr. EWING:—I have never in any manner countenanced the discussions of
slavery and the questions connected with it, at the North. I have always, so
far as possible, discouraged those discussions. No good can possibly come
from them. Is the North the censor morum of the South? We have faults
enough ourselves; let us consider and try to correct them, before we interest
ourselves so much in those of our neighbors.
If there was any danger that slavery would be extended at the North, I
would oppose its extension there, and I would teach my sons to oppose it.
But this danger has never existed. Does any one fear that slavery will go
into New York or Massachusetts? No sane man thinks or ever thought so.
But it exists, and we must deal with it as it is. As one northern man, I do not
want the negroes distributed throughout the North. We have got enough of
them now. I have watched the operation of this emigration of slaves to the
North. Ten negroes will commit more petty thefts than one thousand white
men. We cannot permit them to come into Ohio. Wherever they have been
permitted to come, it has almost cost us a rebellion. Before we begin to
preach abolition I think we had better see what is to be done with the
negroes.
Thirty years ago the subject of abolishing slavery was agitated in Virginia.
Some of the most eloquent speeches were made in favor of the abolition
movement that I ever read. The act providing for gradual abolition, was, I
believe, lost by a single vote. I thought then that the result was an
unfortunate one. But there is something to be said on both sides of the
question. Had the act passed, the negroes would have been sent South, and
we should have had plantation slavery, instead of the humane form which
now exists in Virginia. But Virginia would have had one great, one
powerful advantage. Her power would have increased tenfold. Free labor
would have come in to take the place of slave labor, and the banks of the
Potomac and the James would have blossomed as the rose.
The North has taken the business of abolition into its own hands, and from
the day she did so, we hear no more of abolition in Virginia. This was but
the natural effect of the cause. Now, we can never coerce the Southern
States into abolitionism. It is not the way to convert them to our views by
saying that we abhor their institutions. But these northern men will not
listen to reason. They keep on making eloquent speeches—their pulpits
thunder against the sin of slaveholding. All grades of speech and thought
are made use of, and the sickening sentimentalism of some of them is
disgusting. They repeat poetry. They say:
"I would not have a slave to till my
ground,
To watch me when I wake—to fan me
when I sleep;"
and much more of the same stuff!
In this way false ideas are inculcated throughout the North. The whole
scheme is full of falsehood. It would be far better for each man to look for
the beam in his own eyes before he troubles himself about the mote in his
neighbor's.
England, also, has been very fierce in denouncing slavery in this country,
and yet we have no slavery or misery to be compared with that existing in
the India provinces. It is said that in a single season two hundred thousand
of her subjects were starved to death in one province of Hindostan.
I might say the same thing almost of Ireland. Two millions have died there
from famine, and God knows how many more would have perished but for
the relief sent from this country. I say, and I have abundant reason for
saying, that I never have, and I never will, favor any of these denunciations
of southern slaveholders and slavery.
Let us rather look at this subject as members of a common family—let us
acknowledge our mutual faults. The slave trade was once fostered by the
North. That was when it was profitable, and when large fortunes were made
in that trade by northern men. When it became unprofitable the North began
to denounce it, and to call it sinful. Now, we fastened this institution upon
the South, cannot we permit her to deal with it as she chooses?
I do not say that there is a necessary conflict between the white and the
black races, but I assert that they cannot unite—that they cannot occupy the
same country upon an equality. Our free laborers of the North will not work
with slaves or with blacks. I have had experience in this matter, and I know
I am right. The only way we can do, is to divide the common territory—
divide it fairly, honestly.
Suppose there were two sons who succeeded to a joint inheritance of lands.
One says to the other, "Your family is not so moral as mine, therefore your
sons shall have none of the lands." Would this be right or honest? Would
any one attempt to justify it? And yet this is what extreme men of the North
are practically saying to the citizens of the South.
The Missouri Compromise was intended to settle the rights of the respective
sections in the territories. The line adopted was not unfair to the North. The
same line will answer now. I am for adopting it and arranging this difficult
subject finally.
But one and another says, "Don't let us extend slavery." To that I answer,
that our action will not make one slave more or less. There is no question of
humanity involved in our propositions. I cannot see what question is
involved so far as the North is concerned. We need no more territory. We do
not want New Mexico. We have territory enough now for one hundred and
fifty millions of people, and enough for the expansion of our people for one
hundred and fifty years.
If gentlemen are found here who wish to make trouble, who cannot see the
peril we are in, and how easily we can avoid the danger which threatens us,
I shall be much pained, but not half so much as I shall be, to see this Union
broken up and the Government destroyed.
I was surprised to hear the assertion of the gentleman from Connecticut,
that this was an unconstitutional assembly. I hear to-day the statement made
that it is a revolutionary assembly. If these assertions were true I would not
be a member of it for one moment. If revolutionary, it is either treasonable
or seditious. But it is neither. These gentlemen forget the constitutional right
of petition. We have the right to meet here. We have the right to do just
what we are proposing to do, and the right is to be found in the
Constitution.
I am surprised, too, at the assertion, that there is a wish here to limit or cut
off debate—that this resolution would cut off New York. Would it not cut
off Ohio? I have no intention of depriving any gentleman or any State of
any right. I do not believe such an intention exists in the Conference.
Mr. MORRILL:—In my judgment many subjects have been considered
here, and many things said to the North especially, that are superfluous, and
much more that is useless. I have listened to the gentleman from Ohio and
to some gentlemen who have preceded him. They have all referred, in terms
which I do not choose to characterize, to the action and the opinions of the
North.
The gentleman from Ohio refers in strong terms to what he calls the
sentimentalism of the North. He has recited poetry which he says is popular
there.
Now, once for all, let me ask those gentlemen who are proposing various
methods of settling our differences: Do you propose to make war upon the
sentiments, the principles of the North? If you do, we may as well drop the
discussion here. Our people, and we, their representatives, cannot meet you
upon that ground. Our principles cannot be interfered with; we carry them
with us always. Our consciences approve them. We can negotiate with you,
and treat with you upon subjects which do not involve their sacrifice. If it is
your purpose to attack them, you may abandon all other purposes so far as
this body is concerned. The people of the North will never sacrifice their
principles. It is useless for you to ask them to do so. It is entirely useless for
you to urge war upon the sentiments or opinions of the North.
Again; let me tell you there is no disloyalty in the free States. The word
dissolution has not been thought of there during the last half century. In all
your discussions, in all your action, remember that we are loyal to the
Constitution and the Union.
Strong appeals are made here to the free States. You call them by the
general name of the Northern States. Gentlemen undertake to pledge
different sections to this or that policy. We are told that New York—that
Massachusetts—that Pennsylvania will adopt or will not adopt various
propositions that are made here.
Sir, in my judgment all such questions are unworthy of our consideration.
We spend time to little purpose upon them. The true question here is, "What
will Virginia do? How does Virginia stand?" She to-day holds the keys of
peace or war. She stands in the gateway threatening the progress of the
Government in its attempts to assert its legal authority. Evade it as you may
—cover it as you will—the true question is, "What will Virginia do?" She
undertakes to dictate the terms upon which the Union is to be preserved.
What will satisfy her?
Mr. CLAY:—Has not Virginia spoken? Has she not already told us what she
wants?
Mr. MORRILL:—I am coming to that point very soon. I assert again that
Virginia must not be misunderstood in this matter.
The peril of the time is Secession. Six States are already in revolution. A
distinct confederacy, a new government, has been organized within the
limits of the United States.
Does Virginia to-day, frown upon this atrocious proceeding? No! so far
from that she affirms that these States have a right to do what they have
done. She boasts that she has armed her people, that she has raised five
millions of money, and that she will use both to prevent the interference of
the National Government with these States, now in revolution. Whether her
course will conciliate the free States—whether under such circumstances
the free States will negotiate with Virginia or others in her position, I leave
for others to consider. It is my opinion that the people of this country will
first of all demand the recognition of the supremacy of the Government.
Mr. RUFFIN:—No! I do not understand such to be the position of Virginia.
She appeals to both sides to refrain from violence while these negotiations
are pending.
Mr. SEDDON:—No! A little farther than that. Virginia will not permit
coercion. She has plainly declared she will not. But in the very highest
spirit of patriotism, she has asked for this Convention, and she proposes to
exhaust the very last means of restoring peace to the Union. This is exactly
her position. She hopes, and I hope, that this Convention will interpose to
preserve the peace and to save this country from war.
Mr. MORRILL:—I thought I did not misunderstand the position of
Virginia. She is armed to the teeth, and she now proposes to step in between
the Government and the States. I understand her attitude. It is an attitude of
menace. It gives aid and comfort to those who trample upon the laws and
defy the authority of this Government.
No action of the Conference can be consummated for months: I might
almost say for years. Any propositions we may make must go to the people.
They must and will take time for consideration. Endeavor to force their
action and you will secure the rejection of the terms proposed. While the
people are acting you will have a Government and it must operate. It must
operate not upon a section only, but upon the whole country. During this
time, does Virginia propose to maintain the position she has assumed? To
prevent by force of arms the execution of the laws of the Union in the
seceded States? Yes, and we are told that her position is one exhibiting the
highest patriotism. In my judgment her position is one of menace, and not
of pacification. If I rightly understand her, nothing that is here proposed to
be done will satisfy her even if adopted.
And now I wish to ask the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. S     ) a plain
question, and I wish to receive a frank answer. If this Conference agrees to
the amendments proposed by the majority of the committee, will Virginia
sustain the Government and maintain its integrity, while the people are
considering and acting on the new proposals of amendment to the
Constitution? If she will not do this, if this proposition does not meet the
heart of Virginia, there is no use—
Mr. SEDDON:—I can let Virginia speak for herself. She has spoken for
herself in most emphatic language. She has told you what will satisfy her in
the resolutions under which this body is convened. I have no right whatever
to suppose that she will accept less. She is solemnly pledged to resist
coercion. She will resist it to the very last extremity. She arrived at that
conclusion after grave deliberation, and it was attended with every
manifestation of concurrence on the part of the people. I have no reason to
suppose there was any hesitation at the time, or that there has been any
change since, or that there is any hesitation in her purpose now.
Now, if the gentleman wants my private opinion, I will tell him that whether
the propositions of the majority of the committee or her own be adopted
here, or by the people, the purpose of Virginia to resist coercion is
unchanged and unchangeable.
Mr. HITCHCOCK:—I rise to a point of order. It appears to me that this
discussion is very foreign to the subject before the Conference. It is so long
since that subject has been named, that many have doubtless forgotten it.
The question is upon the adoption of the resolution limiting the debate. I
think we had better keep to the question.
The PRESIDENT:—The gentleman is undoubtedly correct in his statement
of the question, but the discussion of the general subject has been permitted
to go on without objection by the Convention, and I do not think it would
be right to stop it now.
Mr. SEDDON:—I said the position of Virginia was unchanged. She
considers this a Government of love and not of force. She thinks there
should be no force or coercion used toward any sovereign State acting in its
collective capacity. She does not propose to permit such coercion to be
used.
And now, having answered the gentleman frankly, as he desired, I wish to
ask him a question, and I wish also an explicit and frank answer. My
question is this: Is it the purpose or is it the policy of the incoming
administration to attempt to execute the laws of the United States in the
seceded States by an armed force? The answer to this question involves
information of the utmost importance to my State and others whose
interests are involved with hers. It should be at once communicated, and
especially to my part of the country. I now ask the gentleman, if he knows
what the purpose of the incoming administration is in this respect, to state it
here, and now. His relations to some of the officers elected will entitle his
opinions to grave consideration. I invite a full and frank answer to my
question.
Mr. MORRILL:—There is a point in the gentleman's answer which may as
well be met, but I will not be diverted from the question I was discussing. I
will show him in a moment why I cannot answer his inquiry from any
personal knowledge of my own.
Sir, I was endeavoring to ascertain what was the present position of
Virginia; to find out what she would accept and be contented. I wanted her
to speak emphatically. She has done so. I now understand from Mr.
S     , that he has no assurances to give that Virginia will accept the
propositions of the committee, and that while any propositions are pending
she will resist the enforcement of the laws in the seceded States.
Then let it be understood that Virginia has spoken. That she makes the
Crittenden resolutions her ultimatum, that she must have them and all of
them, that nothing less will satisfy her. As I said at the beginning of my
remarks, it is idle for us to stay here, useless for us to discuss the various
propositions which are made here, unless we expect to satisfy Virginia.
It is important for us to understand her position. I do not under-estimate her
influence. When the propositions of this Conference are presented to the
people of the free States, the first question they will ask is, "Will Virginia
adopt them? Will she be satisfied with them?" If she will not, there will be
no action upon them. If she will, her position will exercise a powerful
influence upon the people of the North in favor of their adoption.
But if Virginia puts her ancient Commonwealth across the path of the
Government, if she stands between the administration and the enforcement
of the laws, the execution of its official duty, its positive obligations—if this
is the manner in which she proposes to mediate, her mediation will be
accepted nowhere. Such I understand to be the position she assumes. It is a
position of menace.
Mr. STOCKTON:—If the gentleman from Maine wants to get up a row, we
are ready for him. He shall have enough of it right here! I should like to
know why he makes such charges against Virginia? They are unfounded;
we don't wish to hear them.
(There was at this point considerable confusion in the Conference, which
was promptly suppressed by the P        .)
Mr. MORRILL:—Gentlemen need not be disturbed or excited. I have
accomplished my object. I know now what to expect from Virginia; the
North will know what the course of Virginia is to be, and we can all act
understandingly. I do not propose to waste valuable time in idle discussions
in this hall, when we can come to the true point at once. I do not propose to
talk around this question, nor to deceive or mislead the Conference. Other
gentlemen may think differently, but I now understand Virginia to say, that
the Federal authority shall not be reëstablished by the ordinary means,
(where it is resisted) in certain of the States comprised in the Federal Union.
I will now answer the question of the gentleman from Virginia, in relation
to the proposed policy of the incoming administration. I have no personal
knowledge upon this subject. Mr. L       I never saw in my life. I know
nothing of his opinions, except from his speeches; but I will say, that if he
and his administration do not use every means which the Constitution has
given them to assert the authority of the Government in all the States—to
preserve the Union, and the Union in all its integrity, the people will be
disappointed. I have felt and now feel the importance of the action of
Virginia, and I have done what I could to learn here what we may expect
from her.
In conclusion, let me say, that unless we can have the earnest concurrence
of the slave States in whatever we do, and especially unless we have the
heart of Virginia with us, our action will give no peace to the country.
Mr. Z           moved that the Conference adjourn. The motion was lost
by a viva voce vote.
Mr. BROWNE:—I think we have debated these matters long enough. Let us
come back to the question before us. Personally I am in favor of limiting
debate to the shortest time, for I feel the necessity for prompt action. I think
if Mr. R        would strike out the latter clause of his resolution,
requiring the final vote to be taken on Thursday next, we should have no
difficulty in agreeing to it. Its adoption in its present form might cut off
some delegation or some gentlemen from speaking at all. I would not do
this. Let every one speak, but let the speeches be short. I move to strike out
the last clause of the resolution.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I did not expect to raise such a storm by introducing
this resolution. I now ask to withdraw it and stop the debate.
Mr. MOREHEAD, of North Carolina:—The gentleman cannot do that, as
several motions are involved. I object to his proposal to withdraw the
resolution. I move to lay the whole subject on the table, and to make it the
special order for ten o'clock to-morrow.
The motion of Mr. M        was carried.
Mr. SUMMERS:—I move that when the present session of the Conference
adjourn, its next meeting be at seven o'clock this evening.
A M     :—Say eight o'clock.
Mr. SUMMERS:—Well, then, let it be eight o'clock. But let me ask you,
gentlemen, not to protract or unnecessarily delay our action here.
Mr. P        , my heart is full! I cannot approach the great issues with
which we are dealing with becoming coolness and deliberation! Sir, I love
this Union. The man does not live who entertains a higher respect for this
Government than I do. I know its history—I know how it was established.
There is not an incident in its history that is not precious to me. I do not
wish to survive its dissolution. My hand or voice was never raised against
it. They never will be. The Union is as dear to me as to any living man; and
it would be pleasant, indeed, if my mind to-day could be as free from fear
and anxiety about it, as the minds of other gentlemen appear to be. But, Sir,
I cannot shut my eyes to events which are daily transpiring among a people
who are excited and anxious, who are apprehensive that their rights are in
danger—who are solicitous for—who will do as much to preserve their
rights as any people. They must be calmed and quieted. It is useless now to
tell them they have no cause for fear. They are looking to this Conference.
This Conference must act. If it does not, I almost fear to contemplate the
prospect that will open before us.
Sir! this Conference has now been in session fifteen days. While I have felt
reluctant to do any thing which should have the appearance of precipitating
our action, of cutting off or limiting debate, I have all the time been pressed
with this conviction; that if we are to save this country we must act
speedily. I have been in constant communication with the people of Virginia
since I have been here. I know that this feeling of apprehension which
existed when I came away, has been constantly increasing in my State
since; and even last night I received letters from members of the
Convention now in session in Richmond; gentlemen who are as true to this
Union as the needle to the pole, informing me that every hour of delay in
this Conference was an hour of danger.
I do not agree with some of my colleagues in their construction of the
resolutions of the Virginia Legislature inviting this Conference. I
understand that she suggests the resolutions of Mr. C          as one
acceptable way of settling our present difficulties. She says that she will be
satisfied with a settlement on the basis of those resolutions. But she has not
made them her ultimatum. She has not said she will not consent to any other
plan of arrangement. Her purpose was not to draw up certain articles of
pacification; to call her sister States together, and say to them, "These or
nothing! We have dictated the terms upon which the matter between us may
be arranged. We will have these or we will not arrange at all!" I understand
her as offering no restrictions whatever. She invites a conference—she asks
the States to confer together. She expects reasonable concessions,
reasonable guarantees, and with these she will be satisfied.
Nor do I know why the gentleman from Maine places Virginia in the
position he described, nor upon what authority. I reply to him that he makes
a grave assumption when he attributes to Virginia a dictatorial position. I
have come here, and I trust my colleagues have also, animated by a single
purpose:—that purpose is to save the Union. Virginia claims no greater
rights than any other State. She would not take them if they were offered.
Let me say here, that it is my purpose to carry out the wishes of the people
of Virginia; that exercising the best judgment I have I shall try to ascertain
what that purpose is, and shall do all I can to accomplish it. When the
proper time comes I shall cast my vote for the proposals of amendment
offered by my colleague (Mr. S     ); I shall do so for several reasons.
The first and most important of them all is this: The Union is our
inheritance—it is our pride. To preserve it, what sacrifice should we not
make? Its preservation is the one single desire that animates me. Can I not
be understood by my Northern friends? Will you not yield something to our
necessities—to our condition? Will you not do something which will enable
us to go back to our excited people and say to them, "The North is treating
us fairly. See what she will do to make our Union perpetual!"
Again; I shall vote cheerfully for Mr. S     '  propositions, because the
Legislature of my State has said that such amendments will satisfy the
people of Virginia. I think the Legislature is right. I think in this respect it
reflects the will of the people of Virginia. Remember, sir, that these
propositions have been for some time before the country, that they have
been discussed and commented upon by the public Press—that they will
probably settle our difficulties, now and forever. They were introduced into
Congress by a distinguished and an able man—a statesman, whose integrity
and fidelity no one has ever questioned, and no one will question. It is my
firm belief that the States can adopt them without any material sacrifice,
and that they will adopt them if they have the opportunity.
But if the C          resolutions—if the propositions of my colleague
cannot be recommended by this Conference—do not find favor with the
majority here? What then? Shall we dissolve this body, and go home? Shall
we risk all the fearful consequences which must follow? No, sir! No! We
came here for peace. Virginia came here for peace. We will not be
impracticable. You, representatives of the free States, will not be
impracticable. Therefore, I tell you that it is my firm belief that the people
of Virginia WILL accept the proposals of amendment to the Constitution as
reported by the majority of the committee. I believe these propositions
would be acceptable to our people. I believe if we should pass them here,
that the Convention now in session in Richmond would at once adopt them
and recommend them to the people of that honored member of the Federal
Union. Can you not? Will you not give us one chance to satisfy our people,
and to save us from that other alternative which I almost fear to
contemplate?
I feared when the result was announced, that the late election in Virginia of
the delegates to the Convention now in session, would be misapprehended
and misunderstood at the North: that the North would regard it as a triumph
of the Union sentiment in Virginia. In one sense it was such a triumph. The
advocates of immediate and unconditional secession were defeated, were
defeated by a heavy majority.
But the members comprising that Convention represent the true feeling of
the people who elected them, and they represent the present feeling of
Virginia. The people of that State are full of anxiety. They fear that the new
administration has designs which it will carry into execution, fatal to their
rights and interests. They are for the Union, provided their rights can be
secured; provided, they can have proper and honorable guarantees. It is
useless to discuss now whether they are right or wrong. Such is the
condition of affairs now, and it is too late to enter into the causes which
produced it. We must deal with things as they are.
I have known many gentlemen who have represented the interests of New
England long and well. I know what sentiments filled their hearts years ago,
and I do not believe those sentiments are changed now. I appeal to Vermont.
Among her representatives here, I see a gentleman with whom, for a long
time, I was upon terms of peculiar intimacy. In the whole course of that
intimacy I cannot recall a single occurrence which did not impress me with
his integrity, his ability, his justice. I appeal to him. I appeal to him by every
consideration which can move a friend, which can influence a patriot,
which can govern the action of a statesman. I appeal to Massachusetts, to all
New England, which I know possesses many like himself; and I ask you to
consider our circumstances, to consider our dangers, and not to refuse us
the little boon we ask, when the consequences of that refusal must be so
awful. Can you not afford to make a little sacrifice, when we make one so
great? Can you not yield to us what is a mere matter of opinion with you,
but what is so vital with us? Will you not put us in a position where we can
stand with our people, and let us and you stand together in the Union? I
have no delicacy here. The importance of our action with me, transcends all
other considerations. I do not hesitate to appeal to New England for help in
this crisis.
If New England refuses to come to our aid, it will not alter my course or
change my conviction. In no possible contingency which can now be
foreseen shall these convictions be changed. I will never give up the Union!
Clouds may hang over it, storms and tempest may assail it, the waves of
dissolution may dash against it, but so far as my feeble hand can support it,
that support shall be given to it while I live!
When the dark days come over this Republic, and there is nothing in the
future but gloom and despondency, I will do as W          once said he
would do in similar circumstances: I will gather the last handful of faithful
men, carry them to the mountains of Western Virginia, and there set up the
flag of the Union. It shall be defended there against all assailants until the
friends of freedom and liberty from all parts of the civilized world shall
rally around it, and again establish it in triumph and glory over every
portion of a restored and united country.
Sir, the questions which now agitate and alarm the country do not affect the
interests of all sections of the Union, or if they do affect all sections,
certainly not in the same proportion. The farther sections are removed from
each other, the less do the interests and the principles of their people
assimilate. Maine and Louisiana, far distant from each other, differ widely.
Approaching the line between the slave and free States all these differences
grow less. This is shown by the action of this Conference. The border States
can settle these questions. They will settle them if you will let them alone.
Pennsylvania and Virginia, Maryland and New Jersey, States along the line,
whose people are most vitally interested, can have no difficulty in coming
to an agreement. With all the possible political interests which you may
have, not only are the relations of society, of business, and commerce, to be
interrupted, but these States are to form the long frontier between two
foreign nations, if that fearful contingency is to happen, so often and so
confidently referred to here.
Why, then, should remote sections interfere to prevent this adjustment? If
they cannot aid us, why not let us alone? Let them look along the valley of
the Ohio River, one of the most fertile sections of the continent, in itself
great enough and fruitful enough to support a nation. It has already a large
population, and that population is increasing every day. The people are
attached to each other by every tie that binds society together. They now
live in harmony and friendship; their property is secure. They are
prosperous and happy. Such a people cannot be, must not be divided.
And therefore, I say, that if we are driven to that alternative; if the
representatives of the two extremes will not give us the benefit of their
counsel and assistance, the Central States, and the great Northwest, must
take the matter into their own hands. North Carolina, Virginia, Kentucky,
Tennessee, with Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and other States near them,
must unite with Ohio and the Northwest to save the country. They have the
power to do it—they must do it.
Remember, sir, that I only refer to this as a last alternative. It is one to
which I hope and pray we may never be driven. I cannot yet give up the
hope, that all we need here is patient and thorough discussion and
examination of the subject; that when the true condition is understood, we
shall unite together to restore confidence to the country. It must be so. The
consequences of farther disagreement are too great, the crisis is too
important to permit mere sectional differences, mere pride of opinion, party
shackles or party platforms to control the action of any gentleman here. The
Republic shall not be divided. The nation shall not be destroyed. The
patriotism of the people will yet save the country against all its enemies.
Mr. R      gave notice, that at the proper time he wished to offer two
amendments to the second section of the propositions reported by the
committee.[1]
Mr. F     and Mr. D     rose and made motions at the same time.
The floor was given to Mr. D    , who moved, that when the Conference
adjourn, it adjourn to meet at ten o'clock to-morrow.
Mr. R        moved to amend, by inserting half-past ten o'clock.
Several motions were made by different members, and much confusion
arose, which was suppressed.
Mr. CHITTENDEN:—We all, no doubt, wish to economize time as much as
possible. The prevailing wish seems to be to meet about eleven o'clock to-
morrow. That can be accomplished by a simple motion to adjourn, which I
make, and which should take precedence of all others.
The P         put the motion to adjourn, and declared it not carried.
A M     :—I move to amend Mr. D    '  motion, by inserting seven
o'clock this evening.
This motion did not prevail, and the question was taken upon Mr. D    ' 
motion, which was adopted, and the Conference then adjourned.

T H I R T E E N T H  D A Y .
W         , W        , February 20th, 1861.
T   Conference was called to order by President T     at ten o'clock, and
after prayer by the Rev. Dr. S      , the Journal of yesterday was read and
approved.
Mr. HARRIS:—I desire to call the attention of the Conference to the fact,
that the time has not yet arrived when the Conference, by its rules, should
commence business. The rule is, that the daily session shall commence at
eleven o'clock.
The PRESIDENT:—The Conference, previous to its adjournment
yesterday, adopted the motion of Mr. D    , fixing this hour for the
commencement of the present session.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I wish to call attention to the 9th rule in the printed list.
It has not been adopted by the Conference. It is in here by mistake. The
Committee on Rules did not intend to recommend it. I ask now that it be
stricken from the record.
Mr. FIELD:—I rise to debate that motion.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—Then I withdraw it.
Mr. HARRIS:—I wish to offer a preamble and resolutions, and would like
to have them read for the information of the Conference. I ask to have them
printed and laid upon the table, so that I can move them as an amendment at
the proper time.
The resolutions were laid upon the table and ordered to be printed, and are
as follows:
Whereas, The Federal Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof,
are the supreme law of the land, and should command the willing obedience
of all good citizens; and whereas it is alleged that sundry States have
enacted laws repugnant thereto. Therefore,
Resolved. That this Convention respectfully requests the several States to
revise their respective enactments, and to modify or repeal any laws which
may be found to be in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
Resolved, That the President of this Convention is requested to send a copy
of the foregoing preamble and resolutions to the Governor of each of the
States, with the request that the same be communicated to the Legislature
thereof.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—I must now insist upon having my resolution, offered
yesterday, considered. Congress is about adjourning, and, if we do not close
our labors to-day, we cannot have our propositions acted upon under the
rules of the Senate and House of Representatives. They can be kept out on
the objection of any member. I do not wish to debate the resolution, and I
hope the debate will not be continued in the general manner it was
yesterday.
Mr. FIELD:—There seems to be a disposition to stop debate now, after
nearly the whole time has been occupied by the other side. Yesterday the
whole session was occupied by a general discussion of this question. It is
my right to debate it as generally as other gentlemen have done. I shall avail
myself of that right. I may not speak thirty minutes, but I will not submit to
the imposition of a different rule upon me, if I can avoid it, from that which
has been imposed upon others. The first question is on striking out the last
clause of the resolution. On that I have nothing to say except that I ask for a
vote by States.
A vote by States was then taken, and resulted as follows:
A   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
Maryland, New York, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont—
12.
N   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—8.
Mr. CLAY:—I move to lay the whole subject upon the table. It is useless to
attempt to stop discussion in this way.
Mr. CHASE:—I call for a vote by States.
The motion of Mr. C    prevailed by the following vote.
A   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts. New
York, Vermont, Virginia, and New Hampshire—10.
N   .—Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee—9.
Mr. McCURDY:—There is really but one question that ought to engage the
attention of this Conference. All others may be settled in half an hour. This
question is a great one, and assumes a variety of forms. I wish to vote upon
it understandingly, and I want some information from the committee which
has had it in charge.
I ask that committee whether they are not proposing a change in the
Constitution, which, if adopted, will operate as a direct and effectual
protection of slavery in all the territories of the United States? This appears
to me to be the true question for our consideration. I wish to know what
meaning is attached by its friends to one part of the proposed article.
It states that "the status of persons owing service or labor as it now exists
shall not be changed by law," &c.; and again, "that the rights arising out of
said relations shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts
according to the common law." The status, then, shall not be changed. By
that term I suppose condition is intended. I understand that perfectly. There
shall be no law to change the condition, to impair the rights of the
slaveholder; but shall there be no law to protect these rights? Now, what is
intended by this? Why not make this provision plain, and not leave it open
to any question of construction? The ghost of the old trouble rises here, and
will not down at the bidding of any man. I believe under this article the
institution of slavery is to be protected by a most ingenious contrivance.
The common law, administered according to the pro-slavery view, is to be
called in for its protection.
Now I ask the chairman of the committee reporting these propositions what
he means by the common law? The common law, as we understand it, is the
law of freedom—not of slavery. But I do not here propose to discuss that
question. I wish to know how the truth really is. How does the committee,
how do the friends of this proposition understand it?
By the common law a slave is still a man: a person, and not a personal
chattel. He may owe service, as a child to its parent, an apprentice to his
master, but he is still a person owing service. He is all the time recognized
as a man. As such he may own and hold property, take it by inheritance and
dispose of it at pleasure, by will or by contract. All these rights, all the
principles on which they are founded, are in direct antagonism to slavery.
The argument may be carried much farther, but this is far enough for my
purpose. By the slave law, all this is reversed. The master owns the body of
the slave, may sell or otherwise dispose of him, may make him the subject
of inheritance. The slave loses all the attributes of a person, and becomes
property as much as the horse or the ox that feeds at his master's crib.
These, in a condition of slavery are the rights of the master over the slave.
These rights the common law, under this proposition, is to recognize,
protect, and enforce. I believe I am not mistaken in this. What other
construction can you give the article? It is a distinct proposal to engraft
slavery upon the common law: to declare in the Constitution that slavery is
recognized and protected by the common law.
Now, the North has always protested against this. She will never consent to
it. She understands all the consequences as well as you. No doubt it would
be a great point gained for you, to have the Constitution recognize the
institution of slavery as part of the common law. For then slavery goes
wherever the common law goes. Its rights under this provision are not
confined to the territories. Once established, these may be enforced in a free
State just as well. It is the old proposition over again, which has come
before the American people so many times under so many different guises.
It makes slavery national, freedom sectional. If this is so, if such is the
construction which it is intended this section shall receive, why not state it
openly? why leave it as a question of construction?
This construction involves other considerations. This new kind of common
law is to be substituted for the old. The latter has been understood for
centuries almost. Its principles have been discussed and settled. It is a
system founded by experience, and adapted to the wants of the people
subject to it. Its very name implies that it was not created by legislative
authority. A strange common law indeed that would be which is created by
the Constitution.
But this is not all. Other principles of the common law are subject to
change. They are adapted to the advance of civilization, to the wants of
communities. Change is the universal law of nature. This new kind of
common law is alone to be perpetual.
It is not my purpose to enter into a general discussion of the subject. This
point struck me as important, as needing elucidation. If I am wrong in this
construction, the committee will correct me.
Mr. EWING:—The proposition contained in the first article of the proposed
amendment, is copied from the C          resolutions in substance. It is
true that the language is somewhat changed, but the legal effect is identical
in both the propositions. The term "status" &c., as there used is not
applicable to all the territory of the United States. It only extends to that
portion of the territory south of 36° 30´. It crushes out liberty nowhere. It
changes nothing—no rights whatever. Again, whatever may be the status of
the person in the State from which he comes, that is preserved in the
territory, and that alone. It is precisely similar to the case of a contract to
which the lex loci gives the construction, and the lex fori its execution.
I like the common law. I have made it my study. I like the use of this term
here. It was a good system when not as perfect as it is now. The common
law of England even tolerated slavery until it was abolished. The colliers of
the North of England were once, to all intents and purposes, as much slaves
as any negro on the Southern plantations, except in the matter of separation
of families. I can refer you to a precedent on this subject, which you will
find in a book of no very high authority. I mean the novel, Red Gauntlet.
The general principle applicable here is this: Whenever you establish the
right—no matter how, if you establish it—the common law asserts the
remedy. There is no crushing out about it. The simple proposition is this:
Slavery exists already in that little worthless territory we own below the
proposed line. Will we agree that it shall remain there just as it is now, so
long as the territorial condition continues? That is all. There is no mystery
or question of construction about it.
Mr. FIELD:—The questions now before the Conference I suppose arise
upon the report presented by the majority of the committee, and upon the
motion to substitute for that report the propositions of the minority of the
same committee.
I propose to add to this report the three following propositions; and I will
read them for the information of the Conference.
I. "Each State has the sole and exclusive right, according to its own
judgment, to order and direct its domestic institutions, and to determine for
itself what shall be the relation to each other of all persons residing or being
within its limits.
II. "Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens of each State
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.
III. "The union of the States under the Constitution is indissoluble; and no
State can secede from the Union, or nullify an act of Congress, or absolve
its citizens from their paramount obligations of obedience to the
Constitution and laws of the United States."
These additions would render the majority report much more acceptable to
the northern people than it is in its present shape, though even then, I am
bound to declare, I could not support it. I prefer the substitute. In what I
have now to say, I shall not confine myself to a discussion of these
propositions, but availing myself of the latitude of debate hitherto allowed
to gentlemen who have addressed the Conference in favor of the report of
the majority of the committee, I shall endeavor to bring to the notice of this
body, more fully than I have yet done, my views upon the general question
presented for our consideration.
For myself, I state at the outset that I am indisposed to the adoption, at the
present time, of any amendment of the Constitution. To change the organic
law of thirty millions of people is a measure of the greatest importance.
Such a measure should never be undertaken in any case, or under any
circumstances, without great deliberation and the highest moral certainty
that the country will be benefited by the change. In this case, as yet, there
has been no deliberation; certainly not so far as the delegates from New
York are concerned. The resolutions of Virginia were passed on the 19th of
January. New York (her Legislature being in session) appointed her
delegates on the 5th of February. We came here on the 8th. Our delegation
was not full for a week. The amendments proposed were submitted on the
15th. It is now the 20th of the month. We are urged to act at once without
further deliberation or delay.
To found an empire, or to make a constitution for a people, on which so
much of their happiness depends, requires the sublimest effort of the human
intellect, the greatest impartiality in weighing opposing interests, the utmost
calmness in judgment, the highest prudence in decision. It is proposed that
we shall proceed to amend in essential particulars a Constitution which,
since its adoption by the people of this country, has answered all its needs;
with a haste which to my mind is unnecessary, not to say indecent.
Have any defects been discovered in this Constitution? I have listened most
attentively to hear those defects mentioned, if any such have been found to
exist. I have heard none. No change in the Judicial Department is suggested.
The exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution has been satisfactory
enough to the South. The Judicial Department is to be left untouched, as I
think it should be. You propose no change in the form of the Executive or
Legislative Departments. These you leave as they were before. What you do
propose is, to place certain limitations upon the Legislative power, to
prohibit legislation upon certain important subjects, to give new guarantees
to slavery, and this, as you admit, before any person has been injured,
before any right has been infringed.
There is high authority which ought to be satisfactory to you, that of the
President of the United States, now in office, for the statement that
Congress never undertook to pass an unconstitutional law affecting the
interests of slavery except the Missouri Compromise. Well, you have
repealed that. You have also every assurance that can be given, that the
administration about coming into power proposes no interference with your
institutions within State limits. Can you not be satisfied with that? No. You
propose these amendments in advance. You insist upon them, and you
declare that you must and will have them or certain consequences must
follow. But, gentlemen of the South, what reasons do you give for entering
upon this hasty, this precipitate action? You say it is the prevailing sense of
insecurity, the anxiety, the apprehension you feel lest something unlawful,
something unconstitutional, may be done. Yet the gentleman from Virginia
(Mr. S     ) tells us that Virginia is able to protect all who reside within
her limits, and that she will do so at all hazards. Why not tell us the truth
outright? It is not action under the Constitution or in Congress that you
would prevent. What is it, then? You are determined to prevent the agitation
of the subject. Let us understand each other. You have called us here to
prevent future discussion of the subject of slavery. It is that you fear—it is
that you would avoid—discussion in Congress—in the State Legislatures—
in the newspapers—in popular assemblies.
But will the plan you propose, the course you have marked out, accomplish
your purpose? Will it stop discussion? Will it lessen it in the slightest
degree? Can you not profit by the experience of the past? Can you prevent
an agitation of this subject, or any other, by any constitutional provisions?
No! Look at the details of your scheme. You propose through the
Constitution to require payment for fugitive slaves: to make the North pay
for them. You are thus throwing a lighted firebrand not only into Congress,
but into every State Legislature, into every county, city, and village in the
land.
This one proposition to pay for fugitive slaves, will prove a subject for
almost irrepressible agitation. You say to the State Legislatures, you shall
not obstruct the rendition of fugitives from service, but you may legislate in
aid of their rendition, thereby implying that the latter kind of legislation will
be their duty. You thus provide a new subject of discussion and agitation for
all these Legislatures. In the Border States especially, such as Ohio and
Pennsylvania, you will find this agitation fiercer than any you have hitherto
witnessed; of which you complain so much. You will add to the flame until
it becomes a consuming fire.
You propose to stop the discussion of these questions by the press. Do you
really believe that in this age of the world you can accomplish that? You
know little of history if such is your belief. Free speech is stronger than
constitutions or dynasties. You might as well put your hands over the crater
of a burning volcano, and seek thus to extinguish its flames, as to attempt to
stop discussion by such an amendment of the Constitution. Stop discussion
of the great questions affecting the policy, strength, and prosperity of the
Government! You cannot do it! You ought not to attempt to do it!
I wish to speak kindly upon this subject. I entertain no unfriendly feelings
toward any section. But while you are thus complaining of us in the free
States, because we agitate and discuss the question of slavery, are you not,
in a great degree, responsible for this agitation yourselves? Do you not
discuss it, and agitate it? Do you not make slavery the subject of your
speeches in the South, and in the presence of your slaves? Do you not make
charges against us, which in your cooler moments you know to be
unfounded? Do you not charge us in the hearing of your slaves with the
design of interfering with slavery in the States, with a design to free them if
we succeed?
You have done all this and more, and if discontent, anxiety, and mistrust
exist among your people, let me say that such discussion has contributed
more to produce them, than all the agitation of the slavery question at the
North. But your amendments are not pointed at your discussions. That kind
of agitation may go on as before. It is only the discussion on the other side
you would repress!
If the condition of affairs among you is as you represent it, have you no
duties to perform; is there nothing for you to do? Should you not tell your
people what we have assured you upon every proper occasion, that the
Republican Party has always repudiated all intention of interfering with
slavery, or any other Southern institution within the States? This you all
know. Have you told your people this? If you would explain it to them now,
would they not be quieted? Do not reply that they believe we have such a
purpose. Who is responsible for that belief? Have you not continually
asserted before your people, notwithstanding every assurance we could give
you to the contrary, that we are determined to interfere with your rights? It
is thus the responsibility rests with you.
Although such is my conviction, supported, as I think, by all the evidence, I
am still for peace. Show me now any proposition that will secure peace, and
I will go for it if I can. We came here to take each other by the hand, to
compare views, explain, consult. We meet you in the most reasonable spirit.
Any thing that honorable men may do, we will do.
We will go back to 1845 when you admitted Texas; back to the Missouri
Compromise of 1820. You certainly can complain of nothing previous to
that time. If, since then, there has been any law of Congress passed which is
unjust toward you, which infringes upon your rights, which operates
unfairly upon your interests, we will join you in securing its repeal. We will
go farther. If you will point out any act of the Republican Party which has
given you just cause for apprehension, we will give you all security against
it. We will do any thing but amend the fundamental law of Government.
Before we do that we must be convinced of its necessity.
When you propose essential changes in the Constitution you must expect
that they will be subjected to a critical examination; if not here, certainly
elsewhere. I object to those proposed by the majority of the committee—
1st. For what they do contain.
2nd. For what they do not contain.
I do not propose to criticize the language used in your propositions of
amendment. That would be trifling. I think the language very infelicitous,
and if I supposed those propositions were to become part of the
Constitution, I should think many verbal changes indispensable. But I pass
by all that, and come at once to the substance.
I object to the propositions, sir, because they would put into the
Constitution new expressions relating to slavery, which were sedulously
kept out of it by the framers of that instrument; left out of it, not
accidentally, but because, as M       said, they did not wish posterity to
know from the Constitution that the institution existed.
But I object further, because the propositions contain guarantees for slavery
which our fathers did not and would not give. In 1787 the convention was
held at Philadelphia to establish our form of Government. W          was
its presiding officer, whose name was in itself a bond of union. It was soon
after the close of a long and bloody war. Shoulder to shoulder—through
winter snows and beneath summer suns—through such sufferings and
sacrifices as the world had scarcely ever witnessed—the people of these
States, under Providence, had fought and achieved their independence.
Fresh from the field, their hearts full of patriotism, determined to perpetuate
the liberties they had achieved, the people sent their delegates into the
convention to frame a Constitution which would preserve to their posterity
the blessings they had won.
These delegates, under the presidence of W         , aided by the
counsels of M       and F       , considered the very questions with
which we are now dealing, and they refused to put into the Constitution
which they were making, such guarantees to slavery as you now ask from
their descendants. That is my interpretation of their action. Either these
guarantees are in the Constitution, or they are not. If they are there, let them
remain there. If they are not there, I can conceive of no possible state of
circumstances under which I would consent to admit them.
Mr. MOREHEAD:—Not to save the Union?
Mr. FIELD:—No, sir, no! That is my comprehensive answer.
Mr. MOREHEAD:—Then you will let the Union slide.
Mr. FIELD:—No, never! I would let slavery slide, and save the Union.
Greater things than this have been done. This year has seen slavery
abolished in all the Russias.
Mr. ROMAN:—Do you think it better to have the free and slave States
separated, and to have the Union dissolved?
Mr. FIELD:—I would sacrifice all I have; lay down my life for the Union.
But I will not give these guarantees to slavery. If the Union cannot be
preserved without them, it cannot long be preserved with them. Let me ask
you, if you will recommend to the people of the southern States, in case
these guarantees are conceded, to accept them, and abide by their
obligations to the Union? You answer, Yes! Do you suppose you can induce
the seceded States to return? You answer: We do not know! What will you
yourselves do if, after all, they refuse? Your answer is, "We will go with
them!"
We are to understand, then, that this is the language of the slave States,
which have not seceded, toward the free States: "If you will support our
amendments, we will try to induce the seceded States to return to the Union.
We rather think we can induce them to return; but if we cannot, then we will
go with them."
What is to be done by the Government of the United States while you are
trying this experiment? The seceded States are organizing a Government
with all its departments. They are levying taxes, raising military forces, and
engaging in commerce with foreign nations, in plain violation of the
provisions of the Constitution. If this condition of affairs lasts six months
longer, France and England will recognize theirs as a Government de facto.
Do you suppose we will submit to this, that we can submit to it?
I speak only for myself. I undertake to commit no one but myself; but I here
assert, that an administration which fails to assert by force its authority over
the whole country will be a disgrace to the nation. There is no middle
ground; we must keep this country unbroken, or we give it up to ruin!
We are told that one State has an hundred thousand men ready for the field,
and that if we do not assent to these propositions she will fight us. If I
believed this to be true, I would not consent to treat on any terms.
From the ports of these seceded States have sailed all the fillibustering
expeditions which have heretofore disgraced this land. There, have those
enterprises been conceived and fitted out. Their new government will enter
upon a new career of conquest unless prevented. Even if these propositions
of amendment are received and submitted to the people, I see nothing but
war in the future, unless those States are quickly brought back to their
allegiance.
I do not propose to use harsh language. I will not stigmatize this
Convention as a political body, or assert that this is a movement toward a
revolution counter to a political revolution just accomplished by the
elections. Nor will I speak of personal liberty bills, or of northern State
legislation, about which so much complaint has been made. If I went into
those questions, much might be said on both sides. We might ask you
whether you had not thrown stones at us?
Did not the Governor of Louisiana, in his message to the Legislature of his
State, recommend special legislation against the supporters of Mr.
L      ? Is there not on the statute books of Maryland a law which
prohibits a "black Republican" from holding certain offices in that State?
Mr. JOHNSON:—There was a police bill before the Legislature of
Maryland, in which some provision of that kind was inserted by one who
wished to defeat it. Its friends were compelled to accept the provision in
order to save the bill. The courts at once held the provision unconstitutional.
All that is so.
Mr. FIELD:—I am answered. It is admitted that the Legislature of that
ancient State did place upon her statute book an act passed with all the
forms of law, containing a provision so insulting to millions of American
citizens.
Mr. HOWARD:—Will Mr. F     permit me a single question? I ask it for
information, and because I am unable to answer it myself. I therefore rely
upon his superior judgment and better means of knowledge. It appears to
me that Massachusetts, Maine, and New York have gone much farther. The
charge is a serious one. Maryland has never refused to submit to the
decisions of the proper judicial tribunals. The Constitution has provided for
the erection of a tribunal which should finally decide all questions of
constitutional law. That tribunal has decided that the people of the slave
States have a legal right to go into the territories with their property. The
gentleman from New York tells us he is in favor of free territory, and his
people are also.
Now, I wish to ask, where in the Constitution he finds the right to appeal
from the decision of the Supreme Court to the popular voice? In what
clause of the Constitution is this power lodged? Where does he find this
right of appeal to the people, a right which he insists the North will not give
up?
Mr. FIELD:—I am happy to answer the question of the gentleman from
Maryland, and I reply that when once the Supreme Court has decided a
question, I know of no way in which the decision can be reversed, except
through an amendment of the Constitution. I have the greatest respect for
the authority of the Supreme Court. I would take up arms, if necessary, to
execute its decisions. I say that States, as well as persons, should respect
and conform to its judgments, and I would say they must. But I am bound in
candor to add, that in my view the Supreme Court has never adjudged the
point to which the gentlemen refers; it gave opinions, but no decision.
I was about to state, when I was first interrupted, that the majority report
altogether omits those guarantees, which, if the Constitution is to be
amended, ought to be there before any others that have been suggested. I
mean those which will secure protection in the South to the citizens of the
free States, and those which will protect the Union against future attempts
at secession; guarantees which are contained in the propositions that I have
submitted as proper to be added to the report of the majority.
But, sir, I must insist, that if amendments to the Constitution are required at
all, it is better that they should be proposed and considered in a General
Convention. Although I do not regard this Conference as exactly
unconstitutional, it is certainly a bad precedent. It is a body nominally
composed of representatives of the States, and is called to urge upon
Congress propositions of amendment to the Constitution. Its
recommendations will have something of force in them; it will undoubtedly
be claimed for them in Congress that they possess such force. I do not like
to see an irregular body sitting by the side of a legislative body and
attempting to influence its action.
Again, all the States are not here. Oregon and California—the great Pacific
dominions with all their wealth and power, present and prospective—have
not been consulted at all. Will it be replied that all the States can vote upon
the amendments? That is a very different thing from proposing them.
California and Oregon may have interests of their own to protect,
propositions of their own to make. Is it right for us to act without consulting
them? I will go for a convention, because I believe it is the best way to
avoid civil war.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—If a General Convention is held, what amendments will
you propose?
Mr. FIELD:—I have already said that I have none to propose. I am satisfied
with the Constitution as it is.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—Then, for God's sake, let us have no General
Convention.
Mr. FIELD:—I think the gentleman's observation is not logical. He wants
amendments, I do not. But I say if we are to have them, let us have them
through a General Convention.
And I say farther, that this is the quickest way to secure them. If a General
Convention is to be called, let it be held at once, just as soon as possible. If
gentlemen from eight of the States in this Conference represent truly the
public sentiment of their people, as I will assume they do, there is no other
alternative. We must have either the arbitrament of reason or the
arbitrament of the sword. The gloomy future alone can tell whether the
latter is to be the one adopted. I greatly fear it is. The conviction presses
upon me in my waking and my sleeping hours. Only last night I dreamed of
marching armies and news from the seat of war. [A laugh from the
Kentucky and Virginia benches.]
The gentlemen laugh. I thought they, too, had fears of war. I thought their
threats and prophecies were sincere. God grant that I may not hereafter have
to say, "I had a dream that was not all a dream."
Sir, I have but little more to trouble you with. In what I have said I trust
there has been no expression that will be taken in ill part. I have spoken
what I sincerely felt. If there has been an unkind word in my remarks I did
not intend it, and am sorry for having uttered it.
For my own State and for the North I have only to say that they are devoted
to the Union. We have been reminded of H       '  opinion, that the States
are stronger than the Union, and that when the collision comes the Union
must fall. This is a mistake. In the North the love for the Union is the
strongest of political affections. New York will stand by the flag of the
country while there is a star left in its folds. If the Union should be reduced
to thirteen States—if it should be reduced to three States—if all should fall
away but herself, she will stand alone to bear and uphold that honored flag,
and recover the Union of which it is the pledge and symbol. God grant that
time may never come, but that New York may stand side by side with
Kentucky and Virginia to the end. That we may all stand by the Union,
negotiate for it, fight for it, if the necessity comes, is my wish, my hope, my
prayer. The Constitution made for us by W         , F       ,
M      , and H       , and the wise and patriotic men who labored with
them, is good enough for us. We stand for the country, for the Union, for the
Constitution.
I found yesterday upon my table a pamphlet bearing the title of "The
Governing Race." It contains a sublime passage from L         '  poem
of "The Ship," which, as it closes the pamphlet, shall also close my
observations:
"Thou, too, sail on, O Ship of State!
Sail on, O UNION, strong and great!
Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate!
We know what Master laid thy keel,
What Workmen wrought thy ribs of
steel,
Who made each mast, and sail, and rope,
What anvils rang, what hammers beat,
In what a forge and what a heat
Were shaped the anchors of thy hope!
Fear not each sudden sound and shock,
'Tis of the wave and not the rock;
'Tis but the flapping of the sail,
And not a rent made by the gale!
In spite of rock and tempest's roar,
In spite of false lights on the shore,
Sail on, nor fear to breast the sea!
Our hearts, our hopes, are all with thee,
Our hearts, our hopes, our prayers, our
tears,
Our faith triumphant o'er our fears,
Are all with thee,—are all with thee."
Mr. WHITE:—I shall not occupy much of the time of the Conference. All
the speeches that have been made, and all the declamation that has been
uttered on this floor, have not made a single convert. Last of all would I
wish to follow the gentleman who has just taken his seat. He proposes to
postpone action, asserts that we are acting without consideration, in haste,
and without due deliberation. I look upon this subject from a different point
of view. I believe the motive of Pennsylvania in first responding to the
invitation of Virginia was to induce the States to meet here in council, and
remove that peril which now threatens our common country.
Pennsylvania had another reason. She is a border State; she has a deeper
and more vital interest in the present unhappy differences than New York or
the North. If there is to be war; civil, unnatural war, whose country is to be
devastated, whose fields laid waste and trampled down? They are those of
the border States—of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, and possibly
New Jersey. These are the States that are to suffer. Gentlemen from New
York and the North East, in the bosom of their families, their towns and
cities not in the least danger, may be as impassive as the granite rocks that
bind their shores. We have a deeper, a more vital interest; therefore we feel
and speak. When Pennsylvania received the invitation of Virginia, South
Carolina, Georgia, and other States had seceded. Dangers were
accumulating. Then it was that the old conservative Keystone State threw
herself into the breach. She sent her delegation here to save the country and
not to change the Constitution—not to alter it, but to explain it and to give
our Southern sisters the guarantees they once did not ask and did not need.
We believed that the great majority of the people of the Southern States
were Union loving men, who choose to sail under the flag of the Union,
rather than under any piratical and treasonable banner. We knew there were
rebels within those States, as there is a faction at the North composed of
men as much rebels as they are. We knew, also, that there was a large body
of men at the South, who, though loyal at heart, were in a state of great
anxiety and apprehension, and who might be stirred up by demagogues,
through appeals to their State pride and other influences, to take a stand
against the Union.
The Republicans denied that they wished to interfere in any manner with
the institution of slavery. We have come here to give the slave States a
declaratory exposition of our views. We have come bearing the olive
branch. We are met by the South in a spirit of conciliation. The delegates
tell us that they hope to be able to bring back their erring sister States into
the fold of the Union, if they can go to them bearing satisfactory guarantees
from us. Pennsylvania is willing that we should give them that opportunity.
We have lived in harmony with them: we wish to live in peace with them. If
the seceded States will not come back, if the other Southern States cannot
bring them back, then, are we in any worse position? No, sir! we are not.
We desire to place ourselves right before the world. Then, if some States
will not stay in the Union, on their heads be the responsibility. Then, if any
wrong has been done, if any right has been violated, Pennsylvania will not
be responsible. We shall have done our duty, on them will the responsibility
rest. They must answer for it before the world and before the judgment-seat.
What will be the consequence of postponing action on this subject? We are
strengthening the position of the seceded States. We
"Keep the word of promise to the ear,
And break it to the hope."
Every rebel will rejoice at our inaction.
The continuance of Virginia in the Union depends upon the action of a
convention now in session in Richmond. If we send her commissioners
home to say to that convention, "The North will wait two years and then
consider your propositions," what will the convention say to that? The
seceded States have at this moment commissioners at Richmond entreating
Virginia to join their Confederacy, and to detach herself from the free
States. If we fail to act, who can fail to foresee the consequences? Maryland
is about calling a convention. She, too, will act, and she will go where her
associations and her interests carry her.
From this you can infer some of the reasons why Pennsylvania has sent her
commissioners here. Her object was not delay. Her wish was for action—
speedy action. She wishes to do all she can to accelerate action. She wishes
to have some plan laid before the country at once—something fair to all
sections—and then, with, the alternatives before them, let the people
decide. She wishes to pour oil on the troubled waters.
We are told by our friend from New York, that the amendments are badly
drawn. If so, let him help us to correct them. No one can do it better. Surely
there is talent enough in this Conference to remedy such defects as are
suggested by him.
Gentlemen say they do not wish to convert free territory into slave territory.
Neither do I. We are not doing that. All the territory south of the line
proposed is slave territory already. The adoption of these propositions does
not extend slavery at all.
The first advantage the Republican party ever obtained in Pennsylvania,
was on account of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, followed by the
decision of the Supreme Court, declaring that the normal condition of the
territory was a condition of slavery, and on that ground holding the
Missouri Compromise unconstitutional. Such being the state of the matter,
do we lose any thing by the prohibition of slavery north of 36° 30´? No! All
that vast territory north of the line will be dedicated to freedom. The South
asks that faith shall be kept; that slavery in the territory south of the line
shall not be interfered with. This is the only material averment in the
declaration.
The second article contains a modification of the Constitution which was
not intended. This I understand it is proper to amend.
Another proposition is to put a barrier into the Constitution, which will
prevent the acquisition of territory in future by joint resolution. To this I am
sure the gentleman from New York will not object.
Sir, I have read and carefully considered all the proposed amendments. To
my mind they present no essential changes, or modifications, or
constructions, of that instrument. I can see no injury in them to the interests
of the North. I think they are rather to the advantage of the North. I believe
the people of the North will hasten cheerfully to adopt them.
Now, if we can adopt them—if we can make them a part of our organic law,
and thus settle these differences, who will not be glad? There is still a deep
and abiding love of the Union in the hearts of all the people. They will hail
with joy any action of yours which tends to strengthen it.
Mr. TUCK:—I should not address the Conference at this time if I did not
discover early signs of closing the debate, and I prefer to be clearly
understood upon the subject of discussion before it closes.
I well understand the appeals of the border slave States. They think that
one-half their number are already out of the Union. They deem themselves
weakened by their defection. I well understand the inquiry of the eloquent
gentleman from Virginia, when he asked, on the second day of the session,
"Can't you understand our position?"
I have listened to appeals stronger and more eloquent than I ever expect to
hear again. The representatives from the South on this floor are skilful in
debate and eloquent in speech. Were there no view of the case but the one
they present, I might become a convert myself.
They have seen half of the slave States, acting on the theory of right
claimed by the South, undertake to go out of the Union. If they love the
States they represent, and the Union of all the States, they should be filled
with apprehension and alarm. The venerable gentleman from North
Carolina (Judge R     ) has appealed to us with an ardor, patriotism, and
eloquence which has produced an indelible impression upon my mind,
while the gentleman (Mr. S     ) from Virginia, in describing parallels of
attack which the North, as he said, were constructing, in the course of
events, about the institution of slavery, commanded my undivided attention.
Yet gentlemen greatly err in assuming that we of the North are acting under
some wizard influence, and, out of pure malignity, are plotting the
overthrow of slavery. There is no plot or general concert in the action of the
North on this subject. We are, like the South, subject to general laws
affecting mind and morals, as well as pecuniary concerns, which laws
cannot be disregarded. We cannot act otherwise than we do. Ideas and
principles control, and we and those whom we represent will act in
accordance with them, whatever be the consequences.
Much is said here about saving to the Union the slave States not yet gone.
All I have to say on this point is, I wish to save them, and I trust we shall
have less trouble with the seven than with the fifteen.
The chair was here taken by Mr. A        .
The people of this country, North and South alike, obey the laws of interest
and morality. There is no disposition at the North to destroy slavery. Let
these accusations and criminations be heard no more. What I am about to
say may weigh but little, but I know something of the North, and a little of
the South. I fully believe that the institution of slavery within the States
should be left with them exclusively—that such is the prevailing sentiment
of the North. I say so because there is no disposition at the North to
interfere with it. Do we believe that we can manage slavery better than you?
No, sir! I believe that we could not manage it so well. If we had been reared
on your soil in the midst of slavery, we could manage it just as well. It is a
mistake and a pernicious error, for the South to believe that either party at
the North proposes to raise any question relating to slavery within State
limits. There is not a man at the North who could stand up long enough to
fall down, if he should take such a position.
There are problems connected with slavery which we cannot solve; we do
not wish to undertake their solution. We will leave them with you.
What, then, should we do? My answer is, live along as we have done
before. We will live with you in the Union, under a Constitution that
requires us to help you keep the peace. Where you dwell, we will dwell.
Your people shall be our people, and where you die, we will die. Our
Constitution is good enough for a people who are wise enough to live under
it. With such a Constitution, Virginia proposes to leave the Union.
Will you leave the Union because the Constitution has not been rightly
construed? No; for it has been construed to your entire satisfaction. It has
been made to speak your views. The judges of our Supreme Courts
represent your opinions. There has never been a construction of the
Constitution adverse to your interests. The Dred Scott decision protects
slavery in all the territories according to your desire, though against our
strong conviction of law and right. Will you leave the Union because you
have not had the Government your share of the time? You have had
possession and control of it for fifty years out of seventy-two; and during a
large portion of the twenty-two years, when we have had the President from
the free States, the administration has been under the control of southern
sentiments, and southern interests have been in the ascendency, through the
servility of northern men. Do you leave the Union in order to secure the
protection of a better Constitution? No; for they who have left us have said
that the Constitution was well enough, if the people were sufficiently
enlightened to live under it. Why is it, then, with all these facts before you,
that you propose to turn away from the Government of our fathers, from all
the glories of the past, the blessings of the present, and the hopes of the
future, to hunt for new and better things under a new Government?
You are going out of the Union because you say we propose to immolate
you—to turn you over to the mercies of a Government of slaves set free.
How unfounded is such a belief! Are we not brothers still? I doubt whether
there was a better feeling between the masses of the North toward you ten
or seventy years ago than there is to-day. Can you find better fortunes
elsewhere? Where do you propose to go? To the doubtful fortunes of a
Southern Confederacy? You certainly are not acting with your accustomed
prudence and forethought. You know what the teachings of history are in
relation to nations in that belt of latitude. You know how they have always
compared with northern nations. Together the two sections may be
prosperous and powerful; separated you can judge where the advantage
must fall. Had we not better try and get along as we are?
This Conference presents some singular scenes. Although made up, so far
as the North is concerned, of members of both political parties, yet, by a
majority, it supports southern views of southern interests as earnestly and
emphatically as any southern man has done. In all conflicts of the past and
present you have carried your points, and you have reason to think you may
do so in future. Yet you insist upon separation. Be assured, you will
experience as bitter feuds among yourselves as you do in the fellowship of
those you leave. You cannot be reconciled to even the existence of a
minority against you, but you will find you cannot escape the minorities,
and may fall into one yourselves. You propose to join the fortunes of the
Southern Confederacy, in which, there is a contention already. You turn
your backs upon the Government of the Father of his Country, whose
portrait is before us, and join your fortunes to a mere southern nationality.
Beware of the act. Look back over the last two thousand years, and contrast
the stability of governments in southern latitudes with those more northern,
under latitudes which you leave. Mexico, Central America, and South
America, furnish valuable lessons on this Continent, while the Eastern
Hemisphere is, in this respect, full of instruction. Will you leave a people
whose character and habits are like those which have produced the
permanence and power of Russia, France, and England, and ally yourselves
to those more southern people who have not hitherto enjoyed stability,
power, or happiness? Is it not wiser to stay where you are, to scorn the
pernicious doctrines of new teachers, and to live and die under the flag of
our fathers?
The annexation of Texas opened a Pandora's box of evil. Had not that taken
place, the Missouri Compromise would not have been repealed. Had not
that Compromise been repealed, the shadow of our present troubles would
not have arisen.
You speak of the opposition of the North to slavery. Believe us or not, it is
true, nevertheless, that slavery is regarded at the North as strictly a State
institution; as such, we are content to let it remain; we desire to let it remain
such. But let not the North be misunderstood in its position. The North is
willing to let slavery remain where it is—where our fathers left it; but
against its extension into the territories, the North is inflexibly and
unalterably opposed.
If there is any thing to pacificate I am in favor of pacification, but in favor
of it according to the Constitution. The Constitution embraces all that any
State can reasonably ask or honorably concede. But if from change of
circumstances or other causes, the men of the South are of the opinion that
their interests are overlooked or ill-defined, I, for one, will favor a call of a
convention to consider amendments to the Constitution, and I will vote for
such amendments as shall give as substantial protection to the South as the
North ought to ask for, in the change of circumstances.
I submitted an address and resolutions a few days since for adoption in this
Convention, which I hope may be carefully read before being rejected.
They contemplated a convention, and their design is to give assurance of
justice to the public. I oppose the proposition for an address by the
committee, to be issued to the public after our adjournment. We wish to
know beforehand what we adopt, and to weigh every word. There is a
northern sentiment to be regarded as well as a southern sentiment.
We of the North have heard much said in denunciation of us, and have
thought it political clap-trap and gasconade. But if we are made to believe
in your hostility to us and the Government, we may conclude it is best to let
you leave us. We have no fears in trusting ourselves, if necessary, to our
industry, our habits, and enterprise, separate from the slaveholding States.
Opinions are changing rapidly. I do not like the idea of maintaining the
Union by force of arms. It is not in accordance with the theory of our
Government.
A Virginian stated only a few days ago, that there was nothing which the
South could ask or that the North could give, that was not found in the
Constitution. But you say that we do not understand it alike—that the two
sections differ in their construction of it. Well, if that is so, we are willing to
submit to the courts.
You have always fared well enough there. If that is not enough we will
leave the whole subject, amendments and all, to a General Convention. That
we now propose. We propose it fairly, not for any purpose of delay or
postponement. Call the convention as early as it can be done. We will aid
you. We will go home and in good faith urge our people to go into the
convention, and there patiently and fairly consider all your claims, all your
complaints. We would urge them to concede all they can without a sacrifice
of principle. We will do this as a party, and with all our strength. Now, this
does not quite come up to what you want, but is it best for you to insist
upon breaking up the Government on that ground? That is neither sensible
nor safe. We are like two lobes in the same skull; one cannot outlive the
other. Destroy one and you destroy the other. I do not believe this Republic
can stand without the Union which our fathers made. But it will stand—it
must stand. Wise counsels will yet prevail. You will yet believe us sincere
in our desires to relieve you. The end of the Union has not come—it is not
coming. The Union will yet outlive us and our posterity.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN:—In rising to express briefly my views, I feel
oppressed and embarrassed in view of the magnitude of the subjects we are
discussing, and in the presence of this distinguished auditory. I cannot claim
to represent an Empire State with its four millions of people, nor a Bay
State, which we are told, with its wealth, its enterprise, and its commerce,
can settle a new State every year. But with my colleagues, I represent a
State which performed her part in the dark night of the Revolution—her
share in that great struggle for our priceless institutions—a State which has
ever since been faithful in the discharge of all her constitutional obligations.
In that bloody conflict, upon her own soil, New Jersey joined hands with
the North and South. There is scarcely a church spire within her borders
beneath whose shadows does not lay the remains of some of the entombed
patriots in that great conflict from both these sections, commingled with
those of her own sons!
New Jersey was true to the Union in that great struggle—she has always
since been true; and under the favor of Providence she always will be
faithful to the Union and its memories, so inseparably connected with the
glory and honor of her sons. Other States may have done as much, may
have as good a record, may be entitled to equal credit with her. But in all
her past history, I can point to her fidelity to the Union and her sister States
with no blush of shame upon my brow. Other States might be wanting! New
Jersey never! She has always been true to her constitutional obligations; she
has always kept—never sought to avoid them.
With a narrow stream separating her from a slaveholding State, there were
never any underground railroads in New Jersey; she never rescued a
fugitive slave from the custody of the law; no personal liberty bill ever
disgraced the pages of her statutes, nor ever will disgrace them. In 1793 she
enacted a statute providing for the prompt return of fugitive slaves found
within her limits. She subjected any judge required to act under it, to
imprisonment, if he neglected to perform his duties. That law has ever since
been in force. It was reënacted in 1836, and again in 1846, when some of its
defects were amended. Courteous as just, she provided by another law,
passed in 1820, that any southern gentleman visiting her territory, might
bring with him his household slaves, travel in, through, and out of the State,
or even take up his temporary residence as securely in this respect as at
home. This law was reënacted in 1847, and again in 1855; one of my
worthy colleagues here was associated, upon the commission which revised
this act, with that distinguished New Jersey Republican, W       L.
D     .
In the recent unhappy political contest, New Jersey, ever anxious to do
justice to all sections of the Union, and injustice to none, as if hesitating and
doubtful toward which of the two parties in that struggle she ought to
incline, extended her fraternal hands to North and South, by giving one-half
her electoral vote to each; thus showing that she still retains her unselfish
spirit, which leads her to sacrifice her own preferences to her duty to the
Union.
In the same spirit to-day she bears her full share of the heavy sorrow that
rests, like a pall, over the people of the whole country as they witness this
glorious fabric, which our fathers erected and cemented with their blood
and their prayers—trembling, shattered, and dismembered. In the
conciliatory spirit of my State, I, as a Jerseyman, proud of the title and
every thing connected with it, wish to say a word to the South in all
frankness and candor. I freely tell you that, in my opinion, you have a right
to guarantees, and to constitutional guarantees. It is no answer to say that
the Constitution has not been broken. That is not the question now.
Reference has been made to the fact that W          signed the present
Constitution. Yes, but when he did so we had a population of but three
millions, and now we have a population of upward of thirty millions. Is it
surprising that some change should be required in that instrument with this
great change in the nation? The balance of power so long fluctuating
between the free and the slaveholding States has at length entirely changed.
It has now come to us of the free States, and therefore we are bound to
respect the claims of the South, and quiet the apprehensions of its people.
It is of little use to make patriotic speeches here. The South demands
guarantees, and I feel under obligations to respond to that demand. I assert
as a general principle, that whoever has a right is entitled to have it
guaranteed. I believe there is not a gentleman here, who, in his heart, does
not think so. If it is right for them to have these guarantees at all, they
should have them to-day. I do not care whether Virginia occupies a
menacing attitude or not, my moral code is still the same; it is not effected
by any thing that has been done or can be done by Virginia or any other
State. It is my belief that nineteen-twentieths of the people of the North to-
day are in favor of giving to the South all the guarantees it asks against all
interference with slavery in the territories. Some say, "We admit this, but we
will do nothing until the Republican President is inaugurated on the 4th of
March." I am ready to do it now; and my obligations to do right will not be
changed by the 4th of March rolling over my head.
Gentlemen have made eloquent and patriotic speeches asserting their
determination not to interfere with the rights of the South. That is very
pleasant and very proper. But those speeches are the expressions of
individuals, and they pass away. Where is the man who will consent to hold
any political right at the will of any man or class of men, no matter how
kindly disposed? We all require security. The highest and grandest aim and
object of government is not the stability and peace of society, but a well-
grounded confidence in the minds of the people of the perpetuity of that
stability and peace.
The South asks the right to use and occupy a portion of the common
territory of the country. As a northern man I will accept the compromise,
and I believe a large majority of the people will agree with me. You,
gentlemen of the South, have asked that the arrangement may be extended
to territory hereafter to be acquired. New Jersey has voted in this
Convention against interference with slavery in the territory, present or
future, and she is the only northern State that has cast her vote in favor of
your demand. Her representatives have been told somewhat sneeringly, that
while slaveholding States voted against this proposition, New Jersey was
the only free State that voted for it. Well, we accept the responsibility, and
will bear it. New Jersey has made up her record. There it stands, and there
let it stand forever. We are proud of it. If civil war is to come, if this land is
to be deluged with fraternal blood, when that time comes there will not be a
northern State represented here that would not give untold millions to be
placed upon that record by the side of New Jersey.
The fact is, sir, we have acquired our liberties too cheaply. Had we
purchased them at the cost our fathers did, by coloring the snows of winter
by our blood tracks, and by passing the summers in the unhealthy morass,
we should have learned to prize them more highly; we should be more
patriotic and less proud, more sensible and less sensitive.
A word further on the subject of extending this provision to territory
hereafter acquired. Gentlemen, you do not want that provision; you do not
need any provision as to future acquisitions. You are better off without it.
No present rights are involved in it. You are providing for a contingency
which may never, and probably never will happen. Would it not be
inconsistent for a nation to commit suicide because a constitution is not
made to meet an improbable contingency? You have territory enough for
the next two hundred years. You say you require it to maintain your honor,
to preserve your fair equality, to maintain your lawful rights. Permit me to
say you have no rights in territory which we never owned, and I hope never
may. This is no question of honor or equality. But if we should acquire
territory and should then exclude you from it, will it not then be time
enough to resort to the expedient of national suicide as a remedy for the
wrong? Nor do you require it for any particular purpose. You have within
your States room for all the increase of a century. Your interest is to retain
your sons at home and develop the wealth and advance the prosperity of
your States, and not to send them to the western wilderness where one-half
die in the process of acclimation. The fact that you are all in favor of
placing in the Constitution new restrictions as to the acquisition of territory,
proves you do not consider you need more territory. I heard it said, the other
day, by a gentleman from Virginia, that the South wanted the provision for a
finality, to end forever this dispute about slavery. With all my heart I
sympathize with him in his desire to end this discussion forever. You think
you have suffered from these discussions at the South; so have we at the
North. It has separated families and neighborhoods; it has broken up and
scattered Christian churches; it has severed every benevolent society of the
land; it has destroyed parties; it broke up the good old Whig party, and more
recently sapped the strength and vigor from the Herculean Democracy. It
now threatens the dissolution of the Union. Let us crush the head of the
monster forever. Let us do it by restricting and defining its limits in existing
territory.
Suppose the word "future" had been inserted. You do not wish to destroy all
probability of the adoption of this proposition at the North. These proposals
could not pass Congress, with the word "future," by the requisite vote; and
if it passed Congress, there is no hope that twenty-five out of twenty-eight
States would have adopted it. With it you would have given great strength
to the opposition at the North. It would have created a more powerful anti-
slavery party than ever before existed. No, you are better off by confining
the provisions of this compromise to present territory—you having, as well
as the North, in the contemplated amendment a veto on the acquisition of
territory.
The North will want new territory before you will desire it. They will
demand Mexico and Cuba for the advantages of trade. You then, having the
veto power, can say to them—No, gentlemen, we will not agree to it unless
our particular institution is there respected; or, if you please, you may go
further and say, We will not acquiesce unless this territory comes in as a
slave State so as to restore measurably the balance of power in the
Government. With this veto power you would have the North in your hands,
and could make your own terms. You make the provision more of a finality
by letting it stand as it is.
But gentlemen say, they want the amendment for another purpose, in order
that they may induce States that have gone out to return. Here, again, I
sympathize with you. I had rather bring back South Carolina than to secure
the annexation of both the Canadas. I would give more for one American
than for a regiment of John Bulls. Ungenerous as South Carolina has been, I
would receive her home again. I desire the States to return. Let their place
at the Federal Board remain vacant for them. Let the stars of their
sovereignty on our nation's ensign remain unobliterated and without further
dishonor. We are ready to receive them. But this provision as to future
territory is not necessary for their return. The same considerations to which
I have alluded, and which, will satisfy you that such provision is not
requisite, will satisfy them. The guarantees which the North are ready to
give as to the representation, taxation, and return of property, and the
compromise as to the existing territory, will do much to satisfy them. To
effect a compromise, you of the South must demand as little as you can
render satisfactory to your people, and we of the North must give as much
as our people will approve, and both parties must consent to avoid all
objectionable phraseology.
Now, a few words to my friends of the North. There is resting upon us a
grave responsibility. We are bound to settle this question finally in this
Convention. Talk about a convention of the people! We who have no
constitution, we who are tied up to no technicalities, must settle it. We of
the North may meet political death; but let political death come, it is enough
to have lived for, if we can settle this question.
But one asks, Will you strike hands with treason, and enter into compacts
with rebels and traitors? Yes, sir! I will strike hands with just such rebels
and traitors as I see around me; and I would give them what they ask as
cheerfully and as freely as I would give a glass of water to a soldier
returning wounded and weary from the field of battle.
But it is said we must first see whether we have a Government. We must try
the strength of the Government. We must know whether the Government
can assert its supremacy and compel obedience to its laws. Sir, that is just
what I do not want to try. What, try the strength of the Government! and do
so at the end of an administration in which corruption and treason and every
evil principle have been contending for the mastery, when our ships are all
away beyond sea, when our arms and our fortifications are out of our hands,
when our treasury is bankrupt, our people divided, insolvency and ruin
threatening our country, and all the Gulf States defying the authority of the
Government? No, sir! this is no time to try the strength of the Government.
When we do that, let us select some more auspicious period.
But another says these proposals of amendment contravene the Chicago
platform. What if they do? Is the Chicago platform a law to us? Is it a law
to any one? It was passed upon ten minutes' consideration in a convention
of five thousand people. If it was a law, the convention should have been
perpetual and never dissolved, in order that the law might have been subject
to requisite modifications without a change of circumstances. A strange
manner in which to enact such a law! But things have changed since the
Chicago Convention. In fifty days, fifty years of history have transpired.
This is enough to release us from the obligation, if any existed. It is not a
law; it is a doctrine, the spirit, the policy of the party that it undertakes to
enunciate. It is not a law, because a majority of the people have never given
it their sanction. Mr. Lincoln was elected by less than a majority. And in his
vote how many old Whigs and Democrats may be counted who did not
support him because he stood upon the Chicago platform, but because they
preferred him to either of the opposing candidates. And even if it is a law, I
call upon the North to support the proposals of amendment here submitted.
Let us, as Republicans, be honest, and when the opportunity offers are we
not bound so to change the Constitution that three-fourths of all our present
territory, now open to slavery, shall be consecrated to freedom? Yes, we are
bound to relieve that three-fourths from slavery. All we need to do to secure
this, is not to carry slavery where it is not, but to secure it where it is. I can
go home to the Republicans of New Jersey with a clear conscience and say
to them, that by our action here we have not carried slavery one inch farther
than it was before. If they are not satisfied with that, they must be
dissatisfied.
But there is one plank in the Chicago platform to which I will call the
attention of my Republican friends. It must not be forgotten. I read from a
genuine copy which I brought from Chicago myself.
"Resolved, That to the Union of the States, this nation owes its
unprecedented increase in population, its surpassing development of
internal resources, its rapid augmentation of wealth, its happiness at home
and its honor abroad, and we hold in abhorrence all schemes of disunion,
come from whatever source they may."
It is a rule of construction, that all parts of an instrument must be construed
together; that due regard and effect must be given to all parts of it, unless
they are clearly repugnant. Will any gentleman tell me how the Union can
be more effectually preserved than by controlling disunion? It is by granting
what is asked to those who might disturb its tranquillity, when they ask
nothing unreasonable. This resolution every patriot can subscribe to; and I
hold that it can be as effectually violated by the neglect to do all we can to
turn aside disunion, as by affirmative action against the Government. And
let me say that the party in this country which goes between the people and
the preservation of the Union, will sink so low, eventually, that a bubble
will not return to mark the spot where it went down. But I cannot
understand how any one who is honestly opposed to the extension of
slavery, as a political institution, can refuse the compromise proposed. The
federal courts, to which we have committed the power, have decided that
slavery, of right, goes into all the territories. The distinguished Republican
from Massachusetts has told us that the court cannot be so organized, even
if we keep the power, as to change that decision in twenty-five years. In that
time the whole question will be determined. Now we have an opportunity,
at once and forever, by constitutional enactment, to prohibit slavery from
going into three-fourths of the territory, by simply agreeing that as to the
other one-fourth, while it remains a territory, the status of slavery shall not
be changed. I confess I have not the ingenuity to contrive how I should
apologize to an audience of Republicans for refusing such a contract.
Now, what can we of the North, we Republicans, do? By a settlement here
we can retain the Border States, and, in my opinion, that is equivalent to
saving the Union. Retain the Border States and the seceding States must
come back. If the Border States go, I believe war is inevitable. How can two
sections exist with only an imaginary line between them. I do not believe
the South will ever consent to give up the Capital, claimed to be within her
borders, and the North could never surrender it. Sir, I shrink from the
prospect of civil war. The picture of civil war has often been painted, and
by abler hands than mine. Its calamities and miseries, the sufferings that
attend it, strike a chill of horror to the soul. But such a picture as a civil war
in this country would be, has never been drawn. History would be searched
in vain for its parallel. A civil war between the members of a family,
between brother and brother, father and son, who have all enjoyed the same
blessings which their fathers made early and bloody sacrifices to secure!
Shall it be said that such a people, for such a cause, risked their interests,
their country, their all, and rushed blindly into the calamities of a civil war?
He has read history to little account who has not learned that such a warfare
is, in its nature, not only cruel, but protracted. It is like letting loose the
hurricane. Passion and poverty, carnage and crime, desolation and death,
become the condition of a hitherto happy people. For thirty years Germany
was ravaged, and millions slain by a contest occasioned by a difference in
religious opinions. For more than thirty years the war of the Roses
devastated England. The French Revolution, including the "Reign of
Terror"—originating in a question of taxation and terminating with the
supremacy of Napoleon—lasted nearly ten years. For a like decade civil
war raged between England and Scotland, originating in a question of
authority between the King and Commons, and ending in Cromwell's
protectorate. Why, I ask, if we admit this fiendish visitant to our borders,
should we anticipate that our fate would be more favorable? No! war is to
be averted, and a nation still covered with glory is to be preserved by
holding the Border States in the Union.
If I am asked what I would do; I answer, Compromise—compromise! Two
gentlemen cannot live in a parlor together a single day without reciprocal
compromises. I would not be "stiff in the back and firm in the knees." There
is such a thing as too much "backbone." I say I would "back down" to save
the country. I am not ashamed of the expression. Our Government itself was
a compromise, and in nothing more so than as to the slavery question.
H     C    was the great compromiser. The Missouri Compromise was
his. Resigning his office as Speaker, on the floor of Congress by irresistible
argument, and eloquence unequalled—though twice defeated, he succeeded
in establishing the compromise line of 36° 30´—and thereby erected a
barrier which severed the angry currents of opinion on this distracting
theme, and which was as valuable to this nation as the isthmus at the
equator, holding in check the mighty ocean on either side. The North has
compromised before; let her do it again. Let our friends at the South take as
little as they can, and let the North yield as little as she can, but let us come
together. The party that stands between the people and the preservation of
the Government will be crushed to atoms. It will be remembered in history
only with curses and indignation.
We all love this Union, and we mean to preserve it. There is no one here
who, as he has witnessed the freedom, the comfort, the prosperity, and the
pure religion disseminated among the people, has not hoped this nation was
to accomplish great social and moral good for our whole race. Yes, in fond
conception we have seen her the Liberator and Equalizer of the world—
walking like an angel of light in the dark portions of the earth. These sacred
anticipations may not be disappointed without a fearful accountability
somewhere. And, sir, suffer me to say that this whole people have a strong
regard for each other, notwithstanding the petulant differences which have
arisen between us. Kindred blood flows in our veins, and that of our fathers
mingles on the same field; and even now, in the day of our country's peril,
our affections meet at the hallowed grounds of Mt. Vernon, of Marshfield,
and of Ashland.
We have our history. W          and F       , and H     and S     ,
as well as Bunker Hill, and Yorktown, and Trenton, are yours, and they are
all ours.
We have our religion—and with every diurnal revolution of this sphere,
from North and South, through the efficacy of a common faith, a goodly
company are ascending to that realm of peace where their harmonious
union shall never more be severed. And to-day, from a thousand
hearthstones in the sunny South, and in the more rigid North, the family
prayer ascends to the Father of us all, for a blessing on our common country
and for the preservation of this Union. Those prayers will be heard, and this
priceless Union will be preserved.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I wish to call the attention of the Conference for a
moment to another subject, in order that members may give it their
consideration. I shall call up my motion to terminate the debate upon the
report of the committee early to-morrow, and ask to have the discussion
closed on the 21st instant. I am sure that I shall be sustained in this by every
member who wishes to have this body come to any agreement. I wish to
have the vote taken on the twenty-second day of February, that we may see
whether the same day that gave a W          to our Fathers, may not give
P     to their posterity.
Mr. DODGE:—I have listened with intense interest to the addresses which
have recently been made to the Conference. I respect the ability which they
have exhibited—I honor the patriotism which has produced them. They
have presented the important principles involved in the action of this
Conference in a much more interesting and forcible manner than I could;
and I would not occupy the attention of this body with a single observation,
if I had the good fortune to be associated with a delegation in which
unanimity of opinion and feeling prevailed. But I am not so fortunate. In
that delegation I find many shades of opinion. I respect the views of my
brother delegates. It is not for me to assume to sit in judgment upon them. I
give each one of them credit for the same honesty and integrity which I
claim for myself; and if I happen to differ from them, I claim that such
difference honestly arises from the different paths in life which we pursue,
which may lead us to take different views of the same subjects as they are
here presented.
The Conference has heard the ideas of political and professional men
expressed upon the important questions now presented for its consideration.
These ideas have been well expressed, and we have all been interested in
hearing them. Will you now hear a few words from a body of men who
have hitherto been silent here, but who have a deep and abiding interest in
the happiness and prosperity of the country and in the preservation and
perpetuity of the American Union?
Sir! I am here as a plain merchant, out of place, I very well know, in such a
Conference as this; but accident has brought me here, and I will tell you
how and why I came. Three weeks ago I left my business—which in times
like these certainly deserves all my attention—to come to the city of
Washington on business of a public character. I came at the suggestion and
request of the Chamber of Commerce of New York, hoping, in my humble
way, to serve the public interests in this crisis. Inconvenient though it was,
and involving personal sacrifices of no ordinary character, when others
thought my country had need of my poor services, I did not hesitate to
respond to her call. And I hope I may never hesitate under such
circumstances.
I came here to visit Congress, as a member of a committee, bearing a
petition to that body signed by more than thirty-nine thousand of my
fellow-citizens, all interested in the welfare and permanence of this
Government. This number included more than twenty thousand business
men and firms. This petition was earnest and emphatic. In it, we asked and
prayed that Congress would adopt some plan that would settle our present
sectional troubles; that would relieve the country from the anxiety and
apprehension which pervaded it, and permit business and commerce to
resume their accustomed channels, with assurances of safety in the future.
We knew that the time had arrived when patriotic men must act; that
commercial and financial ruin was impending. Our petition set forth, that in
the opinion of the signers, the plan contained in what were called the
"Border State Resolutions" was best calculated to secure the end desired.
We thought those resolutions ought to be satisfactory to the reasonable and
true Union men of the South, and that they ought not to be obnoxious to the
prejudices or objections of the people of the free States. Still we were not
strenuous—we were not committed to any particular plan. All we desired,
was to secure such action on the part of Congress and the Executive, as
would satisfy the country; such action as would give the country peace.
When we came to Washington we met seventy republican members of the
Senate and House of Representatives. We had with them a most satisfactory
and delightful interview. It gave me renewed hope for my country and her
interests when I heard the expressions of conciliation and good will which
these gentlemen used; I felt my confidence renewed.
Besides these gentlemen, who met and heartily coöperated with us, there
were several members from the Border States whose expressions were not
less friendly, although they did not think it expedient to act with us. Our
committee made all the representations and explanations which were
deemed necessary; and having performed my duty in that connection, in the
earnest hope that we had influenced the action of Congress in the right
direction, I was about to return home with my colleagues, when I received a
telegraphic despatch requesting me to attend the meeting of this
Conference. I obeyed the summons; and since I received it, I have been
laboring with all the ability, strength, and power with which GOD has
blessed me, to secure the adoption of some plan here, that would settle our
difficulties and avert from our beloved country the evils with which she is
now threatened.
Sir, there has not one moment passed since I came here, during which I
have not felt a deep and overpowering sense of the grave responsibility
which rests upon myself and the other members of this Conference. I am
accustomed to the trials, vexations, cares, and responsibilities of business; I
know how to meet and grapple with them calmly. But I do not feel so here.
My days are anxious and excited—my nights are wakeful and sleepless. In
all the weary watches of last night, I could not close my eyes in slumber.
The reason was, because I saw from a point of view which you do not, the
certain and inevitable ruin that is threatening the business, commercial
interests of this country, and which is sure to fall with crushing force upon
those interests, unless we come to some arrangement here.
I speak to you now as a business man—as a merchant of New York, the
commercial metropolis of the nation. I am no politician, I have no interest
except such as is common to the people. But let me assure you, that even I
can scarcely realize, much less describe, the stagnation which has now
settled upon the business and commerce of that great city, caused solely by
the unsettled and uncertain condition of the questions which we are
endeavoring to arrange and settle here.
I tell you what I do not get from second hands, but what I know myself,
when I assure you that had not Divine Providence poured out its blessings
upon the great West in an abundant harvest, and at the same time opened a
new market for that harvest in foreign lands, bringing it through New York
in its transit, our city would now present the silence and the quiet of the
Sabbath day. Why is this? It is because we, who have lived together in
harmony with each other, a powerful and a happy people, are breaking up—
are preparing to separate and go out from one another!
The merchants of our great commercial cities of Baltimore, Philadelphia,
New York, and Boston, are not listless or unenterprising men. They are
accustomed to the interests, the bustle, the excitement of business. They
have heretofore seen their stores crowded with buyers. During the day the
interiors of their places of business were like busy hives. Not unfrequently
have their clerks been obliged to labor all through the night to secure and
send off the goods which they had sold to reliable customers during the day.
When business is good and driving throughout our commercial cities,
wealth and comfort are secured to merchants and agents engaged in
commerce in those cities, and it indicates general prosperity in the country
to which the goods purchased are transmitted. It shows a healthy condition
of affairs both in city and country.
How stands the matter in those cities to-day? Now, just when the spring
trade should be commencing, go to the extensive and magnificent
establishments for the sale of goods in any of the cities I have named, where
goods are sold which in prosperous times found their way into almost every
family to a greater or less amount in this great country. What will you see in
those cities now? The heavy stocks of goods imported last autumn, or laid
in from our own manufactories, remain undisturbed and untouched upon the
shelves. The customers are not there—they have not made their appearance.
The few who have come at all, come not as buyers, but as debtors who
cannot pay, and whose business is not to make purchases but to arrange for
extensions. The merchants, in despair, are poring over their ledgers;
checking off the names of their insolvent debtors, a new list of whom comes
by each day's mail. Their clerks sit around in idleness reading the
newspapers, or thinking mournfully of the wives and children at home, who
will go unclad and hungry if they are discharged from their places, as they
know they must be, if this condition of things shall continue. All alike,
employers and employed, with all dependent upon them, are looking
anxiously, and I wish I could say hopefully, to the Congress of the United
States, or to this Conference, as the only sources from which help may
come.
There are thousands and tens of thousands belonging to these classes all
over the country who must have relief, or their ruin is inevitable. And then
look at that other class, numerically larger, perhaps, certainly not less
worthy of our regard, who are dependent upon these; I mean the mechanics,
the day laborers, and those in turn dependent upon them. What are they to
do? If some change does not come, if something is not done again to start
the wheels of commerce and business, what is to become of them?
And look, too, at New England! She has latterly been the workshop of the
South and the West. She has furnished their people with her manufactures—
they have been her market. An excellent market, too, have they furnished
her; she has grown rich through their consumption. How stands the matter
with New England to-day? True, some of her shops are running, but many
more are still. The noise of the loom, the rattle of the shuttle, have ceased in
many of her factories, while others are gradually discharging their
operatives and closing their business. But I will pursue this branch of the
subject no farther. No one acquainted with the facts, will deny that the
whole country is upon the eve of such a financial crisis as it has never seen
—that this crisis will come as sure as that the sun will rise, unless we do
something to avert it!
What is it that has thus stopped the wheels of manufactures and arrested the
ordinary movements of commerce? What is it that has produced this
unusual and uncommon stagnation of business? What is it that has driven
away from the markets of the North those hitherto so welcome to them? I
do not propose to go into the history of these questions. I will not attempt to
enlarge upon the answers to them. I can condense the answer into few
words. It is because anxiety, distrust, and apprehension, are universally
prevailing. Confidence is lost. The North misunderstands the South—the
South misunderstands the North. Neither will trust the other, and the
consequences to which I have adverted necessarily follow.
I am a merchant. I am unused to public discussions or arguments, but I am a
business man, and I take a business view of this subject. I can see as clearly
as I can see the sun at noonday the causes of our present embarrassment. I
believe I can see equally clear how those causes may be removed.
We have come here for a grand and lofty purpose. What nobler work can
engage the mind of a true patriot than that of devising the means of saving
his country when it is in peril? That work is ours. In performing it, are we
not acting under a grave and solemn responsibility? We are, sir! The people
will hold us responsible for the manner in which we perform this great trust.
I know the people of this country. They value this Union. They will make
great sacrifices to save it. They will disregard politics and parties—they
will cast platforms to the winds of heaven, before they will place the Union
in peril.
The delegates from New England in this Conference seem to be the most
obstinate and uncompromising. They aver that they cannot agree to these
propositions because their adoption involves a sacrifice of principles—that
New England is opposed to slavery, and will not consent to put it into the
Constitution, nor to its extension. They say the people hate slavery, and will
not for that reason accept these proposals.
I do not believe one word of this. I know the people of New England well;
they are true Yankees; they know how to get the dollars, and how to hold on
to them when they have got them. They are a shrewd and calculating as
well as an enterprising people; they understand their interests and will
protect them. They will not sit quietly by and see their property sacrificed
or reduced in value. Once show them that it is necessary to adopt these
propositions of amendment in order to secure the permanence of the
Government, and to keep up the property and other material interests of the
country, and they will adopt them readily. You will hear no more said about
slavery or platforms. They will never permit this Government, which has
contributed so much to their wealth and prosperity, to be sacrificed to a
technicality, a chimera. The people of New England know how to take care
of themselves. Give them a chance, and they will settle all these points of
difference in some peaceful way.
I am not here to argue or discuss constitutional questions. That duty belongs
to gentlemen of the legal profession. I have lived under the Constitution. I
venerate it and its authors as highly as any man here. But I do not venerate
it so highly as to induce me to witness the destruction of the Government
rather than see the Constitution amended or improved.
I regret that the gentlemen composing the committee did not approach these
questions more in the manner of merchants or commercial men. We would
not have sacrificed our principles, but we would have agreed—have
brought our minds together as far as we could; we would have left open as
few questions as possible. These we would have arranged by mutual
concessions.
Mr. P        , I speak as a merchant; I have a deep and abiding interest in
my country and its Government. I love my country; my heart is filled with
sorrow as I witness the dangers by which it is surrounded. But I came here
for peace. The country longs for peace; and if these proposals of
amendment will give us peace, the prayer of my heart is, that they may be
adopted. Believing such will be their effect, I will vote for them. I would
like to say much more, but I will not occupy time that is now so valuable.
Let us approach these questions in a spirit of conciliation. Above all, let us
agree upon something. Let us do the best we can, and then let us go home
and ask the people to approve our action. The people will approve it, and
their approval will give us peace!
Mr. SMITH, of New York:—I did not propose to take any part in this
debate. The Conference is made up of men, many of whose names are
historical, and are intimately connected with the history of the country. I
preferred to leave the whole discussion to them.
But as we are all seeking a common end, there are some views which have
occurred to me that I thought should be presented, inasmuch as they appear
not to have engaged the attention of others. New York, I am aware, has
occupied considerable time, and I owe an apology on her part for
trespassing farther upon your time.
We are here in a family meeting. On one side Virginia thought the parent
was so ill that the family ought to be called together. I thought yesterday
that we were undergoing some family discipline—that New York had in
some way disgraced herself, and needed correction. I did not know what
she had done; but I supposed the reproof was administered to her in a
kindly spirit, though it was uncalled for.
The work proposed to us is, to be sure, a work of conciliation. But call it by
whatever name you may, nothing less is proposed than an alteration of the
Constitution. When we are asked to alter a Constitution that was made by
W          and M      , under which the country has grown to wealth
and happiness, we certainly ought to approach the subject with the utmost
deliberation. If we were settling family differences only, we would
deliberate. How much more should we do so when we are dealing with the
great principles which uphold our Government!
It is by great principles that nations are governed and their destinies are
shaped. The world is governed by ideas and not by material interests. These
facts must be kept distinctly in view by those who take upon themselves the
business of making constitutions.
It is stated that we are called here to settle the terms upon which certain
sectional differences are to be arranged. We ought, then, first to ascertain
what is the extent—what the limit of these differences.
In the first place, it is agreed that no constitutional rights have yet been
invaded. The occasion for fear is not what has been, but what may be done.
I suppose we are all alike tenacious of our rights, whether we derive them
from the Constitution or from any other source. The rights of the State are
just as important to New York as to Virginia. But it is said that appearances
exist that indicate an intention on our part to interfere with some of the
institutions of the South. We ask for the proof. None is forthcoming—
nothing but the most vague and indefinite suspicion.
We propose to give the most satisfactory and absolute guarantees on that
subject—the subject of interference with Southern institutions—even to put
those guarantees into the Constitution. But that is not satisfactory—we are
told that we cannot be trusted. I should hope that no Northern State could
ever be truthfully required to admit that it had given cause for such an
apprehension. But it is evident that this is not the real occasion of calling us
together. What, then, is the occasion?
It is said, that certain sectional rights in the Territories must be secured and
guaranteed. In that view I desire to call the attention of the Conference to
two or three points in the plan of the proposed security.
As I understand the scheme, it is this: It is proposed to divide our present
territory by the line of 36° 30´, with a view to have emigration from the free
States go north, and from the slave States go south of that line. This is made
in connection with a limitation preventing the acquisition of future territory.
Now the first thing that impresses me is the objection to placing any such
restraints upon emigration.
Mr. CLAY:—I think the gentleman misunderstands the report. I have seen
no proposition that proposes to confine or restrain emigration.
Mr. SMITH:—I concede that there is no express provision restricting
emigration, but such I think will be the effect of the amendments.
By the third section, Congress is prohibited, forever, from interfering with
the subject of slaves, and the sixth section makes the others, with certain
provisions of the Constitution as it now stands, irrepealable and
unchangeable. No matter how much the condition of the country may
change; no matter if all but the most inconsiderable fraction of the people
may desire to change them; these propositions must stand as long as this
country stands, a part of its fundamental law.
These are the general provisions which the scheme contains. It is offered as
a measure of peace; of conciliation; to calm and quiet the existing
excitement.
I think I am right in saying that when you are making a constitution you
should consider all the conditions of the people who are to be governed by
it; that you should keep in view all sections and opinions. It is my belief
that instead of calming the excitement these propositions will aggravate it—
will arouse it to a pitch it has never yet attained. I believe this, because the
entire proposition goes counter to the fundamental ideas upon which our
Government is based.
It proposes to establish slavery South. Is not this the first time in the history
of the Constitution that it has ever been proposed, by affixing an article to
that instrument, to establish—to plant slavery in territory which was free
when it was acquired? The ordinance of 1787 prohibited slavery from going
into the territory which was acquired by it.
In similar language the article proposes to abolish slavery in the territory
north of the line. It is well to consider what is the legal condition of that
territory now. New Mexico and Arizona were free when we first acquired
them. Is not this provision wholly unnecessary? Mr. C    left such
language out of the Missouri Compromise, as he avowed, on the ground
that slavery could not legally go into territory free when it was acquired,
without the aid of affirmative legislation. Previous and up to the year 1850,
there was no difference of opinion among lawyers on this question. All
agreed with Mr. C   .
Now, slavery has gone into a portion of this territory; violently too; without
such legislation. Limits are prescribed to it, it is true, but it is there, and in
this way. That is the status which is to be recognized, constitutionalized by
these articles. I am aware that there is a law of the territory that authorizes
slavery, but slavery went there without law, in spite of the opinions and
opposition of Mr. C   .
This is shown by the debate of 1850. It is proposed now to convert the
territory south of the line of 36° 30´ into slave territory, and to make that
conversion irrevocable. Suppose these propositions had been applied at the
moment the territory was acquired. Then certainly slavery would have been
carried there by force of these articles alone. The principle would have been
the same; one case being no stronger than the other.
Mr. P        , I shall not enter into any discussion of the merits or
demerits of the question in any other than its political aspects. I have
nothing to say respecting the morals of slavery. If there is virtue in the
institution, you have the credit of it; if there is sin, you must answer for it.
And here let me say that you discuss the moral aspect of slavery much more
than we do. We hold it to be strictly a State institution. So long as it is kept
there, we have nothing to do with it. It is only when it thrusts itself outside
of State limits, and seeks to acquire power and strength by spreading itself
over new ground, that we insist upon our objections.
Whatever the consequences may be, we should not conceal from each other
the true condition of public opinion in our respective sections. A correct
knowledge of this is essential and indispensable. It is in view of this opinion
that our proposals should be framed, if they are ever to be adopted. The
settled convictions of a people formed upon mature examination and
experience, cannot be easily changed. This should be understood at the
outset.
Now, I respectfully submit that no sentiment, no opinion ever took a firmer
hold of the Northern mind—ever struck more deeply into it—ever became
more pervading, or was ever adopted after maturer consideration, than this:
That it is impolitic and wrong to convert free territory into slave territory.
With such convictions the North will never consent to such conversion.
Never! never!
This was the view of Mr. C   . His opinion always had great weight at the
North. Mr. C      , of Delaware, declared to the same purpose, and
avowed that Northern men could not be expected to consent to this. We, at
least, know how this opinion is consecrated in the hearts of the people of
the North, and how idle it is for statesmen to run counter to it.
We are told by the gentleman from Maryland, that all the South wants is to
have the force of the decision of the Supreme Court acknowledged as to
that part of the territory south of the line, in consideration of which the
South will yield what she gains by that decision in the territory north; and
also that we must do this, or the slave States will be driven to join those
States that have seceded. Now, it is due to frankness to say, that the North
does not acquiesce in that statement; that the point as made by the
gentleman from Maryland, has been decided by the Supreme Court. We
know that the Chief Justice of that court has expressed his own opinion that
way; but we don't know that it has been decided by that court. But if it has
been so decided, the very ground of the decision is a misapprehension. If I
rightly understand the language of Chief Justice T    , he insists that the
Constitution expressly affirms the right of property in slaves. I think it does
not. The North thinks it does not.
Mr. S     then proceeded to discuss the facts in the Dred Scott case, and
the various opinions declared by the judges, showing that the decision did
not extend so far as claimed by Mr. J      , and that the question of the
right to hold slaves in the Territories was not presented by the record in that
case.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—There were two questions involved in the Dred Scott
case. One was, the authority of Scott to sue; the other was, upon the
constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. Both these were decided in
that case, and both were decided by the Supreme Court years ago.
Mr. SMITH:—I am aware of the views taken by the gentleman from
Kentucky. I am stating as a matter of fact how this decision is regarded by a
large portion of the people of the North. I am aware that the Southern
construction of the decision is different, and some at the North concur in it.
I am trying to see how the majority propositions will suit the people who
agree with the Northern view.
I understand it is claimed that the court decided that slaves were property,
and that the Constitution did not permit any restraint to be laid upon the
owners of that property in the Territories. Yes, the court did decide that the
owner had the right to take his slaves into the Territory and hold them there;
and to that extent they were property. It is a prevalent idea at the North that
the Southern construction of this decision is not fair, and that it would be
dangerous to adopt it.
We do not subscribe to the doctrine that the Constitution expressly affirms
the right of property in slaves. We may be wrong; it may be a mere
misapprehension. But with their present opinions, the people of the North
will hesitate long before they make this express affirmation a part of the
organic law.
Again; if the Constitution affirms this right, and was understood to do so by
its framers, what was the need of the rendition clause? The Constitution is
the supreme law in the free States as well as in the slave States. Under this
construction the rights of the owner could have been enforced like any other
right of property in the courts of law, without any provision for the
rendition of slaves.
These are some of the opinions that are entertained at the North. They may
be right or they may be wrong, but they have been deliberately adopted, and
they prevail extensively. They cannot be changed by our action here. In all
we do they must be respected. They are constitutionally entertained.
This proposition to carry slavery into the Territories, opens the discussion of
the merits of that institution. Gentlemen say they wish to stop the
discussion; that there has been too much of it already; that such a discussion
would be especially unfortunate now. I do not propose to enter upon it here.
But I desire to know in what manner you could more effectually invite
discussion than by placing your proposed amendments before the people?
You must not forget that the people of the North believe slavery is both a
moral and a political evil. They recognize the right of the States to have it,
to regulate it as they please, without interference, direct or indirect; but
when it is proposed to extend it into territory where it did not before exist, it
becomes a political question, in which they are interested, in which they
have a right to interfere, and in which they will interfere. Such an attempt
they consider it their duty to resist by all constitutional means.
The establishing of slavery in the Territories is the practical exclusion of
free labor in them. True, there is no direct provision for the exclusion of
free labor in your propositions, but such will certainly be their effect. I
appeal to gentlemen from the South to say from their own experience
whether free labor can be employed side by side with slave labor. This
presents another consideration. You of the South ask us to guarantee a right
which you say is very important and very dear to you. You ask that your
children may enter into and possess these new Territories. We know it. But
the North asks the same privilege. We want our children to go there, and
live on the labor of their own free hands. They are excluded if slavery goes
there before us.
Mr. P        , the people of the North do understand, that we are in a
contest—a great and important contest. Yet it is one that can be carried on
without trampling upon each other's rights—without attempting to secure
any unfair advantage. That is the way the North proposes to carry on this
contest in relation to the extension of slavery. This contest is between the
owners of slaves on the one side, and all the free men of this great nation on
the other.
There is another fact that should be kept in view. The Territories are the
property not of the individual States, but of the General Government. They
are held by the Government in trust, I grant. But in trust for whom? For the
whole people of the Union; not in trust for thirty-four distinct States. The
idea that these Territories are subject to partition—that South Carolina has
the right to demand her thirty-fourth part of them in severalty, is one that by
the North cannot be entertained. It is this idea which has produced that
other more mischievous one—that an equilibrium must be maintained
between the free and the slave States; in other words, between freedom and
slavery. Where did this idea creep into the Constitution? It never has found,
and it never will find, favor with the people of the North.
We may talk around this question—we may discuss its incidents, its history,
and its effects, as much and as long as we please. And after all is said—
disguise it as we may—it is a contest between the great opposing elements
of civilization—whether the country shall be possessed and developed and
ruled by the labor of slaves or of freemen.
Leave it where it is, and all is well. We can live in peace while it is a State
institution; extend it, and who can answer for the consequences? Leave it
where it is! I humbly suggest that in that direction lays the only path of
peace. So long as the Territories are common property, so long will the
people insist upon protecting their interests in them. In a Government like
ours, conflicts will ensue. The Constitution provides the proper and
peaceful way of settling them; and it is not by a partition of every subject in
which a mutual interest exists.
Mr. SEDDON:—Does the gentleman consider this a nation, or a federal
union of States?
Mr. SMITH:—If I did not consider this a nation I should certainly not be
here.
Mr. SEDDON:—Is not the whole machinery of the Government federative?
Is not its whole action that of a confederation? Is not the recent election of
Mr. L       a proof of the fact? He was elected by less than a majority of
the people.
Mr. SMITH:—In all the action of the Government with other governments,
we are a nation as much as France or England. In every thing pertaining to
the acquisition of territory we are a nation. The rights of the States are
preserved in the Constitution, I admit, but their power is to be exercised
subject to the powers reserved by the Constitution to the General
Government. In all that respects these powers the Government is supreme.
I have only sought to state some of the opinions which are conscientiously
entertained at the North upon subjects connected with these propositions.
They are entertained there, and they must be respected by the Conference.
This doctrine of the preservation of the balance of power is a new doctrine.
It was unknown to the framers of our Constitution. In my opinion it is a
most mischievous doctrine to the country, and can only produce the most
pernicious results. It is closely akin to the doctrine once broached in the
Senate of a duality of the Executive, which, extended, would require a
President for every sectional interest. Such ideas were never popular at the
North. I do not think they would operate very well in practice at the South.
Mr. CLEVELAND:—Will the gentleman give way for a motion to adjourn?
Mr. SMITH:—Certainly.
On motion of Mr. C         the Conference adjourned to ten o'clock to-
morrow.
F O U R T E E N T H  D A Y .
W         , T       , February 21st, 1861.
T   Conference was called to order by the President, at ten o'clock and
fifteen minutes  . ., and prayer was offered by Rev. Dr. S       .
The Journal of yesterday was read and approved.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—As I stated yesterday, I now wish to call up my
resolutions relating to the termination of the debate, and to have a vote
taken upon them.
Mr. CHASE:—Will Governor W         permit me to make a formal
motion, which cannot give rise to discussion? It is this: The resolutions
passed by the Legislature of Ohio, under which myself and my colleagues
hold our seats, make it my duty to lay before the Conference the resolves I
now offer. I ask to have them read, laid upon the table, and printed.
The resolutions were read, and the motion of Mr. C     concurred in.
The resolutions are as follow:—
Resolved, That it is inexpedient to proceed to final action on the grave and
important matters involved in the resolutions of the State of Virginia, in
compliance with which this Convention has assembled, and in the several
reports of the majority and minority of the committee to which said
resolutions were referred, until opportunity has been given to all of the
States to participate in deliberation and action under them, and ample time
has been allowed for such deliberation and action.
Resolved, therefore, That this Convention adjourn to meet in the city of
Washington, on the 4th day of April next; and that the President be
requested to address a letter to the Governors of the several States not now
represented in this body, urging the appointment and attendance of
Commissioners.
Mr. EWING:—I wish to state here that I do not concur in these resolutions.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I now offer two resolutions, one providing that debate
shall cease upon the report of the committee, at 10 o'clock to-morrow. The
other, that five minutes shall be allowed to the mover of an amendment to
explain it, with five minutes to the committee to reply. Upon reflection, I
will offer a third: That a motion to strike out and insert shall not be divided.
If desired, a vote may be taken on the resolutions separately, as I wish to
have each stand upon its own merits. I will not discuss these resolutions, for
I think all must be impressed with the necessity for passing them now.
The resolutions were as follow:—
Resolved, 1st, That at 10 o'clock, the 22d February, 1861, all debate upon
the report of the Committee of one from each State shall cease, and the
Convention will proceed to vote, and continue to vote until the whole
subject shall have been disposed of.
2d. If an amendment be offered by the Commissioners of any State, or the
minority of such Commissioners, five minutes is allowed for explanation,
and the like time is allowed to the committee to resist the amendment, if
they desire to do so; and the mover of the amendment, or any member of
the same State, may have five minutes for reply.
3d. A motion to strike out and insert shall not be divided.
Mr. CHITTENDEN:—I shall not debate these resolutions. As I am engaged
in taking notes of the discussion, I cannot enter into a contest for the floor,
and I would not if I could. My State has not occupied a moment of time on
the general subject, nor are her delegates very anxious to address the
Convention at all.
Whether the Conference will give one of us a few minutes or not, is simply
a question of policy, of which I am not a disinterested judge. It is possible
that some suggestions might be made which would be worthy of attention.
Mr. GOODRICH:—I move to amend by inserting Saturday, instead of to-
morrow, in the first resolution.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—There is force in the remark of the gentleman from
Vermont. No State should be cut off. I suggest that the States whose
delegates have not addressed the Conference, should have the preference.
Mr. JOHNSON, of Missouri:—I represent a youthful State. She is not the
daughter of any particular State or section, but of the Union. We
Missourians love the Union, but we have fully arrived at the conclusion that
the time has come when something must be done to prevent our entire
separation. We have hitherto remained silent. We came here to preserve the
Union. Not that we love the Union less, but we love our rights more. We
love our rights more than the Union, our property, or our lives. We desire to
come to a speedy adjustment. Ten days of Congress only remain. It will be
difficult even to introduce our propositions, still more to get them
considered. I sustain the motion of the gentleman from Kentucky; and
Missouri will vote for it.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I will make the proposition as acceptable as possible. I
will insert one o'clock instead of ten.
Exclamations were heard from several members of, "Let us agree," and the
question being taken on the first resolution as amended, it was adopted.
Mr. BACKUS:—I move to insert in the second resolution, ten minutes
instead of five, wherever the word occurs. That time is none too long to
state the purpose of an amendment properly.
Mr. NOYES:—Is this resolution designed to exclude all discussion upon an
amendment, except by the member moving it and the committee?
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—No! Such is not the intention. Any one can speak five
minutes. I rely on our sense of propriety not to abuse this construction of
the resolution.
The amendment of Mr. B      was decided in the negative by a vote viva
voce.
The resolution was then adopted, together with the resolution relating to
motions to strike out and insert.
Mr. BROWNE:—I move that when the Convention adjourn, it adjourn to
meet at half-past seven o'clock this evening.
Mr. CHASE:—I hope the Conference will not hold night sessions. Our day
sessions are protracted and very laborious. I agree with Commodore
S       , that night sessions are dangerous.
Mr. MOREHEAD, of Kentucky:—I do not agree with Mr. C    . I have
particularly observed the demeanor of all the gentlemen in the Conference,
and know that they are as well fitted for business at five o'clock in the
afternoon as at ten o'clock in the morning.
A vote by the States was called for, which resulted as follows:
A   :—Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, and Virginia—13.
N   :—Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, and
Vermont—7.
Mr. WILMOT:—In pursuance of the instructions of the Legislature of
Pennsylvania, I offer the following. I wish to have it laid on the table, and
printed, that I may move it as an amendment to the committee's report at the
proper time.
The motion of Mr. W      was agreed to, and the amendment is as
follows:
"And Congress shall further provide by law, that the United States shall
make full compensation to a citizen of any State, who in any other State
shall suffer, by reason of violence or intimidation from mobs and riotous
assemblies, in his person or property, or in deprivation, by violence, of his
rights secured by this Constitution."
Mr. DENT:—I ask that the following may be adopted as an additional rule:
"When the vote on any question is taken by States, any Commissioner
dissenting from the vote of his State, may have his dissent entered on the
Journal."
Mr. CHASE:—I suggest whether it would not be better to call the yeas and
nays, on the motion of any Commissioner. I have heretofore introduced a
resolution to that effect, which, with the gentleman's permission, I will now
call up.
Mr. DENT:—I won't insist.
Mr. C    '  resolution was taken up as follows:
"The yeas and nays of the Commissioner of each State, upon any question,
shall be entered upon the Journal when it is desired by any Commissioner,
and the vote of each State shall be determined by the majority of
Commissioners present from each State."
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I hope the gentleman will waive the first part of the
resolution. I think it is the best way not to disclose our divisions any farther
than is indispensably necessary.
Mr. CHASE:—I copied the rule verbatim from the one adopted by the
Congress of the Confederation. I think it right and fair. But I have no
objection to modifying it, so as to have the yeas and nays called on the
motion of any entire delegation.
Mr. DENT:—I did not withdraw my motion. I think it will accomplish all
we need. It will be taken, of course, that those who do not dissent vote with
the delegation.
Mr. REID:—I think it is entirely too late to talk about saving time. How
long will it take to have the names of dissenting delegates called? For one, I
desire to exercise my rights under the authority of the State I represent. I
will not consent to waive them. When the vote of my State is cast, I wish to
have the record show who is responsible for it.
The question was taken on the resolution offered by Mr. C    , and it was
rejected, and the additional rule proposed by Mr. D    was adopted.
Mr. COALTER:—I offer the following, which I shall move as an
amendment to the report. I ask that it be laid on the table, and printed:
"The term of office of all Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the United
States, hereafter elected, shall be six years; and any person once elected to
either of said offices, shall ever after be ineligible to the same office."
The above motion to lay on the table and print was agreed to.
Mr. BRONSON:—I also have an amendment, of which I ask to have the
same disposition made. It is as follows:
"Congress shall have no power to legislate in respect to persons held to
service or labor in any case, except to provide for the rendition of fugitives
from such service or labor, and to suppress the foreign slave trade; and the
existing status or condition of all the Territories of the United States, in
respect to persons held to service or labor, shall remain unchanged during
their territorial condition; and whenever any Territory, with suitable
boundaries, shall contain the population requisite for a representative in
Congress, according to the then federal ratio of representation, it shall be
entitled to admission into the Union on an equal footing with the original
States, with or without persons held to service or labor, as the Constitution
of such new State may prescribe."
Mr. B      '  motion was agreed to.
Mr GUTHRIE:—I call for the order of the day.
The PRESIDENT:—The order of the day is called for, and the gentleman
from New York has the floor.
Mr. SMITH:—At the adjournment yesterday, I had proceeded to state two
or three grounds upon which I think the proposals of amendment to the
Constitution reported by the majority of the committee would be
unacceptable to the North, and I had also stated some special objections to
action in this way and at the present time.
The next consideration to which I would invite attention is this: Is it
necessary or wise for the Conference, composed as it is of friends of the
Union, or is it expedient thus to encounter the settled sentiments and
convictions of the people of so large a section of the country? It is not
necessary, for various reasons. This territorial question is, after all, a
question to be looked at in a prospective view. Why is it necessary to
disturb the Constitution by inserting such a provision as you propose? Why
is it necessary for gentlemen from the South to have it in, in order to enable
them to stand with their people at home?
Slavery is now in New Mexico. That must be acknowledged as a fact. The
South think it rightfully there—the North believe it is there wrongfully. But
its existence in the territories is a fact nevertheless. President L      
cannot help it if he would. The Supreme Court will affirm its rightful
existence there, whenever the question comes before that body. That Court
cannot be changed before these territories are admitted as States, if the
disposition exists to change it. You claim that the question is already
decided. How, then, can it be important to you to press the adoption of these
sections as a part of the Constitution? My judgment is, that it is best to
leave this subject alone—that that is the true way to save the Union.
Gentlemen of the South, remember that if you must stand at home with
your people, so also must we. There is a North as well as a South!—a
northern people as well as southern people. You press us hard on these
subjects. But can men who are rational ask us to abandon our own people,
to go counter to their convictions and sentiments? We cannot do it! You
would not respect us if we did! I am very sure that if this Conference is to
attain any beneficial result, it must abandon all idea of coercion or
intimidation as applied to the friends of the Union.
It is said we are contending for a party platform—that we are letting party
stand between us and the Union. I could trample parties and platforms
under foot to preserve the Union, but I cannot understand how honest men
can abandon principles because a party has adopted them into its platform.
Do not tell us that by adhering to the Union and the Constitution, we are
simply adhering to a party platform. Our principles are at least as dear to us,
as yours are to you; you must not expect us to sacrifice them either to
promote our own material interests or to promote yours.
Let us then sink the question of slavery in the Territories. Let the courts take
care of it if need be, or let it be dealt with when it properly comes up.
"Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." In that direction lays the path of
peace.
But perhaps it may be suggested that such a course would really leave no
plan to be adopted. Perhaps so. Is it, then, not true that we are having all
this trouble over a contingency that may or may not arise? That the
Constitution is sufficient for all purposes but this, you aver; and yet you say
in the same breath that the Court has settled this question entirely and
finally in your favor. Why not be satisfied, then, with the settlement? Can
you make it more of a finality in the way you propose? No, gentlemen;
believe me when I tell you that the true remedy does not consist in
endeavoring to humiliate the people of one section for the benefit of
another. Remember we are dealing with the American people; I would not
throw the Constitution into the vortex of disunion that is opening before us;
I would preserve it rather as a rock on which we can all safely stand. Do not
throw away the compass by which alone we can safely be guided!
If I were to suggest a suitable remedy, what I think a wise plan, it would be
the one adopted on a similar occasion, when one of the States set itself up in
opposition to the General Government, with such very beneficial results;
and that would be, to have the Government appeal to the people for support
—to throw itself into the arms of the people. The result then has become
historical. It is remembered with pride and pleasure by all. I would have a
similar course pursued now. The result would be equally grand, equally
gratifying. It would rally every patriot, every friend of the Union from
every section, to its support. You, gentlemen of the South, now friends of
the Union, still give it the strength of your support, the favor of your
countenance, and you shall be supported and sustained as you can be in no
other way. You shall have the support of the power of the Government and
of every friend of the Union in the country.
You remember how those patriotic statesmen, C    and W      —
differing from the Executive, opposing his election with all the strength of
their gigantic intellects—when the authority of the Government was
questioned, and South Carolina, under the lead of Mr. C      , undertook
to set herself up in opposition to it—how they waived all former
differences, and instead of encouraging secession by their delay and
timidity, without asking for new guarantees or for amendments of the
Constitution, came voluntarily and earnestly to the support of the Executive
and the administration, because the Executive was right, and was the chosen
instrument of the people to preserve the integrity of the Union.
Mr. BARRINGER:—If the gentleman will excuse me, I will state that the
course of the Executive against South Carolina was universally acquiesced
in except in that State. And yet the opinion that President J       far
exceeded his powers, was equally unanimous. That precedent has been
greatly misinterpreted.
Mr. SMITH:—I thank the gentleman from North Carolina. He entertains his
opinions, I do mine, as to what then saved the Union. I should not probably
be able to make him think with me; but I feel sure that the idea prevails
quite extensively, that South Carolina returned to the path of duty then,
because the power of the Government was wielded by an honest and
energetic Executive. She came to the conclusion that any other course
would probably be attended with danger.
Our present differences had no very remote origin. They belong to our own
generation, and we ought to be compelled to deal with them. I think the so-
called compromise of 1850 was the cause of all our troubles—that instead
of saving the country it brought it into greater danger than it ever was
before.
Mr. BARRINGER:—I wish to make a suggestion on that point.
Mr. SMITH:—I hope the gentleman will not forget that he will have a full
opportunity to answer me. I am nearly through, and generally no good
comes of interruptions. They only consume time.
I was about to say, that I do not propose to go into the question of who was
to blame for that repeal. I agree with gentlemen from the South, that there is
no profit now in discussing the origin of our troubles—in inquiring who set
the house on fire before we put on the water.
Mr. CLAY:—Does the gentleman do justice to Mr. C   , when at one
moment he says that Mr. C    held up the arms of the administration,
strengthened the Executive, and aided the Government in putting down
secession, and in the next, states that the compromise of 1850 was the cause
of all our troubles, when it is well known that Mr. C    strongly favored
that compromise?
Mr. SMITH:—When I speak of the unhappy effect of the compromise
measures of 1850, I ascribe no wrong motives to Mr. C    or any one else.
If he approved that compromise, I have no doubt he did it in the full belief
that it would be beneficial to the country. Experience has shown that he was
mistaken. Saying this is doing no injustice to Mr. C   . I spoke only of
effects. I spoke of the zeal and the energy with which the patriots and
eminent statesmen of all parties of this country have been accustomed to
come forward and sustain the administration when any necessity existed for
doing so. Now let this Conference—let all true friends of the Union
everywhere, with one voice, without attempting to place any section or any
man in a false or disagreeable position, unite in one determined effort in
behalf of the Union, and in an attempt to bring the rash and dangerous men
who would seek the destruction of the Government back to a sense of duty.
Let us address the country, let us show that we are devoted to the Union, far
beyond any considerations of party or self; let us invoke the aid of all true
and patriotic men; let us ask them to lay aside for the time all other
considerations, and give themselves for the present to the country! The
spirit of the old time is yet alive. We can call it out in more than its old
strength and vigor, and it will save the country. Our private interests may
suffer, but the great interests of the Union will be strengthened and
preserved, and the Constitution, which has been our pride and strength, will
not be dragged down into the great whirlpool of disunion. I appeal to the
venerable and able men around me, who bear historic names—who have
been themselves long connected with the Union and its Government, to join
us in our struggle to save the Constitution.
The views I have expressed may be chimerical. I have advanced them with
no little diffidence, but I felt called upon to state them in the discharge of a
duty I owe to a people who love and will make great sacrifices to save the
Constitution and the Union.
A majority vote, one way or the other here, would be of little consequence.
It would carry no weight with it. But if the members of this Conference
would all unite in such an appeal to the country, the response would be
instantaneous and effective. The heart of the country is loyal; the heart of
the South is loyal, I believe. We have abundant evidence that it is not too
late to rely upon the Union men in Missouri and Tennessee!
Mr. CARRUTHERS:—The vote of Tennessee is entirely misunderstood.
Mr. SMITH:—Perhaps so. I have no acquaintance with the people of
Tennessee. But I will not occupy the time of the Conference farther. I have
spoken plainly, but I have spoken what I believe to be the honest
convictions of a large majority of the people of this Union. Once more I say,
let us not destroy the Constitution!
Mr. CLEVELAND:—I have not got up to make a speech. We have had too
much speech-making here. It may be very well for gentlemen to get up and
make long arguments and eloquent appeals, and show their abilities and
powers, but it all does no sort of good—nobody is benefited, and no
opinions are changed. I shall take no such course. I want to see whether this
little handful of men who meet every day in this hall, cannot get together
and fix up this matter which has been so much talked about. Let us pay no
attention to the great men or the politicians. They have interests of their
own. Some of them have interests which are superior to those of their
country.
In the common affairs of life there are always a great many differences of
opinion. Some treat these differences one way—some another. Foolish men
go to law, and always come out worse off than when they started. Sensible
men get together, and talk matters over; one gives up a little, the other gives
up a little, and finally they get together. Now, friends, that is just what I
want to see done here.
We are all friends—friends of the Union and of each other. Nobody wants
to give up the Union, or hurt Mr. L      . The South has got frightened—
not exactly frightened, but she thinks the Republicans, since they have got
the power, are going to trample upon her rights. She wants the North to
agree not to do so. Now I should like to know what objection there was to
that? Who is afraid to do that? If we could go to work at this thing like
sensible men, we could settle the whole matter in two hours.
Now about these propositions. I do not see any thing alarming in them. I
have not set to work to pick flaws in them. Leave that to the lawyers. I don't
care much about them, nor does the North care about them. If the South will
take them and be satisfied—if they will stop this clamor about slavery and
slavery extension, I think she had better have them. For one, I am sick of
the whole subject.
Let us then go about the work like sensible men; let us stop making long
speeches and picking flaws in each other. It is a matter of business, and
pretty important business. Let us consider it as such, and from this moment
let us throw aside all feeling, and set about coming to some understanding.
We can do it to-day as well as next week. I do not know that these
propositions are the best that can be made; but if they are not, let us talk the
matter over like good Union men, and see what is best. When we can find
that out, let us agree. If we stay here and make speeches until doomsday, we
shall be no better off. I am for action, and coming to an immediate decision.
Mr. COALTER:—If the vote of Missouri is to be taken as an evidence of
her devotion to the Union, it must also be understood with this
qualification: Her interests and her sympathies unite her closely with the
South. She feels, in common with others, her share of anxiety for the future.
She is devoted to the Union, and at the same time she insists that it is fair
and right that these guarantees should be given.
It has been distinctly avowed on this floor that the people of certain sections
of the North abhor slavery. Ought we not to be distrustful when a party
entertaining such sentiments comes into supreme power? If Massachusetts
abhors slavery, how long will it be before she will abhor slaveholders?
Ignorance is the source of all our difficulties. The people of the North know
little of the condition of the negro in a state of slavery. We know that the
four millions of blacks in the South are better off in all respects than any
similar number of laborers anywhere.
But I rise only to correct a false impression in regard to Missouri. I have
only besides to express my full conviction that if the North will not give us
these guarantees, we are henceforth a divided people.
Mr. GOODRICH:—Mr. President, the object of this Convention, assembled
on the call or invitation of Virginia, is, as set forth in the preamble and
resolutions of her General Assembly,
"To restore the Union and Constitution in the spirit in which they were
established by the fathers of the Republic;" or, as otherwise expressed, "to
adjust the present unhappy controversies in the spirit in which the
Constitution was originally made, and consistently with its principles."
This agrees, in substance, with the purpose of the Republican party, which,
in the words of the Philadelphia platform, is declared to be that of "restoring
the action of the Federal Government to the principles of W          and
J        ."
Virginia announces to the other States that she "is desirous of employing
every reasonable means," and is "willing to unite" with them "in an earnest
effort" for the accomplishment of this common end and object of that State
and the Republican party; and she is moved to make this her "final effort,"
by "the deliberate opinion of her General Assembly, that unless the unhappy
controversy which now divides the States of this Confederacy shall be
satisfactorily adjusted, a permanent dissolution of the Union is inevitable,"
and by a desire to "avert so dire a calamity."
Massachusetts, equally willing to unite with the other States in an earnest
effort to further the same end, accepted the invitation of Virginia, and sent
Commissioners here to represent her.
The honorable Chairman (Mr. G      ) of the committee to report a plan
of adjustment, in his opening speech, advocated with earnestness and
eloquence a restoration of the Constitution to the principles of the fathers.
The distinguished gentleman (Mr. R    ) from Virginia demands a
"restoration of the Constitution to the landmarks of our fathers," and his
colleague (Mr. S     ) urges a return to the "policy of our fathers in
1787."
This assumes that we have departed from the principles and landmarks of
our fathers, and from the policy of 1787. The call of the Convention
assumes this; the platform of the Republican party assumes it, and the
gentlemen whose remarks I have quoted assume it, and it is true.
The particular object of a return to the principles and landmarks of the
policy of 1787, as stated in the preamble and resolutions of the General
Assembly of Virginia, is, "to afford to the people of the slaveholding States
adequate guarantees for the security of their rights." This implies that such a
return will afford these adequate guarantees. I agree that it will; and I am
ready, and Massachusetts is ready, to adjust this unhappy controversy, and
to give the guarantees demanded in exactly this way.
Stated in these general terms, there is a perfect agreement between us. But
we find a wide difference when we go one step farther, and learn precisely
what Virginia claims would be a restoration of the Constitution to the
principles of the fathers, and a return to the policy of 1787. This she has
told us in one of the resolutions sent out with the call for this Convention.
That resolution is as follows:
"Resolved, That in the opinion of the General Assembly of Virginia, the
propositions embraced in the resolutions presented to the Senate of the
United States by Hon. J    J. C         , so modified as that the first
article proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
shall apply to all the territory of the United States, now held or hereafter
acquired south of latitude 36° 30´, and provide that slavery of the African
race shall be effectually protected as property therein during the
continuance of the territorial government, and the fourth article shall secure
to the owners of slaves the right of transit with their slaves between and
through the non-slaveholding States and territories, constitute the basis of
such an adjustment of the unhappy controversy which now divides the
States of this Confederacy, as would be accepted by the people of this
Commonwealth."
It was in reference to these propositions that the gentleman (Mr. S     )
from Virginia, has asked us the question, "Are we not entitled to these
added guarantees according to the spirit of the compact of our fathers?"
The true answer to this question is the pivot on which this whole
controversy must turn. If the slave States are not entitled to these added
guarantees, "according to the spirit of the compact of our fathers," then
Virginia, as I understand her Commissioners, and the resolutions of her
General Assembly, does not claim them. She stands upon her rights
according to that compact. And all such rights Massachusetts is ready to
accord to her, fairly and fully.
By the spirit of the compact of our fathers is meant, the Constitution as they
understood it, and as the people of that day understood it. And this is what
is meant by the "landmarks of the fathers." All admit that the Federal
Government should be administered now, as it was administered by its
framers. This is what gentlemen from the slave States, in giving utterance to
their intense devotion to the Union, say.
Then, what is the Constitution, as understood by those who framed it? What
does it mean when interpreted by the light of the policy of 1787? and what
is the spirit of the compact which they made? This is the question we are
called to consider. In my remarks I do not mean to wander from it.
So far as the Constitution touches the question out of which the present
unhappy controversy has arisen, I say it means this: That slavery, as it
existed or might exist within the limits of the original States, should not be
interfered with to the injury of the lawful rights of slaveholders under State
authority; on the contrary, that it should have the right of recaption, and a
qualified protection; but that outside of those limits, otherwise than in this
right of recaption, it should never exist, neither in the territories nor in the
new States.
And let me say here, that when I speak of the original States, I mean the
territory of those States as then bounded. Alabama and Mississippi
belonged to Georgia, Tennessee belonged to North Carolina, Kentucky
belonged to Virginia, Vermont belonged to New York, and Maine belonged
to Massachusetts, and were parts of the thirteen original States, at the time
the Constitution was adopted. When, therefore, I speak of territory outside
the original States, I do not refer to territory within any of the States named.
Mr. BOUTWELL:—I trust my colleague does not claim to speak for
Massachusetts, when he denies the right of any State of this Union to
establish and maintain slavery within its jurisdiction, or to prohibit it
altogether, according to its discretion. This right was reserved to the States;
and States in this Union, whether original or new, stand on a footing of
perfect equality.
Mr. GOODRICH:—I certainly do not claim to speak for Massachusetts,
though I believe the opinion of the great majority of her people agrees with
my own on this subject. However, what I claim is, that Ohio and the other
States of the northwestern territory have no constitutional power to legalize
slavery within their limits; that they were admitted into the Union without
any such power, and that every other new State formed from territory
outside the limits of the original States, according to the "spirit of the
compact of our fathers," should have been admitted without that power, or
the right to acquire it. This I will now proceed to show.
On the first day of March, 1784, the northwest territory, constituting the
present States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, was
ceded by Virginia to the United States. The jurisdiction of the United States
was then exclusive and paramount, or soon became so—such other States
as had claimed any right of jurisdiction having ceded it. The cession of
Virginia was made by T      J        , S      H    , A      L  ,
and J     M     , who were delegates in Congress from that State, and
had been appointed Commissioners for this purpose. On the same day the
cession was made, Mr. J        , in behalf of a committee, reported a plan
for temporary governments in the United States territory then and
afterwards to be ceded, and for forming therein permanent governments.
That plan provided, "that so much of the territory ceded, or to be ceded, by
individual States to the United States, shall be divided into distinct States."
It is obvious that this plan contemplated the possession of territory in no
other way than by cession from the States. It was expected that Georgia and
North Carolina would cede their western lands, now the States of Alabama,
Mississippi, and Tennessee, as they did some years later; and Mr.
J        '  plan was intended to embrace those lands or territories to be
ceded. Consequently, the following provisions, which were part of the plan
reported, were intended by him to apply to Alabama, Mississippi, and
Tennessee, viz.:
"After the year 1800 of the Christian era, there shall be neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude in the said States, otherwise that in the punishment of
crimes."
Here the States were evidently those to be formed in United States territory.
And farther on in the plan it is stated,
"That the preceding articles shall be formed into a charter of compact, and
shall stand as fundamental Constitutions between the thirteen original
States, and each of the several States now newly described, unalterable ...
but by the joint consent of the United States in Congress assembled, and of
the particular State within which such alteration is proposed to be made."
This was a proposition to exclude slavery forever after 1800, not only from
the territories which had been, and might afterwards be, ceded, but from the
States to be formed in them, and to make it a fundamental Constitution
between the original States and each new State. It excited a short
discussion, and was postponed from time to time to the 19th of April, when
Mr. S      , of North Carolina, moved to strike it out. The motion was
seconded by Mr. R   , of South Carolina. The vote by States, on the
motion to strike out, was:
Y   .—Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina—3.
N   .—New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New
York, and Pennsylvania—6.
This was under the Confederation articles, which provided that the vote on
all questions should be taken by States, each State casting one vote; that no
proposition could be adopted without the vote of seven States in favor of it,
and that the vote of no State could be counted unless two members, at least,
were present. As there were but six States in favor of the proposition to
prohibit slavery after 1800, it was stricken out.
There was but one member present from New Jersey, and the vote of that
State was not counted. The member present voted for Mr. J        ' 
proposition. Another vote from that State would have made the required
number, and carried the measure.
In North Carolina, W          voted for prohibition, and S       against
it. One more vote from that State would have made seven States for the
proposition, and it would have been carried.
J         voted for his own proposition to prohibit; and if one of the other
two members present from Virginia had voted with him, that, too, would
have made the required number of seven States.
The vote North and South, by members, was in favor of prohibition: North,
14; South, 2—total, 16. Against prohibition, South, 7.
The majority was more than two-thirds; enough to carry it over an
executive veto under the present Constitution, and yet it was defeated. And
this vote was given in favor of absolute and unconditional prohibition, and
that alone, without the right of reclaiming fugitive slaves, or any
proposition, or any expectation to confer it. Under the Confederation, no
such right existed, nor was it agreed to till more than three years afterwards,
and then with the greatest reluctance, and as a matter of compromise, as I
will presently show.
Such was the action of the American Congress in 1784—a unanimous vote
from the North, and two in nine from the South—in favor of excluding
slavery forever after 1800, in all new States to be formed, in territory ceded
or to be ceded, embracing Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, in the
extreme South. Nothing can be clearer than that the interdiction was to
apply to all such States, and to constitute a fundamental Constitution
between them and the original States, unalterable without the consent of
Congress. The new State was to be deprived of all power to admit slavery.
This proposition was made and voted for by J        . But how many
votes would such a proposition receive in this Convention? Not many, I
fear, even from the free States. My friend and colleague, though strongly
anti-slavery, and earnestly devoted to freedom in the Territories, is afraid I
shall commit Massachusetts to this old Jeffersonian doctrine of no slavery,
and no right to establish it in the new States.
From this time till July, 1787, the question of slavery in the Territories and
new States remained open and unsettled. In 1785, R     K    renewed Mr.
J        '  proposition to prohibit, and it was referred to a committee by
the vote of eight States; but it never became a law, a few from the South
always preventing it.
The Federal Convention to revise the old, or frame a new Constitution,
assembled in Philadelphia on the second Monday of May, 1787. And here
let me read a single paragraph from a lecture by Mr. T     , of Georgia,
delivered in Boston in 1856. It is as follows:
"The history of the times and the debates in the Convention which framed
the Constitution, show that the whole subject of slavery was much
considered by them, and perplexed them in the extreme, and that those
provisions which relate to it were earnestly considered by the State
Conventions which adopted it. Incipient legislation providing for
emancipation had already been adopted by some of the States.
Massachusetts had declared that slavery was extinguished by her Bill of
Rights. The African slave trade had already been legislated against in many
of the States, including Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina, the largest
slaveholding States. The public mind was unquestionably tending toward
emancipation. This feeling displayed itself in the South as well as in the
North. Some of the present slaveholding States thought that the power to
abolish, not only the African slave trade, but slavery in the States, ought to
be given to the Federal Government; and that the Constitution did not take
this shape, was made one of the most prominent objections to it by L     
M     , a distinguished member of the Convention from Maryland; and
Mr. M    , of Virginia, was not far behind him in his emancipation
principles. Mr. M       sympathized to a great extent. Anti-slavery
feelings were extensively indulged in by many members of the Convention,
both from the slaveholding and the non-slaveholding States."
Mr. M      '  testimony is important here. He was a member of the old
Congress in New York, until the assembling of the Constitutional
Convention, and took his seat as a member of that body.
The History of the Ordinance of 1787, by Hon. E      C    , contains
the following statement, as made to him by Mr. M      :
"The old Congress held its sessions, in 1787, in New York, while at the
same time the Convention which framed the Constitution of the United
States held its sessions in Philadelphia. Many individuals were members of
both bodies, and thus were enabled to know what was passing in each—
both sitting with closed doors and in secret sessions. The distracting
question of slavery was agitating and retarding the labors of both, and led to
conferences of intercommunications of the members."
I quote this testimony now, to show that Conferences were held between the
members of Congress and the Federal Convention, upon the subject of
slavery. I shall quote farther from it on another point, after turning for a
moment to the proceedings of Congress.
On the 9th July, 1787, the Convention having been in session about two
months, the ordinance for the government of the Western Territory, which
had been reported in a new draft on the 26th of the preceding April, and
ordered to a third reading on the 10th May, and then postponed, was
referred to a new committee, consisting of Messrs. C         , of
Virginia; D   , of Massachusetts; R.H. L  , of Virginia; K   , of North
Carolina; and S    , of New York. Two days afterwards, July 11th, Mr.
C          reported what has since been known as the "Ordinance of
1787," with the exception of the 6th article of compact, prohibiting slavery.
When it came up the next day, the 12th, for a second reading, Mr. D   
rose and stated as follows:
"In the committee, as ever before, since the day when J         first
introduced the proposal to prohibit slavery in the territory, it was found
impossible to come to any arrangement; that the committee desired to report
only so far as they were unanimous; that they, therefore, had omitted
altogether the subject of slavery; but that it was understood that any
member of the committee might, consistently with his having concurred in
the report, move in the house to amend it in the particular of slavery. He
therefore moved as an amendment, to add a prohibition of slavery in the
following words:
"That there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said
territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted."
And as a compromise, Mr. D     proposed to add the following proviso:
"Provided always, that any person escaping into the same, from whom
labor-service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such
fugitive may be lawfully retained and conveyed to the person claiming his
or her labor or service as aforesaid."
This was at once unanimously accepted by the slave States. The next day,
the 13th, the ordinance was passed, every slave State present, viz.:
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, and every
member from those States voting for it. The same prohibition—which a
large majority of the South had resisted when presented alone—was now,
when accompanied with the proviso, unanimously agreed to.
Here was a sudden change. But the proviso giving the right of reclamation
in the said territory, only partially explains it. For a full explanation we
must turn again to the Convention. And the first thing is a further extract
from Mr. M      , respecting a letter, before quoted, as follows:
"The distracting question of slavery was agitating and retarding the labors
of both bodies—Congress and the Convention; and led to conferences and
intercommunications of the members, which resulted in a Compromise, by
which the Northern, or anti-slavery portion of the country, agreed to
incorporate into the ordinance and Constitution, the provision to restore
fugitive slaves; and this mutual and concurrent action was the cause of the
similarity of the provisions contained in both, and had its influence in
creating the great unanimity by which the ordinance passed, and also in
making the Constitution the more acceptable to the slaveholders."
Mr. M      , also, in the Virginia Convention, urged the ratification of the
Constitution for the following among other reasons, viz.:
"At present, if any slave escape to any of those States where slaves are free,
he becomes emancipated by their laws; for the laws of the States are
uncharitable to one another in this respect. This clause was expressly
inserted to enable owners of slaves to retain them. This is a better security
than any that now exists."
General P       , one of the delegates in the Federal Convention, from
South Carolina, in a debate in the House of Representatives of that State on
the Constitution, said:
"We have obtained a right to remove our slaves in whatever part of America
they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before. In short,
considering all the circumstances, we have made the best terms we could,
and on the whole I do not think them bad."
In the speech made by Mr. W       on the 7th of March, 1850, he
remarked that:
"So far as we can now learn, there was a perfect concurrence of opinion
between those respective bodies—the Congress and the Constitution—and
it resulted in this ordinance of 1787."
When Mr. W       had closed his speech, Mr. C       arose, and among
other things, said:
"He, Mr. W      , states very correctly that the ordinance commenced
under the old confederation; that Congress was sitting in New York at the
time, while the Convention sat in Philadelphia; and that there was concert
of action.... When the ordinance was passed, as I have good reason to
believe, it was upon a principle of compromise; first, that this ordinance
should contain a provision similar to the one put in the Constitution, with
respect to fugitive slaves; and next, that it should be inserted in the
Constitution; and this was the compromise upon which the prohibition was
inserted in the ordinance of 1787."
This agrees with Mr. M      . The idea he conveys could scarcely have
been more identical with Mr. M       if he had used M      '  words.
When the Southern members of Congress voted unanimously for the 6th
Article, or anti-slavery clause in the ordinance, with the proviso in respect
to slaves escaping into the Territory, it was with the understanding that the
Convention would insert a similar provision in the Constitution respecting
slaves escaping from one State to another; and this—its insertion in both—
was the compromise upon which the prohibition was inserted in the
ordinance. Such is the concurrent testimony of Mr. M       and Mr.
C      .
We will now turn to the ordinance of 1787, and see whether it applies, as
the one proposed by Mr. J         in 1784 did, to the new States as well as
to the Territories, and is the basis of State as well as Territorial
Governments, and was so intended. It declares as follows:
"For extending the fundamental principles of civil and religions liberty,
which form the basis whereon these republics, their laws and constitutions,
are erected; to fix and establish these principles as the basis of all laws,
constitutions, and governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in
the said Territory; to provide also for the establishment of States and
permanent governments therein, and for their admission to a share in the
Federal councils, on an equal footing with the original States, at as early
periods as may be consistent with the general interest.
"It is hereby ordained and declared by the authority aforesaid: That the
following articles shall be considered as articles of compact between the
original States and the people and States in the said Territory, and forever
remain unalterable, unless by the common consent."
Then follows six articles of compact. Part of the fifth and the sixth are in
these words:
"A  . 5.... Whenever any of the said States shall have sixty thousand free
inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the
Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States,
in all respects whatever; and shall be at liberty to form a permanent
Constitution and State Government; provided the Constitutional
Government, so to be formed, shall be republican and in conformity to the
principles contained in these articles."
"A  . 6. There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said
Territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted; Provided, always, That any person escaping
into the same from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of
the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed
to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid."
Such is so much of the ordinance as bears directly upon the point I am
discussing. And the Convention, as if for the very purpose of giving the
unequivocal sanction of the Constitution and of the country to this
compromise, and of establishing it as the permanent policy of the
Government, expressly provided that the "engagements entered into before
the adoption of this Constitution shall be as valid against the United States
under this Constitution, as under the Confederation."
This ordinance, then, which was an unalterable compact, prohibiting
slavery, and fixing and establishing freedom as the basis of all laws,
constitutions, and governments in the Territory forever—State Constitutions
and Governments of course included—was made valid by the Constitution
itself. And on this point I refer to the highest Southern authority, the late
Judge B      , who was thoroughly pro-slavery in his views, and should
certainly be ranked among the ablest lawyers and statesmen Georgia has
ever produced, who spoke to this precise point during the compromise
discussion in the United States Senate in 1850, as follows:
"Validity was given to their act by the clause in the Constitution, which
declares that contracts and engagements entered into by the Government of
the Confederation, should be obligatory upon the Government of the United
States established by the Constitution."
It is the "act" of Congress in passing the ordinance referred to here. This
being so, it was the same in effect as though the ordinance had been written
word for word in the Constitution itself. A contract can be made valid, only
by making it binding and obligatory upon the parties to it, according to its
terms and meaning. To make an unalterable compact valid is to make it
perpetually binding.
Having shown that the articles of compact in the ordinance were
unalterable; that validity was given to them by the Constitution itself; that
in express terms they applied to States as well as to Territories, and must,
therefore, being made valid by the Constitution, necessarily have been
understood and intended by Congress and the Convention to prohibit
slavery as effectually in one as the other, I will now show very briefly that
they were also so understood in all parts of the country.
Mr. W     , of Pennsylvania, a prominent member of the Federal
Convention, and also of the State Convention for ratifying the Constitution,
remarked in the latter as follows:
"I consider this clause as laying the foundation for banishing slavery out of
the land.... The new States which are to be formed will be under the control
of Congress in this particular, and slavery will never be introduced among
them."
Mr. W      speaks of the clause authorizing the prohibition of the African
slave trade.
In the Massachusetts Convention to adopt the Constitution, Gen. H    
said:
"Slavery cannot be extended. By their ordinance Congress has declared that
the new States shall be republican States, and have no slavery."
Colonel B    , a member of the Convention from Virginia, said he
"wished slavery had never been introduced into America," and that "he was
willing to join in any measure that would prevent its extending farther." To
allow it in new States would not prevent its extending farther, and therefore
it was prohibited in such States.
Doctor R     , a member of the Convention of South Carolina, in his
History of the United States, says:
"Under these liberal principles, Congress, in organizing colonies, bound
themselves to impart to their inhabitants all the privileges of coequal
States.... These privileges are not confined to any particular country or
complexion. They are communicable to the emancipated slave, for in the
new State of Ohio, slavery is altogether prohibited."
This compact, then, applies to State as well as Territorial governments, and
was so understood in all sections of the country—northern, central, and
southern—when the Constitution was ratified.
Let me now call attention to the very significant proviso to the sixth article.
What does the word original mean, and what does the whole article mean
with that word in the proviso?
"There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said
Territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, &c.; Provided,
always, That any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or
service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive
may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her
labor or service as aforesaid."
This means that there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except for the purpose of reclaiming such fugitives—and I admit that slaves
were intended—as are lawfully claimed in any one of the original States.
The very fact of the proviso implies that Congress understood that the right
of reclamation could not exist, unless it was excepted.
And of course it could only exist for the purpose excepted. The intention
was to grant the right to the original States, but to limit it to them. It is
impossible to conceive of a measure for framing the proviso as it is, if that
had not been the intention. As the ordinance itself made provision for the
formation of new States, such States must have been in the minds of
members when acting upon it. If the object had been to authorize the
reclamation of slaves escaping to this territory from other States than
original States, it is certain the word "original" would have been omitted. It
was intended for the purpose of limiting the right.
Now observe that this article, proviso and all, is part of an unalterable
compact to which the Constitution has given validity. Nobody pretends
Congress has ever had the power to alter it. Mr. T      denies any such
power in express terms. A law which Congress cannot alter has
substantially the force and effect of a constitutional proviso. This, then, is
the only law for the reclamation of fugitive slaves in the five States of the
northwest territory; and there can be no other, the Constitution having made
it perpetually valid.
Such obviously is the meaning and legal effect of the fugitive slave
provision in the ordinance. And the meaning of that, derived as it is not
merely from the consent of the Federal and State conventions, but from
their concurrent action, necessarily fixes the meaning of the provision on
the same subject in the Constitution, and shows how it must have been
understood. As the two were parts of the same compromise, of course
neither was understood to be inconsistent with the other. The provision in
the Constitution is in these words:
"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation
therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up
on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."
So far as this describes, or was understood to describe, persons held to
service or labor as slaves, it necessarily must also have been understood to
apply only to the original States. This follows from what has already been
shown. And it must have been so understood for another reason, because it
was only "in" and "under" the laws of those States that persons could be
held to service or labor as slaves. Under the laws of the Territories and new
States, their being so held was forever prohibited. Hence, none but those
escaped from one of the original States could ever be legally liable to
reclamation, according to the understanding and intention of the original
parties to this compact. This manifestly was the meaning of "the fathers,"
when the ordinance and Constitution were framed and ratified.
The two provisions must be construed together. That in the ordinance was
intended for the Territories and new States, and that in the Constitution for
the original States. If that in the Constitution had been intended for the
Territories, it would have read, "escaping into another State or into the
Territory," and that in the ordinance would have been entirely omitted. The
proviso to the prohibition in the Missouri Compromise in 1820 is a striking
confirmation of this. That was copied, word for word, from the ordinance of
1787, or original compromise, except substituting for the words "in any one
of the States," the words "in any State or Territory of the United States," as
follows:
"Provided, always, That any person escaping into the same, from whom
labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such
fugitive," &c. And in the compromise of 1820:
"Provided, always, That any person escaping into the same from whom
labor or service is lawfully claimed in any State or Territory of the United
States, such fugitive," &c.
Why say "in any State or Territory of the United States," instead of "in any
one of the original States," as in the ordinance of 1787, unless the Congress
of 1820 understood the latter to limit the right of recovering fugitive slaves
to the original States, and meant by the Missouri bill to extend it to all the
States and Territories? They did extend it, but in palpable violation of the
"spirit of the compact of the fathers," and of the "policy of 1787."
Originally the Southern States committed themselves to the policy of
slavery restriction, by a compact in the nature of a contract for a
consideration. By their own votes, they relinquished all pretence of right to
any slaves beyond the jurisdiction of the original States. Slaveholders, as
such, voluntarily shut themselves out of the new States, in consideration of
the right of recovering their fugitive slaves in whatever part of America
they might take refuge. The object, as I have clearly shown, was to secure
to slavery in the original States the right of recovering fugitives, whether
their escape should be from one of those States to another, or to the
Territories and new States; but to make that the limit, both of the right of
recovery on one side, and of the obligation to permit or allow it, on the
other.
It follows, then:
First: That as between the new States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan,
and Wisconsin, no right of reclamation exists, or can exist, there being no
power in Congress, as the South admit, to alter the compact in the ordinance
of 1787, which denies this right.
Second: That no person, escaping from those States into any other State or
Territory, can be reclaimed as a fugitive slave, because no person can be
held as a slave under their laws.
Third: That no slave escaping from the slave States of Missouri, Arkansas,
Texas, Louisiana, or Florida, into Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, or
Missouri, can be lawfully reclaimed as a fugitive slave, because Missouri,
Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, and Florida are not original States.
Fourth: If slaves escape from any State or Territory other than the original
States, into the States of the northwestern territory, no lawful power can
touch them. The moment they reach those States they become free, because
labor or service cannot lawfully be claimed of them in an original State.
Fifth: After the Missouri Compromise of 1820, slaves escaping from
Arkansas and Missouri, for example to Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and
Minnesota, could be reclaimed, but escaping to Illinois, Wisconsin,
Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio, they could not be. And the Congress of 1820
so understood it. The particular in which the Missouri proviso was altered
in copying from the ordinance of 1787, is proof enough of this.
But did the framers of the Government intend to distinguish in this manner
between new and original slave States? Certainly not; and the reason is,
they did not mean to have any new slave States. Otherwise they certainly
did mean to make this distinction, for nothing can be clearer than that
Louisiana and Missouri cannot go to Ohio to recover fugitive slaves within
the meaning of this "compact of the fathers;" while Georgia can. Manifestly
we have departed from the system devised by the fathers in allowing
Missouri, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Florida to be admitted with
slavery, which explains, and nothing else can, this anomalous condition of
things.
There can be no escape from these conclusions, but to deny that the
ordinance has ever had any validity under the Constitution; which would be
scarcely less than to deny that the Constitution itself had ever been a valid
instrument. Having the like unequivocal sanction of national authority, and
expressing alike in the words of Mr. Toombs, "the collective will of the
whole," they must stand or fall together.
Originally the territory was not divided by the line of 36° 30´, or by any
other line giving part to freedom and part to slavery. It was all secured, and
by consent of the South, to freedom. There is nothing, therefore, in the
original compromise, to justify the remark of the Editor of the Boston
Courier in a recent number of that paper, that "below the line of 36° 30´, the
South have the right of prescription." Freedom has an older prescriptive
right to all the Territories. The line established by the compromise, between
slavery permitted and slavery prohibited, was the boundary line between the
then existing States and the Territory of the United States; or the line
between exclusive national jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the States. It
is an erroneous assumption, therefore, that the free States, by the
introduction of slavery south of 36° 30´, as well as north of it, would
receive more than a fair share or moiety of rights and privileges, as between
States or parties entitled to equal privileges. The idea that the extension of
slavery under the Federal Government can be claimed by anybody south or
north as a right, is wholly inadmissible. The Courier will hold the following
declarations from Mr. W       to be good authority, if others do not:
"Wherever there is a foot of land to be staid back from becoming slave
territory, I am ready to assert the principle of excluding slavery." "We are to
use the first and last, and every occasion which offers, to oppose the
extension of slave power."
"I have to say, that while I hold with as much integrity, I trust, and
faithfulness, as any citizen of this country, to all the original amendments
and compromises in which the Constitution under which we now live was
adopted, I never could, and never can persuade myself to be in favor of the
admission of other States into this Union as slave States with the
inequalities which were allowed and accorded to the slaveholding States
then in existence by the Constitution. I do not think that the free States ever
expected, or could expect, that they would be called upon to admit further
slave States.... I think they have the clearest right to require that the State
coming into the Union, shall come in upon an equality; and if the existence
of slavery be an impediment to coming in on an equality, then the State
proposing to come in should be required to remove that inequality by
abolishing slavery or take the alternative of being excluded. I put my
opposition on the political ground that it deranges the balance of the
Constitution."
Wherever there is a foot of land to be staid back from slavery! Every
occasion to be used to oppose the extension of the slave power! New States
to abolish the inequality of slavery, or be excluded! I suppose Northern
conservatives of the class referred to have endorsed those doctrines and
declarations of Mr. W       a thousand times, as sound, national,
conservative, and constitutional. But no Republican, so far as I know, has
ever proposed to go an inch beyond the line of policy they indicated. The
Chicago, or Republican Platform, certainly does not. And yet that same line
of policy, when advocated by Republicans, is denounced as unsound,
sectional, radical, and unconstitutional.
We have a great deal said about the equality of the States; of the new with
the original States. This is said to be a fundamental doctrine of the
Constitution.
It is claimed that citizens of the slaveholding States have an equal right in
the Territories with the citizens of the non-slaveholding States; and I admit
they have. But it is also claimed that they have the same right to the
protection of property in slaves as property in cotton. This I deny. There is
no such doctrine of State equality in the Constitution, nor was any thing like
it contemplated by its framers. On the contrary, the Constitution denied this
doctrine by clear implication, certainly for the first twenty years. It withheld
from Congress the power to prohibit the importation of slaves into the
"existing" States till 1808, while their importation into the Territories and
new States might be prohibited at once. Ohio was admitted in 1802.
Congress had power to prohibit the importation of slaves into that State
from that time, and did do it in effect by the very terms and conditions of
her admission, which required that her Constitution and Government should
not be repugnant to the ordinance of the 13th of July, 1787, which
interdicted slavery. But Congress had no power to prohibit the importation
of slaves into Georgia till after 1808. Georgia and Ohio, therefore, in this
respect, were not political equals from 1802 to 1808.
Nor have the States been all political equals in the sense claimed, since
1808. It will surprise many to be told that there is nothing in the
Constitution about State equality, and especially nothing that affirms the
equality of the new with the original States, even after 1808. And yet this is
true. The only passages which refer to the new States, except impliedly in
the importation clause, are these: "New States may be admitted by Congress
into the Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the
jurisdiction of any other State." There is nothing, certainly, in this language
to show that the new States were to be admitted on an equality, or an equal
footing with the original States.
And yet provision was made, when the Constitution was framed, for the
admission of all the new States to be formed in United States Territory then
possessed, "on an equal footing with the original States." But it was a
footing of equality which was in nowise inconsistent with an absolute
denial of the right to establish the inequality of slavery. And this is proved
by the only compact in the English language contemporaneous with the
Constitution which touches the subject, namely, that part of the fifth article
of compact in the ordinance of 1787 which I have already quoted. There
can be no shadow of claim that any thing else secured, or pretended to
secure, the right of new States to admission into the Union on an equal
footing with the original States. That, I admit, did. It is, to repeat it, in these
words:
"Whenever any of said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants
therein, such State shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of
the United States, on an equal footing with the original States in all respects
whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent Constitution and State
Government; provided the Constitution and Government so to be formed,
shall be republican in conformity to the principles of these articles," the 6th,
which prohibited slavery, included.
And this is all there is, contemporaneous with the Constitution, on the
subject of the equality of the States. The very instrument, then, which
secured the admission of new States, on an equal footing with the original
States, itself provided that they were never to tolerate slavery.
The new States, then, neither were to have, nor have they, any political
equality which the prohibition violates, as Southern gentlemen contend.
Certainly those formed and admitted under the plan of Government devised
by the fathers, have not. In this sense they are not political equals. The
original States were, from the beginning, and have ever been, political
equals in this and every sense. Not, however, because the Constitution says
they are, for it says nothing on the subject; but because they were
independent sovereignties, and as such, made a compact which united them
under one Federal Government, with discriminating restrictions upon the
subject of slavery, or upon any other subject. But the fact that the evil and
inequality of slavery existed in the original States, and was tolerated from
necessity, was no reason why it should be allowed in the Territories and
new States, where it did not and need never exist. So the power of the
Territories and new States was sufficiently restricted to secure equality in
personal rights and freedom to all the "inhabitants." Of course it cannot be
pretended that the mere fact that one or more States had established, and
had power to perpetuate slavery, secured to new States the right to establish
and perpetuate the same enormity, as a necessary result of State equality.
That would make the right or power of one State, resulting from State
equality, necessarily coextensive with tolerated evil in another. Manifestly
"the fathers" had no such idea as this. Theirs was the common sense and
rational idea that a moral and political evil which existed in the old States,
and could not be removed, need not for that reason be tolerated in new
States.
The Constitution guarantees to each State a republican form of Government
merely; but the ordinance of 1787 provides that the "Constitution and
Government of each new State shall be republican." Why this difference? In
the original States slavery existed, or in most of them; and so far they were
anti-republican in fact and practice, though republican in form. The framers
of the Constitution, having no power to abolish this anti-republican
institution of slavery in those States, did nothing more than guarantee them
Governments republican in form. But having the power to exclude it from
the new States, they did exclude it, and provided that their constitutions and
governments should be republican. That this was the reason for the
difference may be inferred from the remark of L      M     , a
distinguished member of the Federal Convention, that "slavery is
inconsistent with the genius of republicanism," and of General H     in the
Massachusetts Convention, that "Congress has declared that the new States
shall be republican and have no slavery." No other reason can be given.
Thus republicanism in fact, and not in form merely, was made a condition
of admitting new States. This is part of the unalterable compact to which
validity was given by the Constitution. The Constitution, therefore, while it
guarantees a republican form of government, does in fact, by giving validity
to the ordinance, guarantee republican governments to the new States. This
is another very significant fact harmonizing perfectly with all the other facts
in the original plan for extending the Union by admitting States from
Territories.
The States are all equals, or not, according to the terms of their admission.
The original States became members of the Union upon the single condition
of ratifying the Constitution, which left them at liberty to tolerate slavery or
not. But the States formed in the only Territory which belonged to the
United States at the time the Constitution was framed, were admitted on
condition that slavery should be perpetually interdicted within their limits,
and as parties to an unalterable compact to that effect.
Slavery was regarded, South as well as North, when the Constitution was
adopted, as a moral and political evil. This had been the general sentiment
of the country many years before, and continued to be long after that period.
The representatives of the extensive district of Darien in Georgia, on the
12th of January, 1775, spoke of slavery as "founded in injustice and cruelty,
and highly dangerous to our liberties." J         pronounced it "an
injustice and enormity." The present Chief Justice of the United States, Mr.
T    , who acted many years ago as counsel of Rev. Mr. G     , who was
indicted in the State of Maryland for preaching a sermon on the evils of
slavery, spoke as follows in his defence:
"Mr. G      did quote the language of our great act of National
Independence, and insisted on the principles contained in that venerated
instrument. He did rebuke those masters who, in the exercise of power, are
deaf to the call of humanity, and he warned them of the evils they might
bring upon themselves. He did speak in abhorrence of those who live by
trading in human flesh, and enrich themselves by tearing the husband from
the wife, the infant from the bosom of the mother, and this was the head and
front of his offending. So far is he from being the object of punishment in
any form of proceeding, that we are prepared to maintain the same
principles, and to use, if necessary, the same language here in the Temple of
Justice, and in the presence of those who are the ministers of the law."
"A hard necessity, indeed, compels us to endure the evils of slavery for a
time. While it continues it is a blot on our national character; and every real
lover of freedom confidently hopes that it will be effectually, though it must
be gradually, wiped away, and earnestly looks for the means by which the
necessary object may be best obtained. And until it shall be accomplished,
until the time shall come when we can point, without a blush, to the
language held in the Declaration of Independence, every part of humanity
will seek to lighten the galling chain of slavery, and better, to the utmost of
his power, the wretched condition of the slave."
Mr. JOHNSON, of Maryland:—Where did you get that?
Mr. GOODRICH:—I got it from a printed sermon recently preached by Dr.
O       D    , of Boston.
And Mr. C      , in the United States Senate, in 1838, said that "many in
the South once believed that slavery was a moral and political evil;" and
Mr. B     , late a United States Senator from South Carolina, said in the
Senate in 1850, that he "remembered the time when slavery was regarded as
a moral evil, even in South Carolina."
In such a state of public sentiment, it is certainly no marvel that slavery was
not allowed to extend into the Territories and new States. It was not
prohibited in the northwest territory, because it was supposed to be, or
would become, an evil in that territory particularly, or a greater evil there
than anywhere else; but because it was regarded as an evil everywhere, and
therefore wrong to permit its extension anywhere, when there was power to
prevent it. There can be no doubt it would have been prohibited in the
Territories and new States of Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee, if
Georgia and North Carolina, previous to the Federal Convention, had ceded
them to the United States upon the same conditions Virginia had ceded the
northwest territory. Proof of this is found in the fact that the plan of
territorial governments interdicting slavery forever after 1800, embraced all
territory ceded, or to be ceded by individual States; and still further proof is
in the fact, that the cessions by Georgia and North Carolina, after the
adoption of the Constitution, were upon the express condition that slavery
should not be prohibited; thereby showing that the policy of the Federal
Government, as they understood it, was restrictive of slavery in the far
southern latitudes as well as in the more northern, and that they expected
the power to restrict would be exercised, if not withheld in the deeds of
cession. A proposition was, in fact, made to apply the anti-slavery clause of
1787, to all the southern part of the Mississippi territory, now the southern
parts of Alabama and Mississippi, by the act of April 7th, 1798, it being
supposed at one time that it belonged to the United States; but the debate
shows that the proposition was withdrawn because the jurisdiction was in
Georgia, or because not five members of Congress, after the question was
examined, believed otherwise. Georgia claimed absolute title and right of
jurisdiction, and denied all right on the part of the United States to interfere
with slavery. Congress did, however, prohibit the importation of slaves into
the territory, and declare every slave so imported to be entitled to his
freedom. This was probably wholly unauthorized, as it was six years before
Georgia ceded it to the United States, and ten years before Congress had
power to prohibit the importation of slaves into that State. But these facts
show a strong disposition on the part of "the fathers" to curtail and
circumscribe slavery, even in the far south, and at the hazard, too, of
exercising doubtful power.
Nothing can be clearer than that the original States had a right to form a
Federal Government on such terms as to themselves as they could mutually
agree upon, and to fix the terms upon which they would permit new
members to be admitted. The Northern States were under no obligation to
protect slavery at all, not even by permitting fugitives to be reclaimed
within their limits. If, then, they were willing to concede that right to the
original States, only upon condition that slavery should not be allowed to
extend, who will say they had not a right to make that condition, or that, if
agreed to, it would not be valid and binding? With their views of slavery,
believing it to be a moral and political evil, it was certainly their first and
highest duty to make effectual provision against its extension, before
undertaking, for any reason, to give the least protection to it. Such provision
they supposed they had made, and it was this that justified them, if any
thing could, in conceding the right of reclamation.
The free, or northern States, in the exercise of their admitted right in
deciding upon the terms of Union, insisted on making it a fundamental and
ever-binding condition that no obligation to protect slavery in Illinois
should ever exist; and this was done for reasons which render it morally
certain that they would have insisted on the same condition in reference to
Missouri, if Missouri had been part of the original territory. It would be
preposterous to suppose that while they would not consent to guarantee
slavery in any manner in Illinois, because they believed it to be a moral and
political evil, they meant at the same time to make a Government that could
obligate them to guarantee it in the adjoining Territory or State of Missouri,
either by the return of fugitive slaves, or in any other manner. They meant
no such thing, nor can an honest interpretation of the terms of union bind
them to such guarantee now. The right to recapture fugitive slaves could not
exist without the consent of the free States; and as that consent was given
upon conditions and with limitations, by necessary implication and every
sound principle of construction, they reserved the right to say whether it
should exist upon other conditions and with other limitations, or without
either condition or limitation.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—No one from Kentucky or Virginia wishes to alter the
ordinance of 1787. For G  '  sake spare us the argument.
Mr. GOODRICH:—I understand no alteration is proposed in the ordinance;
nor am I arguing against any such proposition. I am showing what the
policy of 1787 was, and what the compact of the fathers was. And I am
doing this because it is in the spirit of that policy and compact that
Kentucky and Virginia tell us they wish to have this controversy adjusted.
Massachusetts and the other Northern States meant to fix, and supposed
they had fixed, a limit to their connection with, and responsibility for
slavery. By consenting to the clause which secured the right of reclamation,
they did become responsible for it to a certain extent. So far as it was
supposed, when that clause was agreed to, that its effect would be the
recapture of fugitive slaves, and their return to bondage, and so far as the
purpose was to make such recapture and return lawful, so far the
responsibility of adding to the security of slavery was voluntarily assumed.
But this was limited to the existing States by excluding slavery from all
United States territory. If any part of such territory had been left for slavery
—enough for a single slave State—it might be said that its extension from a
part was for reasons applicable only to a part, and so could not be
considered as establishing the principle of non-extension. But now this
cannot be said. Not a foot was left for slavery.
We thus see what the state of things would have been to-day if foreign
territory had not been acquired. Such acquisitions were not originally
contemplated, and of course not provided for. The first—Louisiana—was
deemed unconstitutional by Mr. J        , and yet it was made while he
was President; but with no right, "according to the spirit of the compact of
the fathers," to place the Federal Government or the States under any other
relation to slavery in subsequently acquired territory than that which they
sustained to it—the only one they would consent to sustain—in the
Territories possessed at the time that compact was made.
A great deal is said about State rights. But the doctrine of State rights
proves too much. Massachusetts had a clear and undoubted right originally
to limit her obligations upon this subject. And she did limit them. The
original compromise was "better security" to slavery in the original States,
with no extension of it to the Territories and new States. This better security
was the accepted consideration for waiving the right to extend, and
Massachusetts may rightfully insist on this waived right to extend, so long
as this "better security" is demanded of her.
Southern gentlemen in this Convention propose to be governed by the
principles of the founders of the Government, and by the Constitution, or
compact of union, as those founders understood it. By that they say they are
willing to do as the fathers did, and adjust the present unhappy controversy
by applying to new territory the same principles which the fathers applied
to the old. Let me assure gentlemen from the slave States that if they are
really in earnest in offering these terms of adjustment, this unhappy
controversy can be settled in less than an hour's time. Having always
claimed the right to recapture fugitive slaves in territory acquired since, as
well as in that acquired before the adoption of the Constitution, the slave
States have ever been bound, upon every principle of honor and fair
dealing, to concede the original consideration for it, that is, prohibition. A
purpose secretly entertained when that compromise was made, to use the
Government in the manner it has actually been used, to enlarge the area of
slavery and the obligation to guarantee it, would have been dishonest and
fraudulent; but the fact that this purpose was conceived afterward, as it
doubtless was, does not alter the case a whit. No man possessed of the facts
can honestly claim that the bargain between the North and South,
interpreted according to the true interest and meaning of both parties at the
time of making it, can justify the extension of slavery a rod beyond the
original States, or a particle of protection to it beyond the right to recover
fugitives from such States.
Having thus shown, as I think I have, that an essential element in the basis
of the "more perfect Union" on the question of slavery, was the principle of
non-extension, we find the first failure to assert this principle was in the
omission to apply it to the Louisiana purchase. The importation of slaves
into that territory was immediately prohibited. That probably cut off the
only source of supply from which danger of extension was then
apprehended. The policy of the Government was well understood, and no
apprehension of a practical departure from it existed. There was nothing in
the circumstance of the purchase, or the reasons for making it, to excite
such apprehension. But it was seen on the application of Missouri for
admission, that the ordinance of 1787 should have been applied to it at the
time of the purchase. If it had been, Louisiana, Missouri, and Arkansas
would never have become slave States (the few slaves in New Orleans and
vicinity being emancipated, as they should have been, upon some equitable
principle), and the Missouri Compromise, which was the second departure
from the original policy, would never have been made. The third was the
annexation of Texas as a slave State, and the argument to divide it into three
or four more. Annexation led to the war with Mexico, and the acquisition of
a large part of her territory, and to the compromise of 1850, by which it was
Congressionally agreed that the States formed in that territory might be
admitted with slavery, if their Constitutions should so prescribe. This was
the fourth departure from the original policy of prohibition. The fifth was
the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1850, and the attempts to
subjugate and enslave Kansas. That repeal made the change from the
original policy radical and total. Certainly it is high time "to restore the
Union and Constitution in the spirit in which they were established by the
fathers."
And now, sir, I propose to begin the work of "restoring the policy of 1787,"
by applying the ordinance of 1787 to every foot of organized and
unorganized territory, wherever situated, which now belongs to the United
States, precisely as the fathers applied it to every foot of such territory at the
time the Constitution was made; and I ask, in all earnestness and
seriousness, what any member of the Convention can have to say against
this, who sincerely desires to "restore the Union and Constitution in the
spirit in which they were established by the fathers of the Republic," and is
"ready to adjust the present unhappy controversy" in the same spirit? What,
I beg to know, can be said against this mode of adjustment by those who are
in favor of a "restoration of the Constitution to the principles and landmarks
of our fathers," and of a "return to the policy of 1787"? Can any man doubt
that that ordinance would have been extended over all these territories in
1787, if they had belonged to the United States at that time? Let slavery,
then, be prohibited now precisely as the fathers prohibited it then. Copy that
old ordinance word for word, and give it legal force and effect, and make it
the basis of all laws, and all constitutions, and all governments in these
Territories forever, because the fathers gave it such force and effect, and
made it the basis of all laws, and all constitutions and all governments
forever in all the Territories of the Union, in 1787. If that would not be a
return to the "principles and landmarks of the fathers," and to the "policy of
1787," then I beg to know what would be? How is it possible—I put it to
you, gentlemen of the South—how is it possible to persuade yourselves that
the principles and policy of 1787 can be restored by adopting the
resolutions of the General Assembly of Virginia? By what process is it that
the gentleman (Mr. S     ) from Virginia, has come to believe that the
South is entitled, according to the spirit of the compact of the fathers, "to
the added guarantees" of which he speaks? According to the spirit of that
compact it is manifest the slave States are entitled to no added guarantees.
But another of the Virginia Commissioners (Mr. R    ) tells us that this
question of slavery in nowise concerns the free States. On this point I will
quote from a very high authority, which Virginia, certainly, will respect. Mr.
M       was a member of the first Congress under the Constitution. A
colleague of his, Mr. P     , proposed a duty on the importation of slaves,
and said he "hoped Congress would do all that lay in their power to restore
to human nature its inherent privileges, and, if possible, wipe off the stigma
under which America labors." Mr. M      , in remarking on that
proposition, among other things said:
"Every addition the States receive to their number of slaves tends to weaken
and render them less capable of self-defence. In case of hostilities with
foreign nations, they will be the means of inviting attack instead of
repelling invasion. It is a necessary duty of the General Government to
protect every part of their confines against danger, as well internal as
external. Every thing, therefore, which tends to increase danger, though it
be a local affair, yet, if it involve national expense and safety, becomes of
concern to every part of the Union, and is a proper subject for the
consideration of those charged with the general administration of the
Government."
And we hear, too, a great deal about war, civil war, if this unhappy
controversy is not satisfactorily adjusted, which means upon the terms
proposed by the slave States. But do gentlemen mean that an appeal will be
made to the sword, unless the Constitution shall be so amended as to
"provide that slavery of the African race shall be effectually protected as
property in all the territory of the United States, now held or hereafter
acquired south of latitude 36° 30´"?—which is the proposition of Virginia.
If that is what is meant, then let me, before I close, read an extract from one
of the last speeches made by H     C    in the Senate of the United
States. It is as follows:
"If, unhappily, we should be involved in war, civil war, between the two
portions of this Confederacy, in which the effort upon the one side should
be to restrain the introduction of slavery into the new Territories, and upon
the other side to force its introduction there, what a spectacle should we
present to the astonishment of mankind, in an effort, not to propagate rights,
but—I must say it, though I trust it will be understood to be said with no
design to excite feeling—a war to propagate wrongs!"
Mr. H      moved an adjournment.
Mr. B       objected, raising the question of order. He claimed that the
Conference, by adopting the resolutions of Mr. R       , had fixed the
limits of the sessions, from 10 o'clock  . ., to 4 o'clock  . .
The motion of Mr. H      was not concurred in.
Mr. LOOMIS:—I feel that this is an important crisis in the affairs of the
country. Perhaps it is the most important that ever occurred in American
history. The first Convention of thirteen scattered States was earnestly
engaged in protecting the liberties which had been won in the Revolution. It
gave us a Constitution under which, for more than seventy years, we have
lived prosperously and happily. Now political contests have taken place.
New questions have arisen, and one portion of the Union believes the
Constitution inadequate to protect its interests. The question which we are
obliged to consider is: How shall we save the country? Disguise it as we
may, deceive ourselves as we may, the country is in danger—in great and
imminent danger. A solemn duty is imposed upon each one of us. How shall
we save the country?
Virginia has invited this conference of her sister States. Pennsylvania
responded to her call with all activity. Pennsylvania has responded because
she understood and appreciated Virginia. There is great misapprehension in
the North concerning this venerated State, as well in regard to her motives
as in regard to the principles and feelings that influence her people in their
intercourse with and their action toward other States of the Union. I know
Virginia well. I have associated with her people. I have practiced before her
judicial tribunals.
Some years ago I was greatly pressed by an abolitionist who was indicted in
Virginia, to undertake his defence. He was very fearful that he would not
receive an impartial trial, that the court and jury would participate in the
public excitement. I told him that he need indulge in no such
misapprehensions. I knew Virginia too well for that. I told him, however,
that if he desired it, I would go; but it was simply to defend him, and secure
him a fair trial—to act as his counsel. I could not represent his sentiments,
for I am not and never was an abolitionist. I assumed his defence. I told him
I would go, and I went. I did find great excitement there, but it did not
surprise me. Many valuable slaves had shortly before escaped, some of
them through the assistance and instrumentality of my client. Judge Fry was
the presiding judge of the court. His liberality, and that of all his officers,
was great—as great as I ever enjoyed in my own State. The sheriff of the
county drew thirty-six jurymen. Of these, twelve were slaveholders, twelve
were abolitionists, and twelve were non-slaveholders. When the jury was
finally empannelled it consisted of nine abolitionists and three non-
slaveholders.
I never saw in my whole professional life a trial conducted with greater
fairness or justice. The whole of it was entirely satisfactory to myself, and I
believe to my client.
I have ever since entertained a feeling of the highest respect for Virginia.
Her abstractions I confess I could never understand, nor did I ever wish to.
They are her exclusive property, and she never uses them to the injury of
her neighbors. If she chooses to make the resolutions of '98 a matter of
importance, I do not know that anybody is injured.
I regretted to hear the imputations upon Virginia which some gentlemen
have seen fit to make. Menace is not the habit of that ancient
commonwealth. She does not indulge in it, and it would not become her.
The gentleman from New York intimated that if a State came to him with a
menace he would meet it with a menace. In this I agree with him. If
Virginia came here with a menace I should meet her with defiance. But
happily for us we have no occasion to consider the question in this light. If
ever a State came to meet her sisters, to consult for the common good in a
proper spirit, Virginia does so now.
A military chieftain once, when approaching his death, lamented that he had
no children to transmit his name and his qualities to posterity. Virginia will
never need to take up such a lamentation. She has children enough. She is
the mother of W          and J        , of M      , M       , and
C   . Rightly and justly she has been called the mother of States. She is the
mother of States, and of millions of freemen.
I honor and respect Virginia, for she deserves it. She was among the
foremost in the Revolutionary struggle; and since it was terminated, she has
exhibited a continued example of patriotism and loyalty. Her sons have
been among the ablest in our legislative councils, and even to-day she sets a
noble example before the country, for the emulation of her sister States. Our
interests are inseparably connected with her own. We will acknowledge the
fact, and act in view of it. Let her remember, also, that she has a common
interest with us. She will do so because she will be faithful to her old
traditions as well as to her present duty.
I cannot believe that the time has come when it is necessary for us to
contemplate a dissolution of the Union. The people are not prepared for
such an awful event. We do not yet know how heavy sacrifices they will
make to avoid it. Some States have left us I know, but I believe their
absence is but temporary. We must have them back, and we will. As for the
Border States leaving us in the present condition of affairs, with the present
feeling of friendship for them, that I regard as an impossibility. Why should
the Border States go out of the Union when three-fourths of the present
Congress are ready to give them all the guarantees they ask?
But let not Pennsylvania be misunderstood in her position. She will yield a
vast deal for peace. She will examine and recognize the rights of every
section of the country. She believes that when this is done, it is the duty of
all to stand by the Union. She believes that the Border States cannot
connect themselves with a so-called Southern Confederacy without
involving themselves in a vortex of ruin. The President of the Southern
Confederacy already talks about the smell of gunpowder, and about battles
at the North. Well! he is a brave man no doubt, but if he will invade
Pennsylvania we will resist him. Pennsylvania has gold enough to calm her
friends; she has iron enough to cool her enemies.
But Pennsylvania desires no war. She will do all that an honorable State can
do to avoid war. In that temper she sends her delegates here, and they will
do all that honorable men can do to carry out her wishes. She has no desire
to be a frontier State with her four hundred miles of border, which she must
guard and protect if disunion takes place on the terms suggested. She will
do all she can to avoid disunion. She is now a central State—the keystone
of the arch. She wants no imaginary line drawn along her border, with
herself on one side of it and enemies upon the other.
Pennsylvania has always kept faith with the Union. She has always
performed all her duties toward the Federal Government with cheerfulness
and fidelity. Her three millions of people are true to all their obligations
now to the Government as well as to her sister States. Her voice is for
peace. She would at all hazards avoid disunion. She would make many
sacrifices to avoid civil war. Last of all, she would do all she could to save
the Union; she would never permit the destruction of the country. My own
position is easily defined. I fully sympathize with and endorse the position
of Pennsylvania.
Mr. L      referred to the election, installation, and message of the
Governor of Pennsylvania, also to various resolutions of political
conventions in Pennsylvania, in confirmation of his own views of the
sentiments of the people of that State, and continued:
I shall dwell but a short time upon the provisions of the proposed
amendments. I can live under the Constitution as it is, or as it will be if
these amendments are adopted. I shall uphold the Constitution. I shall
commit myself to no opposite course. The whole amendment is connected
with and concerns the question of slavery in the Territories. This has always
been a fruitful source of trouble.
The character of the relation of the Government to the Territories, and the
interests of the States in them, were questions raised in most of the States
when the Constitution was adopted.
The compromise of 1820, it was hoped, settled one question concerning
them—the question of slavery. But upon the repeal of the compromise the
difficulty was opened again. Pennsylvania never took as ultra ground
respecting this subject as many other States. She thought its importance was
magnified. It is magnified now. If the South secured the amendment
proposed it would not avail her much. The granting of it would not injure
the North. The territory is unfitted for the profitable employment of slave
labor. That is shown by experience. In ten years scarcely ten slaves had
found their way into New Mexico and Arizona.
This is a question of sectional interest, and may be one, to some extent, of
political power. Examine, for a moment, the true interests of both the North
and South, in the question as it is now presented. I mean the interest of the
extremes, for the Border States certainly cannot have a very deep interest in
it. They lay between the two sections, and to some extent sympathize with
both. The valuable portion of our present territory is north of the line
proposed. It is rich in agricultural and mineral resources. It will be changed
in time into a number of powerful and wealthy States. Is it not desirable
now to exclude slavery from them forever? Then as to the territory south. It
is smaller in extent, and almost infinitely less valuable. Much of it is barren
desert which can never be cultivated. Considered as a material interest, the
South is asking but little. The North is giving up almost nothing, by
agreeing to give the South the control of this section while it remains a
territory. But the South does not ask even that. She simply asks to have
those rights guaranteed, the existence of which are already practically
conceded.
As to future territory, I would raise no question about it. We want no more
territory north or south. Its acquisition would only be attended with new
troubles. New questions would be raised to threaten the quiet of the country
and the stability of our institutions. Why should we trouble ourselves about
the acquisition of new territory when we have already enough for one
hundred millions of people?
We may form a Constitution which will be entirely satisfactory to the nation
now. We may extend our territory in such a way as to render a change
indispensable. Considerations of climate and race will be constantly
occurring, which will require new changes. The Federal Constitution may
have been well enough adapted to the four millions of people to whom it
was first applied, and it is not strange that the growth of the nation, and the
new interests which have since arisen, should require some changes now. I
say that we need no more territory.
What objection, then, can there be to compromising this matter, to
arranging it to the satisfaction of all parties, if the rights of all can be
regarded and secured? The course which I would follow in such a case,
would be that indicated by traditional policy of statesmen in whom our
people have had confidence—the policy of such men as H        and
H     C   .
I do not regard the provisions relating to slavery in the District of Columbia
as of any practical consequence to the North. Pennsylvania cares little about
it. There would seem to be a propriety in countenancing slavery here so
long as it exists in the adjoining States.
The Border States ask us now for these guarantees. They ask them earnestly
and in a spirit of loyalty to the Union. My answer to such a request, urged in
such a spirit, is, that I would give them any guarantees I could within the
limits of the Constitution.
Pennsylvania forms one of the brotherhood of States. She is in the Union,
and she will remain there. She is bound to it by all the memories and
associations of the past, and by all the hopes of the future. She will
discharge, as she always has discharged, all her duties, all her obligations to
the Union. No State exceeds her in devotion to it. But, at the same time, she
will not be unmindful of her duties and her obligations to the other States.
She would discharge these obligations as she can afford to discharge them,
in a spirit of generosity and conciliation. In that spirit she will give her
assent to these propositions of amendment. I believe I have fairly
represented the opinions of Pennsylvania in what I have said, and I rely
upon her people—my constituents—for my justification.
Mr. CHITTENDEN:—I will consult the pleasure of the Conference whether
I shall proceed with my observations now, or during the evening session?
Mr. MOREHEAD: I think the Conference had better adjourn. I make the
motion.
The motion was adopted, and the Conference adjourned to meet at half-past
seven o'clock this evening.
EVENING SESSION—FOURTEENTH DAY.
W         , T       , February 21st, 1861.
T   Conference was called to order at half-past seven o'clock, Mr.
A         in the chair.
Mr. CHITTENDEN: I feel gratified by the kindness which has given me an
opportunity of making a few observations to the Conference, and I shall not
abuse it.
The delegates from Vermont have acted throughout the session under great
embarrassment. We hold our appointments from the Executive of that State.
Her Legislature was not in session when the Virginia Resolutions were
adopted, and the day fixed for the meeting of the Conference was so early
that no time was given to the Governor of Vermont for consultation, or for
taking any other means of ascertaining the temper of the State in relation to
the Virginia plan. We were summoned by telegraph—myself upon an hour's
notice—to come here, and we obeyed the summons.
By the rules of the Conference we are prohibited from correspondence with
our constituents upon the subject of its action, and we are entirely without
recent information concerning their views and wishes. But one course
remains to us, and that we must inflexibly pursue. That is, to apply the
propositions upon which we are called to vote, to the known and established
opinions of our people upon the principles involved in them; and if these
principles coincide with their opinions, to give our assent; if they do not, to
withhold it. We hold it our duty to respect and obey the opinions of our
constituents; and in our action here, such obedience is a pleasure.
First of all, before referring to the merits or demerits of these propositions, I
wish to be informed distinctly upon one point. One section of the Union
requires guarantees; the other does not. Here are two parties having
different interests, proposing to themselves different courses of action. One
of them proposes these guarantees in the form of what it calls a
compromise. There are many subjects which, in the experience of life, we
are obliged to compromise. All of us understand the meaning of the term. It
implies that when two parties differ upon a subject of common interest,
each is to yield something to the other, until both reach an agreement upon a
middle ground, and the difference is settled. But one consequence always
follows, always must follow, or it is in nowise a compromise: Both parties
are bound by the agreement.
There is another way in which compromises are effected. When opposing
parties cannot come to an understanding, they agree to submit the matters in
difference to some tribunal that can decide between them. A like
consequence always follows from such a proceeding. The parties agree to
submit to the decision, to be bound by it, and mutually undertake to carry it
into effect, whatever the decision may be.
There is still another way in which a political compromise may be made. Its
terms may be agreed upon, and then it may be submitted to the people for
adoption. When adopted, it becomes the law of the land—equally binding
upon all sections of the country. If it is rejected, the party which proposed it
has secured its submission to the proper tribunal—it has been considered,
and that party should, upon every principle of law or morality, acquiesce in
the result.
Except in one of these three methods I know of no way in which a
compromise can be made. Let us apply these methods to the questions
before us. One of them must be adopted if we compromise at all.
In fact there is one principle which forms the very foundation of our
Government, and it should be kept constantly in mind. We cannot negotiate,
we cannot legislate, we cannot compromise, unless all parties will
acknowledge its binding force. If there is a party that does not acknowledge
this, in my judgment that party has no right to be here. It is not a
Republican party. I do not use this term in a party sense, but in the sense
which is used in the fourth article in the Constitution, where the United
States are required to guarantee to every State a republican form of
Government. The principle to which I refer is this: That the will of the
majority, constitutionally expressed, must control the Government, and all
questions relating to it; and that will must be respected and obeyed by the
minority.
Now, if the members representing the free States will accept these
propositions of amendment in good faith—will agree to submit them
through Congress to the people of the States, and to be bound by the
decision of the majority, whatever that decision may be—will you,
gentlemen of the slave States, do the same? I do not refer to the States
which have undertaken to withdraw from the Union. I only call upon the
members for the States here represented. You have the right to speak for
your respective States. You are sent here for that purpose. You ask us to
give our votes for proposals which are certainly unpleasant, not to say
offensive to us, and to use such influence as we possess to induce Congress
to submit these to the people. You express the highest degree of confidence
in the result. This is your plan of compromise. If we resist it, you charge us
with standing between the people and your plan—of sacrificing the Union
to our platform. Very well. If we will submit your propositions to the
people, and agree to be bound by and to acquiesce in their decision, will
you do the same? If you will, it may be of service to protract this
discussion, to make these propositions as acceptable as possible. If you will
not, we are wasting time. We may as well stop here. Believe me, sir,
Vermont, as well as every other free State, will have too much self-respect
to agree to the terms of a compromise which will bind one party and will
not bind the other.
There is one thing farther which we must understand. It has been frequently
referred to in debate, and I shall not enlarge upon it. Time must elapse
before these propositions can be acted upon. The free States expect
faithfully to observe all their duties to the General Government—to keep
faith with it as they always have. Will the slave States do the same? Will
they not only not obstruct the Government in the execution of the laws, but
will they aid the Government in executing the laws? The answer to this
inquiry is as important as the other.
Now, it is useless to tell the people of the free States, that such is the present
condition of the South, such is the apprehension and distrust prevailing
there, that we must give them these guarantees at once, without any longer
delay or discussion—that if we do not they will secede. Such an argument
as that, sir, is an unworthy argument; it is unfit to be used in an assembly of
men met to confer upon the Constitution. This is not the way in which good
constitutions are made, for one of the several parties to present its
ultimatum, and then insist upon its adoption, under the threat that if it is not
adopted they will go no farther. If such is the true condition of affairs in
some of the States, and the gentlemen representing them are the best judges,
then before proceeding to amend the Constitution to satisfy them, I think we
had better try to put them into a frame of mind suitable for negotiation. A
Constitution adopted in that way would be good for nothing. Let it once be
understood that such claims will be recognized, and we shall have
amendments to the Constitution proposed as often as any section can find a
pretext for proposing them. The agreeable course to us all would be to yield
to your pressing appeals. But you ask us to compromise upon most
extraordinary terms. You will not give us the slightest assurance that the
people of the slave States will acquiesce in the vote of the whole people
upon your propositions. You even say, you will not acquiesce, if the
decision is adverse. You are in doubt if they will be satisfied if the decision
is in their favor; and some gentlemen frankly avow that these propositions
in themselves are not satisfactory. The gentleman from Virginia, with an
openness and a frankness which seems a part of his nature, tells us in
substance that Virginia will not be satisfied with these; that Virginia is
settled in her determination that slave property shall be respected; that it has
as high a right to protection as any other property, and in some respects
higher; that Virginia will have these rights acknowledged and secured under
the Constitution, or she will not be satisfied. The statement that she will not
be satisfied, has a very peculiar and expressive signification.
Such being our present condition, I have little hope that good can come of
our deliberations. We have started wrong. We should have settled the
questions first, that the Union must be preserved, the laws enforced, and the
duty of every State toward the Union performed, in every contingency and
under all circumstances. Having resolved this, we could then go on,
carefully consider the wants of every section, and we could afford to be
generous in meeting the views of our Southern friends.
I feel more diffidence than I can well express in being obliged to differ so
widely from the opinions of the gentlemen who have introduced the
proposals contained in the majority report, and who have advocated them
with such signal ability. I have less hesitation in expressing my unqualified
dissent from the representatives of the free States, who pledge the people of
those States so unreservedly to the support of these propositions, if
Congress will submit them to their constituents. I object to these pledges,
because I know they are deceptive, that they are made without authority,
and that they will never be fulfilled. The South may as well understand this
now, as hereafter.
The Union is precious to the people of the free States. They look upon it
with a feeling closely approaching to reverence. They have looked upon its
dissolution as the greatest national calamity possible. They have been
taught to regard the idea of dissolution as a sin. Now, when the subject is
forced upon their attention, when Conventions are called throughout the
South to discuss it, when in some of the States the process has already
commenced, I am well aware they will make heavy sacrifices to preserve
the Union. They will sacrifice their prosperity, political influence,
friendship, social relations, yes, their lives, to secure its perpetuity. But they
will not sacrifice their principles which they have conscientiously adopted.
No, not even to save the Union.
But let me not be misunderstood. A Government that cannot be maintained
without the sacrifice of those principles upon which all good governments
are founded, is not worth preserving. Such is not the case with ours. Its
preservation requires no such sacrifice; and if we made it, the sacrifice
would be useless. The habit once commenced, we should be called upon to
repeat it over and over again, until at length we should have a Government
destitute of principle.
The people of the slave States believe that slavery is a desirable institution,
that a Government founded upon it would be most desirable. It has been
declared here, that it is even a missionary institution, and that the North, in
attempting to overthrow it, interposes between the slaveholder and his
Maker, thereby preventing him from performing a duty toward the African
race which his ownership imposes upon his conscience. Well, that is a
question between yourselves and your consciences. We do not wish to
interfere. Keep the institution within your own State limits, and we are
content that you should have all the credit, and honor, and glory that
pertains to it. Over and over again the truth has been asserted here, that
there never has been, and is not now, any party, or any considerable number
of men in the free States, who entertain the idea of interfering with slavery
in the States. The opinions of a few rash men who entertain other views, are
no more respected among us than among yourselves.
But the growth and extension of slavery outside of State limits, in the
Territories which are our common property, present a very different
question. If the North permits it there, to that extent it becomes responsible
for slavery. I do not care what term you use to describe the feeling of the
North in relation to slavery. One gentleman says that the North abhors it,
and the use of the term has excited much comment. I may be still more
unfortunate, but it is my duty to say that you cannot present an idea more
repulsive to the northern mind or the northern conscience, than that of
making the North responsible for the existence, expansion, growth,
extension, or any thing else relating to slavery. Right or wrong, this
sentiment has taken a firm hold of the northern mind. There it is, and it
must be taken into account in every proposition which depends for its
success upon the action of the North. Sneering at it will do no good; abuse
will only make it stronger. You cannot legislate it out of existence. From
this time forward, as long as the nation has an existence, you must expect
the determined opposition of the North to the extension of slavery into free
territory. If your proposals of amendment involve that, we may accept
them, Congress may propose them, the South may adopt them; but the
answer of the North to them all will be an emphatic, a determined, No!
Mr. GRANGER:—If you Republicans will let us go to the people, we will
show you what they will do. I think I understand the wishes and feelings of
the people of the North.
Mr. CHITTENDEN:—No doubt. The gentleman says he supported the
B    and E       ticket. The record of his State shows to what extent his
opinions are in sympathy with those of the people of the North.
Mr. President, for a time I did expect profitable results from this
Conference. As I watched it from day to day, it seemed to me that generally
the States had been very fortunate in the selection of their representatives;
that few of extreme opinions had been selected; and that such a body,
animated by common love for the Union, and by a common desire to secure
a perpetuity of its blessings, must finally come to an agreement which
would satisfy all; or if not, to an agreement in which all would acquiesce. In
that belief I had determined to give my assent to the most extreme
propositions which might be made here, that did not run counter to the
position of my State upon the question of slavery extension, if those
propositions would quiet the country and settle our present difficulties.
But when I heard it announced on this floor that the propositions contained
in the majority report even, which do provide for the extension of slavery
into the Territories, which involve a direct constitutional recognition of
slavery for the first time, which place it above and beyond legislation,
which take it out of the hands of posterity, which compel the North to pay
for fugitives; and when I heard it stated that even these were not enough to
satisfy the South, that Virginia must have something more, that she was
"solemnly pledged against coercion, that she would not agree to abide by
the decision of the people upon these propositions," then hope went out
from my heart! I have not since had any expectation that much good would
come from our deliberations.
I have refrained from entering into the merits or demerits of slavery. I have
refrained, so far as I could, from repeating what has been better said by
others than I could say it. The point which I wish to press upon the
Conference is this: Speaking for one State, we frankly tell you that she will
not enter upon a compromise which is not fair and mutual, which does not
bind both parties.
But, sir, although I have thus expressed myself, I do not at all despair of the
Republic. I do not believe that a dissolution or destruction of this
Government is to take place. Its origin and its existence have been
characterized by too many signal interpositions of Providential favor. We
cannot look into the future. I have no desire to do so. If we all
conscientiously perform our prescribed duties, if we are faithful to
ourselves, to our people and our Constitution, H  who rules the nations will
take care of the rest. It may be that the clouds which now cover our horizon
will be swept away, carrying with them all these subjects of difficulty and
danger, which alone have troubled the quiet and the prosperity of the
American Union.
Mr. LOGAN:—Instead of dreaming, like Mr. F    , of news from the seat
of war, and of marching armies, I have thought of a country through which
armies have marched, leaving in their track the desolation of a desert. I have
thought of harvests trampled down—of towns and villages once the seat of
happiness and prosperity, reduced to heaps of smoking ruins—of battle-
fields red with blood which has been shed by those who ought to have been
brothers—of families broken up, or reduced to poverty; of widowed wives,
of orphan children, and all the other misfortunes which are inseparably
connected with war. This is the picture which presents itself to my mind
every day and every hour. It is a picture which we are doomed soon to
witness in our own country, unless we place a restraint upon our passions,
forget our selfish interests, and do something to save our country.
We feel these things deeply in the Border States. The people of these States
bear the most intimate relations to each other. They are closely connected in
business. They associate in their recreations and their pleasures. The
members of a large number of their families have intermarried. State lines,
except for legislative purposes, are scarcely thought of. The people of
Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, are one people, having an identity of
sympathy, of feeling, and of interest.
We have in the West a section of country known as the dark and bloody
ground. The historical incidents connected with it are of the most sad and
mournful character. There is buried under it an ancestor of almost every
family descended from the early settlers of the West. But this ground is
limited in extent. If we are to plunge this country into civil war—if we are
to go on exasperating the sections until they take up arms against each
other, then shall we make a dark and bloody ground of all the Border States.
We shall desolate all their fields, and carry sorrow and mourning into every
family within their limits.
Should we not have a deep interest in avoiding war? Should we not labor
with, and entreat the people of all sections to help us avoid it? If it comes,
we are to be the sufferers. Upon our heads the ruin must fall. We cannot and
will not talk about abstractions now. We are impelled by every
consideration to do all we can to settle our differences, and keep off the evil
day that brings civil war upon our happy and prosperous country, and to
prevent the devastation of that country.
I wish to say a few earnest words to my brother Republicans. You object to
these propositions because they are pressed just now when the new
administration is coming into power. You say that there is no need of them,
and that they involve submission on your part, as a condition of your
enjoying the fruits of the victory you have won. Let me assure you that no
one labored harder for the triumph of Mr. L       than myself; I exerted
what little influence I had; I paid my money to secure his election; I now
wish to give him an honorable administration. I believe he will make a good
President, and I wish to give him a united country to rule. This can only be
done by a settlement of our troubles. No one will rejoice over that
settlement more than Mr. L      .
Fellow Republicans, the only way that opens before us now to settle them
is, by adopting the report of the committee; by permitting the people to
adopt it. Can you, dare you, refuse to let these propositions go to the
people? Dare you stand between the people and these propositions?
I would appeal to you on another ground. Remember that it is the minority
that is asking for these guarantees. You are just coming into power. The
country has approved of your action in the election of Mr. L      . You
can afford to be liberal. Liberality is a noble trait in any character, whether
it be that of an individual or political party.
There are reasons why the South should be apprehensive now. The
organizations of the old Whig and Democratic parties had nothing sectional
in them. There were no resolutions in their platforms which could give the
South any cause of alarm. The content between these parties did not involve
any sectional interests whatever. Now, it is undeniable that the organization
of the Republican party was brought about by the agitation of the slavery
question in its various forms.
It is not strange to me that the success of that party in the late election
should be misconstrued and misunderstood by the South, and that the
people there should be apprehensive for the result.
If the Missouri Compromise had not been repealed we should not have
found ourselves in our present condition. It was the repeal of that
compromise that brought the Republican party into power. The masses of
the people do not sympathize with extremists on either side. The
Republican party took the middle ground, and thus rendered itself
acceptable to them.
After the repeal of the Missouri Compromise came the Kansas agitation. In
this the North was right and the South was wrong. Slavery was attempted to
be forced upon an unwilling people. They resisted—the American people
always will resist injustice. The excitement pervaded the whole country.
Sympathy was excited for Kansas, and properly enough. This excitement
benefited the Republican party—it injured all others. It overwhelmed all
other considerations. The aspect of the slavery question was remembered in
Kansas; elsewhere it was forgotten.
In this way, was the Republican party brought into power. I say now that if
the Union is dissolved, that party will be responsible; responsible, as that
party has now the power to prevent it.
The gentleman from Vermont, who has put his argument in a very ingenious
way, insists that before the North is called upon to act on these propositions,
that the South ought to declare whether she will be satisfied with them. I do
not think so. I am perfectly aware of the difficulties under which the
Representatives of the slave States are laboring. They cannot answer this
question. Let the gentleman remember, when he presses this point so hard,
and with such apparent candor, that even he will not undertake to answer
for New England. More than that, he denies the authority of those who
undertake to answer for the North. I do not believe the gentleman is very
extreme in his opinions; but let him remember that the South should be
treated fairly, and that she is placed in circumstances of peculiar
embarrassment. It raised the hair upon Republican heads when they were
told that Virginia had presented her ultimatum. Now complaint is made that
she has not done so, and that she will not say what will satisfy her.
I feel that I have no interest in this question, except the interest of a citizen.
I have no special interest in it. I ask nothing of politics, but I do feel for my
country. I may be wrong. I do not claim infallibility; but I cannot bring my
mind to the conclusion that we ought not to adopt these proposals. I cannot
see any practical injury to the North in them, and I can see much benefit to
the South.
The North is vitally interested in the preservation of peace, in the
preservation of her commerce, and other relations with the South. These
relations cannot be broken up without great injury to the Northern people.
My heart would rejoice if we could think alike upon these propositions, and
adopt them with a degree of unanimity that would give them weight with
the country.
I would not assail the motives of gentlemen. Doubtless there are men who
honestly believe that such a proposition ought only to be considered in a
General Convention. In my judgment such a Convention would be utterly
useless. It would lead to endless discussion, which would not be conducted
with the decorum that characterizes these proceedings. It would amount to
nothing.
No, gentlemen, there is a better way than that. Let us have no General
Convention, but let us induce Congress to submit our propositions at once
to the people. In no other way, in my judgment, can we avoid the disunion
that threatens us. In no other way can the country be saved in her present
peril.
Mr. DAVIS, of North Carolina:—[2]
Mr. ORTH:—Mr. President, I have thus far avoided any participation in the
general discussion of questions which have claimed the attention of this
Conference. My purpose has been to give a calm and careful attention to
whatever may be offered for our consideration; to hear with unbiassed
judgment the grievances which are the subject of complaint, and to afford
redress, if redress be necessary.
Virginia, rich in her patriotism of the past, rich in her historic treasures, has
called upon her sisters to convene and consult with reference to the
condition of the Union, and the matters which are supposed to threaten our
future peace and welfare. Indiana heard and heeded that call. To her it was
as the voice of a mother to her child. It was a voice which none of the States
of the great Northwest—carved out of that vast domain which Virginia
granted to the United States as the common property of all—could fail to
hear with favor. If dangers threaten the common welfare, if the future peace
of this land is to be disturbed, it was well for Virginia, as in other days of
danger, to sound the alarm, and invite a general council. In pursuance of
that call, Indiana is here, and here to listen. She feels conscious that she has
by no act of hers infringed upon the rights of any of her sister States; that
she has been faithful to her constitutional obligations—seeking for nothing
but what was right, and ever ready to remedy any wrong. Occupying this
position, her representatives on this floor would be derelict in their duty if
they attempted to assume any other, or to pursue any course of action
inconsistent therewith.
What, then, in all candor, are the grievances of some of our sister States, as
presented by their delegated authority to this Conference? Nothing of a
tangible nature calling for practical and definite action. A deliberative body
ought not to act upon the fears or imaginations of those desiring such
action. The mere election of President of the United States by the votes of
the northern portion of this Union, affords no just ground of complaint. That
election is valid, being in strict conformity with all the requirements of the
Constitution. The peculiar notions or political opinions of that President
cannot be the ground of a just complaint, so long as these opinions in their
practical operations do not interfere with or contravene the provisions of
that Constitution. The opinions and principles of the President elect,
however obnoxious they may be to any portion of the people of this Union,
are harmless so long as his political opponents have in their control the
legislative and judicial departments of the Government. The question of
slavery in the Territories, if ever any real cause of grievance to any portion
of the Union, is in process of final settlement, and will be settled before the
close of the present Congress in a manner acceptable to a large majority of
the American people. What, then, is left? "Personal Liberty bills" in some
of the States; and these are being repealed as rapidly as possible; and so far
as practical results are concerned, they have been a dead letter on the statute
books ever since their enactment.
The non-enforcement of the fugitive slave law. The history of the country
since the year of its enactment clearly shows that no law among the national
statutes has received more prompt and vigorous execution, notwithstanding
its exceedingly odious features. Here, then, is the list of grievances, or I
might more properly say supposed grievances; and for a failure to redress
them, this Government is threatened with civil war. To justify this unnatural
and diabolical resort to arms, the chimera of "State sovereignty" is invoked.
And what is State sovereignty? The gentleman from North Carolina has
endeavored to enforce this doctrine, and deduce from certain premises, the
right of a State, when she feels herself aggrieved, to secede from her sister
States, and assume an independent position and a separate nationality. The
fallacy of the gentleman's position, in fact the fallacy of the doctrine of
"State rights," and the deductions made therefrom by the school of
politicians and statesmen to which the gentleman belongs, arises from
confounding the terms State rights and State sovereignty, and using these as
though they were convertible terms. The several States of this Union
possess certain rights clearly defined, and known and understood by the
reader of American political history. Subject to the restrictions of the
national Constitution, they have the right to establish, regulate, and control
their internal police and entire polity so far as it affects the persons and
property subject to their jurisdiction; to regulate trade, commerce, contracts,
marriage, the acquisition, possession, control, and disposal of real and
personal property; also the assessing and collecting of taxes, and
disbursement of the public revenue.
These are some of the main rights belonging to the States as such, but these
do not in any just sense constitute sovereignty. The several States of the
Union are not now and never have been sovereign States. They never
possessed the right to declare war, to make peace, to coin money, to enter
into treaty with nations, and none of them ever endeavored or attempted to
exercise any such rights as these. These are attributes of sovereignty, as laid
down by writers upon the laws of nations, and recognized as such by the
civilized world. Examine the history of your several States, and tell me
whether in any one of them any act or fact can be found which would entitle
either of them at any time, past or present, to be recognized as sovereign
independent nations?
Mr. RUFFIN:—Will the gentleman from Indiana permit me to inform him
that during the Revolutionary War, the State of North Carolina had laid the
foundation of a navy, and at the close of hostilities she transferred her
vessels to the United States.
Mr. ORTH:—I thank the gentleman from North Carolina for the
interruption, and for the allusion to the local history of his State, of which I
was not before aware.
There, then, we have a single instance of one of the States taking one step
toward sovereignty, by the establishing of a navy. I believe this is the only
instance now remembered, and this instance affords the strongest argument
in favor of the position I assume and am endeavoring to enforce. North
Carolina, it seems, had taken one step toward sovereignty; and yet upon the
adoption of our national Constitution, upon the creation of the only
sovereign Government in this Union, the Government of the Union, she
transfers to that sovereign her infant navy; she relinquishes her only
attribute of sovereignty—if such it be—to the United States, and merges
herself with her sister States into that Union of States which has hitherto
been our boast and pride, as well as the admiration of the world.
The several propositions now pending before us do not meet my
approbation, and cannot receive my support. They are in the shape of
amendments to the Constitution, and are all in the interest of slavery,
seeking to strengthen that institution, and to give it an importance far
beyond what the fathers were willing to concede. While the North is willing
to recognize and enforce the requirements of the Constitution touching the
various aspects of the slavery question, so nominated in the bond, they feel
unwilling to grant new guarantees to a system which the civilized world is
beginning to hold in detestation, and which is inimical to free institutions,
and the only subject of contention that will ever seriously disturb the peace
and prosperity of the Union. I am opposed to the proposition before us:
First, because the grievances complained of are not of that serious character
requiring any amendment of our fundamental laws. Secondly, because I am
in favor of the Constitution as it is, firmly believing that no good reason
exists for its change, and that an honest adherence to its wise provisions is
our surest guarantee for real or supposed grievances, and that the present of
all times is the most unpropitious moment to attempt any change or
modification. Party politics in all their embittered madness rule the hour,
but calm times and cool heads will be required whenever the American
people desire to enter upon so hazardous an experiment. Let the
Constitution remain; it has hitherto been, and will continue to be, the
palladium of our rights, the sheet anchor of our safety. Thirdly, under no
state of circumstances that can possibly arise among us as a people, will I
ever consent, by word, thought, or deed, to do any thing to strengthen the
institution of slavery. I regard it as an evil which all good men should desire
to see totally eradicated; and I hope for the day to dawn speedily when,
throughout the length and breadth of the land, freedom shall be enjoyed by
every human being, without reference to caste, color, or nationality. While I
am willing to tolerate its existence where it now is, I am unwilling to extend
its boundaries a single inch, and will not give it any guarantee, protection,
or encouragement, save what it can exact by the strict letter of the
fundamental law. Beyond that I will never go; beyond that Indiana will
never go; and to this, gentlemen from the other side had as well become
reconciled. It is the ne plus ultra of the American people, and to that they
will adhere through all coming time. If, in consequence of this position, the
foundations of society are to be broken up, civil war inaugurated, and the
destruction of the Government attempted, you must remember we are
standing upon the Constitution, in favor of sustaining the laws of the land,
denying the existence of any real grievance; and standing thus with that
consciousness of strength which integrity imparts, you must strike the first
blow, cross the Rubicon, commit the foul and damning crime of treason,
and bring upon your people ruin, devastation, and destruction, and call
down upon your guilty heads the curses of your children and the
disapprobation of the civilized world!
Mr. BRONSON:—For what purpose was this Conference called? Why have
we come here? I suppose we are here to do something, to accomplish
something. If we are only here to make speeches, and not to arrive at
conclusions, our mission is useless. The greater portion of the debate
hitherto has been made up of set speeches, all like the circumlocution office
in one of Dickens' novels, showing "how not to do it." I am not in favor of
pursuing this course any longer. Let us talk the subject over like business
men, in a sensible way, and then come to a vote. I think we may do
something which will prove effectual, and I hope we shall. My political
opinions are well known. For more than forty years I have belonged to one
political party. I did not come here to speak. I did not intend to speak at all,
and shall now only submit a few observations.
I hail from the old Democratic party. The most of you are members of the
opposition. I do not know how or why I was selected as one of the delegates
from New York. I do not even know how the vote of that delegation will
stand on these proposals of amendment. I suppose the dominant party has
taken care to send a majority of its members. If I was a mere politician, I do
not know but I should be in favor of breaking up the Conference, and of
doing nothing; but being only a Democrat, I desire to transmit to posterity
the blessings of a good Constitution and a good Government.
The country has become disquieted. Its peace has been disturbed by the acts
of politicians. Many have become disgusted with the present condition of
affairs, and are unwilling to act or vote. A large portion of our people have
become alarmed. They think their rights have been invaded. Some of the
States have gone. GOD knows whether they will ever come back again. If
we act wisely, perhaps they may. But there is occasion enough for alarm. I
have felt alarmed for a long time. One way suggested to get these States
back is by conquest. But what are we to do with a conquered State? Shall
we establish a military despotism over it?
We all have the right to express our opinions, and I will express mine. There
are eight other slave States whose condition is to be considered. If we do
not act here, will they not leave us and join their sisters? I hope they will
not. I would not raise my voice in this Conference, if it were not for the
purpose of inducing them to stay.
Virginia, that noble old Commonwealth, has invited us together. She
proposes the C          resolutions, and asks us to consider them. Now
she is charged with standing in the way of the Government. This is not true.
Blessed are the peacemakers, and the position of Virginia in this matter is
that of a peace-maker. I thank her for bringing us together.
Two-thirds of the speeches here have been made by those of a political
party to which I never belonged. I do not understand either their purposes or
wishes. Perhaps I may be behind the times. I have not been actually
engaged in politics for more than twenty-five years. During a large part of
that time I have been engaged, in my humble way, in the administration of
justice in the State I here in part represent. I do not know but I may be
falling into the common fault of making a speech. If I do, you must check
me. Again I say, I thank Virginia for her invitation. Why should we not
confer together? Six or seven States—no matter which—are gone. If
nothing is done, eight or nine others will follow, and other divisions will
come as a matter of necessity. Rhode Island—patriotic Rhode Island—will
not go with New England in this Conference. She will not separate from her
southern sisters. Connecticut, I think, will not stay, and New York, I
believe, will stand with the South.
How is it, or why is it, that we should do nothing? Why should we break up
and go home? Have not all the States asked us to come here and do this
work? Why did their legislatures take the trouble to send us here? All this
circumlocution might have better been done at home.
Will a Convention answer the purpose, when another Confederacy has been
formed in our very midst? It would be two years at least before any thing
could be accomplished by a Convention, and then it would be too late. We
all know how delegates to such a Convention are elected. We all know how
much time would be consumed before the Convention could meet. I say we
cannot bear the delay. I ask the gentleman (Mr. B      ) of Connecticut
whether he thinks it would be safe to delay.
Mr. BALDWIN:—I think it is always safe to follow the Constitution. I
think we can follow the example of Kentucky.
Mr. CLAY:—I would suggest to the gentleman from Connecticut that the
representatives of Kentucky are here to speak for her.
Mr. BRONSON:—Kentucky has sent delegates to this Convention since
she passed the resolutions to which the gentleman refers. I think we cannot
stand upon the ground taken in these resolutions. I do not believe Kentucky
herself would be satisfied with them now.
It is strange to see gentlemen so cool and apathetic under such
circumstances. Is no one alarmed for the safety of the old flag about which
so much is said? Can the Border States stay with us when their brethren are
gone? If the action of the North in relation to slavery is such as to drive out
South Carolina, can Delaware and the other Border States remain? For one,
I do not wish to put this Constitution into the hands of a General
Convention. Who can tell what such a convention would do with the
Constitution; what it would do with the decisions of the Supreme Court,
under which so many of the vexatious questions have been settled? It would
be worse than attempting to settle our differences in a town meeting. I
would hesitate long before I would submit such questions to a convention.
Before they could be settled in that way, the Union would be gone forever.
The process would be too slow. I have nothing to gain in this matter. My
only wish is to spend my few remaining days in the United States, and to
transmit the blessings of our Government to my children.
Some of the Republican members here subordinate their platform to their
country. I commend them for it; these are noble sentiments. Men should
abandon platforms when they tend to destroy the country. I concur in the
sentiments of the gentleman from Illinois, uttered this morning. They also
are noble sentiments.
I venerate our Constitution. When made, it was equal to any ever framed.
Nothing short of Almighty Wisdom could have framed a better. But was it
given to human wisdom, to W          and M      , to foresee all the
events of the future? The Constitution has held us together for three-fourths
of a century; that is a wonder in itself; but its makers did not foresee this
day—a day when Freedom itself was in danger of perishing.
Why this hesitation about amending the Constitution? New York accepted it
reluctantly, and only ratified it upon the assurance that it should be amended
as she proposed. It is not so holy a thing now, that it may not be amended.
W         , you must remember, signed the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793,
as well as the Constitution.
We are told by gentlemen from New York and Connecticut (Mr. N     and
Mr. B      ), that the action proposed here is unconstitutional. It does not
become these gentlemen to raise this objection. There was never an
amendment of the State Constitutions, in either of the States they represent,
adopted, that was not brought before the people in substantially the same
way.
Much has been said here about modern civilization and the spirit of the age.
It is said that these are hostile to slavery. Suppose they are? What have we
to do with them? The example of England, also, has been referred to, as
well as that of France. True, they have abolished slavery by name, but they
have imported apprentices from Africa, and Coolies from Asia, and have
placed them under the worst form of slavery ever known. England tolerates
slavery in her mining districts to-day in a worse form than that existing in
the Southern States. She has millions in India worse off than slaves. She has
been the greatest land robber on the earth. She has contributed to the
support of the Juggernaut, and has forced the Chinese at the point of the
bayonet to eat opium. Do you forget that she ruined the capitol in this city,
and blew it up, in 1814? I do not deny her virtues, but I do not care to
follow her example.
Our fathers said slavery was strictly a State institution, and they would not
meddle with it by the Constitution. Their doctrine is true now. The Union
cannot be preserved if we interfere with the institutions of the States.
I will not stop to refer to the Missouri Compromise, or the compromises of
1850 and 1854. I will only say that the North understood these to settle the
slavery question, and professed to agree not to meddle with slavery
hereafter in the States. But the cry of freedom was raised, and its new
apostles, during the last campaign, went through the land preaching
destruction to slavery. What did they mean but that slavery was to be
assailed at every possible point? This doctrine was involved in their
platforms, and advocated in their speeches. They collected all the bad things
ever said about slavery, whether true or untrue, and published them. The
purpose to assail the institution was everywhere owned.
I wish to say a word about the Territories. What great harm would be done
if all the Territories were thrown open to slavery? By the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case, they are open already. But in the
greater part of them slavery cannot exist at all. New Mexico has a slave
code. So have the Cherokee and other Indian tribes; and yet slavery does
not and cannot flourish among them. It cannot make head against the
obstacles which oppose it, and yet you will attack it even there. If you do
so, civil war is inevitable.
But what mischief is done if slavery does go into the Territories? It will not
add another to the degraded race of Africans. It is a blessing to the slave if
he may be permitted to go with his master into these new Territories. In the
old slave States he is compelled to work in gangs under the whip of a
driver, with no one to look after his health or comfort. Take him into one of
these new Territories, and there are one hundred white men and women to
protect each individual of his race, and to see that he suffers no wrong. It is
a blessing to take him out of the plantation gangs, and to place him in a new
country. Then why not let him go there and live in peace? Your zeal to
exclude slavery from the Territories only injures the African race. If there is
a good substantial reason for this exclusion I shall be glad to hear it. Up to
this time I have heard no good reason stated. Although I have declared
myself a Democrat, in this Conference I am no party man. Show me any
good reason for not adopting these proposals of amendment and I will
oppose them. But until that reason is shown they will receive my support.
So far as I can judge, no argument has been proposed here against these
propositions which is not of a partisan character.
The rights which the slave States now ask to have us recognize, are
guaranteed to them by the Constitution as it now stands. We are giving them
nothing new. Every lawyer is familiar with the rule of constitutional
construction, that all the rights not expressly granted to the General
Government are reserved to the States. Let us carry this principle into effect
now. It is all that we are asked to do. Let us do something. Let us amend
these propositions; make them as unobjectionable as we can, and send them
to Congress. Let us urge Congress and the country to adopt them. In their
adoption there is safety; there is great danger in their rejection.
Mr. P       obtained the floor, and at twelve o'clock the Conference
adjourned to ten o'clock to-morrow.
F I F T E E N T H  D A Y .
W         , F     , February 22d, 1861.
T   Conference was called to order by President T    , at 10 o'clock  . .,
and prayer was offered by Rev. Dr. S         .
The Journal of yesterday was read, corrected, and approved.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—It will be necessary that some plan be adopted to
defray the expenses of the Conference, and of printing the Journal. I move
the appointment, by the President, of a committee of three to take those
subjects into consideration.
The motion was adopted, and the President appointed Mr. J      , of
Maryland, Mr. P      , and Mr. G       as such committee.
Mr. HITCHCOCK:—I have an amendment in three sections which I shall
offer to the report of the committee. I ask that it may be read, laid on the
table, and printed.
The motion was agreed to, and the amendment read as follows:
Strike out Section 3, and insert the three following:
S  . 3. Congress shall have no power to regulate, abolish, or control within
any State the relations established or recognized by the laws thereof,
touching persons held to service or labor therein.
S  . 4. Congress shall have no power to discharge any person held to
service or labor in the District of Columbia, under the laws thereof, from
such service or labor, or to impair any rights pertaining to that relation
under the laws now in force within the said District, while such relation
shall exist in the State of Maryland, without the consent of said State, and
of those to whom the service or labor is due, or making to them just
compensation therefor; nor the power to interfere with or prohibit members
of Congress, and officers of the Federal Government whose duties require
them to be in said District, from bringing with them, retaining, and taking
away persons so held to service or labor; nor the power to impair or abolish
the relations of persons owing service or labor in places under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, within those States and Territories where
such relations are established or recognized by law.
S  . 5. Congress shall have no power to prohibit the removal or
transportation of persons held to labor or service in any State or Territory of
the United States, to any State or Territory thereof, where the same
obligation or liability to labor or service is established or recognized by
law; and the right during such transportation, by sea or river, of touching at
ports, shores, and landings, and of landing in case of distress, shall exist;
nor shall Congress have power to authorize any higher rate of taxation on
persons held to service or labor than on land.
Strike out Section 7, and insert:
S  . 9. Congress shall provide by law, that in all cases where the marshal,
or other officer whose duty it shall be to arrest any fugitive from service or
labor, shall be prevented from so doing by violence of a mob or riotous
assemblage, or where, after arrest, such fugitive shall be rescued by like
violence, and the party to whom such service or labor is due shall thereby
be deprived of the same, the United States shall pay to such party the full
value of such service or labor.
Mr. TURNER:—I offer the following resolution:
Resolved, That the time fixed upon to commence voting upon the questions
before this Convention, be postponed until Monday, February 25th, at 12
o'clock  .
I am as desirous as any member of the Conference can be for action. Illinois
is a Border State, and she feels, in common with the Border States, a deep
interest in the questions we are discussing here. But I think a false issue has
arisen, and that it ought to be corrected. This issue has been forced upon us,
and it will go to the country unless corrected. Very little time has yet been
occupied by Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio, but we wish and we ought to be
heard.
Mr. J      , of Missouri, moved to lay the resolution upon the table.
The vote was taken by States, with the following result:
A   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—10.
N   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
York, New Hampshire, Ohio and Vermont—10.
Mr. TURNER:—I see the resolution does not meet with favor. I will
withdraw it.
Mr. CHASE:—I offer the resolution again. I wish to appeal to this
Conference in the name of peace, not to press this vote to-day. We have
been discussing general questions. There has been little or no discussion
touching the merits of the proposed amendments to the Constitution. Do
gentlemen suppose that if it is pressed through in this way, it will meet with
favor when it comes before the country? Let me assure you, gentlemen, that
you will not give the country peace by such a course.
There is a prospect that all sections of the Union may yet be induced to
agree to a General Convention. The floor is so parcelled out that the
Western States cannot be heard. Why do you force the vote in this manner?
Two-thirds of Congress must concur, or these propositions cannot go to the
people. The same two-thirds can suspend the rule at any time. There is no
necessity for passing these propositions to-day. I regret that the proposition
of Mr. W        , limiting the speeches to thirty minutes, has not prevailed.
It was withdrawn.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—No! It was laid on the table by enemies.
Mr. POLLOCK:—I have the floor. I will occupy it only thirty minutes, with
the understanding that those who follow will do the same. We still have
time for six speeches.
Mr. CHASE:—I have but little more to say. When we have a rule, we know
what it is. A general understanding will amount to nothing. I have insisted
that it was inexpedient to press these matters to a decision before the
inauguration of Mr. L      ; but when overruled I have cheerfully
submitted. I now appeal to gentlemen to yield, and let us take the final vote
on Monday.
One word now as to a General Convention. I have faith in that, and believe
we can agree to call one. The idea was started by Kentucky, and promptly
followed by Illinois. I have seen a copy of the "Louisville Journal," which
strongly advocates it. It is practicable, and the country will assent to it.
Mr. HOUSTON:—The delegates from Delaware desire that the vote should
be taken to-day. We have not discussed these propositions, and do not wish
to discuss them. We want action.
Mr. BACKUS:—I concur in the views of the gentleman from Delaware.
Discussion, so far, has tended very little toward harmony or unanimity. I am
in favor of closing the general debate to-day. But I do protest against that
part of the resolution we have adopted, which limits the discussion of an
amendment to five minutes, and confines the reply to the committee. We
ought not thus to be restricted and choked down. I will not move to amend
the resolution now under discussion. It will answer my purpose to give
notice that I shall move to amend the five-minute rule.
Mr. COOK:—We ought to have an opportunity to present the views of
Illinois. As yet we have had none. We cannot justify ourselves to our people
unless we do.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I move to lay the whole subject on the table. I want to
test the question. Debate and discussion change the mind of no one. We
have now been here eighteen days, and the country is expecting a decision.
The vote upon Mr. W        '  motion was called by States, and resulted as
follows:
A   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—9.
N   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
York, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont—11.
Mr. BACKUS:—I now offer my proposition as a substitute for Mr. C    ' 
resolution, as follows:
Resolved, That the resolution heretofore passed, limiting debate on
amendments that shall be offered to the report of the Grand Committee, be
so amended as to allow the delegates who may desire, to speak not
exceeding ten minutes on each amendment.
Mr. CHASE:—I do not wish to seem unreasonable. As my resolution meets
with objection, I will withdraw it in favor of the one adopted by my
colleague.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—Have gentlemen calculated how many hours this will
take? It will amount to a total defeat of all action. We could not get through
by the middle of next month.
Mr. EWING:—I favor the resolution. All should have a fair chance.
Mr. HOUSTON:—I move to amend, giving each delegate ten minutes.
Mr. WILMOT:—I object to that very strenuously. Many delegations are
divided. I hope the resolution will pass as it is.
Mr. HACKLEMAN:—I approve of the rule as it now stands. Practically, it
gives ten minutes.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—I move to lay the resolution on the table. We adopted
the rule unanimously.
Mr. WILMOT:—The motion is not in order. We have once voted not to
table the resolutions.
Mr. HOUSTON:—I will withdraw my motion, at the instance of the
gentlemen around me.
Mr. CHASE:—The question is upon the adoption of the resolution offered
by Mr. B     . I have accepted it in place of the one offered by myself.
The PRESIDENT:—It is subject, at any time, to a motion to lay on the
table.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—That is my motion.
The motion to lay the resolution of Mr. B      on the table was lost by the
following vote—the vote by States being requested by Mr. C    :
A   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—10.
N   .—Connecticut, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Vermont—10.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I presume we all desire to know the result of our labors. I
regret to see so much feeling manifested. Perhaps some of us had better
take the benefit of the prayers of the church on Sunday. Some of us wish to
get our propositions to Congress at an early hour. Those who oppose us—
those determined to defeat action, can speak on until the fourth of March. I
hope such is not their intention.
Mr. TUCK:—If the rule is abused, the Convention will stop the abuse.
At this point there were loud calls of "question," and the President put the
question to vote, viva voce.
The PRESIDENT:—I think the Noes clearly have it.
Mr. CHASE:—A vote by States was called for by several members.
Mr. BARRINGER:—Is this resolution intended to give the right of reply? If
so, we shall have a half-hour speech upon every amendment.
Mr. BACKUS:—If any member wishes to divide his time, he can do so; but
he can only occupy ten minutes in all. We are called to deliberate, as well as
to act. We are asked if we wish to stave off final action? I answer, No. I
want speedy action. But at the same time let us have deliberation. I wish to
give a vote that my constituents will approve.
The PRESIDENT:—The vote will be taken by States.
The resolution was adopted by the following vote:
A   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
York, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont—11.
N   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—9.
Mr. H    offered the following, which was read, laid on the table, and
ordered to be printed:
Amendment to Section 3 of the Committee's Report, to come in after the
words "retaining and taking away persons so bound to labor:"—"but the
bringing into said District of persons held to service for the purpose of
being sold, or placed in depot to be afterwards transferred to any other place
to be sold as merchandise, is forever prohibited, and Congress may pass all
necessary laws to make this prohibition effectual; nor shall Congress have,"
&c.
The PRESIDENT:—The Conference will proceed to the order of the day,
and Mr. P       has the floor:
Mr. POLLOCK:—Brevity is always a virtue. I intend to practice that virtue
now. I would not make a single observation, if I did not feel that by keeping
silence I should neglect my duty. As it is, I do not intend to occupy the time
of the Conference more than twenty minutes.
When the committee upon the subject invited Pennsylvania to furnish a
block for the Washington Monument in this city, they asked also for a
motto, to be inscribed upon it, which should express some idea
characteristic of Pennsylvania. What was the motto selected in behalf of
that great State? Did we go to Germantown and invoke the memories of the
mighty dead? Did we ask the motto of Valley Forge? No, brothers, no!
Pennsylvania stood by the side of the grave of Penn, the man of peace, and
in his example she found her motto, and it stands inscribed upon her
contribution to that monument to the Father of his Country to-day. There
may it stand forever. "Pennsylvania was founded by deeds of Peace." How
noble the sentiment! How characteristic of that Commonwealth!
Animated by the same sentiment, filled with the same spirit, herself asking
nothing, requiring nothing, Pennsylvania comes into this Conference and
says to every delegate here, "Peace, Brothers, Peace." She is not for war.
She believes that the power of kindness is far greater than that of the sword;
that in the affection of brother toward brother there is greater strength than
in all the iron contained in all her thousand hills and mountains. She comes
here at the instance of a sister. She heard the voice of that sister asking for
consultation, and she obeyed it. She is here, and in the right spirit.
A word now as to the motive of Virginia in calling the States together.
Some object that Virginia comes bearing the olive branch on the point of
the bayonet. Not so, sir. She is placed in a peculiar position, and I
appreciate it. She does not make use of threats. These exist only in the
imagination of gentlemen. I am willing to meet her here upon the very
ground she takes, and unite with her in saying, "Our Union as it is, now and
forever." We are here taking counsel, not with traitors, not with
secessionists, but with lovers of the Union.
The people love the Union; they will not give it up. They are true. My heart
almost leapt from my bosom when that telegraph message was read from
Missouri a few days ago. Tennessee has taken up the cry, "Union for ever,"
The nation is troubled. All nations are, at times. But our troubles are not
insurmountable. We are all here together to settle them. Why not settle
them, and give peace to the Union, and joy to the hearts of the people?
We can settle our difficulties. The right feeling animates gentlemen from
both sections. Where was the heart in this Conference that did not start with
emotion, when, some days ago, that glorious old patriot from North
Carolina (Mr. R     ) told us of his devotion to the Union? Who did not
honor and respect him? Old men and young men wept as they listened.
Friends! Countrymen! I come here from a Border State. These States have a
vital interest in the result, therefore we speak earnestly. Let us say to the
angry passions of the country, "Peace, be still!"
The Border States are united; they have common interests. Beside the
hearthstones of each, sit wives, and children, and families, connected with
each other by ties of blood, of interest, of social intercourse. We are one. Is
Maryland or Delaware ready to say that either will part company from
Pennsylvania? No! We are brethren—come weal, come wo, we will stand
by each other, and we will stand by the Union.
Gentlemen say there will not be war, if we do not agree. I wish I could think
so, but I cannot. But if war should come, let me ask the gentlemen from
New York who think principles are standing in their way, will you take the
risk? Will you see the soil of Pennsylvania drenched with blood? Can you
risk all this hereafter, when you can avoid it by accepting a proposition that
involves no sacrifice of principles? Never in my whole life have I felt the
weight of official responsibility as I feel it now. God grant that war may be
averted from the country!
Let the lightning this day flash to the extreme limits of the Union, the glad
tidings that we have settled these questions. The message would be received
with gratitude and thanksgiving. Our friends in the Border States say, "We
love the Union, we wish to stay in it; we do not wish to be driven out." Can
you not, will you not, do something for them? Let us trust this matter to the
people. I am not afraid to trust the people of Pennsylvania. New York and
Massachusetts, trust yours!
We talk calmly of war, but we forget its calamities. Let us remember that
we should not sacrifice one life for this paltry abstraction. Let us remember
how great are the miseries of war. Let us think of the rush of angry armies,
of the widows and orphans, of the sorrow and desolation that war always
leaves in its path.
Christian men! remember that our great Saviour was a Prince of Peace—
that he came to conquer with peace, not with the sword. "The Lord God
omnipotent reigneth."
Disunion is a crime against every thing. Above all, it is a crime against
G  . Christians, pause and reflect. Let me entreat you to help us save this
country from disunion.
I speak earnestly. We Pennsylvanians are upon the border. Our soil must be
the battle ground. Upon us will the heavy trouble fall. Once more I say, let
us trust the people. They are always right. They will do something; and
honest men, sincere men, tell us that unless something is done, the border
slave States cannot be retained in the Union.
I am not here as a party man, but as an American citizen, and a citizen of
Pennsylvania. I am here to perform my duty to the whole country, if I can
find out what that duty is.
Our friends say there is great apprehension at the South that the Republican
party meditates unconditional interference with Southern rights. I do not
believe for a moment that there is any ground for such an apprehension.
But, nevertheless, it exists. Acting upon it, several States have withdrawn
from the Union. We must deal with it in the best way we can. If we can
satisfy our southern brethren, in the name of peace let us do it. I labored for
the election of Mr. L      , but I never understood that hostility to slavery
was the leading idea in the platform of his party. Pennsylvania had other
interests—other reasons very powerful, for supporting him. There was the
repeal of the Missouri Compromise—ruinous discriminations in the Tariff
—the corruption of the Government—the villanous conduct of its high
officers; these and other considerations gave Mr. L       more strength in
Pennsylvania than the slavery question.
There are sentiments and opinions at the North that must be respected.
There are sentiments and opinions at the South that must be respected; but
there are no differences that cannot be honorably adjusted. The only
practicable way that I can discover is to adopt the plan reported by the
committee, and secure its submission to the people.
How can we do greater honor to this glorious day, which gave the immortal
W          to his country and to the world, than by marking it on the
calendar as the day that secured the safety and perpetuity of the American
Union?
Mr. SUMMERS:—The Committee on Credentials have examined the case
of Mr. J.C. S    , who is commissioned as a delegate from Kansas, and are
of opinion that he is duly accredited.
Mr. FIELD:—I understand that he was appointed by Mr. B    , the
Secretary of the Territorial Government.
Mr. CLAY:—There is a provision in the Kansas Act authorizing the
Secretary to perform all the duties of the Governor in his absence.
Mr. BROCKENBROUGH:—I represent an old and honored
Commonwealth. I speak, remembering the maxing that "a soft answer
turneth away wrath." But I should disregard my duty if I did not reply to
what was said a few days ago, in arraignment—in unfair and improper
arraignment, of Virginia.
Virginia occupies no menacing position, no attitude of hostility toward the
Union or her sister States. Virginia knows that "eternal vigilance is the price
of liberty." She knows, too, that there is good policy in the maxim, "in
peace prepare for war." Her action is only such as is dictated by a prudent
foresight. How unkind, then, are such taunts against Virginia, the mother of
us all. She comes here in a paternal spirit; she desires to preserve the Union;
she disdains to employ a menace; she knows that she never can secure the
cooperation of brave men by employing menaces. No! She wishes to use all
her efforts to perpetuate the reign of peace.
Another says we are seeking to secure an amendment of the Constitution by
the employment of unconstitutional means, and that this meeting is a
revolutionary mob—that these eminent men of the country assembled here,
constitute a mob. No, sir! No!
Mr. BALDWIN:—If the gentleman from Virginia refers to me, he quite
misunderstood me. I said only that the action proposed here was not
contemplated by the Constitution, and was revolutionary in its tendency.
Mr. BROCKENBROUGH:—I cannot for my life so consider it. This is
merely an advisory body. We are here to devise an adjustment, and to lay it
before Congress. We are exercising the right of petition, and that is a sacred
right. Is this revolutionary? No, sir! You would insist that Congress should
receive a petition, although that body had no right to act upon it. If so, how
much more should our petition be received, when we seek to preserve the
Union, and when the Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to act in
such a case.
The gentleman from Vermont said last evening, that a pledge from the
South to abide by the result would be a condition precedent to the
submission of the proposition at all, and yet he says he cannot pledge
Vermont. Why, then, does he ask us to pledge Virginia?
Mr. CHITTENDEN:—I am not willing to be misunderstood. I thought my
language was plain. What I said was, that no one could pledge the free
States for or against these propositions; but I did say we could pledge them
to abide by the Union, whatever the result might be. That is the pledge we
ask from the South.
Mr. BROCKENBROUGH:—Well, that is a pledge we have no authority to
give. We cannot accept these propositions as a boon from any section. We
must have them as a right, or not at all.
But let me address myself at once to the momentous question. It seems that
we can agree upon every thing but this question of slavery in the Territories.
So far as that subject is concerned, Virginia has declared that she will accept
the Crittenden resolutions. She and her southern sisters will stand upon and
abide by them. If gentlemen will come up to this basis of adjustment with
manly firmness, the electric wires will flash a thrill of joy to the hearts of
the people this very hour. Why not come up to it like men?
The Supreme Court has already established the rights of the South, so far as
this question is concerned, upon a basis which is satisfactory. Under the
Dred Scott decision, the people of the South have the right to go into any
portion of the Territory with their slaves. You, gentlemen of the North, will
not abide by that decision. You have declared in your platform that it is a
miserable dogma. How can we be satisfied with such a guarantee for our
rights as that?
But it is said that this part of the Dred Scott decision is only an obiter
dictum; that the question was not presented by the record. This is not so. As
was said by Governor W        , the other day, there were two questions in
that case. The judgment of the court was upon them both, and both were
presented by the record.
We know that the dominant party has elected a President on a purely
sectional issue, and in deadly hostility to our institutions. We believe, from
all the indications of the times, that our institutions are utterly insecure.
Therefore we ask these guarantees. Give them to us, and from that time you
will restore peace and quiet to the country. You at once attach the Border
States firmly to you forever. I hope you will do so; but I tell you that the
Border States cannot be retained unless you will consent to give such
guarantees as will bring back the seceded States, and unite us all in a
glorious confederation.
Sentiments have been uttered here that grate harshly on the minds of
Southern gentlemen. It is said that this is a war of ideas. If so, then there is
certainly that irrepressible conflict about which we have heard so much. But
it is not true that slaves exclude free labor. Come to the harvest homes of
Western Virginia. There you will see the union of white and black labor—
see the two races working harmoniously together. The mechanics are white,
the field hands are black. Those only make such assertions who know
nothing about it.
You insist at the North that slavery is a sin. If it is as you claim it to be, a
sin, the sum of all villanies, then we may as well separate. We cannot live
together longer.
If we cannot have the aid of other sections, the Border States must take the
subject into their own hands, and settle it for themselves. These States, with
one exception, have shown a most excellent spirit. Let them all come up to
the work to-day; on this natal day of W         , of whom it was said that
nature had denied him children, in order that he might be indeed the Father
of his Country. New Jersey has most nobly responded, through her
distinguished sons, but especially through the voice of that eloquent man,
who swept with a master hand the chords of the human heart, in his remarks
here, and tones of heavenly music responded to the touch.
The whole nation stands on tiptoe awaiting the final result of the action of
this Conference. All sections are ready to make sacrifices, but sacrifices are
not required. Let us act, and then go home. A grateful people will bind the
wreath of victory around your brows, for "Peace hath her victories not less
than War."
We make no appeal to the sympathies of gentlemen. We ask you to do
justice, simple justice to the South. Do it, and you will do honor to
yourselves. Give us the guarantees we ask, and my word for it, you will see
the seceded States coming back one by one, and we shall see ourselves once
more a happy and a united people!
Mr. WILMOT:—It is not my purpose to enter upon the wide field that has
been opened in this debate. I did not intend to speak at all. I know well the
position I occupy before the country. I am regarded by those who do not
know me as an extreme man. I am, if I know myself, a man of moderation,
and, I trust, of firmness. I make these remarks because the time has come
when I must separate from my delegation. I concede every thing to their
patriotism, good intentions, and integrity. But I must separate from them in
the votes they are about to give.
We are called here to consider the condition of the country. It is said that
condition requires our interference—that such interference is necessary. The
country has just passed through one of those conflicts which are incidental
to our form of Government. It has borne the trial, and I think it is safe.
Those who insist that certain things shall be done, place us in a delicate
position. You say that you do not object to the inauguration of Mr.
L      , but you refuse to permit his principles to be carried into effect.
We say that we have not merely elected Mr. L      , but we have decided
the principles upon which his administration shall be conducted. You refuse
to permit this, and say that you will leave us and revolutionize, unless we
consent to a counter resolution.
The contest in which we are now engaged is not a new one. It is of twelve
or fifteen years' standing. It assumed new proportions when we acquired
Texas. Texas, under the laws of Mexico, was then free. We insisted that
slavery should not be recognized there. You claimed that it should—that
slavery should go into all the common Territories of the Union. You
succeeded. You procured what you claim is a decision of the court in your
favor. But the people would not give the question up. The issue was formed
—Slavery or Freedom; and on that issue we went into the late election. It
was well understood in all its bearings. It was discussed and argued upon
both sides and all sides, and the people determined the question against the
South. In my section of the country there was no change. In all the
excitement of a Presidential contest, I do not know of twenty votes that
were changed. The opinions of the people were formed before; now they
have declared them.
My first allegiance is to the principles of truth and justice. Convince me that
your propositions are right, that they are just and true, and I will accept
them. I will sustain them to the end. If they are wrong—and I now believe
them to be—I will never sustain them, and I will show my faith in GOD by
leaving the consequences with Him.
Any substantial change in the fundamental principles of government is
revolutionary. Yours may be a peaceable one, but it is still a revolution. The
seceded States are in armed revolution. You are in direct alliance with them.
You say the Government shall not retake the forts, collect the revenue, and
you ask us to aid you in preventing the Government from doing its duty.
Permit this, and the judgment of the world will be that we have submitted to
the inauguration of your principles as the principles of the Government. It
would exhibit a weakness from which the country could never hope to
recover. These are reasons satisfactory enough to me. I cannot vote for the
first article.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—Do you wish to get the seceded States back?
Mr. WILMOT:—Certainly I do.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—How do you propose to do it?
Mr. WILMOT:—I cannot say that I have any special way. It is their duty to
return. There are better methods of coercing them than to march our army
on to their soil. Now I understand it is your purpose to intrench slavery
behind the Constitution.
Mr. RUFFIN:—Certainly. That is true—in a certain portion of the
Territories.
Mr. WILMOT:—I thought I was not mistaken. The Government has long
been administered in the interest of slavery. The fixed determination of the
North is, that this shall be no longer.
Mr. HOUSTON:—Will the gentleman hazard the assertion that such has
been the policy of Tennessee, Maryland, or Delaware?
Mr. WILMOT:—I did not intend to say more than that such has been the
general policy of the Government. Another objection to the proposed
amendment is its ambiguity. Its construction is doubtful, when it should be
plain. Don't let us differ when we go home. If we do we shall settle nothing.
Some will claim that the first article does not furnish a slave code. Others
will claim that it does, and such I think is a fact. I am also opposed to the
second article. I do not think it is right thus to bind posterity. I am opposed
to the third article, except the first clause. If you think there is really a
purpose at the North to interfere with slavery in the States, I am willing a
declaratory amendment should be adopted prohibiting such interference. I
like that of Mr. F     much better. I can go for that with all my heart.
As to the foreign slave trade we ask nothing. The laws are well enough as
they are, if properly enforced. Besides, you make too much of it. You will
claim hereafter that this formed one part of the compromise. It will amount
to nothing.
Mr. BARRINGER:—But the South wants the foreign slave trade
prohibited.
Mr. WILMOT:—Do not the statutes prohibit it? Why not enforce them?
Mr. BARRINGER:—We had rather have the prohibition in the
Constitution.
Mr. WILMOT:—I am opposed also to abrogating the power of Congress
over the District of Columbia. I hope to see slavery abolished in the
District.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—Will the gentleman from Pennsylvania abide by the
decision in the Dred Scott case?
Mr. WILMOT:—Certainly, so far as it decides what is in the record.
Mr. SEDDON:—You will not permit it to settle the principle?
Mr. WILMOT:—I will not, any more than Virginia would accede to the
decision upon the Alien and Sedition Laws. I will be frank and go farther. If
the Court had undertaken to settle the principle, I would do all I reasonably
could to overthrow the decision.
Mr. SEDDON:—My voice has failed me to-day, and I do not know that I
can speak in audible tones, but I will try.
I understand the gentleman who last addressed us to say, that there are to be
incorporated into the administration of the Government two new principles:
one is, that there shall be no slavery in the territories; the other is, that the
action of the Government shall be on the side of freedom. And furthermore,
that slavery is to be regarded as a purely local institution, and that slaves are
not to be regarded as property anywhere except in the slave States. Now,
that was just the way in which I interpreted the action of the North in the
last election, and it is precisely this view which has led to the secession of
the States. The gentleman well understands that a different view of their
rights under the Constitution prevails among the Southern people. Will he
also understand and recognize the fact, that the Supreme Court has clearly
given the sanction of its opinion to the Southern construction?
Mr. WILMOT:—Ought not the action of the Government under
W          to be a precedent of some weight in our favor?
Mr. SEDDON:—I cannot accede to that. Now the North has inaugurated
this policy. We of the South say it is a subversion of the Constitution. The
gentleman must as freely admit that the party just coming into power must
of necessity be a Northern party. It can have no affiliation with any party at
the South. Now I ask, can we, as a matter of policy or justice, whose rights
are so vitally involved, sit by and see this done? Slavery is with us a
democratic and a social interest, a political institution, the grandest item of
our prosperity. Can we in safety or justice sit quietly by and allow the North
thus to array all the powers of the Government against us?
The hour of one o'clock having arrived, the P         announced that
under the resolutions adopted by the Conference, general debate must
cease, and the Conference would proceed to vote upon the report of the
General Committee, and various amendments proposed thereto.
Mr. FIELD:—I rise to a question of privilege. What was done by the
Conference with the credentials of the gentleman from Kansas?
The SECRETARY:—The practice heretofore has been, to consider a
gentleman a member, when the Committee on Credentials report in his
favor.
Mr. FIELD:—Then I move to reconsider the action of the Conference in
this case.
Mr. PRICE:—I rise to a question of order. The committee have reported in
favor of Mr. S    , and that is conclusive.
The PRESIDENT:—I think the Conference has a right to pass upon the
credentials.
Mr. FIELD:—I have a serious objection to the admission of the gentleman
from Kansas. He holds the commission of the Secretary of the Territory
alone, from a man who has never been appointed Governor. It is very
irregular. It looks as though the gentleman was sent here only for the
purpose of giving the vote of Kansas to certain propositions.
Mr. JOHNSON, of Missouri:—The delegate comes here with an
appointment under the seal of the State of Kansas. The act admitting Kansas
provides that all the territorial officers shall exercise jurisdiction until others
are elected. I think it is in very bad taste for the gentleman from New York
to question the regularity of the appointment.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I make a point of order. We have decided to proceed to
the vote at this time.
The PRESIDENT:—I think this is a privileged question.
Mr. HOUSTON:—I respectfully appeal from the decision of the P        .
Mr. MOREHEAD:—I move to lay the whole subject on the table.
Mr. FIELD:—I ask for a vote by States.
The PRESIDENT:—It is somewhat difficult to decide what motion has
precedence. What was the motion of the gentleman from New York?
Mr. FIELD:—I moved a reconsideration of the action of the Convention
admitting Mr. S    . Let us have a vote on that motion. It is as good a test
as any.
Mr. MOREHEAD:—I insist that the question is upon my motion to lay the
whole subject on the table.
The question was taken upon the motion of Mr. M       , with the
following result:
A   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Virginia—10.
N   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New York,
New Hampshire, Ohio, and Vermont—9.
Mr. CLAY:—I would ask, as a matter of courtesy, not to say of common
decency, that Mr. S     may be permitted to state how and why he came
here.
Mr. STONE, of Kansas:—I understand that I was appointed by the
Secretary of Kansas, who was at the time the Acting Governor. I understand
that the appointment was made in accordance with the Enabling Act of
Kansas. I am not inclined to argue my right to a seat in the Conference.
Mr. FIELD:—I wish to ask the gentleman only one question. Was not
Governor R        actually in possession of his office before the delegate
received his appointment, and is he not in such possession now?
Mr. STONE:—He was, and is.
Mr. ALEXANDER:—I call for the reading of the fourth Rule.
The fourth Rule was read by the Secretary, as follows:
4   R   .—A member shall not speak oftener than twice, without special
leave, upon the same question; and not a second time, before every other
who has been silent shall have been heard, if he chooses to speak upon the
subject.
Mr. FIELD:—In order to bring the subject fairly before the Conference, I
will put my motion in the form of a resolution, as follows:
Resolved, That the credentials of Mr. S    , who desires to act as a
Commissioner from Kansas, be referred back to the Committee on
Credentials, with instructions to that committee to report the facts
concerning his appointment, and whether it proceeded from the Territorial
Secretary.
Mr. SUMMERS:—I wish the Committee on Credentials to stand right with
the Conference. We accepted the commission of the Acting Governor as
prima facia correct.
Mr. VANDEVER:—I wish to offer a resolution.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—All resolutions are out of order.
The PRESIDENT:—I think resolutions under the ruling of the Conference
cannot now be considered.
Mr. CURTIS:—I ask leave for the State of Iowa to vote on the motion to lay
the subject of the admission of the delegate from Kansas on the table.
The motion was granted, and Iowa being called, voted No; and the vote
stood: Ayes, 10; Noes, 10. And so the motion was lost.
Much discussion here ensued on the subject of the admission of the
delegate from Kansas, which was participated in by Messrs. S       ,
C        , C      , and others, when
Mr. STONE observed that he had no desire to force himself into the
Conference, and until the question was settled he thought it proper to
withdraw.
The resolution offered by Mr. F     was adopted without a division.
VOTE ON THE PROPOSITIONS AND AMENDMENTS.
The PRESIDENT:—The Conference will now proceed to the consideration
of the report of the General Committee, and the amendments thereto. The
question will be taken on the adoption of the first section reported by the
Committee of One from each State, which the S         will now read.
The S         read the report as follows:
S       1. In all the present territory of the United States, not embraced
within the limits of the Cherokee treaty grant, north of a line from east to
west on the parallel of 36° 30´ north latitude, involuntary servitude, except
in punishment of crime, is prohibited whilst it shall be under a territorial
government; and in all the present territory south of said line, the status of
persons owing service or labor as it now exists shall not be changed by law
while such territory shall be under a territorial government; and neither
Congress nor the territorial government shall have power to hinder or
prevent the taking to said territory of persons held to labor or involuntary
service, within the United States, according to the laws or usages of the
State from which such persons may be taken, nor to impair the rights
arising out of said relations, which shall be subject to judicial cognizance in
the Federal Courts, according to the common law; and when any territory
north or south of said line, within such boundary as Congress may
prescribe, shall contain a population required for a member of Congress,
according to the then Federal ratio of representation, it shall, if its form of
Government be republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing
with the original States, with or without involuntary service or labor, as the
constitution of such new State may provide.
S       2. Territory shall not be acquired by the United States, unless by
treaty; nor, except for naval and commercial stations and depots, unless
such treaty shall be ratified by four-fifths of all the members of the Senate.
S       3. Neither the Constitution nor any amendment thereof shall be
construed to give Congress power to regulate, abolish, or control, within
any State or Territory of the United States, the relation established or
recognized by the laws thereof touching persons bound to labor or
involuntary service therein; nor to interfere with or abolish involuntary
service in the District of Columbia, without the consent of Maryland, and
without the consent of the owners, or making the owners who do not
consent just compensation; nor the power to interfere with or prohibit
representatives and others from bringing with them to the city of
Washington, retaining and taking away, persons so bound to labor; nor the
power to interfere with or abolish involuntary service in places under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within those States and
Territories where the same is established or recognized; nor the power to
prohibit the removal or transportation, by land, sea, or river, of persons held
to labor or involuntary service in any State or Territory of the United States
to any other State or Territory thereof where it is established or recognized
by law or usage; and the right during transportation of touching at ports,
shores, and landings, and of landing in case of distress, shall exist. Nor shall
Congress have power to authorize any higher rate of taxation on persons
bound to labor, than on land.
S       4. The third paragraph of the second section of the fourth article of
the Constitution shall not be construed to prevent any of the States, by
appropriate legislation, and through the action of their judicial and
ministerial officers, from enforcing the delivery of fugitives from labor to
the person to whom such service or labor is due.
S       5. The foreign slave trade, and the importation of slaves into the
United States and their Territories, from places beyond the present limits
thereof, are forever prohibited.
S       6. The first, third, and fifth sections, together with this section six
of these amendments, and the third paragraph of the second section of the
first article of the Constitution, and the third paragraph of the second
section of the fourth article thereof, shall not be amended or abolished
without the consent of all the States.
S       7. Congress shall provide by law that the United States shall pay to
the owner the full value of his fugitive from labor, in all cases where the
marshal, or other officer, whose duty it was to arrest such fugitive, was
prevented from so doing by violence or intimidation from mobs or riotous
assemblages, or when, after arrest, such fugitive was rescued by force, and
the owner thereby prevented and obstructed in the pursuit of his remedy for
the recovery of such fugitive.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I hope now the Conference will proceed in the regular
way, and that the majority report will be first perfected so far as
amendments are concerned, and that then it may be adopted.
Mr. SEDDON:—I move to amend the first section by inserting, after the
words "in all the present territory south of said line," the words "including
the Cherokee grant," and I call for a vote by States on the adoption of the
amendment I propose. My object is to carry out the instruction of the
committee. A small part of the grant lies north of the line. It is better to
include the whole.
Mr. BACKUS:—I move to amend the amendment proposed by the
gentleman from Virginia, by substituting the word "excluding" for the word
"including," and on my motion ask a vote by States.
Mr. RUFFIN:—I think the gentleman does not understand the effect of his
amendment.
Mr. BACKUS:—I do not think we ought to regard the Cherokee grant at all.
Mr. FRANKLIN:—I think both the amendments important.
Mr. SEDDON:—We must recognize the Cherokee Territory, and not divide
it. Upon mature reflection, I think the amendment is important.
The vote was taken upon the motion of Mr. B     , and resulted as
follows:
A   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
York, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont—11.
N   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—9.
The PRESIDENT:—The question is now upon the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Virginia, as amended by the Conference.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I hope the amendment will not be adopted. It is not
necessary to the sense of the article. It is cumulative in its effect. We have
expressly excluded the Cherokee grant, lest we might seem to overrule the
Cherokee treaty by a provision of the Constitution.
The vote was taken by States, on the adoption of the amendment proposed
by Mr. S     , as amended, with the following result:
A   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
York, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Vermont—10.
N   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—10.
Thus the amendment was lost.
Mr. PRATT:—I wish to enter my dissent from the vote of Connecticut.
Mr. FRANKLIN:—I now offer as a substitute for the first section, as
reported, the following:
Strike out after the words "United States," in the first line, and insert as
follows:
"Not embraced by the Cherokee treaty, north of the parallel of 36° 30´ of
north latitude, involuntary servitude, except in punishment of crime, is
prohibited. In all the present territory south of that line, the status of persons
held to service or labor, as it now exists, shall not be changed; nor shall any
law be passed to hinder or prevent the taking of such persons to said
territory, nor to impair the rights arising from said relation; but the same
shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts, according to
the common law. When any territory north or south of said line, within such
boundary as Congress may prescribe, shall contain a population equal to
that required for a member of Congress, it shall, if its form of government
be republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the
original States, with or without involuntary servitude, as the constitution of
such State may provide."
Mr. FOWLER:—Let us first perfect the original. I move to amend by
inserting after the word "prevent," in the first section, the words "or
facilitate."
Mr. REID:—I think we ought to perfect the section before we vote on a
substitute. I move to amend it by inserting after the word "line," after the
words "territory south of said line," the following words: "involuntary
servitude is recognized, and property in those of the African race held to
service or labor in any of the States of the Union, when removed to such
territory, shall be protected and"—
I have not expressed my views at large upon the subject of the committee's
report. I have earnestly wished to settle the perplexing questions which now
distract the country. I do not rise to make a speech. I have not come here to
exact more than the North can honorably grant, nor to deceive the North in
the result, if the rights of the South are not protected. Our property is
involved in your action. You can afford to be liberal. If you intend to
recognize property in slaves, write it down in the bond. If the North wants
any protection, name it, and we will put it into the bond. If you fear that
slavery may go north of the proposed line, we will give you any assurance
to the contrary. But I tell you that on the other side we require reciprocal
terms. Nothing else will satisfy the public sentiment. Twelve months hence
and we will not take what we now offer to take.
What are we talking about? Every one knows that the African race is better
off at the South than it could be elsewhere. We do not wish to disrupt the
Union. You are doing it on a mere Northern abstraction. Suppose a foreign
power asked you what you were fighting about, what would be your
answer?
But I was saying that the only way is for the North to be liberal; to be
reciprocal; to make us entirely safe. Our security must be put into the bond
and be faithfully preserved. The present status of the States in the Union is
deceptive. If I am to remain in the Union, it don't suit me. If I am to go into
a southern confederacy, it is just what I should want. Beware, gentlemen of
the North! You are cutting yourselves off from future glory and expansion.
Mr. VANDEVER:—The gentleman from North Carolina wants the distinct
recognition of slavery in the bond. I would like to refer him to the condition
of this question when the Constitution was adopted. The men of that time
would not assert such a position. They did not think it proper or necessary.
If we adopt his views we attempt to sit in judgment on the men of that day.
Mr. C       understood this matter perfectly, and in one of his speeches
refers to the unwillingness of the Convention to recognize slavery
specifically. The sentiment of Iowa is that no such recognition ought to be
made now. I am opposed to the amendment.
Mr. SEDDON:—I consider this an important amendment, and a very just
one. The principle upon which we are proceeding is that of partition. We,
with our property are prohibited from going north of the line. The exact
correlative of that would be, that you should be prohibited from going south
with your institutions. That we do not ask. On one side involuntary
servitude is prohibited. On the other we simply ask that it may be
recognized. We give up two-thirds of the territory altogether. All we ask is
protection in the remaining one-third.
What is the meaning of this proposition as it now stands? Who does not see
that its meaning is ambiguous? It requires us to give up territorial
protection, and leaves us with nothing but the shred of a right protected by
the Federal courts. Once more let me tell you, that in my opinion the South
will never consider this a satisfactory adjustment. You say we are protected
by the principles of the common law. Who can tell what this will amount
to? Assuming the territorial government to be favorable, it could do
nothing. You leave it powerless. Suppose a citizen of Virginia emigrates to
the territory south of the line with his property. He would have no earthly
right except under the laws of Virginia. The power to enforce those laws is
a thousand miles away. If we are to make a partition, let it be a partition. As
the provision stands, it is the unfairest bargain ever made. It is all on the
side of the North. In common fairness and honesty, I submit that the North
ought to vote for this amendment.
Mr. ORTH:—There is much that is worthy of consideration in the remarks
of the gentleman from Virginia. I hope earnestly that we shall not adopt a
proposal of amendment that admits of two interpretations. If I could vote
for the report of the majority at all, I would throw around it all the
protection it needs. This is a new and peculiar species of property which we
are now making the Constitution recognize and protect. If the South is
entitled to the proposition itself, I think they are entitled to this amendment.
After all, it is only making the amendment express just what we know its
friends claim it implies.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I would have preferred the direct recognition by express
terms of slavery south of the line proposed, and I voted that way in the
committee. I suppose, however, that the clause as it stands recognizes the
status there, as it now exists—that it prevents all interference with the
status. Would you prefer to put into the proposition certain express terms
which would destroy all chance of its adoption by the people? I do not think
the world is governed by ideas alone. It is governed by ideas and material
interests. The Constitution of 1787 secured the interests of the slaveholder
in the States. This clause does the same in the Territories. No man can be
cheated by it unless he cheats himself. Gentlemen favoring the amendment
must know that at least it will not improve the prospects of the proposition
with the people. Do you wish to break up the Conference? This is an
effectual way of doing it.
We ask for this proposition substantially as it stands. The North can give it
to us if it chooses. If it will not, then we shall go home and tell our
constituents. They must decide for themselves what they will do. This will
settle the Territorial question effectually. What more do we want? The
additional guarantees? These are provided for in the other clauses.
Mr. CHITTENDEN:—I call for a vote by States on Mr. R   '  amendment.
Mr. BARRINGER:—I shall vote for the amendment of my colleague. I
have occupied no time in the general debate, but now I do desire to say a
few words about this amendment, and the proposition to which it is offered.
The amendment brings up the very gist of the matter. Differences of opinion
exist as to the effect of the clause. The amendment settles them. This is no
place to talk about devotion to the Union. To be a Union at all it must be
one that recognizes and protects the rights of all. Any other Union is not
worth the name; is not worth preserving. We came here, it is true, to save
the Union. We came here to devise the means of saving it. Practically the
Union is already dissolved. If not dissolved it is disintegrated.
We ask first, additional guarantees for our rights—for Southern rights. They
must be such as will satisfy our people, and bring back the States that have
left the Union. Short of this they will amount to nothing. I know the public
opinion of the South on these important questions. I have closely watched
its growth. My own convictions as to what it will require are decided.
Unless you use language and adopt terms in your proposals of amendment
which will satisfy the seceded States—which will induce them to return to
the Union—your labors will have been in vain.
What is our claim? It is this, in short: We claim that every Southern man has
the right to go into the Territories with his property, wherever these
Territories may be. The Territories belong to both; to the South as well as to
the North. We want equality. We have no wish to propagate slavery, but
every man at the South does wish to insist upon his right to enter the
Territories upon terms of perfect equality with the North, if he chooses to do
so. He may not exercise the right, but he will not give it up.
We want a division of the Territories. We want to set up landmarks so that
neither we nor our posterity shall dispute hereafter about the line.
North Carolina has instructed us to say to this Conference, that if the
C          amendment can be adopted here, we can carry it almost with
unanimity. There will be a struggle even with our own people, but we can
induce them to adopt it.
We have three hundred miles of border in common with South Carolina.
Our trade and our associations are in that direction. It is useless to deny that
South Carolina has sympathizers among us in her recent movement. You
must consider these things, and give us a chance. We must base our
argument on principle; we must stand upon terms of perfect equality.
The proposition needs this amendment. As it stands it is ambiguous. It is
worse than that, for its construction will depend on the opinion of a
Territorial Judge.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—I come from a State that is deeply interested in the
subject of slavery. Nevertheless, I shall vote against the amendment of the
gentleman from North Carolina.
I belong to that class of politicians which believes that the people of every
section of the Union have a right to go into all the Territories of the Union,
and take with them their property and hold it in safety. But we ought not, in
our proposals of amendment to the Constitution, to insist upon what will be
repulsive to any section of the Union. I think the amendment is unnecessary
—that the right we claim is sufficiently protected without it. As it stands,
neither Congress nor the Territorial Government has the right to impair the
status of the slave. What farther protection do we need? What other can we
have? Why should we insist upon the adoption of a new style of language?
We ought not to be unreasonable; we ought to content ourselves with the
proposition as it stands, and not put expressions into it which will make the
whole repulsive to a large section of the country, and which, in all
probability, will defeat the whole amendment when it comes before the
country. I am not even sure that we could get it there. I doubt whether it
would pass Congress.
This is a very serious and important question. We wish to stay the hands of
extremists on both sides. We wish to stand by the Union. If war comes, our
soil is to be the battle ground. I wish to avoid war. I will insist upon this,
and I will consent to no extreme opinions.
Mr. VANDEVER:—I do not see why Mr. G       cannot accept the
proposed amendment. He and the gentleman from North Carolina are both
aiming at the same thing. The amendment is certainly the clearest. Do you
suppose the people are not going to understand the subject thoroughly? Do
you suppose that they will be deceived by any such transparent disguise of
words? You do not pay them a very high compliment by such a supposition.
I must vote against the amendment, because I am opposed to the principle
of protecting slavery in the Territories. Such is the sentiment of the North. If
it was not, I should vote for the amendment.
Mr. MOREHEAD, of Kentucky:—As I intend to vote against the
amendment, it is due to the Convention that I should state the reasons for
my vote. I am in favor of a clear recognition of all the rights of the South,
especially of our rights in the Territories. I voted for the C         
amendment in the committee. I thought the North ought, in justice to us, to
adopt that amendment. We, in this Conference, have selected a Committee
of One from each State—a committee of able men, and we have placed this
subject in their charge. They have consulted together. They have ascertained
the views and feeling of the different sections of the country; they have
embodied the result of their labors in this report. The question now
presented appears to my mind to be this: After all the time and ability they
have given to their report in the present distracted and perilous condition of
the country, shall I consent to put words into the amendment of the
Constitution which they recommend, that will ensure its defeat when it
comes before the people?
I know as certainly as that G   rules in heaven, that unless we come to
some satisfactory adjustment in this Conference, a convulsion will ensue
such as the world has never seen.
I have been travelling for nearly two months in the seceded States. I believe
I understand the temper of their people. I have found there an all-pervading
dissatisfaction with the existing state of things, but I have also found great
devotion to the Union. I think we can yet save the seceded States. But at
least let us save Texas and Arkansas. As it is, black ruin sits nursing the
earthquake which threatens to level this Government to its foundations. Can
you not feel it, while there is yet time to prepare for the shock? If this giant
frenzy of disunion raises its crested head—if red battle stamps his foot, the
North will feel the shock as severely as the South.
Such is the prospect before us, and near to us, and yet gentlemen say that
they will not give one guarantee to avert such dire calamities. Will not the
gentleman from New York do one thing to save that Ship of State of which
he spoke so eloquently, when she is already among the breakers, and
driving so rapidly toward that rocky shore against which her ribs of steel
cannot long protect her? We are patriots all—we are bound to act together
—to do something—to do our duty, and our whole duty—to do what will
ultimately preserve the Union.
Mr. PALMER:—A few days ago the Conference listened to a deliberate
defence of the institution of slavery by its friends from the slave States, in
which at least one gentleman from a free State (Mr. E    ) participated.
That defence could have had but one object. That object was to place us
who do not believe in slavery in such a position that we could not agree to a
compromise without endorsing the views then expressed. Gentlemen expect
us to give up our opinions and concur with them. I have but one remark to
make to all such suggestions. We entertain our opinions on the subject of
slavery; we cannot, we will not surrender them.
We are told that this contest must cease, or the Union must perish. I am
inclined to think so myself. We stand ready to make any reasonable
compromise to save the Union, short of sacrificing our opinions. You,
gentlemen of the South, cannot be satisfied unless our capitulation is
complete.
I do not assent to much that is said here about the Border States. If the
Union is not dissolved until the Border States go to fighting each other, it
will last forever.
Mr. REID:—If we all mean the same thing, let us put it into the bond. Then
there will be no room for misunderstanding or controversy. If you leave this
article open to construction, nothing will be settled. The gentleman is
mistaken if he supposes that I wish him to adopt my arguments. I do not. If
this provision, as it stands, protects slavery in the Territories south of 36°
and 30´, why not say so in express terms? I question whether the article, as
reported, recognizes property in slaves at all. I wish to settle the question
now and forever. I do not wish to have my purpose perverted. I wish to
carry home to North Carolina a reasonable story. We have given up all our
rights in the territory north of the line. Let the North be reciprocal. What
shall I tell my people at home? That I have given away their rights in more
than one-half the territory, and have not even secured a provision protecting
property in slaves in the remainder?
The vote, on the request of Mr. C         , was taken by States, and
resulted as follows:—
A   .—Virginia, North Carolina, and Missouri—3.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa—17.
So the amendment was lost.
Mr. CARRUTHERS:—Tennessee approves the sentiment of the
amendment, but she thinks the requisite security is already given.
Messrs. B      and C   , of Kentucky, and Mr. D   , of Maryland, asked
to have their dissent recorded from the votes of their respective States.
Mr. BARRINGER:—I wish to make a suggestion in relation to Mr.
F       '  substitute. I think it is not in order. The Conference has already
determined to perfect the committee's report, before substitutes are to be
considered.
Mr. CURTIS:—I now move to amend Mr. F       '  substitute, by
striking out all after the word "prohibit," in the third line, down to and
including the words "common law," and inserting instead thereof the words,
"but this restriction shall not apply to territory south of said line."
My proposition is offered in good faith, and to show that Iowa is disposed
to compromise. I do not say that this is as far as she will go. I have inserted
the very words used by our fathers. They prohibited slavery north and
tolerated it south of the line. This was the original proposition of Virginia. If
there is any thing in its ethics, they are Virginia ethics. Slavery now exists
in these Territories. Let it be there. There is slavery in Kansas, Utah, and
Nebraska. We cannot help it. It appears to me that the South ought to accept
this amendment. It recognizes the opinions of our fathers. This was
J        '  idea when he drew the ordinance of 1787.
The Constitution does recognize the relation of master and slave, in my
opinion. I do not like it, I confess. You in the South do not regard your
blacks as slaves in the absolute sense of the term. You have a right in their
services, not in their bodies. You recognize them as men in various ways.
Again I say, I do not offer this amendment to embarrass the action of the
Conference. It secures slavery south of 36° 30´.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—This amendment would not be satisfactory either to the
South or myself. In my judgment, it ought not to be adopted. We claim the
right under the Constitution as it is, to go into all the Territories of the
Union with our property. This right is confirmed to us by the decision of the
Supreme Court. There will be no compromise, if we cannot go home to our
people and tell them that you concede this right south of 36° 30´.
Otherwise, they would throw the propositions in our faces. As it stands, the
article gives you security, North. As it would be when this amendment is
adopted, it would give the South law and litigation. We want peace. We
cannot take this amendment.
Pending the consideration of the amendment offered by Mr. C     , on
motion of Mr. J    , the Conference adjourned to ten o'clock to-morrow
morning.
S I X T E E N T H  D A Y .
W         , S       , February 23d, 1861.
T   Conference was called to order at ten o'clock  . ., by President T    ,
and its proceedings commenced with prayer from Rev. Dr. B     .
The Journal of yesterday, in part, was read. The Secretary stated that he had
not found time to complete it.
Mr. ALEXANDER:—I move to rescind the resolution adopted yesterday
allowing ten minutes to a member proposing an amendment, and ten
minutes for the reply. I do not propose to discuss the motion. I think all will
agree upon the necessity of rescinding the resolution. This will leave the
five minutes' rule in full force.
A vote by States was asked by several members.
Mr. SEDDON:—I wish to call the attention of the Conference to this
subject for a moment. I hope the present rule will not be changed. The
debate up to yesterday was upon general questions. We have not yet gone
into detail. We tried the operation of the ten minutes' rule yesterday. I am
sure that it will not be claimed that any gentleman abused it.
Mr. JAMES:—We have scarcely discussed a question of detail connected
with an article in the committee's report.
Mr. ALEXANDER:—I will withdraw my motion.
Mr. VANDEVER:—I tried to offer a resolution yesterday which I deemed
important. It was then ruled out of order. I am sure it is in order now. It
reads as follows:
Resolved, That whatever may be the ultimate determination upon the
amendment of the Federal Constitution, or other propositions for
adjustment approved by this Convention, we, the members, do recommend
our respective States and constituencies to faithfully abide in the Union.
Mr. BRONSON:—I rise to a question of order. The report of the committee
and the amendments thereto, are the special order of business. We ought not
to permit collateral questions to be brought in. We adjourned yesterday with
the amendment proposed by Mr. F        as a substitute for the first
article of the committee's report before us. To that Mr. C     , of Iowa, had
offered an amendment, which was under discussion. Let us keep to our
rules.
The PRESIDENT:—I think the resolution of the gentleman from Iowa is in
order now.
Mr. VANDEVER:—I hope the question will be taken upon my resolution at
the present time. All the questions we have been discussing are, in my
judgment, secondary to another which ought to be first decided. Is this
Conference true to the Union—true under all circumstances? If so, I regard
it as highly important that the Conference should give some expression to
that effect. Even if we should settle this great contention about slavery to-
day, other questions might afterward arise. I am quite prepared to see a
claim set up, to what is called the right of peaceful secession. I would guard
against all such claims. The passage of this resolution would have a
beneficial effect upon the public mind. I think we still have a Government
which can protect itself and the nation. My constituents believe this
preliminary question quite as important as that of protecting slavery in the
Territories.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—I move to lay the resolution introduced by the
gentleman from Iowa, on the table.
Mr. BUTLER:—I want the resolution read again.
Mr. VANDEVER:—Let us all go on to the record. I ask a vote by States.
The resolution was read, and the vote being taken by States, resulted as
follows:
A   .—Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio—11.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa—9.
So the motion to lay the resolution on the table prevailed.
The PRESIDENT:—The Conference will now proceed to the consideration
of the order of the day. The question is upon the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Iowa, to the substitute for the first section of the report of
the committee, offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. HITCHCOCK:—I came into this Conference with the honest and single
purpose of healing the unfortunate differences which now distract the
country, having no sinister ends to answer. That purpose has hitherto
remained unchanged. To accomplish it, there is nothing I will not sacrifice
except principle and honor. I think the amendment of the gentleman from
Iowa is, in substance, just the same as Mr. F       '  substitute. In the one,
a fact is implied; in the other, the same fact is expressed. I understand that
neither proposition can command the support of those gentlemen in the
Conference who favor a National Convention. Neither can the amendment
command the approval of the border slave States. Certainly not all, if it can
any of them. The adoption, then, of this amendment, will operate as a defeat
of the first section of the proposed amendment of the Constitution. Neither
party in this Conference will accept it. While, therefore, I believe it ought to
be accepted—while I believe it amounts to nearly the same as the original
proposition, I will not peril the Union upon a mere question of form.
I did not come here to inquire into causes. Our differences exist, and I do
not think they were occasioned by the success of the Republican party in
the last Presidential election. The plotters against the Union have seized
upon the occasion to accomplish their designs.
By no fault of their own, several of the Border States are placed in a very
unfortunate position. They wish to remain in the Union, but their people
insist that certain of their rights shall be previously secured; in other words,
guaranteed.
It is my firm belief that if the inauguration of President L       was over,
if his administration had been for a few months in operation, we should all
be at peace. Now, we must act upon the facts as they are presented to us.
I must vote against the amendment of the gentleman from Iowa in order to
give the original proposition a fair chance. I wish to have it distinctly
understood that this is the reason why I cast my vote against his
amendment.
Mr. JAMES:—I do not rise to debate the question at length, now before the
Conference. I think that this amendment brings us at once to the true issue
which the case presents. We have hitherto been talking about abstractions.
Now we come directly to the point. As this is a Conference to settle
disputed questions, the sooner we come to the true points in issue, the
better.
What is the cause of our present differences? It is not found in any action of
the North. No Northern State proposes to disrupt the Union or to threaten its
stability. But certain of the Southern slave States come here and say to us
that certain alleged rights of theirs must be secured, or they cannot induce
their people to consent to remain in the Union.
I have heard a great deal said in this Conference about civil war. Now, civil
war is not a pleasant subject to consider; but, gentlemen, I pray you to
remember that the North proposes no civil war. She declines to consider the
subject at all, now. If civil war is brought upon the country, it will be your
work, not ours. The North will do all she can to stay your hands—to
prevent you from plunging the country into civil war. She will not enter
upon it until you force her to do so. When you begin it, and force her into
war in order to defend the Government and the Union, I have no doubt she
will enter the field and carry on civil war until the Union is restored and its
enemies put down. Let me ask you, gentlemen, who have so much to say
about war, whether you had not better leave that question where it is?
It has been assumed, and very often stated here, that the present
Constitution gives the right to the Southern slave owner to take his negroes
into any of the Territories of the United States, and hold them there as
slaves. I think it would be well for you not to act so entirely upon that
assumption. A different view prevails quite extensively at the North. It will
be a long time before that view is changed.
Now, you gentlemen of the South propose to restore the Missouri
Compromise line. To induce us to adopt it, you say that the territory south
of it is a barren, worthless desert—that slavery can never obtain a
substantial foothold there. Why, then, do you make the subject one of so
much importance? Why do you risk all the calamities of civil war and a
disruption of the Union for such a poor reward? We should distrust all your
statements, we should disbelieve all your professions of patriotism, if we
could for a moment credit the assertion that you would break up the Union
on such a worthless pretext.
You ring the changes in our ears upon the decision of the Supreme Court in
your favor. Let me tell you plainly that there is no section of the Union in
which the decisions of that court have been so fully and fairly respected and
observed as in the free States of the North. With that you should be
satisfied.
You are in trouble; that is evident. Your troubles have been caused by the
repeal of the Missouri Compromise. That, again, was your work, not ours.
We opposed the repeal to the end. You had the power and you carried it.
Now the North is indifferent about the restoration of that compromise; but if
that will satisfy you, restore the status quo, and the North will stand by you.
But you must not expect now, that the North will do any thing better for you
than to extend the provisions of the Missouri Compromise to the Pacific
Ocean.
Mr. CARRUTHERS:—The gentleman from New York who has last
addressed the Conference, appeals to us to accept the amendment now
proposed, upon the grounds of justice and equity. What is the present state
of the case? We claim the right to go into all the Territories with our
southern property. The Supreme Court has confirmed this right to us. With
this advantage in our favor, we have met here to compromise. What is the
proposition now? It is to give the North all the territory north of 36° 30´,
and to leave all questions concerning the territory south of that line without
any adjustment at all! That gentleman favors no compromise at all. He
proposes that we should go home without any adjustment. Shall we go back
to our excited people and say this: "The North will make no adjustment
with you"? Is this the way to settle the important questions that now distract
the country?
We have not come here for war; we have come here for peace. We have
come to settle all the questions between us upon a fair and equitable basis.
How are we met? Gentlemen from the North say they will give us nothing.
All we ask is right and justice—that right which the Constitution and the
Court has given us in all the territory, secured in one-third of it. With that
we will be content.
Some gentlemen object to the phraseology of the article. Let them have all
that their own way. They stop here to quarrel about words? Settle those as
you like, but we ask all the friends of the Union to stand by, and reject all
amendments which affect the substance of the article. Such a course will
end all contention.
We read in Sacred History that the Israelites were once so conscientious that
they would not fight on Sunday. They were attacked and overthrown. They
finally agreed to compromise the question of conscience so far as to fight in
self-defence on Sunday. They were attacked then, and the enemy was
overthrown.
The report is not such as we could wish it might be, but, such as it is, we
will accept it and stand by it. We will adopt it, and we ask the North to
adopt it, in the true spirit of compromise.
Mr. LOGAN:—I am under the necessity of believing that the gentleman
from Iowa is in earnest, in offering this amendment; but if I were to present
it, I should not expect any one to believe I was in earnest. What is the
compromise which this amendment proposes? It is, in substance, that the
North will take three-fourths of the Territory under the Constitution, and the
rest by force. If gentlemen entertain such views, we might as well come to a
direct vote at once, and see whether any thing can be done.
The gentleman from Iowa says this is the Missouri Compromise; but it
lacks much of it. Besides, circumstances have greatly changed since 1820,
when the compromise was adopted. Now, seven States have left us and
gone out of the Union, and we are acting in view of that fact. There is a
contest between the North and the remaining Southern States, and the latter
have no better chance in that contest alone, than Turkey had in the grasp of
the rugged Russian Bear. The gentlemen from these States do not threaten.
All they say is, "If we cannot agree longer together, let us go in peace. We
will fight only in self-defence."
They ask us further, "If we stay with you, how do you intend to treat us? As
equals, or as inferiors?" If as inferiors, we cannot sustain ourselves with our
people, saying nothing of our own self-respect. I acknowledge the force of
these inquiries.
A civil revolution terminated at the last election. The power to wield the
Government came into the hands of the Republicans. The circumstances
suddenly change. Political power leaves the South. What now shall we give
them in place of that? Shall we leave these States at our mercy? This is an
earnest time. We should act as if the fate of a great nation depended on our
action. If we intend to say we will do nothing, let us say so plainly, and not
by indirection.
Mr. MOREHEAD, of North Carolina:—I thank GOD I hear a voice such as
I have just heard from that section of the country (Iowa)! I have been a
member of a recent Legislature of North Carolina, in which there was a
majority of secessionists. I have been jeered at in that body for the opinions
I have expressed, for I have told those gentlemen repeatedly that if we
could once get the ear of the North, the North would do us justice. They
pointed me to the raid of J    B    —to the meeting in Boston, where
the gallows of J    B     was carried with solemn ceremonies into the
Cradle of Liberty. They pointed me to the man who presided over that
meeting, since elevated to the high and honorable position of Governor of
Massachusetts. Notwithstanding all this, I have replied that the masses of
the northern people would deal fairly by us. I have told these secessionists
to their teeth that Mr. L       was properly elected under the Constitution,
and that he ought to be inaugurated. Their reply was, "Kansas, and the J   
B     raid!"
Now, I ask this Conference to look for one moment at the effect of the
amendment which is proposed. It withdraws all constitutional protection
from us north of 36° 30´. Adopt it, and what has Massachusetts to do but to
import her foreigners into the country south, and take possession of it. New
York will back her, and we shall be swept from the face of the earth.
If the gentleman from New York means to say that the nation can put its
foot on to the neck of the States and crush them into submission, let him go
into Virginia and join in another J    B     raid. Virginia will treat him
as she did J    B    . No! the gentleman has not studied the motto of the
Union. There is the E pluribus as well as the unum. If the new President
proposes to come down to the South and conquer us, he will find that the
whole temple shall fall. We can be crushed, perhaps, but conquered, never!
Mr. BRADFORD:—Maryland has, under the lead of her constitutional
Chief Magistrate, determined to preserve her position of neutrality, and not
by any action of hers to add to the prevailing excitement on either side. She
has done what she could to allay the existing irritation, and will continue to
pursue the same policy she has hitherto adopted.
Here is a large file of amendments. Almost every delegation has given
notice of an intention to offer one or more. If we begin to adopt them, I feel
sure that we shall destroy all hope of an ultimate agreement.
Mr. President, I desire to make an emphatic declaration to this Conference.
It is this: Give us the report as it came from the committee, without
substantial alteration, and there is no power on earth that can draw the State
of Maryland out of the Union! Maryland has been called the heart of the
Union. The day she leaves the Union, that heart is broken! I am now
inclined to set my face against all amendments. I think that is the better
course.
In the populous section of the State where I reside, the universal cry is, "For
God's sake, settle these questions!" Why can we not settle them? The
committee inform us that the members of which it is composed, were nearly
unanimous upon all points except the territorial question. Will reasonable
men not yield a little to each other in order to settle that?
Then let us look calmly at the consequences which must follow our
disagreement. I will enter into no panegyric of the Union. To use an often
repeated expression, it needs none. It is enshrined in the hearts of the people
with all the glories of the past, with all the glorious hopes of the future. It
has given us a position in the front rank of the nations. There is every
prospect that it will make us in the end the most powerful among the
nations. Who can look unmoved upon the spectacle of such a Union about
to fall into fragments? What sacrifice too great to avert such a ruin?
We all understand, we all agree that we can save the Union by settling this
miserable question of slavery in the Territories. We should be unworthy of
ourselves and our trusts, if we set our division upon this question above the
preservation of the Union. How can it be possible that Union men, or even
politicians, can hesitate as to which path ought to be taken? One leads to
ruin, the other to a haven of safety.
It will be a world-wonder hereafter, if we do not agree. The people—the
whole country, will stand aghast at the spectacle of folly we present. I
would not, for all the wealth and honors the nation could bestow, be
remembered hereafter as a man who stood between these measures of
pacification and the people who should finally decide upon them. I would
not have the priceless blessing of the Union put in peril for a single hour,
when its safety can be purchased at so small a cost.
Mr. HACKLEMAN:—The civilized world is amazed at the present
condition of one of the greatest Governments on the face of the earth. I
participate in that amazement myself. What is that condition? In a time of
profound peace, of great prosperity, with the Government itself in the hands
of southern men, State after State has dared to attempt to sever its
connection with the Union. Even Florida, which has cost us so many
millions, which ever since we had her has been a constant slough of
expenditure, says we cannot even have the national property which happens
to be within her territorial limits!
I am not so strong a believer in the effect of legislative action as many
others. I have looked at the main points of our differences in the light of
history, and it is my belief that the laws of soil and climate will settle this
question of slavery in the Territories, much more effectually than we can
settle it by any legislative or constitutional provisions.
The Missouri Compromise once settled this Territorial question in a manner
satisfactory to the South. Through the influence of the South it was
repealed. Now the South desires to have its provisions restored. As I
understand the amendment of the gentleman from Iowa, it exactly restores
the status quo.
We are told, farther, that the natural allies of the border slave States have
left them; that, reduced in numbers, they cannot maintain their position
against the North. This assumes that the North is hostile to the South. I deny
it. I say that my state is the natural ally of Kentucky, a more powerful ally
than she ever had South.
Parties are governed by certain natural laws. A party which adopts a
principle at war with the sentiments of the people may succeed for a time
by the force of party drill, but in the end it will go down. The C      
doctrine destroyed a party. Under the operation of the same law the
Democratic party has gone down. But you cannot destroy a party before its
time. The effort of Virginia now is to overthrow the Republican party. The
effort will not succeed. It is equivalent to an attempt to overthrow the
country.
I am not frightened at this idea of giving guarantees. I do not think them of
much importance. I am willing to give such as are reasonable. We hold to a
certain extent to your doctrine of State sovereignty, and would protect it.
Our people North and South are too much alike in many respects. We are all
inclined to stand too much upon party abstractions. This is almost the only
reason why we cannot agree.
We are told that some things stated here grate harshly upon the ears of
gentlemen from the South. The converse of this is equally true. I can take a
rebuke, I trust, in a good temper, but I do not like to be stabbed in the house
of my friends. I do not like to have doctrines and opinions imputed to me
and my party which are only entertained by a little knot of fanatical
abolitionists in the neighborhood of Boston; a few men who will not vote
under the present Constitution, and who are led and controlled by L    
G        and W       P       .
Mr. HOUSTON:—I am strongly averse to the introduction of the subject of
party into the deliberations of the Conference. I did not intend to allude to
party at all; but since the subject has been referred to in such impassioned
terms, I feel that I must say a word about it.
Many references have been made in this debate to the opinions of
W         . I wish his opinions were better observed and respected. I
refer to his appeal to his countrymen not to form parties with reference to
geographical lines, and asking them to frown indignantly upon every
attempt to form such parties.
What W          foresaw, at length has come to pass. Parties have been
formed, and are now in existence, divided by geographical lines, having no
interests or opinions in common. But no such parties can long exist without
threatening the stability of the Government.
So long as parties were national in their character; so long as they excluded
sectional interests from their platforms, their existence was a benefit rather
than an injury to the Union. Gradually they have all drifted toward
sectionalism, until now we find ourselves in a position which taxes the
ability and ingenuity of the ablest men to provide for the existence even of
our Government.
Now, I see no chance of safety for us until we reëstablish political parties
upon their old bases, excluding all sectional considerations. When this is
accomplished, the country is safe. It can only be done by settling this
territorial question, and removing all inducement to the formation of
sectional parties.
The election of Mr. L       was a fair election. It afforded no just pretext
for secession, much less for the formation of sectional parties, or for
creating sectional issues.
The time has come when the advice, the counsels of W         , become
his most precious legacy to the country. Shall we not regard the solemn
admonitions of the Father of his Country?
I would ask our friends from the North—for they are our friends and not
our enemies—whether they will not listen to these counsels of
W         ? He was always ready, always willing to submit to just
compromises, when they were necessary to the peace and happiness of his
country. Will they not emulate his example now?
Delaware does not feel any special interest in this question of slavery in the
Territories. She would have it settled in that way which would promote the
interests of the whole Union. Her present impression is, that the report of
the committee presents the most practicable and equitable mode of
adjustment. Long ago Delaware favored the abolition of the slave trade. She
has been consistent in her course on that question ever since. It is not
unlikely that she may soon favor the abolition of slavery within her limits.
Her progress has been in that direction. When the present Constitution was
adopted, Delaware had fifteen thousand slaves. Now she has not more than
eighteen hundred.
Mr. TUCK:—I recognize the reason and propriety of the wishes of the
gentleman from Maryland, to try the proposition now before the Conference
upon its merits. I certainly do not desire to have time taken up in
unnecessary delay. I do not think much of these statements about civil war.
Nor is there any attempt here to defame or injure any section. No member
here has any such intention. We seem to be divided into two parties. Both
are willing to act; neither asks for delay. One desires action through
Congress, the other through the people, acting in General Convention. We
all have confidence in the people. What do you see in this Conference?
One-half of the Republicans here, are ready to join hands with those who
would invoke the action of Congress, and carry their propositions through,
to send them at once to Congress. I am ready to carry your propositions
directly to the people.
A word now to the Democrats in this Conference. You have always been
our superiors in political address and management. You expect in four years
to bring the Government back under your control. My strong bias is in favor
of a General Convention. That bias I got from the old Democratic party.
The first mention of such an idea I found in an article in the "National
Intelligencer"—a paper which certainly does not advocate radical views. I
am aware of the opposition which this idea will meet with here, and yet I
have heard many gentlemen from the South say, that this idea carried out—
the question fairly submitted to the people, and decided by them, their
decision would be satisfactory. And would not many of the Southern slave
States be satisfied with a decision upon these questions by a General
Convention? Would not Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, and Tennessee be
willing to submit their interests to such a tribunal?
Now, I wish to ask the members representing the Southern States in this
Conference, whether, when we offer you a General Convention, fairly
elected, which shall patiently hear and firmly decide all our points of
difference, you had not better accept it? I assure you, gentlemen, in the most
perfect good faith, that a convention is the best alternative the North can
now offer you. It is a fair and an honorable alternative; and because it is so,
the North will insist that it ought to be satisfactory to you. If you refuse it, I
ask you whether, in the sight of GOD and Man, you will not have stood
between the country and peace? We act in secret here, but in the end all our
actions will be exposed to the world. It will be seen that we were ready to
do justice to you, and to submit all your claims to the final verdict of the
people. Should you not at least wait for their decision?
Mr. DONIPHAN:—Will the gentleman support these proposals of
amendment in a convention of the people, and will he use his influence to
elect members of such a convention who will do the same? If the North will
give us such pledges as will secure that kind of action, perhaps we will go
for a General Convention. Without such a pledge, a General Convention
would be worse than useless.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I am glad I have obtained the floor for a few minutes. I
feel that it will be very painful for me to address the Conference, on account
of physical debility.
But I came here with the single purpose of accomplishing the settlement of
one or two important questions. Permit me, once for all, and for the last
time, to tell the gentlemen from New Hampshire and Connecticut, that they
wholly misunderstand the import of the action of the Legislature of
Kentucky, and the views of the "Louisville Journal." I have said, before,
that in view of the fact that Congress could not settle our difficulties, the
Legislature of Kentucky asked for a National Convention, as our only hope
of making an adjustment. After this came the invitation of Virginia, like a
bright beam of hope. Virginia invited you all, New York, New Hampshire,
and Massachusetts, and the other States, to meet and consult for the public
safety. If you did not wish to secure our common safety, you should not
have accepted her invitation.
Mr. BOUTWELL:—Then we are to understand that if we do not favor the
C          resolutions, we should not have come here at all.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I say nothing of the kind. But I insist that you should
tell us now, what the conclusion is to which you have arrived. We want to
know what you gentlemen, representing the Northern States, intend to do.
Give us your votes. We have had enough of discussion, which amounts to
nothing. If you will consent to no arrangement, let us know it now. We have
a duty to perform toward our own people. We wish to relieve them from
suspense, so that they may determine what their future course shall be, in
view of the fact that you will do nothing for them.
Mr. COOK:—If Illinois had understood that she was only to come here for
the purpose of agreeing to the propositions of Virginia as announced in the
resolutions which accompanied her invitation, the Conference may be
assured that Illinois would not have appeared here at all. She understood
that she was invited to a Conference, in which all the States were to meet
upon a basis of perfect equality. The very resolutions of the Legislature of
Illinois, under which we received our appointments, assert that their
adoption is not to be regarded as an assent to the resolutions of Virginia.
We think we are not passing the limits of propriety, when we insist that we
should be permitted to state the views and opinions of the people of Illinois,
on the questions which this Conference proposes to decide. To state what
we will and what we will not concede. There seems to be an unwillingness
to give us this permission. If the people are now ready to give their sanction
to the propositions contained in the Virginia resolutions, they would send
delegates here who would accept these propositions without debate or
discussion. They have not yet done so. If they intended to limit our right of
private judgment, they have certainly not yet expressed any such intention.
They understand, and we have not forgotten, that there is a broad distinction
between the guaranty of old rights and the creation of new ones.
We now understand just what the South proposes. The question is plainly
and distinctly presented to us, whether we will assent to a constitutional
recognition of the right to hold slaves in a portion of the Territories of the
United States. It is not a question of prohibition at all. We are required to
assert the affirmative right of holding slaves independent of State laws, and
under the Constitution.
Gentlemen present us this question, and coolly tell us we want no more
discussion, no more arguments, no examination of our respective rights
under or outside the Constitution. We wish you to tell us at once whether
you will assent to our wishes or not. If you will not, then comes some dark
insinuations about going home to their people, and certain consequences are
to follow, of the precise nature of which we are not informed.
Gentlemen, when was the sanction of the American people ever secured to
an important proposition in such a way as this? If we are not to exercise our
judgment, and act according to its dictates, upon every proposal of
amendment here presented, then, for one, I care not how soon our
deliberations end. Until we better understand our relative positions than we
seem to at present, I do not see much use in prolonging the discussion.
Mr. EWING:—Some concession must be expected from both sides, or we
cannot agree. As a Northern man, I feel it to be my duty to get these
propositions made as acceptable to the North as I can, and then to ensure
their submission to the people. Even then, we are not committed to the
support of these propositions, though I myself should feel so to some
extent. A single question is now presented to us. Shall we accept these
propositions when they are perfected as far as they can be, or shall we
submit to a dissolution of the Union? I am willing to say that I will yield my
personal opinions for the purpose of concession, and I do not think I show
myself an inferior man by doing so. In all disputes, the firmest men are the
first to yield. Let a man be firm as a rock in battle, but conciliatory in
council; especially in such a council as this, where the lives of millions may
be concerned. There is a firmness which is but another name for
imprudence—for rashness. Take the case of a railroad collision. One
engineer may have the right of track; it may be the duty of all others to
recognize that right, and not interfere with his exercising it. But, if another
gets on to it, he who has the right would not be justified, if, in its exercise,
he ran blindly on, and produced a collision, destroying the lives of his
passengers, when he could have avoided the collision. So it is here. We may
be right—the North may be right; but we should not hazard the existence of
the Union by a determination to exercise that right at all events, when, by
some slight concessions, we could save the Union. Let us use our
judgments—let us act in view of the facts here presented, with that
prudence and discrimination which we apply to the ordinary affairs of life,
and all will yet be well.
Mr. KING:—I have not spoken hitherto, and should not now say a word,
but for the remark of the gentleman from Kentucky. I come here as one of
the representatives of the State of New York. As such I am the equal—the
peer of any representative of any other State on this floor. I do not intend to
be lectured into or intimidated from doing any thing which my judgment
tells me I should not do, or should do.
Speaking for New York, I say that she holds her allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the United States above and beyond
any other political duty or obligation. With this obligation always before
them, her representatives have come here to consult with you upon the
present condition of the country. I am as old as the gentleman from
Kentucky. I recognize no right in him to lecture me on my political duties. I
revere the Constitution of my country. I was educated to love it, and my
own father helped to make it. I cannot sit still and hear such declarations as
have been hourly repeated here for the last few days.
Mr. SEDDON:—Does the gentleman consider this a consolidated
Government or a confederation of States?
Mr. KING:—I consider this a confederation of States under the
Constitution, and that in all that respects the General Government, every
good citizen owes an allegiance to it above and beyond that which he owes
to his State or to any other political authority. And that statement comprises
nearly all I wish to say. The State of New York at all times, in peace or war,
has been loyal to the Constitution; and, although some of her
representatives here may undertake to make you think differently, she
always will be. Yes! loyal with all her strength and power! And as one of
her representatives, I shall yield nothing on her part to threats, menaces, or
intimidations. I believe the Constitution as it now stands gives you
guarantees enough—all you ought to have.
Mr. GOODRICH:—I ought not to permit this vote to be taken, without a
word of reply to the remarks of the gentleman from North Carolina. The
impression would certainly be derived from his speech that Governor
A     , of Massachusetts, approved of the J    B     raid. This is not
true. There is not a particle of truth in the assertion. There is a gentleman
here, who heard Governor A      state publicly when he first heard of
that raid, that J    B     must be crazy. It is true that a meeting was held
in Boston to raise funds to support the poverty-stricken family of J   
B    . Governor A     , I believe, presided; and a single paragraph
taken from some remarks he made on that occasion, has been scattered
broadcast over the country. In order to understand what he did say, both the
context and what followed it are indispensable. Those were carefully
suppressed. The opinions of Governor A      are well known. They are
in sympathy with those of the people of Massachusetts. Neither he nor they
approved the J    B     invasion.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—I call the gentleman to order. He is discussing a subject
which is strictly personal, having no connection with the report of the
committee, or the amendments offered to that report.
The PRESIDENT:—I think the remarks of the gentleman from
Massachusetts are not in order.
Mr. GOODRICH:—Well, I cannot proceed in order. I only desired to
correct a misapprehension. I do not quite understand why these
misrepresentations should be made, and then objections interposed to their
correction.
Mr. HOPPIN:—I rise, Mr. President, to address the Conference with great
reluctance. If there is a gentleman within the sound of my voice whose
heart is full of anxious solicitude for the safety of the country, he will know
how to sympathize with me. I do not represent a State containing four
millions of people, but one of the smallest in the Union; and yet little Rhode
Island has a heart which beats true to the Union. It so happened that she was
one of the last to accept the Constitution; but when she did accept it—when
she took upon herself its obligations—she became faithful to it, and she has
ever since been true.
I feel that my position is peculiar. I cannot judge of other men as some
gentlemen do. The North is full of men who do not concur in my opinions
upon the question of slavery. I know they are honest and honorable men. I
should do injustice to them and to myself, if I believed them to be either
corrupt or enemies of the Union and of good government; and it is just the
same in the South as in other sections. Looking around me upon these able
and patriotic representatives, who come here with full hearts and tell us of
their position—of the feelings of their people—of the anxiety and
apprehension which is so deeply felt among them, can I believe that these
men are dishonest? that they do not mean what they say? No, sir! Nobody
can be so unjust and unfair as that.
I think of these questions which we are discussing earnestly and
continually. My heart is torn by conflicting emotions. I wish to perform my
duty toward all sections, and I do feel sure that something must be done for
our southern friends. They wish to remain in the Union—they do not wish
to be driven out; and they tell us in all sincerity that something must be
done to satisfy their people, or they cannot keep them in the Union. I know
that the questions presented here are very embarrassing to the North, but we
must decide them. We must do the best we can, and the North will sustain
us; our constituents will approve our action.
Rhode Island wishes to act fairly by all. She does not herself, need any
amendments to the Constitution; but if her sisters need them, she will
consider their necessities. Her delegation here acts unitedly, and it's
members are influenced by the same spirit. We have done all we could to
bring ourselves to a rational conclusion; and we feel, my friends, as though
this body ought never to separate until we come to an agreement—until we
come to some compromise which will be satisfactory to all.
I cannot now, in the short time that remains, go into a minute examination
of the various points presented. This has been done by abler men. But I do
feel that although the questions may be difficult, there are none of them
which, as sensible men, we cannot settle. Don't let us forget our great
mission and descend into personal abuse. Do not let us forget our high
duties. Let us perform them in a friendly and a Christian spirit. Let us look
at the facts as they are. Let us not spend our time in trying to find out who
struck the first blow, or who is responsible. Let us all unite together in one
great, final effort to save the country and the Union.
As matters now stand, we who represent Rhode Island can see no way more
desirable than to vote for and support the report of the committee. And yet
we do not insist upon that report. Show us any thing better, and we will go
for it. But we will do nothing to widen the breach—we will do all we can to
heal it. My friends, I say once more, let us go to work earnestly, and do not
let us separate and go to our homes, until we can carry with us the glorious
news that we have healed up all dissensions and adopted a plan that will
secure the Union and make it perpetual.
Mr. CROWNINSHIELD:—I understand that the proposition of the
gentleman from Iowa is to restore the Missouri Compromise. If so, does not
his proposition commend itself to the Conference as one that will command
the respect and support of the country? I have asked, many others have
asked, what is the cause of our present difficulties? The question meets no
direct reply—no definite answer. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise is
referred to, hinted at, as the principal cause. If an answer were extorted, I
think it would be, the repeal of that Compromise.
The history of the Missouri Compromise is so simple that we all understand
it. Southern men forced the measure upon the North. The few northern men
who voted for it were swept out of their political existence at the election
which followed its passage. Which section is responsible for its repeal—the
North or the South? You say its repeal was moved by a northern man. Very
true! But he was a northern man who had adopted southern principles, and
who sought to secure the favor of the South by this act. Southern men
supported his proposition and carried it through Congress against the votes
and the remonstrances of the North.
The South, then, established and destroyed the Missouri Compromise. The
South wishes to have its provisions restored. Why, then, are you not
satisfied to have it put into the Constitution, and so make it permanent and
perpetual, if the North will consent to it? Are the circumstances of the
South so much changed? If it was equitable in 1820, à fortiori it ought to be
equitable in 1861. Territory has been acquired since 1820, it is true, but it is
all or nearly all, south of the compromise line. Restore the Missouri
Compromise and this territory will be devoted to southern institutions.
What territory has been acquired since? Will gentlemen reply, "Oregon"? I
insist that Oregon was virtually acquired before. It only required the final
agreement upon a boundary line.
If there is any proposition in which the North can concur—any that will
restore harmony between the North and the South—it is the restoration of
the Missouri Compromise. If any other is proposed less favorable or just to
the North, I do not believe the people will adopt it.
I am not insensible to the condition of the country. Neither are my
colleagues, nor the constituents they represent. But you must not expect us
here, in the worst emergency you can imagine, to forget or throw away the
rights of our people. If we consent to support this amendment, it is as far as
we can go. You ought not to ask us to go farther.
Mr. DENT:—I will only occupy one moment. Maryland has spoken in
language which satisfies me. As I understand him, I concur in what my
colleague has said.
Now the nut is to be cracked. The majority report proposes to give up three-
fourths of our territory to the North absolutely, retaining the little balance
for the South. The amendment proposes to pick the kernel out of the
balance, and to leave the husks to us. To that we shall agree when we are
compelled to; not before.
Mr. JOHNSON, of Missouri:—The Supreme Court has already decided, in
terms which are not ambiguous, that Congress has no right, under the
Constitution, to prohibit slavery in the Territories. Now, our brethren of the
North propose to give us the Missouri Compromise. What do they mean?
Do they intend to give us a substantial right—one that we can enforce and
rely upon, or do they intend to keep it from us? They are shrewd as well as
honorable men. They know that the effect of this amendment will be to
leave the territory south of the line, without the slightest acknowledgment
or guaranty, just where it is at the present time, so far as slavery is
concerned.
The construction placed upon the Missouri Compromise was, that the
prohibition of slavery north of the line which it established, implied the
right of holding slaves south of the line. At the time of its adoption there
was, in respect of this construction, no difference of opinion: Such was the
construction of Mr. W      .
Now you propose to leave it still for Congress to legislate as to the territory
south. You secure that north, by a prohibition in the Constitution; you will
get that south, by the action of Congress.
The decision in the Dred Scott case may be reversed. It afforded no
permanent protection. One of your leaders (Mr. W     ) says he will war
against it. The gentleman from New York (Mr. S    ) denies the force of
the decision in this respect. Now, gentlemen, all we of the South want, is to
have this question settled. You know well that the adoption of this
amendment, so far from settling it, leaves it all open; or rather it settles the
question North, and leaves it open South. The country is in danger—that all
concede. Will you, because you do not agree in opinion with the Supreme
Court, refuse to join us in one more effort to save the country?
Mr. CLAY:—I have not unnecessarily occupied a moment of the time of
this Conference, and it is not now my intention to occupy the whole ten
minutes to which I am entitled. But I do wish to express some of the
opinions which I entertain upon the questions immediately under our
consideration. "Red Gauntlet" has been cited as an authority in this body,
but I think I might cite another of the same class which would be more in
point. It is the "Bleak House," by Charles Dickens, in which the
circumlocution office is so graphically described. It would be decidedly
more appropriate to our present action.
Why have we come together? What brought us here? We have come to
devise the means of saving a distracted and bleeding country. What the
South asks you to do, is, to recognize the property which her citizens
possess; and when they take that property to the Territories, to secure its
protection there, or rather to protect it south of the line of 36° 30´. Will you
do it? Are you going to do it? If you intend to recognize our property south
of this line, write it down so plain that my constituents can understand it—
so that they will not be cheated. If you intend to do nothing, let us know it
at once. We will then know what to expect, and how to advise our people.
The question of slavery is but an incident to the great questions which are at
the bottom of our divisions. Such differences have brought war after war
upon Europe. It is, after all, the old question of the balance of power
between the different sections and different interests. Who does not
remember that in 1832 and 1833 the Tariff brought up the same questions?
Why did South Carolina then threaten to nullify? Because nullification then,
was one of the effects which the disregard of the rights of a section caused.
The South have always insisted upon terms of equality with the North. To
this equality no one can deny she is justly entitled. So long as new States
came in pari passu, North and South, she was satisfied. When this
equilibrium was disturbed, she began to insist upon guarantees. Now, when
you propose to put the point of equilibrium out of sight altogether, the
South insists upon these guarantees, as not only necessary, but
indispensable to her safety. This is right and fair. The North would insist
upon the same thing, under like circumstances.
Gentlemen from the North have complained here that we have not stated
exactly what would satisfy us. We have told you what we wanted over and
over again. We want the C          resolutions. We told you that, when
we first came here. We have now been here for nearly four weeks, and the
C          amendment has never once been submitted to a vote. Since our
difficulties first assumed importance, there has never been a measure of
pacification suggested which has met with such a measure of acceptance as
the C          resolutions. State after State has sent petitions to Congress
asking for their adoption. Almost the entire South, with Virginia, the
Mother of States, in the advance, tells you that these resolutions will be an
acceptable measure of pacification, and yet you will not give us a vote upon
them; you will scarcely consent to consider them. Even the committee,
whose report is so unsatisfactory to the North (and a portion of the South
also), does not appear to have given them much attention.
Mr. President, in behalf of the South, I think I know what to say. If our
differences are to be settled at all, we must have our property in our slaves
in the Territories recognized; and when that property is constitutionally
recognized, it must be constitutionally protected. Such, I know, are the
sentiments of the people of Kentucky.
Mr. ALLEN:—I wish to ask the attention of the Conference for only one
moment to the true aspect of the question now before us. We are asked if we
will suffer the Union to be destroyed on account of the Territory of New
Mexico. Let me ask these gentlemen who it is that proposes to break up and
destroy the Union? It is the South—it is not the North. But all that I pass by.
If it were merely a question of who should have the beneficial possession of
our present unoccupied territory, we would give that up at once to the
South. But it is not a question of possession at all. It is the question which
shall control and give direction to the policy of the country—the institutions
of Slavery or the institutions of Freedom! You ask for a provision in the
Constitution which will place that policy under the control of the
institutions of slavery. This we cannot grant you.
We of the North stand where our fathers did, who resisted the Stamp Act;
who threw overboard the tea in Boston harbor. We have been taught to
resist the smallest beginnings of evil; that this is the true policy. Obsta
principii was the motto of our fathers. It is ours. The debates of this
Conference, and those of the Convention of 1787, will stand in a strange
contrast to each other.
Mr. BALDWIN:—I now offer the minority report of the committee, with
the accompanying resolutions as an amendment to—
The PRESIDENT:—The gentleman from Connecticut is not in order.
The vote was then taken by States, upon the amendment offered by Mr.
C     , to the substitute proposed by Mr. F       , for the first article of
the section reported by the General Committee, with the following result:
A   .—Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, and New York
—6.
N   .—New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky,
Missouri, and Ohio—12.
And the amendment was lost.
Mr. CORNING:—I dissent from the vote of New York.
Mr. WILMOT:—I wish to be recorded as voting Aye!
Mr. DODGE:—I dissent; I am against the amendment.
Mr. WOOD:—I wish my vote recorded in favor of the amendment.
Mr. COOK:—And so do I.
Mr. LOGAN:—I am the other way.
Mr. TUCK:—I dissent from the vote of New Hampshire.
Mr. GRANGER:—And I from that of New York.
Mr. WOLCOTT:—I dissent from the vote of Ohio. I notice that my
colleague, Mr. C    , is not present at this moment.
Mr. BRONSON:—I also dissent from the vote of New York. My associate,
G  . W   , is confined to his room by a severe indisposition. For his
benefit, and as I know he feels a deep interest in these votes, and desires to
have his name appear upon the record, in his behalf I offer the following
resolution:
Resolved, Whereas J    E. W   , a delegate from New York, is unable to
attend the Convention, from sickness, therefore that he be permitted, when
he does attend, or by communication in writing to the Secretary, to have his
dissent recorded, as to any vote of his State.
This resolution was agreed to without a division.
The PRESIDENT:—The question now will be upon the adoption of the
substitute proposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. F       ),
to the first section of the article reported by the committee.
Mr. FRANKLIN:—Before that question is taken, I desire to accept certain
verbal amendments which have been proposed by various members, which
will, I think, improve the substitute which I offer. These amendments are as
follows:
1st. In the fifth line, as printed, after the words "nor shall any law be
passed," insert the words "by Congress or the Territorial Legislature."
2d. In the sixth line, after the words "the taking of such persons," insert
"from any of the States of this Union."
3d. In the eighth line, before the words "according to the common law,"
insert the words "course of the."
4th. In the seventh line, after the words "prevent the taking of such
persons," insert the words "from any State in the Union."
These amendments I adopt, and wish them to be treated as incorporated into
my substitute.
The PRESIDENT:—Such will be assumed as the pleasure of the
Conference, as no objection is made.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I am content, on the part of the committee, that the
substitute offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania should be adopted in
the place of the first section of the article reported by the committee. It
amounts to the same thing, and is expressed in shorter and better language.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN:—I move to amend Mr. F       '  substitute as
follows:[3] I think these words would be more acceptable to the people of
the Northern States.
Mr. PALMER:—Does not the gentleman's amendment involve an
Hibernicism? I think if we are to adopt the report of the committee, the
F        amendment admits of no improvement. It had better stand as it
is. If we undertake to change it we shall all get to sea.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN:—I withdraw my proposition.
Mr. JAMES:—It was moved yesterday to insert the words, "or facilitate"
after the words "hinder or prevent," in that part of Mr. F       ' 
amendment which negatives the right to pass laws. What was done with
that?
Mr. FOWLER:—Nothing. I moved it, and I insist upon the motion.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I submit to the Conference whether this amendment is
necessary or proper. Suppose some new question arises relating to slavery
which it may be greatly for the interest of the Territory to protect. Suppose
mines are discovered, and the Territory should want slaves to work them.
Shall we put it into the Constitution that no law shall be passed to
encourage their emigration?
Mr. BRONSON:—I see no need of it.
Mr. JAMES:—The point generally comes out. Now you say that you will
have the right to go into the Territory with your slaves, and no law shall be
passed to prevent you, no matter how much such a law would promote the
material interests of the Territory. The converse of this you will not agree
to. You are not content to let slavery stand by itself, you must have it nursed
by the Territorial Legislatures. Does slavery always require such partiality?
I say the power of the Legislature should be exercised on both sides, or it
should not be exercised at all. I am trying to perfect the article. If it is to
pass, and go to the people as a measure of pacification, and if you expect
them to adopt it, you must not have it so one-sided and unfair. The people
will understand it—it will be our duty to explain it to them, and to give
them its history.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—But your amendment would prohibit the passage of a law
permitting the transit of a slaveholder through the Territory with his
property. Remember, also, that the prohibition only continues so long as the
territorial condition exists.
Mr. SMITH:—Before this vote is taken, I wish to call attention to the
character of the prohibition. "Nor shall any law be passed to hinder or
prevent the taking of such persons to said Territory, nor to impair the rights
arising from said relation," &c. Now, this is very broad. Suppose a law
giving the right of transit to the people of the free States, or any law for
their protection in the Territory, as inhabitants, is held by the Territorial
Judge to "impair the rights arising from said relation." He holds it
unconstitutional. Where is the remedy? What views are entertained upon
some of these points in some sections of the South we know. If you do not
adopt this amendment it is quite in the power of the Legislature to exclude
any person from the Territory whose presence there may be thought
injurious to slavery. Did the committee intend this?
The question upon the adoption of Mr. F     '  amendment resulted as
follows:
A   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa—10.
N   .—New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio—10.
So the amendment was rejected.
Mr. GROESBECK:—I move to amend the substitute offered by Mr.
F       , by inserting after the words "nor shall any law be passed," the
words "by Congress or the Territorial Legislature." I think this is necessary
to make our intention plain. Otherwise it might be said that the prohibition
did not apply to Congress.
Mr. FRANKLIN:—I think the suggestion a very proper one. I will accept
the amendment.
Mr. WILMOT:—I only wish to understand where we are. Have we disposed
of the word "facilitate"?
The PRESIDENT:—That amendment was not adopted.
Mr. WILMOT:—Then I move to insert before the word "status," the word
"legal."
Mr. RUFFIN:—That raises again every question we have been discussing.
The word, as used in the substitute, only refers to the status in fact.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—This brings up all our old troubles. Let us reject it.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—I wish to understand this subject, and what will be the
effect of adopting this amendment. I understand that the slave has what we
call a status. The substitute of Mr. F        is intended specifically to
recognize and protect that status in the Territories as fully as it is protected
and recognized in the States. I think it has that effect. Adopt the
amendment, and the effect is precisely the opposite. The amendment
rescinds the status.
Mr. PALMER:—I wish to make an inquiry of the mover. Does the
amendment, after all, make any difference? Must not any status, not against
law, be, of necessity, a legal status?
Mr. WILMOT:—No. I think there is a wide difference, and the South thinks
so. One is a status in fact, the other, one in law.
Mr. LOGAN:—I hope we shall not adopt the amendment. We all want these
questions settled. The amendment opens them all wider than before. If we
intend to give the South the right she asks for, and, as I think, rightfully asks
for, let us give it to her in plain and unequivocal language. Let us not give
her a legacy of litigation, by using words which mean one thing or the
opposite, according to the construction you place upon them. I wish to settle
all these questions fairly. The amendment leaves the question as to what
constitutes a legal status, to be decided by the Court. The North would
claim that there cannot be such a thing as a legal status, a legal condition of
slavery. The South would claim the opposite.
Mr. WILMOT:—If the amendment of the gentleman from North Carolina
had been adopted, I would not have moved this. The section then would
have been unambiguous and clear. Now it is all open to construction.
Mr. CHASE:—In my judgment it is unimportant whether the amendment is
adopted or not. The condition of the slave in the Southern States is one
arising out of law, established by legislative provisions. Status in fact must
mean status in law as well as status in fact.
I have listened with attention to the appeals made by gentlemen who urge
the interests of the South in favor of a settlement of these questions. But
you are now prosecuting a plan which will be the subject of debate
throughout the country. Adopt your article in either form, and the question,
What does status mean? will still remain.
A majority of the people have adopted the opinion that under the
Constitution slavery has not a legal existence in the Territories. The triumph
of this opinion is not the result of any sudden impulse. A President has been
elected, and a Government will soon be organized, whose duty it will be to
respect and observe the opinions of the people. You are now seeking, by the
adoption of a single section, to change these opinions and this policy. Do
not deceive yourselves, gentlemen. You will never accomplish this result so
easily. You are presenting such a subject for debate and excitement as the
country never had before. It is best we deal frankly.
The vote was taken upon the adoption of the amendment, and resulted as
follows:
A   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa—9.
N   .—Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio—11.
And the amendment was rejected.
Mr. GOODRICH:—I move to insert in the substitute offered by Mr.
F       , after the words "south of that line," the words "not embraced by
the Cherokee treaty."
A word of explanation. Do we intend to prohibit the Cherokee Nation from
changing the status of persons within their Territory, if they think proper to
do so? Would not this be a violation of our understanding, if not of our
treaty stipulations with these Indians?
Mr. EWING:—I have looked into this subject, and I do not think the
proposition would be improved by the amendment.
Mr. GOODRICH:—Then I will withdraw it for the present.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I hope the vote on the main question will now be taken. It
is evident that the sense of the majority is against accepting amendments.
Mr. GOODRICH:—That obliges me to renew my motion. I do renew it, and
ask for a vote by States.
The vote upon the amendment offered by Mr. G        was taken, with
the following result:
A   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa—11.
N   .—Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri—9.
So the amendment was adopted.
Mr. TURNER:—I move to amend the substitute offered by Mr. F       ,
by inserting after the words "hinder or prevent," the words "or encourage."
I think there is a palpable difference between the word "encourage" and the
word "facilitate." The former is broader and less restricted. If this measure
is to be commended to the favor of the North, it should be deprived of this
one-sided character.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—We have already decided this question. In every practical
sense the words are synonymous.
The vote was taken upon the amendment offered by Mr. T     , and
resulted as follows:
A   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa—10.
N   .—New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio—10.
And the amendment was lost.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I ask the Conference now to let us have a vote.
Mr. SEDDON:—Not just yet. I move to amend the substitute offered by the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, by the insertion after the clause providing for
the division of the territory, of the following:
"All appointments to office in the Territories lying north of the line 36° 30´,
as well before as after the establishment of Territorial governments in and
over the same, or any part thereof, shall be made upon the recommendation
of a majority of the Senators representing, at the time, the non-slaveholding
States. And, in like manner, all appointments to office in the Territories
which may lie south of said line of 36° 30´, shall be made upon the
recommendation of a majority of the Senators representing, at the time, the
slaveholding States. But nothing in this article shall be construed to restrain
the President of the United States from removing, for actual incompetency
or misdemeanor in office, any person thus appointed, and appointing a
temporary agent, to be continued in office until the majority of Senators as
aforesaid may present a new recommendation; or from filling any vacancy
which may occur during the recess of the Senate; such appointment to
continue ad interim. And to insure, on the part of the Senators, the selection
of the most trustworthy agents, it is hereby directed that all the net proceeds
arising from the sales of the public lands, shall be distributed annually
among the several States, according to the combined ratio of representation
and taxation; but the distribution aforesaid may be suspended by Congress,
in case of actual war with a foreign nation, or imminent peril thereof."
Mr. SEDDON:—I invite the careful and deliberate attention of the
Conference to the provisions of this amendment. It is commended by high
authority. It is commended by nothing inferior to the wisdom and
experience of our honored President. It is intended as a division of the
territory between the North and the South.
Now, to insure a fair operation of the provisions of the Constitution, as they
will stand in that instrument when amended as we propose, we deem it very
essential that the rights of the southern section should be secured by such an
amendment as this. It will be noticed that Mr. F       '  substitute
precludes us from any appeal to Congress or the Territorial Legislatures for
affirmative protection. The powers of those bodies will be negative only.
We have nothing left, then, but the Federal Courts. We ask now that we may
not be subjected to the government and power of Federal officers, whose
opinions are against us—who will exercise those powers for our oppression.
Congress or the President may send into a Territory in the southern section,
a set of officers who are anti-slavery propagandists, who will exercise all
their official powers to our injury. I hold this amendment to be eminently
just and fair. We have no protection from Congress; none from the
Legislature. Is there a chance, even, unless such a provision is adopted, that
the South will ever be placed in the favorable possession or enjoyment of
the rights you are willing to concede to us?
The latter portion of the amendment is equally just. The Government holds
the public lands in trust. It is better to divide their proceeds at short
intervals, and thus remove the subject from all danger of corrupting
influences. But I shall leave this to be discussed by the mover.
Mr. PALMER:—I move to rescind the ten-minute rule adopted by the
Conference, so far as the President is concerned.
The motion of Mr. P      was agreed to without a division.
President TYLER:—I am very grateful for the compliment which the
Conference extends to me in the vote which has just passed. I will not abuse
its kindness.
The amendment which is offered may, at first sight, appear to be
extraordinary; but I wish to say, in all seriousness, that all my experience in
public life leads me to favor its adoption. I wish to have the Conference
understand fully its import and meaning.
That policy is the best, which reduces within the narrowest limits the
patronage to be exercised by the Executive authority. Every party out of
power has discovered that in the patronage of the President there is a voice
of greater potency than is heard elsewhere in the Government. This
amendment places a limitation upon the power of the President. It confers
upon a majority of the Senators from each section the power to recommend
appointments to office, and this will be found in practice equivalent to the
power of appointment. It is the only practicable limitation of Executive
patronage. The power of the Executive in this Government is very great.
Limit it, abridge it as you may, and the President will have a power in the
Government which is not possessed by any sovereign of any throne in
Europe.
This is not a political question. Our warrant for the adoption of this plan
will be found in the tranquillity it will give to the country—in the peace
which will result from it. We are now settling differences between the
States. Adopt this provision, and we secure unanimity forever. You will
always find that dissatisfaction is confined to limited portions of the
country. The North is content with the existing state of things—so is three-
fourths of the South. Remove this power from the Executive, and those
measures will be adopted which will promote the welfare of the greater
number. Do you not see that you have in this way good security for the
selection of the best men?
Suppose the Government should start to day on this new policy—that it
should avoid all propagandism—should place honest, competent men, only,
in office—should let all others understand that there was no chance for
them—should permit both sides, all sides to be fairly represented. You
would ensure peace, secure quiet in the country forever. You would thus
heal the wound, not cicatrize it. How small would be the cost of so great a
victory!
May I not go one step farther. I have heard with pleasure the feelings
expressed, the references made, to the Cotton States. I have scarcely heard
an unkind word said against them. We have come here to cement the Union
—to make that Union, of which gentlemen have so eloquently spoken,
permanent, noble, and glorious in the future as it has been in the past—not
to be content with it as a maimed and crippled Republic.
Now, eight flourishing States are practically lost to us. The crest of the
noble Mexican Gulf has separated from us. Let us exert every power we
possess to bring them all back to the fold. Why should we not? Every
motive of interest or patriotism should induce us to do so. Suppose the
States were vacillating and in doubt where to go. Suppose they were set up
for sale in market overt, and the States of Europe were to bid for them—for
this, not only the richest portion of our own country, but of the world—
because this portion of our land has an element of wealth and power which
must be prized and valued wherever commerce is known. What would not
one of the Powers of Europe give for this favored section? The treasures of
the continent would be opened. Nations would unlock the caskets of their
crown jewels to secure it. England would double her national debt to have
it; so would France; so would Russia. And yet we stand here higgling over
these little differences which alone have caused our separation. Is it not
better that we should rise to the level of the occasion, and meet the
requisition of the times, instead of expending precious hours in the
discussion of these miserable abstractions?
We talk about the events of the Revolution and their consequences. Have
we forgotten our revolutionary history? Have we forgotten the M      ,
the S      , the P      , of those times? Has the spirit of sacrifice which,
animated those men wholly departed from their descendants? God forbid!
Our body politic is not free from disease. The disease should be treated
properly and judiciously. Whenever disease shows itself we should apply a
suitable remedy—one that is suggested by the pharmacy of mutual
brotherhood, and yet powerful enough to reach every nerve in our political
system.
It is to accomplish this purpose that we have come together. It is to secure
this desirable result that I urge the adoption of this amendment. I press it
because I feel that it will give peace to all sections. Adopt it, and from that
moment you may date the beginning of the return of the seceded States into
the fold of the Union. How heartily would we welcome their return! Do we
not all desire it? Has not Virginia a heart large enough to give them their old
place in the Union? Has not Rhode Island and New Jersey?
I say my proposition will accomplish this, and a single reason will disclose
the ground of my faith. It preserves the equilibrium, the balance of power,
between the sections. It enables each section to appoint its own officers, to
protect its own interests, to regulate its own concerns. It is fair and equal in
its operations. With it, no section can have any excuse for dissatisfaction. I
pledge the united support of the South to the Union, if it is adopted.
The latter branch of the amendment looks to the annual distribution of the
net proceeds of the sales of the public lands among the several States. This
was one of the favorite ideas of H     C   . His argument upon this
subject, to my mind, was always conclusive. Will the party which has
adopted his principles repudiate this, or will its members put their feet down
firmly and give it their support?
I have watched the operations of this Government with great interest and
care, and I have noticed that every approach toward making each source of
revenue or expenditure separate and independent of all others, tended to the
profit and advantage of the Government, and increased the chances of
securing honorable and honest agents to transact its business. A marked
instance of this will be found in the administration of the affairs of the Post
Office Department. And here I cannot refrain from relating an anecdote
which is strongly in point, and which forms one of the pleasantest
recollections of my own connection with the administration of the General
Government.
Upon a certain occasion I called my cabinet together. Sad complaints had
been made concerning the administration of several of the Departments, and
the press had not failed to predict heavy losses to the Government through
the dishonesty and the defalcations of its agents. I determined that I would
know what the facts were, and I directed all the departments to furnish me,
by a certain day, with a correct and accurate list of all their defaulting
employés, and on the same day I summoned my cabinet to consider these
reports. The lists came in from the several Departments, and I assure the
Conference that they were formidable enough to give ample occasion for
anxiety. But the list from the Department of the Post Office was not
forthcoming. My friend, Governor W        , was at that time at the head
of that Department. The day of the cabinet meeting arrived. We were all
assembled but the Postmaster General. We waited for a long time for him
and for his report. At length he came, bringing his report with him, but with
the marks of great care and anxiety upon his brow. He had discovered a
defalcation in his Department. He had been occupied for a long time in
tracing it out, but he had at length succeeded. He came to announce to the
President that the postmaster of a certain "Cross Roads" in Kentucky had
absconded, and defrauded the Government out of the sum of fifteen dollars!
and worst of all, his bail had run away with him!!
This is only one of the many proofs which my own experience would
furnish of the propriety, if not the necessity of keeping each Department of
the Government by itself—of not connecting it with others, and of making
the agents of each Department responsible to itself alone. Carry this idea
into practice in all the Departments of the Government, and a better class of
agents would be secured, and the loss by defaulters would be much
lessened.
The enormous increase of the expenditures of the General Government
might, by the same process, be prevented. How does it happen that in a time
of peace these expenses have risen from twenty-three millions of dollars up
to seventy or eighty millions? In the same proportion, the sum to which
they will reach in another decade will be frightful! It is high time that a stop
was put to this lavish expenditure, and especially to the losses by dishonest
agents. The plan here proposed will give you a starting point. The proceeds
of the vast domain of the public lands are now so mingled with the other
expenditures of the Government, that no one can tell what becomes of
them. They are now common plunder. Divide them among the States, and
they will be saved—they will be applied to some worthy object, and you
will have adopted a principle which, after a little time, under any honest
administration, will be applied to the other Departments of the Government.
I trust the whole amendment may be adopted. As the amendment may be
divided into two parts—one relating to appointments to office, and the other
to the public domain—I would ask that the vote may be taken upon each
proposition separately.
The vote was then taken upon the first portion of the amendment proposed
by Mr. S     , with the following result:
A   .—Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Missouri—5.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa—14.
And the amendment was rejected.
Mr. JOHNSON:—I cannot concur in the vote just given by Maryland. I
desire to have my dissent recorded.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—I dissent, also, from the vote of Maryland.
President TYLER:—The last part of the amendment will be considered as
withdrawn.
Mr. McCURDY:—I move to amend the substitute proposed by Mr.
F       , by adding thereto the following words:
"Provided, That nothing in this article contained shall be so construed as to
carry any law of involuntary servitude into such Territory."
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I hope we shall reject all such amendments. I consider
this simply procrastination.
Mr. JOHNSON, of Missouri:—I wish to raise a point, a question of order.
This conflicts directly with the sense of the substitute proposed. We ought
not to entertain it.
The vote was taken upon the amendment proposed by Mr. M C    , with
the following result:
A   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, and Iowa—7.
N   .—Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, Indiana,
and Illinois—13.
And the amendment was rejected.
Mr. ORTH:—I dissent from the vote of Indiana.
Mr. RUFFIN:—I rise to inquire whether it will now be in order to offer a
substitute? I have one which I wish at the proper time to present.
The PRESIDENT:—The question is now upon the adoption of a substitute
—that offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania—to the first section of
the article reported by the committee. I do not think any other substitute is
in order at the present time.
Mr. CHASE:—I hope that this vote may be postponed, and I will briefly
state the reason why. I am informed that a delegation from the State of
Kansas has arrived during the day, and that their credentials are now in the
hands of the appropriate committee. That committee has not yet reported,
and cannot until they have a meeting after our adjournment. The credentials
of three of these delegates have been presented by myself but a few minutes
since. The Committee on Credentials, I am informed, will not report until
Monday. I wish the youngest State in the Union to express her opinion upon
this motion. I therefore move an adjournment.
Mr. EWING:—I do not think any delay is necessary. We can let them vote
on Monday.
Mr. SUMMERS:—I only wish to say a word of explanation in behalf of the
Committee on Credentials. The delay in the case of Kansas is not the fault
of that committee. The delegates themselves think it better that the report
should not be made until all the delegates arrive who are expected. The
committee can report at any time.
The vote was taken on the motion to adjourn, with the following result:
A   .—Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and Indiana—5.
N   .—New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Kentucky, and Missouri—12.
So the motion to adjourn was negatived.
The PRESIDENT:—The question will now be taken upon the substitute of
the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. F       ), offered for the first
section of the article reported by the committee.
Which vote being taken, resulted as follows:
A   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Ohio,
Indiana, and Illinois—14.
N   .—Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Missouri—4.
And the substitute was agreed to.
Mr. FIELD:—There seems to be a misapprehension as to the proper time
for offering substitutes for the whole report of the committee. I shall act
upon the understanding that the proper time to offer them will be when we
have gone through with the report of the committee. If I am wrong I wish to
be corrected now.
Mr. LOGAN:—I am informed that Mr. L      , the President-elect, has
arrived in this city. I feel certain that the Conference would desire to treat
him with the same measure of respect which it has extended to the present
incumbent of that high office. I therefore move that the President of this
Convention be requested to call upon the President-elect of the United
States, and inform him that its members would be pleased to wait upon him
in a body at such time as will suit his convenience, and that this Convention
be advised of the result.
The motion of Mr. L     was agreed to unanimously.
Mr. WILMOT:—I move an adjournment to half-past seven o'clock this
evening.
The motion was agreed to, and the Conference adjourned.
EVENING SESSION—SIXTEENTH DAY.
W         , S       , February 23d, 1861.
T   Conference was called to order by the President, at half-past seven
o'clock.
The PRESIDENT:—I have addressed a note to the President-elect,
announcing the desire of the Conference to offer their respects to him in a
body, at seven and one-half o'clock this evening, or at such other time as
would be agreeable to him. I have received his reply, stating that he will be
pleased to receive the members of this body at nine o'clock this evening, or
at any other time which may suit their convenience.
The Conference then proceeded to the order of the day, being the
consideration of the second article of the section reported by the committee.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I move to strike out the second article, and to insert the
following in its place:
"Territory may be acquired for naval and commercial stations and transit
routes, and by discovery, and for no other purposes, without the
concurrence of four-fifths of the Senate."
It is generally conceded that under our present Constitution the United
States have no power to acquire territory for coaling or naval stations,
within the country of a foreign power. It was the committee's intention to
remedy this defect by the present section. But as it stands, I do not like it.
The idea is somewhat awkwardly expressed. I wish to have the enabling
power conferred in direct terms.
Mr. SUMMERS:—I would ask to interrupt the order of business for a
moment, in order to make a report from the Committee on Credentials, in
the Kansas case. The defect adverted to in the case of Mr. S    , has been
supplied to the satisfaction of the committee, and Messrs. C     , E    ,
and A    , have also presented themselves as delegates from the State of
Kansas, with proper credentials. It has not been our practice heretofore to
admit members by a formal vote, nor do I see any necessity for making the
case of Kansas an exception. The committee would suggest that the clerk
enter the names of these gentlemen upon the roll of delegates, unless
objection is made.
The PRESIDENT:—The Secretary will make the entry, as no objection is
made.
Mr. SUMMERS:—Some days ago I introduced into the Conference, and
caused to be printed, a substitute which I proposed to offer for the second
section of the committee's article. I offer it now, as follows:
"No territory shall be acquired by the United States without the concurrence
of a majority of all the Senators from States which allow involuntary
servitude, and a majority of all the Senators from States which prohibit that
relation; nor shall territory be acquired by treaty, unless the votes of a
majority of the Senators from each class of States hereinbefore mentioned,
be cast as a part of the two-thirds majority necessary to the satisfaction of
such treaty."
I do not propose to occupy time in discussing it, but I ask a minute or two to
explain its provisions. The second section of the article proposed by the
committee, requires that a treaty under which territory or commercial or
naval stations is acquired, should require four-fifths of the Senate for its
ratification. This, I think, is an unnecessary restriction upon the treaty-
making power. Occasion may arise when it would not be advisable to wait
for the exercise of this power at all. The question of acquiring territory may
arise under circumstances when delay would be fatal. Suppose our title to
an island in the Arctic Ocean, or a point upon the shore, by discovery or
otherwise, which might be settled by prompt action! There might be no
national authority with which we could treat for its acquisition. I think it
would be hazardous to provide that in no event should territory be acquired
except by treaty. The case I have supposed has no relation whatever to the
case of an ordinary acquisition of territory by treaty with a recognized
foreign power.
But the question of slavery always arises when the subject of acquiring
territory is mentioned. This clause would fix the status, would put it in the
power of either class of States to prevent the acquisition, but it would not
permit a small number of States to do it. To leave it where a majority of the
Senators of both sections could control the subject, would seem to me the
mode of settlement least objectionable. The ratification would require two-
thirds of the Senate, like all treaties, and these two-thirds would include a
majority of both sections.
Objection will be made to this classification of the States. I do not like it
myself, but there it no way to avoid it. I have adopted the language of the
Ordinance of 1787. There can be no very sound objection to the use of these
terms. The objection is rather sentimental than otherwise.
The amendment I offer ought to satisfy the South, and I think it will. The
South asks for these provisions because they settle all questions about our
present territory, and prevent questions arising over that we may acquire
hereafter. They will give to both sides equality of power. But voting is far
more important now than speaking. I will consume no more time.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—The gentleman from Virginia desires to try his motion.
For the present, I will withdraw mine.
Mr. FIELD:—I have only a word to say on this subject. There are very
grave objections to this classification of sections. I will not repeat them
here. I supposed the sense of the Conference had been expressed against it.
But I wish to inquire why this second section is necessary at all? It came up
in the committee rather by accident than otherwise. I do not think any one
of the committee intended to make it one of the subjects of our action, and
the section was finally presented by a small majority.
Let us leave this subject where the Constitution leaves it. We can now
acquire territory by discovery or by treaty. So far the Constitution has
operated satisfactorily. The country owes much of its greatness to this very
provision of the Constitution. No grievance to the South, assuredly, has
been caused by it. I am much averse to any alteration.
Mr. BARRINGER:—I think, after some reflection, that this amendment is
of much more importance than many of us have supposed. I shall vote for
it, because I do not wish to have too many limitations placed upon the
power of the Government in relation to the acquisition of territory. We
know how difficult it is to change our fundamental law. Very few
amendments to the Constitution have been made since the death of
W         . We are now establishing our fundamental law for ages to
come. Is there upon the face of the civilized earth a nation with such a
limitation upon the power of acquiring territory as this original article
proposes? Its adoption would place us at the feet of foreign nations.
In war, conquest is one means of indemnity—often the best and only one.
We must look to the acquisition of future territory; we must make our
settlement with that in view.
Reference has been made here to the seceded States, and some hard words
have been used toward them. This is not the place for such words. What is
the condition of these States now? They say they are out of the Union. We
say, No! The question between us may be decided by the Courts; it may be
decided by the sword. But we all want them back; we would place no
restrictions upon their return. They will only come back by treaty. Unless
you adopt this amendment, the section proposed will be applicable to their
case, and a mere fraction could keep them out of the Union forever.
In regard to the subject of slavery, what we want is security for the future.
That we can arrange. In my opinion you will never get back the seceded
States, without you give them some hope of the acquisition of future
territory. They know that when slavery is gathered into a cul-de-sac, and
surrounded by a wall of free States, it is destroyed. Slavery must have
expansion. It must expand by the acquisition of territory which now we do
not own. The seceded States will never yield this point—will never come
back to a Government which gives no chance for the expansion of their
principal institution. They will insist upon equity, upon the same rights with
you in the common territory, and the same prospect, of acquiring foreign
territory that you have. If you are not prepared to grant all this, do not waste
your time in thought about the return of the seceded States.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—New Jersey voted to make the first section of the
article reported applicable to future territory, not because she wishes to
acquire new territory, but because she knows that it will be acquired; and
she believes all questions raised here can be settled now, in regard to it,
better than they can be hereafter. These questions have raised a ferment in
the nation; we would settle them any way. We should have voted for these
restrictions upon the power of acquiring territory; and still we cannot shut
our eyes to the fact that in a few years new territory must be acquired. Look
at Sonora, at all Mexico; they furnish the reason for our action. An effort
will be made, perhaps, to secure the new territory by treaty. Better get it in
that way than by conquest.
Personally, I would oppose any farther acquisitions. We need no more
territory, and yet I know that more will be acquired. The North wishes it
more than the South. In the end, the North will insist that we should have
Cuba. What is the sentiment of our commercial cities now?
I think we ought to surround this power of acquisition by some judicious
restrictions; not make them too strong, or the country will break over, and
not regard them. What restriction would not have been broken down, when
the question came up in relation to Texas? We must anticipate occasions of
the same kind. I am inclined to vote for the substitute of the gentleman from
Virginia. At all events let us adopt some limitations. If not these, then such
as are contained in the original article.
Mr. JOHNSON, of Maryland:—I propose to amend the substitute offered
by the gentleman from Virginia, by inserting after the words "United
States," the words "except by discovery, and for naval and commercial
depots and transit routes."
There is now a law, the constitutionality of which has not been doubted,
providing for the acquisition of territory by discovery. But the Court, in the
Dred Scott case, decided that territory could not be acquired, except as
preliminary to the formation of a State. This difficulty should be obviated. I
think the amendment I propose will do it. If we adopt the proposition of Mr.
S      , we cut off the power of acquiring territory for transit routes, &c.,
except by treaty. I think my amendment will make the section more
satisfactory to the South.
Mr. SUMMERS:—I will accept the amendment, and treat it as a part of my
substitute.
Mr. BROCKENBROUGH:—I feel a deep solicitude in this subject. We are
here for the purpose of settling a great difficulty. Instead of settling it, we
shall add to it by placing these unnecessary obstructions in the way of
acquiring territory in future. Would not the South be safer by the adoption
of this guarantee? It is the only one, aside from the first section, which
gives the South a grain of power. We cannot go on with things as they are—
only seven States to contend with all the rest of the nation. We must all
desire that the seceded States should return to the Union. How are they to
come back? By treaty, or by the sword? Who will not prefer to win them
back by adopting principles in our amendments which will make it for their
interest to return? If the amendment is adopted, no future territory will be
acquired without the consent of a majority of Senators on both sides of the
line. Reject this, and I have not the slightest hope of ever seeing the seceded
States again in the Union. I believe this amendment will meet the wishes of
a large majority of the people of Virginia.
The vote upon the adoption of the substitute proposed by Mr. S      
resulted as follows:
A   .—Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri—9.
N   .—Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas—10.
And the amendment was lost.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I will now renew my proposition, and ask a vote upon it
by States.
The vote upon the substitute offered by Mr. G      , for the section of the
article reported by the committee, resulted as follows:
A   .—New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio—10.
N   .—Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, North
Carolina, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa—10.
And the amendment was lost.
Mr. P     dissented from the vote of New Jersey, and Mr. B         from
the vote of North Carolina.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—As the hour named for the call upon the President-elect
is approaching, I move that a committee of three members be appointed by
the President to make arrangements for the introduction of the members of
the Conference.
The motion of Mr. W         was agreed to, and the President appointed
Messrs. W        , F    , and C    , as the committee.
Mr. McKENNAN:—I move a reconsideration of the vote of the Conference
rejecting the substitute offered by the gentleman from Virginia. I am not at
all certain that we may not think it advisable to adopt that amendment.
The order of the day was now suspended, and the committee appointed to
wait upon the President-elect, reported that they had performed that duty,
and that the President-elect would be pleased to receive the members of the
Conference in his parlors in Willard's Hotel, at the present time.
For the purpose of waiting on the President, on motion of Mr. E    , the
Conference adjourned until the 25th inst., at ten o'clock  . .
S E V E N T E E N T H  D A Y .
W         , M     , February 25th, 1861.
T   Convention was called to order at ten o'clock, pursuant to adjournment,
by President T    , and prayer was offered by Rev. Dr. S    .
The Journal of Saturday was read.
Mr. HACKLEMAN:—The Delegates from the State of Indiana desire that
the vote of that State upon the proposition of amendment offered by the
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. C     ), on Friday last, may be recorded. The
vote was taken on Saturday, and Indiana desires to record her vote against
said proposition.
The Conference granted the leave asked, and the vote of Indiana was
accordingly entered upon the Journal.
The PRESIDENT:—There have been transmitted to me the proceedings of
a meeting of the Democrats of Pennsylvania, in which are contained certain
resolutions relating to the matters now before us. I am informed that the
meeting was one of the largest ever held in that State. The usual course
would be to enter them upon the record, but in this instance I would suggest
the propriety of having them read. However, the Conference will take such
order upon them as it thinks proper.
Mr. POLLOCK:—The policy of the Conference from the beginning has
been not to receive or consider resolutions of a partisan character. That
decision was made on one of the early days of our session, upon a series of
resolutions adopted by a convention held in New Haven, Connecticut,
which were presented by Mr. C   . I think we had better pass over the
subject informally, and I would call for the order of the day.
Mr. MOREHEAD, of Kentucky:—I think the resolutions had better be
referred to the Committee on Credentials.
Mr. CLAY:—I quite approved of the course taken by the Conference of the
resolutions which were sent to me for presentation. I hope we will pursue
the same course now. I move that these resolutions be entered upon the
Journal as received, and that they be laid on the table.
The motion of Mr. C    was agreed to, and the resolutions were laid on the
table.
Mr. SMITH, of New York:—I would inquire whether any action has been
taken under the order of the Conference for the printing of the Journal from
day to day. It is very important that we have these Journals, that we may
know exactly what has been done. No gentleman can carry all our
proceedings in his memory.
The Secretary made a statement to the effect that he had not found time
fully to complete the Journal, or to arrange for its being printed under the
rule requiring that secrecy should be preserved; that the Mayor of
Washington had proposed to have the printing done under a supervision
which would secure its non-publication by the press, and that various
reasons existed why the order of the Conference had not been complied
with.
Mr. SMITH:—Then I hope the order will be complied with to-day. It is very
important that each member should have a copy of our daily Journal. I
certainly expected one this morning. I will not make a motion now, but if
these copies are not furnished, I shall move the appointment of a committee
to secure their future publication.
Mr. DENT:—There was a vote passed upon this subject. It may have been
in the absence of the Secretary.
The PRESIDENT:—The Conference is informed that the Journal shall be
published as soon as possible.
Mr. BROCKENBROUGH:—I have two amendments which I shall offer. At
present I desire to have them laid on the table and printed.[4]
The PRESIDENT:—The Conference will now proceed to the consideration
of the order of the day, which is the motion to reconsider the vote rejecting
the substitute offered by Mr. S      , for the second section of the articles
of amendment reported by the committee.
Mr. McKENNAN:—At the request of one of my colleagues I would ask a
postponement of the vote upon my motion of reconsideration for the
present. It will produce no injurious result, and I think myself we had better
hold this amendment subject to the future action of the Conference.
Mr. SUMMERS:—I will not withhold my consent to the postponement. But
I hope the members of this Conference will consider my amendment, and
give it their attention when it comes up again.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—If we pass Mr. S      ' amendment, we should pass by
the consideration of the whole section. I think that is the better way. Let us
now proceed to the consideration of the third section in the article of
amendment proposed by the committee.
The PRESIDENT:—Such will be taken as the pleasure of the Conference.
The third section was read.
The PRESIDENT:—The third section is open to propositions of
amendment.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I move to amend this section by striking out the words
"by land, sea, or river," occurring after the words "or transportation."
Mr. G      '  motion was adopted without a division.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I now move to insert after the words "during
transportation," the words "by sea or river."
Which motion was also agreed to without a division.
Mr. HITCHCOCK:—I now move to amend the third section by striking out
all after the word "give," in the second line thereof, and inserting as
follows:
"to Congress power to regulate, abolish, or control, within any State, the
relations established or recognized by the laws thereof, touching persons
held to service or labor therein."
S       4. Congress shall have no power to discharge any person held to
service or labor in the District of Columbia, under the laws thereof, from
such service or labor, or to impair any rights pertaining to that relation,
under the laws now in force within the said District, while such relations
shall exist in the State of Maryland, without the consent of said State, and
of those to whom the service or labor is due, or making them just
compensation therefor; nor the power to prohibit or interfere with members
of Congress and officers of the Federal Government whose duties require
them to be in said District, from bringing with them, for personal service
only, retaining, and taking away persons so held to service or labor, nor the
power to impair or abolish the relations of persons owing service or labor in
places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, within those
States and Territories where such relations are established or recognized by
law.
S       5. Congress shall have no power to prohibit the removal or
transportation of persons held to service or labor in any State or Territory of
the United States to any State or Territory thereof where the same obligation
or liability to labor or service is established or recognized by law; and the
right during such transportation, by sea or river, of touching at ports, shores,
or landings, and of landing in case of distress, shall exist; nor shall the
Congress have power to authorize any higher rate of taxation on persons
held to service or labor than on land.
Although it may not be strictly in order, yet, as a part of my plan, I wish to
bring forward a substitute which I shall offer to the seventh section of the
committee's article, which, if adopted, should be numbered
S       9. Congress shall provide by law, that in all cases where the
Marshal, or other officer whose duty it shall be to arrest any fugitive from
service or labor, shall be prevented from so doing by violence of a mob or
riotous assemblage; or where, after such arrest, such fugitive shall be
rescued by like violence, and the party to whom such service or labor is due
shall thereby be deprived of the same, the United States shall pay to such
party the full value of such service or labor.
I offer these in separate sections, in order not only that the vote may be
taken upon each one separately here, but also when the same questions
come before the people. The first section of my amendment, as I understand
from every quarter, sets all opposition at rest; all are willing to agree to it.
This may be adopted and the others rejected, which could not be done if the
original section was adopted. The other sections conform to the language of
our present Constitution, and for that reason I think they will meet with
more favor. Each subject is thus made to stand on its own merits.
The PRESIDENT:—The question will be taken upon each section of the
substitute proposed.
Mr. JAMES:—I propose the following as a substitute for the first section of
the amendment offered by Mr. H        . It is, I believe, the same as that
proposed in Congress by the Committee of Thirteen. I understand, also, that
the Committee of the House of Representatives are about to substitute it for
what is known as the A     Proposition. We all have the same purpose in
view, to negative in express terms the right of Congress to interfere with the
institution of slavery within the States. I present the amendment because I
think it expresses the purpose in better language.
S       1. No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will
authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any
State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held
to labor or service by the laws of said State.
Mr. CHASE:—This amendment would be limited in its application to the
States. Congress would still have power in this respect over Territories.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—The report of the committee has been agreed upon after
much discussion, and printed. We all understand it, and I hope we shall
adhere to it without any alteration. If we begin to adopt these amendments
no one can tell where they will carry us.
Mr. JAMES:—My proposition is offered as an amendment to that offered
by Mr. H        .
Mr. GUTHRIE:—So I understand; but his amendment is proposed as a
substitute for the third section of the article reported by the committee. I
object to the whole of it.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—Do I understand that the question now is upon
substituting Mr. H        '  amendment for the committee's report.
Mr. JAMES:—No. It is upon substituting my proposition for the first
section of Mr. H        '  amendment.
The vote upon the amendment offered by Mr. J     resulted as follows:
A   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, and Indiana—7.
N   .—Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, Illinois, and
Kansas—13.
And the amendment was lost.
Mr. WOOD:—I must enter my dissent from the vote of Illinois.
Mr. FOWLER:—I have an amendment which I offer to the substitute
proposed by Mr. H        —
Mr. RANDOLPH:—I object to it as out of order. Let us take the vote upon
the various sections of Mr. H        '  proposition. If they are rejected,
then these amendments may all be moved to the committee's report.
The PRESIDENT:—I have already decided that the substitute is open to
amendment.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—Then I will appeal from the decision of the Chair.
The PRESIDENT:—I will state the ground of my decision. It is true, as
claimed by the gentleman from New Jersey, that if the propositions of Mr.
H         are rejected these amendments may be moved to the sections
reported by the committee. If, on the contrary, they are adopted, or either of
them, so far as they are adopted they must stand as the order of the
Conference, and are no longer subject to amendment. I understand the
Parliamentary rule in such a case to be well settled.
A somewhat confused debate here arose, when Mr. R        withdrew his
appeal from the decision of the chair.
Mr. BALDWIN:—I move to amend the proposition of the gentleman from
Ohio, by striking out the words "nor shall Congress have the power to
authorize any higher rate of taxation on persons held to service or labor,
than on land." I do not think these words are appropriate in a provision of
the Constitution.
Mr. HITCHCOCK:—I supposed the Conference would understand my
purpose. It was to substitute my three sections for the third section of the
committee's report. I did not suppose this series of amendments would be
offered. For the present, I will withdraw my amendments.
Mr. HARRIS:—The gentleman forgets that if we once adopt them, they are
no longer subject to amendment.
Mr. BRONSON:—I wish to make a suggestion. I don't know but
Parliamentarians would call it a point of order. Now let us go on and decide
whether we will, or will not, adopt the third section as reported by the
committee.
Mr. SEDDON:—I have several amendments which I am constrained to
offer to this third section. My State would think me remiss if I did not offer
them. I move, first, to insert after the words "State or Territory of the United
States," the words "or obstruct, hinder, prevent, or abolish."
By the section as reported by the committee, Congress is prohibited from
controlling or abolishing slavery in any State or Territory. This amendment
which I propose will prevent any action in relation to it—in aid of it, or
otherwise. The Territorial Legislature will always be the creature of
Congress, and under the committee's section it might act upon the subject of
slavery. I understand that the purpose of the committee was to prevent
Congress from abolishing slavery in the Territories, but not to prevent the
Territorial Legislature from acting in aid of it. My amendment will secure
slavery from all interference. That is what we want.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—The first section of the report covers this. The
amendment, I think, is unnecessary.
Mr. SEDDON:—I think the first section, properly construed, would prevent
the Territorial Legislature from enacting a law in aid of slavery, even if the
whole people of the Territory desired it.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I do not desire to go over these questions again. If the
Conference intends to come to any conclusion at all, I hope it will vote
down all these amendments.
Mr. SEDDON:—I call for a vote by States.
Mr. WOOD:—I move that the amendment be laid on the table.
Mr. BALDWIN:—Which motion is in order—mine or that of the gentleman
from Virginia?
The PRESIDENT:—The gentleman from Ohio having withdrawn his
amendment, the proposal of the gentleman from Connecticut is no longer
before the Conference. The question is upon the motion of the gentleman
from Virginia to amend the third section of the article reported by the
committee.
The vote upon the amendment proposed by Mr. S      resulted as
follows:
A   .—Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and
Missouri—6.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky—14.
And the amendment was not adopted.
Mr. SEDDON:—I now move to amend the third section reported by the
committee, by striking out the words "City of Washington," and inserting in
their place the words "District of Columbia."
The motion of Mr. S      was agreed to without a division.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I do not see why this privilege of bringing their slaves
into the District should be limited to members of Congress.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—It is not. The expression is "representatives and others."
Mr. SEDDON:—I now propose to amend the same section by inserting
after the words "without the consent of Maryland" the words "and
Virginia." I think slavery ought not to be destroyed in the District of
Columbia without the consent both of Maryland and Virginia. If there is any
reason for requiring the consent of one State, the same reason exists as to
the other. This amendment will make the section much more acceptable to
the slaveholding States.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—The committee did not require the assent of Virginia,
because no part of the present District came from Virginia. We thought it
unnecessary.
Mr. DENT:—Maryland and Virginia originally joined in the cession of the
District to the United States. Afterwards that portion which came from her
was re-ceded to Virginia. But this question is not one of territory alone. The
policy and interest of the two States are intimately connected. It would be
far more satisfactory to both these States, and to the South, if the assent of
Virginia was required before Congress could abolish slavery in the District.
Still Maryland does not insist upon it.
Mr. EWING:—I can see no necessity for, or propriety in, the amendment.
We might as well require the consent of North Carolina or any of the other
slave States. Virginia owns none of the District. She has no right to
interfere.
The amendment proposed by Mr. S      was rejected by the following
vote:
A   .—Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Missouri—5.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, and Kansas—14.
Mr. SEDDON:—My next proposition is to amend the third section by
inserting after the words "landing in case of distress, shall exist," the words
"and if the transportation be by sea, the right of property in the person held
to service or labor shall be protected by the Federal Government as other
property."
We claim that our property in slaves shall be recognized by the Union just
like any other property—that no unjust or improper distinction shall be
made. When we trust it to the perils of the seas, we wish to have it protected
by the Federal Government.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I would inquire of the gentleman from Virginia
whether it has not already been decided that this species of property is as
much entitled to Federal protection as any other. I refer to the "Creole" case.
The British Government made compensation for this species of property in
that case. This was done upon the award of the commissioners pursuant to
the decision of the umpire.
Mr. SEDDON:—Yes! But on the express ground that slavery was
recognized in the islands. Express notice was given, that when the
emancipation policy was adopted, the same principles would not be
recognized. We are now removing doubts. We wish to have these matters no
longer involved in uncertainty. We insist upon having these provisions in
the Constitution.
Mr. RUFFIN:—I wish to say a word on this subject, much as I regret the
consumption of time. I am willing to leave this question where it is now;
and my reason is this: If we put this into the Constitution, the question may
be raised, whether if foreign nations should interfere with this kind of
property on the high seas, the Government would not be bound to consider
it a cause of war. We ought not to bind ourselves to go to war. War should
always depend upon considerations of policy. We should raise a thousand
troublesome questions by putting these words "shall be protected" into the
Constitution. The matter is well enough as it is. Our rights in this respect
are well enough protected by the ordinary course of national diplomacy. I
would not be willing to put into the Constitution language which would
embarrass us hereafter.
Mr. SEDDON:—I will frankly say that I think slave property upon every
ground is as well entitled to the national protection as any other species of
property.
Mr. BARRINGER:—This amendment brings up the very gist of the matter.
The question of the right of our property to Federal protection is now an
open one. In the case of the Creole it was settled by negotiation, and not by
the courts. The question so often hinted at and suggested in this Conference
is now fairly brought up for decision. Governor C     struck at the very
root of the matter the other day, when he said that slavery was an abnormal
condition. He laid down the opinion of the North. He is a statesman and a
lawyer. He says that slavery cannot exist anywhere until it is established or
authorized by law. This is the Northern idea, and it is a technical one. I hate
technicalities almost as bad as I do sectionalism. The North deals in both. I
regret to speak in these terms of the North, but I must if I speak truth. Now,
I will lay down what is the opinion of the South upon the subject. We say
that the right to hold and use slave property, always, everywhere, exists
until it is prohibited by law. We say that it is a natural right, which grows
out of the very necessities of society. We hold that the condition of slavery
is a normal condition—not local at all; that it is found everywhere, except
where it is forbidden by law. We claim that the right to hold slaves is a
natural right, recognized by the law of nations, and of the world. I am quite
aware that the North does not agree with our opinion.
Mr. VANDEVER:—I would ask whether this normal condition is confined
to the blacks, or does it extend to all races?
Mr. BARRINGER:—Most assuredly it is not confined to a single race. It
extends to all races. Slavery of all races exists even in Europe.
Mr. FIELD:—Not now!
Mr. BARRINGER:—Perhaps not now, and why? For the reason that it has
been abolished by law, as in the recent case of Russia. Slavery once existed
in the Northern States. By law it was also abolished in those States. We say
that when slave property is on the high seas it ought to be protected—the
rights of the owner ought to be protected.
This question came up in the case of the "Amistead." Mr. A     claimed
that although these slaves were recognized by the laws of Spain as property,
yet, when once upon the high seas, they were, by the law of nations, free,
and these slaves have never been paid for to this day.
This amendment is highly important to the South. The concession we ask is
no greater than has been made before. In the treaties of 1783 and 1815,
slaves were to be protected as property.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I do not wish to nullify the action, or change the course
of our Government on this question. Slaves upon the high seas have always
been recognized as property. Look at the treaty of 1815. That recognized
slaves as property, and those which were taken from the District were paid
for. A    , of Massachusetts, took the same ground now taken by the
North. The Government took the opposite ground. The question was
ultimately referred to the Emperor of Russia, who decided that property in
slaves must be recognized by the law of nations, and sustained our view.
Take the "Creole" case also. But I will not go over the ground. The
"Amistead" case stood upon grounds which were entirely different.
But it is not necessary to put this amendment into the Constitution. The
rights of the South in this respect are well enough protected now.
Mr. GRANGER:—I regret that the distinguished gentleman from Virginia
has again raised a question which was decided against him by a large
majority in the Conference a few days ago.
Mr. SEDDON:—The gentleman is quite correct. The principle must be the
same whether applied to the Territories or to the high seas.
Mr. GRANGER:—It is claimed by the South that slaves are property
everywhere. Why, then, name slave property more than any other species in
the Constitution?
Mr. BARRINGER:—We say that slaves are both persons and property.
Mr. GRANGER:—It has always been the course of the Government to pay
for slaves taken on the high seas. The gentleman has referred to the
"Amistead" case as having been decided against the southern claim. I
present the "Amistead" case as a perfect answer to the miserable calumnies
which have been disseminated against that Court. The Judges in that case
were unanimous with a single exception, and he was a Judge from a free
State. We of the North upon these national questions are prepared to go with
you to the extreme verge of right and loyalty.
Mr. MOREHEAD, of North Carolina:—I have no desire to complicate
these questions of international law. The treaties of 1783 and 1815 were
participated in by J   and the elder A    . They expressly provided for the
payment for slaves like other property. This is plain English, and settles the
question so far as the North is concerned. I am for letting it alone where it
is.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—I am not able to support this proposition of the
gentleman from Virginia. I consider the right of property in slaves, in the
slave States, and in the territory south of 36° 30´, as fully recognized and
established in the report of the majority of the committee. In this very
clause this property is expressly admitted, and Congress is prohibited from
interfering with it. This is enough—it is all that should be done. We have
come here to settle our domestic troubles. The report of the committee
recognizes and affirms these rights of the South which have heretofore been
denied or doubted. I think their report gives us all the assurance we need.
We were not sent here to engraft new principles into our foreign policy, and
I will not consent to enter upon that business. We have got this right of
property specifically recognized, and no administration hereafter will refuse
to carry out the plain provisions of the Constitution.
Mr. SEDDON:—Where in the article do you find this right recognized? It
simply prohibits Congress from interfering with slavery within certain
limits. Nothing beyond that.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—I find the recognition pervading the whole report. The
right of transportation, for instance, is secured. Does not that involve, of
necessity, a recognition of the right of property? I am sure the South is safe
in leaving this question where the report leaves it.
Mr. HOUSTON:—We feel disposed to adhere firmly to the report of the
committee. We know the arduous labor they have bestowed upon the
subject, and feel that we ought to be satisfied with the result. We do not
wish to have our friends put us in a false position. We shall vote against the
amendment of the gentleman from Virginia, not because we do not think it
is right on principle, but because we think it is unnecessary. The right of
property in slaves is protected now wherever that property goes.
Mr. BARRINGER:—I admit that the policy of the Government hitherto has
been as the gentlemen claim. If the South could have been satisfied with
that, we should never have been sent here—this Convention would never
have been called. But we have come together for the reason that we fear the
established policy of the Government will be changed by the party now
coming into power. We ask for assurances that the old policy should be
continued; and we wish to have the obligation to continue it, written down
in the bond.
The Chair restated the question, and Mr. S      called for a vote by States.
The vote upon Mr. S     '  amendment resulted as follows:
A   .—Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Missouri—4.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas—17.
And the amendment was lost.
Messrs. B      and C   , of Kentucky; Messrs. D        and J      ,
of Missouri; Messrs. H      and D   , of Maryland, dissented from the
votes of their respective States.
Mr. SEDDON:—I now move the following amendment of the same third
section. After the words "in case of distress, shall exist," insert the
following:
"And the rights of transit by persons holding those of the African race to
labor or service, in and through the States not recognizing the relations of
persons held to labor or service, in passing with them from one State or
Territory recognizing such relation, to another, shall be secure."
I only wish to say in reference to this amendment that it secures a right
specifically referred to in the resolutions of Virginia under which this
Conference is called. On that account I feel bound to offer it, but I will not
occupy time in its discussion.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—In the early years of our Government this right was
extended by courtesy to the slaveholding States. Since these differences
have sprung up, in some States it has been denied—in others, the courtesy
still exists. We considered this question thoroughly in committee. We did
not wish to put any thing into our report that would operate to excite the
prejudices of any section against it, and so lessen the chances of its being
adopted. We thought it best not to insert such a provision. I am opposed to
the amendment.
Mr. SEDDON:—I call a vote by States.
The amendment proposed by Mr. S      was rejected by the following
vote:
A   .—Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Missouri—4.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas—17.
Mr. SEDDON:—One more amendment. I move to amend the third section
as follows: after the words "by the laws thereof touching," insert the words
"the relations existing between master and slave or."
I shall not detain the Conference for five minutes in the discussion of this
amendment. I wish, however, to have the words "master and slave"
somewhere inserted in this article, in plain English language, so that the
dangerous delusion so prevalent at the North, that the Constitution does not
recognize slavery, may be thoroughly and forever removed; so that the
Constitution shall, beyond any question, recognize the relation of master
and slave; a duplex relation—a relation of person and property. I wish to
meet that question fairly and squarely. Let it be thoroughly understood as a
relation of person and property. This is what we ask, and this is what we
insist upon. Put this into the Constitution, and you take the shortest and the
most effective means of settling the question, and of promoting peace and
tranquillity. You strike the axe to the very root of bitterness, whence has
sprung all our trouble, all our difficulties. I ask a vote by States.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—What I have already said applies with equal force to this
amendment. I will not repeat my objections.
The amendment offered by Mr. S      was rejected by the following vote:
A   .—Virginia, North Carolina, and Missouri—3.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas—18.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—Maryland votes "No," not because she specially objects
to the amendment, but she stands by the report of the committee.
Mr. DENT:—I dissent from the vote of Maryland.
Mr. CLAY:—And I from the vote of Kentucky.
Mr. ALEXANDER:—[5]
Mr. HALL, of Vermont:—I move to amend the third section by striking out
the word "nor," immediately succeeding the words "persons so bound to
labor," and inserting the following:
"But the bringing into said District of persons held to service, for the
purpose of being sold, or placed in depot to be afterwards transferred to any
other place to be sold as merchandise, is forever prohibited, and Congress
may pass all necessary laws to make this prohibition effectual; nor shall
Congress have."
It is well known that much of the agitation upon the question of slavery has
formerly arisen from the existence of the slave-trade in the District of
Columbia. Since the prohibition of 1850, the public mind has been much
more quiet, so far as this subject is concerned. I suppose the committee did
not intend to change the law of 1850, but I fear their action will not be so
understood at the North. I propose to make the matter clear. [Mr. H    here
read the section of the Act of 1850 referring to this subject.] My
amendment puts the language of this act into the Constitution. My only
purpose is, to have this question left in exactly its present position. Without
the amendment, I fear it will be claimed that the article restores the slave-
trade in this District. Nothing would more effectually destroy the article at
the North.
Mr. WHITE:—The language of the report is clear. It gives no right to sell
slaves in the District.
Mr. HALL:—I wish to be understood. The article prohibits Congress from
interfering with slavery. Ergo, it will be claimed they cannot prohibit the
exercise of any of its functions. The construction, to say the very least, will
be doubtful. It should not be left in doubt.
Mr. NOYES:—The slave-trade in the District of Columbia has always been
a subject of great dissatisfaction. I don't know that it is considered of much
importance in the South, but at the North it always has been. Ten years ago
it was abolished by act of Congress. I fear that unless the amendment of the
gentleman from Vermont is adopted, the effect of the committee's report
will be to restore the slave-trade in the District. The section reported by the
committee permits any person to bring his slaves into the District; to retain
them there as long as he chooses, and to take them away. It recognizes the
right of absolute dominion. It secures it effectually. It imposes upon the soil
of the District the right of holding, retaining, and taking away the slaves by
the owner himself, his agent or assignee. The slave-trade, in my judgment,
is thus restored.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I am satisfied that the article reported by the committee is
not susceptible of misconstruction, and I hope we shall not mar the report
by adopting the amendment. Our intention was only to permit public
officers to bring their servants here.
Mr. AMES:—Two words will cure all this difficulty. The insertion of the
words "for personal service only."
Mr. GUTHRIE:—We have no intention of reviving the slave-trade in the
District. I have no more to say.
Mr. DODGE:—I hope this section will not be left in doubt. When I first
read it I said to myself, "This thing will never do; it will bring the slave-
trade back to the District."
Mr. AMES:—Will the gentleman from Vermont accept my amendment?
Mr. HALL:—No. I cannot accept it. I offer the amendment in good faith,
for I believe it necessary.
Mr. MOREHEAD, of North Carolina:—Cannot we avoid the verbiage of
the amendment?
Mr. EWING:—I shall vote against the amendment of the gentleman from
Vermont, so that I can vote for that proposed by Mr. A   .
The vote upon Mr. H   '  amendment being taken by States, resulted as
follows:
A   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas—11.
N   .—Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri—10.
And the amendment was adopted.
Messrs. H      and B     , of Rhode Island, dissented from the vote of
that State.
Mr. McCURDY:—I move to amend the original article of the committee's
report by the addition of this proviso. My object is to prevent the sale of
slaves in the waters of New York or any other port:
"Provided, That nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent
any States in which involuntary servitude is prohibited, from restraining by
law the transfer of such persons, or of any right or interest in their services,
from one individual to another, within the limits of such State."
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I insist there is not the slightest necessity for this
amendment. I hope gentlemen will stop interposing these useless
propositions; they confound the sense of the article, and we are guarding
against questions which by no possibility can arise.
The vote was then taken on the amendment of Mr. M C    , and resulted
as follows:
A   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas—11.
N   .—Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri—10.
And the amendment was agreed to.
Messrs. L     and P     , of Illinois, dissented from the vote of that
State.
Mr. HOWARD:—I would ask the gentleman from Connecticut if he ever
knew or heard of a case where a slave was sold in a free State?
Mr. McCURDY:—I do not intend to argue that question; but as I am
appealed to, although the proviso is adopted, I will state the grounds on
which it rests.
Mr. CLAY:—I wish to know whether the object of the amendment is to
prevent the making of contracts connected with the purchase or sale of
slaves in the free States?
Mr. McCURDY:—My object is apparent from the amendment. It explains
itself. I wish to prohibit any transactions concerning the purchase or sale of
slaves, either within the free States or the navigable waters connected
therewith, or under free State jurisdiction. If there were no such prohibition,
a cargo of slaves might be brought from the coast of Africa into the port of
New York, and transferred there to parties residing in the slave States. The
free States have a right to direct what shall, and what shall not be a subject
of commerce within their limits. I presume it is not intended that the
Constitution shall prohibit the exercise of this right. I desire not to leave this
open to construction, but to make the section declare that no such intention
exists.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I am now satisfied that we shall get nothing here that is
satisfactory to the people of the south side of the river. We are continually
waylaid by suspicions, which are unjust, unfounded, and ought not to exist.
If this class of amendments is to be adopted, I cannot go on, with respect to
myself or the Convention. I feel now, since this amendment is adopted, that
my mission here is ended.
Mr. REID:—I move to insert at the end of the third article reported by the
committee these words: "Persons of the African race shall not be deemed
citizens, or permitted to exercise the right of suffrage, in the election of
federal officers."
Mr. GUTHRIE:—This is worse than ever, and it comes from the South too.
Mr. REID:—I will withdraw it then.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I ask the unanimous consent of the Conference to move
the adoption of the previous question. We may as well come to the point
now as ever. There is no use of discussing this question any longer. I move
the previous question upon the report.
Objections and cries of "No, no," were made by several members.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I will withdraw the motion.
Mr. TURNER:—I think it would be very unreasonable for any gentleman to
expect that we were to get through with the questions presented by this
report without the exercise of mutual forbearance. The adoption of an
amendment implies no disrespect to the committee. No member of the
committee should take it in that sense. I will move a reconsideration of the
vote by which the last amendment was adopted. I do not think we had better
take the vote now, but pass the subject for the present.
The PRESIDENT:—It can be passed by common consent.
The vote was reconsidered without a division, and the immediate
consideration of the question passed.
Mr. HITCHCOCK:—I now renew the offer of my substitute for the third
section of the article reported by the committee.
Mr. FIELD:—I thought when the motion to reconsider the vote upon Mr.
M C    '  amendment was agreed to, it was understood that the
consideration of the whole section was to be passed for the present. My
vote upon that amendment was given deliberately, and I have no idea that
this Convention is to break up because a vote is passed in it which is
distasteful to any man, State, or delegation.
Mr. HITCHCOCK:—I think I must insist upon the consideration of my
substitute.
Mr. BROWNE:—I move to lay the substitute proposed by the gentleman
from Ohio on the table. If that motion is carried, I do not understand that the
effect of it is to lay the report of the committee on the table.
Mr. SMITH:—I rise to a question of order. I think the question now should
be on Mr. M C    '  amendment. I ask for information. I do not quite see
how that amendment can be informally passed over without at the same
time passing the consideration of the whole article.
The PRESIDENT:—It was passed by universal consent.
Mr. CHASE:—As I understand it, the gentleman from Illinois made the
motion that the vote be reconsidered, and the consideration of the
amendment passed for the present, and this was agreed to by the
Conference unanimously.
The motion of Mr. B      to lay the motion of Mr. H         on the
table, was agreed to without a division.
Mr. BALDWIN:—I move to strike out these words in the third section:
"Nor shall Congress have power to authorize any higher rate of taxation on
persons bound to labor than on land." I have already stated that I think this
language singularly inappropriate to a provision of the Constitution. The
Constitution already prohibits such distinctions in the laying of taxes, and,
therefore, there is no necessity for the adoption of this clause. But I have
another and more important objection to it; it contains and proposes to place
in the Constitution the distinct recognition of the right of property in slaves.
This recognition was carefully avoided in the Convention which framed the
Constitution, and the North always has been, and always will be, opposed to
any such recognition. Place it there, and your article will never be adopted
in any of the free States.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—The first statutes passed by Congress on this subject
recognized the right to tax slaves. This implied the right to hold slaves. This
recognition of the right of taxation was made in express terms. The
gentleman has forgotten the history of the legislation on this subject. The
object of the committee is to prevent any possibility that those who come
after us should make any distinction between these classes of property in
levying taxes. We do not seek a recognition of the right of property in
slaves in this; that right is already recognized to our satisfaction in the
Constitution.
Mr. TUCK:—I understand the gentleman from Kentucky, and I think he is
right. If we adopt the article at all we ought to retain this language.
The vote was taken by States on the amendment proposed by Mr. B      ,
with the following result:
A   .—Maine, Massachusetts, and Connecticut—3.
N   .—New Hampshire, Vermont, New York, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri—18.
Mr. P     dissented from the vote of Connecticut.
Messrs. N     and S     also dissented from the vote of New York.
Mr. FOWLER:—I move to strike out the words "without the consent of
Maryland," immediately following the words "service in the District of
Columbia."
I can see no necessity for requiring the consent of Maryland to the abolition
of slavery in the District. There is no more reason for it than for requiring
the consent of Maine, or any other State. By the cession of the District to
the United States Maryland has parted with all power over it, and the
exclusive power of legislation is given to Congress. The District has
become the common property of the Union as much as any of the
Territories, and ought to be controlled in the same way.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—I hope this amendment will not prevail. The District is
almost surrounded by the Territory of Maryland. The abolition of slavery in
it would be very destructive to our interests and property. To convert the
District into free territory would offer a direct invitation to our slaves to
abscond and go into the District. Even if the rendition clause of the
Constitution was faithfully observed and carried out, it would involve us in
much expense and difficulty. If we are required to maintain faith with the
Government, the Government must keep faith with us.
Mr. FOWLER:—I did not suppose my motion would meet with such
serious objections. If they exist I will withdraw it.
Mr. BATES:—I have an amendment to propose, which I think will improve
the language of the section, and make it more consonant with that used in
the Constitution. I move to amend the third section by striking out the word
"bound" wherever it occurs therein, and inserting in its place the word
"held;" also to insert after the words "to labor" wherever they occur, the
words "or service."
The amendments proposed by Mr. B     were adopted without a division.
Mr. CARRUTHERS:—I propose to amend the section as it stands after the
adoption of the amendments of Mr. B    , by inserting between the words
"or" and "service" where they occur in that connection, the word
"involuntary."
Mr. EWING:—I had rather leave out the word "involuntary;" it would look
better. As the section now stands, both voluntary and involuntary service
are included.
Mr. CARRUTHERS:—By the insertion of the words "service" in Mr.
B    ' amendment, one portion of my purpose is accomplished. I will
withdraw my motion.
Mr. GROESBECK:—I would ask if it is now in order to move a substitute
for the whole section. I have one which meets my wishes, and which, I
think, will meet the views of, and be acceptable to, the Conference.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—I do not think it is in order to offer a substitute at the
present time.
Mr. GROESBECK:—Then I will call it a motion to strike out and insert,
which, certainly, is in order. I, therefore, move to strike out the whole of the
third section and insert the following:
S       3. Congress shall have no power to abolish or control within any
State the relations established or recognized by the laws thereof respecting
persons held to service or labor therein.
S       4. Congress shall have no power to legislate respecting the relation
of service or labor in places under its exclusive jurisdiction, but within
States where that relation is established or recognized, and while it
continues, without the consent of such States; nor abolish or impair such
relation in the District of Columbia, without the consent of such States; nor
abolish or impair such relation in the District of Columbia, without the
consent of Maryland, and compensation to persons to whom such service or
labor is due.
S       5. Congress shall have no power to prohibit the removal from any
State or Territory of persons held to service or labor therein, to any other
State or Territory in which persons are so held; and the right during removal
of touching at ports, shores, and landings, and of landing in case of distress,
shall exist, but not the right of transit in or through any State or Territory
without its consent. No higher rate of taxation shall be imposed on persons
so held than on land.
Three objects are sought to be obtained by the third section as proposed by
the committee: one is, the declaration that Congress has no power over
slavery in the States; the second, that Congress shall not legislate respecting
slavery in territory under its jurisdiction, but within the limits of States,
without the consent of such States, nor abolish slavery in the District
without the consent of Maryland; the third concerns the subject of the
removal of slaves from place to place. It is desirable that these three
subjects should be so presented that one or more of them may be adopted,
and the others rejected; a purpose that cannot be accomplished if they are
all embraced in the same section. My substitute is plain and simple, and I
think covers the whole ground.
Mr. ROMAN:—Has not the gentleman entirely left out the provision
relative to bringing slaves into the District of Columbia?
Mr. GROESBECK:—I have, because I believe it entirely unnecessary.
Cannot the South take a proposition that is fair? A slave within the District
cannot be taken from the owner under any authority of Congress, unless the
owner receives full compensation. Compensation would in all cases be an
equivalent for the slave in the District, or elsewhere. Under the
Constitution, slavery cannot be abolished without compensation, except by
the consent of all parties interested in the subject. It is not pretended that
Congress has a right to abolish slavery anywhere without making
compensation to the owner.
Mr. SEDDON:—The owner should always have compensation, it is true;
but his right in this respect is based upon the right of property in slaves. It is
not true that compensation is in all cases an equivalent for the slave. An
owner should be free to determine for himself the question whether he will
part with his property upon receiving suitable compensation. Under the
gentleman's proposition this right would be exercised by Congress and not
by the owner. But there is a farther, and still greater objection to the
proposition: The North denies the right of property in slaves, and would
deny compensation also, unless compelled to make it under the
Constitution. The North holding slavery to be unjust and unrighteous,
would desire to abolish the institution without paying for it.
Mr. GROESBECK:—I am willing to amend Section 4 of the substitute I
offer, by denying to Congress the power to abolish the relation without
making compensation, and the section may be thus considered.
Mr. DODGE:—I wish to support the proposition of Mr. G        ; and let
me say one thing farther: our words should be plain and simple; we should
use language which common men can understand, and which does not
require to be construed by lawyers. Above all, let us have some confidence
in each other.
Mr. BARRINGER:—There is another entire and important omission in Mr.
G        '  proposition: there is no provision whatever for the Territories.
Mr. DENT:—I think the Conference had much better adhere to the section
reported by the committee as it has been already amended. We have all read
and studied that section. We understand it. A State that will not adopt the
whole of the section will not adopt any part of it, and so there is no use in
severing the subjects provided for. I am opposed to the adoption of the
substitute. We understand the original article better than we can any other.
Mr. WILMOT:—I think the original proposition the best; the word
"regulate" has been struck out of it, leaving only the words "impair or
abolish."
Mr. McCURDY:—I ask leave to revive my motion. I regret having
withdrawn it. I think I have the right to renew it now.
The PRESIDENT (Mr. A         in the chair):—The motion of the
gentleman from Connecticut is out of order.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—I understand we are now considering the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. G        ). If so, I move to
insert in his proposition after the word "abolish" the words "or impair."
Mr. GROESBECK:—I think the amendment improves it. I will accept it.
Mr. CHASE:—There is, certainly, a misunderstanding as to the effect of the
vote laying the amendment offered by Mr. H         upon the table: it
was offered as a substitute to the third section; if it did not carry the whole
section to the table, then motions to amend that section are in order. In that
view, I think Mr. M C    '  motion is in order either way: to amend the
article proposed by the committee, or to amend the amendment of Mr.
G        .
Mr. RANDOLPH:—I think Mr. M C    '  motion is entirely out of order;
it has once been passed by informally.
Mr. CLEVELAND:—Is it not in order at any time to make a motion which
will render the proposed substitute more perfect?
Mr. McCURDY:—I do not wish my proposition ruled out upon any
technical construction of rules. I will now move it as an addition to the third
section.
Mr. FOWLER:—I move to reconsider the vote adopting the motion
proposed by the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. H   ).
Mr. FIELD:—I oppose the motion. The amendment is both proper and
necessary. It can certainly do no harm to the South; and if the South wishes
to be fair, it will not object to it.
Mr. CHITTENDEN:—I oppose the reconsideration of the vote adopting Mr.
H   '  amendment, and I will state very shortly the reason why. If the
doctrine is to be established here, that the report of the committee is too
sacred to be touched—too perfect to be made subject to amendment—let us
know it. It will relieve myself, and I think many others, from farther
attendance here; and I wish to say now, that if we are to sit here, such
considerations must not be presented in future.
Mr. FOWLER:—I will withdraw my motion.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN:—I certainly wish some one would renew the
motion to reconsider the vote upon Mr. H   '  amendment. I do not like to
do it myself, but I think if that amendment were reconsidered, we would fix
upon some terms that would be satisfactory to all sides.
Mr. AMES:—I do not see the necessity for adopting Mr. M C    ' 
proposition. I think it amounts to nothing. It is simply a prohibition in the
Constitution against the exercise of a right which no one wishes to exercise.
I oppose it because it is unnecessary.
Mr. McCURDY:—I certainly do not wish to insist upon an unnecessary
amendment. If the third section, as reported by the committee, is adopted, it
declares that the right of transportation, &c., shall exist. Under this, if no
amendment is adopted, slaves may be bought and sold in any of the waters
of the free States.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—What difficulty or damage does the gentleman propose
to obviate by his amendment?
The PRESIDENT:—The Chair has already decided that the proposition of
Mr. M C     is not in order.
Mr. C     appealed from the decision of the Chair, and upon the appeal the
decision was sustained.
Mr. FIELD:—I understand this decision cuts off both the amendments
offered by Mr. H    and Mr. M C    ; that compels us to vote against the
proposition of Mr. G        .
Mr. CHITTENDEN:—The amendment offered by my colleague, Mr. H   ,
has been accepted. It stands as the order of the Conference, and cannot be
rescinded except by a vote. I sustain the decision of the Chair, because, by
every rule of parliamentary law, it was correct. But one thing farther. It is
now perfectly in order to move Mr. M C    '  proposition, or any other,
as an addition.
The PRESIDENT:—Most clearly so.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—I do not discover any particular objection to the
amendment of Mr. G        . If it had been reported by the committee, I
should have preferred it; but the South is willing to take the section as it
stands, and prefers the original to any substitute.
Mr. NOYES:—I am against the substitute, for it destroys the effect of the
amendments offered by Messrs. H    and M C    .
The vote was then taken upon Mr. G        '  amendment, and resulted as
follows:
A   .—New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Ohio, and Indiana—7.
N   .—Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Missouri, Illinois, and Kansas—12.
And it was rejected.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I feel that my mission here is ended, and that I may as
well withdraw from the Conference. I seem to be unable to impress
gentlemen with the necessity of accomplishing any thing. The report of the
committee is not satisfactory to the South; it is even doubtful whether they
will adopt it; certainly they will not, if it is cut to pieces by amendments. I
may be compelled to sacrifice my property, or go with the secessionists. At
my time of life, I do not wish to do either.
Mr. McCURDY:—I regret that my amendment produces so much feeling,
but I think, at all events, we should prevent the sale of slaves in the free
States; it should be prevented beyond any possibility. I renew the offer of
my amendment.
Mr. EWING:—If the laws of New York will permit the sale of slaves within
the limits of that State, then we should prohibit the sale in the Constitution
as proposed; but so long as that State has power to pass a law prohibiting it,
there is no necessity for the amendment. The owner is only permitted to
touch with his slaves, under certain circumstances, at the ports of free
States.
Mr. RUFFIN:—It is impossible that slaves can be sold in a free State under
the section reported by the committee. We propose to give the right of
touching at those ports as a privilege, but we give no right of sale there. The
laws of a free State could not be evaded in this way. Each State is supreme
within its own limits; that supremacy would not be aided by this proviso.
Mr. TURNER:—Suppose a slave owner is compelled to stop at the port of
Cairo, through stress of weather or any other cause, and he dies there, are
his slaves set free by his death? Does not the law of actual domicil prevail?
I think they will be regarded as slaves, and that under this provision they
might be administered upon and sold as a part of his estate.
Mr. POLLOCK:—I think we may obviate all difficulty by inserting after the
words "landing in case of distress," the words "but not for traffic or sale."
Mr. TUCK:—I am in favor of the amendment proposed by the gentleman
from Pennsylvania. It is not proper or best to encumber these propositions
with amendments that are not necessary.
Mr. LOGAN:—Every State has the right to regulate transit within its own
limits to suit itself. The proposed amendment gives no rights except such as
are expressly named: "a right, during transportation, of touching at the
ports, and of landing in case of distress." The right of the State to regulate
transit is left unimpaired.
Mr. HOWARD:—There is one principle of law which will settle this
question at once: property that is held under State laws must be transferred
by the operation of State laws alone. Slaves are held and transferred by the
specific laws of the States in which they are held.
Mr. PALMER:—The right of sale cannot possibly arise out of the right to
touch during transportation at a port, or the right to land in case of distress. I
cannot see the slightest occasion or necessity for the adoption of Mr.
M C    '  amendment.
Mr. M C    '  amendment was rejected by the following vote:
A   .—Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Indiana,
and Iowa—7.
N   .—New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky,
Missouri, Ohio, Illinois, and Kansas—14.
Mr. P      '  amendment was then adopted without a division.
Mr. VANDEVER:—I wish to propose an amendment by way of proviso:
"Provided nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent any
State from prohibiting the introduction as merchandise of persons held to
service or labor, or to prevent such State from prohibiting the transit of
persons so held to service or labor through its limits."
Mr. FIELD:—This does not cover Mr. M C    '  proposition at all. Is
there any secret purpose here to bring into the Constitution a provision
which will permit the sale of slaves in free States? If there is not, why not
say plainly that the States shall have the exclusive right to determine who
shall and who shall not cross its borders, and what shall be the subject of
sale or traffic within them?
Mr. GUTHRIE:—The States have all the powers which are not expressly
delegated under the Constitution to be exercised by Congress. Congress has
no power, except such as are expressly conferred upon them. The power to
prohibit the sale of slaves rests somewhere. It has not been conferred upon
Congress; it must remain in the State.
Mr. SMITH:—The argument of the gentleman from Kentucky seems to me
very inconsistent with his report in other respects.
Mr. HOWARD:—The Border States are trying to get back the seceded
States. We hope they will come back. We expect the adoption of this report
to offer a strong inducement to them to return to the Union. It will not offer
such inducement if its general effect is ruined by amendments.
The vote upon Mr. V       '  amendment resulted as follows:
A   .—Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Indiana,
and Iowa—7.
N   .—New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania.
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky,
Missouri, Ohio, Illinois, and Kansas—14.
So the amendment was not agreed to.
Mr. CLAY:—I have already stated that the State of Kentucky is prepared to
adopt the C          amendment; that amendment will be satisfactory to
the Border States. The longer we remain here the more I become satisfied
that the C          amendment will meet with more general favor than
any other; therefore I ask the consent of the Conference to introduce the
C          amendment as a substitute for the committee's report.
The consent of the Conference was not given to Mr. C   '  proposition.
Mr. GROESBECK:—I move to amend the third section by inserting after
the words "in case of distress shall exist," the words "but not the right of
transit in any other State or Territory without its consent."
We must certainly do something to cover this difficulty; if we omit the
subject entirely, we shall leave much opportunity for cavil on this question
when the question goes to the people.
Mr. RUFFIN:—I move to amend the amendment by substituting in place of
the words "without its consent," the words "against its dissent."
Mr. GROESBECK:—I will accept the amendment.
The amendment of Mr. G         was agreed to by the following vote:
A   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio—10.
N   .—Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Kentucky, Missouri, and Illinois—8.
Mr. A        , of New Jersey, dissented from the vote of that State.
Mr. G       moved that when the Conference adjourn it adjourn to half-
past seven o'clock this evening.
The vote upon Mr. G      '  motion was taken by States, and resulted as
follows:
A   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and
Kansas—13.
N   .—Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and
Missouri—6.
So the motion was adopted.
On motion of Mr. C     the Conference adjourned.
EVENING SESSION—SEVENTEENTH DAY.
W         , M     , February 25th, 1861.
T   Conference was called to order at half-past seven o'clock, Mr.
A         in the chair.
Mr. SMITH, of New York:—I move that a committee of two be appointed
by the P         to arrange for the printing of the Journal.
The motion of Mr. S     was adopted, and the P         appointed as
such committee, Mr. S    , of New York, and Mr. H     , of Maryland.
The Conference then proceeded to the consideration of the order of the day,
being the third section of the article reported by the committee.
Mr. HITCHCOCK:—I move to amend the third section by striking out the
words "or Territory of the United States," occurring after the words "within
any State."
I think we shall make the amendment more satisfactory by limiting the
prohibition to States alone; still leaving the power in Congress to be
exercised in conformity with the other provisions that regulate slavery in
the Territories.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I have the same objection to this as to other amendments.
It may not be important, but I do not want to commence by adopting
amendments at all.
The question was taken upon the amendment proposed by Mr. H        ,
and was agreed to by the following vote:
A   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Kansas—10.
N   .—Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri—9.
Mr. SUMMERS:—I now desire to call up for consideration the amendment
proposed by myself on the evening of the 23d instant. The state of the case
is this: Mr. J      , of Maryland, moved an amendment to my
proposition, which was accepted; my amendment was then rejected by a
vote of the Conference, and on the 25th the Conference reconsidered the
vote by which the amendment was rejected. I will not now repeat what I
said, when the amendment was offered, in favor of its adoption. I would
only call the attention of gentlemen to the remarks I then made, and say in
addition, that I earnestly hope the Conference will now adopt the
amendment. It will make the proposition much more acceptable to the
South, and, certainly, not more objectionable to the North. The amendment
is offered to the second section, and is as follows:
"No territory shall be acquired by the United States, except by discovery,
and for naval and commercial stations, depots and transit routes, without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Senators from States which allow
involuntary servitude, and a majority of all the Senators from States which
prohibit that relation; nor shall territory be acquired by treaty, unless the
votes of a majority of the Senators from each class of States hereinbefore
mentioned, be cast as a part of the two-thirds majority necessary to the
ratification of such treaty."
The amendment of Mr. S       was adopted by the following vote:
A   .—New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky,
Missouri, and Ohio—12.
N   .—Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Indiana, Illinois, and Kansas—
6.
The PRESIDENT:—No further amendment being offered to the second and
third sections, the Conference will proceed to the consideration of the
fourth section of the report, or any amendments proposed to that section.
None being proposed, the Conference proceeded to the fifth section.
Mr. SEDDON:—I move to strike out the whole of the section. It has been
heretofore stated, on behalf of the North, when this section was under
consideration, that its adoption was not desirable, inasmuch as existing
laws, properly enforced, amount to a sufficient prohibition of the slave-
trade. If the North does not desire it, the South does not. I hope the
Conference will consent to strike it out.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I think it very important to retain this section; it can,
certainly, do no harm. We all agree, North and South, that the foreign slave-
trade should not be revived.
The amendment offered by Mr. S      was rejected by the following vote:
A   .—Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Missouri—4.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas—17.
Mr. BRADFORD:—I move to amend the fifth section by inserting after the
words "slave-trade," the words "by citizens of the United States."
In proposing amendments to the Constitution, it seems to me improper that
we should attempt to bind any but our own citizens. The adoption of the
section in this form would seem to imply that we undertook to prohibit the
slave-trade in other countries and among citizens of other countries. I desire
to see it prohibited, but wish to have the constitutional provision expressed
in appropriate terms.
Mr. CROWNINSHIELD:—I object to this amendment. It would nullify the
operation of the section entirely. There are in the United States thousands of
persons who are not citizens, but who, under such a provision of the
Constitution, would revive the slave-trade and infuse into it a vigor which it
never before possessed. It would be better to have no section at all than to
permit such an amendment as this. The amendment can bear but one
construction. It is intended to prohibit the slave-trade by our own citizens,
and expressly to permit it by those who are not citizens.
Mr. COALTER:—I am in favor of the amendment.
Mr. BRADFORD:—I do not desire to embarrass the action of the
Conference, and I will withdraw the amendment.
Mr. JAMES:—I move to amend this section by striking out the following
words: "from places beyond the limits thereof."
The object of this amendment is apparent, and does not need explanation.
The amendment of Mr. J     was agreed to by the following vote:
A   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and Kansas—17.
N   .—Virginia, North Carolina, and Missouri—3.
Mr. MOREHEAD, of North Carolina:—I move that the vote just passed
striking out the words "from places beyond the present limits thereof," be
rescinded.
I think the action of the Convention in passing this vote was hasty, and not
taken upon due consideration. It may be an important question to determine,
what are "the present limits thereof." Upon one construction it might
prohibit the bringing of slaves from the States which have seceded and left
the Union; upon another construction, which assumes that these are still in
the Union and does not recognize their secession, it would not cut off the
trade between those States and the others. I do not like to have such a
question raised.
Mr. BACKUS:—I am against this reconsideration. So far as I am
concerned, I do not propose, in this Conference, to recognize the secession
of the States at all. I deny the legal power of a State to withdraw itself from
the Union without the consent of the others. And beyond this, I do not think
the question is raised as the gentleman asserts.
Mr. RUFFIN:—I think the clause is better as it is. By striking out the words
"from beyond the present limits thereof," we do not establish any territorial
limitation. And whether these States come back or not, no question of
territory is raised. But if this reconsideration is carried, and the seceding
States do not return to the Union, they will retaliate upon us. In the event of
their continued secession we cannot get back from those States those of our
slaves who are now temporarily there. We may wish to bring back those
slaves, and some of our people may wish to carry ours there.
Mr. GRANGER:—I hope this vote will not be reconsidered. The argument
of Judge R      is conclusive.
Mr. COALTER:—This is likely to be a troublesome question any way. Why
not leave it as we have to leave many others—to the discretion of
Congress? We certainly do not wish to adopt a provision which will cut off
the traffic in slaves between the Gulf States and the others. Nobody is in
favor of that, and I am at a loss how to manage this question. The negroes
are a portion of the families of Southern men. They are regarded as such in
all the transactions of life. Those families may at times become separated.
A portion of them may now be in the seceded States, and a portion farther
North. Again, it often happens that during one season of the year the
planter, with his family and slaves, lives upon the plantation in the Gulf
States; and at another season, removes with his family and slaves to a
plantation farther North. We do not wish to obstruct a relation or proceeding
of this kind. This is not a mere matter of dollars and cents. It is one
involving the happiness of families. The blacks themselves are interested in
it. I think it better to let the section stand as it does, and to leave the whole
matter to the discretion of Congress.
Mr. GRANGER:—I have always stood up against all the societies and
organizations which have been established at the North to carry on crusades
against slavery. My position in that respect is still unchanged. I hold that the
people of the free States have nothing to do with slavery; that they are not
responsible for it, and that it is their duty to let it alone. At the same time I
have just as steadily opposed the slave-trade. I think it inhuman and
atrocious, and I am the last man that would consent to its restoration. This
section as it stands, in my judgment, cannot be improved. I think we had
better leave it, and not raise these troublesome questions which will
inevitably be suggested if these words are restored.
Mr. MOREHEAD:—This is a matter which requires some reflection, and,
on the whole, I am inclined, for the present, to withdraw my proposition.
Mr. SEDDON:—I do not like this plan of legislating in the Constitution.
The Constitution ought to be an instrument defining and limiting the powers
of Congress. We had better leave to Congress, or rather, to assign to
Congress the power to exercise this prohibition. I, therefore, move to amend
by inserting at the commencement of the section these words: "The
Congress shall have power to prohibit," and to strike out at the end of the
section the words "are forever prohibited."
Mr. ALLEN:—This would be a most effectual way of reviving the slave-
trade. It would remove the constitutional prohibition, and permit Congress
to prohibit or permit it, as that body may choose. Would that ever hereafter
be considered a crime which Congress had power to permit? No. I cannot
conceive it possible that any State should seriously wish to see a traffic
resumed which has been stigmatized by the whole civilized world as worse
than piracy. This is a question which I would not leave to Congress. We
know how immensely profitable this trade is—that fortunes are made by a
single successful voyage. Don't let such an inducement to corruption creep
into our Constitution.
Mr. COALTER:—I am in favor of this amendment, not because I am in
favor of the slave-trade, but because such a section is out of place in the
Constitution. The Constitution is a bill of rights, an instrument which
defines and settles the rights of citizens. It is not a law. I have no fear that if
we leave this to Congress the slave-trade will be revived.
Mr. DONIPHAN:—I cannot agree with my colleague. I am opposed to the
foreign slave-trade in every form. I would not even make a treaty with a
nation or a State that would permit it. If the seceded States are to be
regarded out of the Union, I would not treat with them; I would not invest
Congress with such a dangerous power. Nothing will suit me but an
unqualified prohibition of this trade in the Constitution itself.
Mr. HOUSTON:—The gentleman from Missouri has expressed the views
of Delaware. His argument is conclusive.
Mr. HOWARD:—The intervention of Congress will be necessary whether
this amendment passes or not. The section as adopted makes no provision
for the punishment of any one who violates it. If a vessel should be seized
while engaged in the trade, this section does not provide for her forfeiture
or condemnation, or the punishment of her officers or owners. The section
would be inoperative without the action of Congress. Why not let Congress
have all the power?
Mr. DODGE:—Congress will declare the punishment.
Mr. SEDDON:—If you cut off the slave with the seceded States, they will
do the same with you. I think the Border States should at all events adopt
the amendment.
The Conference refused to agree to the amendment of Mr. S      by the
following vote:
A   .—Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Missouri—5.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Kentucky,
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas—16.
Messrs. J       and D       , of Missouri, dissented from the vote of
that State.
Mr. MOREHEAD:—I move to strike out the whole of this section, and
insert a new one of the following tenor: "The foreign slave-trade is hereby
forever prohibited; and it shall be the duty of Congress to pass laws to
prevent the importation of slaves into the United States and their Territories,
from places beyond the limits thereof."
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I like the amendment proposed better than the original,
but I wish to suggest an amendment to it myself.
We are aware that certain countries which are much exercised over the
criminality of slavery and the slave-trade, have recently adopted a system,
the horrors of which are not surpassed by those of the middle passage. I
refer to the importation of coolies and other persons from China and the
East. In my judgment, this is the slave-trade in one of its worst forms. I
think if we prevent the importation of slaves at all, the provision ought to be
made to cover such a case. I therefore move to amend the proposition of
Mr. M       , by inserting after the words "importation of slaves," the
words "or coolies, or persons held to service or labor."
Mr. MOREHEAD:—I accept the amendment of Mr. W        , and should
have inserted it myself had it occurred to me. My proposition as it now
stands, covers both the points here made; it declares the entire prohibition
of the slave-trade, and it makes it also the duty of Congress to pass laws
effectually to prevent it.
The amendment offered by Mr. M        was agreed to by the following
vote:
A   .—Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois—11.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
New York, New Jersey, and Kansas—8.
Mr. H     , of Rhode Island, Messrs. O    and E    , of Indiana, and Mr.
S       , of New Jersey, dissented from the votes of their respective
States.
Mr. CROWNINSHIELD:—I move to strike out the whole section. I had
rather have no section at all, and no provision upon the subject, than such a
one as we have now adopted. The requisition upon Congress making it their
duty to enact laws, will be considered as a necessary one; the consequence
which must result is, that until Congress legislates, there is no law against
the importation of slaves.
The motion of Mr. C             was rejected by the following vote:
A   .—Massachusetts, Virginia, and Tennessee—3.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina,
Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Kansas—18.
The PRESIDENT:—The Conference will now proceed to the consideration
of the sixth section.
No amendment being offered thereto, the Conference proceeded to the
seventh section.
Mr. TURNER:—I move to strike out the whole of the seventh section, and
insert in lieu thereof the following:
"Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens of each State the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States."
The seventh section, as it now stands, will encounter more serious objection
at the North than all the remaining portion of the article. It is objectionable
for many reasons: it looks to the actual exercise of violence and
intimidation by mobs and unlawful assemblies at the North. Although such
may have occurred in one or two sections only, generally the provisions of
the fugitive slave law have been observed and carried out. The whole
subject is very distasteful to the North. I think if we keep it out of the
article, and in its place secure that respect for the privileges of citizens in
the various States, to which, indeed, under the Constitution, they are
entitled, we shall do much better.
Mr. LOGAN:—There are various reasons peculiar to some of the free
States why this provision should not be adopted. The laws of several of the
Western States do not recognize negroes as citizens. I move to amend the
amendment proposed by my colleague, by inserting the words "free white"
before the word "citizens."
The amendment offered by Mr. L     was adopted by the following vote:
A   .—New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois—10.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, and Iowa—8.
Mr. O   , of Indiana, dissented from the vote of his State.
Mr. TURNER:—I suppose the purpose of my colleague has been attained.
If there is a delegation willing to make such a distinction in the
Constitution, they will, of course, support the amendment as it is now
amended.
The vote was then taken upon the amendment, as amended, with the
following result:
A   .—None.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, and Indiana
—18.
Mr. WILMOT:—If the seventh section is adopted, I think the North should
have some compensation therefor. I think citizens of the North have as
much occasion for complaint on account of the action of mobs and riotous
assemblies in the slave States, as the slave States have of the occurrence of
those mobs and assemblies in the North. I therefore move the following as
an addition to the seventh section:
"And Congress shall farther provide by law, that the United States shall
make full compensation to a citizen of any State, who, in any other State,
shall suffer by reason of violence or intimidation from mobs and riotous
assemblies, in his person or property, or in the deprivation, by violence, of
his rights secured by this Constitution."
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I am opposed to this amendment upon the general
principles I have so often stated. I oppose it for another reason. I am not in
favor of an amendment which encourages mobs and riots at the North, and I
will not consent to one which, like this, encourages seditious speeches at
the South.
Mr. WILMOT:—Such is not the effect of my amendment. It does not
protect a man in making seditious speeches in the slave States. It only
secures to the citizen his rights without regard to the State to which he
belongs. We have a provision of the Constitution on that subject now, but it
is not effective.
Mr. COALTER:—I am in favor of the amendment. There is great necessity
for it.
Mr. SEDDON:—I think gentlemen entirely misconstrue the intent and
purpose of the present provision of the Constitution on that subject. It grows
out of and rests upon that provision which requires the return of fugitive
slaves. It imposes an obligation upon Congress to secure to the owner, when
he pursues his slave into a free State, the right which he enjoys as a citizen
of his own State. In all other respects it is unnecessary. If a man is injured in
his person or his property, he has his redress in the State courts; or if he is a
foreigner or a citizen of another State, he may go into the Federal courts and
get his redress there. In this respect the citizens of both sections are amply
protected.
Mr. STEPHENS:—I earnestly hope this amendment may be rejected. We
have come here to arrange old difficulties, not to make new ones. Adopt
this, and you lay the foundation stone of disunion. It is an encouragement to
seditious speeches and purposes. The clause is well enough as it is. We do
not wish to encourage men to come among us and excite discontent among
our slaves. We will not permit them to do it. Our safety requires that we
should not. Our own citizens do not connive at the escape of slaves. None
do it who have any business in our States. We are here for peace. When half
a dozen States are out, whose return we wish to secure, shall we put such a
clause as this into the Constitution? Do it, and a half dozen others will
follow. I am not at all sure that the report of the majority, if adopted, will
satisfy my State. It certainly will not if it is mangled and frittered away. I
have not occupied time in making speeches here. I say to you gentlemen,
beware! If I thought the spirit of the North was truly represented in this
Conference, I would go home and advise my State to secede; and if she did
not, I would abandon her forever.
Mr. RUFFIN:—I am opposed to the amendment because I think it
unnecessary, and because it opens a new and very serious controversy. The
rights of Northern men are fully protected now. There is not a court in the
South in which a Northern citizen cannot find a lawyer to advocate his
cause. If he is poor, he may even sue in forma pauperis, and incur no
liability even for costs.
Mr. WILMOT:—I am claiming no more than I have a right to claim under
the decision of the Supreme Court. That court, in the case of Prigg vs. The
State of Pennsylvania, decided that the Constitution imposes the duty upon
Congress of carrying this provision into effect. I insist upon making it plain.
Rights upon both sides are sought to be protected by this article. They are
correlative.
Mr. L     favored and Mr. E     opposed the amendment, in a few brief
remarks.
Mr. ORTH:—I do not think we shall accomplish much by protracting our
present session longer. I move that the Conference adjourn, and ask a vote
by States.
The Conference refused to adjourn, by the following vote:
A   .—Maine, Connecticut, New York, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas
—7.
N   .—New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio—14.
The PRESIDENT:—The question recurs upon the amendment of the
gentleman from Pennsylvania.
The vote upon the question of agreeing to the motion of Mr. W     ,
resulted as follows:
A   .—Maine, New York, Indiana, Vermont, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Illinois, and Iowa—8.
N   .—Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio—11.
And the motion was rejected.
Mr. BARRINGER:—I now move to amend the seventh section, by adding
thereto the following words:
"And in all cases in which the United States shall pay for such fugitive,
Congress shall also provide for the collection by the United States of the
amount so paid, with interest, from the county, city, or town in which such
arrest shall have been prevented, or rescue made."
I am certain that no objection can be made to the equity of this amendment.
If a municipal corporation shall permit the rights of a slave owner to be
disregarded by the rescue of a slave, it not only fails to perform its duty
under the Constitution, but becomes an active participant in the crime. Shall
the consequences of its own fault be visited upon the people of the whole
country? Those who acknowledge and carry out their obligations under the
Constitution, as well as those who do not? This would inflict a punishment
upon the innocent for the crime of the guilty. It is not right to leave it in that
way. It would present an inducement to these violations of law which the
provision is intended to prevent. We ought to make the guilty party pay the
penalty.
Mr. HACKLEMAN:—If such a proposition were to come from a free State,
the mover would be charged with attempting to destroy all hope that the
committee's report could be adopted by the people. However, if the friends
of the report are willing to adopt it, I do not know that I ought to object. It
places the Government in a position where it is bound under the
Constitution to prosecute a municipal corporation for the acts of its
individual members. It is certainly novel, and introduces a new system into
the jurisprudence of the country. Is the mover serious in his proposition?
Mr. BARRINGER:—I am certainly serious. I would like to hear some
substantial argument against my motion.
The question being taken on the amendment of Mr. B        , resulted as
follows:
A   .—Virginia, North Carolina, and Kansas—3.
N   .—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa—17.
And the amendment was rejected.
Mr. DENT:—I wish to enter my dissent from the vote of Maryland. I
consider the amendment as eminently just and proper.
Mr. CLAY:—I dissent from the vote of Kentucky.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN:—I have an amendment which I intend to offer at
some time, and I may as well propose it now. The people of the free States
have complained, and not without good reason, that one clause in the
Constitution is not carried into effect in some of the slaveholding States.
Their complaints are similar to those made on the part of the South, which it
is the purpose of the seventh section to remove. If there have been instances
at the North where mobs and riotous assemblies have obstructed the
administration of justice in the case of fugitive slaves, so there have been
instances at the South where mobs and riots have disregarded the rights of
citizens of Northern States. I propose to deal fairly by all sections. Let us
remove both causes of complaint. I move to amend the seventh section by
adding thereto the following words:
"Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens of each State the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I repeat my objection to all these amendments. If our
work here is to have any efficacy, we must adhere to the report. Why bring
in another bone of contention?
Mr. ORTH:—Will you not extend the same protection to free citizens which
you do to slaveholders?
The question was taken on the motion of Mr. F            , with the
following result:
A   .—Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Kansas—16.
N   .—Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia—4.
So the amendment was adopted.
Mr. R     dissented from the vote of Maryland.
Mr. AMES:—I move an amendment which will make the section more
explicit. I move to strike out the word "force," and to insert instead thereof
the words "violence or intimidation."
The motion was agreed to without objection.
Mr. ORTH:—I move to amend the seventh section by adding at the close
thereof the following words:
"And such fugitives, after such payment, shall then be discharged from such
service."
I am opposed to this whole business of making compensation for fugitive
slaves; but if this section is to be adopted, and the Government pays the
owner the whole value of the fugitive, upon every principle of equity and
justice the fugitive should be discharged, and the master should have no
right to reduce him again to slavery. You make the measure of the owner's
damages in such a case the value of the slave. Do you intend, after he has
secured that, he shall still have the right of capture—that after the damages
have been fully paid, he may still call on the courts of law for the slave's
surrender? This would be a double compensation indeed. I shall insist upon
this amendment, and ask a vote by States.
Mr. ROMAN:—I have not hitherto addressed the Conference, but I should
do myself injustice if I remained silent any longer. I came here in good
faith, encouraged with the hope that this Conference would do something
which would indicate a purpose to protect and acknowledge the rights of
the slaveholding States. I have patiently attended your sittings, and little by
little that hope has faded, until to-night it has almost passed away. What
good can come of these deliberations, when upon every question which is
presented the lines of sectionalism are tightly drawn, and with one or two
exceptions every northern State is arrayed against us? Suppose these
proposals of amendment as reported by the committee are adopted, there is
evidently a purpose manifested here by a large delegation from the free
States, to prevent their adoption by the people. I know the opposition which
in any event will be arrayed against them. It is an opposition which nothing
but unanimity among the moderate conservative men of the country can
overcome. Believe it or not, gentlemen, I assure you we are in earnest, in
our determination to have our rights under the Constitution defined and
guaranteed. Our safety, as well as our self-respect, requires this. I have not
been satisfied with the majority report, but if I had been disposed to accept
it—if the South would accept it now, you will not concede even that. You
insist upon weakening its provisions by amendments, and by amendments
which are insulting to us.
It is now seriously proposed under the Constitution, by an express
provision, to deprive us of our property in slaves against our consent, and to
emancipate them by making compensation. What other effect can be given
to such an amendment? One of our slaves escapes into a free State. He is
arrested by the marshal and discharged by a mob. Does this act discharge
him from his service? Does this lawless violence make him free? And if the
town or city where the mob occurs is made to pay a slight penalty, does this
also divest the owner of his right? This is nothing but an inducement to
mobs and riots. Pass this provision, and no fugitive slave will ever again be
returned from a free State. There will always be abolitionists enough to pay
for a slave, and this payment will set the slave free, and will constitute the
only penalty for this violence. For one, I would prefer to have no provision
at all on the subject than to have one encumbered with such an amendment.
I have but little more to say. If the peace of this country is to be hereafter
established on a permanent basis, and the Union is to be preserved, you,
gentlemen of the North, must recognize our rights, and cease to interfere
with them. You have nothing to do with this question of slavery. It is an
institution of our own. If it is a crime, we are responsible for it, and will
bear the responsibility. We have never interfered with your institutions. You
must now let us alone.
Mr. ORTH:—The objection of the gentleman from Maryland may be
answered in a word. It is for the owner to elect whether or not to accept
compensation and set his slave free. If he still chooses to pursue him, he
need not accept compensation; but if he does not, and receives payment for
him, the slave should go free. As to mobs and riots, we punish men at the
North who engage in them.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—I entirely agree with my colleague in this respect. We
could not accept the section if such an amendment was adopted. The report
of the committee is the very least that will satisfy our people. Do not
destroy it by such amendments as these.
The vote was then taken upon the amendment proposed by Mr. O   , with
the following result:
A   .—Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, New
Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Kansas—10.
N   .—Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia—
11.
And the amendment was rejected.
Mr. CLAY:—I move to amend the report by adding a section to be
numbered Section 8, as follows:
"The second paragraph of the second section of fourth article of the
Constitution shall be so construed that no State shall have the power to
consider and determine what is treason, felony, or crime, in another State;
but that a person charged in any State with treason, felony, or crime, who
shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall, on demand of
the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to
be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime."
I do not think discussion necessary upon such an amendment as this. It is
well known to the Conference that great difficulties have been found to
exist in carrying into effect this provision of the Constitution. So far as the
slave States are concerned, it is a perfect nullity. Unless it is amended it
may as well be stricken from the instrument. I believe the tenor of the
decisions at the North has been to permit the executive upon whom the
requisition is made, to determine whether the offence charged is a crime
under the law of the State to which the person charged has fled. If it is a
crime, the fugitive is delivered up. If not a crime in that sense, he is
discharged. The decisions of the courts have been to the same effect;
whenever the fugitive has been brought upon habeas corpus, the decision
has been the same. It is obvious that under this construction of the
Constitution no fugitive will be hereafter returned for an offence in which
the question of slavery is involved. This is only one of the many evasions of
the Constitution which have been practised in the free States. I deem the
amendment very important.
Mr. BRONSON:—The gentleman from Kentucky is entirely mistaken in
his statement of the decisions of the northern courts or northern governors.
The decisions are uniform so far as I know, that where the offence charged
is either a crime at common law, or under the statutes of the State from
which the fugitive has fled, he has been delivered up.
Mr. CLAY:—Did not the Executive of New York refuse to deliver up a
fugitive on the demand of the Governor of Virginia?
Mr. BRONSON:—In that case I think there was no evidence that the
offence charged was a crime under the statutes of Virginia, and it certainly
was not at common law.
The vote was taken upon Mr. C   '  amendment, and resulted as follows:
A   .—Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia—5.
N   .—Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Kansas—16.
And the amendment was rejected.
And on motion, at two o'clock  . ., the Conference adjourned.
E I G H T E E N T H  D A Y .
W         , T      , February 26th, 1861.
T   Conference, pursuant to adjournment, was called to order at eleven
o'clock.
Prayer was offered by Rev. Dr. G     .
The P         informed the Conference that in consequence of the length
of the Journal of yesterday, the Secretary had not been able to write it out,
and that it would be necessary to omit the reading thereof this morning.
Mr. McCURDY:—There was a vote taken in the confusion near the close of
the session last evening, in which Connecticut, according to the minutes of
the Secretary, appears to have voted in the negative. It was upon the
amendment of Mr. O   , declaring that the slave should be free whenever
his master had accepted payment for him. On that amendment the vote of
Connecticut was Yea. As the vote is recorded Nay by mistake, I move to
reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.
Mr. BRONSON:—The motion to reconsider is not necessary. Connecticut
can record her vote as she wishes to have it stand. It will not change the
result.
The PRESIDENT:—I think the motion is in order, if made by Connecticut.
Mr. BATTELL:—I will move to reconsider. I voted with the majority.
Mr. MOREHEAD, of North Carolina:—No individual delegate can make
such a motion. States vote here, not individuals. I submit that the motion is
out of order, unless made by a majority of the delegation.
Mr. BALDWIN:—The question is not complicated at all; neither is the
motion out of order. A majority of the delegation from Connecticut cast the
vote of that State in favor of Mr. O   '  amendment. By mistake that vote
was recorded against the amendment. The same majority whose vote is
made to do them injustice by a mistake for which its members are not
responsible, now moves to reconsider the vote.
The question was then taken upon Mr. M C    '  motion, and resulted as
follows:
A   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
York, New Hampshire, Ohio, Vermont and Kansas—11.
N   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—10.
And the motion prevailed, and the vote was reconsidered.
The PRESIDENT:—The question now recurs upon the amendment offered
by Mr. O   . On this amendment the vote will be taken by States.
Mr. WHITE:—I consider this amendment as entirely unnecessary. The
result which it seeks to attain is only the announcement of a well-
understood provision of the common law. By the common law, if an action
is brought for a trespass, and judgment recovered for that trespass, and the
damages under that judgment paid, the property which is the subject of the
action, and which may have originally been wrongfully taken, becomes
transferred; the damages take the place of the property, the defendant has
paid for his wrongful act, or, in other words, has paid for the property. The
same principle applies to the case of the fugitive slave who is rescued from
the custody of the law, when his owner has consented to accept payment for
him. The legal right of the owner in the slave is satisfied by such payment;
the money takes the place of the slave. But if this were not so, we ought not
to encumber the Constitution with such provisions. Congress will
undoubtedly make the proper provision both for the protection of the slave
and his master. Congress will not permit payment to be made for a slave,
and then suffer him to go back to bondage. This would be both unlawful
and unjust. I can see no necessity for adopting the amendment.
Mr. ORTH:—I understand there is some difference of opinion between
members of the Conference as to the effect of the phraseology of my
amendment. I will change that phraseology, and make the amendment read
as follows:
"And such fugitive, after the master has been paid therefor, shall be
discharged from such service."
Mr. MOREHEAD, of Kentucky:—I am opposed to this amendment upon
every ground. I would rather see some direct scheme of emancipation
adopted and inserted in the Constitution. Adopt this amendment, and the
result is inevitable. It would amount to emancipation upon the largest
possible scale. Our slaves would escape, you would rescue and pay for
them, and that would be the end of them. Why not leave it to Congress to
pass the necessary laws upon this subject? The adoption of this amendment
would destroy all hope that our labors would be acceptable to the South. I
say again, we had better establish emancipation at once.
Mr. DENT:—If this amendment is to be adopted, I hope we shall at the
same time reconsider the vote by which we rejected the amendment of the
gentleman from North Carolina, requiring the payment by the county, city,
or town wherein the slave is rescued from the custody of the law. This
provision would make the General Government pay for the crimes of a few
citizens in one section. In that case the General Government ought to own
the negro. It has paid for him, and the property in him ought to be
transferred.
Mr. WILMOT:—There is nothing in this. We do not wish to have the
Government own the negro. It is bad enough to have individuals own
slaves. We do not propose to turn the Government into an extensive slave
owner.
But let me ask the gentleman seriously, who is to own the negro, in such a
case, after he has been paid for? Certainly not the former owner, because his
right is gone. This amendment only states a conclusion of law; the right of
the owner being gone, the negro is free.
Mr. CHASE:—I think a single word will settle this. By the Constitution as
it now stands, the escaped fugitive is not discharged from service or labor.
The original section, as proposed, requires that the slave should be paid for,
when he is rescued. Now, he might be rescued three or four times. Shall he
be paid for as often? Do gentlemen claim that his owner shall receive
compensation more than once? I cannot see why gentlemen interested in
slavery should object to this amendment.
Mr. RIVES:—I think if gentlemen would look at this proposition seriously,
there would be no difference of opinion among us. Such a proposition
would foist into the Constitution a most injurious, pernicious, and
troublesome doctrine. By the most ultra abolitionists of the free States the
power of emancipating our slaves has been disclaimed. From the
organization of the Government, no such right has been claimed by any
respectable party or body of men. The question arose in the first Congress, I
think, upon the petition of the Quakers of Pennsylvania. It was decided
almost unanimously against the power, even when exercised by Congress.
But there is no need of multiplying or citing precedents. From that time to
this, no political party has claimed the power of emancipation. Such is the
universal doctrine now.
The right to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia is now claimed by
some. I think that is the doctrine of Mr. C    . But upon what argument is
it founded? Simply this: That the States, by the act of cession, have
surrendered this power to Congress. This is the only argument I have ever
heard in favor of the right, even in the District.
But this amendment proposes a most comprehensive scheme of
emancipation. It accomplishes emancipation in every one of the slave
States. It amounts to forcible emancipation upon the principle of
compensation.
The point has been well stated by gentlemen who have preceded me. Place
this in the Constitution, and there is an end of returning fugitives. The very
courts will act upon it. They will say that if any one will come forward and
pay the value of a slave when arrested, all the requirements of the
Constitution are satisfied, and he shall go free.
What is the object of our Conference? Why are we here? We are here to
bury out of sight all the causes of our difference and trouble. And yet you
propose to insert a new principle into our fundamental law, which, however
you may look upon it, will be regarded at the South as totally inconsistent
with our independence. Our people will not consent to it.
There is another view which I would suggest. This is eminently a matter of
legislative regulation. If the slave is paid for, Congress will at once
recognize the impropriety and injustice of permitting the owner to receive
payment for, and also receive his slave. Congress may say with great
propriety that the owner shall give a bond to return the money upon the
restoration of his slave. I hope no principle will be implanted in the
Constitution which will be more troublesome—more productive of
difficulties than any which has heretofore been made the subject of
discussion.
Mr. EWING:—If we do any thing of this kind, perhaps we had better say
that if the owner accepts compensation for his slave, he shall execute a deed
of manumission. This will make it a matter of consent on the part of the
owner. Put the amendment in that form and I will vote for it.
Mr. COALTER:—This amendment would offer a most powerful
inducement to our slaves to run away. It would be dangerous in the extreme.
When a fugitive has been paid for, and thus emancipated, he can come back
and settle by the side of his master. What effect would that have upon the
rest of his slaves? Would they not attempt the same thing? It may be said
that the States can pass laws which will prevent their return. But this power
will not be exercised. I know many free negroes in the slave States who are
respectable persons, who own property, and have their social and domestic
ties. These examples are bad. A fugitive who has been set free is not a safe
man to return and settle as a free negro among those who were his co-
slaves.
Mr. BROCKENBROUGH:—By this amendment you are inaugurating a
system of covert emancipation to which the South can never submit. We
protest against its adoption. The argument upon which you seek to sustain it
is a false one. How can the owner receive the full value of his rescued slave
when he himself, as a citizen and tax-payer, pays a part of the price?
Mr. MOREHEAD, of North Carolina:—I move to amend this amendment
by adding thereto these words:
"And the negro when thus emancipated shall not be permitted to leave the
State in which the emancipation takes place."
We know from past experience what the abolitionists of the free States
would do under such a provision as this in the Constitution. There will be
an underground railroad line along every principal route of travel. There
will be depots all along these lines. Canoes will be furnished to ferry
negroes over the Potomac and Ohio. J    B       C . will stand ready to
kill the master the very moment he crosses the line in pursuit of his slave.
What officer at the North will dare to arrest the slave when J    B    
pikes are stacked up in every little village? If arrested, there will be
organizations formed to rescue him, and you may as well let the "nigger" go
free at once. You are opening up the greatest scheme of emancipation ever
devised.
Mr. BACKUS:—I move to amend the amendment proposed by Mr. O   
by the substitution of the following:
"And the acceptance of such payment shall preclude the owner from further
claim to said fugitive."
It is claimed that this is a scheme of emancipation. It is nothing of the sort.
It is not intended that the owner shall be obliged to accept compensation for
his slave. That is left optional with him. He may take it or not as he likes.
The effect of accepting compensation would be just the same as if he sold
his slave to the North. The gentleman from Virginia raises a curious
objection; that the owner does not receive a full compensation because he
pays a portion of it himself. Well, I suppose the owner would pay the one
hundred and thirty-millionth part of the price! Does not the same objection
lay against the payment of any tax whatever? It is asked, Does this payment
transfer the legal title to the slave? Well, it probably goes to the party who
pays for it. If the payment is made in a free State, where slavery is not
tolerated, the title would not pass at all. I submit to our friends from the
South, whether they wish to have the Government become a slave-trader, to
set it up as a huckster of slaves in the shambles. My amendment imposes
the responsibility upon Congress. I have no doubt Congress will legislate
properly upon the subject.
Now let me say one word to gentlemen, friends of the South, in all
kindness. I have appreciated your position, and it has influenced my action.
I have not refused to give you any reasonable guarantees, and I shall not
refuse them. But I submit to you, whether it is in good taste for you to
declare that, if we do not yield all these little points to you, the Government
is to be broken up; that that is the only alternative?
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I hope this amendment will be adopted. As a Southern
man, I declare that it is acceptable to me. Let us adopt it, and end the matter.
[Cries of "Agreed."]
Mr. JOHNSON, of Missouri:—I have a very serious objection to putting
any bid in the Constitution to induce slaves to run away. I firmly believe
that if this amendment should ever become a part of the Constitution, it
would lead to the ultimate extinction of slavery. The State of Missouri is
surrounded on three sides by free States. When one of our slaves escapes
and crosses the border, he finds himself at once among a people, some of
whom will vindicate his freedom with their lives. I am willing to leave this
whole subject to Congress. Congress will not permit the owner to get his
money, and also retain his slave. In the name of God I ask that no such
provision may be put into the Constitution!
Mr. MOREHEAD:—I will agree to this. The difference between the two is
as wide as the poles.
The vote was then taken upon the amendment as amended, and resulted as
follows:
A   .—Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, New
Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Vermont—
17.
N   .—Indiana, Missouri, and Virginia—3.
So the amendment was agreed to.
Messrs. C   , of Kentucky, D    and R    , of Maryland, S        and
T     , of Tennessee, dissented from the votes of their respective States.
Mr. BRONSON:—It is evident under the rules, as they now stand, that this
debate is not to close within a month. I move to amend the rules as follows:
"Before reaching the final question on the plan to be submitted to Congress,
no member shall be allowed to speak more than three minutes on any
proposition."
Mr. SEDDON:—I rise to a question of order. I submit that the motion of the
gentleman from New York is not in order.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I move to lay the amendment on the table.
The motion of Mr. G       prevailed without a division.
Mr. FIELD:—I move to add an additional section to the report, as follows:
S       8. The Union of the States under the Constitution is indissoluble,
and no State can secede from the Union, or nullify an act of Congress, or
absolve its citizens from their paramount obligation of obedience to the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
In offering this amendment as an additional section, I propose very briefly
to state the reasons for its adoption. I shall not anticipate any of the
objections that may be urged against it, for, as I understand the rule, I shall
have the right to speak in reply. I will only state one or two arguments in
favor of the article.
We have been discussing the means of removing the symptoms of the
disease called secession. This amendment attacks the disease itself. The
doctrines of C      , originated and advocated by him, have now been
taken up by his followers, who are striking at the very foundation of our
Government. The doctrine of the North is, that no State can secede from the
Union. This amendment asserts that doctrine. Before we begin to amend,
we ought to know whether we have any Constitution to amend. The people
of my section wish to know whether we can compel obedience of a State, if
every man in it undertakes to refuse obedience. They believe that power to
exist in the Constitution now. If there is any doubt about it, they wish that
power distinctly asserted.
Mr. EWING:—I move to lay the amendment on the table at present,
without affecting the section of the report under consideration.
Mr. FIELD:—This motion is debatable.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN:—I submit that the motion of the gentleman from
New York is not an amendment; that it is an addition, and may be laid on
the table without affecting the remainder of the report.
Mr. BRONSON:—We have now gone through with the propositions, and
are ready to take a final vote upon them. Mr. F    '  amendment is properly
an addition, and relates entirely to other subjects. Laying that on the table
does not carry the whole subject there.
The motion of Mr. E     prevailed by the following vote: Ayes, 11; Noes,
10.[6]
Messrs. M       , W     , and C     dissented from the votes of their
respective States.
Mr. FIELD:—I now offer it as an amendment to the 7th section.
Mr. BRONSON:—I rise to a point of order. My colleague has proposed this
amendment as an additional section, and it has been laid upon the table. He
now proposes to put the same thing in another place. That is certainly not in
order.
Mr. FIELD:—I now offer it distinctly as an amendment to the 7th section,
to avoid the quibbling by which a direct vote was avoided before. It may as
well be understood that other than slave States have certain rights upon this
floor, and that those rights will be asserted. I wish gentlemen to understand
that I shall resist, as well as I may, every attempt to avoid or dodge this
question.
The PRESIDENT:—In the opinion of the Chair it is not in order.
Mr. FIELD:—Then I offer one-half the amendment as follows: "The Union
of the States, under the Constitution, is indissoluble."
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—Is it necessary to put this into the Constitution? Does
not the gentleman think the Constitution prohibits secession now? If so, let
him offer a resolution to that effect, and I will vote for it.
Mr. DENT:—I rise to a point of order. The amendment is not germane to
the section.
The PRESIDENT:—That is entirely a matter of opinion. The Chair cannot
rule out an amendment on that ground.
Mr. FIELD:—If gentlemen will give us a square vote on my proposition, I
will not debate it.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I believe every word that is stated in that proposition. It is
all in the Constitution now; but the South thinks differently, and this is one
of the great obstructions in our path. There is not a man here who does not
believe that this provision is already in the Constitution. I hope, therefore,
that we shall vote at once, and vote it down.
Mr. EWING:—The amendment proposed, implies the existence of the right
of secession, under the present Constitution. I do not believe in that, and
shall therefore vote against it.
Mr. FIELD:—I desire to obtain a clear vote upon this question, and not
have it pass off upon any technical points. I will withdraw my amendment,
and now move to amend the 7th section by striking out the whole of it, and
inserting in its place the following:
"No State shall withdraw from the Union without the consent of all the
States, given in a Convention of the States, convened in pursuance of an act
passed by two-thirds of each House of Congress."
Mr. GOODRICH:—I do not quite like the language of the amendment, for
it might seem to give the implication of a right to secede. I move the
following as a substitute:
"And no State can secede from the Union, or nullify an act of Congress, or
absolve its citizens from their paramount obligations of obedience to the
Constitution and laws of the United States."
Mr. MOREHEAD, of North Carolina:—There is no objection on my part
against the gentleman from New York taking any course he pleases, and as
much time as he likes; but I should regret extremely to have this
amendment adopted, and to have the Constitution made practically to assert
a right of secession. I have denied that right always in my State, in public
and in private. I am aware that on this point I differ from the general
sentiment of the South, and I hold there is no right of secession, and on the
part of the General Government no right of coercion. I claim that a State has
no right to secede, because that right is not found in the Constitution, and
the theory of the Constitution is against it.
The PRESIDENT:—I think the amendment of Mr. G        is not in
order.
Mr. FIELD:—As suggested by a friend, I will modify my motion, and state
it in this way, which certainly will avoid all these objections:
"It is declared to be the true intent and meaning of the present Constitution,
that the Union of the States under it is indissoluble."
Mr. COALTER:—Does the gentleman mean this as a substitute for the
entire report of the committee, for all that we have hitherto done?
Mr. FIELD:—Certainly not.
Mr. COALTER:—We have not met here for any such purpose as that
indicated in the present amendment. We are not here to discuss the question
of secession. We are here because the Border States are alarmed for their
own safety. We wish them to remain in the Union. The purpose of our
consultations is to make an arrangement under which they can stay in the
Union. If we do not confine ourselves to that purpose, and leave these
questions alone, our differences may be submitted to a greater than any
human judge. I hope, in Heaven's name, they will not be submitted to the
arbitrament of battle. No practical good whatever can come from debating
this amendment. I move to lay it on the table; but if that motion will have
the effect to carry the whole report on the table, I will not make it.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—I shall vote against this amendment. I believe the
Constitution is endowed with sufficient authority to accomplish its own
preservation, and to carry into execution its own laws; and, believing so, I
deny the right of secession, but the right of revolution is a natural right
possessed by every people. They may revolutionize their governments
when they become oppressive. The Constitution was adopted as the logical
consequence of this idea. There is no use now in discussing the abstract
question of secession. We must treat the present condition of the Gulf States
as a revolution in fact accomplished. We must meet them fairly. I vote
against this amendment, and wish to stand right upon the record. If the
history of this Convention is to be written, I do not wish to be handed down
to posterity as one who favors the right of secession, which I believe to be a
radical error.
Mr. WILMOT:—Pennsylvania is agreed in principle upon the doctrine of
this amendment. I believe the whole North agrees also that the right of
secession cannot be conceded, but my colleagues and myself differ
essentially as to the manner in which we shall make our doctrine most
effective. I think the true way is, to vote for this plain proposition, and not
vote against it.
Now, all the North agrees that there is no right under the Constitution to
interfere with slavery where it exists. No one has ever asserted such right,
or believed in it. We are now asked to give a declaratory provision on that
subject—to give it in order to quiet the slave States. One of my colleagues
—Mr. P      —was willing to give that declaratory clause, which was
necessary. I went with him in that; I now ask him to go with me, not against
a mere shadow, but against what is the doctrine of a large portion of the
people of the slave States; a doctrine of that proportion which proposes to
overthrow the Constitution of the country. It is a demoralizing doctrine. My
colleague proposes to vote against it. Did my colleague believe that any one
proposed to interfere with slavery in the States?
Mr. POLLOCK:—No, I do not believe there was any such intention
entertained by any considerable party. But there was an apprehension upon
this subject in the slave States, caused by the action of a few radical men at
the North. I was willing to vote for a declaratory resolution to quiet that
apprehension.
Mr. WILMOT:—This amendment points to something more than an
apprehension. It deals with an existing fact. Seven States have already gone
out of the Union, asserting that the principal allegiance of their people is to
the State, and not to the General Government. I think it high time that the
Constitution was made unequivocal upon this subject of secession.
Mr. PRICE:—I occupy even a few minutes of time with much reluctance.
Time is precious to us—too precious to be used in debate. I believe in the
doctrine of the gentleman from New York. That is the doctrine of my State;
but I believe in a great many other things which it is not necessary to insert
in the Constitution. We came here to treat a fact, a great fact. There is a
Southern Confederacy—there is a President D    —there is a Government
organized within the Union hostile to the United States. I came here, as the
gentleman from Illinois has said, to act as if I had never given a vote or
united with a political party. I say, with my colleague, that when the country
is in danger my political robes hang loosely upon my shoulders.
There is an element in this Conference which, from the first day of our
session, has opposed any action. Its policy has been to distract and divide
our counsels, to put off every thing, to prevent all action. How different this
is from what I expected when I came here. Shall we sit here debating
abstract questions when State after State is seceding? I hope not. I trust the
patriotic spirit which animates a majority of this Conference will to-day
send forth a proposition which will restore peace to the country. We all
agree to the principle contained in this amendment; but if we adopt it and
make it a part of the Constitution, we could never, under it, bring back the
seceded States. They will not admit the principle. What is to be gained,
then, by adopting it? Why will gentlemen insist upon propositions which
will nullify our action? New Jersey occupies high constitutional ground.
She is ready to do any thing that is fair, and she goes for these propositions
of the majority because they are fair. She will adopt these, and I believe
every State will adopt them—New York as quickly as any. I do not think the
gentleman properly represents the wishes of his constituents. He
misrepresents them. Let us act, then, promptly, and act now. Every moment
is precious. I know the trembling anxiety with which the country is awaiting
our action. Do not let us sit here like the great Belshazzar till the
handwriting appears on the wall. Let us set our faces against delay. Let us
put down with an indignant rebuke every attempt to demoralize our action
or destroy its effect.
Mr. BUCKNER:—I move to amend the amendment of Mr. F    , by
adding the following:
"But this declaration shall not be construed so as to give the Federal
Government power or authority to coerce or to make war directly or
indirectly upon a State, on account of a failure to comply with its
obligations."
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN:—I hope the gentleman from New York will
withdraw his resolution. The view of this Convention is against secession,
and we all know that the Union of the States under the Constitution is
indissoluble. We know just as well that it is not necessary to assert this
principle now. It is not expedient to assert it. We want to get back the
seceded States. If we are earnest in this, is it best to call them traitors? I ask
the gentleman whether the rejection of his proposition will not tend to
weaken the Government and the Union? It will stand as a naked vote of
rejection; the reasons why we vote against it will not go before the world.
Mr. BRONSON:—With the exception of a few minutes between eleven and
twelve o'clock, a few nights since, I have not occupied the time or attention
of the Conference. I will not now occupy but a few minutes. I came here to
do something. I supposed we could accomplish something. We learned very
soon after our arrival here that my colleague was opposed to any
amendment of the Constitution. The same is true of several of my
colleagues; perhaps a majority of them are here to do nothing. I supposed
that something ought to be done to quiet the country. Instead of that an
amendment is now offered asserting that we do not believe in the right of
secession, that we do believe that these States which have seceded have
done wrong. Suppose we do not believe in secession, what relevance has
that to the present subject? Such an amendment may be used to delay or
embarrass our action. There are a good many ways to defeat the project, a
good many ways to suppress secession. My colleague looks to force alone.
He proposes to bring back the seceded States by force. I contemplate the
use of force in this connection with horror. It can never be used
successfully.
We are here to agree upon something which will give peace to the country.
Our committee has submitted a report which they think will accomplish
that. My colleagues are skilful; they know how many ways there are to
accomplish their purposes. One way to defeat any action here is by making
long speeches, by loading down the propositions of amendment to the
Constitution with other amendments, which will make the whole thing
offensive to the country.
I stand here for my country. I would leave politics and political parties in
the back ground. I would vote for nothing here which is not pertinent to the
Constitution, and which will not help us in our attempts to quiet the
apprehensions of our fellow-citizens. My colleague now brings forward a
proposition which may be true in itself, but it is not pertinent and amounts
to nothing. I am sorry he is not in his seat to hear what I have to say. He
shot his arrow, and, I understand, has left for New York.
I am ready to vote down his proposition. I wish to see it voted down. I am
prepared to take all the consequences of voting it down, here and elsewhere.
But I have drawn an amendment myself which I offer in lieu of his. Permit
me to read it:
"While we do not recognize the constitutional right of any State to secede
from the Union, we are deeply impressed by the fact that this Government
is not maintained by force, but by unity of origin and interest, inducing
fraternal feelings between the people of different sections of the country;
and our labors have been directed to the end of giving a new assurance to
our brethren, North, South, East, and West, of our determination to stand
firmly by all the compromises of the Constitution."
I think we can vote for this amendment. It denies the right of secession as
explicitly as the amendment of my colleague. But it has no coercion about
it, and it asserts, as I understand it, the true principle upon which our
Government is founded. I offer it as an expression of my own views. I have
sat here for eight or ten days and have voted, except in a few instances, with
the delegation from my own State. There is a bare majority of that
delegation against the propositions of the committee. That majority
ordinarily casts the vote of our State. I cannot express my views by my
votes, and for that reason I undertake to express them in this amendment.
Mr. KING:—Like my colleague, I have taken but little part in the
discussions in this Conference. I cannot be justly charged with having
occupied time unnecessarily, as I have spoken on but one occasion, and
then very briefly. I would not speak now if I did not sincerely believe this
amendment to be eminently proper for the consideration of this body.
Myself and the majority of my colleagues differ from the majority of the
Conference. That difference is an honest difference of opinion. It is based
upon principle. If we consulted policy only, it would give us pleasure to
yield to the wishes of the majority. But our first duty is to our constituents,
and we must represent their opinions here. We should do it because our
opinions coincide with theirs; and it was because we entertained these
opinions that we were selected to represent New York in this body. When
we are called upon to vote, we shall vote to carry out those opinions; and
even when we differ from some of our colleagues, we are entitled to the
same consideration from this body that they are. We do not intend to be
driven from our position by threats or by intimidation. We believe that it is
eminently proper for this Conference to express its decided convictions
upon the question of secession. We are told here that secession is a fact.
Then let us deal with it as such. I go for the enforcement of the laws passed
in pursuance of the Constitution. I will never give up the idea that this is a
Government of the people, and possessing within itself the power of
enforcing its own decrees. This I shall never do. This Conference could
perform no nobler act than that of sending to the country the announcement
that the union of the States under the Constitution is indissoluble, and that
secession is but another term for rebellion.
The gentleman from New Jersey says we misrepresent our constituents.
How does he know that? Who gave him the right to place himself between
our constituents and ourselves—to sit in judgment upon us? He will find
that statement a very adventurous one. I should know something about New
York and the people of New York. I have lived in that State all my life. I
have been honored by the confidence and support of my fellow-citizens. Let
me assure the gentleman that I know the people of that State far better than
he. We will undertake to answer to our constituents; let him answer to his.
I will occupy no farther time. I wish to live in peace and harmony with our
brethren in the slave States. But I wish to put upon the record here a
statement of the fact that this is a Government of the people, and not a
compact of States.
Mr. PALMER:—It is no part of my business or duty to vindicate the
motives or conduct of the gentleman from New York, who is charged by
one of his colleagues with interposing his amendment only for the purpose
of delay. But that amendment meets my approval, and will have my support
without regard to such imputations. Of what consequence are the
gentleman's motives to us if his motion is right and proper? Are we to be
gravely told that secession and treason are not proper subjects for our
consideration? To be told this when every mail that comes to us from the
South is loaded with both these crimes? Sir, we have commenced wrong.
The first thing we ought to have done was to declare that these were crimes,
and that we would not negotiate with those who denied the authority of the
Government, and claimed to have thrown off their allegiance to it. Far
better would it be for the country if, instead of debating the question of
slavery in reference to our Territories, we had set to work to strengthen the
hands of the Government, and to put down the treason which threatens its
existence.
You, gentlemen of the slave States, say that we of the North use fair words,
that we promise fairly, but you insist that you will not rely upon our
promises, and you demand our bond as security that we will keep them. I
return the statement to you with interest. You, gentlemen, talk fairly also—
give us your bond! You have been talking fairly for the last dozen or twenty
years, and yet this treason, black as night, has been plotted among you, and
twelve years ago one of your statesmen predicted the very state of things
which now exists. I am willing to give bonds, but I want our action in this
respect to be reciprocal. I want your bond against secession, and I ask it
because seven States in sympathy with you have undertaken to set up an
independent Government—have placed over it a military chieftain who
asserts that we, the people of the United States, are foreigners, and must be
treated with as a foreign nation.
You charged J    B     with treason. You convicted and executed him;
and yet among you are thousands of men guilty of treason, beside which
that of J    B     was paltry and insignificant. If we are to act at all,
gentlemen, we must act upon reciprocal terms. I am willing to make every
reasonable concession. Will you do the same? Will you, gentlemen of the
South, declare that you will stand by the Union, and brand secession as
treasonable? If you will, you must vote for this amendment.
Mr. HOWARD:—I am sure no member of this Conference could have
listened to the remarks of the two gentlemen who have last spoken without
the deepest regret. It has been intimated here that Maryland will secede
unless she secures these guarantees. I do not know whether she will or not. I
know there is danger that she will.
I agree that there is no right of secession. I think that secession is
revolution. But the right of revolution always exists. It has always been
maintained by statesmen North and South. It was admitted by W       in
his reply to H    . I would read a quotation from his speech if time was not
so valuable.
Yes, gentlemen, we are all in danger. The storm is raging; Virginia has hung
her flag at half-mast as a signal of distress. If Virginia secedes our State will
go with her, hand in hand, with Providence as our guide. This is not
intended as a threat. GOD forbid! It is a truth which we cannot and ought
not to conceal.
Why will not New York and Massachusetts for once be magnanimous?
Why will they not follow the glorious example of Rhode Island? If they
will, I should still have hope. But if those two great States are against us, I
can see nothing but gloom in the future.
Mr. SMITH:—I hope the true state of the question will not be lost sight of.
The first question is on the motion of the gentleman from Missouri, to
amend the proposition of my colleague. On that I rise to a point of order.
The motion of the gentleman from Missouri is a distinct proposition, and
inconsistent with that offered by Mr. F    .
The PRESIDENT:—I do not think the point of order is well taken.
The question upon agreeing to the amendment of Mr. B       was then
taken by States, with the following result:
A   .—Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, and Virginia—5.
N   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Vermont, and Kansas—15.
So the amendment was lost.
Mr. BRONSON:—My motion is now in order as an amendment. I insist
that the question should be taken upon its adoption.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—Does the gentleman propose to put this into the
Constitution? If the gentleman wishes to publish it as his speech, I will
agree to it.
The question on the adoption of Mr. B      '  motion was taken viva
voce, and the amendment was rejected.
The PRESIDENT:—The question now recurs on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from New York—Mr. F    .
Mr. RIVES:—I hope the Conference will pardon me for saying a few words
upon this motion. I feel so sensibly the gravity of the consequences
involved in the result of this vote, that I ask for a few minutes only in which
to beseech the Conference not to act now upon a mere abstraction.
Gentlemen, what have we come here for? We have come at a time when the
Government of our country is in great peril; and after a long session of
diligent labor, and when we are just upon the point of arriving at the
satisfactory adjustment of our differences, we have these abstract questions
thrust upon us. They do not belong here. They ought not to be considered
here. They would better befit a debating society than an assembly of
statesmen met to consider constitutional questions. The gentleman
(Governor K   ) of New York announces his theory that this is a
Government of the people and not a compact of the States. While I should
agree with him upon his conclusions, we should differ widely as to the
premises from which they are derived. It is a compact. All the authorities
say so; and like any other compact, it is one from which each independent
party may withdraw.
Now, what is this proposed amendment but an abstraction? In theory, the
union of the States under the Constitution is indissoluble. But how is it in
fact? It is now a fact that the Union is disrupted, is dissolved, because
certain of the States composing it have withdrawn. But this is no time to
discuss these questions. While we are talking about abstractions, we are
wasting our time. I do not propose to enlarge upon the observations I have
already submitted. But I beseech you, one and all, recognizing every
member of the Conference as a brother of a common family, that now, after
the labor of three weeks, and upon the very verge of adjustment, you should
not destroy all we have done by interposing questions of this kind. Do not
let us be seen engaged in the idle labor of Sisyphus. Do not let us now, just
as we are about placing on the top of the mountain the block of
constitutional adjustment, suffer that block to rebound. Dismiss the
amendment with, I pray you earnestly, all questions of this sort, and let us
proceed to the practical matters involved in the report, and its adoption.
Mr. NOYES:—If my colleague who offered this amendment, was not at this
time absent, I should not address the Conference at all. I should like,
however, to know what possible dangerous consequence we may anticipate
from the adoption of this clause. Whether this Union is a compact of the
States or a Government of the people, is equally unimportant in this
connection. In either case it is not to be broken up at pleasure. If it is
claimed either that the right exists already—if it is apprehended that the
people themselves may assert the right to overthrow the Constitution and
destroy the Government at pleasure—we should not, by all means, pass this
amendment.
The slave power has now had possession of the Government in all for more
than fifty years. A President has been elected belonging to the opposing
party. For that cause alone, and without claiming or assigning any other, the
slave States, under the powerful protection of Virginia, have come here for
guarantees. We are told, over and over again, that seven States have left the
Union. There is a fact with which we have to deal. On our side, we are
merely dealing with apprehensions. If you have a right to guarantees to
quiet your apprehensions, have we not a right to insist that secession shall
be put down and condemned by an explicit clause of the Constitution? It is
this claim of the right of secession which has brought all the trouble upon
the country. We are right in our claim that it should be dealt with in this
Conference. If we, as delegates, should prove faithless to our trust, should
yield you all the guarantees you ask, and should insist upon nothing on our
side, such action would not avail you any thing.
The North and the people of the North must be satisfied upon this point.
Much has been said here about the right of revolution. I do not propose to
discuss that right. At all events that is not a right which depends upon the
Constitution, or grows out of it. If it exists at all, it is higher than, and above
all Constitutions. The statement in this amendment does not controvert the
right of revolution. It is simply a statement that the Union of the States,
under the Constitution, is indissoluble. I regard the adoption of this
amendment as both expedient and essential.
Mr. TURNER, of Illinois:—I do not think this amendment very important
either way. If this is intended as a mere declaration of the purposes of the
Constitution, it may be well enough. But will the assertion that such is the
purpose of the Constitution preserve that instrument and the Government
under it? No, sir. We may call spirits from the vasty deep; but the question
is, will they come?
If the right of secession exists at all, it is not confined to the South. If it is
conceded at all, it must be conceded in much broader terms—in terms that
are common to all the States. This amendment secures to the States no
practical benefit. I protest against being bound to harmonize on all abstract
questions. This is an abstraction. Gentlemen schooled in deduction could
spend weeks in argument over it.
The vote was taken upon the amendment proposed by Mr. F    , and
resulted as follows:
A   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
York, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Kansas—10.
N   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—11.
So the amendment was disagreed to.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I now submit that we ought to take the vote on the
substitute proposed by the gentleman from Connecticut. I trust we are
through with speeches, and hope we shall now get to some result. We may
as well vote upon all these propositions within the next hour.
Mr. SOMES:—I desire to move an amendment by adding the following, to
be numbered
S       8. "That the freedom of speech, or of the press, shall not be
abridged; but that the people of any Territory of the United States shall be
left perfectly free to discuss the subject of slavery."
Mr. BRONSON:—I move to lay that amendment on the table.
Mr. SOMES:—Is not that motion debatable?
The PRESIDENT:—It is not debatable.
The motion to lay the amendment offered by Mr. S     upon the table,
prevailed by the following vote:
A   .—Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and
Kansas—13.
N   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, and Vermont—5.
Thus the amendment was laid upon the table.
Mr. VANDEVER:—I move to amend the report by the addition of the
following section:
"The navigation of the Mississippi River shall remain free to the people of
each and all the States; and Congress shall provide by law for the protection
of commerce on said river against all interference, foreign or domestic."
The importance of this proposition can be seen at once. It is one in which
the whole country is interested, especially that portion of it in which I
reside, which is drained by the upper waters of the Mississippi and
Missouri. On this subject we have our apprehensions, and they are better
founded, too, than any which I have heard from the South. We believe that
our right to the navigation of this great national highway is imperilled. I
submit whether we are to be cavalierly treated in this matter, and whether a
subject of so much importance is to be laid upon the table? We may at all
events, with perfect propriety, go this far, and make it, under the
Constitution, the duty of Congress to protect the free navigation of the
Mississippi River by law. We want it understood that the navigation of that
river should be free and unobstructed, and that the faith of the nation is
pledged to enforce that right. H     C    once stated that nothing upon
earth could induce him to agree to any thing that should impede the free
navigation of that river. I assert and repeat his declaration. We of the
Northwest ask that this right should be guaranteed to us.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—I am as anxious for the free navigation of the
Mississippi River as the gentleman. I wish simply to say that it is made the
duty of the people of Iowa, and of other States bounded by this river, to
protect that right of navigation. But the amendment is not germane to the
report of the committee. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion of Mr. C         prevailed by the following vote:
A   .—Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey,
North Carolina, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia—14.
N   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, and New York
—6.
So the amendment was laid on the table.
Mr. BALDWIN:—I move that my substitute be taken up, and ask that it
may be read.
It was read as follows:
Whereas unhappy differences exist, which have alienated from each other
portions of the people of the United States, to such an extent as seriously to
disturb the peace of the nation and impair the regular and efficient action of
the Government within the sphere of its constitutional powers and duties;
And whereas, the Legislature of the State of Kentucky has made application
to Congress to call a Convention for proposing amendments to the
Constitution of the United States;
And whereas, it is believed to be the opinion of the people of other States
that amendments to the Constitution are, or may become, necessary to
secure to the people of the United States, of every section, the full and equal
enjoyment of their rights and liberties, so far as the same may depend for
their security and protection on the powers granted to or withheld from the
General Government in pursuance of the national purposes for which it was
ordained and established:
This Convention does therefore recommend to the several States to unite
with Kentucky in her application to Congress to call a Convention for
proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States, to be
submitted to the Legislatures of the several States, or to Conventions
therein, for ratification, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be
proposed by Congress, in accordance with the provision in the fifth article
of the Constitution.
I propose to avail myself of the privilege of a short reply to the arguments
against my proposition; and in order that I may occupy as little time as
possible, I have reduced my reply to writing. At the risk of repeating some
of the remarks I made at the opening of the discussion, I wish to recur to the
facts on which my report is based.
The resolution which I have moved to substitute, recommends to the several
States to unite with Kentucky in her application for the calling of a
Convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution.
On the 28th day of January, seven days before the assembling of this
Conference Convention, the Governor of Kentucky transmitted to the
President of the United States the joint resolutions of the General Assembly
of that Commonwealth, "recommending a call for a Convention of the
United States," with a request that the President would lay the same before
Congress; and on the 5th of February, the day after the assembling of this
Convention, they were, by a special message of the President,
communicated to Congress, with the expression of great satisfaction in the
performance of that duty, and of confidence that Congress would bestow
upon those resolutions the careful consideration due to the distinguished
and patriotic source from which they proceeded, as well as to the great
importance of the subject which they involve. The resolution requesting the
call of a Convention I have already read to the Conference.
There are, sir, but two modes provided by the people of the United States
for altering the fundamental law of their Government, both of which are
specified in the fifth article of the Constitution:
1. Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary,
shall         amendments to the Constitution; or,
2. On the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States,
shall call a Convention for           amendments, which, in either case,
shall be valid as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures,
or by Conventions in three-fourths of the States.
The first mode is recommended by the majority of the committee, in the
expectation that Congress, by a two-thirds vote of both houses, will
propose, on the request of this Convention, for ratification by the States, the
several amendments they have reported.
The second mode is the one proposed by the Legislature of Kentucky, and
which, in accordance therewith, I have moved to substitute for the
recommendation of the committee.
There are now but few days remaining before the termination of the
functions of the present Congress. If it were within the fair scope and
interest of the constitutional provision that Congress should act, in the
proposing of amendments, on the recommendation of this Conference
Convention, no one, I think, can reasonably expect them to consider and
deliberately act on such recommendation during the few remaining days of
the present Congress. Other questions, of engrossing interest, now pending
before them, and the acts of necessary legislation at the close of the session,
will prevent it. It must, therefore, go over to the next Congress. Assuming
that during the term of that Congress the amendments recommended by this
Convention shall, by two-thirds of both houses, be deemed necessary, and
be proposed to the States for ratification; there would probably be no earlier
final action by the requisite number of States, than in the mode proposed by
Kentucky, and recommended by the resolution which I have moved to
substitute for the mode of amendment reported by the committee. But the
great objection, in my mind, to the mode of amendment contemplated by
the majority report, is that it is not in accordance with either the letter or the
spirit of the Constitution. The people of the United States intended, when
they adopted the Constitution under which we have for more than seventy
years enjoyed a higher degree of prosperity than has fallen to the lot of any
other people, that it should remain in full force and unchanged, except in
one of the two modes prescribed in that sacred instrument for its own
amendment.
It is a Constitution which binds the people of every State, as the supreme
law of the land, until it can be changed by the action, in the first instance, of
those who are sworn to support it. No amendments can, consistently with
the letter or the spirit of the Constitution, be proposed by Congress, unless
two-thirds of both houses, acting under the responsibility of their official
oaths, shall "deem them necessary." No interference or pressure by any
extraneous body unknown to the Constitution, was contemplated, or can be
allowed with safety to the people, to impair the exercise of this function
under all the responsibilities and official sanctions that properly appertain to
it. The judgment of two-thirds of both houses of Congress in regard to the
necessity of the amendments, must precede their proposal to the States for
ratification.
The Government of the United States, in its sphere of duties, is supreme.
The State Governments, when they consented to its formation by the people
of the United States, surrendered so much of their separate sovereignties as
was essential to its strength and efficiency. To that extent we became one
people. This Government, for all national purposes, took the place of the
State Governments, as well in regard to the paramount allegiance as to the
duty of protection of the people of every State in the enjoyment of all their
federal rights. Its powers can neither be enlarged nor diminished, except in
the constitutional mode, without violating the rights of the States as well as
of the people.
Any attempt from without, by combinations and associations not
responsible to the people, to coerce or overawe Congress, or in any way to
impair the free and deliberate exercise of its judgment in proposing
amendments "as deemed necessary" by Congress, is a palpable violation of
the privileges of the people. They elected the members of the House of
Representatives with the intention that they should freely and deliberately,
under their official oaths, propose amendments, or not, to the Constitution,
as they might deem necessary, and not at the dictation of States even, who
cannot themselves propose amendments, but can only require of Congress
to call a Convention of all the States for that purpose. Much less can a
convention of delegates from the Legislatures, or the Executive of a part
only of the States—a body unknown to, and unauthorized by, the
Constitution—assume to exercise, or dictate to Congress the exercise of this
high prerogative.
W  do not represent the people of the United States. This Government, for
every purpose for which it was established, is a separate, and in some sense
a foreign government to the States. It operates directly on the people, and is
itself their true protector in all their Federal rights.
Any number of States, less than two-thirds, have no more right to call into
action the power of Congress either to call a Convention, or to propose
amendments, than the individual members of their Legislatures in their
private capacities; and Congress might as well, and probably would, treat
our interference with their official duties as an usurpation; as much so as if
we should seek to interfere with the appropriate duties of the Legislatures of
Virginia or Massachusetts. And, sir, I cannot but regard it, so far as the free
action of Congress should be influenced by the recommendations of this
body, as in the nature of a revolutionary proceeding for which there is no
sufficient cause or justification. Sir, all the States are not here represented.
All have not even had an opportunity to be here. And yet we are
endeavoring to influence the action of Congress in a manner which may
deeply affect their interests. If, under any circumstances, a body so
convened, would have a right to act upon Congress, by the expression of
our opinions as a Convention of States, ought not all to have an opportunity
to participate in our deliberations? Most certainly they ought.
But it is said some of the States are threatening to secede from the Union;
others have seceded, and must be induced to come back, by the speedy
action of Congress on the amendments recommended by the committee.
Does the Constitution authorize amendments under such circumstances,
with less care and deliberation than in time of peace and tranquillity?
This Government, sir, cannot recognize the fact that States have seceded. It
is not a Government over States, but over the people of the United States,
irrespective of the State in which they live. This Government, and not the
States, protects them in their Federal rights, and requires allegiance and
obedience from the people in every State, to the Constitution and laws of
the United States as the supreme law of the land, any thing in the laws or
ordinances of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. It is the people and
not the States that are governed by that law, within the sphere of its
constitutional operation.
I have said that the course proposed by the majority of the committee is, in
my judgment, not only against the letter, but the spirit of the Constitution.
The State of Kentucky, ever patriotic and conservative, must have so
regarded it, when, instead of asking Congress to propose the amendments
they desired, they requested their sister States to unite with them in an
application in the mode prescribed by the Constitution to Congress to call a
Convention for that purpose.
Our fathers, who framed that Constitution, and the people of the United
States, who ratified it, set it forth in the preamble as their first great purpose
"to form a more perfect Union." They intended to establish thereby a
Government of perpetual obligation and of self-sustaining vigor. They did
not contemplate the necessity of amendments for any other causes than such
as, after calm, deliberate, undisturbed consideration should be judged
necessary. They did not intend that it should be exposed to the danger of
hasty action under the influence of excited passions or timid and groundless
apprehension. They would not trust the entire people even with the right of
amendment, except in the mode prescribed, with all the delays incident to
that mode; and then only by the action, in every stage of the proceeding, of
persons bound by solemn oath to support it.
The Constitution, in prescribing the modes of proposing amendments,
endeavored to provide against irregular combination of a part only of the
States to effect them. Hence it prohibited all agreements or compacts
between the States; and it made no provision for the recognition of any
action by a convention, except when called on the recommendation of two-
thirds of the States applying to Congress, by separate action of their
Legislatures, for that purpose.
Any interference with the duty of Congress by such a body as we are,
representing only a portion of the States in any form, and some of us only
the executives of the States from which we come, would be as much at
variance with the Constitution as with the counsel of that illustrious
American—I will not say Virginian—for W          belonged to his
whole country—in the Farewell Address which he dedicated to the people
of the United States on his retirement from the public service, and which
ought to be cherished in the heart of every patriot. In addition to what I
have already read from that address let me read this passage:
"All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and
associations under whatever plausible character, with the real design to
direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the
constituted authorities, are destructive to this fundamental rule, and of fatal
tendency."
Let me read it again. "All obstructions," &c. "All combinations," &c.
This address is replete with words of true wisdom. Let us heed them; for
they are eminently adapted to the present occasion. There is no exigency
which should be allowed to overawe Congress in the performance of its
constitutional duties. No State intervention, no combination or association
of representatives of States in a manner unknown to the Constitution, can be
recognized as authoritative by those to whom, on their own responsibility,
the people of the United States have conferred their national interests and
the guardianship of their fundamental law. "We owe," in the language of the
illustrious statesman of Kentucky, "a paramount allegiance to the
Government of the United States—a subordinate one to our State."
Sir, while I am willing to perform all my constitutional duties—all my
fraternal duties toward the people of every section of our common country,
I, for one, feel bound to abstain from any encroachment on the duties which
the Constitution of my country has delegated to others to be performed, in
the modes, and with the responsibilities, which the people for their own
security have deemed it proper to prescribe.
With these opinions, I should be unfaithful to my own convictions of duty,
and recreant to the trust which has devolved on me as a citizen of the
United States, and by inheritance from an ancestor who took a part in the
deliberations of the Convention which framed our Constitution, and to
whose public services, you, sir, so kindly alluded at the opening of the
Conference, were I to unite with the majority of the committee in urging
upon Congress the amendments they have proposed.
Entertaining as I do for the members of the committee who have concurred
in that report a profound respect, it has been with a feeling of unaffected
diffidence and self-distrust that I have ventured to express my sentiments on
this occasion. But as I must act on my own convictions of duty, which are in
harmony with those of my associates from Connecticut, so far as in the
brief period which has elapsed since the report was submitted I have had
opportunity to ascertain them, I felt bound to make known to the
Convention the reasons which will govern my action.[7]
The vote was then taken by States on the substitute proposed by Mr.
B      , and the substitute was rejected by the following vote:
A   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, New
Hampshire, and Vermont—8.
N   .—Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and
Kansas—13.
So the amendment was not agreed to.
The following gentlemen disagreed to the vote of their respective States:
Mr. B      , of New York; Mr. G      , of New York; Mr. D    , of
New York; Mr. C      , of New York; Mr. O   , of Indiana; Mr.
H        , of Indiana.
Mr. SEDDON:—I suppose it is now in order for me to move my substitute
for the report of the majority of the committee.
Mr. TUCK:—I also have a substitute to offer. I shall not discuss it.
Mr. SEDDON:—The substitute which I propose embodies the C         
resolutions, with the modifications suggested by Virginia. These are
principally confined to the first section, which is made to apply to our
future as well as our present territory. I have modified the form of the
substitute in several particulars, and now offer it without farther
introduction. These are the amendments which I understand the delegation
from Virginia is instructed to insist upon:
JOINT RESOLUTIONS
PROPOSING CERTAIN AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES.
W      , serious and alarming dissensions have arisen between the
Northern and Southern States, concerning the rights and security of the
rights of the slaveholding States, and especially their rights in the common
territory of the United States; and whereas, it is eminently desirable and
proper that those dissensions, which now threaten the very existence of this
Union, should be permanently quieted and settled by constitutional
provisions, which shall do equal justice to all sections, and thereby restore
to the people that peace and good will which ought to prevail between all
the citizens of the United States: therefore,
Resolved, by this Convention, that the following articles are hereby
approved and submitted to the Congress of the United States, with the
request that they may, by the requisite constitutional majority of two-thirds,
be recommended to the respective States of the Union, to be, when ratified
by conventions of three-fourths of the States, valid and operative as
amendments of the Constitution of the Union.
A       1. In all the territory of the United States now held or hereafter
acquired, situate north of latitude 36° 30´, slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime, is prohibited, while such territory shall
remain under territorial government. In all the territory now or hereafter
acquired south of said line of latitude, slavery of the African race is hereby
recognized as existing, and shall not be interfered with by Congress; but
shall be protected as property by all the departments of the territorial
government during its continuance; and when any territory, north or south
of said line, within such boundaries as Congress may prescribe, shall
contain the population requisite for a member of Congress, according to the
then federal ratio of representation of the people of the United States, it
shall, if its form of government be republican, be admitted into the Union
on an equal footing with the original States, with or without slavery, as the
constitution of such new State may provide.
A       2. Congress shall have no power to abolish slavery in places under
its exclusive jurisdiction, and situate within the limits of States that permit
the holding of slaves.
A       3. Congress shall have no power to abolish slavery within the
District of Columbia, so long as it exists in the adjoining States of Virginia
and Maryland, or either, nor without the consent of the free white
inhabitants, nor without just compensation first made to such owners of
slaves as do not consent to such abolishment. Nor shall Congress at any
time prohibit officers of the Federal Government or members of Congress,
whose duties require them to be in said District, from bringing with them
their slaves and holding them, as such, during the time their duties may
require them to remain there, and afterwards taking them from the District.
A       4. Congress shall have no power to prohibit or hinder the
transportation of slaves from one State to another, or to a Territory in which
slaves are by law permitted to be held, whether that transportation be by
land, navigable rivers, or by the sea. And if such transportation be by sea,
the slaves shall be protected as property by the Federal Government. And
the right of transit by the owners with their slaves in passing to or from one
slaveholding State or Territory to another, between and through the non-
slaveholding States and Territories, shall be protected. And in imposing
direct taxes pursuant to the Constitution, Congress shall have no power to
impose on slaves a higher rate of tax than on land, according to their just
value.
A       5. That in addition to the provisions of the third paragraph of the
second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States,
Congress shall provide by law, that the United States shall pay to the owner
who shall apply for it, the full value of his fugitive slave, in all cases, when
the marshal, or other officer, whose duty it was to arrest said fugitive, was
prevented from so doing by violence or intimidation, or when, after arrest,
said fugitive was rescued by force, and the owner thereby prevented and
obstructed in the pursuit of his remedy for the recovery of his fugitive slave,
under the said clause of the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance
thereof. And in all such cases, when the United States shall pay for such
fugitive, they shall reimburse themselves by imposing and collecting a tax
on the county or city in which said violence, intimidation, or rescue was
committed, equal in amount to the sum paid by them, with the addition of
interest and the costs of collection; and the said county or city, after it has
paid said amount to the United States, may, for its indemnity, sue and
recover from the wrong-doers, or rescuers, by whom the owner was
prevented from the recovery of his fugitive slave, in like manner as the
owner himself might have sued and recovered.
A       6. No future amendment of the Constitution shall affect the five
preceding articles, nor the third paragraph of the second section of the first
article of the Constitution, nor the third paragraph of the second section of
the fourth article of said Constitution, and no amendment shall be made to
the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress any power to
abolish or interfere with slavery in any of the States by whose laws it is or
may be allowed or permitted.
A       7. S  . 1. The elective franchise and the right to hold office,
whether Federal, State, territorial, or municipal, shall not be exercised by
persons who are, in whole or in part, of the African race.
And whereas, also, besides those causes of dissension embraced in the
foregoing amendments proposed to the Constitution of the United States,
there are others which come within the jurisdiction of Congress, and may be
remedied by its legislative power: and whereas it is the desire of this
Convention, as far as its influence may extend, to remove all just cause for
the popular discontent and agitation which now disturb the peace of the
country, and threaten the stability of its institutions: Therefore,
1. Resolved, That the laws now in force for the recovery of fugitive slaves
are in strict pursuance of the plain and mandatory provisions of the
Constitution, and have been sanctioned as valid and constitutional by the
judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States; that the slaveholding
States are entitled to the faithful observance and execution of those laws,
and that they ought not to be repealed or so modified or changed as to
impair their efficiency; and that laws ought to be made for the punishment
of those who attempt, by rescue of the slave or other illegal means, to
hinder or defeat the due execution of said laws.
2. That all State laws which conflict with the fugitive slave acts, or any
other constitutional acts of Congress, or which, in their operation, impede,
hinder, or delay the free course and due execution of any of said acts, are
null and void by the plain provisions of the Constitution of the United
States. Yet those State laws, void as they are, have given color to practices,
and led to consequences which have obstructed the due administration and
execution of acts of Congress, and especially the acts for the delivery of
fugitive slaves, and have thereby contributed much to the discord and
commotion now prevailing. This Convention, therefore, in the present
perilous juncture, does not deem it improper, respectfully and earnestly, to
recommend the repeal of those laws to the several States which have
enacted them, or such legislative corrections or explanations of them as
may prevent their being used or perverted to such mischievous purposes.
3. That the act of the eighteenth of September, eighteen hundred and fifty,
commonly called the fugitive slave law, ought to be so amended as to make
the fee of the commissioner, mentioned in the eighth section of the act,
equal in amount, in the cases decided by him, whether his decision be in
favor of or against the claimant. And to avoid misconstruction, the last
clause of the fifth section of said act, which authorizes the person holding a
warrant for the arrest or detention of a fugitive slave to summon to his aid
the posse comitatus, and which declares it to be the duty of all good citizens
to assist him in its execution, ought to be so amended as to expressly limit
the authority and duty to cases in which there shall be resistance, or danger
of resistance or rescue.
4. That the laws for the suppression of the African slave-trade, and
especially those prohibiting the importation of slaves into the United States,
ought to be made effectual, and ought to be thoroughly executed, and all
further enactments necessary to those ends ought to be promptly made.
The substitute offered by Mr. S      was rejected by the following vote:
A   .—Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, and Virginia—4.
N   .—Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Maryland, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Kansas—16.
Mr. D    dissented from the vote of Maryland.
Mr. HOUSTON:—I wish to explain the vote of Delaware. She has endorsed
the C          resolutions. She would accept the mode of adjustment
proposed by the gentleman from Virginia. She has adhered to her opinions
as long as she thinks it fit or expedient to do so. Under these circumstances
Delaware feels it her duty to vote for the report of the majority. As we
desire to harmonize conflicting opinions, and to arrive at a fair settlement,
we have voted against Mr. S     '  amendment.
Mr. CRISFIELD:—Like Delaware, Maryland prefers the C          plan
of adjustment. That we think is now impossible. But that plan does not
differ very widely from the report of the majority. Certainly not enough to
warrant us in risking the Union, when we can get the one and cannot have
the other. For this reason Maryland votes "No" on Mr. S     ' 
proposition.
Mr. CLAY:—I gave notice some days ago that I should offer as a substitute
the C          resolutions—pure and undefiled—without the crossing of a
"t" or the dotting of an "i." I now offer them as follows, and demand a vote
by States:
W      , the Union is in danger; and owing to the unhappy divisions
existing in Congress, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for that body to
concur, in both its branches, by the requisite majority, so as to enable it
either to adopt such measures of legislation, or to recommend to the States
such amendments to the Constitution as are deemed necessary and proper to
avert that danger; and whereas, in so great an emergency, the opinion and
judgment of the people ought to be heard, and would be the best and surest
guide to their representatives: Therefore,
Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law, without delay, for taking
the sense of the people, and submitting to their vote the following
resolutions as the basis for the final and permanent settlement of those
disputes that now disturb the peace of the country and threaten the existence
of the Union.
And that whereas serious and alarming dissensions have arisen between the
Northern and Southern States, concerning the rights and security of the
rights of the slaveholding States, and especially their rights in the common
territory of the United States; and whereas, it is eminently desirable and
proper that those dissensions, which now threaten the very existence of this
Union, should be permanently quieted and settled by constitutional
provisions, which shall do equal justice to all sections, and thereby restore
to the people that peace and good will which ought to prevail between all
the citizens of the United States: Therefore,
Resolved, That the following articles be, and hereby are, proposed and
submitted as amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which
shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of said Constitution, when
ratified by conventions of three-fourths of the several States:
A       1. In all the territory of the United States now held or hereafter
acquired, situate north of latitude 36° 30´, slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime, is prohibited, while such territory shall
remain under territorial government. In all the territory south of said line of
latitude, slavery of the African race is hereby recognized as existing, and
shall not be interfered with by Congress; but shall be protected as property
by all the departments of the territorial government during its continuance;
and when any Territory, north or south of said line, within such boundaries
as Congress may prescribe, shall contain the population requisite for a
member of Congress, according to the then Federal ratio of representation
of the people of the United States, it shall, if its form of government be
republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original
States, with or without slavery, as the constitution of such new States may
provide.
A       2. Congress shall have no power to abolish slavery in places under
its exclusive jurisdiction, and situate within the limits of States that permit
the holding of slaves.
A       3. Congress shall have no power to abolish slavery within the
District of Columbia, so long as it exists in the adjoining States of Virginia
and Maryland, or either, nor without the consent of the inhabitants, nor
without just compensation first made to such owners of slaves as do not
consent to such abolishment. Nor shall Congress at any time prohibit
officers of the Federal Government or members of Congress, whose duties
require them to be in said District, from bringing with them their slaves, and
holding them, as such, during the time their duties may require them to
remain there, and afterwards taking them from the District.
A       4. Congress shall have no power to prohibit or hinder the
transportation of slaves from one State to another, or to a Territory in which
slaves are by law permitted to be held, whether that transportation be by
land, navigable rivers, or by the sea; and the right of transit by the owners
with their slaves in passing to or from one slaveholding State or Territory to
another, between and through the non-slaveholding States and Territories,
shall be protected.
A       5. That, in addition to the provisions of the third paragraph of the
second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States,
Congress shall have power to provide by law, and it shall be its duty so to
provide, that the United States shall pay to the owner who shall apply for it,
the full value of his fugitive slave in all cases, when the marshal or other
officer whose duty it was to arrest said fugitive was prevented from so
doing by violence or intimidation, or when, after arrest, said fugitive was
rescued by force, and the owner thereby prevented and obstructed in the
pursuit of his remedy for the recovery of his fugitive slave, under the said
clause of the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof. And in
all such cases, when the United States shall pay for such fugitive, they shall
have the power to reimburse themselves by imposing and collecting a tax
on the county or city in which said violence, intimidation, or rescue was
committed, equal in amount to the sum paid by them, with the addition of
interest and the costs of collection; and the said county or city, after it has
paid said amount to the United States, may, for its indemnity, sue and
recover from the wrong-doers, or rescuers, by whom the owner was
prevented from the recovery of his fugitive slave, in like manner as the
owner himself might have sued and recovered.
A       6. No future amendment of the Constitution shall affect the five
preceding articles, nor the third paragraph of the second section of the first
article of the Constitution, nor the third paragraph of the second section of
the fourth article of said Constitution; and no amendment shall be made to
the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress any power to
abolish or interfere with slavery in any of the States by whose laws it is or
may be allowed or permitted.
A       7. S  . 1. The elective franchise, and the right to hold office,
whether federal, State, territorial, or municipal, shall not be exercised by
persons who are, in whole or in part, of the African race.
S  . 2. The United States shall have power to acquire, from time to time,
districts of country in Africa and South America, for the colonization, at
expense of the Federal Treasury, of such free negroes and mulattoes as the
several States may wish to have removed from their limits and from the
District of Columbia, and such other places as may be under the jurisdiction
of Congress.
And whereas, also, besides those causes of dissension embraced in the
foregoing amendments proposed to the Constitution of the United States,
there are others which come within the jurisdiction of Congress, and may be
remedied by its legitimate power; and whereas it is the desire of this
Convention, as far as its influence may extend, to remove all just cause for
the popular discontent and agitation which now disturb the peace of the
country, and threaten the stability of its institutions: Therefore,
1. Resolved, That the laws now in force for the recovery of fugitive slaves
are in strict pursuance of the plain and mandatory provisions of the
Constitution, and have been sanctioned as valid and constitutional by the
judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States; that the slaveholding
States are entitled to the faithful observance and execution of those laws,
and that they ought not to be repealed or so modified or changed as to
impair their efficiency; and that laws ought to be made for the punishment
of those who attempt, by rescue of the slave or other illegal means, to
hinder of defeat the due execution of said laws.
2. That all State laws which conflict with the fugitive slave acts, or any
other constitutional acts of Congress, or which in their operation impede,
hinder, or delay the free course and due execution of any of said acts, are
null and void by the plain provisions of the Constitution of the United
States. Yet those State laws, void as they are, have given color to practices,
and led to consequences which have obstructed the due administration and
execution of acts of Congress, and especially the acts for the delivery of
fugitive slaves, and have thereby contributed much to the discord and
commotion now prevailing. This Convention, therefore, in the present
perilous juncture, does not deem it improper, respectfully and earnestly, to
recommend the repeal of those laws to the several States which have
enacted them, or such legislative corrections or explanations of them, as
may prevent their being used or perverted to such mischievous purposes.
3. That the act of the eighteenth of September, eighteen hundred and fifty,
commonly called the fugitive slave law, ought to be so amended as to make
the fee of the commissioner, mentioned in the eighth section of the act,
equal in amount, in the cases decided by him, whether his decision be in
favor of or against the claimant. And to avoid misconstruction, the last
clause of the fifth section of said act, which authorizes the person holding a
warrant for the arrest or detention of a fugitive slave to summon to his aid
the posse comitatus, and which declares it to be the duty of all good citizens
to assist him in its execution, ought to be so amended as to expressly limit
the authority and duty to cases in which there shall be resistance, or danger
of resistance or rescue.
4. That the laws for the suppression of the African slave-trade, and
especially those prohibiting the importation of slaves into the United States,
ought to be made effectual, and ought to be thoroughly executed, and all
further enactments necessary to those ends ought to be promptly made.
The question on agreeing to said amendment resulted in the following vote:
A   .—Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia—5.
N   .—Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Maryland, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Vermont—14.
So the amendment was not agreed to.
Mr. DENT:—I desire to dissent from the vote of Maryland.
Mr. EWING:—I desire to record the vote of Kansas in the negative.
The PRESIDENT:—Leave will be given unless objection is made.
Mr. TUCK:—I hold in my hand a substitute which I propose to offer for the
report of the committee. I know all the delegates have made up their minds
how to vote, and what to vote for. Argument now will amount to but little.
But I submit this as indicating to a certain extent the views of the minority
here. I shall make no farther remarks, but shall pass it to the Secretary, and I
hope the Conference will be patient for five minutes while it is read.
The proposition of Mr. T    was read as follows:
T      P             U      S     :
On the 4th day of February, 1861, in compliance with the invitation of the
State of Virginia, commissioners from several other States met the
commissioners of that State in Conference Convention, in the City of
Washington. From time to time, commissioners from other States appeared,
appointed as were those who first appeared, some by the Legislatures, and
some by the Governors of their respective States, until, on the 23d instant,
twenty-one States were then represented. The Convention thus constituted
claims no authority under the Constitution and laws; but deeply impressed
with a sense of existing dissensions and dangers, proceeded to a careful
consideration of them and their appropriate remedies, and having brought
their deliberations to a close, now submit the result to the judgment of their
fellow-citizens.
We recognize and deplore the divisions and distractions which now afflict
our country, interrupt its prosperity, disturb its peace, and endanger the
Union of the States; but we repel the conclusion, that any alienations or
dissensions exist which are irreconcilable, which justify attempts at
revolution, or which the patriotism and fraternal sentiments of the people,
and the interests and honor of the whole nation, will not overcome.
In a country embracing the central and most important portion of a
continent, among a people now numbering over thirty millions, diversities
of opinion inevitably exist; and rivalries, intensified at times by local
interests and sectional attachments, must often occur; yet we do not doubt
that the theory of our Government is the best which is possible for this
nation, that the Union of the States is of vital importance, and that the
Constitution, which expresses the combined wisdom of the illustrious
founders of the Government, is still the palladium of our liberties, adequate
to every emergency, and justly entitled to the support of every good citizen.
It embraces in its provisions and spirit, all the defence and protection which
any section of the country can rightfully demand or honorably concede.
Adopted with primary reference to the wants of five millions of people, but
with the wisest reference to future expansion and development, it has
carried us onward with a rapid increase of numbers, an accumulation of
wealth, and a degree of happiness and general prosperity never attained by
any other nation.
Whatever branch of industry, or whatever staple production, shall become,
in the possible changes of the future, the leading interests of the country,
thereby creating unforeseen complications or new conflicts of opinion and
interest, the Constitution of the United States, properly understood and
fairly enforced, is equal to every exigency, a shield and defence to all, in
every time of need. If, however, by reason of a change in circumstances, or
for any cause, a portion of the people believe they ought to have their rights
more exactly defined or more fully explained in the Constitution, it is their
duty, in accordance with its provisions, to seek a remedy by way of
amendment to that instrument; and it is the duty of all the States to concur
in such amendments as may be found necessary to insure equal and exact
justice to all.
In order, therefore, to announce to the country the sentiments of this
Convention, respecting not only the remedy which should be sought for
existing discontents, but also to communicate to the public what we believe
to be the patriotic sentiment of the country, we adopt the following
resolutions:
1st. Resolved, That this Convention recognize the well-understood
proposition that the Constitution of the United States gives no power to
Congress, or any branch of the Federal Government, to interfere in any
manner with slavery in any of the States; and we are assured by abundant
testimony, that neither of the great political organizations existing in the
country contemplates a violation of the spirit of the Constitution in this
regard, or the procuring of any amendment thereof, by which Congress, or
any department of the General Government, shall ever have jurisdiction
over slavery in any of the States.
2d. Resolved, That the Constitution was ordained and established, as set
forth in the preamble, by the people of the United States, in order to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide
for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity; and when the people
of any State are not in full enjoyment of all the benefits intended to be
secured to them by the Constitution, or their rights under it are disregarded,
their tranquillity disturbed, their prosperity retarded, or their liberty
imperilled by the people of any other State, full and adequate redress can
and ought to be provided for such grievances.
3d. Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States, and the acts of
Congress in pursuance thereof, are the supreme law of the land, to which
every citizen owes faithful obedience; and it is therefore respectfully
recommended to the Legislatures of the several States to consider
impartially whatever complaints may be made of acts as inconsistent
therewith, by sister States or their citizens, and carefully revise their
statutes, in view of such complaints, and to repeal whatever provisions may
be found to be in contravention of that supreme law.
4th. Resolved, That this Convention recommend to the Legislatures of the
several States of the Union to follow the example of the Legislatures of the
States of Kentucky and of Illinois, in applying to Congress to call a
Convention for the proposing of amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, pursuant to the fifth article thereof.
Mr. CHASE:—I have not thought it best to occupy much of the time of the
Convention in discussing the propositions presented for its decision. I have
indeed been impressed with an idea that a decision upon these propositions
just now may be premature.
I have already stated to the Conference that the delegates from Ohio act
under resolutions of the General Assembly of that State, one of which
requires them to use their influence in procuring an adjournment of this
body to the 4th of April next. It is the wish of that State that opportunity
may be given for full consideration of any constitutional amendment that
may be proposed here, and especially to avoid precipitate action under
apprehensions of resistance to the inauguration of Mr. L       on the 4th
of next month.
I have already submitted resolutions in accordance with the views of the
Legislature, and intended, at the proper time, to ask a vote upon the
proposed adjournment. On consultation with my colleagues, however, I find
a majority of them averse to postponement; and, in view of the fact that the
resolution of the Legislature is not imperative in its terms, and especially in
consideration of the assurances constantly given here by delegates from
slaveholding States that, whatever may be the result of our deliberations, no
obstruction or hindrance will be opposed to the inauguration of Mr.
L      , I have determined to forbear urging a vote.
Upon the respective merits of the propositions of the committee, and the
proposed amendments, I have not much to say. But what I do say will be
said in all seriousness.
I do not approve the confident pledges made here of favorable action by the
people of either section, or of any State, upon whatever propositions may
receive the sanction of this Conference. The people of the free States, so far
as my observation goes, do not commit their right of judgment to anybody.
They generally exercise it themselves, and be assured they will exercise it
freely upon any proposition coming from this body. Whatever our actions
may be here, every proposition to amend the Constitution must come before
the people. They will discuss it, and must adopt it before it can become a
part of the fundamental law. Dismiss, then, the idea that all that is necessary
to secure amendments acceptable to a particular interest or section is to
secure for them the sanction of a majority in this hall.
The result of the national canvass which recently terminated in the election
of Mr. L       has been spoken of by some as the effect of a sudden
impulse, or of some irregular excitement of the popular mind; and it has
been somewhat confidently asserted that, upon reflection and consideration,
the hastily-formed opinions which brought about that election will be
changed. It has been said, also, that subordinate questions of local and
temporary character have augmented the Republican vote, and secured a
majority which could not have been obtained upon the national questions
involved in the respective platforms of the parties which divide the country.
I cannot take this view of the result of the Presidential election. I believe,
and the belief amounts to absolute conviction, that the election must be
regarded as the triumph of principles cherished in the hearts of the people of
the free States. These principles, it is true, were originally asserted by a
small party only. But, after years of discussion, they have, by their own
value, their own intrinsic soundness, obtained the deliberate and unalterable
sanction of the people's judgment.
Chief among these principles is the restriction of slavery within State limits;
not war upon slavery within those limits, but fixed opposition to its
extension beyond them. Mr. L       was the candidate of the people
opposed to the extension of slavery. We have elected him. After many years
of earnest advocacy and of severe trial, we have achieved the triumph of
that principle. By a fair and unquestionable majority we have secured that
triumph. Do you think we, who represent this majority, will throw it away?
Do you think the people would sustain us if we undertook to throw it away?
I must speak to you plainly, gentlemen of the South; it is not in my heart to
deceive you. I therefore tell you explicitly that if we of the North and West
would consent to throw away all that has been gained in the recent triumph
of our principles, the people would not sustain us, and so the consent would
avail you nothing. And I must tell you farther, that under no inducements
whatever will we consent to surrender a principle which we believe to be so
sound and so important as that of restricting slavery within State limits.
There are some things, however, which I think the people are willing to do.
In all my relations with them, and these relations have been somewhat
intimate, I have never discovered any desire or inclination on the part of
any considerable number, to interfere with the institution of slavery within
the States where it exists. I do not believe that any such desire anywhere
prevails. All your rights have been respected and enforced by the people of
the free States. More than this: even your claims have been enforced, under
repulsive circumstances, and, in my judgment, beyond right and beyond
constitutional obligation. When and where have the people of the free
States, in their representatives, refused you any right? When and where
have they refused to confer with you frankly and candidly when you
imagined your rights to be in danger? They have been, and still are, patient
and forbearing. They do not believe that you need any new constitutional
guarantees. You have guarantees enough in their voluntary action. But,
since you think differently, they send us hither to meet you, to confer with
you, to consider the questions which threaten the Union, to discuss them
freely and decide them fairly.
Now, gentlemen, what do we ask of you? Do we ask any thing unreasonable
in the amendment which has been submitted? We simply ask that you say to
your people that we of the free States have no purpose, and never had any
purpose, to infringe the rights of the slave States, or of any citizen of the
slave States. And that our devotion to the Government and the Constitution
is not inferior to that of any portion of the American people. By uniting
with us in the declaration we propose, you tell your people at home that no
considerable party, that no considerable number of persons, in the free
States, has any wish or purpose to interfere with slavery in the States where
it exists, or with any of your rights under the Constitution. You can say this
with absolute truth, and with entire confidence. In all the action of the
delegates who favor this amendment, in all our private consultations, every
heart has been animated by a most anxious desire to maintain the Union and
preserve the harmony of the Republic. No word has been uttered indicating
the slightest wish to avoid any obligation of the Constitution, or to deprive
you of any right under it. All concur in desiring to give effect to the
Constitution and the laws passed in pursuance of it. The same sentiments
animate the people of the free States. Congress has declared, with the
almost unanimous concurrence of the members from the free States, against
national interference with slavery in the slave States. The Chicago
Convention most emphatically asserted the same doctrine. It has been
reiterated over and over again by the Legislatures of the free States, and by
great and small conventions of their people. Is it, then, too much to ask you
to unite with us in a declaration that all fears of aggression entertained by
your people are groundless? Such a declaration will go far to insure peace;
why not make it?
You profess to be satisfied with slavery, as it is and where it is. You think
the institution just and beneficial. The very able gentleman from Virginia
(Mr. S     ), who commands the respect of all by the frankness and
sincerity of his speech, has said that he believes slavery to be the condition
in which the African is to be educated up to freedom. He does not believe in
perpetual slavery. He believes the time will come when the slave, through
the beneficent influences of the circumstances which surround him, will rise
in intelligence, capacity, and character, to the dignity of a freeman, and will
be free.
We cannot agree with you, and therefore do not propose to allow slavery
where we are responsible for it, outside of your State limits, and under
National jurisdiction. But we do not mean to interfere with it at all within
State limits. So far as we are concerned, you can work out your experiment
there in peace. We shall rejoice if no evil comes from it to you or yours.
[Mr. C    '  time having expired, he was unanimously invited to proceed.]
Aside from the Territorial question—the question of slavery outside of the
slave States—I know of but one serious difficulty. I refer to the question
concerning fugitives from service. The clause in the Constitution
concerning this class of persons is regarded by almost all men, North and
South, as a stipulation for the surrender to their masters of slaves escaping
into free States. The people of the free States, however, who believe that
slaveholding is wrong, cannot and will not aid in the reclamation, and the
stipulation becomes therefore a dead letter. You complain of bad faith, and
the complaint is retorted by denunciations of the cruelty which would drag
back to bondage the poor slave who has escaped from it. You, thinking
slavery right, claim the fulfilment of the stipulation; we, thinking slavery
wrong, cannot fulfil the stipulation without consciousness of participation
in wrong. Here is a real difficulty, but it seems to me not insuperable. It will
not do for us to say to you, in justification of non-performance, "the
stipulation is immoral, and therefore we cannot execute it;" for you deny
the immorality, and we cannot assume to judge for you.
On the other hand, you ought not to exact from us the literal performance of
the stipulation when you know that we cannot perform it without conscious
culpability. A true solution of the difficulty seems to be attainable by
regarding it as a simple case where a contract, from changed circumstances,
cannot be fulfilled exactly as made. A court of equity in such a case decrees
execution as near as may be. It requires the party who cannot perform to
make compensation for non-performance. Why cannot the same principle
be applied to the rendition of fugitives from service? We cannot surrender
—but we can compensate. Why not, then, avoid all difficulties on all sides,
and show respectively good faith and good will by providing and accepting
compensation where masters reclaim escaping servants and prove their right
of reclamation under the Constitution? Instead of a judgment for rendition,
let there be a judgment for compensation, determined by the true value of
the services, and let the same judgment assure freedom to the fugitive. The
cost to the National Treasury would be as nothing in comparison with the
evils of discord and strife. All parties would be gainers.
What I have just said is, indeed, not exactly to the point of the present
discussion. But I refer to this matter to show how easily the greatest
difficulties may be adjusted if approached in a truly just, generous, and
patriotic spirit.
I refer to it also in order to show you that, if we do not concede all your
wishes, it is because our ideas of justice, duty, and honor forbid, and not
because we cherish any hostile or aggressive sentiments. We will go as far
as we can to meet you—come you also as far as you can to meet us. Join at
least in the declaration we propose. Your people have confidence in you.
They will believe you. The declaration, made with substantial unanimity by
this Conference, will tranquillize public sentiment, and give a chance for
reason to resume its sway, and patriotic counsels to gain a hearing.
Do you say that after all what we propose embodies no substantial
guarantees of immunity to slavery through the perversion of Federal
powers? We reply that we think the Constitution as it stands, interpreted
honestly and executed faithfully, is sufficient for all practical purposes; and
that you will find all desirable security in the legislation or non-legislation
of Congress. If you think otherwise, we are ready to join you in
recommending a National Convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution in the regular and legitimate way. Kentucky, a slave State, has
proposed such a Convention; Illinois, a free State, has joined in the
proposition. Join us, then, in recommending such a Convention, and assure
us that you will abide by its decision. We will join you and give a similar
assurance.
This, gentlemen, is the proposition we make you to-day. It is embodied in
the amendment just submitted. Is it not a fair proposition? It is a plain
declaration of facts which cannot reasonably be questioned, and a plain
submission of all disputed questions to the only proper tribunal for the
settlement of such questions—that of the American people, acting through a
National Convention.
The only alternative to this proposition is the proposition that the present
Congress be called upon to submit to the States a thirteenth article
embodying the amendments recommended by the committee. In order to
the submission of these amendments to the States by Congress, a two-thirds
vote in each House is necessary. That, I venture to say, cannot be obtained.
Were it otherwise, who can assure you that the new article will obtain the
sanction of three-fourths of the States, without which it is a nullity? As a
measure to defeat all adjustment, I can understand this proposition. As a
measure of pacification, I do not understand it. There is, in my judgment, no
peace in it. Gentlemen here, of patriotism and intelligence, think otherwise.
I am sorry that I cannot agree with them.
Gentlemen say, if this proposition cannot prevail, every slave State will
secede; or, as some prefer to phrase it, will resort to revolution. I forbear to
discuss eventualities. I must say, however, and say plainly, that
considerations such as these will not move me from my recognized duty to
my country and its Constitution. And let me say for the people of the free
States, that they are a thoughtful people, and are much in earnest in this
business. They do not delegate their right of private judgment. They love
their institutions and the Union. They will not surrender the one nor give up
the other without great struggles and great sacrifices. Upon the question of
the maintenance of an unbroken Union and a whole country they never
were, and it is my firm conviction they never will be divided. Gentlemen
who think they will be, even in the worst contingency, will, I think, be
disappointed. If forced to the last extremity, the people will meet the issue
as they best may; but be assured they will meet it with no discordant
councils.
Gentlemen, Mr. L       will be inaugurated on the 4th of March. He will
take an oath to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States—of
the whole—of all the United States. That oath will bind him to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed throughout the United States. Will
secession absolve him from that oath? Will it diminish, by one jot or tittle,
its awful obligation? Will attempted revolution do more than secession?
And if not—and the oath and the obligation remain—and the President does
his duty and undertakes to enforce the laws, and secession or revolution
resists, what then? War! Civil war!
Mr. President, let us not rush headlong into that unfathomable gulf. Let us
not tempt this unutterable woe. We offer you a plain and honorable mode of
adjusting all difficulties. It is a mode which, we believe, will receive the
sanction of the people. We pledge ourselves here that we will do all in our
power to obtain their sanction for it. Is it too much to ask you, gentlemen of
the South, to meet us on this honorable and practicable ground? Will you
not, at least, concede this to the country?
The question on agreeing to said amendment resulted in the following vote:
A   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
York, New Hampshire, and Vermont—9.
N   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—11.
So the amendment was not agreed to.
Mr. WILMOT:—I wish now to offer an amendment which embraces an
unconditional proposition for the call of a Convention.
Mr. BRONSON:—This has been voted down already.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—What changes do you gentlemen from Pennsylvania
and Ohio wish to make in the report of the committee? Would you adopt
that report in a General Convention?
The PRESIDENT:—The Chair rules that the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Pennsylvania is not in order.
Messrs. W     , C    , C      , and B       then entered their
dissents from their respective States upon the substitute offered by Mr.
T   .
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I hope now that we may be permitted to take the vote
at once upon the report of the majority.
Mr. REID:—Before this vote is taken, I deem it my duty to myself and my
State to make a remark.
I came here disposed to agree upon terms that would be mutually
satisfactory to both sections of the Union. I would agree to any fair terms
now, but the propositions contained in the report of the majority, as that
report now stands, can never receive my assent. I cannot recommend them
to Congress or to the people of my own State. They do not settle the
material questions involved; they contain no sufficient guarantees for the
rights of the South. Therefore, in good faith to the Conference and to the
country, I here state that I cannot and will not agree to them.
Mr. CLEVELAND:—If the gentlemen from the South, after we have
yielded so much as we have, assert that these propositions will not be
satisfactory to the slave States, I, for one, will not degrade myself by voting
for them.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I insist now upon taking the vote.
The PRESIDENT:—The rules of the Conference do not require the vote to
be taken upon this proposition by sections.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—We have not heretofore adhered to the rules. Let us
vote then on the whole as a proposition, and not by sections.
Mr. SEDDON:—I think we should take the vote by sections. It is certainly
within the discretion of the President to rule that the vote may be so taken.
The rules do not apply to an article which is composed of many sections.
We certainly should vote upon them separately.
Mr. BROCKENBROUGH:—I desire now to get the amendment which I
have proposed once more before the Conference. I move to amend by
adding to the first section a clause which shall provide that
"The rights of the slave States shall be protected by all the departments of
the territorial government during its continuance."
By the section as it now stands, the rights of the North are absolute; those of
the South should be equally clear. It is true that the section contains a
distinct recognition of the relation of master and slave, but this recognition
is in negative terms. It is certainly the duty of the territorial legislature and
government to protect these rights wherever they are invaded. If this is so,
why not declare it in the provision?
Mr. WILMOT:—I desire to ask whether this proposition is in order.
Mr. BROCKENBROUGH:—I insist that it is. I assert the existence of
certain rights, and I want these rights protected under the Constitution.
Rights without remedies are anomalies of which the law knows nothing.
Mr. WILMOT:—I feel constrained to oppose any amendment of this kind.
The PRESIDENT:—The Chair is inclined to rule this amendment as not in
order.
Mr. RUFFIN:—Before the final vote is taken, I wish to say a word by way
of explanation. My colleague says he cannot vote for the report of the
committee because he does not approve the whole of it. I do not like the
first article, but the report as a whole is a great improvement upon the
Constitution as it now stands. I think the report ought to go before the
people. If we can secure what the report proposes, we are certainly no
worse off. I wish to submit it to my people, and thus have them to judge for
themselves whether they will adopt it.
Mr. MOREHEAD, of North Carolina:—I would not say a word were it not
for the words that have fallen from my colleague—Governor R   . I came
here to try to save the Union. I have labored hard to that end. I hope and
believe the report of the majority, if adopted, will save the Union. I wish to
carry these propositions before the people. I believe that the people of North
Carolina and of the Union will adopt them. Give us an opportunity to
appeal to the generosity of the people of the whole Union. Certainly no
Southern man can object to submitting these propositions to the popular
vote.
Mr. LOOMIS:—I am content to vote for the first article.
Mr. CARRUTHERS:—I only desire to say for my State that if you will give
us these propositions, Tennessee will adopt them, and it will sink secession
beyond any hope of resurrection.
Mr. BARRINGER:—I cannot say that I am gratified with the display which
I have just witnessed in these appeals from the Conference to the people.
We come here to deal with facts, not theories. I do not speak with the
confidence of some with respect to the action of some of the people. I know
the people of the South, and I tell you this hollow compromise will never
satisfy them, nor will it bring back the seceded States. We are acting for the
people who are not here. We are their delegates that have come here, not to
demand indemnity for the past, but security for the future. This is my
opinion. You will see whether I am right or not. We could stand upon the
C          proposition or the Virginia alternative. With Virginia in our
favor we could have stood upon either. You, gentlemen of the North, might
as well have consented to either as to the report which is now presented. I
desire the preservation of the Union; I would go for this scheme if that
would accomplish it. But it will not. There is great force in the statement of
the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. C    , in which he says there is no
importance to a scheme which goes from this Conference to the States only
by a majority of one or two States. If one or two States only, which are here,
reject this compromise, it will be rejected entirely. Once more I say it would
have been better for all to have stood upon the Virginia alternative.
Mr. STOCKTON:—I have not much to say, sir. I rise with a sadness which
almost prevents my utterance. I was born at Princeton. My heart has always
beat for the Union. I have heard these discussions with pain from the
commencement. Shall we deliberate over any proposition which shall save
the Union? The country is in jeopardy. We are called upon to save it. New
Jersey and Delaware came here for that purpose, and no other. They have
laid aside every other motive; they have yielded every thing to the general
good of the country.
The report of the majority of the committee meets their concurrence.
Republicans and Democrats alike, have dropped their opinions, for politics
should always disappear in the presence of a great question like this.
Politics should not be thought of in view of the question of disunion. By
what measure of execration will posterity judge a man who contributed
toward the dissolution of the Union? Shall we stand here and higgle about
terms when the roar of the tornado is heard that threatens to sweep our
Government from the face of the earth? Believe me, sir, this is a question of
peace or war.
In the days of Rome, Curtius threw himself into the chasm when told by the
oracle that the sacrifice of his life would save his country. Alas! is there no
Curtius here? The alternative is a dreadful one to contemplate if we cannot
adopt these propositions and secure peace. It is useless to attempt to dwarf
this movement of the South by the name of treason. Call it by what name
you will, it is a revolution, and this is a right which the people of this
country have derived in common from their ancestors.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I now move that we proceed to take the vote, and propose
to take it upon the first section of the report of the majority.
Mr. ELLIS:—I move so to amend the rule that when the report is taken up
each section and each distinct proposition shall be voted on separately.
The PRESIDENT:—I think this motion is out of order, and the question
will be taken on the motion of the gentleman from Kentucky for the
adoption of the first section, which the Secretary will now read.
S       1. In all the present territory of the United States north of the
parallel of 36° 30´ of north latitude, involuntary servitude, except in
punishment of crime, is prohibited. In all the present territory south of that
line, the status of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now
exists, shall not be changed; nor shall any law be passed by Congress or the
Territorial Legislature to hinder or prevent the taking of such persons from
any of the States of this Union to said territory, nor to impair the rights
arising from said relation; but the same shall be subject to judicial
cognizance in the Federal courts, according to the course of the common
law. When any Territory north or south of said line, within such boundary
as Congress may prescribe, shall contain a population equal to that required
for a member of Congress, it shall, if its form of government be republican,
be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, with
or without involuntary servitude, as the Constitution of such State may
provide.
The question on agreeing to said section resulted as follows—Indiana
declining to vote:
A   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Tennessee—8.
N   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
York, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Virginia—11.
And the section was not agreed to.
The following gentlemen dissented from the votes of their respective States:
Mr. R      and Mr. M       , of North Carolina; Mr. T     , of
Tennessee; Mr. C       and Mr. H    , of Missouri; Mr. B      , Mr.
C      , Mr. D    , Mr. W   , and Mr. G      , of New York; Mr.
M        and Mr. W     , of Pennsylvania; Mr. R     and Mr. S      ,
of Virginia; Mr. C    and Mr. B     , of Kentucky; and Mr. L    , of
Illinois.
The vote was taken in the midst of much partially suppressed excitement,
and the announcement of the vote of different States occasioned many sharp
remarks of dissent or approval. After the vote was announced, for some
minutes no motion was made, and the delegates engaged in an informal
conversation.
Mr. T      finally moved a reconsideration of the vote.
Mr. GRANGER:—To say that I am disappointed by the result of this vote,
would fail to do justice to my feelings. I move that the Conference adjourn
until half-past seven o'clock this evening. I think it well for those gentlemen
from the slave States especially, who have by their votes defeated the
compromise we have labored so long and so earnestly to secure, to take a
little time for consideration. Gentlemen we have yielded much to your
fears, much to your apprehensions; we have gone to the very verge of
propriety in giving our assent to the committee's report. We have incurred
the censure of some of our own people, but we were willing to take the risk
of all this censure in order to allay your apprehensions. We expected you to
meet us in the path of compromise. Instead of that you reject and spurn our
propositions. Take time, gentlemen, for reflection. Beware how you spurn
this report, and incur the awful responsibility which will follow. Reject it,
and if the country is plunged in war, and the Union endangered, you are the
men who will be held responsible.
Mr. President, I have been deeply pained at the manner in which some
gentlemen have here spoken of the possible dissolution of this Government.
When, perchance, the rude hand of violence shall here have seized upon the
muniments and archives of our country's history; when all the monuments
of art that time and treasure may here have gathered, shall be destroyed;
when these proud domes shall totter to their fall, and the rank grass wave
around their mouldering columns; when the very name of W         ,
instead of stirring the blood to patriotic action, shall be a byeword and a
reproach—then will this people feel what was the value of the Union!
The motion to reconsider was then adopted by a vote of 14 ayes to 5 noes,
and the Conference adjourned to seven o'clock and thirty minutes this
evening.
EVENING SESSION—EIGHTEENTH DAY.
W         , T      , February 26th, 1861.
T   Conference was called to order pursuant to adjournment by the
President.
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I hope after some of the informal consultations which
have been held since the adjournment of the Conference this afternoon, that
we may yet be able to bring our minds together, and to adopt the
propositions recommended by the committee. It is, however, certain that the
vote had better not be taken this evening. I therefore move an adjournment
until ten o'clock to-morrow morning.
The motion to adjourn was agreed to; ayes 17, noes 3, and the Conference
adjourned.
N I N E T E E N T H  D A Y .
W         , W        , February 27th, 1861.
T   Conference assembled pursuant to adjournment, and was called to
order by President T    . Prayer was offered by Rev. Dr. G     .
The PRESIDENT:—The Conference will now proceed to the consideration
of the order of the day, the proposals of amendment to the Constitution
reported by the majority of the committee.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I suppose, under the rules which the Conference has
adopted, discussion of these proposals is no longer in order. I hope now the
Conference will proceed to the vote. The opinions of each delegation are
undoubtedly fixed, and cannot be changed by farther argument.
I move you, sir, the adoption of the first section of the report as amended,
which I ask to have read by the Secretary.
The section was read by the Secretary, as follows:
S       1. In all the present territory of the United States north of the
parallel of 36° 30´ of north latitude, involuntary servitude, except in
punishment of crime, is prohibited. In all the present territory south of that
line, the status of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now
exists, shall not be changed; nor shall any law be passed by Congress or the
Territorial Legislature to hinder or prevent the taking of such persons from
any of the States of this Union to said territory, nor to impair the rights
arising from said relation; but the same shall be subject to judicial
cognizance in the Federal courts, according to the course of the common
law. When any Territory north or south of said line, within such boundary
as Congress may prescribe, shall contain a population equal to that required
for a member of Congress, it shall, if its form of government be republican,
be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, with
or without involuntary servitude, as the Constitution of such State may
provide.
The vote upon said section resulted as follows:
A   .—Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee—9.
N   .—Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New
Hampshire, Vermont, and Virginia—8.
So the section was adopted.
The vote of New York being called, Mr. K   , temporary Chairman of the
delegation, said:
The question arises concerning the vote of New York. Mr. F    , one of the
delegates from this State, is necessarily absent from the Conference, having
left to attend to the argument of a cause in the Supreme Court noted for
argument this morning. It is his understanding, and with him that of a
majority of the delegation, that the vote of New York is to be cast against
this section, and the whole report. Under these circumstances I propose to
give the vote of New York as it would be given if Mr. F     was present.
Mr. CORNING:—I object to this. The vote of that State should be given as
the majority of the commissioners present decide. And I think this is a
matter for the delegation, and that the Conference has nothing to do with it.
The PRESIDENT:—An absent member cannot participate in the control of
a vote except by general leave of the Convention.
Mr. KING:—If Mr. F     is not to be taken into the account, the vote of
New York upon this section is divided.[8]
Mr. EWING:—The vote of Kansas is also divided.
Mr. HACKLEMAN:—The vote of Indiana is divided. The commissioners
of Indiana were appointed by virtue of resolutions passed by the Legislature
of that State, which require them to report to the Legislature any proposition
before voting for it finally, so as to commit the State either for or against it.
It is impossible, under the circumstances, to submit this proposition of
amendment to the Legislature of Indiana for approval or rejection. Indiana,
therefore, declines to vote.
Mr. SLAUGHTER:—As the delegation from Indiana declines to cast its
vote, I desire to have my individual vote entered in the affirmative upon this
section.
Mr. ELLIS:—For the same reason I desire to have my vote entered in the
negative.
The following gentlemen dissented from the vote of their respective States:
Mr. C    and Mr. M       , of Kentucky; Mr. R      and Mr.
M       , of North Carolina; Mr. M        and Mr. W     , of
Pennsylvania; Mr. T     , of Tennessee; Mr. C   , of Illinois; Mr. R    
and Mr. S      , of Virginia; and Mr. C     and Mr. W      , of Ohio.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I move the adoption of the second section of the report as
amended, and ask that it may be read.
The Secretary read it as follows:
S       2. No territory shall be acquired by the United States, except by
discovery, and for naval and commercial stations, depots, and transit routes,
without the concurrence of a majority of all the Senators from States which
allow involuntary servitude, and a majority of all the Senators from States
which prohibit that relation; nor shall territory be acquired by treaty, unless
the votes of a majority of the Senators from each class of States
hereinbefore mentioned be cast as a part of the two-thirds majority
necessary to the ratification of such treaty.
The vote on the adoption of section two was taken, and resulted as follows:
A   .—Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—11.
N   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina,
New Hampshire, and Vermont—8.
New York and Kansas were divided.
So the section was adopted.
The following gentlemen dissented from the vote of their States: Mr.
M        and Mr. W     , of Pennsylvania; Mr. R      and Mr.
M       , of North Carolina; Mr T    , of Virginia; Mr. C   , of
Kentucky; and Mr. H         and Mr. O   , of Indiana.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I now move the adoption of the third section of the report
as amended, and request that it may be read.
The Secretary proceeded to read as follows:
S       3. Neither the Constitution nor any amendment thereof shall be
construed to give Congress power to regulate, abolish, or control, within
any State, the relation established or recognized by the laws thereof
touching persons held to labor or involuntary service therein, nor to
interfere with or abolish involuntary service in the District of Columbia
without the consent of Maryland and without the consent of the owners, or
making the owners who do not consent just compensation; nor the power to
interfere with or prohibit representatives and others from bringing with
them to the District of Columbia, retaining and taking away, persons so held
to labor or service; nor the power to interfere with or abolish involuntary
service in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within
those States and Territories where the same is established or recognized; nor
the power to prohibit the removal or transportation of persons held to labor
or involuntary service in any State or Territory of the United States to any
other State or Territory thereof, where it is established or recognized by law
or usage; and the right during transportation, by sea or river, of touching at
ports, shores, and landings, and of landing in case of distress, shall exist;
but not the right of transit in or through any State or Territory, or of sale or
traffic, against the laws thereof. Nor shall Congress have power to authorize
any higher rate of taxation on persons held to labor or service than on land.
The bringing into the District of Columbia of persons held to labor or
service for sale, or placing them in depots to be afterwards transferred to
other places for sale as merchandise, is prohibited.
The question on the adoption of said section resulted in the following vote:
A   .—Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia
—12.
N   .—Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Vermont—7.
New York and Kansas were divided.
So the section was adopted.
The following gentlemen dissented from the vote of their States: Mr. C   ,
of Kentucky; Mr. C   , of Illinois; Mr. S        , of Indiana; and Mr.
C    , and Mr. W      , of Ohio.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I move the adoption of the fourth section of the report as
amended.
And the Secretary read it as follows:
S       4. The third paragraph of the second section of the fourth article of
the Constitution shall not be construed to prevent any of the States, by
appropriate legislation, and through the action of their judicial and
ministerial officers, from enforcing the delivery of fugitives from labor to
the person to whom such service or labor is due.
The question on the adoption of said section resulted in the following vote:
A   .—Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia—15.
N   .—Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire—4.
New York and Kansas were divided.
And the section was adopted.
The following gentlemen dissented from the vote of their respective States:
Mr. B      , of Connecticut; Mr. H         and Mr. O   , of Indiana;
and Mr. C     and Mr. W      , of Ohio.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I now move the adoption of the fifth section of the report
as amended.
It was read by the Secretary as follows:
S       5. The foreign slave-trade is hereby forever prohibited; and it shall
be the duty of Congress to pass laws to prevent the importation of slaves,
coolies, or persons held to service or labor, into the United States and the
Territories from places beyond the limits thereof.
The vote on the adoption of this section resulted as follows:
A   .—Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Kansas—16.
N   .—Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia—5.
So this section was adopted.
The following gentlemen dissented from the vote of their respective States:
Mr. B      , of Connecticut; Mr. C   , of Kentucky; Mr. R      and Mr.
M       , of North Carolina; Mr. W       and Mr. C    , of Ohio; and
Mr. H         and Mr. O   , of Indiana.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I move the adoption of the sixth section of the report as
amended, and desire that the Secretary may read that also.
The Secretary read as follows:
S       6. The first, third, and fifth sections, together with this section of
these amendments, and the third paragraph of the second section of the first
article of the Constitution, and the third paragraph of the second section of
the fourth article thereof, shall not be amended or abolished without the
consent of all the States.
The vote on the adoption of this section stood as follows:
A   .—Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Kansas—11.
N   .—Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina,
New Hampshire, Vermont, and Virginia—9.
The State of New York was divided.
And this section was adopted.
The following gentlemen dissented from the vote of their States:—Mr.
R      and Mr. M       , of North Carolina; Mr. C     and Mr.
W      , of Ohio; Mr. C   , of Illinois; and Mr. S       and Mr. R    ,
of Virginia.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—I move the adoption of the seventh section of the report,
as amended.
The Secretary read as follows:
S       7. Congress shall provide by law that the United States shall pay to
the owner the full value of his fugitive from labor, in all cases where the
marshal, or other officer, whose duty it was to arrest such fugitive, was
prevented from so doing by violence or intimidation from mobs or riotous
assemblages, or when, after arrest, such fugitive was rescued by like
violence or intimidation, and the owner thereby deprived of the same; and
the acceptance of such payment shall preclude the owner from further claim
to such fugitive. Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens
of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.
The vote on the adoption of this section was as follows:
A   .—Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New
Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Kansas—12.
N   .—Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, North Carolina, Vermont, and
Virginia—7.
The vote of New York was divided.
So this last section was also adopted.
The following gentlemen dissented from the vote of their respective States:
—Mr. R      and Mr. M       , of North Carolina; Mr. T      of
Tennessee; Mr. H         and Mr. O   , of Indiana; and Mr. C     and
Mr. W      , of Ohio.
Mr. CHASE:—The sections which have been adopted severally, as a whole
may not be acceptable to a majority of the Conference. They have been
adopted by different votes and different majorities. I think a vote should be
taken upon them collectively, in order that we may know whether, as a
single proposition, they meet the approbation of the Conference. I move
that a vote be taken upon the several sections as a whole.
The PRESIDENT:—It is the opinion of the Chair that this motion is not in
order. Each section, when once approved by a majority of votes, stands as
the order of the Conference. These sections have been severally taken up,
amended, and adopted, and no further vote is necessary or proper, except by
way of reconsideration.
Mr. CHASE:—I think the motion an important one, and with all deference,
appeal from the decision of the Chair to the Conference.
The PRESIDENT:—The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair stand
as the order of the Conference?
Mr. CHASE:—As I have no wish except to secure a fair vote, and the
opinion of the Chair may be technically correct, I will withdraw my appeal.
Mr. FRANKLIN:—Having adopted the report of the committee, I think
now there should be an expression of the Conference upon the question of
secession. I therefore move the adoption of the following resolution:
Resolved, As the sense of this Convention, that the highest political duty of
every citizen of the United States is his allegiance to the Federal
Government created by the Constitution of the United States, and that no
State of this Union has any constitutional right to secede therefrom, or to
absolve the citizens of such State from their allegiance to the Government
of the United States.
Mr. BARRINGER:—I move to lay that resolution on the table. This is a
Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, not to make
commentaries upon that instrument.
Mr. CLEVELAND:—I ask a vote by States.
The question was taken by States, and resulted as follows:
A   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Virginia—9.
N   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
York, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Kansas
—12.
And the Convention refused to lay the resolution upon the table.
Mr. COALTER:—I offer the following amendment: strike out all after the
word resolve, and insert as follows:
"The term of office of all Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the United
States, hereafter elected, shall be six years; and any person once elected to
either of said offices shall ever after be ineligible to the same office."
The amendment of Mr. C       was rejected by a viva voce vote.
Mr. SEDDON:—I now move to amend by striking out all after the word
"resolved" in Mr. F       '  resolution, and insert a series of amendments
hitherto proposed by myself, as follows:
To secure concert and promote harmony between the slaveholding and non-
slaveholding sections of the Union, the assent of the majority of the
Senators from the slaveholding States, and of the majority of the Senators
from the non-slaveholding States, shall be requisite to the validity of all
action of the Senate, on which the ayes and noes may be called by five
Senators.
And on a written declaration, signed and presented for record on the Journal
of the Senate by a majority of the Senators from either the non-slaveholding
or slaveholding States, of their want of confidence in any officer or
appointee of the Executive, exercising functions exclusively or
continuously within the class of States, or any of them, which the signers
represent, then such officer shall be removed by the Executive; and if not
removed at the expiration of ten days from the presentation of such
declaration, the office shall be deemed vacant, and open to new
appointment.
The connection of every State with the Union is recognized as depending
on the continuing assent of its people, and compulsion shall in no case, nor
under any form, be attempted by the Government of the Union against a
State acting in its collective or organic capacity. Any State, by the action of
a convention of its people, assembled pursuant to a law of its legislature, is
held entitled to dissolve its relation to the Federal Government, and
withdraw from the Union; and, on due notice given of such withdrawal to
the Executive of the Union, he shall appoint two commissioners, to meet
two commissioners to be appointed by the Governor of the State, who, with
the aid, if needed from the disagreement of the commissioners, of an
umpire, to be selected by a majority of them, shall equitably adjudicate and
determine finally a partition of the rights and obligations of the withdrawing
State; and such adjudication and partition being accomplished, the
withdrawal of such State shall be recognized by the Executive, and
announced by public proclamation to the world.
But such withdrawing State shall not afterwards be readmitted into the
Union without the assent of two-thirds of the States constituting the Union
at the time of the proposed readmission.
I desire to get these amendments on the Journal. It is my duty to offer them,
and I wish the Journal to show that I have performed that duty.
Mr. FRANKLIN:—I then move to lay the amendment on the table, and to
give the gentleman leave to have it inserted in the Journal. That will
accomplish his purpose.
The question was taken on the motion to lay the amendment on the table,
and resulted in an affirmative vote.
Mr. RUFFIN:—I regard the mission of this Convention as now performed,
and I hope we shall take up no new questions, which can only distract and
divide us. I therefore move to postpone the consideration of this resolution
indefinitely.
The question was taken on Mr. R     '  motion, with the following result:
—
A   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—10.
N   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Pennsylvania—7.
The vote of New York was divided.
Messrs. D      and A    dissented from the vote of Rhode Island.
Mr. GUTHRIE:—It will be necessary that this proposition be presented to
Congress in an authentic form, and I suppose it will not be necessary for the
Convention to continue its sessions until this presentation is made. I
therefore offer the following preamble:
T      C               U      S     :
The Convention assembled upon the invitation of the State of Virginia to
adjust the unhappy differences which now disturb the peace of the Union
and threaten its continuance, make known to the Congress of the United
States that their body convened in the city of Washington on the 4th instant,
and continued in session until the 27th.
There were in the body, when action was taken upon that which is here
submitted, one hundred and thirty-three commissioners, representing the
following States: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas.
They have approved what is herewith submitted, and respectfully request
that your honorable body will submit it to conventions in the States as an
article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Mr. RANDOLPH:—I move the adoption of the preamble, and that the
same, with the propositions already adopted, be authenticated by the present
Secretary, and that all be presented by the President of this Convention to
the Senate and House of Representatives, with a respectful request for their
passage.
This motion was agreed to.
Mr. BARRINGER:—As the labors of the Convention are now closed, I
presume there is no occasion for continuing the injunction of secrecy. As
notes of the proceedings have been taken with a view, I presume, to
publication, I now move that the injunction of secrecy against speaking of
the action of the Convention, or the publication of its proceedings, be
removed.
The motion of Mr. B         was agreed to by a viva voce vote.
Mr. JOHNSON:—I desire here to have printed in the Journal the following
resolution.
Leave was granted to Mr. J       as requested, and his resolution was as
follows:
Resolved, That while the adoption, by the States of South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, of
ordinances declaring the dissolution of their relation with the Union, is an
event deeply to be deplored; and while abstaining from any judgment on
their conduct, we would express the earnest hope that they may soon see
cause to resume their honored places in this Confederacy of States; yet to
the end that such return may be facilitated, and from the conviction that the
Union being formed by the assent of the people of the respective States, and
being compatible only with freedom, and the republican institutions
guaranteed to each, cannot and ought not to be maintained by force, we
deprecate any effort by the Federal Government to coerce in any form the
said States to reunion or submission, as tending to irreparable breach, and
leading to incalculable ills; and we earnestly invoke the abstinence from all
counsels or measures of compulsion toward them.
Mr. POLLOCK:—The Committee on Finance have made an examination of
the expenses which have been incurred for printing, stationery, &c., by the
Conference. It has been, already stated that the expense of printing the
Journal is met by the city of Washington. The additional expense incurred
amounts to $735. If this is equally apportioned among the States
represented it will amount to $35 each. It is for the Conference to decide in
what manner the assessment shall be made.
Mr. BROWNE:—I offer the following resolution:
Resolved, That the report of the committee be received and accepted; that
the committee be continued, and requested to make the necessary
disbursements; and that the States now pay over the sum assessed to the
chairman.
And the resolution was unanimously adopted.
Mr. LOOMIS:—I take great pleasure in presenting to the Conference the
following letter, which has been addressed by the proprietors of the hall to
the Secretary. I ask that the letter may be read, and I also offer the following
resolution.
The letter was read, as follows:
C      J. W     , E  .,
Secretary Conference Convention:
S  :—Please inform the Convention that we have tendered, free of charge,
the use of our Hall and lights, which they have occupied. We hope the use
may be sanctified by restoring peace to the Union.
We are, respectfully, &c.,
J.C.   H.A. W      .
February 23d, 1861.
And the resolution, which was unanimously adopted, was as follows:
Resolved, That the thanks of this Convention are justly due, and are hereby
given, to the Messrs. Willard, for the liberal and generous tender, free of
charge, of the use of the Hall and the lights, for the purposes expressed in
their letter to the Secretary; and that the Secretary be requested to
communicate to them a copy of this resolution.
Mr. D     offered the following resolution, and that, too, was unanimously
agreed to:
Resolved, That the thanks of this Convention are justly due and hereby
given to the Mayor and Council of the city of Washington, for their
kindness and liberality to the members of this Convention, in defraying so
large an amount of their expenses for printing and stationery, and also for
the officers to protect this hall and the members from intrusion whilst in
session, and that the Secretary be requested to communicate the same to
said parties.
On motion of Mr. R       , the thanks of the Conference were tendered
to the clergymen of the city for their services during the Conference.
The thanks of the Conference were also presented to the Secretary and his
assistants.
Mr. EWING:—I move the adoption of the following:
Resolved, That the thanks of this Convention be tendered to the President,
for the dignified and impartial manner in which he has presided over the
deliberations of this body.
The resolution being seconded by Mr. H        , it was unanimously
adopted; whereupon President T     addressed the Conference as follows:
"G                C         :
"The labors of this Convention are drawing to a close. Before we separate
never in this world to meet again, I am much pleased that the resolution you
have just adopted gives me an opportunity of uttering a few words of
congratulation and farewell.
"We came together at a most important and critical time. One of the oldest
members of the American Union, a commonwealth which had contributed
its full share to the honor and glory of the nation—having as great interests
at stake as any other member of the sisterhood of States—summoned you
here to consider new additions to our Constitution, which the experience of
near three-quarters of a century had taught us were required. I expected
from the first that you would approach the consideration of the new and
important questions which must arise here, with that patriotism and
intelligence which belongs to the descendants of the patriots of the
Revolution and the statesmen of the Convention of 1787. I have not been
disappointed. In the whole course of a public life, much longer than usually
falls to the lot of man, I have been associated with many bodies of my
fellow-citizens, convened for legislative or other purposes, but I here
declare that it has never been my good fortune to meet with an association
of more intelligent, thoughtful, or patriotic men, than that over which I have
been here called to preside. I cannot but hope and believe that the blessing
of GOD will follow and rest upon the result of your labors, and that such
result will bring to our country that quiet and peace which every patriotic
heart so earnestly desires. I thank you most sincerely for that kindness and
partiality on your part which induced you to call me to the honorable
position of your presiding officer, and for the courtesy so uniformly
extended in the discharge of the responsible duties of that position.
"Gentlemen, farewell! I go to finish the work you have assigned me, of
presenting your recommendations to the two Houses of Congress, and to
ask those bodies to lay your proposals of amendment before the people of
the American Union. Although these proposals are not in all respects what I
could have desired—although I should have preferred the adoption of those
recommended by the Legislature of Virginia, because I know they would
have been acceptable to my own constituents, still it is my duty to give
them my official approval and support. It is not to be expected that entire
unanimity of opinion should exist among the representatives of so large a
population, and so many diversified interests, as now comprise the Republic
of the United States. It is probable that the result to which you have arrived
is the best that under all the circumstances could be expected. So far as in
me lies, therefore, I shall recommend its adoption.
"May you have a happy and safe return to your constituents and your
families! May you all inculcate among your people a spirit of mutual
forbearance and concession; and may GOD protect our country and the
Union of these States, which was committed to us as the blood-bought
legacy of our heroic ancestors!"
Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I move that the Convention do now adjourn, its labors
having come to an end; and I would suggest that the delegates meet
informally and take leave of each other at three o'clock this afternoon.
Mr. B      moved that the Conference adjourn without day, and his
motion was adopted by the following vote:
A   .—Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, and Vermont—9.
N   .—Connecticut, Indiana, Missouri, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania
—5.
And the Conference adjourned without day.
A P P E N D I X .
No. I.
B      the final vote was taken upon the proposals of amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, reported by the General Committee of
which Mr. G       was Chairman, and the votes upon the various
substitutes offered for such proposals, there were twenty-one States
represented in the Conference.
Maine and Iowa were represented by their respective Congressional
delegations; Tennessee, Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Delaware, Illinois, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Missouri, by delegates appointed by their respective Legislatures, under
joint resolutions which are here inserted; New Hampshire, Vermont,
Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, Indiana, and Kansas, by delegates
appointed by their respective Governors.
The resolutions of Virginia originated the call for the Conference.
Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, and Oregon were not
represented. South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi,
Arkansas, and Texas had passed ordinances of secession previous to the
meeting of the Conference. Messrs. B        and S      , the Senators
from Louisiana, withdrew from the Senate of the United States before the
proposed amendments to the Constitution were reported to the Conference.
The following resolutions of their respective States were presented by the
delegates to the Committee on Credentials, and were ordered by the
Conference to be printed, on the motion of Mr. C    .[9]
TENNESSEE.
R           proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United
States.
Resolved by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, That a
Convention of delegates from all the slaveholding States should assemble at
Nashville, Tennessee, or such other place as a majority of the States
coöperating may designate, on the fourth day of February, 1861, to digest
and define a basis upon which, if possible, the Federal Union and the
constitutional rights of the slave States may be perpetuated and preserved.
Resolved, That the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee appoint a
number of delegates to said Convention, of our ablest and wisest men, equal
to our whole delegation in Congress; and that the Governor of Tennessee
immediately furnish copies of these resolutions to the Governors of the
slaveholding States, and urge the participation of such States in said
Convention.
Resolved, That in the opinion of this General Assembly, such plan of
adjustment should embrace the following propositions as amendments to
the Constitution of the United States:
1. A declaratory amendment that African slaves, as held under the
institutions of the slaveholding States, shall be recognized as property, and
entitled to the status of other property, in the States where slavery exists, in
all places within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress in the slave States,
in all the Territories south of 36° 30´; in the District of Columbia; in transit;
and whilst temporarily sojourning with the owner in the non-slaveholding
States and Territories north of 36° 30´, and when fugitives from the owner,
in the several places above named, as well as in all places in the exclusive
jurisdiction of Congress in the non-slaveholding States.
2. That all the territory now owned, or which may be hereafter acquired by
the United States south of the parallel of 36° 30´; African slavery shall be
recognized as existing, and be protected by all the departments of the
Federal and Territorial Governments, and in all north of that line, now
owned, or to be acquired, it shall not be recognized as existing; and
whenever States formed out of any of said territory south of said line,
having a population equal to that of a congressional district, shall apply for
admission into the Union, the same shall be admitted as slave States, whilst
States north of the line, formed out of said territory, and having a population
equal to a Congressional district, shall be admitted without slavery; but the
States formed out of said territory north and south having been admitted as
members of the Union, shall have all the powers over the institution of
slavery possessed by the other States of the Union.
3. Congress shall have no power to abolish slavery in places under its
exclusive jurisdiction, and situate within the limits of States that permit the
holding of slaves.
4. Congress shall have no power to abolish slavery within the District of
Columbia, as long as it exists in the adjoining States of Virginia and
Maryland, or either, nor without the consent of the inhabitants, nor without
just compensation made to such owners of slaves as do not consent to such
abolishment. Nor shall Congress at any time prohibit the officers of the
Federal Government or members of Congress whose duties require them to
be in said District, from bringing with them their slaves, and holding them
as such, during the time their duties may require them to remain there, and
afterwards take them from the District.
5. Congress shall have no power to prohibit or hinder the transportation of
slaves from one State to another, or the Territory in which slaves are by law
permitted to be held, whether that transportation be by land, navigable
rivers, or by seas.
6. In addition to the fugitive slave clause, provide that when a slave has
been demanded of the Executive authority of the State to which he has fled,
if he is not delivered, and the owner permitted to carry him out of the State
in peace, the State so failing to deliver, shall pay to the owner the value of
such slave, and such damages as he may have sustained in attempting to
reclaim his slave, and secure his right of action in the Supreme Court of the
United States, with execution against the property of such State and the
individuals thereof.
7. No future amendment of the Constitution shall affect the six preceding
articles, nor the third paragraph of the second section of the first article of
the Constitution, nor the third paragraph of the second section of the fourth
article of the Constitution; and no amendments shall be made to the
Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress any power to abolish
or interfere with slavery in any of the States by whose laws it is, or may be
allowed or permitted.
8. That slave property shall be rendered secure in transit through, or whilst
temporarily sojourning in, non-slaveholding States or Territories, or in the
District of Columbia.
9. An amendment to the effect that all fugitives are to be deemed those
offending the laws within the jurisdiction of the State, and who escape
therefrom to other States; and that it is the duty of each State to suppress
armed invasion of another State.
Resolved, That said Convention of the slaveholding States having agreed
upon a basis of adjustment satisfactory to themselves, should, in the opinion
of this General Assembly, refer it to a Convention of all the States,
slaveholding and non-slaveholding, in the manner following:
It should invite all States friendly to such plan of adjustment, to elect
delegates in such manner as to reflect the popular will, to assemble in a
Constitutional Convention of all the States North and South, to be held at
Richmond, Virginia, on the —— day of February, 1861, to revise and
perfect such plan of adjustment, for its reference for final ratification and
adoption by a Convention of the States respectively.
Resolved, That should a plan of adjustment, satisfactory to the South, not be
acceded to by a requisite number of States to perfect amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, it is the opinion of this General Assembly
that the slaveholding States should adopt for themselves the Constitution of
the United States, with such amendments as may be satisfactory to the
slaveholding States, and that they should invite into the Union with them all
States of the North which are willing to abide such amended Constitution
and frame of Government, severing at once all connections with States
refusing such reasonable guarantees to our future safety; such renewed
conditions of Federal Union being first submitted for ratification to
Convention of all the States respectively.
Resolved, That the Governor of the State of Tennessee furnish copies of
these resolutions immediately to the Governors of the non-slaveholding
States.
OHIO.
J     R           of the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, relative to
the appointment of Commissioners to the Convention to meet in
Washington on the 4th of February, proximo. Passed, January 30,
1861.
W      , The Commonwealth of Virginia has appointed five
Commissioners to meet in the City of Washington on the fourth day of
February next, with similar Commissioners from other States, and after full
and free conference to agree, if practicable, upon some adjustment of the
unhappy difficulties now dividing our country, which may be alike
satisfactory and honorable to the States concerned; therefore be it
Resolved, by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, That the Governor,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, be and he is hereby
authorized and empowered to appoint five Commissioners to represent the
State of Ohio in said Conference.
Resolved, That while we are not prepared to assent to the terms of
settlement proposed by Virginia, and are fully satisfied that the Constitution
of the United States as it is, if fairly interpreted and obeyed by all sections
of our country, contains ample provisions within itself for the correction of
all evils complained, yet a disposition to reciprocate the patriotic spirit of a
sister State, and a sincere desire to have harmoniously adjusted all
differences between us, induce us to favor the appointment of the
Commission as requested.
Resolved, That the Governor be requested to transmit without delay a copy
of these Resolutions to each of the Commissioners to be appointed as
aforesaid, to the end that they may repair to the City of Washington, on the
day hereinbefore named, to meet such Commissioners as may be appointed
by any of the States in accordance with the aforesaid propositions of
Virginia.
Resolved, That in the opinion of this General Assembly, it will be wise and
expedient to adjourn the proposed Convention to a later day, and that the
Commissioners to be appointed as aforesaid, are requested to use their
influence in procuring an adjournment to the fourth day of April next.
KENTUCKY.
R           appointing Commissioners to attend a Conference at
Washington City, February 4th, in accordance with the invitation of the
Virginia Legislature.
W      , The General Assembly of Virginia, with a view to make an effort
to preserve the Union and the Constitution in the spirit in which they were
established by the Fathers of the Republic, have, by resolution, invited all
the States who are willing to unite with her in an earnest effort to adjust the
present unhappy controversies, to appoint Commissioners to meet on the
4th of February next, to consider, and if practicable, agree upon some
suitable adjustment—
Resolved, That we heartily accept the invitation of our Old Mother Virginia,
and that the following six Commissioners, viz.: Wm. O. Butler, James B.
Clay, Joshua F. Bell, C.S. Morehead, James Guthrie, and Chas. A.
Wickliffe, be appointed to represent the State of Kentucky in the
contemplated Convention, whose duty it shall be to repair to the City of
Washington, on the day designated, to meet such Commissioners as may be
appointed by any of the States in accordance with the foregoing invitation.
Resolved, That if said Commissioners shall agree upon any plan of
adjustment requiring amendments to the Federal Constitution, they be
requested to communicate the proposed amendments to Congress, for the
purpose of having the same submitted by that body, according to the forms
of the Constitution, to the several States for ratification.
Resolved, That if said Commissioners cannot agree on an adjustment, or if
agreeing, Congress shall refuse to submit for ratification such amendments
as they may propose, the Commissioners of this State shall immediately
communicate the result to the Executive of this Commonwealth, to be by
him laid before this General Assembly.
Resolved, That in the opinion of the General Assembly of Kentucky, the
propositions embraced in the resolutions presented to the Senate of the
United States by the Hon. J    J. C         , so construed, that the first
article proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
shall apply to all the territory of the United States now held or hereafter
acquired south of latitude 36° 30´, and provide that slavery of the African
race shall be effectually protected as property therein during the
continuance of the Territorial Government; and the fourth article shall
secure to the owners of slaves the right of transit with their slaves between
and through the non-slaveholding States and Territories, constitute the basis
of such an adjustment of the unhappy controversy which now divides the
States of this Confederacy, as would be acceptable to the people of this
Commonwealth.
Resolved, That the Governor be, and he is hereby requested to communicate
information of the foregoing appointment to the Commissioners above
named, at as early a day as practicable, and that he also communicate copies
of the foregoing resolutions to the Executive of the respective States.
INDIANA.
A J     R          authorizing the Governor to appoint Commissioners
to meet those sent by other States in Convention on the state of the
Union.
W      , The State of Virginia has transmitted to this State resolutions
adopted by her General Assembly, inviting all such States as are willing to
unite with her in an earnest effort to adjust the unhappy controversies, in the
spirit in which the Constitution was originally formed, to send
Commissioners to meet those appointed by that State in Convention, to be
held in the City of Washington, on the fourth day of February next, to
consider, and if possible, to agree upon some suitable adjustment.
And whereas, some of the States to which invitations were extended by the
State of Virginia have already responded and appointed their
Commissioners; therefore,
Resolved, by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, That we accept
the invitation of the State of Virginia, in the true spirit of fraternal feeling,
and that the Governor of the State is hereby directed and empowered to
appoint five Commissioners to meet the Commissioners appointed by our
sister States, to consult upon the unhappy differences now dividing the
country; but the said Commissioners shall take no action that will commit
this State until nineteen of the States are represented, nor without first
having communicated with this General Assembly in regard to such action,
and having received the authority of the same so to commit the State.
Resolved, That while we are not prepared to assent to the terms of
settlement proposed by the State of Virginia, and are fully satisfied that the
Constitution, if fairly interpreted and obeyed, contains ample provisions
within itself for the correction of the evils complained of; still, with a
disposition to reciprocate the patriotic desire of the State of Virginia, and to
have harmoniously adjusted all differences existing between the States of
the Union, this General Assembly is induced to respond to the invitation of
Virginia, by the appointment of the Commissioners herein provided for; but
as the time fixed for the Convention to assemble is so near at hand that the
States cannot all be represented, it is expected that the Commissioners on
behalf of this State will insist that the Convention adjourn until such time as
the States shall have an opportunity of being represented.
Resolved, That his Excellency, the Governor, be requested to transmit
copies of these resolutions to the Executives of each of the States of the
Union.
DELAWARE.
J     R           appointing Commissioners.
W      , The State of Virginia has recommended the holding of a
Convention of Delegates from all the States of the Union, at the City of
Washington, on the fourth day of February next, for the purpose of taking
into consideration and perfecting some plan of adjusting the matters in
controversy now so unhappily subsisting in the family of States, and has
appointed five Commissioners to represent the people of that
Commonwealth in said Convention; and
Whereas, the people of the State of Delaware regard the preservation of the
Union as paramount to any political consideration, and are fixed in their
determination that Delaware, the first to adopt the Federal Constitution, will
be the last to do any act tending to destroy the integrity of the Union;
therefore,
Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of
Delaware in General Assembly met, That the Hon. George B. Rodney,
Daniel M. Bates, Esq., Dr. Henry Ridgely, Hon. John W. Houston, and
William Cannon, Esq., be, and they are hereby appointed Commissioners,
on behalf of the State of Delaware, to represent the people of said State in
the Convention to be held at Washington, on the fourth day of February
next.
Resolved, That in the opinion of this General Assembly, the people of
Delaware are thoroughly devoted to the perpetuity of the Union, and that
the Commissioners appointed by the foregoing resolution are expected to
emulate the example set by the immortal patriots who framed the Federal
Constitution, by sacrificing all minor considerations upon the altar of the
Union.
Resolved, further, That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to
furnish a copy of the above preamble and resolutions to each of the
Commissioners herein and hereby appointed, duly attested under the great
seal of the State.
Resolved, further, That immediately upon the adoption of the foregoing
preamble and resolutions, it shall be the duty of the Clerk of the House to
transmit to the Secretary of State a copy thereof, certified by him; and when
the Secretary of State shall have received said copy so certified, it shall be
evidence that said preamble and resolutions were duly adopted by this
General Assembly.
ILLINOIS.
W      , resolutions of the State of Virginia have been communicated to
the General Assembly of this State, proposing the appointment of
Commissioners by the several States to meet in Convention, on the fourth
day of February, A.D. 1861, at Washington.
Resolved by the Senate, the House of Representatives concurring herein,
That with the earnest desire for the return of harmony and kind relations
among all our sister States, and out of respect to the Commonwealth of
Virginia, the Governor of this State be requested to appoint five
Commissioners on the part of the State of Illinois, to confer and consult
with the Commissioners of other States who shall meet at Washington:
Provided, That said Commissioners shall at all times be subject to the
control of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois.
Resolved, That the appointment of Commissioners by the State of Illinois,
in response to the invitation of the State of Virginia, is not an expression of
opinion on the part of this State that any amendment of the Federal
Constitution is requisite to secure to the people of the slaveholding States
adequate guarantees for the security of their rights, nor an approval of the
basis of settlement of our difficulties proposed by the State of Virginia, but
it is an expression of our willingness to unite with the State of Virginia in an
earnest effort to adjust the present unhappy controversies in the spirit in
which the Constitution was originally formed, and consistently with its
principles.
Resolved, That while we are willing to appoint Commissioners to meet in
convention with those of other States for consultation upon matters which at
present distract our harmony as a nation, we also insist that the appropriate
and constitutional method of considering and acting upon the grievances
complained of by our sister States, would be by the call of a Convention for
the amendment of the Constitution in the manner contemplated by the fifth
article of that instrument; and if the States deeming themselves aggrieved,
shall request Congress to call such Convention, the Legislature of Illinois
will and does concur in such call.
NEW JERSEY.
J     R           in relation to the Union of the States.
W      , the people of New Jersey, conforming to the opinion of "the
Father of his Country," consider the unity of the Government, which
constitutes the people of the United States one people, a main pillar in the
edifice of their independence, the support of their tranquillity at home and
peace abroad, of their prosperity, and of that liberty which they so highly
prize; and properly estimating the immense value of their National Union to
their individual happiness, they cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable
attachment to it as the palladium of their political safety and prosperity;
therefore,
1. Be it resolved by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New
Jersey, That it is the duty of every good citizen, in all suitable and proper
ways, to stand by and sustain the Union of the States as transmitted to us by
our fathers.
2. And be it resolved, That the Government of the United States is a
National Government, and the Union it was designed to perfect is not a
mere compact or league; and that the Constitution was adopted in a spirit of
mutual compromise and concession by the people of the United States, and
can only be preserved by the constant recognition of that spirit.
3. And be it resolved, That however undoubted may be the right of the
General Government to maintain its authority and enforce its laws over all
parts of the country, it is equally certain that forbearance and compromise
are indispensable at this crisis to the perpetuity of the Union, and that it is
the dictate of reason, wisdom, and patriotism, peacefully to adjust whatever
differences exist between the different sections of the country.
4. And be it resolved, That the resolutions and propositions submitted to the
Senate of the United States by the Honorable John J. Crittenden, of
Kentucky, for the compromise of the questions in dispute between the
people of the northern and of the southern States, or any other constitutional
method that will permanently settle the question of slavery, will be
acceptable to the people of the State of New Jersey, and the Senators and
Representatives in Congress from New Jersey be requested and earnestly
urged to support those resolutions and propositions.
5. And be it resolved, That as the Union of the States is in imminent danger
unless the remedies before suggested be speedily adopted, then, as a last
resort, the State of New Jersey hereby makes application, according to the
terms of the Constitution, of the Congress of the United States, to call a
Convention (of the United States) to propose amendments to said
Constitution.
6. And be it resolved, That such of the States as have in force laws which
interfere with the constitutional rights of citizens of the other States, either
in regard to their persons or property, or which militate against the just
construction of that part of the Constitution that provides that "the citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several States," are earnestly urged and requested, for the sake of
peace and the Union, to repeal all such laws.
7. And be it resolved, That his Excellency Charles S. Olden, Peter D.
Vroom, Robert F. Stockton, Benjamin Williamson, Joseph F. Randolph,
Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, Rodman M. Price, William O. Alexander, and
Thomas J. Stryker, be appointed Commissioners to confer with Congress
and our sister States, and urge upon them the importance of carrying into
effect the principles and objects of the foregoing resolutions.
8. And be it resolved, That the Commissioners above named, in addition to
their other powers, be authorized to meet with those now or hereafter to be
appointed by our sister State of Virginia, and such Commissioners of other
States as have been, or may be hereafter appointed, to meet at Washington
on the fourth day of February next.
9. And be it resolved, That copies of the foregoing resolutions be sent to the
President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
United States, and to the Senators and Representatives in Congress from
New Jersey, and to the Governors of the several States.
NEW YORK.
C          R           appointing Commissioners from this State to
meet Commissioners from other States at Washington, on invitation of
Virginia.
W      , the State of Virginia, by resolutions of her General Assembly,
passed the 19th instant, has invited such of the slaveholding and non-
slaveholding States as are willing to unite with her, to meet at Washington,
on the fourth of February next, to consider, and, if practicable, agree on
some suitable adjustment of our national difficulties; and whereas, the
people of New York, while they hold the opinion that the Constitution of
the United States, as it is, contains all needful guarantees for the rights of
the States, are nevertheless ready, at all times, to confer with their brethren
upon all alleged grievances; and to do all that can justly be required of them
to allay discontent; therefore
Resolved, That David Dudley Field, William Curtis Noyes, James S.
Wadsworth, James O. Smith, Amaziah B. James, Erastus Corning, Addison
Gardiner, Greene O. Bronson, William E. Dodge, Ex-Governor John A.
King, and Major-General John E. Wool, be and are hereby appointed
Commissioners, on the part of this State, to meet Commissioners from other
States, in the City of Washington, on the fourth day of February next, or so
soon thereafter as Commissioners shall be appointed by a majority of the
States of the Union, to confer with them upon the complaints of any part of
the country, and to suggest such remedies therefor as to them shall seem fit
and proper; but the said Commissioners shall at all times be subject to the
control of this Legislature, and shall cast five votes to be determined by a
majority of their number.
Resolved, That in thus acceding to the request of Virginia, it is not to be
understood that this Legislature approves of the propositions submitted by
the General Assembly of that State, or concedes the propriety of their
adoption by the proposed Convention. But while adhering to the position
she has heretofore occupied, New York will not reject an invitation to a
conference, which, by bringing together the men of both sections, holds out
the possibility of an honorable settlement of our national difficulties, and
the restoration of peace and harmony to the country.
Resolved, That the Governor be requested to transmit a copy of the
foregoing resolutions to the Executive of the several States, and also to the
President of the United States, and to inform the Commissioners without
delay of their appointment.
Resolved, That the foregoing resolutions be transmitted to the honorable the
Senate, with a request that they concur therein.
PENNSYLVANIA.
R           to appoint Commissioners to a Convention of the States.
W      , the Legislature of the State of Virginia has invited a meeting of
Commissioners from the several States of this Union, to be held in the City
of Washington, on the fourth day of February next, to consider, and if
practicable, agree upon some suitable adjustment of the unhappy
differences which now disturb the business of the country and threaten the
dissolution of this Union:
And whereas, in the opinion of this Legislature, no reasonable cause exists
for this extraordinary excitement which now pervades some of the States, in
relation to their domestic institutions, and while Pennsylvania still adheres
to, and cannot surrender the principles which she has always entertained on
the subject of slavery, this Legislature is willing to accept the invitation of
Virginia, and unite with her in an earnest effort to restore the peace of the
country, by such means as may be consistent with the principles upon which
the Constitution is founded; therefore,
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania in General Assembly met, That the invitation of the
Legislature of Virginia to her sister States, for the appointment of
Commissioners to meet in the City of Washington, on the fourth of
February next, be and the same is hereby accepted; and that the Governor
be, and he is hereby authorized to appoint seven Commissioners for the
State of Pennsylvania, whose duty it shall be to repair to the City of
Washington on the day designated, to meet such Commissioners as may be
appointed by any other States which have not authorized or sanctioned the
seizure of the forts, arsenals, or other property of the United States, to
consider, and if possible, to agree upon suitable measures for the prompt
and final settlement of the difficulties which now exist: Provided, That the
said Commissioners shall be subject, in all their proceedings, to the
instructions of this Legislature.
Resolved, That in the opinion of this Legislature, the people of
Pennsylvania do not desire any alteration or amendment of the Constitution
of the United States, and any recommendation from this body to that effect,
while it does not come within its appropriate and legitimate duties, would
not meet with their approval; that Pennsylvania will cordially unite with the
other States of the Union in the adoption of any proper constitutional
measures adequate to guarantee and secure a more strict and faithful
observance of the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of
the United States, which provides, among other things, that "the citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several States," and that no person held to service or labor in one State
under the law thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any
law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall
be delivered up on the claim of the party to whom such service or labor may
be due.
MASSACHUSETTS.
R       for the appointment of Commissioners to attend a Convention
to be held in the City of Washington.
W      , the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is desirous of a full and
free conference with the General Government, and with any or all of the
other States of the Union, at any time and on every occasion when such
conference may promote the welfare of the country; and whereas, questions
of grave moment have arisen touching the powers of the Government and
the relations between the different States of the Union; and whereas, the
State of Virginia has expressed a desire to meet her sister States in
Convention at Washington; therefore,
Resolved, That the Governor of this Commonwealth, by and with the advice
and consent of the Council, be and he hereby is authorized to appoint seven
persons as Commissioners, to proceed to Washington to confer with the
General Government, or with the separate States, or with any association of
delegates from such States, and to report their doings to the Legislature at
its present session; it being expressly declared that their acts shall be at all
times under the control, and subject to the approval or rejection of the
Legislature.
RHODE ISLAND.
W      , the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, on the
19th day of January inst., adopted resolutions inviting the sister States of
this Union to appoint Commissioners to meet on the fourth day of February
next, in the City of Washington, to consider the practicability of agreeing on
terms of adjustment of our present national troubles:
Resolved, That the Governor be, and he is hereby authorized to appoint five
Commissioners, on the part of this State, to meet such Commissioners as
may be appointed by other States, in the City of Washington, on the fourth
day of February next, to consider and, if practicable, agree upon some
amicable adjustment of the present unhappy national difficulties, upon the
basis and in the spirit of the Constitution of the United States.
MISSOURI.
J     R          to appoint Commissioners.
Resolved by the House of Representatives, the Senate concurring therein,
That Waldo P. Johnson, John D. Coalter, A.W. Doniphan, Harrison Hough,
and A.H. Buckner be appointed Commissioners on the part of the State of
Missouri, to meet Commissioners from Virginia, and other States, in
Convention at Washington City, on the 4th of February, 1861, to endeavor
to agree upon some plan of adjustment of existing difficulties, so as to
preserve or to reconstruct the Union of these States, and to secure the honor
and equal rights of the slaveholding States. Said Commissioners shall
always be under the control of the General Assembly, except when the State
Convention shall be in session, during which time they shall be under the
control of the Convention.
No. II.
The following is a corrected list of the Delegates to the Conference, with
their respective post office address.
M    .—William P. Fessenden, Biddeford; Lot M. Morrill; Daniel E.
Somes, Biddeford; John J. Perry, Oxford; Ezra B. French, Damariscotta;
Freeman H. Morse, Bath; Stephen Coburn; Stephen C. Foster, Pembroke.
N   H        .—Amos Tuck, Exeter; Levi Chamberlain; Asa Fowler,
Concord.
V      .—Hiland Hall, North Bennington; Levi Underwood, Burlington;
H. Henry Baxter, Rutland; L.E. Chittenden, Burlington; B.D. Harris,
Brattleboro'.
M            .—John Z. Goodrich, Stockbridge; Charles Allen,
Worcester; George S. Boutwell, Groton; Theophilus P. Chandler, Boston;
Francis B. Crowninshield, Boston; John M. Forbes, Salem; Richard P.
Waters, Salem.
R     I     .—Samuel Ames, Providence; Alexander Duncan,
Providence; William W. Hoppin, Providence; George H. Browne,
Providence; Samuel G. Arnold, Providence.
C          .—Roger S. Baldwin, Windham; Chauncey F. Cleveland;
Charles J. McCurdy, Lyme; James T. Pratt; Robbins Battell; Amos S. Treat,
Bridgeport.
N   Y   .—David Dudley Field, New York; William Curtis Noyes, New
York; James S. Wadsworth, Geneseo; James C. Smith, Canandaigua;
Amaziah B. James, Ogdensburg; Erastus Corning, Albany; Francis Granger,
Canandaigua; Greene C. Bronson, New York; William E. Dodge, New York;
John A. King, Jamaica; John E. Wool, Troy.
N   J     .—Charles S. Olden, Princeton; Peter D. Vroom, Trenton;
Robert F. Stockton, Princeton; Benjamin Williamson, Elizabeth; Joseph F.
Randolph, Trenton; Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, Newark; Rodman M. Price,
Harrison, Hudson Co.; William C. Alexander, P.O., 92 Broadway, N.Y.;
Thomas J. Stryker, Trenton.
P           .—James Pollock, Milton; William M. Meredith,
Philadelphia; David Wilmot, Towanda; A.W. Loomis, Pittsburg; Thomas E.
Franklin, Lancaster; William McKennan, Washington; Thomas White,
Indiana.
D       .—George B. Rodney, Newcastle; Daniel M. Bates, Wilmington;
Henry Ridgely, Dover; John W. Houston, Milford; William Cannon,
Bridgeville.
M       .—John F. Dent, Milestown; Reverdy Johnson, Baltimore; John
W. Crisfield, Princess Ann; Augustus W. Bradford, Govanstown; William T.
Goldsborough, Cambridge; J. Dixon Roman, Hagerstown; Benjamin C.
Howard, Catonsville.
V       .—John Tyler, Sherwood Forest; William C. Rives; John W.
Brockenbrough, Lexington; George W. Summers, Kanawha C.H.; James A.
Seddon, Goochland.
N     C       .—George Davis, Wilmington; Thomas Ruffin, Graham;
David S. Reid, Pleasantville; D.M. Barringer, Raleigh; J.M. Morehead,
Greenboro'.
T        .—Samuel Milligan, Greenville; Josiah M. Anderson, Walnut
Valley; Robert L. Carruthers, Lebanon; Thomas Martin, Pulaski; Isaac R.
Hawkins, Huntington; A.W.O. Totten, Jackson; R.J. McKinney, Knoxville;
Alvin Cullom, Livingston; William P. Hickerson, Manchester; George W.
Jones, Fayetteville; F.K. Zollicoffer, Nashville; William H. Stephens,
Jackson.
K       .—William O. Butler, Carrollton; James B. Clay, Ashland;
Joshua F. Bell, Danville; Charles S. Morehead, Louisville; James Guthrie,
Louisville; Charles A. Wickliffe, Bardstown.
M       .—John D. Coalter, St. Louis; Alexander W. Doniphan, Liberty;
Waldo P. Johnson, Osceola; Aylett H. Buckner, Bowling Green; Harrison
Hough, Charleston.
O   .—Salmon P. Chase, Columbus; William S. Groesbeck, Cincinnati;
Franklin T. Backus, Cleveland; Reuben Hitchcock, Cleveland; Thomas
Ewing, Lancaster; V.B. Horton, Pomeroy; C.P. Wolcott, Akron.
I      .—Caleb B. Smith, Indianapolis; Pleasant A. Hackleman,
Rushville; Godlove S. Orth, Lafayette; E.W.H. Ellis, Goshen; Thomas C.
Slaughter, Corydon.
I       .—John Wood, Quincy; Stephen T. Logan, Springfield; John M.
Palmer, Carlinville; Burton C. Cook, Ottowa; Thomas J. Turner, Freeport.
I   .—James Harlan, Mt. Pleasant; James W. Grimes, Burlington; Samuel
H. Curtis, Keokuk; William Vandever, Dubuque.
K     .—Thomas Ewing, jr., Leavenworth; J.C. Stone, Leavenworth; H.J.
Adams, Leavenworth; M.F. Conway, Lawrence.
No. III.
In the United States Senate, February 27th, 1861, while the Army
Appropriation bill was under consideration, proceedings relating to the
Peace Conference were opened as follows:
Mr. POWELL:—Is it in order to move to postpone this bill and take up
another?
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Chair believes it is in order.
Mr. POWELL:—I move to postpone the Army bill for the purpose of taking
up the resolutions to amend the Constitution proposed by my colleague. For
several weeks Senators have declined to make an effort to call up the
propositions of my colleague, for the reason that certain Peace
Commissioners were in session in this capital, convened at the call of the
State of Virginia. I am confident now that that Commission, or Peace
Congress, or Conference, or whatever you may call it, will not accomplish
any thing. Indeed, certain facts have fallen under my notice, that cause me
to believe that it has been the fixed purpose of certain Republicans that that
Conference should not accomplish any thing. I believe, sir, that certain
commissioners from States of this Union have been brought into that
Conference for the purpose of preventing them from agreeing on any thing.
I have thought that for some time past. A friend sent to me yesterday the
Detroit Free Press, containing two letters from the distinguished Senators
from the State of Michigan to their Governor, which, I think, clearly and
fully establish the fact that the Republicans, a portion of them at least,
instead of sending commissioners to that Conference with a view to
inaugurate something that would compromise the difficulties by which we
are surrounded, and save this country from ruin, have absolutely been
engaged in the work of sending delegates there to prevent that commission
from doing any thing. I send this paper to the desk, and ask the Secretary to
read these letters.
The Secretary read as follows:
W         , February 15th, 1861.
D    S  : When Virginia proposed a Convention in Washington, in
reference to the disturbed condition of the country, I regarded it as another
effort to debauch the public mind, and a step toward obtaining that
concession which the imperious slave power so insolently demands. I have
no doubt at present but that was the design. I was therefore pleased that the
Legislature of Michigan was not disposed to put herself in a position to be
controlled by such influences.
The Convention has met here, and within a few days the aspect of things
has materially changed. Every free State, I think, except Michigan and
Wisconsin, is represented; and we have been assured by friends upon whom
we can rely, that if those two States should send delegations of true,
unflinching men, there would probably be a majority in favor of the
Constitution as it is, who would frown down rebellion by the enforcement
of laws. These friends have urged us to recommend the appointment of
delegates from our State; and, in compliance with their request, Mr.
C        and myself telegraphed to you last night. It cannot be doubted
that the recommendations of this Convention will have a very considerable
influence upon the public mind, and upon the action of Congress.
I have a great disinclination to any interference with what should properly
be submitted to the wisdom and discretion of the Legislature, in which I
place great reliance; but I hope I shall be pardoned for suggesting that it
may be justifiable and proper, by any honorable means, to avert the lasting
disgrace which will attach to a free people who, by the peaceful exercise of
the ballot, have just released themselves from the tyranny of slavery, if they
should now succumb to treasonable threats, and again submit to a degrading
thraldom. If it should be deemed proper to send delegates, I think, if they
could be here by the 20th, it would be in time.
I have the honor, with much respect, to be truly yours,
K.S. BINGHAM.
To his Excellency Governor B    .
Mr. FESSENDEN:—I submit whether it is in order to go into a discussion
on this motion. If so, I suppose this must be regarded as a part of the
speech.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Chair understood the discussion to be in
order. It was certainly not objected to at the time the Senator commenced.
Mr. FESSENDEN:—It is not too late to raise the point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The motion is to lay aside one bill and take
up other business; and the Chair understood the Senator from Kentucky to
be giving his reasons why he wished that to be done.
Mr. FESSENDEN:—If it is in order, of course I cannot object to it; but I
raise that question.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Senator from Maine raises the question
whether this debate is in order.
Mr. POWELL:—There was no objection to my proceeding, and I suppose I
have a right to go on. I wish the letters read as part of my speech.
Mr. FESSENDEN:—There is no objection to reading them.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Chair has decided that the Senator from
Kentucky is in order.
Mr. POWELL:—I have not yielded, except for the purpose of reading these
letters.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—Is an appeal taken from the decision of the
Chair?
Mr. FESSENDEN:—I take no appeal.
The Secretary read as follows:
W         , February 11th, 1861.
M  D    G       : Governor B       and myself telegraphed you on
Saturday, at the request of Massachusetts and New York, to send delegates
to the Peace or Compromise Congress. They admit that we were right and
that they were wrong; that no Republican State should have sent delegates;
but they are here and cannot get away. Ohio, Indiana, and Rhode Island are
caving in, and there is danger of Illinois; and now they beg us, for God's
sake, to come to their rescue, and save the Republican party from rupture. I
hope you will send stiff-backed men, or none. The whole thing was gotten
up against my judgment and advice, and will end in thin smoke. Still, I hope




His Excellency A      B    .
P.S.—Some of the manufacturing States think that a fight would be awful.
Without a little blood-letting this Union will not, in my estimation, be worth
a rush.
Mr. POWELL:—I think it evident from these letters, that there is, and has
been, a fixed purpose in certain quarters, that the Peace Conference should
do nothing. Indeed, it seems, from the letter of the Senator from Michigan
[Mr. C       ], that while he opposed any Republican State going into
this Conference, yet, as some of them were there, and Indiana, and Illinois,
and Ohio, and Rhode Island were about to cave in, on the advice of
Massachusetts and New York he asked Michigan to come in and relieve
them, and save the Republican party from rupture. Is it possible that the
Republican party is to be saved, even if the Union be destroyed? It is very
evident that those "stiff-backed" gentlemen were to be sent here in order to
prevent any compromise being presented. The object, then, as I stated, on
the part of certain members on the other side of the Chamber, has been to
send delegates to the Conference for the purpose of preventing any
compromise measures being proposed by that body. They desire, in the
language of these letters, to save their party from destruction. They say that
if the Conference should agree on any thing, it would have a demoralizing
effect upon the people, and upon the two Houses of Congress. In one word,
it will have the effect to make a rupture in the Republican party, which, in
the estimation of the Senators, is higher, holier, and better, it seems, than the
Union.
In consequence of this fact being apparent, that it is not the design or the
intention that the Peace Conference should do any thing, I think we should
not wait for it any longer, but the Senate should proceed at once to the
consideration of the amendments to the Constitution proposed by my
colleague. I think we had better be engaged in that work—one that is
calculated, if the propositions of my colleague should pass, in my opinion,
to save the country from further disintegration. I think we had better be at
that, than be appropriating money to support an Army that is to be engaged,
it seems, in the work of blood-letting. The Senator from Michigan thinks
the Government is not worth a rush until it shall have drawn a little blood. I
hope my motion will prevail, and that we shall lay this bill aside and
proceed to the consideration of the measures proposed by my colleague.
Mr. CHANDLER:—The Senator from Kentucky has read what purports to
be a short note that I sent the other day to the Governor of Michigan.
Whether it is a correct copy or not, I cannot say; I kept no copy of it, nor do
I care.
Mr. POWELL:—If the Senator will allow me one word, I will state to the
Senate that, when I received this paper, yesterday—
Mr. CHANDLER:—I was about to state that.
Mr. POWELL:—I asked both the Senators if the letters were right. They
told me they kept no copies, but they believed they were substantially so.
Mr. CHANDLER:—I was going to say that. Now, sir, I desire to answer the
Senator from Kentucky, and to set myself right on this question—(my
position from the first has been well known upon this question, and upon
most others)—but, at the earnest solicitation of the Senator from Maine,
who has charge of this bill, I will forego the response which I intended to
make, and which I shall make to the Senator from Kentucky, for the
present, for the purpose of going on and disposing of the Army
appropriation bill. At another day I propose to give my views more at large
upon these compromise measures, that the Senator from Kentucky seems so
anxious to take up at this time. I am as anxious as he is to go into that
discussion. I am anxious to go into it. It is a question that ought to be
discussed. It is a question in which the people of Michigan take a deep
interest. They are opposed to all compromises; they do not believe that any
compromise is necessary; nor do I. They are prepared to stand by the
Constitution of the United States as it is; to stand by the Government as it
is; ay, sir, to stand by it to blood, if necessary.
Mr. POWELL:—I ask for the yeas and nays on my motion.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. MASON:—I ask the general permission of the Senate to give notice
that at three o'clock I shall move to go into executive session; and if it is not
agreed to, I shall then ask that the galleries may be cleared, for the purpose
of disclosing what I consider ought to be passed on in executive session.
Mr. JOHNSON, of Tennessee:—If I can obtain the attention of the Senator
from Kentucky, I wish to make a suggestion. Those resolutions, as I
understood, went over until last Monday at one o'clock, and were then to be
taken up and considered. I do not know whether the motion was made in
that way, or whether it was an informal understanding that they should be
taken up last Monday for consideration; but as the Army bill is now under
consideration, and the time is growing short, would it not be better to have a
night session, and postpone the subject until seven o'clock this evening, and
let it be taken up at that time; and then let this other bill go on to-day?
Those who want to make speeches on those resolutions could do it to-night;
we should thus save time and expedite business.
Mr. FESSENDEN:—I think the Senator from Virginia has given an
additional very good reason for taking up the Army bill, and going through
with it; and not postponing it for speeches at the present time.
The question being taken by yeas and nays, resulted—yeas 17, nays 27; as
follows:
Y   .—Messrs. Bayard, Bigler, Bragg, Bright, Clingman, Douglas, Fitch,
Gwin, Hunter, Johnson of Tennessee, Kennedy, Lane, Latham, Mason,
Polk, Powell, and Rice—17.
N   .—Messrs. Anthony, Baker, Bingham, Cameron, Chandler, Clark,
Collamer, Dixon, Doolittle, Durkee, Fessenden, Foot, Foster, Grimes, Hale,
Harlan, King, Morrill, Pearce, Seward, Simmons, Sumner, Ten Eyck,
Trumbull, Wade, Wilkinson, and Wilson—27.
So the motion to postpone the Army bill, in order to take up the resolutions
of Mr. C         , was not agreed to.
Subsequently the following action, by the Senate, was taken on the report of
the Peace Conference.
The VICE-PRESIDENT:—The Chair has received a communication from
Ex-President T    , as President of the Conference which has been
recently sitting in this city, which he will lay before the Senate; and also the
proceedings of that body.
The Secretary read the communication, as follows:
To the Senate of the United States:
I am instructed, as the presiding officer of the Convention, composed of
Commissioners appointed by twenty-one States, now in session in this city
to deliberate upon the present unhappy condition of the country, to present
to your honorable body the accompanying request and proposed
amendment.
JOHN TYLER,
President of the Convention.
W         , D.C., February 27, 1861.
To the Congress of the United States:
The Convention assembled, upon the invitation of the State of Virginia, to
adjust the unhappy differences which now disturb the peace of the Union,
and threaten its continuance, make known to the Congress of the United
States that their body convened in the City of Washington on the fourth
instant, and continued in session until the twenty-seventh.
There were in the body, when action was taken upon that which is here
submitted, one hundred and thirty-three Commissioners, representing the
following States: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Kansas. They have approved what is
herewith submitted, and respectfully request that your honorable body will
submit it to conventions in the States as article thirteen of the amendments





S  . 1. In all the present territory of the United States north of the parallel
of 36° 30´ of north latitude, involuntary servitude, except in punishment of
crime, is prohibited. In all the present territory south of that line, the status
of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now exists, shall not be
changed; nor shall any law be passed by Congress or the Territorial
Legislature to hinder or prevent the taking of such persons from any of the
States of this Union to said territory, nor to impair the rights arising from
said relation; but the same shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the
Federal courts, according to the course of the common law. When any
Territory north or south of said line, within such boundary as Congress may
prescribe, shall contain a population equal to that required for a member of
Congress, it shall, if its form of government be republican, be admitted into
the Union on an equal footing with the original States, with or without
involuntary servitude, as the constitution of such State may provide.
S  . 2. No territory shall be acquired by the United States, except by
discovery and for naval and commercial stations, depots, and transit routes,
without the concurrence of a majority of all the Senators from States which
allow involuntary servitude, and a majority of all the Senators from States
which prohibit that relation; nor shall territory be acquired by treaty, unless
the votes of a majority of the Senators from each class of States
hereinbefore mentioned be cast as a part of the two thirds majority
necessary to the ratification of such treaty.
S  . 3. Neither the constitution, nor any amendment thereof, shall be
construed to give Congress power to regulate, abolish, or control, within
any State, the relation established or recognized by the laws thereof
touching persons held to labor or involuntary service therein, nor to
interfere with or abolish involuntary service in the District of Columbia
without the consent of Maryland and without the consent of the owners, or
making the owners who do not consent just compensation; nor the power to
interfere with or prohibit Representatives and others from bringing with
them to the District of Columbia, retaining, and taking away, persons so
held to labor or service; nor the power to interfere with or abolish
involuntary service in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States within those States and Territories where the same is established or
recognized; nor the power to prohibit the removal or transportation of
persons held to labor or involuntary service in any State or Territory of the
United States to any other State or Territory thereof where it is established
or recognized by law or usage, and the right during transportation, by sea or
river, of touching at ports, shores, and landings, and of landing in case of
distress, shall exist; but not the right of transit in or through any State or
Territory, or of sale or traffic, against the laws thereof. Nor shall Congress
have power to authorize any higher rate of taxation on persons held to labor
or service than on land. The bringing into the District of Columbia of
persons held to labor or service, for sale, or placing them in depots to be
afterwards transferred to other places for sale as merchandise, is prohibited.
S  . 4. The third paragraph of the second section of the fourth article of the
Constitution shall not be construed to prevent any of the States, by
appropriate legislation, and through the action of their judicial and
ministerial officers, from enforcing the delivery of fugitives from labor to
the person to whom such service or labor is due.
S  . 5. The foreign slave-trade is hereby forever prohibited; and it shall be
the duty of Congress to pass laws to prevent the importation of slaves,
coolies, or persons held to service or labor, into the United States and the
Territories from places beyond the limits thereof.
S  . 6. The first, third, and fifth sections, together with this section of those
amendments, and the third paragraph of the second section of the first
article of the Constitution, and the third paragraph of the second section of
the fourth article thereof, shall not be amended or abolished without the
consent of all the States.
S  . 7. Congress shall provide by law that the United States shall pay to the
owner the full value of his fugitive from labor, in all cases where the
marshal, or other officer, whose duty it was to arrest such fugitive, was
prevented from so doing by violence or intimidation from mobs or riotous
assemblages, or when, after arrest, such fugitive was rescued by like
violence or intimidation, and the owner thereby deprived of the same; and
the acceptance of such payment shall preclude the owner from further claim
to such fugitive. Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens
of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.
Mr. MASON:—I suppose the proper disposition is to have it printed.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—There is nothing to print.
Mr. GREEN:—And refer it to the Committee for the District of Columbia. I
think that is about right.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I move that it be referred to a select committee, with
instructions to report to-morrow morning.
Mr. MASON:—We ought certainly to have it printed.
Mr. DOUGLAS:—It can be printed in the mean time.
Mr. FESSENDEN:—We should have time to look at it.
The VICE-PRESIDENT:—It is moved that the communication be printed
and referred to a select committee, with instructions to report to-morrow
morning.
Mr. BIGLER:—I would be glad to make a suggestion to the Senator from
Kentucky, that he name in addition an hour to-morrow at which the
consideration of the report shall be in order, or else a single objection will
throw it over to the next day.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—Well, to-morrow at twelve o'clock, I would say.
["One."] I move one o'clock.
Mr. BIGLER:—With instructions to the committee to report to-morrow
morning, and that the report be the special order at one o'clock?
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—Yes, sir.
The VICE-PRESIDENT:—Does the Senator indicate the number of the
committee?
Mr. GREEN:—Seventeen.
Mr. DOUGLAS:—Five is enough.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—A committee of five; no more.
Mr. COLLAMER:—I would suggest to gentlemen not only that it be made
the order of the day for twelve o'clock to-morrow, but that it be adopted by
three-fourths of the States the next day. [Laughter.]
The VICE-PRESIDENT:—It is moved and seconded that the
communication be printed and referred to a select committee of five
members, to report to-morrow at one o'clock.
Mr. HALE:—I ask for a division of the question.
The VICE-PRESIDENT:—The first question will be on printing.
The motion to print was agreed to.
The VICE-PRESIDENT:—The next question is that the communication be
referred to a select committee of five, with instructions to report to-morrow
at one o'clock.
Mr. HALE:—I ask for a division of that.
The VICE-PRESIDENT:—How would it be divided?
Mr. HALE:—The motion to refer to a select committee is one proposition,
and the instructions are another.
The VICE-PRESIDENT:—That is the form in which the Senator wants it
divided?
Mr. HALE:—Yes, sir.
Mr. BIGLER:—As the Chair states the proposition, it does not reach the
object which the Senator from Kentucky had in view. The instructions
should be that the committee report to-morrow morning, and that the report
shall be the special order at one o'clock. Unless that is done, one objection
will put it over.
The VICE-PRESIDENT:—The Senator from New Hampshire asks for a
division of the question, and it is susceptible of division. The first question
is on referring the communication to a special committee of five.
The motion was agreed to.
The VICE-PRESIDENT:—The next branch of the proposition is that that
committee be instructed to report to-morrow morning, and that their report
be made the special order for to-morrow at one o'clock.
Mr. HALE:—On that, I should like to have the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The VICE-PRESIDENT:—The question is upon directing the committee to
report to-morrow morning, and that the report be made the special order for
to-morrow at one o'clock.
The Secretary proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. CLINGMAN:—Though I am utterly opposed to the proposition, I am
willing to give it the direction its friends desire, and I vote "yea."
Mr. LATHAM:—I desire to change my vote. I have no confidence in this
thing, and I fear it will be an unnecessary consumption of time; but I yield
to the judgment of my political associates and I vote "yea."
The result was announced—yeas 26, nays 21; as follows:
Y   .—Messrs. Anthony, Baker, Bayard, Bigler, Bragg, Bright, Clingman,
Crittenden, Dixon, Douglas, Fitch, Foster, Gwin, Hunter, Johnson of
Tennessee, Kennedy, Lane, Latham, Mason, Nicholson, Pearce, Polk,
Powell, Rice, Sebastian, and Thomson—26.
N   .—Messrs. Bingham, Chandler, Clark, Collamer, Doolittle, Durkee,
Fessenden, Foot, Green, Grimes, Hale, Harlan, King, Morrill, Seward,
Simmons, Sumner, Ten Eyck, Trumbull, Wade, and Wilson—21.
So the motion was agreed to.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I move that the committee be appointed by the Chair.
The motion was agreed to; and Mr. C         , Mr. B     , Mr.
T      , Mr. S     , and Mr. T       , were appointed the committee.
On the 28th of February the committee so appointed, presented to the
Senate the following report, and the following action was taken thereon:
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—The select committee, to whom was referred the
communication received yesterday from the Convention assembled in this
place, commonly called the Peace Convention, with instructions to report
by twelve o'clock to-day, have had the subject under consideration, and
have directed me to make the following report—
Mr. HALE:—I object to its consideration to-day.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. F     in the chair):—Objection being
made, it cannot be considered until one o'clock, but it will be read.
The Secretary read the joint resolution reported by Mr. C          (S. No.
70), proposing certain amendments to the Constitution of the United States,
as follows:
J     R          proposing certain amendments to the Constitution
of the United States.
W       Commissioners, appointed on the invitation of the State of
Virginia, by the following States, respectively: Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin,
and Kansas, have met in Convention at the City of Washington, for the
purpose of considering the distracted and perilous condition of the country,
and proposing measures for the preservation of the peace, the safety of the
people, and the security of the Union, and having performed that duty, and
communicated to Congress the result of their deliberations, with a request
and recommendation on the part and in the name of said States, that the
following be proposed to the several States as amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, according to the fifth article of said
instrument, namely: [See article preceding.]
Mr. SEWARD:—Mr. President—
Mr. GWIN:—I think I am on the floor.
Mr. SEWARD:—I desire to speak a word from the committee touching the
present report.
Mr. GWIN:—Certainly.
Mr. HALE:—I object to its present consideration.
Mr. SEWARD:—I am not proposing to consider it.
Mr. BIGLER:—The Senator from New Hampshire has no right to make the
objection.
Mr. SEWARD:—I am not proposing to consider it at the present moment;
but I am desirous of making an explanation from the committee, touching
the report made by the Senator from Kentucky. The honorable Senator from
Illinois [Mr. T       ], and myself, constituted a minority of the
committee. We dissent from the report, and we proposed in committee to
submit a substitute. The majority held that, for some reason, sufficient in
their estimation, we were not entitled to submit a minority report. I
therefore ask leave of the Senate to introduce a joint resolution in my own
name, and in which the honorable Senator from Illinois authorized me to
say that he concurs with me, and which I ask unanimous consent to have
read and printed; and it will be the subject of consideration at such time
hereafter as the Senate shall choose to hear it, either in connection with the
other or not.
Mr. MASON:—Is it in the form of a report?
Mr. SEWARD:—No; it is not insisted on in that form; it is submitted on my
own behalf. I desire that it may be read for information and printed, subject
to the future action of the Senate.
The proposition of Mr. S      was read, as follows:
A joint resolution concerning a National Convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
W      , The Legislatures of the States of Kentucky, New Jersey, and
Illinois, have applied to Congress to call a Convention for proposing
amendments to the Constitution of the United States: Therefore,
Be it Resolved, &c., That the Legislatures of the other States be invited to
take the subject into consideration, and to express their will on that subject
to Congress, in pursuance of the fifth article of the Constitution.
Mr. BIGLER:—I desire to make—
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Senator from California was on the
floor. No action is now requested on the paper just offered, only a motion to
print. Shall the paper be printed?
Mr. HALE:—Was it read for information?
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—For information only.
Mr. SEWARD:—I move that it be printed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Chair hears no objection.
Mr. BIGLER:—I desire to make a remark in reference to the question of
order made by the Senator from New Hampshire. The Senator objects to the
consideration of the report to-day. Yesterday, when the Senator from
Kentucky made the motion, I insisted on further moving that the report of
the committee should be the special order at one o'clock to-day.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—That is the record.
Mr. BIGLER:—That instruction was offered, and therefore the Senator's
objection will not apply.
Mr. HALE:—Therefore it will.
Mr. SEWARD:—I insist on the motion to print.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Senator from California is on the floor.
The Senator from New Hampshire having objected to the present
consideration of the resolution reported by the Senator from Kentucky, for
the time being it cannot be considered.
Mr. SEWARD:—Will the Senator from California allow the question to be
put on my motion to print?
The PRESIDING OFFICER:-The Chair heard no objection to that; and it
was ordered.
Mr. DOOLITTLE:—The Senator from California will allow me to say a
single word. I observe that, in this report, the State of Wisconsin is
mentioned as having sent delegates to this Convention, commonly
denominated the Peace Convention. That is a mistake. I desire, also, to give
notice that when this subject shall come up for consideration, I shall offer as
an amendment to the first section of article thirteen, as proposed, the
following proviso:
Provided, however (and this section shall take effect upon the express
condition), That no State, or any part thereof, heretofore admitted, or
hereafter to be admitted, into the Union, shall have power to withdraw from
the jurisdiction of the United States; and that this Constitution, and all laws
passed in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land therein,
any thing contained in any constitution, act, or ordinance of any State
Legislature or Convention to the contrary notwithstanding.
The section will then read as follows:
S  . 1. In all the present territory of the United States north of the parallel
of 36° 30´ of north latitude, involuntary servitude, except in punishment of
crime, is prohibited. In all the present territory south of that line, the status
of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now exists, shall not be
changed; nor shall any law be passed by Congress or the Territorial
Legislature to hinder or prevent the taking of such persons from any of the
States of the Union to said territory, nor to impair the rights arising from the
said relation; but the same shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the
Federal courts, according to the course of the common law. When any
Territory north or south of said line, within such boundary as Congress may
prescribe, shall contain a population equal to that required for a member of
Congress, it shall, if its form of government be republican, be admitted into
the Union on an equal footing with the original States, with or without
involuntary servitude, as the Constitution of such State may provide;
Provided, however (and this section shall take effect upon the express
condition), That no State, nor any part thereof, heretofore admitted, or
hereafter to be admitted into the Union, shall have power to withdraw from
the jurisdiction of the United States; and that the Constitution, and all laws
passed in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land therein,
any thing contained in any constitution, act, or ordinance, of any State
Legislature or Convention to the contrary notwithstanding.
And I desire that that amendment, which I now send to the Chair, may be
printed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—Is there any objection to printing the paper
which the Senator has just read? The Chair hears no objection.
The same day the Report of the Peace Conference was called up for
consideration, when Senator H    objected to the consideration of the
report. Considerable discussion then ensued, in which Messrs. H   ,
B     , T       , C         , and D     participated. This discussion
related merely to the question, whether under the rules of the Senate the
Report of the Peace Conference could at this time be taken up. The merits
of the report were not considered, and for that reason it is not deemed
necessary to report the proceedings of the Senate in this respect. The joint
rules of the two Houses were suspended in order that another subject might
be taken up, and no decision was had upon the question, whether the Report
of the Peace Conference at this time should be considered.
The allotted time having been consumed in this discussion, the Senate
proceeded to the consideration and disposal of several orders of the day. On
the first of March it resumed action on the Report of the Peace Conference.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. F    ):—It is the duty of the Chair to
announce the special order of the day, being the joint resolution (S. No. 70)
proposing certain amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
Mr. DOUGLAS:—I ask that the resolutions from the House of
Representatives, in regard to amendments of the Constitution, be laid before
the Senate, in order that they may be considered at the same time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Chair will lay before the Senate a joint
resolution from the House of Representatives.
The joint resolution (H.R. No. 80) to amend the Constitution of the United
States, was read the first time by its title.
Mr. DOUGLAS:—I ask that that be made the special order at the same
time, in connection with the joint resolution reported by the Senator from
Kentucky.
Mr. MASON:—I have looked at that joint resolution, and it certainly ought
to be committed to a committee to correct its English. It is unintelligible.
Mr. DOUGLAS:—My object is merely to have it considered at the same
time with the other.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The joint resolution will have its second
reading.
The joint resolution (H.R. No. 80) was read a second time by its title.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—It is now the subject of any motion that may
be made in regard to it.
Mr. DOUGLAS:—I move that it be made the special order in connection
with the joint resolution reported by the Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. CLARK:—How does that happen to be in order here when there is a
special order called up?
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—It is not in order to consider it, except by
unanimous consent.
Mr. CLARK, Mr. BINGHAM, and Mr. SUMNER:—I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The special order is before the Senate.
Mr. DOUGLAS:—I ask that the other resolutions which have come from
the House of Representatives, be read. There are two of them, I believe.
The House joint resolutions (No. 64) declaratory of the opinion of Congress
in regard to certain, questions now agitating the country, and of measures
calculated to reconcile existing differences, were read the first time by the
title.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The second reading—
Mr. CHANDLER and others:—I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—Is objection made?
Mr. CHANDLER:—I withdraw my objection.
Mr. SUMNER:—I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—Objection being made, it cannot be read the
second time.
Mr. SIMMONS:—It passed the other House unanimously. There can be no
objection, I think.
Mr. CLARK:—We have another subject up.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The special order is before the Senate. The
question is on the second reading.
The joint resolution (S. No. 70) proposing certain amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, was read the second time, and considered
as in Committee of the Whole.
Mr. PUGH:—Let the resolution be read, not the proposition itself, but the
formal part, the introduction.
Mr. HUNTER:—Is that open to amendment now?
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—It is in Committee of the Whole, and open
to amendment. The reading of the formal part of the joint resolution is
called for.
The Secretary read it.
Mr. SEWARD:—I offer the following as a substitute:
Strike out all after the word "whereas," in the preamble, to the end of the
resolution, and insert:
The Legislatures of the States of Kentucky, New Jersey, and Illinois, have
applied to Congress to call a Convention for proposing amendments to the
Constitution of the United States; Therefore,
Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the Legislatures of the other
States be invited to take the subject of such a Convention into
consideration, and to express their will on that subject to Congress, in
pursuance of the fifth article of the Constitution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Chair understands that a proviso was
offered to the matter that the Senator from New York proposes to strike out.
The vote will first be taken on the proviso offered by the Senator from
Wisconsin [Mr. D        ], to insert at the end of section one of article
thirteen:
Provided, however (and this section shall take effect upon the express
condition), That no State, nor any part thereof, heretofore admitted, or
hereafter to be admitted into the Union, shall have power to withdraw from
the jurisdiction of the United States; and that this Constitution, and all laws
passed in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing
contained in any constitution, act, or ordinance of any State Legislature or
Convention to the contrary notwithstanding.
Mr. HUNTER:—I believe that the amendment of the Senator from
Wisconsin is not pending.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Senator from Wisconsin proposes that
as a proviso to the matter which the Senator from New York moves to strike
out; and the question must first be taken on that.
Mr. HUNTER:—I did not know that that was before the Senate.
Mr. BIGLER:—He only gave notice of it.
Mr. HUNTER:—I thought the Senator from Wisconsin only gave notice
that he would offer it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Chair may have misunderstood the
Senator's motion at the time. He called for the printing of it; but if that is the
understanding of the Senate—
Mr. SEWARD:—What does the record say?
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Chair understands that the record
presents it as "intended to be offered."
Mr. SEWARD:—Then the question is on the substitute. I ask that the
question be taken.
Mr. HUNTER:—I have an amendment to submit. I propose to amend the
first section of the proposition before us, by inserting in lieu of it the first
article of what are called the C          resolutions. I move to strike out
the first article of the peace propositions, and to insert:
That in all the territory of the United States now held, or hereafter acquired,
situate north of latitude 36° 30´, slavery or involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime, is prohibited while such territory shall remain
under territorial government. In all the territory south of said line of
latitude, slavery of the African race is hereby recognized as existing, and
shall not be interfered with by Congress; but shall be protected as property
by all the departments of the territorial government during its continuance;
and when any Territory, north or south of said line, within such boundaries
as Congress may prescribe, shall contain the population requisite for a
member of Congress, according to the then Federal ratio of representation
of the people of the United States, it shall, if its form of government be
republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original
States, with or without slavery, as the constitution of such new State may
provide.
Mr. COLLAMER:—I rise to a question of order. It will be observed that
this paper is before us under a recital that, whereas these propositions of
amendment have been presented by the Commissioners, as they are called,
from the several States—naming them—who have asked Congress to
submit them, therefore we propose to submit them to the States. The whole
proceeding is based and predicated on this recital. I say that it cannot be
amended. If it were amended, it would cease to be the application of that
body which the recital States. I therefore object to any amendments, except
a substitute; perhaps a substitute may be offered striking out the recital and
all; but an amendment to it is out of order, in my view.
Mr. HUNTER:—In regard to the question of order, I understand that the
recital is the recital of the committee, and that the question before us is on
these propositions for amending the Constitution of the United States,
which are to be treated as a bill. If so, each section is subject to amendment
as a bill would be subject to amendment. It was my purpose to offer the
entire series of what are called the C          resolutions, as an
amendment to these, and I still intend to offer them, section by section; but I
was prevented from offering them in that form, because the Senator from
New York got the floor first, and offered his proposition as a substitute. I
therefore could not raise the question which I desired to raise, except by
offering the amendments, section by section, in order to perfect the original
proposition. I submit that it is in order.
Mr. COLLAMER:—I submit, still, my question of order, suggesting to
gentlemen that if we make any amendment, we must strike out the recital.
Mr. BIGLER:—I do not see that any ordinary question of order can be
raised in this case; but I do think there is a consideration much more grave,
and that is the question whether we will treat the series of resolutions
presented here by this Peace Congress as a proposition which we ought
either to accept or reject. I was one of those in the select committee who
took that position. It was manifestly intended that we should accept the
entire programme, or reject it. Therefore I was unwilling; and we decided to
consider no question of amendment—
Mr. HUNTER:—That is not a question of order, but of propriety. It would
be an argument against any amendment.
Mr. BIGLER:—I have said it was no ordinary question of rules; but that
there was a far graver question of propriety. I agree with the Senator in that
view; and I rose for the purpose of alluding to the view taken of this subject
by the select committee. The Senator from New York desired the leave of
the committee to report his proposition as a substitute; but the majority of
the committee held that the resolutions had not been committed to us for the
purpose of considering them and changing them, or substituting something
else, but simply to attach to them the formal resolution to present them as
amendments to the Constitution for the ratification of the States. For that
reason we proposed no amendment; and the Senator from New York
yesterday offered his substitute on his own responsibility, because, as I
understood him, of the view taken by the committee. Now, sir, I still
entertain the view that, while the Senate have a clear right unquestionably
to change these resolutions, and to change the resolution of submission to
make it conform to any thing we may do, we ought to consider these
resolutions sent here by this Peace Conference as a whole, and accept them
or reject them; but there can be no question of ordinary rule raised as to the
right to offer an amendment; there is a greater, a graver question of
propriety as to how they shall be treated.
Mr. SEWARD:—It is not merely a question of form or order, but the
proposition of the Senator from Virginia would change the whole character
of the transaction. This joint resolution is one single, complete proposition.
It is one act. It begins with a declaration by Congress, that "whereas
Commissioners, appointed on the invitation of the State of Virginia," have
performed a certain duty confided to them, "and communicated to Congress
the result of their deliberations, with a request and recommendation on the
part and in the name of said States"—of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and the rest of the States represented in the
Convention—"the following"—nothing different, nothing originating in
Congress, nothing originating anywhere else, but—"the following be
proposed to the several States as amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, according to the fifth article of said instrument." Now, if we
should adopt this whole transaction, we should simply do this: we should
submit these amendments to the people of the United States for their
acceptance, for the reason that the Peace Convention, as it is called, has
considered upon the subject, and thought it grave enough to solicit us to
invest it with the legislative or congressional sanction, and so submit it to
the Legislatures and conventions of the States; but whenever you have
made a single alteration in it, such as is proposed now by the Senator from
Virginia, it is not, then, the proposition of the States "of Maine, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts," or any other States; but it is a
recommendation of the Congress of the United States. The whole character
is changed. The Convention is swept out of existence in the history of
Congress. The resolutions then adopted become the deliberate conviction of
the majority of the Congress of the United States, who substitute their own
judgment, and their own wisdom, and their own will, for the wishes, the
opinions, respectfully submitted to them by the representatives of those
States, and take the responsibility of saying that this is what the Peace
Convention should have submitted, instead of the proposition which they
have sent here.
Mr. HUNTER:—I wish to make a suggestion in regard to the real position
of this question, as it now appears before us. The arguments that have been
urged by the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from New York
might very well be brought up against the propriety of adopting the
amendment; but, so far as the question itself stands, it is only brought
before us by a report of our committee. The Peace Conference had no
power to present questions or make communications to us; but they having
made a communication, and we, having respect for that body, agreed to take
it up, and we referred their proposition to a committee. The only authority
which we have now for considering it in the Senate, is on the
recommendation of our committee. This proposition stands here as a
recommendation of that committee to alter the Constitution, as proposed by
this Conference. It being their recommendation in regard to the alteration of
the Constitution, under our rules it stands like a bill; and I have a right to
move to amend it, section by section; and in doing so, I should be pursuing
the method taken by the Peace Conference, as I understand, for I am told
they never took a vote on it as a whole, but voted on it proposition by
proposition; and in fact, the majority who passed the propositions were
composed of different States, and they never did take a vote on the articles
as a whole.
Now, I am proposing to amend this as it comes up, proposition by
proposition; and if it would be in order for me to make such a motion,
supposing that this proposition had originated with a committee of this
body, who had made a report proposing such amendments to the
Constitution, I should have a right to make it now, for it is only in that way
that it appears legally before us. I say, then, so far as the question of order is
concerned, it seems to me that I have clearly a right to do it. I would be
willing, in order to get rid of the question of order, to move to strike out the
preamble too; but in my opinion it stands before us as a bill would stand. I
may amend the particular sections. I am not proposing by this amendment
to perfect the whole proposition, but a part of it; and if I should succeed in
that, I can then go back, and move to amend the preamble.
So far as the question of order is concerned, I cannot see how it is that I am
out of order. There may be a question of propriety. Those who believe that
this proposition is one that ought to be accepted as a whole, and ought to be
accepted because it comes from this body, eminently respectable, as we all
acknowledge it to be, may say that we ought not to amend it; not that we
have not the power, but that we ought not to amend it. Those of us,
however, who think as I do, that it is a proposition not to be accepted; that it
is a proposition highly dangerous, and one which will give rise to great
difficulties, on the other hand, may think it eminently proper to amend it. I,
thinking in that way, avail myself of what I suppose my parliamentary right,
to offer an amendment; and it is upon that question of parliamentary right
alone, as I understand, that the Chair is to determine.
Mr. TRUMBULL:—Mr. President, it seems to me very clear that, as a
question of order, this proposition does not stand in any respect different
from any other. Suppose an individual Senator had thought proper to
propose amendments to the Constitution; that they had been referred to a
committee; and the committee had approved them: what would it have
done? Precisely what this committee has done. It would have reported back
the proposition, with a resolution in conformity with that clause of the
Constitution which points out the mode of its amendment. The fact that this
proposition was adopted by gentlemen from various States does not alter it
at all. It comes here as a mere petition. However respectable and dignified
the Convention may have been which arrived at these conclusions; however
much weight their conclusions may be entitled to in the country, they come
here simply as petitioners—in that light, and none other—asking Congress
to submit certain resolutions to the States of the Union to be adopted or not
as portions of the fundamental law, and, unquestionably, any Senator has a
right to propose an amendment in the same way as if they were introduced
by an individual Senator. Can it be possible that if I draw up a series of
propositions as amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and a
select committee thinks proper to recommend them to this body, the hands
of the body are tied up, and it must take them, word for word, and letter for
letter, as I have drawn them? The question is, whether it is proper to do this;
whether the respect due the Peace Convention should not deter gentlemen
from offering amendments, is a question we are not discussing. The point is
one of order; and as a question of order, I was astonished when the Senator
from Pennsylvania first suggested it.
Mr. BIGLER:—I suggested no question of order.
Mr. TRUMBULL:—I did understand the Senator from Pennsylvania to say,
that that was the view he took in committee in response to what was said by
the Senator from Vermont, and it was to that I alluded when I said I was
astonished at the ground he took, that the committee could not amend these
propositions, or that any other person could not move to amend them.
Mr. BIGLER:—The Senator from Vermont made a distinct point of order;
but I did not sustain the Senator's views on the point of order. On the other
hand, so far from that, I stated distinctly, that there could be no ordinary
question of order under the rule; but a question of propriety, a question as to
the consideration that was to be attached to this proposition of the Peace
Convention; that the select committee, or a majority, at least, were under the
impression that it was expected we would treat it as a whole, and accept it
or reject it. That is what I said. I have no doubt whatever of the right of a
Senator on this floor to move to amend this resolution. But, sir, I cannot
agree with the Senator from Illinois by any means, that this proposition
should be treated as the mere report of a committee or the proposition of an
individual Senator. Who supposes that twenty States would have sent
commissioners here to consider this great question and suggest to Congress
—
Mr. TRUMBULL:—The Senator from Pennsylvania, I see, is
misunderstanding me. I said, as a question of order, it was to be treated the
same as if offered by an individual Senator; that however much respect we
might have for it, as coming from the source it did, yet, as a question of
order, there was no difference in the rules.
Mr. BIGLER:—I did not understand the Senator as placing entire stress on
the question of order. I have been endeavoring to take this question away
from the rules, to set it above the rules, and I say that we ought to consider
it without reference to the rules. If it be that this programme is not
acceptable to the Senate, let it be rejected. What I supposed was intended
from the beginning was, that whatever they sent here was to be considered
as an entirety—accepted or rejected. I was about to remark, who supposes
that twenty States would have sent commissioners to prepare a programme
of peace for the consideration of Congress, if they had supposed that
immediately the peculiar views of each member of Congress would be set
up in opposition to them?
Mr. President, a single remark in relation to what fell from the Senator from
New York, and I shall have done. The Senator from New York alludes to
the terms of the preamble, that, for the reason that these commissioners
agreed, therefore these propositions are submitted as amendments to the
Constitution. I do not wish to be understood as regarding it in that light. I do
not think it is the right of Congress to submit propositions of amendment of
the Constitution because they come from any source. The spirit of the
Constitution is, that Congress will submit amendments to the Constitution;
because Congress approves those amendments, and it would be a reason
why I should vote for or against them, whether I approved them or not. If,
as a whole, I could vote for them, I would vote for them; if, as a whole, I
could not, I would vote against them. That does not affect the question
whether, under all the circumstances, and solemn surroundings, the labor
which has been bestowed, and the character of the men that have presented
this paper, we should consider it as an entirety, or attempt to cut it up by
piecemeal, by which neither they, nor the public, will ever ascertain what
the judgment of Congress was on the results of their labor. That is what I
say.
Mr. SEWARD:—The honorable Senator may very naturally and very
properly take the ground that he would not vote, and that Congress ought
not to vote, for submitting this proposition to the people, for the reason
assigned in the paper before us. I have not any disposition to quarrel with
him about it. I might take the same view, and say that I would not submit to
the people a proposition which was futile, which was frivolous. That is not
what I was speaking to. What I was speaking to was, the character of this
proposition; and this is a proposition just to this effect, logically and
technically expressed: that whereas these commissioners appointed by the
States have met, consulted, considered, and adopted that resolution,
therefore, for that reason, independent of every thing else, Congress submits
it to the States.
Mr. PUGH:—I want to make an appeal to the friends of some proposition
of peace. This is the last day of the session but one, and we have not made
the progress of one line. We have gone into an eternal discussion about
questions of order, and that, too, in defiance of the rule of the Senate. I
insist that the question shall be decided without further debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. F    ):—It is not for the Chair to decide
any question of propriety, except as an individual Senator. As Presiding
Officer, he does not deem the question of order, made by the Senator from
Vermont, to be well taken. The joint resolution differs in no respect from
other resolutions, and is open to amendment, and is before the Senate, as in
Committee of the Whole, for that purpose. The question is on agreeing to
the amendment which has been offered by the Senator from Virginia.
Mr. HUNTER:—Mr. President, I have offered this amendment, as the first
of a series which I shall offer, for the purpose of carrying out the will of my
State, as it has been expressed through its Legislature; and I might say there
are other Senators similarly situated, for there are other States which have
declared a disposition to settle upon the basis of what are called the
C          resolutions. That is the first reason which prompts me; and to
me it is imperative, because the Legislature of the State which I have the
honor in part to represent, has declared that this is the basis upon which it
would settle, and intimated that it would not take less than they propose by
way of security for the South. I have also another reason. I have examined
this proposition of the Peace Conference—
Mr. WADE:—Will the Senator let us hear it read? We do not understand
what his proposition is.
Mr. HUNTER:—My proposition is the first article from the C         
amendments, in regard to the territorial adjustment.
Mr. WADE:—We understand that.
Mr. HUNTER:—After as careful an examination as I have been able to give
this proposition from the Peace Conference since it was printed, that is to
say, within the last day or two, I have come to the conclusion that it would
not only make a great many more difficulties than it would remove, if it
should be adopted as an amendment to the Constitution, but that it would
place the South—the slaveholding States—in a far worse position than they
now occupy under the present Constitution, with the Dred Scott decision as
its exposition.
Mr. CLARK:—Will the Senator from Virginia allow me to make a
suggestion?
Mr. HUNTER:—Certainly.
Mr. CLARK:—I understand him to say he proposes to offer the several
propositions of the C          amendment one after the other.
Mr. HUNTER:—Yes, sir.
Mr. CLARK:—Then I suggest, as that is the intention of the Senator, that
unanimous consent be given to move them as one amendment, so that we
may have them all up for discussion, if any one chooses to discuss them, at
the same time.
Mr. HUNTER:—I have no objection to that, if it is the general wish. I was
saying, Mr. President, when I was interrupted, that after as careful an
examination as I was able to give this peace proposition, since it was
printed, I came to the conclusion that it would put the southern States in a
far worse position than they now occupy under the present Constitution,
and with the Dred Scott decision. Under that Constitution, and with the
Dred Scott decision, they had a right, as the court has decided, to carry their
slaves into any Territory of the United States. That is a right which has been
adjudicated to them by a solemn decision of the Supreme Court; and it is to
be remembered that this right has not only been accorded to them by the
decision of the court, but by the action of the several branches of the
Federal Government. That is their present state of things under the present
Constitution of the United States with regard to the territorial question. In
what position, then, does this proposed territorial adjustment place them?
Why, sir, it excludes them; it puts the W      proviso on all territory north
of 36° 30´; and south of 36° 30´ it gives them the privilege of another
lawsuit, in order to try their right and title to enter the territory with their
slaves. What are the words of this proposed amendment of the
Constitution?
"In all the present territory south of that line, the status of persons hold to
involuntary service or labor, as it now exists, shall not be changed; nor shall
any law be passed by Congress or the Territorial Legislature to hinder or
prevent the taking of such persons from any of the States of this Union to
said territory, nor to impair the rights arising from said relation; but the
same shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts, according
to the course of the common law."
"In all the present territory south of that line, the status of persons held to
involuntary servitude or labor, as it now exists, shall not be changed." What
is the meaning of that word "status"? What is the status? The word status
may be applied to different things; there may be a local status or a political
status. In some countries a slave may hold property, and, in a certain form,
sue; in others, he cannot. Or it may be the social and legal relation, that of
the slave to his master, which constitutes the status that is referred to; and I
presume it is that which it is declared shall not be changed. But, sir, shall
not be changed by whom? By Congress? It does not say so. By the
Territorial Legislature? It does not say so in terms. Does it mean that it shall
not be changed by Congress or by the government of the Territory? Does it
mean that it shall not be changed at all by anybody? Does it mean the
master shall not emancipate him if he chooses? Is it an absolute prohibition
of any change of the status of the slave, of any sort or description?
These are the terms which we are obliged to resort to in order to escape
from the manly declaration of the C          resolution, that south of that
line slavery shall be recognized and protected. It was eminently proper, as
we excluded them north of it, that our institutions should be recognized and
protected south of that line. That, sir, was plain English; that everybody
could understand; but here we are interpolating law Latin into the
Constitution; this word "status" is introduced; and who is to determine what
the status was? I thought it had been considered a march forward, a step of
progress, an evidence of improvement in English legislation, when it
abandoned Norman French and law Latin, and resorted to the mother
tongue; and especially it should be so, when we are making constitutions
for American people of English descent, and who speak the English tongue.
A constitution is for the millions, and the millions should be able to
understand it.
But, Mr. President, let us proceed a little further. This whole matter is to be
subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts, according to the course
of common law. That embraces the right of the master to his slave as a
matter of cognizance under the common law before the courts; because
what do they mean by the status of all persons held to involuntary servitude
or labor? They mean rightfully held. They do not mean if a man is
kidnapped and held illegally to involuntary service or labor that he is
always to be so held. It means that the status of persons who are rightfully
and legally held shall not be changed; and who is to determine that? The
courts are to determine it according to the common law. That is to be
determined by judges who are to be appointed from a party, and by a party
who believe that there cannot be property in man; by a party who believe
that, in the Somerset case, Lord M         has laid down the common law
properly; by a party who will probably believe that the decision of the
English courts, in regard to the slave A       , that it was no murder for a
slave when escaping to kill his master, was a correct exposition of the
common law.
How, then, do we stand? Why, sir, in relation to our right to slaves, we have
to try that right before judges who are thus appointed, and appointed from a
party who we know entertain these opinions. Why, sir, you might poll that
party through the whole United States, and I would venture any thing upon
the assertion that you cannot get one in a hundred thousand who would not
deny that there could be property in man, especially under the common law.
We thus lose the advantage of the Dred Scott decision. According to the
Dred Scott decision, we can carry them into the territory of the United
States and hold them, and it is decided that there is property in slaves—
decided under the Constitution. The court maintain that the Constitution
recognizes it. It is upon constitutional ground that we have made our
claims, and so far, it is upon this that we have fought and won the battle, not
upon common law; and now we are to abandon the advantages that we have
got from that ground of title under the Dred Scott decision, and go into
court and try a case that has been already decided in our favor; and under
the common law, try it before judges who are to be selected by a party
entertaining such opinions as I have just described; and I am sorry to say,
without appeal to the Supreme Court; because, in the territorial bills which
have been lately passed, that right has been taken from us. My friend from
North Carolina will be kind enough to read an article in the Chicago
platform, showing what is held on that subject by those who wield the
power of this Government.
Mr. CLINGMAN read, as follows:
Eighth. "That the normal condition of all the territory of the United States is
that of freedom; that as our republican fathers, when they had abolished
slavery in all our national territory, ordained that 'no person should be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,' it becomes
our duty, by legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary, to maintain
this provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it; and we
deny the authority of Congress, of a Territorial Legislature, or of any
individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any Territory of the United
States."
Mr. HUNTER:—Thus much, Mr. President, in regard to the status; and it is
to be observed that the same word is used in reference to persons who are
now held to involuntary servitude in the Territories and to those whom we
are to have the right to take into the Territories from the States recognizing
slavery. So that we submit this question of our right to slaves, when it
reaches the Territories, to be tried under the common law, by courts
appointed by the party entertaining the opinions I have described, and that
without appeal. This is in regard to the Territories which we now own.
What is the settlement provided for in regard to territory hereafter to be
acquired? Here it is, in the third section:
S       3. Neither the Constitution, nor any amendment thereof, shall be
construed to give Congress power to regulate, abolish, or control, within
any State, the relation established or recognized by the laws thereof
touching persons held to labor or involuntary service therein, nor to
interfere with or abolish involuntary service in the District of Columbia
without the consent of Maryland, and without the consent of the owners, or
making the owners who do not consent just compensation; nor the power to
interfere with or prohibit Representatives and others from bringing with
them, to the District of Columbia, retaining and taking away, persons so
held to labor or service; nor the power to interfere with or abolish
involuntary service in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States within those States and Territories where the same is established or
recognized.
That is, they shall not prohibit it as to future acquired territory, where it is
established or recognized. Will not the inference be claimed from such an
expression, that where it is not established and not recognized, they may
prohibit it? Will it not be said that the expression of one exception to the
power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the Territories excludes the idea of
an exception to that power when slavery is not recognized in the
Territories?
Mr. COLLAMER:—If the gentleman will indulge me a moment, I desire to
say that is a section declaring that Congress shall not abolish slavery in the
dock-yards, &c., in the States where it is recognized. There is nothing in it
about future acquired territory.
Mr. HUNTER:—This third section applies not only to present but to future
acquired territory. It is not confined, like the first section, to the territory at
present acquired. It is not confined to dock-yards and arsenals in the
Territories and States. If the Senator will examine it, he will find that it is
applied to all places where the United States have exclusive jurisdiction.
"Exclusive jurisdiction" is the word. Will it not be claimed that they have
exclusive jurisdiction in the Territories of the United States? Will not those
who have the power to construe, and carry out their construction, so
construe it? Will they not say it is a prohibition to Congress to prohibit
slavery where it is recognized in the Territories or States, but not a denial of
the right to prohibit slavery in Territories where it is not recognized by law,
although that Territory may be vacant and uninhabited?
Mr. COLLAMER:—That clause of the section is, that Congress shall not
have power—
"To interfere with or abolish involuntary service in places under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within those States and
Territories where the same is established or recognized."
That, so far as I have read, is confined only to where they have local
jurisdiction in the States holding slaves.
Mr. HUNTER:—I thought so at first myself; but the Senator will find, on a
further examination, I think, that he is mistaken. They shall not prohibit it
wherever they have exclusive jurisdiction in places where slavery "is
established or recognized." It is not confined to dock-yards, forts, and
arsenals. Why should it be in the Territories? They have exclusive
jurisdiction over the whole. There is reason for confining it to dock-yards in
the States; but there is no reason for confining it to dock-yards, &c., in the
Territories. But that is not the construction which will be given; the
construction given to it will be, that they shall not prohibit it where they
have exclusive jurisdiction, if it is recognized in such places; but if it be not
recognized in such places, where they have exclusive jurisdiction, I say the
inference will be drawn, plausibly, if not justly, that they shall have power
to prohibit; and I say if this be so, then it is a power (so far as Mexican
territories are concerned, if there should be any acquisition there) by which
the South will be forever estopped; because there the Mexicans have
abolished slavery, and there, under this clause giving in that territory
exclusive jurisdiction, the party now controlling the Government would
claim the right to prohibit it. And what a difference between our position
then and our position now under the decision of the Supreme Court! Under
the decision of that court, all the people of all the States have a right to go
into the common territory with their institutions. It belongs to all in
common, and Congress cannot prohibit them from taking their property
there.
I say that those who have the power to carry out any construction they
choose to give, would be interested in putting upon it the construction
which I fear; and it would be difficult to raise an argument which they
would deem conclusive against it. But take it the other way; suppose that
the Senator from Vermont is right in his first supposition, that it was only
meant to be applied to forts, arsenals, and dock-yards, then I ask what
settlement does this proposition give us in regard to future acquired
territories; what earthly settlement is it? We have all the old difficulties to
encounter that we have to meet now, every one of them. We not only have
all the old difficulties to encounter, but the slaveholder would have an
additional obstacle which this first clause would put in his way. It requires
that the right to slaves in the present territory shall be tried by the common
law, and it might be said in court that the inferences drawn heretofore from
those provisions of the Constitution recognizing slavery were to be
overruled by the fact that the people in their latest action—by way of
constitutional amendment—had introduced another rule in order to
determine the status of those held to involuntary service or labor, and the
consequence of that would be that the South never could acquire another
foot of territory; that is, the few southern States who are left in the Union.
I am told that here is a provision that you cannot acquire territory except by
the assent of a majority of the Senators from both sections. Does any man
believe that the North, with its eighteen, soon to be twenty, or thirty, non-
slaveholding States, would allow a majority of six, or seven, or eight slave
States, that are now attached to them, to prevent them from acquiring any
territory hereafter? Would they agree to such an amendment, in the first
instance; and if they did, how long before they would change this restriction
in the Constitution? Indeed, it is hardly to be supposed that they will agree
to it in the first instance, so far as it regards the acquisition of territory; but
of what avail would it be to the South? There is but one conceivable
acquisition—I speak of possible things, and I hope gentlemen will not
understand me as coveting my neighbor's goods, or desiring to lay violent
hands on the property of any other States or nations—but, if things should
so happen that we could rightfully acquire Cuba, under my view of the
probable construction to be given to this clause, and because slavery there is
recognized, Congress might be prevented from prohibiting it; but,
everywhere else, the South would be shut out and excluded.
Then, sir, what would be its position? It would be prevented from acquiring
any territory under this Government as an outlet for its slaves; and the only
chance of securing that necessity of its condition would be to quit this
Union and join the Southern Confederacy, which can acquire territory. It
would be an inducement to disunion so strong as would almost force them
to it.
Let us go a little further. Here is another clause holding out the same
temptation:
"The foreign slave-trade is hereby forever prohibited, and it shall be the
duty of Congress to pass laws to prevent the importation of slaves, coolies,
or persons held to service or labor, into the United States and the Territories
from places beyond the limits thereof."
This is to be the duty of Congress. As it now stands, it is in the power of
Congress. When it was merely given as a power to Congress, was there a
failure to execute that power? Do we not know that every State in the
present Confederation has desired to suppress the African slave-trade?
Some do it from sentiment and principle; some from interest; but there is a
controlling motive with each and all of them. It is safe enough to leave it
where it stood, giving Congress the power merely. Here you make it their
duty. Suppose this case: the States that have left us have set up another
Government, another Confederation; under this clause you forbid us to buy
their slaves, to interchange and trade in slaves with them: what will be the
consequence? They will exclude us from selling our slaves in their territory,
and where then do we stand? If you should think it prudent, if you should
think it politic, you would have no means, under this proposed amendment,
of allowing that to be done between these two coterminous countries.
Though it would be to the advantage of both Confederacies that there
should be this interchange, you preclude Congress from allowing it; and
then where would that place the border slave States? They would not be
able to sell their slaves in the States further South; and if they carried them
there, they would have to emigrate with them. You would thus prevent
Congress from adopting a regulation which would make it possible for them
to remain in this Union with safety, with advantage, to themselves. Why
was this put in? Why not have left it where it stood, giving Congress the
power, when we all know that there is no State in the present Confederation
that would not exercise that power for the purpose of suppressing the slave-
trade from Africa? This probably would constitute the only exception. Why
shut ourselves out from allowing the exception?
But, Mr. President, my desire is to be brief; I do not want to consume the
time of the Senate; I am merely endeavoring to state the points of objection
as briefly as I can. Here is, at the close of it, another provision which, it
seems to me, contains the seeds of civil war; and that is this: "Congress
shall provide by law for securing to the citizens of each State the privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States;" that is to say, Congress
shall have power to pass laws to force the States to receive those persons
whom they have excluded from police considerations—considerations of
domestic safety. Yes, sir, to force the States to receive persons who would
be dangerous to their peace; to force upon them, if you will, abolition
lecturers; to force upon them persons whom they regard as the most
dangerous emissaries that could be sent among them; to enable Congress to
obtrude, in fact, into all the business of the States. That was not intended
when the Constitution was framed, and never ought to have been. The
present provision in regard to the rights of citizens in the several States, I
regard as in the nature of an inter-treaty stipulation. It is a duty imposed on
each State, for the violation of which there is no remedy; no remedy, unless
the State aggrieved may resort sometimes to retaliation.
There are various things of that sort in the Constitution. Duties imposed
upon the States, but without a remedy for the failure to execute them. No
State shall keep a standing army; but suppose it does: what are you to do?
Congress cannot remedy it; and it would not be right to give Congress the
power to remedy it. You have to trust something to the sense of right and
duty of the States themselves; and so it should be in regard to this matter of
citizens. Suppose one State should say that the citizens of another should
not sue in its courts; how is Congress to enforce their right? Is Congress to
say they shall be allowed to sue, and that the Sheriffs and officers of the
State shall execute the process? Is it proposed to allow Congress, by law, to
interpose in all these delicate matters? Is it not far better to leave it to the
sense of justice of the States—to their sense of duty and of honor? Have we
not got along very well while we left it there? If there be any instances in
which there have been exceptions, they are instances in which persons have
been excluded on account of police considerations, deemed to be dangerous
to the safety of the people who excluded them. Is it proposed so to amend
the Constitution as to take from the people of the States this right of self-
defence?
If we once introduced this as an amendment to the Constitution, what would
become of the feeble southern States, six or seven (for Delaware can hardly
be considered as a slave State), that would be left? Arkansas may conclude
to secede when she shall determine finally upon her position in the Union.
What would become of us in the hands of this powerful majority, who
would pass what laws they pleased in regard to the introduction of their
citizens among us, and the rights of those citizens to do as they pleased after
they got there? Is it not obvious that these various changes would lead to
endless discontents, to irreparable breaches between these States? Would
you not certainly drive out the Border States? They would say, "If we go
south, we ally ourselves to a homogeneous people; we shall have none of
these difficulties; we have no reason to fear their citizens; we can grant all
these privileges without the least difficulty or danger; we can send our
slaves south from a country where they are not profitable, to one where they
are; but if we stay here, we are forbidden to do any of these things; if we
stay here, we are prevented from ever obtaining any outlet for our slave
property." Will you not offer them the highest inducements, nay, will you
not make it almost necessary for them to leave you, if you should adopt
such a proposition as this?
Nor is that all, Mr. President. Our present Constitution—for I am comparing
our position under it with that in which this would place us—in most of its
difficult provisions has been expounded—expounded by the action of the
State Governments, by the action of all the departments of the Federal
Government. We have had legal interpretations in the decisions of the State
and Federal courts. We have come almost to a point—indeed, I, who
believe that the Dred Scott decision is law, think we have come to a point—
where we have a legal exposition on the whole of these matters. Are we to
be turned aside from that, to wander into a new sea of doubt and difficulty
and ambiguity? No candid man can take this up and say it is not full of
double constructions, full of ambiguities, giving ground for new quarrels
between the sections, to new constructions of courts, to new lawsuits.
Mr. COLLAMER:—And to be perpetual.
Mr. HUNTER:—Yes, sir; and to be made perpetual. We cannot change
them afterwards, if we want to do it. I can conceive nothing that would
endanger what is left of this Union so much as the adoption of this
proposition, although it has been produced by persons so eminent and so
respectable as those who composed the Peace Congress.
I know that this measure does emanate from a body eminently patriotic and
wise, entitled to the public deference and affection; and for their work I feel
all possible respect. Against that work I will pronounce nothing except what
the necessities of the occasion may require. But when the peace, the safety,
the rights of the State which I seek to represent—when the peace of the
whole country, as it seems to me, would be so seriously imperilled as it
would be if this were adopted, I feel bound by a sense of what I owe to
those who sent me here, bound by a sense of what I owe to those who have
some respect for my opinions, to express them here on this occasion, and to
give briefly the points and the heads upon which I differ from the
conclusions of that Congress. Indeed, sir, before taking my seat, I may
suggest a doubt whether I am in truth acting against any thing which they
have really done. I was informed by a member of that Congress that they
never did take a vote upon this proposed article, as a whole.
Mr. DOOLITTLE:—If the Senator will allow me, I beg leave to state that I
was informed of the same fact by a distinguished member of the
Convention; and I was further informed that the person who claims to be
the secretary of the Convention was never elected as such. And there is
another fact stated in the preamble that I know is not correctly stated: that
the State of Wisconsin was in that Convention, or took any part in it. How
many more mistakes there are in the preamble, I am unable to say.
Mr. HUNTER:—I believe it is certain that they never did take a vote on this
article as a whole, but upon its separate sections. I think it equally probable
that it could not have passed as a whole. That opinion was expressed to me
by a member. As it did pass, I think there were three or four States not
voting; and the States not voting were supposed to be against it. Under such
circumstances, I do not know that this is to be taken as an expression of the
will of that Congress. Further: I will say, in regard to myself, that a majority
of the members from my own State voted against it, and were very decided
in their opposition to it. They believed it was not such a proposition as the
South could safely accept; and that majority, I believe, have returned home
to express that opinion to the State Convention, and to give their reasons for
it. Under all these circumstances, I have thought that I ought to present, as a
counter proposition (believing that the people whom I represent cannot and
ought not to accept these), resolutions upon which they have said they were
willing to settle this controversy. I believe the State of Kentucky has
declared the same thing. I understand the State of California has done
likewise. I believe, though I may be mistaken, that Tennessee has said the
same. The State of North Carolina has made the same declaration
unanimously. To the last, I believe I may add Missouri.
Now, I am making a proposition to amend, by inserting the resolutions of
the honorable Senator from Kentucky; upon which so many of the border
slaveholding States have said they would settle the difference. Why not
send them out to the States and the people? We know that some of them
would settle on that. Why should we send out such a proposition as this,
which there is every reason to believe they will not accept, and which will
have the effect of dividing the conservative men of the North? Those
northern men who are willing to settle on some proposition that would give
satisfaction to the Border States, would just as soon vote for the
C          resolutions as for these, and some probably would prefer to do
so. They will waste all their strength, and efforts, and energies, in going for
a proposition which the South in the end will not accept, or at least which I
do not believe they will accept, as there is every reason to suppose they will
not accept it. Then, when we know there are propositions upon which so
many of the Border States have said they would be willing to settle existing
difficulties, why not submit them? I think, under such circumstances,
notwithstanding the respect which I feel for the members composing the
Peace Congress, my duty to my own State, whose Legislature has spoken in
regard to it, and my sympathy with so many of the Southern States who
have declared the same opinion, should induce me to present the
proposition which they desire instead of one to which none of them have as
yet given their adhesion, and to which I have no idea they will ever agree.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I suppose, Mr. President, not only out of deference to
the Presiding Officer of this body, but because it seems to me to be entirely
reasonable, that the decision of the Chair on the question of order which
was made as to the admissibility of these amendments, was correct. The
question which these amendments present, I think, is a question of
consistency or inconsistency with the proceeding in which we are engaged,
with the resolutions offered by the Peace Conference; and each member, in
deciding ultimately upon the question for or against the proposed
amendment, will consider that question of consistency or inconsistency, and
regulate his vote accordingly. It is not, perhaps, strictly a question of order,
to be decided on the consistency or inconsistency of amendments. So I take
it. I am willing it should be decided by this body. Now, what is it? The
proposed amendment contravenes the whole nature of the transaction, and
changes its character. The representatives of twenty-one or twenty-two
States—we will not make any question about Kansas; whether it be in or
not, is not material—the representatives and delegates of over twenty States
of the Union have recommended to us the adoption of certain amendments
to the Constitution, which they say will arrest the troubles of the country
and adjust those great differences which now so much threaten us; and they
ask Congress to propose these amendments to the several States, according
to the fifth article of the Constitution, for their adoption. These amendments
have been submitted to us, and the question is, whether we will submit them
to the States or not? That I take to be the specific and solitary question. This
imposes no obligation on us to sanction these constitutional amendments by
proposing them to the people. We can do as we please upon that point; but
what is the question and the only question? It is not whether we ourselves
will propose amendments to the Constitution, but whether we will propose
to the people the amendments which this Convention has proposed to us.
Now, that whole character is effaced, and a new character is given to the
transaction, if any one of the amendments proposed by Senators be adopted.
Suppose these same States, by their Legislatures, had respectively
recommended to us these particular and specific constitutional amendments,
asking us to propose them according to the Constitution: would it have been
proper for us then to undertake to amend their resolutions? It would be a
different transaction altogether. In the one instance, out of respect to the
States, we are proposing their resolutions; in the other case, we are
proposing our own to the States. Now, the question here is, whether the
resolutions have come to us with a sufficient sanction to constitute in our
minds a reason for referring to the States the amendments which the States
themselves have asked. That is all. It seems to my mind to be a clear
question. They have asked us, they have requested us, to submit their
resolutions, and not any others, to the States; and the question is, will we
comply with their request, not whether we will fabricate amendments of our
own and refer them to the people. They have asked of us to submit their
proposals; and the question is, whether we will do it.
This amendment implies, in the first instance, that we will not do that,
because the moment we adopt the amendment of the Senator from Virginia,
that moment we say in effect, "We will not propose your recommendations
to the people; while proposing our own, which we will substitute for yours."
That is passing by this Convention altogether; it is negativing the States
represented in it.
If gentlemen take this view it will be a sufficient reason, I trust, in itself, for
voting against the proposed amendment. These propositions which the
Convention has recommended may be such as we may refuse; it is in our
power to refuse; but the question is, whether a recommendation, coming so
sanctioned to us, is not, in itself, a sufficient reason why Congress, if
disposed to satisfy the people, shall do the small act of presenting this to the
people themselves, for their adoption. We may reject it, if we please. The
people, when it is sent to them, will, of course, have the power to reject or
adopt it. The only question now is, whether we will give the States an
opportunity of saying whether this proposition is satisfactory or not.
Sir, I do not wish to occupy time; but I cannot perceive the justice of the
criticisms made upon these resolutions of the Convention. They seem to me
to be perspicuous and intelligible in every part and in every sentence. I do
not see where the difficulty is to arise. Gentlemen need not tell us here, in
respect to these resolutions, that a member of the Convention told them thus
and so. No matter what a member of the Convention told this one or that
one about the votes that were given, it is certified to us, in a formal manner,
by the President of the Convention—himself a Virginian, and once a
President of the United States—that this is the result of the proceedings of
the Convention.
Mr. HUNTER:—If the Senator will allow me, I will state to him how that
occurred. It was decided, as it will be seen when we get the Journal, that,
according to some rules of the old Convention, they should not vote upon a
proposition as a whole, but upon each particular provision. That was the
rule of the Convention; and therefore he certified it as the Convention had
instructed. The vote was taken only section by section, and the vote was
never taken on it as a whole. There is no inconsistency between what I have
said, and the certificate of the President of the Convention, because,
according to the rules adopted by them, he had to certify it if it was adopted
by sections, though it was not voted upon as a whole.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I suppose this remark is intended to annul the
Convention, and discredit all their proceedings, though the Senate have
received the letter of the President and Secretary as authentic evidence that
this does contain the result of the deliberations and the proceedings of the
body. I take it so, whatever a discontented member here and there may have
said to the contrary notwithstanding. He may have said it all truly, for aught
I know, but we must regard this as the authentic act of the Convention;
otherwise it was nothing; and it is certified to us by the proper authority as
its act, by the President of the Convention, with the request that we shall
adopt it. It must have had, in some form or shape, the sanction of a majority
of the Convention, or it could not have been so certified to us. How they
voted, whether upon parts or the whole, they gave such votes as, they
thought were necessary to ascertain the meaning of the body, and the
expression of their will and opinion upon the subject. This is what they
have done.
I do not stop to inquire whether I like these resolutions better than I do
those proposed by myself, or the amendments now offered by the Senator
from Virginia. We are near the close of our session. I have looked upon the
proceedings of this great and eminent body of men as the best evidence of
public opinion outside of this body, and of the wish and will of the States
they represent. I am for peace. I am for compromise. I have not an opinion
on the subject of what would be best that I would not be perfectly willing to
sacrifice to obtain any reasonable measure of pacification that would satisfy
the majority. I want to save the country and adjust our present difficulties.
[Applause in the galleries.]
The P         O       (Mr. B      in the chair) called to order.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—That is what I want to do. That is the object I am
aiming at. I attach no particular importance—I feel, at least, no selfish
attachment—to any opinions I may have proclaimed on the subject
heretofore. I proclaimed those opinions because I thought them right; but I
am ready to sacrifice them, any and every one of them, to any more
satisfactory proposition that can be offered. I look upon the resolutions
proposed by this Convention as furnishing us, if not the last, the best hope
of an adjustment; the best hope for the safety of the people and the
preservation of the Government. I will not stop to cavil about the
construction of these words; but I see none of the difficulties that suggest
themselves to the mind of my friend from Virginia. Look at that third
section, which has been the subject of his particular criticism. Every part
and portion of it is a negation of power to Congress, and nothing else; and
yet he has argued as if it gave Congress power; as if it conferred more
power upon Congress. It leaves to the States all the rights they now have;
all the remedies which they now have; and consists merely in a negation of
power to Congress. How can that take away the rights of the people? How
can that make our condition worse? I cannot possibly see. It is nothing but a
negative from beginning to end, and therefore it cannot take away any thing
from the people. It may take from Congress, but cannot take away from the
States, or the people, any thing. It is a negative in its form and in its
language, from beginning to end, that Congress shall have no power to do
this, that, or the other. If they have that power under the present
Constitution, it is taken away. That is all. It takes away no power from the
States. It takes away no rights from individuals. Its simple office is the
negation of power to Congress. That is all there is in it; and how, under that,
can the gentleman find constructions which are to increase our difficulties
and diminish our rights? He says the language will need construction. So
does all language need construction. I do not see that this is particularly so.
Now, sir, the Senator offers my own proposition as an amendment to this. I
shall vote against my own proposition here; I shall vote for this. [Applause
in the galleries.]
Mr. MASON:—I shall be constrained to require that the galleries be
cleared, if there be any further demonstrations in that quarter.
Mr. BAKER:—I hope the galleries will not be cleared. The admiration of a
noble sentiment is never out of place.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—There is no motion to clear the galleries.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I shall vote for the amendments proposed by the
Convention, and there I shall stand. That is the weapon offered now, and
placed in my hand, by which, as I suppose, the Union of these States may
be preserved; and I will not, out of any selfish preference for my own
original opinions on this subject, sacrifice one idea or one particle of that
hope. I go for the country; not for this resolution or that resolution, but any
resolution, any proposition, that will pacify the country. Therefore, I vote
against my own, to give place to a proposition which comes from an
authority much higher than mine—from one hundred and thirty of the most
eminent men of this country, out of which number a Senate might be
selected that might well compare in point of talent and intellect and ability
even with this honorable body. They have recommended this on arduous,
laborious consultation with one another; through many difficulties, through
many diversities of opinion, they have at last arrived at these conclusions,
and sent them to us. Shall any Senator stand upon the little consideration,
"this changes my resolution," and shall he compare that little atom of his
production with the great end and object proposed to be attained for a whole
nation? No, sir; not a moment. I believe our best hope of preservation is in
adopting the resolutions proposed by this Convention, and I adhere to them
against all amendments.
Mr. President, the only material or substantial change in respect to the first
section of this proposed amendment from my first proposition is, that it
omits all reference to territory hereafter acquired, limiting our consideration
and our settlement to territory which we now have. When I first offered my
resolutions, I explained somewhat in reference to that particular provision
which related to future territory. I said that I wanted no more territory. Our
great trouble now is from the magnitude of the territory which we have
already acquired. New Mexico is one of our acquisitions, and what a
subject of dispute it has been! I want no more acquisitions. My country is
big enough, and great enough. I say that further acquisitions are dangerous.
We have found them to be so. Our experience and our reason, then, unite in
teaching us "to beware of that sin, ambition." National aggrandizement! I
want no more. I proposed that, however, as the idea then was, that we
wanted a settlement that was to last forever; to be eternal; to embrace the
present and to embrace the future, with all its acquisitions, all its changes.
Reflection since, and the arguments of others, I will say, have changed my
opinion on that point. If they had not changed it, however, I should be ready
here to sacrifice it and give it up, if thereby I could obtain the assent of any
respectable portion of my countrymen to the propositions for peace. If we
can settle in respect to what we have, in G  '  name let us do it; and if we
are to have future acquisitions, let us leave the troubles they may bring
upon us to a future day. We have enough for to-day. I do not object,
therefore, to the first section of the proposition of the Convention, that it is
confined to the territory which we now have. The adjustment which they
have made varies but little in substance in regard to the territorial question,
and the question of slavery as connected with it, from my original
proposition. South of the line which we propose to establish, 36° 30´, you
have no foot of territory left, but what is embraced in the Territory of New
Mexico. In New Mexico, by law of the Territory—a constitutional law, a
valid law of the Territory—slavery exists as fully and completely as the law
can establish it, or has established it.
Now, this proposition is, that the status of things shall continue as it is until
that Territory becomes a State; and when it becomes a State, let it dispose of
the question of slavery as it chooses. There is no ambiguity about this. In
substance, though in a different form of words, the same is expressed in my
proposition. The proposition of the Convention is the same in substance,
only omitting the words—a very proper and a very timely omission—
supposed to be offensive in certain parts of the country, and substituting
others that are equally well understood in all parts of the country, and which
were less offensive to some.
Sir, now is the time for mediation; now is the time for pacification; now is
the time to omit every word that can give offence or add to the irritation
under which the country is. I desire, by the most moderate terms, by the
most unoffending language, to reach some mode of adjustment that can give
satisfaction to the whole country and reunite us all.
My friend from Virginia seems to apprehend that under these amendments
we shall be worse off in respect to territory hereafter acquired. That is
supposed to be sufficiently provided for and secured in the provision, that
no future acquisition shall be made, by purchase or by treaty, except that
treaty or that purchase be ratified by a majority of the Senators from the
slaveholding States, as well as a majority of Senators from the non-
slaveholding States. Does not this give the South a safe assurance, an
assurance to be relied upon? My friend from Virginia says, however, do we
believe the North, with its superior number, would submit to this provision
of the Constitution? Why, sir, the Convention have had the caution to make
this provision, if I understand them, irrepealable by any future amendment
of the Constitution. There it stands, then, in the most solemn form that men
can enter into any compact, in the most formal language by any terms that
Government can establish, that all are bound by that provision of the
Constitution which requires a majority from each section. When the
gentleman asks whether we can believe for a moment that this law will be
acquiesced in and adhered to, I say we must to some extent have confidence
in one another, or all human society must lose its basis, not merely of
government, but its foundation, and all society would be torn up at once by
the roots. That confidence is the root of society; it is the root of all the
associations of men in public or private life; it is the root and foundation of
all government. What more can you have, what better security can you have
than written, solemn terms upon any subject which is to regulate
government? There is nothing more solemn among men, unless you would
require angels to come down and make responses for them. Here you have
the very highest security that can be given; and when any gentleman shall
say these are not to be relied upon, he says there is no Government that
stands upon any foundation that can be relied upon. Such an assertion
strikes not at this provision; it strikes at the root of all government. What
further security can be had? If our brethren of the other section were willing
to give the highest possible security they could, what can they give more?
Nothing. This argument, then, can avail nothing.
Mr. President, I have gone perhaps a little further than I ought to have done.
It is not now necessary that I should enter into a vindication of every
provision of these amendments offered by the Convention. It is sufficient to
speak to the amendment which the gentleman has offered. Excluding
territory hereafter to be acquired, I think, in substance, we ought to be
satisfied with that; I believe that will make peace; I believe that will give
substantial security to our rights, and to the rights which the Southern States
claim. With that I am satisfied. It is enough for the dreadful occasion. It is
the dreadful occasion that I want to get rid of. Rid me of this, rid the nation
of this, and I am willing to take my chance for the future and meet the perils
of every day that may come. Now is the appointed time upon which our
destiny depends. Now is the emergency and exigency upon us. Let us
provide for them. Save ourselves now, and trust to posterity and that
Providence which has so long and so benignly guided this nation, to keep us
from the further difficulties which in our national career may be in our way.
I prefer the propositions which the Convention have made to my own
propositions, because I have no hope for my propositions. They have not
been so fortunate as to receive the favor of my colleagues of the Senate
from the North, the men whose sanction of them was necessary to give
them effect. I transfer all my hopes of peace to these propositions and terms
proposed by the Convention representing twenty-odd of the States of this
Union—a large majority of all the States. I will not go into particulars about
it; but since gentlemen have made some allusion to the out-of-door rumors
and reports and sayings in respect to this Convention, I believe that perhaps
a majority of those who voted for these amendments were men representing
non-slaveholding States. I do not know the fact, and I will not state it, but I
am under that impression now, and that impression encourages my hopes
that the Senate, rather than see the country fall into ruin, fall into
dismemberment, limb from limb, and blood flowing at the plucking out of
every limb, will supply the remedy which is proposed. It seems to me
proper and just. But little is asked, and great is the reward, and mighty are
the consequences that are to flow from it.
Sir, I have occupied more of the time of the Senate on this particular
question than I ought to have done.
Mr. MASON:—Mr. President, there is a very grave duty devolving upon
the Senate on the proposition which is now before us. We are called upon,
pursuant to the Constitution, to propose amendments to the Constitution.
The fifth article of the Constitution says this:
"The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution."
Now, sir, I cannot agree, for one, to propose an amendment to this
Constitution unless it has the sanction and the approbation of my judgment;
and I suppose no other Senator will. I am bound, therefore, by every
obligation of faith and honor to my State, when a proposition is submitted
to the Senate as one that should be proposed to the States as an amendment
to the Constitution, to examine it and understand it, and see it in all its
bearings and effects, as far as my intellect will enable me, and to propose it
or to withhold it by my vote, as I shall be guided by my judgment. I can see
no other position of a Senator.
Now, sir, what are the facts? The country was convulsed by the success in
the late presidential election of one of the political parties of the country.
The tremor was evinced at once in all the Southern States, in a belief that
their existence and their safety was imperilled by that election. Congress
met. As was proper and necessary, the very first act in each House was to
appoint a committee to take the condition of the country into consideration,
and see if, by any mode of amendment to the Constitution, those perils
could be avoided. A committee was raised in the collateral branch. A
committee was raised in this Senate, I think upon the motion of the
honorable Senator from Kentucky, actuated as he always is by principles of
the highest patriotism. Those committees met. They remained in anxious
deliberation for weeks. What was the result? They were unable to agree. I
think the committee came before the Senate and admitted the fact. They
could agree upon no form of amendment which they believed would
remedy the evils and avert the perils under which the country suffered.
In that state of things, the Legislature of Virginia—my own honored State—
having been called into special session on the 19th of January, passed a
series of resolutions, one of which recites this:
"That on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia, an invitation is hereby
extended to all such States, whether slaveholding or non-slaveholding, as
are willing to unite with Virginia in an earnest effort to adjust the present
unhappy controversies in the spirit in which the Constitution was originally
formed, and consistently with its principles, so as to afford to the people of
the slaveholding States adequate guarantees for the security of their rights."
That is the recital of the resolution of the Legislature of Virginia: "to afford
to the people of the slaveholding States adequate guarantees for the security
of their rights;" and there was a further provision, that, if those States
should meet and agree upon any form of adjustment, it should be submitted
to Congress. A number of the States—some twenty or twenty-one, it seems
—some by their Legislatures, some by their Executives—met the invitation
of Virginia, and deputed their commissioners to the conference in
Washington, to see if they could agree upon a mode of adjustment. We have
the report of that Conference before us now, presented through a committee
of this body; and they propose an additional article to the Constitution. Mr.
President, the honorable Senator from Kentucky, who has pronounced so
deserved a eulogium upon that body, does not exceed me in the respect
which I bear to it. If there be one more than another Senator upon whom it
would devolve to treat the work of that Convention with peculiar respect, it
would devolve upon me and my colleague, because they met at the
invitation of my State. I yield to none in the respect which I bear to those
gentlemen or to the purity of their motives in the results which they have
attained in that Conference; but, sir, I am bound by my obligations to the
Constitution, by my honor as a man, by my faith to my own State, to
understand what they have done, and to exhibit it either in recommendation
or disapproval, as my judgment may dictate. Nullius addictus jurare in
verba magistri.
I admit no authority to bind my judgment as a representative of one of the
States of the Union. I yield my respect to what they have done; but I will
scan it, and if, in my honest, unbiased judgment, I cannot recommend it as
an amendment to the Constitution, I am bound to withhold that
recommendation, and to give the reasons for it.
As I have said, sir, the State of Virginia, finding that Congress was at a loss
for a mode of adjustment, invited the States to send commissioners here for
this purpose:
"To agree upon something which would afford to the people of the
slaveholding States adequate guarantees for the security of their rights."
Virginia knew that, under the Constitution as it was interpreted under the
constituted authorities of the country as they have been elected, there was
no security for their rights; and it was in the hope of obtaining such a
security—Congress failing to agree upon it—that, at her invitation, these
gentlemen from the different States met here in conference. I am to look,
therefore, to their work, and to see if it affords that security for their rights;
and if I am satisfied in my own judgment, as I honestly am—and the
reasons for which I am now to announce to the world—that it not only
affords no security for the rights of the South, but takes away what little
they have, I should be a traitor if I would recommend it as an amendment to
the Constitution of the United States.
Now, sir, let us look at it. It is presented as an entire article, to be the
thirteenth article, if adopted, of the Constitution. The first section of it
relates to the Territories—the great and difficult point of division between
the two sections. If that could be overcome—if these rights that are spoken
of in the resolutions of Virginia in the Territories could be guaranteed by
adequate securities to the slaveholding States—I believe the rest of the path
would be smooth. It embraces almost the whole controversy. What
securities are provided in the Territories to the slaveholding States by this
first section of the thirteenth article? It proposes to divide the present
Territories—for it is confined to them—by an east and west line, a parallel
of latitude. North of that line, there is a clear cut entirely, unsusceptible of
misinterpretation. None can doubt what the condition of servitude is north
of that line. It is a clear cut; it is prohibited, and prohibited forever. No
interpretation can mistake it; no casuist can doubt upon it; it is a work well
done. North of that line involuntary servitude, except for crime, is
prohibited. How is it south? My honorable colleague, I think, has well said
that, south of that line, for our rights, at best we are remitted to a lawsuit. I
will read the language:
"Nor shall any law be passed by Congress or the Territorial Legislature to
hinder or prevent the taking of such persons—"
That is, persons held to service—
"from any of the States of this Union to said Territories, nor to impair the
rights arising from said relation."
Neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature has power to interfere with
the rights arising from the relation of master and servant, or master and
slave. That is the meaning; that is clear. What next?
"But the same—"
The rights resulting from the relation of master and slave—
"shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts, according to
the course of the common law."
There is the security for the rights of the South. South of that line they are
remitted to the courts under the common law. Now, sir, let us examine that.
By this section, if it is adopted as an article of the Constitution, the common
law, eo nomine, is made a part of the Constitution, so far as it affects the
relations of master and slave. Now, what is the common law? Who is there
upon this floor that will tell me what common law is meant by this section?
With all my respect for the thorough knowledge and the legal acquirements
of the honorable Senator from Kentucky, I know he cannot tell me what
common law is meant by that first section. We know, as jurists, what is
meant by the term common law, for it is a technical term. The common law
is the law of England, the unwritten law of England, the lex non scripta.
That is the common law in its legal acceptation. Is it, then, the law of
England that is made a part of the Constitution, and to which the master is
remitted for the security of his rights between him and his servant? Will any
gentleman tell me that it is the common law of England that is to be made a
part of the Constitution to which we are to be remitted? If it is the common
law of England, is it the common law of England as it stands at this day, on
the first of March, 1861?
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—If my friend will allow me, I take it that that term
applies only to the remedies known to the common law. The laws of the
Territories are to be enforced, and the remedies under them are to be
administered according to common law. The master is to have his rights
according to the law of the Territory, and to secure those rights according to
the common law.
Mr. MASON:—The language of the section is, that neither Congress nor
the Territorial Legislature shall interfere to impair the rights arising from
this relation of master and slave; "but the same"—that is, this relation
between master and slave—"shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the
Federal courts, according to the course of the common law."
Now, the honorable Senator says that means only the remedy of the
common law; that you are to take the law of the Territory, whatever it may
be, and administer that, by confining it to the remedies known to the
common law. I deny the interpretation. The Senator may be right, or I may
be right. I say the text does not warrant the interpretation. The text refers to
the rights in the relation of master and slave, and says they (those rights)
shall be the subject of judicial cognizance, according to the course of
common law. Now, I ask, what is the common law that is thus made a part
of the Constitution for the subject to which it refers? Is it the law of
England? There is no common law, that I am aware of, known to jurists as
the law of England. There is no law in the State of Virginia, and, I presume,
none in the State of Kentucky, known as common law. The State of
Virginia, when it became independent as a colony of Great Britain, adopted
and made its own that which before had been the common law of England,
and therefore the common law of the colony. The State of Virginia (and I
instance that only because I am familiar with it), when it became
independent, adopted as its law the common law of England, as that
common law stood at the commencement of the fourth year of James I.; and
thereby, by statute, made that which had been the common law, the law of
Virginia. Now, it is the law of Virginia, not because it is the common law,
but because statutes made it the law of Virginia. But is the common law of
Virginia, if you will call it by that name, the common law of Kentucky; or is
the common law of Kentucky the common law of Missouri; or is the law of
those three States, or any other State, now the common law of England? I
demand to know, therefore, when we make the common law a part of the
Constitution, if this enactment should prevail, what is meant by the
common law? To that vague, grand residuum of judicial legislation we are
to be remitted for our rights between master and slave, if this is enacted.
Now, sir, suppose it were so: my colleague has well said (and I will not
repeat it after him, for I should only weaken it), that there is not one judicial
interpreter or expounder of the common law, in any one of the free States,
in reference to the relation of master and slave, that does not deny that the
master has any property in his slave, at this day and this hour. Why, sir,
what is the pending controversy between the State of Ohio, one of the free
States, and the State of Kentucky, one of the slave States—a controversy
depending here recently in the Supreme Court? The Governor of Kentucky
demanded, under the Constitution, the rendition of a fugitive from justice,
who had abducted a slave from Kentucky, and carried him into Ohio. The
Governor of Ohio refused the demand, upon the ground that there could be
no stealing of a man; that there could be no property in man; and that the
slave, being a man, was not a subject of theft, of larceny; and he refused,
and refuses up to this day, under the common law, to recognize the
existence of property in man.
Now, take the common law of England at this day: here, within the last
three or four weeks, the Queen's Bench, in England, has declared as the
common law, that if a slave murders his master, or murders the agent of his
master, in the attempt to recapture him, he is justified. That is the common
law to which we are to be remitted for the rights resulting from the relations
of master and slave. Sir, I have looked back a little to see what the common
law was in England in this famous Somerset case, I find this in the
argument of the counsel there, expounding the common law, which was
afterwards sustained by Lord M         in his decision:
"But it has been said by great authorities, though slavery, in its full extent,
be incompatible with the natural rights of mankind, and the principles of
good government, yet a moderate servitude may be tolerated, nay,
sometimes must be maintained."
And again:
"There is now, at last, an attempt, and the first yet known, to introduce it
[slavery] into England. Long and uninterrupted usage, from the origin of the
common law, stands to oppose its revival."
And again:
"A new species has never arisen till now; for had it, remedies and powers
there, would have been at law; therefore, the most violent presumption
against it, is the silence of the laws, were there nothing more. It is very
doubtful whether the laws of England will permit a man to bind himself by
contract to serve for life; certainly will not suffer him to invest another man
with despotism, nor prevent his own right to dispose of property."
And again:
"There are very few instances, few, indeed, of decisions as to slaves in this
country. Two in Charles II., where it was adjudged trover would lie.
Chamberlayne and Perrin, William III., trover brought for taking a negro
slave; adjudged it would not lie. 4th Ann., action of trover; judgment by
default. On arrest of judgment, resolved that trover would not lie. Such the
determinations in all but two cases; and those the earliest, and disallowed
by the subsequent decisions. Lord H   : 'As soon as a slave enters England
he becomes free.'"
In the opinion of the court, of Lord M        , as to these principles of
common law, that very distinguished and able judge, who made the law, as I
understand, for the occasion, but certainly ruled it as the common law, says
this:
"The state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being
introduced for any reasons, moral or political; but only by positive law,
which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself
from whence it was created, is erased from memory. It's so odious that
nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law. Whatever
inconveniences, therefore, may follow from a decision, I cannot say this
case is allowed or approved by the law of England."
I need not go back to authority. We have it abundantly in our own country,
in all the free States, so far as I know, without exception. They deny what
the amendment of my honorable friend from Kentucky affirms. They deny
that there is property in a slave. The amendment of the Senator affirms there
is property in a slave. This section is silent, ominously silent, portentously
and potentially silent. It is not only silent, Mr. President, but when it refers
you to that code of law which is to protect the right of the master to the
slave, it refers you to the common law, and the common law to be
expounded by the Federal courts, and the common law, which is judicially
and historically known to the whole country, to be expounded in all the free
States as one that denies that very property which we say must be secured.
That is our position under this section. Sir, the State of Virginia has said that
we must have adequate guarantees; and I am asked here to vote away what
little guarantees we have. I am asked, almost in the high ethics or morals of
revealed religion, when my adversary takes away my cloak, that I shall give
him my coat also. I am required to do that by this section. We believe that
our rights are secured under the present Constitution; we know that they
have been withheld by the political party which has now come into power;
we believe that they are insecure unless there are further and adequate
guarantees; but, so far from their being proposed by the section before us, in
my judgment, what little we have is taken away. Sir, I cannot vote for these
propositions. I regret it. I was prepared, whether it had the approval of my
judgment or not, to follow the instructions of my State, and to vote for the
amendment offered by the honorable Senator from Kentucky after it had
been modified, as was required by the resolutions of my State.
The amendment of the Senator from Kentucky was so modified, I do not
know whether at the instance of Virginia or not; but it was modified by a
vote of this Senate, so as to embrace what was required in the resolutions of
Virginia. I am not at liberty to recommend, or, in the language of the
Constitution, to propose to the States this section of the thirteenth article;
because it not only withholds, but denies by withholding, any security, far
less that security which the State of Virginia requires.
There are further provisions in this proposition that are objectionable, one
of which was pointed out by my colleague: that which calls upon Congress
to legislate on that clause of the Constitution which secures to the citizens
of one State all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
States. I need not say that any legislation on that subject by Congress would
be any thing but the messenger of peace to which the honorable Senator
from Kentucky looks. Why, sir, it has been found indispensable in
slaveholding States, as a part of their police regulations, to punish all
persons who were either of the State or otherwise, who tamper with the
slaves, who have intercourse with them that is forbidden by law, far more
those who preach to them sedition, or insurrection, or revolt; and yet, if we
were to be controlled within the body of the State by Federal relations in
our interior police, we should be completely at the mercy of the free States.
Mr. President, I should have been certainly gratified, if my honored State of
Virginia had been successful in the mediation which she invited of all the
States, with a view to agree upon an adjustment which would guaranty the
rights of the South. I deeply deplore, and I doubt not my State will deplore,
that that mediation has not been effected. So far from impugning any
motives or purpose of that honorable and distinguished body, I doubt not
that, in the short time that was allowed to them, they got together the best
mode of adjustment which would satisfy their judgment, but which I am
sure will not satisfy the judgment of the Southern States, but would place
them in still greater peril, if they were to admit that to become a part of the
Constitution. I did not intend to do more than state my objections to it as
briefly as I could. I have done so temperately and without heat, I regret that
I cannot, as one Senator, propose this as an amendment to the Constitution.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I wish only to reply for a single moment to the
material objection urged by the Senator from Virginia. The portion of the
article to which the Senator from Virginia objects, declares that the status of
persons bound to service and labor shall remain unchanged; that neither
Congress nor the Territorial Legislature shall pass any law affecting the
relation, or the rights growing out of the relation between master and
servant—I do not pretend to recite the exact words; but that is the exact idea
—well knowing that, according to the laws of the Territory, the status of
slavery was fully established, and all the rights of the master in and to his
servant established, as they exist in the State of Missouri, or the State of
Virginia, by positive law of the Territory. It is therefore equivalent to saying
that that law shall stand, when it says that the status shall continue
unchanged. It then goes on to say (which I admit was altogether
unnecessary) that the remedy for the violation of the rights of the master,
whatever they might be, shall be had in the Federal courts, and according to
the course of the common law. Now, sir, what right does this take away
from any slaveholder? That law which secured and gave him a right, is
declared to be unchangeable. That law acknowledges his property in any
sense in which you please to take it, or in any sense in which it is
applicable. It acknowledges it, and gives legal remedies for the violation of
it; and in addition to all that, and, as I admit, by a sort of pleonasm of
expression, it says that he shall have his remedy in the Federal court,
according to the course of the common law.
Mr. MASON:—Will the Senator allow me a moment?
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—Certainly.
Mr. MASON:—With the permission of the Senator I will put this
proposition to him: He says that the meaning of the language, "according to
the course of the common law," is confined to the remedy. Now, admitting
that to be the case, for the sake of the argument, suppose, in one of these
Territories, a slave is purloined, seduced, got away; the slave of A gets into
the possession of B, and he is there at work for him upon his farm, or in his
house, and A brings an action of trover to recover him; that is an action
known to the common law; and the decision of the Federal court is, that
trover lies only to recover property, and a slave is not property: what is the
remedy? That is the decision in England; and I presume it would be the
decision in the free States, if the suit were brought.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—It was to avoid going into definitions of that sort that
this language was employed in the amendments of the Convention. They
saw and had before them the law of New Mexico, which did acknowledge
the existence of this right as fully as it is acknowledged by the law of
Virginia. However it may be disputed here, however legal opinions may
differ about it, the law of New Mexico established property in slaves; and
there the law stands; and the Convention now comes and says that status
shall remain unchanged.
Mr. BRAGG:—Oh, no.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—That is the resolution.
Mr. BRAGG:—Will the honorable Senator allow me a word, for I am very
anxious to understand it?
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—Certainly.
Mr. BRAGG:—The Senator says it provides that that law, the law of New
Mexico, whatever it may be, shall remain unchanged, if I understand him,
and that that fixes the status of slavery in the Territory. I call the attention of
the Senator to the language. I think that only fixes the status of persons now
in the Territory, and not those to be carried there hereafter—not the status of
slavery, but the status of persons who are there now, held to service or
labor, and not the status of those who are to be carried there in future. That
is provided for in the language which it follows in another part.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—Here it is, sir:
"In all the present territory south of that line"—
Which I have explained, and which gentlemen admit to be embraced in the
Territory of New Mexico—
"the status of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now exists."
It is not as to such slaves as are now there, but such slavery as now exists.
Mr. BRAGG:—If it said that, I admit that it would cover the status of
slavery.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—It does say that. It seems to me that is the only
construction that can be given to the language. It could not be intended to
confine it to the twenty-six slaves that are now held there, especially when
they provided, in a subsequent article, that it shall be lawful for any one to
carry slaves there.
Mr. BRAGG:—Will the honorable Senator again allow me to interrupt
him?
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—Certainly.
Mr. BRAGG:—I have not the slightest doubt that a great many who voted
for the proposition consider it as the Senator does. I have equally as little
doubt that others intended it to mean precisely what I have stated. I cannot
see, for my life, while they were framing a constitutional provision, why
they did not place this matter beyond any sort of doubt. If they intended to
recognize slavery, they could have said so in one word. If they intended not
to recognize it, they could have said it in another word. If they intended to
mystify and leave in doubt, then they have been very successful in
accomplishing their purpose.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—"In all the present territory south of that line, the
status of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now exists;" not
as they now exist; not in respect to those that are there now; but part of the
same sort of slavery which now exists, shall continue to exist unchanged
until the Territory becomes a State; and in the mean time persons shall be
admitted to go into that Territory and carry their slaves with them. Now, I
submit it to my honorable friend if it is not entirely improbable that any
such construction as he suggests can prevail before any court that seeks to
attain the real intention of the parties who made this proposition? It is such
slavery as now exists. Persons held to that service—you may carry as many
there as you please. Put them both together, and they would read so; and
they being in the same instrument, can there be a doubt that ought to alarm
us here, that the construction will be given to it which I place upon it, that it
was intended not to be confined merely to persons now there and held to
servitude, but as well to those who might be carried there hereafter? This is
all I will say in reference to that; and I submit it to the candor and the
judgment of my honorable friend from North Carolina, in which I have
entire confidence, whatever result he may come to, that if we put the two
propositions together, all doubt would seem to be removed.
Now, sir, my friend from Virginia will argue this question as if the question
of slavery was to be decided according to the course of the common law,
and then refers us to the express declarations and decisions as though the
common law decided that slavery could not exist. What sort of construction
would that make of this provision? Here they have provided that the law
establishing slavery shall exist, that the property of the master in him shall
be recognized as it is there established by law; and then the gentleman
supposes that to be exactly contradictory, to refer to the common law as
furnishing the rule of decision, which common law says there can be no
property, as he interprets it, in man, and that when trover was brought for a
slave—
Mr. MASON:—Not as I interpret it, but as interpreted in England.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I know that. He says it may be so interpreted; that
when trover was brought for a slave in England, the judges decided there
was no property in man. Could the same judges, sitting in a court in New
Mexico, have given that decision when the law there established such
property? In such a case, their decision must be different. They are
referring, according to him, to two contradictory rules: one establishing
slavery and acknowledging property in the master, and the other the
common law denouncing and deciding against the right of property in man.
This could not have been their intention, nor can this be the construction.
We cannot consider these gentlemen to have changed their opinion from
one sentence to another, to have left an incongruity and a contradiction
expressed upon the face of the same section.
Nor, sir, do they refer—and that is my answer to my friend from Virginia—
to the common law as furnishing the rule of decision at all. The proceedings
shall be according to the course of the common law; that is all. If any
violation is done to the rights of the master, he may sue; and, for his greater
security, he may sue in the Federal courts; and, for greater security still, the
law shall be administered according to the course of the common law. The
common law is referred to as determining the mode of trial. We say
according to the course of the civil law, and we say according to the course
of the common law. What do we mean? We mean this marked and
characteristic and essential difference: the course of the civil law is for the
judge, without the intervention of a jury, to decide facts as well as the law.
The common law takes away from the judge the power of deciding the
facts, and demands a trial by jury. What this convention mean, therefore, by
this provision is, that trial shall be by jury, according to the course of the
common law. That is the explanation of the difficulty, and thus all doubt is
removed. By these plain provisions—plain in themselves, and made plainer
still by being taken with the context—they say you shall have your rule of
right, according to the law of the Territory, which is in your favor as to the
right to hold persons as property; that law shall be your security; you shall
have a remedy for any violation of that right in the Federal courts, and you
shall have that remedy, not according to the course of the civil law, in which
the judge is to decide, who might be against you, but in which a jury shall
be called to decide the fact according to the course of the common law. That
is the whole of it.
Mr. MASON:—Mr. President—
Mr. POLK:—If the Senator will allow me, before the Senator from
Kentucky sits down, I will ask him if the Mexican law establishes slavery,
or if it does any thing more than to protect the right of the master to his
slave? If that is the only establishment of it, then it is established by
implication merely.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I really do not know whether the gentleman would
consider it as establishing or merely protecting. I do not know that there is a
law in any State of the Union that eo nomine establishes slavery; I do not
know.
Mr. POLK:—The object of the inquiry was this: it has been contended
heretofore that, by the law of Mexico, there could be no slavery there; and
then there is another law of New Mexico professing to protect the right of
property. I have never seen that New Mexican law.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I believe I have answered the gentleman as far as my
information extends. I have examined that law. It is as strong in favor of the
master as the laws of Kentucky or Missouri. I believe it is the law of
Mississippi transcribed literally, verbatim. That is my understanding. The
law is as complete on the subject as the law of any State that I know of.
Mr. MASON:—Mr. President, if the Senator from Kentucky is right, and, in
the interpretation of this section, the courts are necessarily to consider the
expression, "according to the course of the common law," to which
slaveholders are referred for the enforcing of the relation of master and
slave, as referring only to common law remedies, then I am at no loss to
conceive, after our experience of judicial interpretation against slavery, by
what sort of artificial and sophistic reasoning those judges of the Federal
courts may feel themselves bound to withhold the remedy. Why, sir, are we
to shut our ears and our eyes against experience passing before us every
day? What is the present Constitution? The second section of the fourth
article is in these words:
"A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who
shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of
the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to
be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime."
That is the text of the Constitution. What is the interpretation in the free
States? In the State of Kentucky an African is property, under their laws and
usages, and has been so for two hundred years; for it was so when it was a
part of Virginia; and did it ever enter into the mind of man to conceive that
this plain text of the Constitution would be resisted, upon the ground that
property in man was not acknowledged? And yet it is done. If I am not
mistaken, the honorable Senator from New York [Mr. S     ], not now in
his seat, when Governor of New York, made that very question with the
Governor of Virginia; and seeing this, are we to be willingly blind to this as
the actual, judicial, and executive interpretation in every thing that affects
the question of slavery as it stands in that section, and that, too, while we
are seeking equality? Sir, it never entered into the mind of man, at the time
this Constitution was formed, to credit that the time could ever come in the
relations of these States when a man who fled from the State of Kentucky
because he had stolen a negro into the State of Ohio, was screened from the
operation of the Constitution, because in Ohio they do not deem a negro to
be the subject of property; and yet that is the fact, the very issue now
depending between those States; and we are asked to be blind, willingly
blind, to all that experience at the very time we are attempting to secure a
guarantee for violated rights!
Now, I said, Mr. President, that, if I were to tax my ingenuity, I might find a
mode, even if the honorable Senator is right in ascribing to this clause of the
section the necessary interpretation that it refers to remedies only. The
Senator says the previous part of the section establishes the relation, as he
construes it, not directly like the resolution of the honorable Senator which
we offer here as an amendment, which establishes directly that there is
property in slaves. This does not; but designedly avoids it; not from any
improper motive—I do not ascribe that—but it is not only silent, but it
avoids the very question. I suppose the honorable Senator is right in saying
this language, judicial cognizance, according to the course of the common
law, refers only to the remedy. Now, I tax my ingenuity to know how a
court, in one of the free States, always leaning, of course, against slavery,
would reason out that proposition, whether the remedy could be applied.
Suppose an action of trover is brought. The inquiry would be, what is the
remedy? We are told this is the remedy for which you are to apply to the
law. A remedy is nothing in the world but a redress for wrong. Before you
can apply the remedy, therefore, you must ascertain whether a wrong has
been committed for which the remedy is adequate. Well, it comes from one
side: the wrong was in taking the negro from the possession of the owner,
against the local law of the Territory. The answer would be, "that may be
true as far as the local law of the Territory is concerned; but here the
Constitution adopts the common law as part of its text, and points the
judges to the common law, and it applies the remedy." Now, the remedy is
redress of the wrong, and we are bound to see that the wrong is one to
which the remedy is applicable. The remedy is to recover property in the
possession of one who is not entitled to it, and the common law, which
applies that remedy to that wrong, says there is no wrong inflicted by taking
the negro from the possession of his owner. It comes to that. It is suggested
to me by the honorable Senator from Vermont [Mr. C       ], that the
common law, as a remedy, is one applicable to a common-law wrong. I do
not say that the reasoning is just; I do not say that it is juridical; but I say, in
our experience, we should be willingly blind if we take that for a security
which will only be a snare.
Mr. PUGH:—Mr. President, it is very well known to the Senate that I prefer
the proposition of the Senator from Kentucky, as a matter of individual
choice, to the proposition which is proposed by the Peace Conference.
Nevertheless, that Conference having been authorized, if not by Congress,
at all events, so far as my State is concerned, by the act of her Legislature;
and an overwhelming majority of the commissioners having agreed to this
proposition as it stands, I shall hesitate very much in departing from it,
whatever might be my individual opinion; but certainly if I thought the two
Senators from Virginia had given it a correct interpretation, I should not
agree to it. Now, as to this clause, it, in my judgment, had better have been
omitted:
"The same shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts,
according to the course of the common law."
I suggest that the common law is referred to as fixing a right simply. The
course of the common law is a phrase defined for more than two hundred
years, in Latin, in English, and in Norman French. It means the formula of
proceeding. I understood the Senator from Virginia [Mr. M    ] to say that
it had been decided in several of the courts that an action of trover could not
be brought for a negro slave in England. I think I am familiar with the case.
It is reported in Salkeld's Reports, Lord Raymond's Reports, and in the
Modern Reports—the same case reported three times; but the same court
which decided that trover would not lie, because trover included the idea of
property in the man himself, in the same opinion said that trespass on the
case would lie for the loss of the service; so that it was all a question of
pleading, and no question of right at all. It is within my recollection—and I
believe the case was brought to the Supreme Court on a writ of error, and
can be found in Howard's Reports—that a citizen of Kentucky declared in
trespass on the case for taking away his slaves, and added two counts in
trover. What is trover but an action of trespass on the case? Nothing more;
and it never was any thing more. The measure of damages is the same in
both actions—the value of the service of the servant; and yet that
controversy on mere pleading—which, in nine-tenths of the States of this
Union, has ceased to be of any value, because they have a code of
procedure, is made a terrific objection here.
Now, sir, I have never read the code of New Mexico, and I do not propose
to read it; but it is perfectly understood that that Territorial Legislature,
pursuing the privilege, if you call it privilege, conferred by the compromise
measures of 1850, has established the relation of master and slave, or
master and servant, as perfectly as it is established in any of the fifteen so-
called slaveholding States. I do not admire this word "status" which we find
in the report of the Peace Conference; but as to the meaning of that word, I
cannot be in any doubt. It does not refer to any persons in particular; it
refers to a legal relation of servitude as between master and servant, and it
provides that that relation, or condition, or status, shall not be changed; that
for all wrongs or controversies arising out of that there shall be a remedy
through the Federal judiciary.
I can see why the commission made this distinction. There have been many
who have insisted that the Congress of the United States should pass laws
for the protection of the right of the master to the services of his slave in a
Territory; but it has always been my opinion, that the worst thing the
slaveholding States ever could have would be to have that; for there would
be a perpetual controversy here from session to session, and from day to
day, whether the law went far enough in giving protection or went too far;
and they would be remitting their right to the adjudication of the Senators
and Representatives from the non-slaveholding States. Others have insisted,
as the propositions of my honorable friend from Kentucky provided, that
the relation should be protected by the legislation of the territorial authority.
I would rather it were so, individually, if they chose to establish it. The
peace commission do not want that. They evidently do not want to quarrel
with the Territorial Legislatures about the measure of legislation; but they
declare the right, and then say that this right shall be enforced in the Federal
judiciary according to the course of remedies and forms of the common law.
I do not see how there can be a doubt; and yet, as I have said, it seems to me
that a great deal of it is unnecessary verbiage. I do not mean to debate that; I
am not one of the peace commissioners; I am not to select my words to
express the idea; but I am here; and my State with other States, having
appointed commissioners in view of a crisis like this, as they esteem it, and
as I esteem it, and they having agreed upon a great variety of propositions,
some of which commend themselves to my judgment and some do not; but
taking it altogether as one proposition, I am satisfied that I must either vote
for all of it, or let all of it fall. I would rather vote for the proposition of my
honorable friend from Kentucky. I said that sixty days ago; and I have said
it in season and out of season. I have expressed my views frequently. I think
the proposition of the commissioners would be better expressed, though it
would come to the same thing, in these words: "in all the territory south of
that line, it is hereby declared that no law or regulation shall ever be made
or have any effect denying or impairing the right of the inhabitants to the
service or labor of such persons as were held in that condition in any State
of the Union; and thence taken into the said Territory." That would have
expressed my idea more clearly, yet I am satisfied with this; it amounts to
that. Whether the word "status" be good Latin or good English, the meaning
is very clear.
I believe I admonished the Senate two hours ago that time was very
precious; and I shall not detain them myself.
Mr. BAKER:—Mr. President, I mean to vote for the passage of these
proposed amendments, just as they are, without any change; and I propose
to give very briefly a few of the reasons which govern my judgment in that
act. I will do it as pointedly as I can, and I will certainly do it very briefly.
In the first place, I feel that I am but submitting to the people of the whole
country, amendments which they, and they only, can incorporate in the
present Constitution; and I do not believe that, in any state of the case, I can
do very wrong in doing that; but when I consider the immediate condition
of the country, I feel that I am doing very right. Twenty States assemble in
what is called the Peace Convention. They recommend to us, in times of
great trial and difficulty, the passage of these resolutions. They are eminent
men; they are able men; they are—very many of them, at least—great men;
they have been selected by the States which they respectively represent,
because of their purity of character and ability. The country is in great
trouble. Six States have seceded; and I am told by very many men in whom
I have great confidence, that their States are to-day trembling in the
balance. I believe it. I am told—and upon that subject I have not yet made
up my mind—that the adoption of these measures by the people will heal
the differences with the Border States. I do not believe that I can do wrong,
therefore, in giving the people of the whole Union a chance to determine
these questions.
In the beginning, I voted against the propositions of the distinguished
Senator from Kentucky. Even then I did not perceive any great harm in
submitting any propositions to the people of the United States which
circumstances might appear to render necessary for any good purpose. I
refused to vote for them, for two reasons: first, I believed something better
might be attained; and second, I did not believe that the people of the States
would agree to them. I do not believe that now, and for one simple reason: I
think I may consider myself in some respect a representative of the opinion
as well as the power of my own people. I am a Republican, a zealous and
determined one. I have all my life been of the opinion that Congress ought
not to protect slavery, and to extend the dominion of this Government for
that purpose or with that possibility. A great many in the North, who are not
Republicans, but are what we call D       men, have shown, at the last
election, under something of trial and sacrifice, that they too, do not believe
that the Constitution does or ought to extend slavery. I am not disposed to
give up that opinion; I do not believe they are. I was not disposed to give up
when six States were in the Union who are now out, as they say; and I am
not disposed to give it up yet. Independently of pride of opinion, I do not
believe that kind of sacrifice would accomplish any good result.
These are the reasons in brief which induced me to vote with regret against
the propositions of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky in the earlier
portion of this session. But now, we are within two days of adjournment.
Propositions essentially variant in their character to those are submitted
here; and I am asked: "Will you, in your representative capacity, submit
these to your people for their decision, either to accept or reject?" Now, why
not? I need not dwell upon the fact that, while we are a representative, we
are at the same time a democratic Government. I will not shut my eyes to
the fact that twenty States appeal to us; I will not shut my eyes to the fact
that there is imminent danger of permanent dissolution; I will not shut my
eyes to the fact that, though the Republican party is in a constitutional
majority, it is not yet, and it never has been, in an actual majority; and I do
not believe that it is possible for one-third of the people to coerce the
opinion of two-thirds.
Mr. WILKINSON:—I wish to ask the gentleman a question.
Mr. BAKER:—Do, sir.
Mr. WILKINSON:—I understand him as saying that the whole of the
twenty States which were assembled in this Peace Convention agreed to this
proposition.
Mr. BAKER:—My distinguished friend was writing, instead of listening,
when he understood that. I did not mean to say that, and I did not.
Mr. WILKINSON:—I understood the Senator to say that twenty States
appealed to us.
Mr. BAKER:—Yes, sir; just as I say that the Government appeals to another
Government, I do not say every individual in it; just as I say that Congress
appeals to another Government, not every individual member of Congress;
but I do say, in the words of the proposition before us, that "they," the Peace
Convention, composed of the States recited, "have approved what is
herewith submitted, and respectfully request that your honorable body will
submit it to conventions in the States, as article thirteen of the amendments
to the Constitution of the United States." That is all I said, or, at least, it is
all I meant to say.
Now, sir, suppose every argument that the distinguished Senators from
Virginia have brought to bear on this proposition was true: what then? Is
that any reason why it should not be submitted to the people? Suppose they
do not approve of it: what then? It is their business, not ours. Suppose they
should: it is a measure of peace, of security, of union. Sir, I know, as you
do, many of the members of that Convention. I have acted with them as
Whigs in old times, and I wish they could come back. I know they have
proved in old times, as they will prove again, that they love this Union to
the very depth and core of their hearts. I do not propose to give them up; I
do not propose to weaken them; I do admire, with my whole heart, the
sacrifice of opinion which they make, and which is typified by the noble
expression of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky to-day. Party or no
party, North or no North, I, at least, will meet him half way. My State is
very far distant. She had no members in that Convention. I do not know
whether she will approve this measure; but I know it will neither hurt that
State nor me to give her a chance to determine. I know very well that the
Senators from Virginia do not approve it. That is the very reason I do.
[Laughter.] If I was sure they would not think me guilty of disrespect, I
would remind them of what was said by a distinguished man in old times.
Phocion, in the last days of his Republic—and I hope in that respect, at
least, there will be no parallel—Phocion was once making a speech to the
Athenian people, and something he said excited very great applause. He
turned around to gentlemen, friends near him, and said: "What foolish thing
have I been saying, that these people praise me?" Sir, if Virginia,
represented as she is to-day—not as I believe she really is—but if Virginia,
represented as she is here to-day, and as she has been during this session,
were to approve these propositions, I should doubt them very much indeed.
I was surprised, however, to hear some things that the distinguished Senator
from Virginia—I do not know whether to call him junior or senior—said. I
do not mean the Senator who spoke last. He [Mr. H     ] says that this
proposition here is worse than the old Constitution. If that be really so, what
in the world has he been complaining of so bitterly? He tells us, now, that
under the old Constitution slavery was secure. Then, why do you grumble?
He considers it as secure, not only wherever it is, but wherever it can go—
nay, more than that; wherever the Stars and Stripes of the American
Republic can float. I have been telling my people that, as a Republican, for
a long while, and complaining of the Dred Scott decision; but he says
slavery is secured. All the complaint that the other Senator from Virginia
[Mr. M    ] makes, is against the decision of the courts in the free States
we have been in the habit of making, which he insists are against the
decision of the Supreme Court, constituted other than we wished it was. We
have been in the habit of believing that one of the great evils we
complained of was under the old Constitution, and that a new construction
was given to it, alien to the intention, wish, construction, of our fathers; and
we have complained that the Supreme Court was so constituted that it could
not be reversed. We complained, as partisans, that now this Senate and the
other House were so composed that we had no power in the Government,
save through the President. Now, the Senator from Virginia indorses the
whole of it, and says they were very well off, and did beautifully. Then why
dissolve; why threaten; why make a Peace Conference necessary?
Mr. President, let us be just to these propositions. As a Republican, I give
up something when I vote for them; but remember, sir, I am not voting for
them now; I am only voting to submit them to my people; and I shall go
before them, when the time comes, being governed in my opinion and
advice as to whether they shall vote for them or not, as I see that Virginia,
Tennessee, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Missouri, by their people, desire.
To be frank, sir; if this proposition will suit the Border States, if there will
be peace and union, and loyalty and brotherhood, with this, I will vote for it
at the polls with all my heart and with all my soul; but if I see that the
counsels of the Senators from Virginia shall prevail; if my noble friend from
Tennessee [Mr. J      ] shall be overwhelmed; if secession shall still
grow in the public mind there; if they are determined, upon artificial causes
of complaint, as I believe, still to unite their fate, their destiny, and their
hope, with the extremest South, then, perceiving them to be of no avail, I
shall refuse them. Therefore, at the polls at last, I shall be governed as an
individual citizen by my conviction at the moment of what the ultimate
result of these propositions will be; but I am not voting for that to-day. I am
saying: "People of the United States, I submit it to you; twenty States
demand it; the peace of the country requires it; there is dissolution in the
very atmosphere; States have gone off; others threaten; the Queen of
England upon her throne declares to the whole world her sympathy with our
unfortunate condition; foreign Governments denote that there is danger to-
day that the greatest Confederation the world has ever seen is to be parted
in pieces, never to be reunited." Now, not what I wish, not what I want, not
what I would have, but all that I can get, is before me. I know that I do no
harm. If the people of Oregon do not like it, they can easily reject it. If the
people of Pennsylvania will not have it, they can easily throw it aside. If
they do not believe there is danger of dissolution, if they prefer dissolution,
if they think they can compel fifteen States to remain in or come back, or if
they believe they will not go out, let them reject it. I repeat again, it is their
business, it is not mine.
But, sir, whether I vote for it at the polls or not, in voting for it here it may
be said that I give up some of my principles. Mr. President, we sometimes
mistake our opinions for our principles. I am appealed to often; it is said to
me: "You believed in the Chicago platform." Suppose I did. "Well, this
varies from the Chicago platform." Suppose it does. I stand to-day, as I
believe, in the presence of greater events than those which attend the
making of a President. I stand, as I believe, at least, in the presence of peace
and war; and if it were true that I did violate the Chicago platform, the
Chicago platform is not a Constitution of the United States to me. If events,
if circumstances change, I will violate it, appealing to my conscience, to my
country, and to my God, to justify me according to the motive. [Applause in
the galleries.]
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. F      in the chair). Order will be
preserved in the galleries, or they will be cleared.
Mr. BAKER:—Again, sir, let us see how, as a Republican, I give up any
thing. First, suppose I did: I would give up a great deal to preserve a great
Government; I would give up a great deal to be able to shake hands with
Kentucky and Tennessee as friends for the rest of my life, as I have in all
that has gone before. I would not be ashamed to give up. I would not at
least be giving up to traitorous secession, such as Louisiana, Mississippi,
and South Carolina are guilty of to-day; but I would be giving up to loyal
and affectionate brethren, who implore me for the love of a common Union
to do something to satisfy the doubts and fears of their people. I can stand
that; I will do it.
Again, sir; how much do I give up? I have said, as a Republican, that
Congress has the power to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the
United States. I believe it to-day. Talking about giving up, there are a good
many other people that give up something here. Gentlemen on the other
side, who have been contending that Congress had no power whatever to
prohibit slavery, acknowledge that they were mistaken; at any rate they go
for it; they do prohibit it by law, by the Constitution itself. Therefore I am
not the only one that gives up.
Again: I believe it is wrong, politically wrong—I am not now discussing the
social and moral question—but I believe it to be politically very wrong to
establish slavery in the name of freedom. Sir, twelve years ago or more, it
was my fortune, perhaps, to wander in a foreign land beneath the Stars and
Stripes of my country. I went there, as I think, impelled by motives of
patriotism, perhaps having mingled with them not a little desire of
adventure, love of change, and that feverish excitement for which we
people of this country are always and everywhere remarkable; but I believe,
if I know myself, that I did suppose I was doing something to repay the
country for much that she had done for me. Sir, often and again, wandering
sometimes beneath
"Where Orizaba's purpled summit shone,"
sometimes by the dark pestilential river that marks the boundary between
the two countries, often and often have I wondered to myself whether I was
wandering and suffering there to spread slavery over an unwilling people. I
am not sorry to see that now that is rendered impossible. I am not sorry to
see that it is impossible, first, in the course of events; but if it were not so, I
know, if these propositions shall pass, that the foul blot of slavery never will
be extended over one foot of territory to be stolen or conquered by the
people of the United States.
But I am asked, "What do you say about New Mexico?" I will tell you in
twenty words. I am an older Republican than many of those I see around
me, who vote to-day differently from me; not a better but an older. I voted
in 1850, on the floor of the other House, against the compromise measures
of that year. I did so, among other reasons, because I was not willing that
Utah and New Mexico should become slave or free according to the wishes
of their people, believing as I did then (I have changed my opinion in some
respects since), that that was not best for the whole country. Contrary to my
wishes, those compromise measures prevailed. New Mexico is nominally
now, I believe, a slave Territory; that is, to use the words of the
distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. S     ], there are some twenty
slaves in the whole Territory. There they may, they probably will, remain. I
submit to my people a proposition, that if they approve it as a compromise,
as a concession, for peace for the Union, as it happens that that little
Territory includes all that possibly can be slave territory, they will let it
alone till the people are able and willing to make their own State
constitution. That is all. Do I state it fairly? Does it go beyond that?
First, I contend that I give up but little. I give it up, as I understand, for
purposes of freedom; and the distinguished Senators from Virginia agree
with me. They say, in substance, that I am getting a great deal more than I
give; and I confess, taking that view of the subject, at least in part, I wonder
that a good many more of my Republican friends do not go with me.
Again: it is said on the Republican side that we protect slavery. In one sense
we do, and in another sense we do not. In the offensive idea to me and to
you of protecting slavery, I do no such thing, and I would die first. When
the resolutions of the Senator from Kentucky were up the other day, I voted
for the amendment of the other Senator from Kentucky [Mr. P     ], in
order to make them clear, to show what I was voting against. I was
unwilling that territory hereafter to be acquired should be rendered slave
territory; and I put that proposition distinctly in it, in order that when I
voted against them, it might be seen why and how I did it. As I have said,
this proposition renders that impossible. First, it refers only to the territory
we now possess; that is, New Mexico alone. As to the territory north of 36°
30´, I need not speak. We know that God Almighty has registered a decree
in Heaven that that shall never be slave. We, on our part, want no W     
proviso there; we all agree that we are willing to let it alone. South, there is
but the barren Territory of New Mexico. Beyond that, who knows? If we
are to acquire it, we are to acquire it by this proposition, by the assent of a
majority of the States of both sections and two-thirds of the whole; and I do
not know a man living who believes that with that proposition incorporated
in the Constitution, slavery is probable, or even possible.
Therefore, Mr. President, I agree that in the compromise I, as a Republican,
do give up to that extent, and no more, what I have said; but doing that, I
believe that I consecrate all the territory between here and Cape Horn to
freedom, with all its blessings, forever and forever.
So far, sir, as the discussion as to the meaning of this phrase about the
common law is concerned, I do not care to indulge in it, and for this simple
reason: first, according to the legal view of the Senator from Ohio,
everybody knows that this expression, "the course of the common law,"
means the duly established forms of procedure known to the courts; that is
all. In the next place, I am not afraid of the common law. I have been reared
under it. With all its imperfections, and they are many, I love it. While it
may be an objection to Virginia to quote it, to me it is full of guardianship
and blessing. I do not stop to talk about the Somerset case, nor the decision
in Salkeld, nor the Modern Reports. It is enough for me that I know, taking
the whole proposition together, that slavery is impossible beyond where it
now is, and, as a Republican, I can justify myself to my conscience in
giving that vote.
Mr. President, I add very few more words. I should have been excessively
pleased, as a partisan and a man, if the inauguration of Mr. L       could
be one at which all the States would attend with the old good feeling, and
with the old good humor. I have seen six States separate themselves, as they
say, from us, and form a new confederacy, with great pain and greater
surprise. I cannot shut my eyes, if I would, to the existing state of things. I
listen to the warning of my friend from Kentucky. I listen to the warning of
my friend from Tennessee. I have been in both States. I know something of
their people. I believe that there, even there, the Union is in danger; and I
believe if we break up here without some attempt to reconcile them to us,
and us to them, many of the predictions of friends and foes as to the danger
will be accomplished. I said, in the earlier part of the session—I repeat it—I
would yield nothing to secession. When the Representatives from South
Carolina and Mississippi and Alabama and Louisiana came here invoking
war, telling us that if we did not yield to them they would secede, they
would confederate with foreign Governments, they would break this Union,
they would hold us as aliens and strangers and enemies, I believed then, as I
believe now, that that was too dear a price to pay even for Union and peace;
but to-day the case is altered. Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, reiterate their
love for the Union. They tell us in unmistakable terms that they desire to
remain; and in every county, nay, in every township of those States, we
have staunch and true and ardent friends who would be willing to seal their
devotion to this Union with their blood. It is they to whose appeal I would
listen. It is from them that I would take counsel and advice; and when they
tell me, "pass these resolutions; they are resolutions of peace; submit them
to your people; listen to what ours say in reply; if it appears to you at the
polls that these resolutions will produce peace, restore union, create or
renew fraternal, kindly feeling, pass them; let us settle this question, and be
one people," I agree; with all my heart, I will do it.
Now, as I close, let me ask what evil; who will be hurt? Suppose, when I get
home, I find that the Senators from Virginia are on the stump and they are
convincing their people that they are a great deal worse off; the more they
convince Virginia that she is worse off, the more Pennsylvania and New
York will be convinced that they are better off; and every argument they
make against it in Virginia will have a twofold weight North and West. I
could not make half as good a speech in favor of these propositions of
Union, even in Oregon, or California, or Illinois—I speak of the States I
know best—as I should make if I were to read their objections to these
propositions.
But suppose—which I do not think possible—they could succeed, not only
in Virginia (which I do not believe), but in Kentucky and Tennessee;
suppose they were to swear, by the throne of God, they would not take
them, but would dissolve and go off whether we passed them or not: we
could very easily refuse to vote for them and be in as good a condition as
we are to-day, and, in the mean time, next Monday, Mr. L       will be
inaugurated. I desire to see around him thronging, nay forming the
procession, every augury of hope and peace.
I expect to hear from his lips words of manly trust and confidence in the
Union, and of concession, kindness to all its constituent parts. I have hoped
that, in response to what he shall say, I shall hear from every part of what is
now acknowledged everywhere yet as our Confederacy, a perpetual hymn
of hope and praise rising from all parts of the Union; and, above all things
else, I have hope and trust in time and patience. Therefore it is that I shall
do no harm.
I know that there are very excited feelings upon this subject North and
South. I understand that Massachusetts, an honored State—let me say, to
qualify what I am going to say, first, that I believe that Massachusetts is the
pattern of a community in the world; as well represented here as any State
can be; representing herself better than anybody else can do it for her—I
know that there are excited feelings in Massachusetts, and I think she has
good cause. The act that more than any other else, perhaps, leads to this
proposition of a Peace Convention—that "Congress shall provide by law for
securing to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States"—was an act which I abhorred and condemned
from the beginning, and which I am not sorry to perceive that
Massachusetts remembers now. Many gentlemen on the floor know to what
I allude. On the other hand, South Carolina and Louisiana are ferocious for
disunion; and I am afraid that their young men do want war. There is not
excitement enough on the plantation and the farm, and in the streets of the
towns; but they really want contest, excitement, and bloodshed. What they
want I do not; I am trying to keep from it. I do not apprehend, therefore,
that the sentiments which I have expressed here to-day will meet the
approbation of the extreme men upon either side. I have no doubt my
republicanism may be doubted. I think I can see in the look of my friend on
my left now [Mr. K   ] that he has various convictions that I am very far
from being sound in the faith. [Laughter.] Sir, it may be. I come from the
midst of a people not directly concerned in this controversy; a population
about half northern, half southern. We have intermarried together. Our
interests, our fears, our hopes, our recollections, are mingled North and
South; and I believe I am expressing their opinions—which perhaps form
my own—when I say that I can see no possible harm to anybody anywhere
in submitting these propositions to the people, who are, and ought to be,
sovereign.
Besides, sir, what else can I do? As I sit down, let me ask Senators upon
every side, what else can any of us do? Shall we sit here for three months,
when petition, resolution, public meeting, speech, acclamation, tumult, is
heard, seen, and felt on every side, and do nothing? Shall State after State
go out, and not warn us of danger? Shall Senators and Representatives,
patriotic, eloquent, venerable, tell us, again and again, of danger in their
States, and we condescend to make no reply?
Sir, there is other business to be done here besides the mere ordinary
business of the Government; besides the voting of supplies, and the raising
of means by which to buy them. We have questions here to-day, as I
believe, of peace and war, and I have waited long to see some mode of their
solution. I repeat, I go for this proposition, and agree to submit it to the vote
of the people, not because I believe it the best that can be done. I believe,
however, that, to-day being two days from the close of this session, it is all I
can do. When my people ask me, on my return, "Sir, have not States gone
out?" I will say, "Yes." "Do not more threaten it?" if that is the word (I trust
it is not the best one), I say, "Yes." They say, "Sir, do you believe they will
do it?" "On my honor and on my conscience," I say, "if something is not
done, yes." They then ask, "What have you done?" Mr. President, what have
we done? I believe that is the question the country will ask of us; and I, for
one, will vote for this proposition, that I may be able to respond.
Mr. GREEN:—Mr. President, I regard the consideration of this question as
one of the most important which has ever been presented to the Senate since
I have been a member of it. The Union is in danger; the fate of the country
is at stake; and whatever the Senate or the House of Representatives or
Congress combined can do, ought to be done to save the country. I have
very little faith or hope, and I would express the reason why. But as little as
there is, I will cling to the last remaining straw, and sink with it grasped fast
in my hands, if I have no other resource. This country is of too much
importance to me, to my family, to my friends, to my State, to my
associates everywhere, to give up without a struggle. That struggle may
prove to be fruitless; it may prove to be unavailing. The taunts and jeers
thrown out are calculated to stir up ire and ill-feeling; I shall pass them by
with disregard. I choose to sacrifice my feelings, and to make myself a
burnt-offering on the altar, if I can do any thing to save the country.
What, then, shall we do? These propositions, presented by what is called the
Peace Conference, are not to be compared to the propositions of the Senator
from Kentucky; and I will not vote for a single one of them, while I will
vote for his. They amount to a sacrifice of my honor, and a destruction of
the rights of my State. I am permitted to say that the representatives from
my State in the Peace Conference condemned them all, while they are
willing to go for the proposition of the Senator from Kentucky. We cannot
stand by this, and we will not.
Let us not deceive each other; let us not undertake to practice a system of
deception which will sound pleasant to the ear, but will be bitter to the taste.
I will not do it. Here is a positive prohibition of slavery north of 36° 30´,
and then a doubtful question whether it is recognized south of 36° 30´. The
Senator from Kentucky thinks it is; but I will not act upon a doubt. We have
had too many doubts heretofore, and out of those doubts have grown many
difficulties. I shall never permit, so far as my action is concerned, another
question of doubt.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—Will the gentleman allow me to interrupt him? Did
he understand me as admitting that it was a doubtful recognition of slavery?
Mr. GREEN:—Not at all. I said expressly that the Senator from Kentucky
contended that it did amount to a recognition, but others denied it, and that
made it a question of doubt. I will not misrepresent anybody if I know it.
Now, sir, I will not act upon a question which admits of doubt. We have
passed along in our career for so many years that we have arrived at a point
when we must understand each other distinctly and unequivocally, and I
will not leave a single point open to equivocation. It must be expressly
settled, and settled not only in express words, not only in unmistakable
language; but I go further than that; it must emanate from the hearts of a
people disposed to stand by it; and if they will not stand by it, I will not
associate with them.
I want to preserve this Union; I want to maintain the constitutional rights of
all classes, North and South; but to give me a mere written guarantee on
parchment, and file it in the office of the Secretary of State, with a
predetermination in the hearts and minds of the northern people inculcated
and instructed to violate it, I cannot live with, and I will not. I would rather
go where I naturally belong, with southern men; but if the true-hearted, the
patriotic, and the honorable portion of the North will reverse this inculcated
spirit of hostility to southern institutions, and bring them up to the mark
where they will recognize constitutional guarantees, then I say, "Hail, thou
my brother, we can go together;" but never till that comes to pass. We have
approached that period in our country's history when there should be no
cheating or attempt to cheat. We must understand each other, and make a
permanent, lasting Union, or a permanent, lasting, peaceful separation.
This proposition presented by the Peace Conference, as it is called, I think
the merest twaddle—and I use the term with entire respect to the members
—the merest twaddle that ever was presented to a thinking people. The
proposition of the Senator from Kentucky has some sense in it. If he
chooses to desert his own, I shall not complain of him; for I know that
warm, patriotic impulses move him in all his action; but I cannot accept the
other, and I shall vote against every one of its provisions. When it is said to
me that the territory south of 36° 30´ has adopted slavery—that New
Mexico has—I must reply to Senators that they misunderstand the law. New
Mexico has never adopted slavery. New Mexico has done this: she has
provided remedies for redress of wrongs, including wrongs affecting slave
property; but she has never established slavery; nor has Utah. Utah has
never even recognized it by implication. Utah passed a law of this
character: apprentices bound to service for a period of years may be held
there; but when their servitude has expired, according to their articles of
apprenticeship, they are free; so that the law of Utah absolutely, if it has any
effect, prohibits slavery.
Senators overlook these facts. I take the broad and the bold and the
unmistakable ground, not that the Constitution establishes slavery
anywhere, but that the Constitution, extending over a Territory, will protect
me in all my rights not prohibited by a local competent authority; that my
rights are to take any property which I own in any part of the Union,
Yankee clocks from the North, polar bears from the Rocky Mountains,
mules from the Middle States, and slaves from the South; and that, unless
there is a competent local authority to prohibit my rights in these respective
classes of property, I am to be protected. The second step is that there can
be no local authority as long as the territorial condition remains, competent
to prohibit slavery in any Territory.
These are my positions; and hence, so far from this extraordinary position
that slavery is local being true, the reverse is true. It may be local in the
United States, but so far from its being local to the Territory in the United
States, the reverse is true. Talk about freedom being national, and slavery
local! I have a right to pass through Pennsylvania, and my right of transit is
as perfect this day as it was when Pennsylvania was a slave State....
I have been anxious from the beginning of this session to stave off public
action, to hold the public pulse still, and give an opportunity for reaction of
northern sentiment. I want no reaction south. It has been my only hope, and
my last hope, and that hope has failed....
These resolutions are intended to lull old Virginia, Maryland, Missouri, and
Kentucky, until we are hand-cuffed and tied fast, and then action is to
commence. They are all designed simply to lull us into a fancied security;
but if we are wise betimes, and look forward to coming events, we will at
once strike the blow, and separate from a Confederation which denies us
peace, denies us protection, denies us our constitutional rights, and seek
them in some other association of States....
Now, Mr. President, I want all these propositions voted down, and I hope
my friend from Kentucky will revive his propositions and bring them up
again. There is some vitality in them; there is some point in them; but as for
these wishy-washy resolutions, that amount to nothing, it is impossible that
any Senator here will, for a moment, entertain the idea of supporting them.
The Peace Conference! And the smallest peace that ever I have heard of.
Let the Senator adhere to his original propositions; let the Senator bring
them up and press them upon the attention of the Senate. That is as far
backing down as I will go. It is a little more than I want; but still, as a last
effort to save the Union, I would go that far. Talk about these measures!
These measures that have no vitality—these measures that amount to a total
surrender of every principle—I never will vote for; and let the
consequences of the future be what they may, I stake my faith and
reputation upon the vote I intend to cast.
Mr. WADE:—I move that the Senate adjourn.
Mr. LANE:—I hope the Senator will give me the floor before he makes that
motion.
Mr. TRUMBULL:—I ask the Senator from Oregon to yield to me a
moment.
Mr. LANE:—For a motion to adjourn, I will.
Mr. TRUMBULL:—Yes, sir; I desire the floor with a view to make that
motion. It is apparent that no good is to come out of the discussion of the
proceedings of this Peace Conference. It is a proposition got up for the
purpose of satisfying the Border States; and the Border States, Missouri and
Virginia, say they will have none of it. The first section is a proposition
establishing slavery—
Mr. MASON:—I rise to a question of order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Senator from Illinois will pause. The
Senator from Virginia rises to a question of order, which he will state.
Mr. MASON:—I understand the motion to adjourn has been made.
Mr. TRUMBULL:—I have not made the motion yet. I stated that I would
make that motion, and I was merely going to give the reason. The Senator
from Oregon will have the floor to-morrow. I was stating the reason why I
should make the motion to adjourn, which I intend to make in the course of
a minute, and I merely made that statement to show that there was no object
in sitting here and punishing ourselves in regard to resolutions which
manifestly cannot command the assent of this body. I now move that the
Senate adjourn.
Mr. DOUGLAS:—I call for the yeas and nays on that motion.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
And the Senate refused to adjourn, and, for special business, the peace
propositions were set aside. The same day they were introduced, as follows:
Mr. LANE:—Mr. President, my object in getting the floor, was to give the
reason why I cannot vote for the resolution now before the Senate. You are
aware, sir, that I did vote for the propositions of the Senator from Kentucky
to amend the Constitution, with the hope, if they could be adopted, that
peace, perhaps, might be restored to the country; but those propositions
have been superseded, and the Senator from Kentucky himself says that he
is willing to sacrifice, on the altar of his country, as he terms it, his own
propositions, and take the amendments which are proposed to the
Constitution presented by the Peace Congress to the Senate. The resolutions
proposed by the distinguished Senator from Kentucky were as low down as
I could go. They did not secure to every State that right they have under the
Constitution, as I understand it; but the resolution now before the Senate, to
speak modestly, as I look at it, with all due respect to the great men who
met here to consider this matter, who deliberated for many days, and
presented this as the result of their deliberations, is a cheat, a deception, a
humbug—nothing that any State can take as a final settlement of the
questions that are now giving trouble to this country, nothing that can settle
permanently those difficulties. We must have something more definite,
something more certain, or there can be no Union even of the States that
now remain in the Union, as I believe.
Mr. GREEN:—Mr. President—
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—Does the Senator from Oregon give way?
Mr. LANE:—Only for an adjournment.
Mr. GREEN:—I rise to make that motion, that the Senate do now adjourn.
So the motion was agreed to; and the Senate by a vote—23 to 22—
adjourned.
March 2d.—Senator L    having secured the floor, made the following
speech on the report of the Peace Conference:
Mr. LANE:—Mr. President, I hope I shall be permitted to proceed without
interruption, and I trust not to consume much time. While I had the floor
yesterday, I stated some of my objections to the proposed amendments to
the Constitution which are now before us. They are: that they do not do
justice to the whole country—that they do not do justice to all the States. I
have always held that the territory is common property; that it belongs to all
the States; that every citizen of every State has an equal right to emigrate to,
and settle in, the common Territories; and that any species of property,
recognized as such in any State of the Confederacy, should have a like
recognition in the Territories, and be guaranteed, protected, and secured in
its full integrity, to the owner thereof. That this should be so, was the intent
of the revolutionary fathers who shaped and framed the Constitution; and it
was this principle, more, perhaps, than any other, which called into being
that noble compact, which has so long been a bond of Union and goodness
between all the States. It is the very life-blood and vitality of the
Constitution. It is the ligament that has held us together heretofore, and
which, if cut now, will result only in hopeless and immutable disruption. I
have never deviated a single iota from this correct doctrine. Had we lived
up to this equitable principle—the foundation upon which the Constitution
rests, upon which only this Union can be maintained—we should have had
no trouble in this country to-day. It is not my fault that trouble and
dissatisfaction prevail; it is not my fault that secession has taken place, and
that further secession will take place, unless Congress shall recognize this
great principle of justice, of right, and of equality. That is the doctrine upon
which this Union rests; and it must be maintained, or the connection will be
severed.
While upon this question, Mr. President, I may be permitted to allude to my
course in the Senate last session, and I shall do so very briefly, upon a series
of resolutions introduced by the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. D    ]—a
series of resolutions that were considered in this body, after having been
previously maturely and deliberately adopted by a caucus composed of the
Democratic Senators, and agreed upon by them, as setting forth the
principles necessary to be maintained in order to secure the existence and
perpetuity of this Confederacy. It has been charged upon this floor that, on
the 25th day of May last, I voted against the right of protection to slave
property in the Territories. In order that the Senate may know how I voted,
and that I may show you and every other man that I stood then as I stand to-
day, and as I have always stood upon this question, I will read some short
extracts from the discussion upon this series of resolutions. The fourth
resolution was in these words:
"Resolved, That neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature, whether by
direct legislation or legislation of an indirect and unfriendly nature,
possesses the power to annul or impair the constitutional right of any citizen
of the United States to take his slave property into the common Territories,
but it is the duty of the Federal Government there to afford for that, as for
other species of property, the needful protection; and if experience should at
any time prove that the judiciary does not possess power to insure adequate
protection, it will then become the duty of Congress to supply such
deficiency."
Now mark! this resolution states that all the property of all the people of
any State, whether slave or otherwise, has an equal right to protection; and
if experience should at any time prove that the courts had not the power to
afford that protection, then it was the duty of Congress to enact such laws as
were necessary to protect every man in his legal and rightful property, no
matter of what description or characteristic. Sir, not long since, upon this
floor, a Senator was hardy enough to say that I voted against protecting
property in Territories; and he desired to know what had happened that
States should be concerned; what had occurred to alarm the States that were
seceding from the Union? I will show you, sir, very briefly, what I said
upon that question then; and I will repeat it now, for I have never changed
my sentiments on this subject. No living man can assert, and in so doing tell
the truth, that I ever uttered a word against the equality of the States, and
their equal right in the common territory of our common country; and any
charge that I voted then to refuse protection to property in the territory is
false. I have always held that the territory belonged to all; that it was
acquired, as I knew, at the expense of the Southern States as well as of the
Northern; and upon the battle-fields where I had witnessed the good
conduct of Northern and Southern troops, I found the soldier from the
Southern States pouring out his blood as freely, and certainly in very much
larger quantity—for there were very many more from the Southern States
who participated in the battles of our country in the war which resulted in
the acquisition of territory, than there were from the Northern States. Then,
so far as the acquisition is concerned, it is joint, and it was for the joint
benefit of all portions of the country. Consequently, I have held, and I hold
now, that the Territories should be so appropriated. And when those
resolutions were up last winter, I said what I will now read:
"I only desire to say, in relation to the series of resolutions, a portion of
which I have already voted in favor of, that I shall vote in favor of the rest;
for the whole of them together meet with my hearty approbation. They
assert the truth; they assert the great principle that the constitutional rights
of the States are equal; that the States have equal rights in this country
under the Constitution; and, as I understand it, they must be maintained in
that equality. These resolutions only assert that principle; and I say that it is
a misfortune to the country, in my opinion, that the principles laid down in
these resolutions had not been asserted sooner. They ought to have been
asserted by the Democratic party in plain English ten years ago. If they had
been, you would have had no trouble in this country to-day; the Democratic
party would have been united and strong, and the equality and
constitutional rights of the States would have been maintained in the
territory, and in all other things; squatter-sovereignty would not have been
heard of, and to-day we should be united. It is the fault of the Democratic
party in dodging truth, in dodging principle, in dodging the Constitution
itself, that has brought the trouble upon the country and the party that is
experienced to-day."
I believe, if we had asserted and maintained these great truths ten years ago,
and placed ourselves upon them boldly, as it was our duty to have done, we
would have no trouble in this country to-day; but instead of declaring the
great truths enunciated in these resolutions, we went off upon issues
unbecoming the Democratic party. A portion of our leaders wandered and
went astray, and asserted that the people of a Territory had the right to
prohibit slavery whenever, in their judgment, it ought to be prohibited; a
power which Congress even does not possess, and consequently cannot
confer upon a Territorial Legislature, unless the creature becomes greater
than the creator. It was this kind of trouble, and this sort of heresy
introduced into the Democratic party, that has broken it up, and brought the
disasters upon our country which we experience to-day. I say, then, let the
blame fall upon the guilty; I am innocent of it; for I have held but one
doctrine upon this question from the beginning to the present hour, and I
shall hold that doctrine to the end. In the speech from which I have already
read, I also used the following language:
"Sir, it appears to me to be very singular indeed, that any man can hold that
the territory of this country belongs to a portion of the people, and that the
people of one portion of the Union can go there and enjoy their property,
when the people of another portion cannot enjoy the right of property in that
territory—territory common to the whole country; territory that was earned
or acquired by the common blood and common treasure of all; territory that
is sustained by the common treasure of all; and to say that all shall not have
an equal right there, is to deny a fact so plain, a principle so just, a right so
manifest, that I can hardly see how any man who professes to be a
Democrat can deny it, or how he can attempt to embarrass the adoption of
the correct principles announced in these resolutions. I shall therefore vote
against all the amendments, and every thing that is offered to obstruct their
passage, upon the ground that they assert justice, that they assert truth, that
they assert the equality and constitutional rights of all the States, which
principle must be maintained, or this Union cannot be preserved."
That was my doctrine then, it is the doctrine which I have held and
advocated for twenty years. It is the doctrine I hold now; and I so notified
the Senator from Tennessee, who arraigned me here as voting against
protecting property, and who did me willful and gross injustice in it—for I
voted for it and he voted against it. That is to say, I voted against the
resolution introduced by Mr. C       , declaring "that slave property did
not need protection in the Territories," while the Senator from Tennessee
voted for it; and when the motion was made to reconsider the vote adopting
it in lieu of the fourth resolution of the D     series, I voted to reconsider,
and the Senator from Tennessee voted against it, showing clearly that he
was against affording that protection to slave property which the fourth
resolution provided for. Did I not maintain the truth? Was I not prophetic in
the announcement that I made in this Senate Chamber then? I said, that
unless this great principle of justice, of equality, of the right of every man to
the common territory should be maintained, this Union would be broken up.
This great principle has not been maintained, but the Union has been
destroyed.
But, sir, to go to the votes. It will be borne in mind, and every Senator on
this floor will bear me out in my statement, that while the D     resolutions
—the series of which I speak—were up, various propositions were made to
amend them, and I voted against all amendments. There are Senators here at
this moment who will sustain me when I say that, when in caucus and we
had under consideration this series of resolutions, I said, and said it boldly
and in plain terms, that if every man from every Southern State of this
Union would come here and say, for the sake of peace, if you please, or any
other reason, he was willing to abandon his equality, his right in the
common territory, then, if alone, I would stand and protest against it; protest
that he had no right to surrender a constitutional right; that none but a
coward would do it; that every man had a right in the common territory;
that it was his privilege, and he should never surrender it with my
permission. On the other hand, I said that if every Northern man in the
Senate Chamber—nay, but even every Northern citizen—expressed a desire
to surrender his right, his equality, his privilege, to go to the common
Territories with his property, I should enter my solemn protest against it,
and insist that he had a constitutional right to go there, which he should
never surrender with my consent. Then, how any man could assert that I
ever entertained the opinion that slavery did not need protection from
aggression, is to me the strangest, falsest thing in nature. I said, as I have
shown you, that I had voted against all amendments, and would continue to
vote against all amendments, or any attempt whatsoever calculated to
obstruct the passage of the resolutions; for they asserted the right of the
people to go to the Territories, asserted the power of the court to protect
them in the possession of their property, and that if the court failed to
protect them, Congress should afford the necessary authority to do so.
But, sir, allow me to observe, there was a resolution that I never voted for,
and that no man can charge me with ever having voted for. Senators will
recollect—and whoever has read the proceedings of the Senate will
recollect—that an amendment was offered as a substitute to the fourth
resolution, in these words:
"That the existing condition of the Territories does not require the
intervention of Congress for the protection of property in slaves."
I did not vote for that resolution; but the Senator from Tennessee did. That
amendment was adopted in lieu of the fourth resolution of the series that I
have read, which insured protection to slave property in the Territories. It
was adopted not entirely by Democratic votes; and that there may be no
mistake, I will read what the Senator from Massachusetts said when he
moved a reconsideration:
"I wish simply to say that I voted for that resolution because I believed the
condition of the Territories requires no such law now or ever, and I do not
believe in the enactment of any such law; but my friends on this side of the
Chamber have put that resolution in the series; and for myself, I do not wish
to be responsible for any portion of these resolutions, and I therefore wish
the vote to be reconsidered."
This was the language of the Senator from Massachusetts, when he found
that the Republicans, united with some Democrats, had stricken out the
fourth resolution of the series, and inserted this as a substitute. I said to Mr.
W      on that occasion:
"I desire merely to tender my thanks to the honorable Senator from
Massachusetts. The series of resolutions, as introduced by the honorable
Senator from Mississippi, are germane one to the other. They are a
declaration of principles by the Democratic party. This amendment, as the
Senator has said correctly, has been fastened on the Democratic resolutions
by the votes of the Republican Senators. I feel grateful, indeed, to the
Senator for making the motion to reconsider. I hope the vote will be
reconsidered, and the resolution voted down."
The motion was put, and on the yeas and nays the vote was reconsidered. I
voted for the reconsideration, and I voted against the amendment when it
was adopted as a substitute for the fourth resolution. Among those who
voted in the affirmative for reconsideration were Messrs. B       ,
B    , C      , C   , D    , F          , G    , G   , H      ,
H     , H     , I      , J       of Arkansas, and L   . Among those
who voted against it, I find J       of Tennessee. I did not vote to
continue in the series a resolution that refused protection to all the people in
the common Territories. Portions of the Journal have been paraded to show
the vote on Mr. B    '  amendment to Mr. C       '  amendment. I
said, in several speeches, that I should vote against all amendments,
because the series had been considered not only here, but in a caucus
composed of the Democratic Senators of this body, and we had agreed to
take them as a whole, and to vote them through altogether if we had the
strength to do so. I voted against every proposition to amend. I voted
against Mr. B    ' , and I voted against Mr. C       ' , and I voted
against every other amendment that was calculated to weaken or embarrass
the passage of the resolutions. Yet I am represented here as having voted
against affording protection to slave property in the Territories! I ask again,
if any Senator, if any man who can read, can say that the fourth resolution,
for which I did vote and for which I struggled and contended, does not
declare that slave property shall be protected in the common Territories of
our country.
Could any thing be stronger than the fourth resolution? Could any man
desire a more direct declaration of principles than that? Upon the yeas and
nays I voted for it. I voted against the amendment that was adopted, and
afterwards reconsidered. How, then, can a man arraign me before the
country as having said upon oath, on the 25th of May last, that slave
property should not be protected in the common Territories with other
property? I have always held that all property should be protected, slave as
well as other property; that it should have the same protection as, and no
more protection than any other property. That they do not secure all this, is
the objection I have to the amendments to the Constitution proposed by the
Peace Conference. They are ambiguous, loose, and deceptive. I do not
know that the people can comprehend them. There will be no certainty
under them; and they would, if adopted, result in endless trouble and
litigation. I trust no amendments will ever be made to the Constitution,
unless they are made upon principles of right, justice, and equality, so that
there can be no mistake in construing them hereafter. If we amend the
Constitution, let us do it with a view to the peace of the country, with a
view to the harmony of the country, with a view to the security of every
interest, and of every State in the Union. If we could do that, and this day
amend the Constitution so as to provide expressly that every State should
have equal rights in the Territories and elsewhere within the Union, this
Confederacy would last forever, the States that have left us would come
back, and we should have then a great and a lasting Union indeed. Without
it, we never can have a permanent Union. We must do something that is
clearly right, or the States that have left us will never return. They never
ought to return, unless they can have the right of equality secured to them
by the Constitution. I claim for my State just that which she is entitled to,
and not a particle more. I would concede to the Southern States, that to
which they are entitled, and not a particle more. That, they must have, or
there can be no peace, no union, no harmony, no security, and no perpetuity
of this Confederacy. Such amendments to the Constitution, securing these
objects and principles, are indispensable to the maintenance of the
Government as it was formed.
Then why not do right? Why not every southern man ask just that which he
is entitled to, and no more? He ought to be content with nothing short of
what he is entitled to; and if he be, he is untrue to his section and his
constituents; untrue to the people whose servant he is; and untrue to the
institutions of the country; for the country can exist only upon the triumph
of such principles. He who is unwilling to deal fairly by the North and the
South, is a man who is guilty of shattering and ruining the Confederacy;
destroying the peace and harmony and success of this great experiment of
ours.
Mr. President, in the State of Connecticut the Democracy assert the correct
principle, and they charge the trouble in the country to the right quarter. I
stated, on a former occasion, that the Democracy of old Connecticut would
never join the Republican party in any attempt to coerce the Southern
States; and I am now authorized by their own declaration to say again, what
I said before, that they, like the Democracy of Oregon and of every other
Northern State, will never join a party that has refused justice; that has
refused equality and right; that has refused to protect property in the
Territories, or wherever the jurisdiction of the United States extends, in
putting down those who contended for their rights and for the equality to
which they were entitled. Sir, the loyal Democracy of this country fully
understand the question, and they assert the right.
Now, sir, these great principles were not carried out. The platform on which
the Democracy presented their candidates for President and Vice-President
was not heeded, though based upon the Constitution. I will say to the
Senator who has boasted of his efforts in Tennessee in behalf of the
B            ticket, that I shall notice that hereafter; but I have only to
say now, that, for the sake of the country, I would to God the ticket had
succeeded. We should then have had those principles endorsed upon which
the Government is established, and the country would have been at peace.
For that alone I wished it to succeed.
I will say only a word, now, as to the amendments proposed to the
Constitution. I had the pleasure of listening, yesterday, to the distinguished
Senator from Kentucky. I know his patriotism and his devotion to the
Union. I know his willingness to take any thing, however small, however
trifling, however little it might be, that would, in his opinion, give peace to
the country. Sir, I am actuated by no such feeling. We should never
compromise principle nor sacrifice the eternal foundations of justice.
Whenever the Democratic party compromised principle it laid the
foundation of future troubles for itself and for the country. When we do,
then, amend the Constitution, it ought to be in the spirit of right and justice
to all men and to all sections. I voted for the Senator's propositions, and I
will do so again, if we can get a vote, because there is something in them;
something that I could stand by; but there is nothing in the amendments
proposed by the Peace Conference. He proposed to establish the line of 36°
30´, and to prohibit slavery north of it and protect it south of it, in all the
present territory, or of the territory to be hereafter acquired. In that
proposition there was something like justice and right; but there is nothing
in the amendments proposed by the Peace Conference that any man, North
or South, ought to take. They are a cheat; they are a deception; they are a
fraud; they hold out a false idea; and I think, with all due respect to the
Senator—for I have the highest regard for him personally—that he is too
anxious to heal the trouble that exists in the country. He had better place
himself upon the right and stand by it. Let him contend, with me, for the
inalienable and constitutional rights of every American citizen. Let him
beware of "compromising" away the vital rights, privileges, and immunities
of one portion of the country to appease the graceless, unrelenting, and
hostile fanaticism of another portion. Let him labor with me, to influence
every State to mind its own affairs, and to keep the Territories entirely free
to the enterprise of all, with equal security and protection—without
invidious distinctions—to the property of every citizen. Thus, and only
thus, can we have peace, happiness, and eternal Union.
I could not avoid noticing the anxiety of the Senator from Kentucky to
accept any thing, and the readiness of the Senator from Oregon to pledge
his people—"my people"—to any thing that he chooses. Now, I know there
are many free people in the State of Oregon. They generally do as they
please. They have no master. No man owns them; and no man can claim to
control them. But this I am warranted in asserting—for I know long, well,
and intimately, the gallant men of Oregon—that they will not be found
ready or inclined, at the Senator's and his masters beck, to imbrue their
hands, in a godless cause, in fraternal gore.
Mr. President, the principles asserted in the resolutions adopted by the
Senate, last winter, have not been carried out. We see the consequences. We
see a dissevered country and a divided Union. A number of the States have
gone off, have formed an independent Government; it is in existence, and
the States composing it will never come back to you, unless you say in plain
English, in your amendments to the Constitution, that every State in the
future Union has an equal right to the Territories and all the protection and
blessings of this Government—never! I tell you, sir, although some foolish
men and some wicked ones may say I am a disunionist, I am for the Union
upon the principles of the Constitution, and not a traitor. None but a coward
will even think me a traitor; and if anybody thinks I am, let him test me.
This Union could exist upon the principles that I have held and that are set
forth in the D     resolutions; but upon no other condition can it exist.
Then, sir, disunion is inevitable. It is not going to stop with the seven States
that are out. No, sir; my word for it, unless you do something more than is
proposed in this proposition, old Virginia will go out too—slothful as she
has been, and tardy as she seems in appreciating her own interests and her
rights, and kind and generous as she has been in inviting a Peace Congress
to agree upon measures of safety for the Union. The time will come,
however, when old Virginia will stand trifling and chicanery no longer.
Neither will North Carolina suffer it. None of the slave States will endure it;
for they cannot separate one from the other, and they will not. They will go
out of this Union and into one of their own; forming a great, homogeneous,
and glorious Southern Confederacy. It is and it has been, Senators, in your
power to prevent this; it is and it has been for you to say (you might to-day,
as it is the last day, say so), whether the Union shall be saved or not. I know,
that gallant Old Dominion will never put up with less than her rights; and if
she would, I should entertain for her contempt. I should feel contempt for
her if she were to ask for any thing more than her rights; and so I would if
she were to put up with any thing less than her constitutional rights. Then,
sir, secession has taken place, and it will go on unless we do right.
Mr. President, in the remarks which I made on the 19th of December last, in
reply to the Senator from Tennessee, I took the ground that a State might
rightfully secede from the Union when she could no longer remain in it on
an equal footing with the other States; in other words, when her continuance
as a member of the Confederacy involved the sacrifice of her constitutional
rights, safety, and honor. This right I deduced from the theory of equality of
the States, upon which rests the whole fabric of our unrivalled system of
government—unrivalled, as it came from the hands of its illustrious framers
—a model as perfect, perhaps, as human wisdom could devise, securing to
all the blessings of civil and religious liberty, when rightly understood and
properly administered; but like all other Governments, and even
Christianity itself, a most dangerous engine of oppression when, having
fallen into the hands of persons strangers to its spirit, and unmindful of the
beneficent objects for which it was framed, it is perverted from its high and
noble mission to the base uses of a selfish or sectional ambition, or a blind
and bigoted fanaticism. I said, on that occasion—referring to this
fundamental principle of our Government, the equality of the States—that
"as long as this equality be maintained the Union will endure, and no
longer." I might here undertake to enforce, by argument and the authority of
writers on the nature and purposes of our Government, this, to me, self-
evident proposition. But I deem it unnecessary to consume the time of the
Senate in discussing that branch of the subject.
I propose, Mr. President, to confine what I have to say in regard to the right
of secession to the question, Who must judge whether such right exists, and
when it should be exercised? According to the theory of every despotic
Government, of ancient or modern times, there is no such right. A province
of an empire, how much soever oppressed, is held by the oppressor as an
integral part of his dominions. The yoke, once fastened on the neck of the
subject, is expected, however galling, to be worn with patience and entire
submission to the tyrant's will. This is the theory of despotism. What are its
fruits? We have seen, in modern times, some of the bloodiest struggles
recorded in history growing out of the assertion by one party, and the denial
by the other, of this very right. Hungary undertook to "secede" from the
Austrian empire. Her right to do so was denied. She constituted an integral
part of the empire—a great "consolidated" nation, as some consider the
United States to be. Being an integral part of the empire, according to the
theory of the Austrian Government, she must so remain forever. Austria not
having the power to enforce an acquiescence in this doctrine, Russian
legions were called to her aid; and Hungary, on whose gallant struggle for
independence the liberty-loving people of this country looked with so much
admiration and sympathy, soon lay prostrate and bleeding at the tyrant's
feet. You may call this attempt of Hungary to regain her independence
revolution. That is precisely what Austria called it. I call it an effort on her
part to peaceably secede—to peaceably dissolve her connection with a
Government which, in her judgment, had become intolerably unjust and
oppressive. Her oppressors told her it was not her province but theirs, to
judge of her alleged grievances; that to acknowledge the right of secession
would strike a fatal blow at the integrity of the empire, which could be
maintained only by enforcing the perfect obedience of each and every part.
We have, in the recent struggle of the Italian States, an instructive
commentary on the now mooted questions of secession and coercion.
Indeed, history, through all past ages, is but a record of the efforts of tyrants
to prevent the recognition of the doctrine, that a people deeming themselves
oppressed might peaceably absolve themselves from allegiance to their
oppressors. When our Government was formed, our fathers fondly thought
that they had made a great improvement on the despotic systems of modern
Europe. They saw the infinite evil resulting from coercing the unwilling
obedience of a subject to a Government which he abhorred and detested.
They accordingly declared the great truth, never enunciated until then, that
"Governments derive all their just power from the consent of the governed."
A Government without such consent they held to be a tyranny.
Now, Mr. President, this brings us to the very point in issue. Who is to
determine whether this consent is given or withheld? Must it be determined
by the ruler? If so, the proposition just stated is an absurdity. Clearly it was
the meaning of those who enunciated this great truth, that the subjects of a
Government have the right to declare or withhold their consent; otherwise
no such right exists. They, and they only, must judge whether their rights
are protected or violated. If protected, every consideration of interest and
safety impels them to consent to live under a Government which secures the
blessings they desire. If, on the other hand, in their judgment, their most
sacred rights are violated, interest and honor, and the instinct of self-
preservation, all conspire to impel them to withhold their consent; which
being withheld, the Government, as far as they are concerned, ceases.
Here I would call the attention of the Senate to the first of the Kentucky
resolutions of 1798-'99, written by Mr. J        , in which he says
distinctly, that the parties to a political compact must judge for themselves
of the mode and measure of redress, when they consider the compact
violated and their rights invaded:
"Resolved, That the several States composing the United States of America,
are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their General
Government; but that by compact, under the style and title of a Constitution
for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a
General Government for special purposes, delegated to that Government
certain definite powers, reserving, each State to itself, the residuary mass of
right to their own self-government; and that whensoever the General
Government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void,
and of no force; that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and is an
integral party; that this Government, created by this compact, was not made
the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself,
since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the
measure of its power; but that, as in all other cases of compact among
parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for
itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress."
Here Mr. J         asserts that a State aggrieved shall judge not only of the
mode, but the measure of redress. Is this treason? If the measure of redress
extends to secession, how can the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. J      ]
do less than denounce the great apostle of liberty—as Mr. J         has
been called—a traitor?
No less clear and explicit on this point, is the language of Mr. M      .
Being chairman of a committee to whom the subject was referred—the
resolutions having been returned by several of the States—he says in his
report:
"It appears to your committee to be a plain principle, founded in common
sense, illustrated by common practice, and essential to the nature of
compacts, that where resort can be had to no tribunal superior to the
authority of the parties, the parties themselves must be the rightful judges in
the last resort, whether the bargain made has been pursued or violated. The
Constitution of the United States was formed by the sanction of the States,
given by each in its sovereign capacity. It adds to the stability and dignity,
as well as to the authority of the Constitution, that it rests on this legitimate
and solid foundation. The States, then, being the parties to the
Constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of
necessity, that there can be no tribunal above their authority, to decide, in
the last resort, whether the compact made by them be violated, and
consequently that, as the parties to it, they must themselves decide, in the
last resort, such questions as may be of sufficient magnitude to require their
interposition."
In the remarks which I made on the 19th of December last, I referred to the
fact that Virginia, in accepting the Constitution, declared that the powers
granted under that instrument "being derived from the people of the United
States, may be resumed by them whenever the same shall be perverted to
their injury or oppression." I referred, also, to the fact that New York had
adopted the Constitution upon the same condition and with the same
reservation. I may here quote the language of Mr. W      , distinctly
recognizing the right of the people to change their Government whenever
their interest or safety require it. He says:
"We see, therefore, from the commencement of the Government under
which we live, down to this late act of the State of New York"—
To which he had just referred—
"one uniform current of law, of precedent, and of practice, all going to
establish the point that changes in Government are to be brought about by
the will of the people, assembled under such legislative provisions as may
be necessary to ascertain that will truly and authentically."
If the people of a State, believing themselves oppressed, undertake to
establish a Government, independent of that to which they formerly owed
allegiance, and the latter interferes with the movement, and employs force
to prevent such a consummation, no one who acknowledges the great truth
that the basis of all free government is the "consent of the governed," will
deny that such interference is an act of usurpation and tyranny. Those only
who borrow their ideas of political justice from the despotic codes of
Europe, and are more imbued with the spirit of M          and B    
than of J         and M      , will attempt to justify, palliate, or excuse
such violation of the sacred rights of the people. I have observed that often
the noisiest champions of popular rights are the first to trample those rights
under foot. The word "freedom" is continually on the tongues of gentlemen
on the other side of the Chamber; and I believe the Senator from Tennessee
has been suspected of a decided leaning to agrarianism, so zealous has he
been in advocating the rights, so entirely devoted is he to the interests of the
"dear people." But now, when the people of the seceding States have
pronounced, in tones of thunder, the fiat which absolves them from
allegiance to a Government which they no longer respect or love, these
same gentlemen all lift their hands in horror, roll up the whites of their eyes,
as did old Lord N     many years ago, and exclaim "Treason!" "Treason!"
Then, boiling with patriotic rage, they rise up and declare that "this treason
must be punished; the laws must be enforced." History tells us that this was
the language of King G      and Lord N     when the colonies
renounced their allegiance to the mother country. The former of these
worthies, we are told, spent much of his life in a state of mental darkness—
in other words, he was a lunatic. The other received from nature a narrow
intellect, and inherited prejudices common to the aristocracy of that period
and of all other periods of the world's history. Their errors were the natural
offspring of incapacity and the false teaching received in their youth. While,
therefore, we cannot admire or approve their conduct, these circumstances
incline us more to sorrow than to anger, disarm our resentment, and dispose
us to forgive what, under other circumstances, would deserve the severest
censure.
But what excuse can we find for the peculiar champions of popular rights in
this Chamber; these zealous servants of the people, forever ringing in our
ears, "Let the voice of the people be heard; respect the will of the people;
vox populi vox Dei!" Sir, I say too, let the voice of the people be heard and
respected. And I think, for the sake of consistency with all my past
professions as a Democrat, I am bound to respect the declared will of the
sovereign States which, for reasons satisfactory to themselves, have seceded
from the Union and established a separate and independent Government.
Whatever the causes may have been which impelled them to a separation
from the other States, I am bound to respect the expression of their
sovereign will; and I heartily reprobate the policy of attempting to thwart
that will under the pretence of "punishing treason" and "enforcing the
laws." We are told that the design is to attempt nothing more than to collect
the revenue in the ports of the seceded States. To say nothing of the justice
or injustice of the attempt so to do, I ask Senators from the North, and the
Senator from Tennessee, will it pay? Will it not be a declaration of war
against the seceding States, involving the people of all the States in a long
and bloody conflict, ruinous to both sections? Are their ethics not the ethics
of the school-boy pugilist, "Knock the chip off my shoulder"?
One of the framers of the Constitution [Mr. M      ], whose expositions
of that instrument all classes, all parties, have heretofore received, and still
receive, or pretend to receive, with profound deference and respect, has left
on record his views of the injustice, impracticability, and inefficacy of force
as a means of coercing States into obedience to Federal authority.
Among the statesmen of the Revolution—those who participated in the
formation of our Government—there was no one who had such exalted
notions of the power and dignity of the Federal Government, as the great
H       . He was a consolidationist. The advocates of coercion might
naturally expect to obtain "aid and comfort" from the recorded declarations
of one of his peculiar political faith. But an examination of his writings will
show, that instead of favoring coercion, instead of being the advocate of
force, he was the advocate of leniency and conciliation towards refractory
States, and deprecated a resort to force as madness and folly.
If the great names of M       and H        have not sufficient weight to
restrain the madness of those who urge a coercive policy against the
seceding States, then, indeed, I see no escape from that most dreadful of all
calamities which can befall a nation—civil war. If those in this Chamber
who talk so flippantly of war, had seen, as it has been my lot to see, some of
its actual horrors, they might, perhaps, heed the warnings and respect the
counsels of the sages and patriots whose language I have quoted. They
would at least refrain from ungenerous insinuations against the patriotism
of those northern Democrats, who, like myself, reprobate the policy of
coercion as destructive of the peace, the prosperity, and happiness of every
part of the country, north as well as south.
But to return to the remarks of the Senator from Tennessee. In the pamphlet
report of his speech, page 7, J         is quoted; but the concluding part of
the quotation is repeated in the Globe report and not in that of the pamphlet.
That part is:
"When two parties make a compact, there results to each a power of
compelling the other to execute it."
J         is here quoted to show that the Confederation has a power to
enforce its articles on delinquent States. But the citation is unfortunate for
the Senator from Tennessee. He had just previously asserted that Vermont
and other States had, by personal liberty bills, violated the Constitution.
Well; can he tell us how Virginia and South Carolina could enforce the
Constitution on Vermont in that respect? It cannot be done. What follows?
Why, as Mr. W       said at Capon Springs, "a compact broken by one
party is broken as to all." Hence, according to the doctrines of J        
and W       as to the actual case which, according to the Senator, has
occurred, the compact having been broken, the Southern States have a right
to retire—are absolved from further obligations under the constitutional
compact.
The Senator complains that I replied at all, as I was a northern Senator, and
a Democrat whom he had supported at the last election for a high office.
Now, I was, as I stated at the time, surprised at the Senator's speech—
because I understood it to be for coercion, as I think it was by almost
everybody else, except, as we are now told, by the Senator himself; and I
still think it amounted to a coercion speech, notwithstanding the soft and
plausible phrases by which he describes it—a speech for the execution of
the laws and the protection of the Federal property. Sir, if there is, as I
contend, the right of secession, then, whenever a State exercises that right,
this Government has no laws in that State to execute, nor has it any property
in any such State that can be protected by the power of this Government. In
attempting, however, to substitute the smooth phrases of "executing the
laws" and "protecting public property" for coercion, for civil war, we have
an important concession, i.e., that this Government dare not go before the
people with a plain avowal of its real purposes, and of their consequences.
No, sir; the policy is to inveigle the people of the North into civil war, by
masking the design in smooth and ambiguous terms.
Now, sir, I want it distinctly understood, as I have already shown, that
during the last session I stood firmly by the D     resolutions. I voted
against every amendment. I voted against an amendment that he voted for,
because I believed it was partial, and did not do justice.
But the Senator from Tennessee proceeded with an air and tone of great
triumph to bring forward my vote on the amendments proposed to the D    
resolutions. I think I have said all that it is necessary for me to say upon that
subject. I have shown that I have voted for them under all circumstances,
and against every amendment. Those resolutions assert the right of property
in the Territories, and that when the courts fail to afford protection, then it is
the duty of Congress to come forward and provide that protection. I wished
to put slave property upon the same footing as other property. That is where
I then stood, where I now stand, and where I intend to stand. The Senator
asks, with a kind of triumphant air, what has happened since that day? Mr.
President, I have said that I have done all in my power, by standing firm to
the resolutions agreed to by the Democratic party, to afford protection. The
Senator misrepresented my vote on those resolutions. I never voted against
the D     resolutions, nor did their substitute ever come up as a separate
proposition. It was an amendment to one of that series of resolutions I voted
against; and I would vote against any thing and every thing that would
embarrass their passage, for they contained just what I thought was right.
What has happened since? Why, a thing has happened that never happened
before. The denial of any and all protection to slave property in any and in
all the territory; the denial of the right to take slave property to any of them
has been proclaimed and affirmed at the ballot-box by a majority of the
States, and a majority of the electoral votes of this Union. What has
happened? Why, the thing has happened that has been three times before
attempted, and three times before failed; the first attempt having
endangered the formation of the Union, and the second and third its
continuance. The first attempt was made in 1784, to exclude slavery from
all the Territories. It was abandoned in 1787 by excluding it only from the
territory northwest of the Ohio, leaving it to colonize that portion southwest
of that river. The same thing was again attempted in 1820, as to the territory
acquired from Louisiana; and after a terrible agitation, was abandoned by
adopting the Missouri line. The third attempt was made in 1850, as to the
territory acquired from Mexico; and then also the Union narrowly escaped
destruction; but the compromise measures were adopted. And now it comes
again, but in a more formidable way than ever. A President has been elected
on that issue; for the first time the people of the North, after all previous
compromises and warnings, have voted on the question, and every Northern
State has pronounced for the spoliation.
Mr. President, perhaps the most signal instance of the evils of compulsory
union between dissimilar people, is that of Ireland and England. The people
of Ireland—the home and heritage of my ancestors—have, as the South has,
a representation in the national Legislature; but being also, as the South is,
in a minority in that body, have no power to protect themselves from the
aggressions of England. The consequence is, that they have been excluded
from the common benefits of British legislation, commercially, and even
religiously, to say nothing of their exclusion from official station in the
empire. And, accordingly, Ireland has been impoverished, degraded, and
discontented. She has been trampled upon, outraged, insulted, treated like
Cinderella. The people of this country have always sympathized with the
wrongs of Ireland, and her struggles for independence. Yet there is now a
greater difference between the people of the South and of the North than
between those of England and Ireland, and greater antagonism of opinion
and feeling. Nevertheless, it is proposed to hold the South in political
subjection to the North, and for that purpose to employ naval and military
force.
Sir, I might mention many other cases: the subjection of Greece to Turkey;
of Poland to Russia; of the Netherlands to Spain; Italy to Austria. In all
these cases we have sympathized with, and, in many of them aided, the
secession from the common government, by contributions and individual
service. Yet those Governments were not founded on consent, and there was
no compact conceding the right of secession.
Sir, in conclusion, whether the course the seceding States have seen fit to
take be right or not, is a question which we must leave to posterity, and the
verdict of impartial history. Our time will probably be more profitably
employed in considering how we shall deal with secession than in
discussing the causes which have produced it. Secession, right or wrong,
justifiable or unjustifiable, is an accomplished fact; and it presents to us no
less an alternative than that of peace or war. Sir, I believe that, in the
general ruin which would follow coercive measures against the seceding
states, all sections, all classes, all the great interests of the country, without
any exception, would be involved. How much better, Mr. President, that, in
so fearful a crisis as the present, instead of passing "force bills," and
preparing for war, instead of "breathing threatenings and slaughter," and
preparing implements of destruction to be used against our brethren of the
South, how much better, I say, for ourselves, for posterity, for the cause of
civil liberty throughout the world, that our thoughts should be turned on
peace? Peace, not war, has brought our country to the high degree of
prosperity it now enjoys. The energies of the people up to this time have
been directed to the development of our boundless resources, to the
mechanic arts, to agriculture, mining, trade, and commerce with foreign
nations. Banish peace, turn these mighty energies of the people to the
prosecution of the dreadful work of mutual destruction, and soon cities in
ruins, fields desolate, the deserted marts of trade, the silent workshops,
gaunt famine stalking through the land, the earth cumbered with the bodies
of the dying and the dead, will bear awful testimony to the madness and
wickedness which, from the very summit of prosperity and happiness, are
plunging us headlong into an abyss of woe.
Sir, in God's name, let us have peace! If we cannot have it in the Union, as
it existed prior to November last, let us have it by cultivating friendly
relations with those States which have dissolved their connection with that
Union, and established a separate government. Though we and they may
not, and, perhaps, in the nature of things, cannot live harmoniously under
the same Government, it is our interest, no less than theirs, that we should at
once endeavor to establish between our Government and theirs those
amicable relations which should ever exist between two neighboring
Republics. War, with its attendant horrors, being thus happily averted, the
people of each Republic will be left at liberty to pursue, undisturbed, their
several vocations. A mutually advantageous commerce will grow up
between the two nations; treaties, such as regulate our intercourse with the
Canadas, will be formed; confidence in all branches of business will be
restored; a new impetus given to every variety of industry; the march of
improvement accelerated, and the cause of humanity, of civilization, and of
Christianity, advanced throughout the world. The people of Europe,
accustomed to refer the settlement of their slightest differences to the
bloody arbitrament of the sword, will behold with silent wonder and
amazement the spectacle of a great people unable to agree in reference to
one of their peculiar domestic institutions, peacefully separating, as did the
patriarchs of old; resolving themselves into two distinct political
communities, not hostile, discordant, belligerent; but each, animated with a
spirit of generous rivalry toward the other, pursuing a more successful and
prosperous career in its own chosen path, than when, united under the same
Federal head, they painfully sought together the same common destiny.
Mr. President, we are living at a day and at a time when a Northern
sectional party have obtained possession of the power of this great
Government, who have declared in their platform, in their speeches
everywhere, and in their press, that slavery shall never go into another foot
of territory; that no other slave State shall ever be admitted into this Union;
that slavery shall be put in the course of ultimate extinction. We have the
announcement of the party that the foot of a slave shall never press the soil
of one of the Territories; that no new slave State shall be admitted; and, in
addition to that, that no slave State shall go out of the Union. Who ever saw
such a party as that? Who ever knew any thing like it in the world before?
They will not let slavery go into the Territories; they will not let a slave
State come in; and they will not let one go out! They will not let them go
out because they could not carry out their programme of placing slavery in
the course of ultimate extinction. They want to keep the slave States in for
their benefit—to foot the bills, to pay the taxes—that they may govern them
as they see fit, and rule them against their will. Well, sir, I wish to say one
word to that party, in all kindness; for I shall not trouble them again on this
subject. I shall be a private, independent citizen before long. But I will say
to that party, they had better change their tactics; they had better change
front, and do it speedily. Let them place themselves upon the high ground of
right and justice, and adopt such amendments to the Constitution as will not
only hold old Kentucky, which has produced the greatest "compromiser" of
us all—that good old State where I was raised, and that I am proud of—but
the other Southern States also. I am afraid Republicanism will not do this. I
know those old Kentucky people from terrace to foundation. They will
endure much—very much—peaceably and quietly; but if they are goaded
too far; if, by repeated wrongs, they are compelled to fight, then I would say
to their enemy "beware!" There are chivalry and patriotism in Kentucky
which is neither in the power of accident nor nature to subdue. You had
better not press them too far. Do not drive them to the goal of last resort.
Give them justice while you have it in your power to do so. Satisfy them
that ultimately they shall have equality in this broken Government, or
Union, if you will. But, sir, I leave the patching up of the Constitution to the
distinguished Senator from Kentucky and other gentlemen, especially my
friend from Pennsylvania [Mr. B     ], who has labored harder to patch up
the Constitution than any man I ever knew, except my friend from
Kentucky, and I wish him God speed in the work. Let it be upon just
principles; let it be right; let us have justice; and I shall be content.
Now, Mr. President, I have paid all the attention to the attempt that was
made to place me in the wrong that I deem necessary. I can only now
repeat, in the conclusion of my speech, that neither the Senator from
Tennessee, nor any other Senator, nor can any man, tell the truth and say
that I have, by any vote, word, or act of mine, at any time or on any
occasion, refused protection to all property alike in the Territories. I have
made it a point always. Indeed, the doctrine of the equal right of property,
whether slave or any other, in the Territories, and its equal right to
protection, is as strong in me as life itself. I have never uttered a word
against that principle; but I have said, upon all occasions, that that doctrine
must be maintained, or this Union could not stand. I have fought for it; but
as I said in the outset, while I deeply deplore the condition of the country, it
has been caused by no act of mine. And with this remark, I part with him,
who, in imitation of Esau, seeks to sell his birthright. I would, if there was
time, give a little advice to all sides, to every Senator on this floor. I would
say: Senators come up to the great importance of this question; meet it;
adopt, by a two-thirds vote—as we could do if Senators would deal rightly
—amendments to the Constitution, placing all the States upon an equality in
the Territories, and on every other question; submit them to the people; and
by such amendments I believe we could prevent, or stop, a further rupture
of this Union.
In a reply to the speech of Senator L    of Oregon, the following remarks
on secession, coercion, the Territorial question, and the Peace Conference
propositions, are furnished by
Senator JOHNSON, of Tennessee:—Mr. President, it is painful for me to be
compelled, at this late hour of the session, to occupy any of the time of the
Senate upon the subject that has just been discussed by the Senator from
Oregon. Had it not been for the extraordinary speech he has made, and the
singular course he has taken, I should forbear from saying one word at this
late hour of the day and of the session. But, sir, it must be apparent, not only
to the Senate but to the whole country, that, either by accident or by design,
there has been an arrangement that any one who appeared in this Senate to
vindicate the Union of these States should be attacked. Why is it that no
one, in the Senate or out of it, who is in favor of the Union of these States,
has made an attack upon me? Why has it been left to those who have taken
both open and secret ground in violation of the Constitution, for the
disruption of the Government? Why has there been a concerted attack upon
me from the beginning of this discussion to the present moment, not even
confined to the ordinary courtesies of debate and of senatorial decorum? It
is a question which lifts itself above personalities. I care not from what
direction the Senator comes who indulges in personalities toward me; in
that, I feel that I am above him, and that he is my inferior. [Applause in the
galleries.] Mr. President, they are not arguments; they are the resort of men
whose minds are low and coarse. Cowper has well said:
"A truly sensible, well-bred man
Will not insult me; no other can."
Sir, have we reached a point at which we cannot talk about treason? Our
forefathers talked about it; they spoke of it in the Constitution of the
country; they have defined what treason was; is it an offence, is it a crime,
is it an insult to recite the Constitution that was made by W          and
his compatriots? What does the Constitution say:
"Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against
them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort."
There it is defined clearly that treason shall consist only in levying war
against the United States, and adhering to and giving aid and comfort to
their enemies. Who is it that has been engaged in conspiracies? Who is it
that has been engaged in making war upon the United States? Who is it that
has fired upon our flag? Who is it that has given instructions to take our
arsenals, to take our forts, to take our dock-yards, to take the public
property? In the language of the Constitution of the United States, have not
those who have been engaged in it been guilty of treason? We make a fair
issue. Show me who has been engaged in these conspiracies, who has fired
upon our flag, has given instructions to take our forts and our custom-
houses, our arsenals and our dock-yards, and I will show you a traitor.
[Applause in the galleries.]
Mr. President, if individuals were pointed out to me who were engaged in
nightly conspiracies, in secret conclaves, and issuing orders directing the
capture of our forts and the taking of our custom-houses, I would show who
were the traitors; and that being done, the persons pointed out coming
within the purview and scope of the provision of the Constitution which I
have read, were I the President of the United States, I would do as T     
J         did, in 1806, with A     B   ; I would have them arrested,
and, if convicted, within the meaning and scope of the Constitution, by the
Eternal G   I would execute them. Sir, treason must be punished. Its
enormity and the extent and depth of the offence must be made known. The
time is not distant, if this Government is preserved, its Constitution obeyed,
and its laws executed in every department, when something of this kind
must be done.
The Senator from Oregon, in his remarks, said that a mind that it required
six weeks to stuff could not know much of any thing. He intimated that I
had been stuffed. I made my speech on the 19th of December. The
gentleman replied. I made another speech, and now he has replied again;
and how long has he been "stuffing"? How often has he been "stuffed"?
[Laughter.] He has been stuffed twice; and if the stuffing operation was as
severe and laborious as the delivery has been, he has had a troublesome
time of it, for his travail has been great and the delivery remarkable.
[Laughter.]
We know how the Senator stands upon popular or squatter sovereignty. On
that subject he spoke at Concord, New Hampshire, where he maintained
that the inhabitants of the Territories were the best judges; that they were
the very people to settle all these questions; but when he came here, at the
last Congress, he could make a speech in which he repeated, I cannot tell
how many times, "the equality of the States, the rights of the States in the
Union, and their rights out of the Union;" and he thus shifted his course. If
the conflict between his speech made in Concord in 1856, and his speech
made here on the 25th day of May last, can be reconciled, according to all
rules of construction, it is fair to reconcile the conflict. If the discrepancy is
so great between his speech made then and his speech on the 25th of May
last, of course the discrepancy is against him; but I am willing to let one
speech set off the other, and to make honors easy, so far as speech-making
is concerned.
Then, how does the matter stand? There is one speech one way, and there is
another speech the other way. Now, we will come to the sticking point. You
have seen the equivocation to-day. You have seen the cuttle fish attempt to
becloud the water and elude the grasp of his pursuer. I intend to stick to you
here to-day, as close and as tight as what I think I have heard called
somewhere "Jew David's Adhesive Plaster." How does your vote stand as
compared with your speeches? Your speeches being easy, I shall throw in
the scale against you the weight of what you swore. How does that matter
stand? I intend to refer to the record. By referring to the record, it will be
found that Mr. C        offered the following as an amendment to the
fourth resolution of the series introduced by Mr. D    :
"Resolved, That the existing condition of the Territories of the United States
does not require the intervention of Congress for the protection of property
in slaves."
What was the vote on the amendment proposed to that resolution by Mr.
B    , to strike out the word "not." I want the Senator's attention, for I am
going to stick to him, and if he can get away from me he has got to
obliterate the records of his country. How would it read, to strike out the
word "not."
"That the existing condition of the Territories of the United States does
require the intervention of Congress for the protection of property in
slaves."
Among those who voted against striking out the word "not," who declared
that protection of slavery in the Territories by legislation of Congress was
unnecessary, was the Senator from Oregon. When was that? On the 25th
day of May last. The Senator, under the oath of his office, declared that
legislation was not necessary. Now where do we find him? Here is a
proposition to amend the Constitution, to protect the institution of slavery in
the States, and here is the proposition brought forward by the Peace
Conference, and we find the Senator standing against the one, and I believe
he recorded his vote against the other.
But, let us travel along. We have only applied one side of this plaster. The
Senator voted that it was not necessary to legislate by Congress for the
protection of slave property. Mr. B     then offered the amendment to the
resolution submitted by Mr. D    , to strike out all after the word
"resolved," and to insert in lieu thereof:
"That experience having already shown that the Constitution and the
common law, unaided by statutory enactment, do not afford adequate and
sufficient protection to slave property—some of the Territories having
failed, others having refused, to pass such enactments—it has become the
duty of Congress to interpose, and pass such laws as will afford to slave
property in the Territories that protection which is given to other kinds of
property."
We have heard a great deal said here to-day of "other kinds," and every
description of property. There is a naked, clear proposition. Mr. B    
says it is needed; that the court and the common law do not give ample
protection; and then the Senator from Oregon is called upon; but what is his
vote? We find, in the vote upon this amendment, that but three Senators
voted for it; and the Senator from Oregon records his vote, and says "no," it
shall not be established; and every Southern man, save three, voted against
it also. When was that? On the 25th day of May last. Here is an amendment,
now, to protect and secure the States against any encroachment upon the
institution within the States; and there the Senator from Oregon swore that
no further legislation was necessary to protect it in the Territories. Well, his
speeches in honors being easy, and he having sworn to it in the last
Congress, I am inclined to take his oath in preference to his speeches, and
one is a fair set-off against the other. Then, all the amendments being voted
down, the Senate came to the vote upon this resolution:
"That if experience should at any time prove that the judicial and executive
authority do not possess means to insure adequate protection to
constitutional rights in a Territory, and if the territorial government should
fail or refuse to provide the necessary remedies for that purpose, it will be
the duty of Congress to supply such deficiency, within the limits of its
constitutional powers."
Does not the resolution proceed upon the idea that it was not necessary
then; but if, hereafter, the Territories should refuse, and the courts and the
common law could not give ample protection, then it would be the duty of
Congress to do this thing? What has transpired since the 25th day of May
last? Is not the decision of the court with us? Is there not the Constitution
carrying it there? Why was not this resolution, declaring protection
necessary, passed during the last Congress? The Presidential election was
on hand.
I have been held up and indirectly censured, because I have stood by the
people; because I have advocated those measures that are sometimes called
demagogical. I would to G   that we had a few more men here who were
for the people in fact, and who would legislate in conformity with their will
and wishes. If we had, the difficulties and dangers that surround us now,
would be postponed and set aside; they would not be upon us. But in May
last, we could not vote that it was necessary to pass a slave code for the
Territories. Oh, no; the Presidential election was on hand. We were very
willing then to try to get northern votes; to secure their influence in the
passage of resolutions; and to crowd some men down, and let others up. It
was all very well then; but since the people have determined that somebody
else should be President of the United States, all at once the grape has got to
be very sour, and gentlemen do not have as good an opinion of the people
as they had before; we have changed our views about it. They have not
thought quite as well of us as we desired they should; and if I could not get
to be President or Vice-President of all these United States, rather than miss
it altogether, I would be perfectly willing to be President of a part; and
therefore we will divide—yes, we will divide. I am in favor of secession; of
breaking up the Union; of having the rights of the States out of the Union;
and as I signally failed in being President of all, as the people have decided
against me, we have reached that precise point of time at which the
Government ought to be broken up. It looks a little that way.
I have no disposition now, in concluding what little I am going to say, to
mutilate the dead, or add one single additional pang to the tortures of the
already politically damned. I am a humane man; I will not add one pang to
the intolerable sufferings of the distinguished Senator from Oregon.
[Laughter.] I sought no controversy with him; I have made no issue with
him; it has been forced upon me. How many have attacked me; and is there
a single man, North or South, who is in favor of this glorious Union, who
has dared to make an assault on me? Is there one? No; not one. But it is all
from secession; it is all from that usurpation where a reign of terror has
been going on.
I repeat, again, the Senator has made a set-to on me. I am satisfied if he is. I
am willing that his speech and mine shall go to the country, and let an
intelligent people read and understand, and see who is right and who is
wrong on this great issue.
But, sir, I alluded to the fact that secession has been brought about by
usurpation. During the last forty days, six States of this Confederacy have
been taken out of the Union; how? By the voice of the people? No; it is
demagogism to talk of the people. By the voice of the freemen of the
country? No. By whom has it been done? Have the people of South
Carolina passed upon the ordinance adopted by their Convention? No; but a
system of usurpation was instituted, and a reign of terror inaugurated. How
was it in Georgia? Have the people there passed upon the ordinance of
secession? No. We know that there was a powerful party there, of passive,
conservative men, who have been overslaughed, borne down; and tyranny
and usurpation have triumphed. A convention passed an ordinance to take
the State out of the Confederacy; and the very same convention appointed
delegates to go to a congress to make a constitution, without consulting the
people. So with Louisiana; so with Mississippi; so with all the six States
which have undertaken to form a new Confederacy. Have the people been
consulted? Not in a single instance. We are in the habit of saying that man is
capable of self-government; that he has the right, the unquestioned right, to
govern himself; but here, a government has been assumed over him; it has
been taken out of his hands, and at Montgomery a set of usurpers are
enthroned, legislating, and making constitutions and adopting them, without
consulting the freemen of the country. Do we not know it to be so? Have
the people of Alabama, of Georgia, of any of those States, passed upon it?
No; but a Constitution is adopted by those men, with a provision that it may
be changed by a vote of two-thirds. Four votes in a convention of six, can
change the whole organic law of a people constituting six States. Is not this
a coup d'état equal to any of Napoleon? Is it not a usurpation of the people's
rights? In some of those States, even our Stars and our Stripes have been
changed. One State has a palmetto, another has a pelican, and the last that I
can enumerate on this occasion, is one State that has the rattlesnake run up
as an emblem. On a former occasion I spoke of the origin of secession; and
I traced its early history to the garden of Eden, when the serpent's wile and
the serpent's wickedness beguiled and betrayed our first mother. After that
occurred, and they knew light and knowledge, when their Lord and Master
turned to them, they seceded, and hid themselves from his presence. The
serpent's wile, and the serpent's wickedness, first started secession; and
now, secession brings about a return of the serpent. Yes, sir; the wily
serpent, the rattlesnake, has been substituted as the emblem on the flag of
one of the seceding States; and that old flag, the Stars and the Stripes, under
which our fathers fought and bled and conquered, and achieved our rights
and our liberties, is pulled down and trailed in the dust, and the rattlesnake
substituted. Will the American people tolerate it? They will be indulgent;
time, I think, is wanted, but they will not submit to it.
A word more in conclusion. Give the Border States that security which they
desire, and the time will come when the other States will come back; when
they will be brought back—how? Not by the coercion of the Border States,
but by the coercion of the people; and those leaders who have taken them
out will fall beneath the indignation and the accumulating force of that
public opinion which will ultimately crush them. The gentlemen who have
taken those States out are not the men to bring them back.
I have already suggested that the idea may have entered into some minds,
"if we cannot get to be President and Vice-President of the whole United
States, we may divide the Government, set up a new establishment, have
new offices, and monopolize them ourselves when we take our States out."
Here we see a President made, a Vice-President made, cabinet officers
appointed, and yet the great mass of the people not consulted, nor their
assent obtained in any manner whatever. The people of the country ought to
be aroused to this condition of things; they ought to buckle on their armor;
and, as Tennessee has done (G   bless her!), by the exercise of the elective
franchise, by going to the ballot-box under a new set of leaders, they will
repudiate and put down those men who have carried these States out and
usurped a Government over their heads. I trust in G   that the old flag of
the Union will never be struck. I hope it may long wave, and that we may
long hear the national air sung:
"The star-spangled banner, long may it
wave,
O'er the land of the free and the home of
the brave!"
Long may we hear old Hail Columbia, that good old national air, played on
all our martial instruments! long may we hear, and never repudiate, the old
tune of Yankee Doodle! Long may wave that gallant old flag which went
through the Revolution, and which was borne by Tennessee and Kentucky
at the battle of New Orleans, upon that soil the right to navigate the
Mississippi near which they are now denied. Upon that bloody field the
Stars and Stripes waved in triumph; and, in the language of another, the
Goddess of Liberty hovered around when "the rocket's red glare" went
forth, indicating that the battle was raging, and watched the issue; and the
conflict grew fierce, and the issue was doubtful; but when, at length, victory
perched upon your Stars and your Stripes, it was then, on the plains of New
Orleans, that the Goddess of Liberty made her loftiest flight, and
proclaimed victory in strains of exultation. Will Tennessee ever desert the
grave of him who bore it in triumph, or desert the flag that he waved with
success? No; we were in the Union before some of these States were spoken
into existence; and we intend to remain in, and insist upon—as we have the
confident belief we shall get—all our constitutional rights and protection in
the Union, and under the Constitution of the country. [Applause in the
galleries.]
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. F     in the chair):—It will become the
unpleasant but imperative duty of the Chair to clear the galleries.
Mr. JOHNSON, of Tennessee:—I have done.
[The applause was renewed, and was louder and more general than before.
Hisses were succeeded by applause, and cheers were given and reiterated,
with "three cheers more for J      ."]
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—The Sergeant-at-Arms will immediately
clear the galleries, and the order will not be rescinded.
The order having been executed by clearing the galleries and locking the
doors leading to them, the Presiding Officer announced that the business of
the Senate would be proceeded with.
The Senate, having disposed of several bills, was about to take action on a
proposed amendment to the House resolutions, when the Peace Conference
amendments were adverted to as follows:
Mr. MASON:—Now, I desire to say a word. There was a commission from
twenty or twenty-one States summoned here by the State of Virginia to take
into consideration the state of the country, and they have proposed an
elaborate amendment to the Constitution, which they ask this body, in
connection with the other House, to refer to the States. That has been under
consideration for two days; no vote has been taken upon it; and the Senator
from Illinois now proposes to postpone that in order to give precedence to a
resolution from the House of Representatives proposing to amend the
Constitution by prohibiting Congress from interfering with slavery in the
States. His motion is, at this stage of the session, to put aside any further
consideration of this amendment to the Constitution proposed by that Peace
Conference, presented in the impressive manner in which it was done by the
honorable Senator from Kentucky, in order to give precedence to this joint
resolution of the House on this the last day of the session. Sir, I shall vote
against giving it that precedence. I think it is due not only to those
honorable gentlemen who came here and have submitted to us the result of
their labors that we should give it that precedence, but I feel that it is due to
the State of Virginia, who invited the Conference, that no precedence
should be given over it. For that reason, I shall vote against it.
Mr. DOUGLAS:—I am glad to find that the Senator from Virginia has
become such a warm advocate of the report of the Peace Conference. How
many hours is it since we heard him denounce it as unworthy the
consideration of Southern men or of this country? How long is it since these
denunciations were ringing in our ears? We do not hear the praises of the
Peace Conference sounded until we are about to get a vote on another
proposition to pacify the country; and for fear we may have a vote that will
quiet the apprehensions of the Southern States in respect to the designs of
the North to change the Constitution, so as to interfere with slavery in the
States, we find now that the Peace Conference is to be pushed forward, to
defeat this. Sir, if he is a friend of the proposition of the Peace Conference,
let him act with me and sit as long as I will in urging it upon the Senate. I
am for both; but this one is within our reach. We can close this much in five
minutes. We should have had it passed before this time, if the Senator from
Virginia had not interposed objections. If the amendment to the Constitution
which furnishes guarantees to the border slave States fail, it will be the
result of the efforts of the Senator from Virginia. My object is to take that
up; we can dispose of it in a very few minutes; and then, when we have
secured thus much, we will proceed immediately to take up the report of the
Peace Conference; and I tell the Senator from Virginia he will find me
standing here adhering to it as long as he will; and when the vote comes, I
think I shall show that I am as friendly to it as he; and that I have as much
respect for and appreciation of the services of the great men who reported
it.
Mr. MASON:—The Senator from Illinois and I construe our duties in a
very different way. I have no parliamentary ends to obtain here by
dexterous motions to give preference. The Senator has never heard me
express the slightest approbation of these resolutions from the Peace
Conference. On the contrary, he has heard me point out, with whatever
ability I might, the objections that would compel me to vote against them. I
intend to vote against them; but I deem it due to the character of these
resolutions, and the way in which they were brought before the Senate, that
their precedence should not be taken from them, and that we should have
the first vote upon them. The Senator from Illinois will not find me taking
back one word that I have said of objection to the resolutions that came
from the Peace Conference; but I protest against their precedence being
taken from them—a matter which has engaged the attention of the Senate
for the last two hours to effect it. Now that it is done, I shall vote against the
motion to give precedence. The resolutions of the Peace Conference should
not be thrust aside by this resolution of the House; but that is the motion
now before us, to thrust aside these resolutions in order to give place to the
resolution of the House, and I shall vote against it.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I shall pursue, on this occasion, the course I have
pursued throughout. My object is to attain a great end, and, if possible, to
give entire satisfaction to the country, and restore it to peace and quiet, or to
go as far in that direction as it is in my power to go. I shall vote to take up
the resolution of the House, because we can act upon it immediately. I am
an advocate of the resolutions from the Peace Conference. I have shown it;
I have expressed it, and my determination to vote for them, and so I will;
but I confess that I feel somewhat as the gentleman from Illinois does—
surprised at the great zeal with which gentlemen want to keep up these
propositions merely to strike a blow at others, claiming a precedence for a
thing they mean to trample and spit upon.
Mr. MASON:—It has precedence, if the Senator will allow me, and he took
it from it.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—And he wants to continue that precedence. Sir, the
way to manifest respect for their proposition is to vote for it. I do not
understand this sort of proceeding on the part of gentlemen who desire to
afford any means of pacification to the country. I am for this resolution of
the House of Representatives; and I hope the Senate will vote to take it up.
We can act upon it, and we can vote upon it, and we know well that we
cannot pass these propositions of the Peace Conference. There are but two
hours more of session in the other House—from ten to twelve o'clock on
Monday morning. I cannot indulge in a hope, sanguine as I have been
throughout, of the passage of those resolutions; and, indeed, the opposition
here, and the opposition on this [the Democratic] side of the Chamber to
those resolutions, are confirmation strong as Holy Writ that they cannot
pass. Do gentlemen want to press them forward in order to prevent a vote
on this resolution of the House? I hope not. I hope the motion of the
gentleman from Illinois will prevail, and that we shall take up the House
resolution.
Mr. BAYARD:—Mr. President, I have forborne to take any part in this
discussion about the merits of any of these propositions before the Senate,
nor do I intend to do so now. I shall reserve what I may have to say to
another occasion. I shall not occupy the time of the Senate now. I shall vote
against this motion, because, while I feel I do no injustice to others, I must
necessarily exercise my own opinions. I consider the resolution passed by
the House of Representatives as not worth the paper on which it is written,
for the purpose of adjusting the difficulties in this country. I shall not detain
the Senate by any attempt to give the reasons. Sufficient for me to state the
ground of my objection, why I shall not vote to give preference to a
resolution which, as it stands, I think will lead to no attainable result as
regards peace or quiet in the country. As regards the other propositions, for
which it is sought to be substituted, I express no opinion now, except to say,
they are not exactly those that I should have preferred; but that I would
gladly and willingly vote to adopt the distinct resolutions offered originally
by the Senator from Kentucky. As to attaining a vote and disposing of this
House resolution at once, of course, as I do not attach any importance to the
measure, if passed, for the purpose for which it is to be passed, that would
be a sufficient answer; but further, it will not stop debate, and it cannot
prevent amendments. Amendments may be made; one substitute after
another may be offered, and you can be led into debate quite as much as on
the other. I would rather see the other proposition discussed; and on the
whole, not thinking the particular resolution of the House entitled to
preference as being of any great importance, I am not disposed to give it
precedence.
Mr. SEBASTIAN, in speaking on the House resolutions, said: "It is now
past four o'clock in the morning of the 4th of March, and it is evident, from
obvious causes, that it is utterly impossible that any expression of
preference for any other resolution than this can now have any effect, or
receive even the notice of the House of Representatives."
At different stages of the proceedings of the Senate, in proposing and voting
in relation to various amendments, the following among other things said
and done, occurred with reference to the Report of the Peace Conference:
Mr. JOHNSON, of Arkansas:—I beg leave to offer as an amendment, and I
presume it will be the last, the propositions submitted by the Peace
Conference. I offer them not with a belief that they will be accepted or
sustained at all. I should be glad to see even that step taken by the party
who are to have, and who, in point of fact, do have possession of this
Government. I offer them for the purpose of obtaining a vote upon them. I
offer them, stating frankly that I shall not vote for them. I offer them with
the conviction that there is between the Representatives on the other side of
the Chamber, and those on the southern side, an irreconcilable difference;
and it ought to be proclaimed, and it ought to be made frank and
unmistakable. I offer it because it evolves truth. There is nothing left here to
this Senate, on this the last night of the session, but this: to declare to the
American people what is true, in order that they may know it, and may
prepare themselves to meet it; that they may prepare, if they can, to
reconcile it with peace, or to reconcile it to themselves; to stand by all the
sorrowful consequences that shall otherwise come. This is the reason why I
present this amendment. I believed when I voted for them that the
propositions of the Senator from Kentucky were fair, were just to the people
of the South, and to my own State among that number; and it is but honest
that I should say now in presenting this amendment, that I consider these
propositions a thousand fathoms beneath the propositions of the Senator
from Kentucky.
It is in that condition that I offer this amendment. I hope Senators will have
the courage and the nerve, if they have faith in and regard for their
constituents, to whom they have taught their doctrines heretofore, to adhere
to them and to stick to them now; and while they will vote against this
amendment, I will stand by them also and vote against it, as one person who
for fourteen years has represented his State in one or the other branch of
this Congress. In saying this, I say it as the last act of my political life, and
it is one upon which I put my faith, and on which I would put the last hope I
have on earth. I know from the bottom of my soul that I am not averse to
the continuation and the preservation of the present Union of States, which I
have always considered sanctifies the continent of North America to peace
and to prosperity forever. I feel from the bottom of my heart that whenever
it shall be divided, it will be given up, from petty causes, and from petty
irritations and misapprehensions, to the contingencies of war and the
contingencies of blood and disaster, which have followed the divisions and
separations of every other continent in the whole wide world.
Then, Mr. President, I offer this amendment from the conviction that
common honesty of purpose, and the common frankness of men of nerve
and of honor, will give us one vote to show that there is among us an
irreconcilable difference, or that will give hope to those who, like the
Senator from Kentucky, it seems to me, can hope against hope, that there is
something to be done. I cannot believe that any thing is gained by this
resolution. I cannot conceive that the proposition of the House gives
security to my people. I will not stop to comment upon it, and to show why
it is that I cannot vote for it. I sincerely hope that we may have a vote of the
Senate upon the amendment I now offer; and I call for the yeas and nays
upon it.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. JOHNSON, of Tennessee:—I wish merely to repeat again, before the
yeas and nays are called on this amendment, that I shall vote against this, as
I have voted against all preceding amendments, with the distinct
understanding that I am not committed for or against any proposition
contained in those amendments. I hope we shall vote them all down.
Mr. DOUGLAS:—I will merely state that when we have disposed of this
resolution, I hope we shall take up the Peace Conference propositions
immediately, and get through with them.
The Secretary proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. CRITTENDEN (when his name was called):—I desire to say that,
although preferring this amendment, I shall vote against it, as I have against
all others, in order to pass it as it came to us from the House.
Mr. JOHNSON, of Arkansas:—I should like to have made a further
explanation; but I will not do it. I vote "nay."
The result was then announced—yeas 3, nays 34; as follows:
Y   .—Messrs. Foot, Nicholson, and Pugh—3.
N   .—Messrs. Anthony, Baker, Bigler, Bingham, Bright, Chandler, Clark,
Crittenden, Dixon, Doolittle, Douglas, Durkee, Fessenden, Foster, Grimes,
Harlan, Hunter, Johnson of Arkansas, Johnson of Tennessee, Kennedy,
King, Latham, Mason, Morrill, Polk, Rice, Sebastian, Sumner, Ten Eyck,
Trumbull, Wade, Wigfall, Wilkinson, and Wilson—34.
So the amendment was rejected.
Other amendments—of which some were approved and some rejected—
were offered to the joint resolutions, and, finally, the proposals of
amendments to the Constitution from the Conference Convention were
again brought forward in this manner:
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I intend to be perfectly consistent in my course on
this subject. I look upon the result of the deliberations of the Peace
Congress, as they call it here, as affording the best opportunity for a general
concurrence among the States and among the people. I determined to take it
in preference to my own proposition, and so stated to many of the members
of that Convention. I now propose the propositions agreed to by them as a
substitute for my own.
I came here this morning, without the least expectation of any vote being
taken on this proposition of mine. It has never been in a condition before
where I was prepared to offer amendments to it. I had amendments which I
intended to propose, not intending to make material changes, as I supposed,
in substance and effect, but changing the phraseology, particularly of the
first article, in which I propose to substitute an amendment, to declare
merely that the status of persons held to servitude or labor under the laws of
any State shall continue with the laws thus unchanged, as long as the
Territory remains under a territorial government; and when it forms a
constitution, to come into the Union as a State, to be received with or
without slavery. All my papers and the amendments which I prepared are at
my room, not here. That is the condition of the thing.
Mr. HUNTER:—The resolution stands now as several States have
instructed for it, and I hope we shall have a vote on it.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I now move to substitute the resolutions of the Peace
Convention. I have declared that I would do this; that I would abandon my
own resolutions, and take that proposed by the Peace Conference.
Mr. HUNTER:—Then I call for the yeas and nays on the amendment of the
Senator from Kentucky.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:—Does the Chair understand the Senator from
Kentucky to offer as an amendment to the resolution now before the Senate,
the resolution of the Peace Conference?
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—Yes, sir.
Mr. HUNTER:—That is an amendment, and on that I ask for the yeas and
nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I wish to say a word in explanation; of course I shall
make no speech at this hour. I have examined the propositions offered by
that Convention; they contain, in my judgment, every material provision
that is contained in the resolution called the C          resolution. The
resolution that I offered contained nothing substantial that has not been
adopted by the Convention, except in one particular, and that particular is
this: they reject so much of the resolution offered by me as embraced future
acquired territory. They said it was enough to settle in regard to the territory
we now hold; and they have substituted a provision which, I think, ought to
be perfectly satisfactory, as to acquisition of future territory. They say none
shall be acquired, unless it be by a two-thirds vote of the Senate, which
two-thirds vote shall include a majority of the Senators from the
slaveholding States, as well as a majority of the Senators from the North.
That gives ample security to the South; it gives ample security to the North.
No territory can be acquired without the approbation of both sections of the
Union, and having this in their power, they can then make any previous
arrangement in regard to slavery that they please, before the acquisition of
territory. That is the way they dispose of future acquisitions. I prefer it to
the disposition made in the resolutions which I submitted to the Senate. I
therefore offer them, and for other reasons: out of deference to that great
body of men selected on the resolution of Virginia, and invited by Virginia
herself. The body having met, and being composed of such men, and a
majority of that Convention concurring in these resolutions, I think they
come to us with a sanction entitling them to consideration; therefore I have
moved them.
Mr. GWIN:—I hope the substitute will not be adopted. The very reason the
Senator has given in favor of it, with reference to the acquisition of future
territory, I think should be the cause of its being voted down. I am sure
Senators from Northern States should not vote for such an amendment as
this; because the first acquisition, if we get any at all, will be the very kind
of acquisition that the Northern States want. It is well known that if we had
had the same counsels in 1854 that we had in 1803, we should have
acquired the whole Russian Pacific territory to Behring Straits. If T     
J         had been President, we should have got the whole of the Pacific
possessions of Russia, as we got Louisiana from France, on the same
principle; and I believe the first acquisition of territory we shall get will be
the Russian possessions to Behring Straits. I hope this amendment of the
Constitution will not be voted for by those who are in favor of acquiring
territory, especially which will give us such important advantages on the
Pacific Ocean. I am utterly opposed to restricting all acquisition hereafter;
especially on the Pacific coast of the United States, both north and south. I
hope this amendment will be voted down.
Mr. DOUGLAS:—I was exceedingly anxious to get a separate and distinct
vote, first on the Peace Conference propositions, and then on the
C          proposition, as perfected by the Senator from Kentucky. I have
announced several times to-night, that that was my purpose; but after what
the Senator from Kentucky has said about his obligations to the Peace
Conference, to give priority to their proposition, I must follow him,
although I should be delighted if we could make arrangements for separate
votes. I prefer his perfected amendment to the Peace Conference
proposition; but still, I cannot separate from him on this question, when he
thinks he is bound to bring it forward.
The Secretary proceeded to call the roll on the amendment.
Mr. NICHOLSON (when his name was called):—I greatly prefer the
resolution of the Senator from Kentucky, because it is unequivocal,
unambiguous in its language, and embraces future as well as present
territory; but I am willing, if that cannot be got, to vote for the other; and I
do not concur in the criticisms that have been made on it to the full extent,
though there are features in it to which I very much object. I shall,
therefore, vote "nay" on this proposition.
Mr. POWELL:—As I have before announced, I have paired with the
Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. C      ]. If I were not paired, I should
vote "nay."
Mr. GWIN:—He would vote with you, if he were here.
Mr. POWELL:—I cannot tell; he is not here.
The result was announced—yeas 7, nays 28, as follows:
Y   .—Messrs. Crittenden, Douglas, Harlan, Johnson of Tennessee,
Kennedy, Morrill, and Thomson—7.
N   .—Messrs. Bayard, Bigler, Bingham, Bright, Chandler, Clark, Dixon,
Fessenden, Foot, Foster, Grimes, Gwin, Hunter, Lane, Latham, Mason,
Nicholson, Polk, Pugh, Rice, Sebastian, Sumner, Ten Eyck, Trumbull,
Wade, Wigfall, Wilkinson, and Wilson—28.
So the amendment was rejected.
No. IV.
[The action of both houses of Congress in relation to the Peace Conference,
and the propositions of amendments therein adopted, would seem to form a
portion of its history. I shall endeavor to furnish their action so far as it can
be separated from other matters connected with the propositions presented.
Immediately after the adoption of the resolutions of Virginia, under which
the Conference was called, and on the 28th of January, 1861, the following
proceedings took place in the House of Representatives of the United
States.]
H        R              , }W         , M     , January 28th, 1861.
The S      , Hon. W . P         , laid before the House a message
from the President of the United States, which was read by the Clerk, as
follows:
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:
I deem it my duty to submit to Congress a series of resolutions adopted by
the Legislature of Virginia, on the 19th inst., having in view a peaceful
settlement of the exciting questions which now threaten the Union. They
were delivered to me on Thursday the 24th inst., by ex-President T    ,
who has left his dignified and honored retirement, in the hope that he may
render service to his country in this its hour of peril. These resolutions, it
will be perceived, extend an invitation "to all such States, whether
slaveholding or non-slaveholding, as are willing to unite with Virginia in an
earnest effort to adjust the present unhappy controversies in the spirit in
which the Constitution was originally formed, and consistently with its
principles, so as to afford to the people of the slaveholding States adequate
guarantees for the security of their rights, to appoint Commissioners to
meet, on the 4th day of February next, in the City of Washington, similar
Commissioners appointed by Virginia, to consider, and, if practicable, agree
upon some suitable adjustment."
I confess I hail this movement, on the part of Virginia, with great
satisfaction. From the past history of this ancient and renowned
Commonwealth, we have the fullest assurance that what she has undertaken
she will accomplish, if it can be done by able, enlightened, and persevering
efforts. It is highly gratifying to know that other patriotic States have
appointed, and are appointing Commissioners to meet those of Virginia in
council. When assembled, they will constitute a body entitled, in an
eminent degree, to the confidence of the country.
The General Assembly of Virginia have also resolved "that ex-President
J    T     is hereby appointed by the concurrent vote of each branch of
the General Assembly, a Commissioner to the President of the United
States; and Judge J    R         is hereby appointed, by a like vote, a
Commissioner to the State of South Carolina, and the other States that have
seceded or shall secede, with instructions respectfully to request the
President of the United States and the authorities of such States to agree to
abstain, pending the proceedings contemplated by the action of this General
Assembly, from any and all acts calculated to produce a collision of arms
between the States and the Government of the United States."
However strong may be my desire to enter into such an agreement, I am
convinced that I do not possess the power. Congress, and Congress alone,
under the war-making power, can exercise the discretion of agreeing to
abstain "from any and all acts calculated to produce a collision of arms"
between this and any other Government. It would, therefore, be a
usurpation for the Executive to attempt to restrain their hands by an
agreement in regard to matters over which he has no constitutional control.
If he were thus to act, they might pass laws which he should be bound to
obey, though in conflict with his agreement.
Under existing circumstances, my present actual power is confined within
narrow limits. It is my duty at all times to defend and protect the public
property within the seceding States so far as this may be practicable, and
especially to employ all constitutional means to protect the property of the
United States, and to preserve the public peace at this the seat of the Federal
Government. If the seceding States abstain "from any and all acts calculated
to produce a collision of arms," then the danger so much to be deprecated
will no longer exist. Defence, and not aggression, has been the policy of the
administration from the beginning.
But while I can enter into no engagement such as that proposed, I cordially
commend to Congress, with much confidence that it will meet their
approbation, to abstain from passing any law calculated to produce a
collision of arms pending the proceedings contemplated by the action of the
General Assembly of Virginia. I am one of those who will never despair of
the Republic. I yet cherish the belief that the American people will
perpetuate the Union of the States on some terms just and honorable for all
sections of the country. I trust that the mediation of Virginia may be the
destined means, under Providence, of accomplishing this inestimable
benefit. Glorious as are the memories of her past history, such an
achievement, both in relation to her own fame and the welfare of the whole
country, would surpass them all.
JAMES BUCHANAN.
The "series of resolutions" referred to, and transmitted in President
B       '  message to Congress, are in the body of this book on pages 9
and 10.
The following communication by the Governor of Virginia to the General
Assembly thereof, was also submitted with the President's Message:
The Commonwealth of Virginia,
to all to whom these presents shall come, greeting:
Know you, that the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia,
having, by joint resolution, adopted on the 19th instant, and hereto attached,
appointed ex-President J    T     a Commissioner to the President of the
United States to carry out the instructions conveyed in said resolution:
therefore, I, J    L      , Governor, do hereby announce the said
appointment, and authenticate the same.
[L.S.]
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the
great seal of the State to be affixed, in the City of Richmond, this




Secretary of the Commonwealth.
Mr. STANTON:—I move that that message be printed, and referred to the
Standing Committee on Military Affairs.
Mr. JOHN COCHRANE:—I move as an amendment to that motion, that it
be referred to the special committee of five.
Mr. HOWARD, of Michigan:—I would suggest that whatever committee
the message is referred to, ought to have power to report it back at any time;
otherwise it will be locked up where the House cannot control it.
Mr. BURCH:—The gentleman from Virginia only yielded the floor for the
reading of the message, and is now entitled to the floor.
The SPEAKER:—It is proper that the message should be disposed of in
some way.
Mr. STANTON:—If the House will allow me, I will move that the message
be referred to the Standing Committee on Military Affairs, with power to
report on it at any time.
The SPEAKER:—That motion is not in order. A motion has been made to
refer the message to the Committee on Military Affairs, and the gentleman
from New York moves, as an amendment, that it be referred to the special
committee of five.
Mr. BOCOCK:—If there is to be any debate on this motion, it should be
allowed to go over until my colleague (Mr. P    ) makes his speech.
Mr. STANTON:—I move the previous question.
Mr. CURTIS:—The question should first be taken on the motion to refer to
the Committee on Military Affairs.
The SPEAKER:—That statement is correct. The question is on referring the
message to the Military Committee.
Mr. BOCOCK:—I am bound to interpose on behalf of my colleague, who
says he only yielded to have the message read.
Mr. STANTON:—The previous question is demanded, and that will put an
end to the matter at once.
Mr. MILLSON:—I think the question deserves some little consideration. I
therefore move to postpone the further consideration of the President's
message till to-morrow.
Mr. STANTON:—Very well; let that course be taken.
The motion was agreed to.
After the report of the Peace Conference had been transmitted to the House
of Representatives, and while the joint resolutions were under
consideration, several ineffectual attempts were made to get the labors of
the Conference before the House. Here is one of the first:
Mr. MAYNARD:—It is known, I suppose, to most members of the House,
informally and unofficially, that what is known as the Peace Conference, to
which the country has been looking for several days, has concluded its
labors and dissolved. [Cries of "Order!"] I desire to make a proposition.
Mr. BINGHAM, and others objected.
Mr. MAYNARD:—I have a right to make a proposition.
Mr. CRAIGE, of North Carolina:—I call the gentleman to order, and insist
upon the enforcement of the rules.
Mr. MAYNARD [amid loud cries of "Order!"] moved to postpone the vote
upon the pending propositions until to-morrow after the morning hour.
The motion was not agreed to.
And again, the same day, February 27th, the following effort was made:
Mr. McCLERNAND:—I wish to state that I understand there is on the
Speaker's table a communication from the president of the Peace
Conference. I ask the unanimous consent of the House that it be taken up
and read.
Mr. LOVEJOY:—I object.
So action was further delayed.
March 1st, 1861.—When a communication from the Navy Department
came up for consideration in the House, the motion to postpone the special
order brought out the following action on the communication of the Peace
Conference:
The SPEAKER:—There is a communication, which has been for some time
lying upon the Speaker's table, from the president of the Peace Conference.
The Chair thinks it is right that it should be taken up.
Mr. LOVEJOY:—I object.
Mr. GROW:—I call for the regular order of business.
The SPEAKER:—The Chair has not thought proper to present it until the
propositions of the Committee of Thirty-three had been disposed of; but he
thinks it right that they should now be presented.
Mr. STEVENS, of Pennsylvania:—I object, on behalf of John Tyler, who
does not want them in. [Laughter.]
Mr. McCLERNAND:—I move to suspend the rules.
Mr. GROW:—I call for the regular order of business.
The SPEAKER:—The Chair thinks he ought to have the privilege of
presenting these papers.
Mr. GROW:—I rise to a question of order. The territorial business is the
special order. I am entitled to the floor; and I submit that it cannot be taken
from me by any motion to suspend the rules.
The SPEAKER:—The Chair thinks the motion to suspend the rules is in
order.
Mr. GROW:—The Chair can hardly understand my question of order. It is
that the territorial business is the special order, made so by a suspension of
the rules. While that is pending, therefore, by the uniform decision of the
House, no motion can be entertained to suspend the rules.
The SPEAKER:—The territorial business was made the special order for
the two succeeding days after the propositions reported by the Committee
of Thirty-three had been disposed of.
Mr. BOTELER:—I want to know if there is any business, or can be any
business, that should take precedence of these propositions of the Peace
Conference?
Mr. LOVEJOY:—Yes, sir; there are ten thousand things that should take
precedence.
The SPEAKER:—The Chair decides that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr.
M C       ] has the floor, and is entitled to make the motion to suspend
the rules.
Mr. GROW:—Do I understand the Chair to decide that the business of the
Territories does not come up to-day?
The SPEAKER:—The Chair is of opinion that, under a strict construction
of the rule, it would properly come up to-morrow.
Mr. GROW:—I appeal from the decision of the Chair.
Mr. HATTON: I move to lay that appeal on the table.
Mr. HICKMAN:—Upon that motion, I call for tellers.
Mr. WASHBURNE, of Illinois:—Before the House divides upon the
appeal, I desire the Chair to state precisely what the point of order is that we
are to vote upon.
The SPEAKER:—The Chair decided that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr.
M C       ] had the floor, and was in order in moving to suspend the
rules for the purpose of receiving the communication the Chair desired to
lay before the House. From that decision an appeal was taken, and a motion
made to lay the appeal on the table. The question is now upon the latter
motion.
Mr. GROW:—I rise to a question of order again. The Chair has not stated
my question of order correctly. My point of order was, that the business of
the Territories was set down as a special order immediately after the
disposal of the business of the Committee of Thirty-three.
Mr. HATTON:—I call the gentleman from Pennsylvania to order.
Mr. GROW:—I have the right to state my point of order.
The SPEAKER:—The gentleman from Pennsylvania will state his point of
order.
Mr. GROW:—It is, that the Territorial business having been made the
special order, comes up now as the regular order of business.
The SPEAKER:—The Chair decides that the gentleman from Illinois
obtained the floor, and had the right to submit the motion to suspend the
rules.
Mr. GROW:—He had no right to take the floor from me for any such
purpose.
The SPEAKER:—The Chair overrules the question of order.
Mr. GROW:—And from that decision I take an appeal.
The SPEAKER:—The appeal is already pending; and a motion has been
made to lay the appeal on the table.
Mr. GROW:—I call for tellers on the motion.
Tellers were ordered, and Messrs. A      and G    were appointed.
The House divided; and the tellers reported—forty-seven in the affirmative.
Mr. HOWARD, of Michigan:—I move that the House adjourn.
Before the vote had been taken on the motion, the hour of five arrived; and
The S       declared the House had taken a recess until seven o'clock.
EVENING SESSION.
The House reassembled at seven o'clock  . .
COMMUNICATION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE.
Mr. GROW:—What is the regular order of business?
The SPEAKER:—The Chair had decided that the gentleman from Illinois
[Mr. M C       ] was entitled to the floor, to move that the rules be
suspended to receive a communication from the Peace Conference. From
that decision the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. G   ] appealed; and a
motion was made to lay the appeal on the table.
Mr. McCLERNAND:—I think we can perhaps agree to an arrangement that
will be satisfactory to gentlemen upon both sides, by which any difficulty
upon the question of order can be avoided. If gentlemen upon that side of
the House will allow the propositions to be presented, we are willing that
they shall be referred, and the House then proceed to the consideration of
the territorial business.
Mr. KELLOGG, of Illinois:—I hope that will be done.
Mr. LOVEJOY:—I object to the reception of the proposition.
Mr. HICKMAN:—There are but few members present. I move that there be
a call of the House.
The motion was disagreed to.
Mr. HICKMAN:—I ask the Chair for his judgment whether there is a
quorum present or not.
The SPEAKER:—In the opinion of the Chair, a quorum is not present.
Mr. McCLERNAND:—I inquire whether there is any objection to the
propositions of the Peace Conference being taken up and referred?
Mr. LOVEJOY:—I certainly object in toto cœlo to any such proposition.
Mr. BOTELER:—I desire to ask this question: can any member object to
the reception of a communication from the Peace Congress?
Mr. LOVEJOY:—It is not a Peace Congress at all. There is no such body
known to this House.
Mr. BOTELER:—I merely ask the question for information, for I do not
profess to be familiar with the rules; I desire to know whether the objection
of a single member can defeat the reception of such a proposition,
especially when that single member is known not to be a conservative man,
but a man opposed to all compromises?
The SPEAKER:—The Chair will suggest that a great deal of time will be
saved by having a call of the House, as there is evidently no quorum
present.
A call of the House was taken. A quorum having appeared, the House
proceeded to dispose of several special orders, when, on a motion of
postponement, it returned in this wise to the Peace Conference:
Mr. LOGAN:—I demand the yeas and nays on the motion to postpone.
The yeas and nays were not ordered.
The special order was then postponed.
Mr. McCLERNAND:—I now move to suspend the rules of the House, for
the purpose of receiving the memorial of the Peace Congress, which
assembled lately in this city.
Mr. GROW:—To be received? What for?
Mr. McCLERNAND:—For reference I suppose.
Mr. BURNETT:—No; but to get it in, and put it upon its passage.
The SPEAKER:—The Chair understood the proposition to be, that the rules
should be suspended, in order that the paper should be received for
reference.
Mr. McCLERNAND:—I withdraw that part of the proposition.
Mr. SICKLES:—If it be received, it is then in the power of the House to do
with it what it pleases.
Mr. GROW:—The understanding was that the motion should be made for
the suspension of the rules only to receive the proposition.
Mr. SICKLES:—That is all right. When the paper gets in, the House can do
with it what it may deem fit.
Mr. LOVEJOY:—I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. SHERMAN:—Is it proposed to act on the memorial of the Peace
Congress?
Mr. SICKLES:—If it comes before the House, it will be for us to say what
disposition shall be made of it. [Cries of "Call the roll!"]
Mr. CRAIGE, of North Carolina:—This motion is merely for the
suspension of the rules to receive the proposition, and this, therefore, may
be considered a test vote. [Cries of "Call the roll!"]
The question was taken; and it was decided in the negative—yeas 93, nays
67; as follows:
Y   .—Messrs. Charles F. Adams, Green Adams, Adrain, Aldrich, William
C. Anderson, Avery, Barr, Barret, Bocock, Boteler, Brabson, Branch,
Briggs, Bristow, Brown, Burch, Burnett, Campbell, Horace F. Clark, John
B. Clark, John Cochrane, Corwin, James Craig, John G. Davis, De Jarnette,
Dunn, Etheridge, Florence, Foster, Fouke, Garnett, Gilmer, Hale, Hall,
Hamilton, J. Morrison Harris, John T. Harris, Haskin, Hatton, Hoard,
Holman, William Howard, Hughes, Jenkins, Junkin, William Kellogg,
Killinger, Kunkel, Larrabee, James M. Leach, Leake, Logan, Maclay,
Mallory, Charles D. Martin, Maynard, McClernand, McKenty, McKnight,
McPherson, Millson, Millward, Laban T. Moore, Moorehead, Edward Joy
Morris, Nelson, Niblack, Nixon, Olin, Pendleton, Peyton, Phelps, Porter,
Pryor, Quarles, John H. Reynolds, Rice, Riggs, James C. Robinson, Sickles,
Simms, William N.H. Smith, Spaulding, Stevenson, William Stewart,
Stokes, Thomas, Vance, Webster, Whiteley, Winslow, Woodson, and Wright
—93.
N   .—Messrs. Alley, Ashley, Bingham, Blair, Brayton, Buffinton,
Burlingame, Burnham, Carey, Case, Coburn, Colfax, Conway, Burton
Craige, Dawes, Delano, Duell, Edgerton, Eliot, Ely, Fenton, Ferry, Frank,
Gooch, Graham, Grow, Gurley, Helmick, Hickman, Hindman, William A.
Howard, Hutchins, Irvine, Francis W. Kellogg, Kenyon, Loomis, Lovejoy,
McKean, Morrill, Morse, Palmer, Perry, Potter, Pottle, Christopher
Robinson, Royce, Ruffin, Sedgwick, Sherman, Somes, Spinner, Stanton,
Stevens, Tappan, Tompkins, Train, Vandever, Van Wyck, Wade, Waldron,
Walton, Cadwalader C. Washburn, Elihu B. Washburne, Wells, Wilson,
Windom, and Woodruff—67.
So (two thirds not voting in favor thereof) the rules were not suspended.
During the vote,
Mr. WOODSON said:—I rise for information. What are we voting on?
[Cries of "Order!"] I cannot for my life imagine how this can be regarded as
a test vote. I will vote to receive the proposition of the Peace Conference;
but on its passage I will vote against it.
The SPEAKER:—The motion is, to suspend the rules for the reception of
the memorial.
Mr. CRAIGE, of North Carolina:—I understood the gentleman from Illinois
to state that this was a test vote.
The SPEAKER:—The Chair cannot undertake to decide whether it is a test
vote or not.
Mr. J    C        stated that his colleagues, Mr. C     B. C       
and Mr. L  , were paired.
Mr. CRAIGE, of North Carolina:—I would have no objection, Mr. Speaker,
to permit this resolution to come before the House, but I understood the
gentleman from Illinois to proclaim that this was a test vote. Utterly
opposed to any such wishy-washy settlement of our national difficulties, I
vote "no."
Mr. C      stated that he was paired with Mr. A       , of Missouri.
Mr. FOSTER:—While I am willing to vote for the reception of the
memorial of the Peace Congress, of which I was a member, still I am
unwilling to be considered as favoring their proposition. Is this vote a test
vote on that proposition?
The SPEAKER:—The Chair does not think that it is; but each gentleman
will decide for himself.
Mr. HALE:—I am willing to receive this memorial in courtesy to the Peace
Conference; and not regarding this as a test vote, I vote "ay."
Mr. L    , of Michigan, stated that he had paired with Mr. E      , or he
would have voted in the negative.
Mr. LEAKE (when his name was called) said that he regarded this thing as
a miserable abortion, forcibly reminding one of the old fable of the
mountain and the mouse; nevertheless, he was willing to let the mouse in, in
order to have the pleasure of killing it.
Mr. RUFFIN:—As it is announced that this is a test vote, I am compelled to
vote "no." Otherwise, I would have been willing to let the matter be brought
before the House for its consideration.
Mr. JENKINS:—Who can make this a test vote? Certainly no man in this
House. This is a vote to receive the memorial, and nothing more.
Mr. W      stated that Mr. V            was paired with Mr. B    .
Mr. J      stated that his colleague, Mr. M         , was detained at
home by illness.
Mr. N     stated that his colleague, Mr. S       , was detained at his
room by illness, and that if he were present, he would vote to receive the
memorial of the Peace Conference.
Mr. E   stated that his colleague, Mr. L  , was detained at his room by
indisposition.
Mr. P         stated that his colleague was detained at his room by
indisposition.
Mr. C        stated that his colleague, Mr. S       , was absent from
the Hall because of illness.
Mr. POTTER:—As this is a test vote, I vote "no."
Mr. BRAYTON:—I understand this to be a test vote, and therefore vote
"no."
Mr. HOARD:—These papers are not before us. They are not printed, and
we cannot be supposed to know any thing of them; and I would ask,
therefore, how they can be regarded as a test vote? I vote "ay."
Mr. BOCOCK:—Mr. Speaker, out of deference to the Peace Conference,
called as it was by my State, I vote to receive this report. But unless the
report, as it appears in the papers, can be amended, it cannot receive my
approval.
Mr. SHERMAN:—I vote against this, simply because we have no time to
consider it.
Mr. HINDMAN:—I vote against suspending the rules, because I desire to
defeat the proposition of the Peace Conference, believing it to be unworthy
of the vote of any Southern man.
Mr. C   (not being within the bar when his name was called) asked leave to
vote.
Mr. W        , of Illinois, objected.
Mr. GARNETT:—Mr. Speaker, intending and desiring to express my
abhorrence of these insidious propositions, conceived in fraud and born of
cowardice, by giving a direct vote against them, yet from respect for the
conference which reported them, I am willing to receive them, and therefore
now vote "ay."
Mr. HARRIS, of Virginia:—I vote "ay," because I am in favor of the
resolutions as a peace measure.
Mr. MAYNARD:—Believing these propositions eminently wise and just, I
will let my vote stand in the affirmative.
Mr. BURNETT:—I hope the Chair will enforce the rules.
The SPEAKER:—I am trying to, all I can; and I hope gentlemen will keep
their seats and preserve order.
Mr. DE JARNETTE:—I vote "ay," with the hope of having an opportunity
to vote against the propositions of the Peace Conference.
Mr. BOTELER:—I vote "ay," to introduce these propositions, because I
believe it to be my duty to do every thing, consistent with honor, to preserve
the peace and save the Union of my country.
Mr. COX:—I desire to ask a question of the Chair.
The SPEAKER:—The Chair will hear you.
Mr. COX:—I desire to know whether or not it will be in order to move to
suspend the rules to enable me to have my vote recorded?
Mr. SPEAKER:—No, sir.
Mr. COX:—I would like very much to have it recorded in favor of these
peace propositions. I vote "ay," if there is no objection.
Mr. HINDMAN:—Consent is not given to the gentleman from Ohio to have
his vote recorded.
The SPEAKER:—It is not received.
Mr. ROBINSON, of Rhode Island:—Believing that this is a test vote, I
change my vote, and vote "no."
Mr. JOHN COCHRANE:—I wish to know whether the vote of my
colleague, C     B. C       , is recorded.
The SPEAKER:—It is not.
Mr. JOHN COCHRANE:—I think he has retired from the House on
account of sickness in his family; and I believe he is laboring for the Union
in other quarters.
Mr. MILLSON:—I desire to vote.
Objection was made.
Mr. MILLSON:—I am entitled to vote, having been absent upon a
committee of conference. I vote "ay."
Mr. HINDMAN:—Is the gentleman entitled to vote under the rules of the
House?
Mr. BARR:—Objection comes too late.
The SPEAKER:—It has been usual to allow gentlemen to vote under such
circumstances.
Mr. HICKMAN:—Do the rules allow him to vote?
The SPEAKER:—The Chair supposes that is the rule of the House.
Mr. HINDMAN:—I ask to have the rule read.
Mr. MILLSON:—No rule of the House could take away the right of a
member to vote when he is absent by order of the House. If the rules
deprived a member of the right to vote under such circumstances, it would
be void.
The result was announced as above recorded.
Mr. McCLERNAND:—This vote divides the Republican party, and sounds
its death knell.
No. V.
REPORTS OF DELEGATES TO STATES.
Report of the Peace Commissioners to the Legislature of Virginia.
To His Excellency J    L      , Governor of Virginia:
The undersigned Commissioners, in pursuance of the wishes of the General
Assembly, expressed in the resolutions of the 19th day of January last,
repaired in due season to the City of Washington. They there found, on the
4th day of February, the day suggested in the overture of Virginia for a
Conference with the other States, Commissioners to meet them from the
following States, viz.: Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky. Subsequently, during the continuance of the
Conference, at different periods, appeared likewise Commissioners from
Tennessee, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Maine, Iowa, and Kansas.
So that before the close twenty-one States were represented by
Commissioners, appointed either by the Legislatures or Governors of the
respective States.
The undersigned communicated the resolutions of the General Assembly to
this Conference, and, both before its committee appointed to recommend a
plan of adjustment, and the Conference itself, urged the propositions known
as the C          resolutions, with the modification suggested by the
General Assembly of Virginia, as the basis of an acceptable adjustment.
They were not adopted by the Conference, but in lieu thereof, after much
discussion, and the consideration of many proposed amendments, the article
with seven sections, intended as an amendment to the Constitution, was
adopted by sections (not under the rules, being voted on as a whole), and by
a vote of the Conference (not taken by States), was directed to be submitted
to Congress, with the request that it should be recommended to the States
for ratification, which was accordingly done by the President of the
Conference.
The undersigned regret that the Journal showing the proceedings and votes
in the Conference has not yet been published or furnished them, and that
consequently they are not able to present it with this report. As soon as
received it will be communicated to your Excellency.
In the absence of that record it is deemed appropriate to state that on the
final adoption of the first section, two of the States, Indiana and Missouri,
did not vote, and New York was divided, and that the votes by States was,
ayes 9, nays 8—Virginia, by a majority of her Commissioners, voting in the
negative.
The other sections were adopted by ranging majorities (not precisely
recollected), and on the fifth and seventh sections the vote of Virginia was
in the negative. The plan, when submitted to Congress, failed to receive its
recommendation, and as that body, having adjourned, can take no further
cognizance of it, the undersigned feel the contingency has arrived on which






The above report having been read and ordered to be printed, Mr. S      
stated that the reason it was not signed by Judge B            , the
other Virginia Commissioner, was because that gentleman was not in
Richmond. Mr. S       presented a communication in which Judge
B             stated his views at length on the propositions adopted by
the Convention, and it was printed, by vote of the Legislature, in connection
with the report.
After reviewing the different sections of the propositions adopted by the
Peace Conference, Judge B            , in his letter, states that the said
propositions, as an entirety, would have received his vote, and therefore the
vote of Virginia, in the Peace Conference, if it had been submitted to a vote
in that form.
Reports of the New York Commissioners to the Legislature of that State.
MAJORITY REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS TO THE PEACE
CONVENTION.
March 23d, 1861.
To the Honorable the Legislature of the State of New York:
The Report of the Commissioners appointed by the Legislature of the State
of New York to meet Commissioners from other States in the City of
Washington on the fourth day of February, 1861, upon the call of the State
of Virginia, by resolutions passed by the General Assembly of that State on
the nineteenth day of January, 1861.
A copy of the Journal of the Convention is submitted herewith, from which
it will be seen that prior to the presence of the Commissioners from New
York, that body had been completely organized, rules of order adopted
which excluded all persons other than members from witnessing its
deliberations, forbidding any publication or other communication of its
proceedings, and the taking of any entry from its Journal without leave; in
short, requiring all its debates and acts to be kept secret. A committee had
also been organized of one from each State to be appointed by the
Commissioners from such State, to which the Virginia resolutions were
referred, "with all other propositions for the adjustment of existing
differences between the States, with authority to report what they might
deem right, proper, and necessary to restore harmony and preserve the
Union;" and this committee had been in session two days before your
Commissioners were enabled to appoint any one of their number upon it.
This was done on the eighth of February by the appointment of Mr. Field.
William E. Dodge, one of your Commissioners, took his seat in the
Convention on the seventh day of February, 1861, and Messrs. Field,
Noyes, Wadsworth, Corning, King, and Wool, on the eighth of February,
Mr. Smith on the eleventh, and Judges James and Bronson on the twelfth
day of February, and Mr. Granger, who was appointed in the place of Judge
Gardiner, who declined, on the eighteenth day of February, 1861.
It was deemed advisable by your Commissioners that the proceedings of the
Convention should be open to the public and the press, and hence they
advised and concurred in resolutions introduced for that purpose, which
were laid on the table on the motion of a Commissioner from the State of
New Jersey. On a subsequent day they also concurred in a resolution
authorizing the employment of a stenographer, to "preserve accurate notes
of the debates and other proceedings of 'the Convention,' which notes
should not be communicated to any person, nor shall copies thereof be
taken, nor shall the same be made public until after the final adjournment of
this Convention, except in pursuance of a vote authorizing their
publication;" but this was refused, and the resolution laid on the table on
motion of a Commissioner from the State of Pennsylvania, by a vote of
eleven to eight, all the Slave States represented voting against it, with the
addition of the States of Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania. Before the Convention closed its session, the following
states, twenty-one in all, were represented in the Convention: Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, Missouri,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, New
York, Vermont, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Kansas.
With the concurrence of a majority of your Commissioners, Mr. Field
offered in the committee of one from each State, on the fourteenth of
February, the following proposition:
"Each State has the sole and exclusive right, according to its own judgment,
to order and direct its domestic institutions, and to determine for itself what
shall be the relation to each other of all persons residing or being within its
limits;"
but it was rejected by a majority of the committee, and formed no part of its
report.
That committee made its report on the fourteenth of February,
unaccompanied by any written observations, in the shape of an amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, in the following words:
A       1. In all the territory of the United States not embraced within the
limits of the Cherokee Treaty Grant, north of a line from east to west on the
parallel of 36° 30´ north latitude, involuntary servitude, except in
punishment of crime, is prohibited whilst it shall be under a Territorial
Government; and in all the territory south of said line, the status of persons
owing service or labor, as it now exists, shall not be changed by law while
such territory shall be under a Territorial Government; and neither Congress
nor the Territorial Government shall have power to hinder or prevent the
taking to said territory of persons held to labor or involuntary service,
within the United States, according to the laws or usages of the State from
which such persons may be taken, nor to impair the rights arising out of
said relations, which shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal
Courts according to the common law; and when any Territory north or south
of said line, within such boundary as Congress may prescribe, shall contain
a population required for a member of Congress, according to the then
Federal ratio of representation, it shall, if its form of government be
republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original
States, with or without involuntary service or labor, as the constitution of
such new State may provide.
A  . 2. Territory shall not be acquired by the United States, unless by treaty,
nor except for naval and commercial stations and depots, unless such treaty
shall be ratified by four-fifths of all the members of the Senate.
A  . 3. Neither the Constitution nor any amendment thereof shall be
construed to give Congress power to regulate, abolish, or control, within
any State or Territory of the United States, the relation established or
recognized by the laws thereof touching persons bound to labor or
involuntary service therein, nor to interfere with or abolish involuntary
service in the District of Columbia without the consent of Maryland, and
without the consent of the owners, or making the owners who do not
consent just compensation; nor the power to interfere with or prohibit
representatives and others from bringing with them to the City of
Washington, retaining, and taking away persons so bound to labor; nor the
power to interfere with, or abolish involuntary service in places under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, within those States and
Territories where the same is established or recognized; nor the power to
prohibit the removal or transportation by land, sea, or river, of persons held
to labor or involuntary service in any State or Territory of the United States
to any other State or Territory thereof where it is established or recognized
by law or usage; and the right during transportation of touching at ports,
shores, and landings, and of landing in case of distress, shall exist, nor shall
Congress have power to authorize any higher rate of taxation on persons
bound to labor than on land.
A  . 4. The third paragraph of the second section of the fourth article of the
Constitution, shall not be construed to prevent any of the States, by
appropriate legislation, and through the action of their judicial and
ministerial officers, from enforcing the delivery of fugitives from labor to
the person to whom such service or labor is due.
A  . 5. The foreign slave-trade and the importation of slaves into the United
States and their Territories from places beyond the present limits thereof,
are forever prohibited.
A  . 6. The first, third, and fifth articles, together with this article of these
amendments, and the third paragraph of the second section of the first
article of the Constitution, and the third paragraph of the second section of
the fourth article thereof, shall not be amended or abolished without the
consent of all the States.
A  . 7. Congress shall provide by law that the United States shall pay to the
owner the full value of his fugitive from labor, in all cases where the
marshal or other officers, whose duty it was to arrest such fugitive, was
prevented from so doing by violence or intimidation from mobs and riotous
assemblies, or when after such arrest such fugitive was rescued by force,
and the owner thereby prevented and obstructed in the pursuit of his remedy
for the recovery of such fugitive.
Mr. Field, the member of the committee from New York, dissented from
this report, as also did Mr. Baldwin, of Connecticut, and Mr. Crowninshield,
of Massachusetts, and Mr. Seddon, of Virginia.
This report was under discussion, and various amendments were proposed
to it until the twenty-seventh day of February, a majority of your
Commissioners steadily opposing all its provisions except that prohibiting
the foreign slave-trade, and most of such majority being opposed to the
submission, by the Convention, of any amendment of the Constitution of
the United States at the present time, and in the present excited state of the
public mind. During the consideration of the report various independent
propositions were made by the consent, and with the concurrence of your
Commissioners; among which was one by Mr. Baldwin, of Connecticut,
presented on the fifteenth of February, in the form of a minority report from
the committee upon the plan of adjustment, which concluded with a
resolution, "That the Convention recommend to the several States to unite
with Kentucky in her application to Congress to call a Convention for
proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States, to be
submitted to the Legislatures of the several States or to Conventions
therein, for ratification, as the one or other mode of ratification may be
proposed by Congress;" and this proposition, after being discussed at
length, was lost on the twenty-sixth of February, by a vote of thirteen States
against to nine in its favor, a majority of your Commissioners casting the
vote of New York in favor of it.
A proposition somewhat similar, embracing an address to the people of the
United States, and containing a resolution for calling the Convention, was
also submitted to the Convention, with the like concurrence of a majority of
your Commissioners, by Mr. Tuck of New Hampshire, on the eighteenth of
February, and on the twenty-sixth was also defeated by a vote of eleven
States against nine.
It will be seen, therefore, that your Commissioners, with those from several
other States, offered to unite in a call for a Convention, to be convened in
pursuance of the Constitution of the United States; and that the slave States
uniting with several of the free States, uniformly opposed, and at last
defeated it.
On the twenty-third of February Mr. Vandever, of Iowa, offered the
following resolution:
"Resolved, That whatever may be the ultimate determination upon the
amendment to the Federal Constitution, or other propositions for the
adjustment approved by this Convention, we, the members, recommend our
respective States and constituencies to faithfully abide in the Union."
A motion to lay it upon the table prevailed by a vote of eleven to nine, a
majority of your Commissioners voting in the negative.
On the twentieth of February, Mr. Field, one of your Commissioners, at the
instance of a majority of them, offered, as an amendment to the Constitution
to be adopted by the Convention, and proposed with any other amendments,
that it should recommend the following:
"The Union of the States, under this Constitution, is indissoluble; and no
State can secede from the Union, or nullify an act of Congress, or absolve
its citizens from their paramount obligation of obedience to the Constitution
and laws of the United States."
On the twenty-sixth of February, after several ineffectual attempts to get rid
of the proposition, on points of order, it was negatived by a vote of eleven
States against ten, a majority of your Commissioners casting the vote of
New York in its favor.
Mr. Wilmot, of Pennsylvania, moved the following as an amendment to the
seventh article, on the twenty-first of February.
"And Congress shall further provide by law, that the United States shall
make full compensation to a citizen of any State, who, in any other State,
shall suffer by reason of violence or intimidation from mobs or riotous
assemblies in his person or property, or in the deprivation by violence of his
rights secured by this Constitution."
A motion was made to insert the word "white" before "citizen," but it failed
by a vote of eleven to ten; and on the twenty-fifth of February the entire
amendment was defeated by a vote of eleven to eight; your Commissioners,
by a majority, casting the vote of New York in its favor.
Several other propositions upon other subjects were also submitted to the
Convention, as will appear by the Journal; but it is not deemed necessary to
refer to them more particularly, except, that on the eighteenth of February,
Mr. Reid, of North Carolina, proposed to amend the first section of the
committee's report by inserting after the word "line" in the seventh line
thereof, the words "involuntary servitude is recognized; and property in
those of the African race held to service or labor, in any of the States of the
Union, when removed to such territory, shall be protected," and which was
lost by a vote of seventeen States against to three for it. On the twenty-sixth
of February, he also moved to insert in the same section, after the words
"common law," the words, "and such rights shall be protected by all
departments of the Territorial Government during its continuance," which
the President ruled out of order, as the section had been previously gone
through in detail, and was only before the Convention on its final passage.
The Report of the Committee on a plan of adjustment, already mentioned,
came up for consideration on its final passage, after many amendments had
been made to it, as will appear by the Journal, on the twenty-sixth of
February, in the following form, and was ultimately thus adopted, by the
votes stated at the end of each section:
A       XIII.
S       I. In all the present territory of the United States north of the
parallel of 36° 30´ of north latitude, involuntary servitude, except in
punishment of crime, is prohibited. In all the present territory south of that
line, the status of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now
exists, shall not be changed; nor shall any law be passed by Congress or the
Territorial Legislature to hinder or prevent the taking of such persons from
any of the States of this Union to said Territory, nor to impair the rights
arising from said relation; but the same shall be subject to judicial
cognizance in the Federal Courts according to the course of the common
law.
When any Territory north or south of said line, within such boundary as
Congress may prescribe, shall contain a population equal to that required
for a member of Congress, it shall, if its form of government be republican,
be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, with
or without involuntary servitude, as the constitution of such State may
provide.
Y   .—Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky,
Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Tennessee—9.
N   .—Connecticut, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, North Carolina, New
Hampshire, Vermont, and Virginia—8.
D      .—New York and Kansas—2.
N   V     .—Indiana.
S  . II. No territory shall be acquired by the United States except by
discovery, and for naval and commercial stations, depots, and transit routes,
without the concurrence of a majority of all the Senators from States which
allow involuntary servitude, and a majority of all the Senators from States
which prohibit that relation; nor shall territory be acquired by treaty, unless
the votes of a majority of the Senators from each class of States
hereinbefore mentioned be cast as a part of the two-thirds majority
necessary for the ratification of such treaty.
Y   .—Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and
Virginia—11.
N   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, North Carolina, New
Hampshire, and Vermont—8.
D      .—New York and Kansas—2.
S  . III. Neither the Constitution nor any amendment thereof shall be
construed to give Congress power to regulate, abolish, or control, within
any State, the relation established or recognized by the laws thereof
touching persons held to labor or involuntary service therein, nor to
interfere with or abolish involuntary service in the District of Columbia
without the consent of Maryland, nor without the consent of the owners, or
making the owners who do not consent just compensation; nor the power to
interfere with or prohibit representatives and others from bringing with
them to the District of Columbia, retaining, and taking away, persons so
held to labor or service; nor the power to interfere with, or abolish
involuntary service in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States, within those States and Territories where the same is established or
recognized; nor the power to prohibit the removal or transportation of
persons held to labor or involuntary service in any State or Territory of the
United States to any other State or Territory thereof where it is established
or recognized by law or usage, and the right during transportation, by sea or
river, of touching at ports, shores, and landings, and of landing in case of
distress, shall exist; but not the right of transit in, or through any State or
Territory, or of sale or traffic against the laws thereof; nor shall Congress
have power to authorize any higher rate of taxation on persons held to labor
or service than on land. The bringing into the District of Columbia of
persons held to labor or service for sale, or placing them in depots to be
afterwards transferred to other places as merchandise, is prohibited.
Y   .—Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky,
Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Caroline, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, and Virginia—12.
N   .—Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Vermont—7.
D      .—New York and Kansas—2.
S  . IV. The third paragraph of the second section of the fourth article of
the Constitution shall not be construed to prevent any of the States, by
appropriate legislation, and through the action of their judicial and
ministerial officers, from enforcing the delivery of fugitives from labor to
the person to whom such labor or service is due.
Y   .—Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and
Virginia—15.
N   .—Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, and
New Hampshire—4.
D      .—New York and Kansas—2.
S  . V. The foreign slave-trade is hereby forever prohibited; and it shall be
the duty of Congress to pass laws to prevent the importation of slaves,
coolies, or persons held to service or labor, into the United States and the
Territories, from places beyond the limits thereof.
Y   .—Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Vermont, and Kansas—16.
N   .—Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, North
Carolina, and Virginia—5.
S  . VI. The first, third, and fifth sections, together with this section of
these amendments, and the third paragraph of the second section of the first
article of the Constitution, and the third paragraph of the second section of
the fourth article thereof, shall not be amended or abolished without the
consent of all the States.
Y   .—Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky,
Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee
—11.
N   .—Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, North Carolina, New
Hampshire, Vermont, and Virginia—9.
D      .—New York.
S  . VII. Congress shall provide by law, that the United States shall pay to
the owner the full value of his fugitive from labor in all cases where the
marshal, or other officer, whose duty it was to arrest such fugitive, was
prevented from so doing by violence or intimidation from mobs or riotous
assemblies, or when after arrest such fugitive was rescued by like violence
or intimidation, and the owner thereby deprived of the same; and the
acceptance of such payment shall preclude the owner from further claim to
such fugitive. Congress shall provide by law for securing to citizens of each
State the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.
Y   .—Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New
Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—12.
N   .—Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, North
Carolina, Missouri, and Vermont—7.
D      .—New York.
N   V     .—Massachusetts.
When the question was first taken on the first section, it was lost by a vote
of eleven States against it to eight in its favor, a majority of your
Commissioners casting the vote of New York against it. A motion was
immediately made to reconsider, which was advocated by Mr. Granger, one
of the Commissioners from New York, and was carried by a vote of
fourteen States for, to five against it—a majority of the Commissioners
from New York again casting its vote in the negative, and the Convention
adjourned. On the next day it again came up on its final passage, and was
then carried by a vote of nine States for, to eight against it—the vote of
New York not being given. Why it was not given is left by the
Commissioners to be stated by Mr. Field, on his own responsibility. (See
note, p. 596.)
The vote of New York was not given upon any of the sections except the
fifth, for the reason already stated; but upon that section we all voted Aye,
as all her Commissioners then present were in its favor.
After the several votes had been taken, it was objected that the whole article
should be put to a vote upon the question of its final adoption before it
could be regarded as properly passed, but the President of the Convention
decided that this was not necessary, and no such vote was taken. At the
close of the discussion on this subject your Commissioners were prepared
to cast the vote against the entire article, if any question had been taken
upon it as a whole, as a majority of your Commissioners think it should
have been.
Soon after the adoption of these proposed amendments to the Constitution,
and after voting down and laying on the table various propositions made by
a minority in the interest of freedom and the free States, the Convention
adjourned—having adopted an address to Congress requesting that body to
submit the amendment, to Conventions of the several States, for ratification,
according to the Constitution of the United States; and they were
accordingly communicated to Congress on the same day. In the Senate, they
were referred to a committee, and were recommended for adoption by a
majority of that committee; but Messrs. Seward and Trumbull, a minority of
the committee, reported against the amendments, and in favor of a National
Convention; thus following out and approving the proposition which had
been made in the Convention by your Commissioners, and the entire
minority of that party, nearly three weeks before, and for which the majority
which controlled it, if it had chosen to do so, could at any time have
obtained an unanimous vote. The amendment of the Convention, however,
failed to secure the approval of either branch of Congress.
The labors of your Commissioners having thus terminated, it is due to those
whom they represented, and to themselves, that the majority should state
briefly the reasons why the proposed amendments to the Constitution did
not meet their approbation.
First.—In their judgment, no amendment of that sacred instrument in the
interest, and for the purpose of the extension and perpetuation of the slave
power—an interest which has wielded the whole political power of the
United States during almost the entire existence of the Government—was
either expedient or necessary. They preferred it should remain and continue
just as it came from the hands of our revolutionary fathers; a Constitution
establishing freedom and not slavery.
Second.—The Convention would scarcely listen to, much less adopt, any
amendment in the interest of freedom or of free labor, or of the rights of
citizens of the free States; the only one of that character—that in relation to
securing to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the several States—having been voted down as a direct
proposition when offered by Mr. Wilmot, and only adopted in an indirect
way at the end of the section requiring payment to be made by Congress for
rescued slaves. In like manner the absolute right of secession in every State
as inherent under the Constitution of the United States was claimed to exist
by members of the Convention from the slave States, accompanied by a
denial of any right in the General Government to coerce obedience to it, or
to enforce the laws for the collection of revenue. And although all the
delegates from the slave States did not take this ground, yet in several
instances a majority of the delegates from several of them did so, and the
States themselves generally voted against all propositions to the contrary.
The article proposed by your Commissioners denying the right of
nullification and secession was defeated in accordance with these views; so
that in effect slave States, and such of the free States as voted with them,
would not consent so to amend the Constitution as to deny the right of
nullification and secession, even if all the guarantees demanded by the slave
interest were accorded to it. In addition, many of the delegates from the
slave States declared that it was the fixed determination of those States to
stand by the States that had seceded from the Union, and to aid them in
resisting it, even if such guarantees were given; and that they would resist
any attempts to coerce them, or to enforce the revenue, or any other laws
within their limits, without their consent. In other words, they claimed a
right to remain in the Union under the Constitution, with its new guarantees
of slavery, and yet to obstruct the operations of the Government, to prevent
the execution of the laws, and to aid those who were in open rebellion
against, and had made war upon it. Under these circumstances your
Commissioners did not deem it consistent with justice, or the respect due to
their own State, to give their assent to any of the proposed amendments,
except that prohibiting the slave-trade—and even that, in their opinion, was
unnecessary, as no enlightened legislative body would dare to propose to
reëstablish that infamous traffic.
Third.—By the first section of the proposed amendments, slavery is
constitutionally established in all of the territory south of the line of 36° 30
´, and all control over it by Congress or the territorial legislatures is
absolutely taken away during its territorial condition. In effect, there is to be
no law for slavery, its permanency and existence being provided for, except
the will of the master and the present odious slave code of New Mexico.
These are fastened upon every inch of the soil of that immense region,
beyond even the power of the people to remove them, however much they
may desire to do so, prior to the formation of a State government. Slavery
must therefore be the normal condition of the territory, while the State is in
the process of formation and organization; and the inevitable result must be,
that free labor and free institutions will be excluded, and no free State
formed within its limits. As the territory was free from the blight of slavery
when acquired, your Commissioners could not assent to its being changed
into slave soil by an amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Fourth.—The second section of the proposed amendments gives to the
slave States an absolute negative upon the acquisition of free territory in
every possible mode by which it can be acquired; and in giving reciprocally
the same right to free States as to acquiring slave territory, also fetters the
operations of the General Government both in peace and war, depriving it to
some extent of the exercise of perfect sovereignty, and at the same time
sanctioning, and perpetuating in the organic law, an odious discrimination
in favor of an institution peculiar to the slave States, and at variance with
the humane principles of the age. The free States do not need any such veto
power in their favor, and the slave States would not demand it except to
maintain and preserve for slavery a balance of power hitherto claimed, and
to some extent exercised by them, for which they secure by this amendment
a constitutional perpetuation. No well-founded objection seems to exist in
regard to the acquisition of free territory, unless it be that it is obtained in
order to convert it into slave soil; and your Commissioners could not
consent to give to a single interest, that of slavery, a negative upon such
acquisitions. They have always regarded slavery as a local institution,
depending solely upon the laws of the States in which it was permitted for
its existence; and they did not deem it expedient or just to recognize it as, or
elevate it to, the rank of a positive governmental power, by clothing it with
the right to interrupt one of the ordinary and most essential functions of the
Government. Slavery, except as a limited basis of representation, has now
no political power or authority under the Constitution; the wise and good
men who framed that instrument cautiously withheld it in all other respects;
and your Commissioners find in the history of the aggressions of the slave
interest, only additional reasons for confining it within its original limits.
Fifth.—To so much of the third article as declares that the Constitution nor
any amendment of it, shall be so construed as to give Congress the power to
regulate, abolish, or control slavery within any State, there was no
objection, as it has never been seriously claimed that any such power was
given; but this provision is connected with so many objectionable, not to
say odious ones, that your Commissioners felt themselves bound to vote
against it. These surrender all the power of Congress over the District of
Columbia, and over other places within its exclusive jurisdiction, in respect
of slavery and its ultimate extinction, however much the people of the
United States in the progress of civilization and humanity may desire it; and
by the sixth section this provision is made unalterable without the consent
of all the States. The influences produced by the existence of slavery at the
National Capital, upon public men and public measures, are well known;
and while they may be tolerated, as they have been, without any desire to
exercise the power of eradicating the cause of the evil, still a sound policy
requires that the power should not be abandoned. Connected with this
surrender of a well-defined and necessary power, are other provisions in
regard to the transit of slaves through the free States; in effect, permitting
the carrying on of the internal slave-trade through these States, unless they
pass laws forbidding it. This trade through the free States is not made
dependent upon the consent of the States, but is made lawful without
dissent; and the result is, that if this amendment shall be adopted, every free
State will find it necessary to legislate for its exclusion, or to permit and
regulate the transit by its own laws. These laws would be deemed odious by
the slave States, and would produce dissatisfaction and irritation. Besides,
in most of the free States, the normal legal condition of every person is that
of freedom; this constitutional provision would at once change the local law
of the State, and operate as a positive recognition of slavery in the absence
of any new enactment. Thus, every free State would find itself compelled to
adopt a slave code, more or less extensive in its character, regulating or
excluding the inter-state slave-trade. Taking this in connection with the
fourth section, authorizing the States to legislate upon the subject of
fugitive slaves, and by their judicial and ministerial officers to enforce their
delivery, contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States,
which declares all such interference on the part of the States
unconstitutional, it is apparent that the legislatures of all the free States
would be beset by hordes of persons in the interest of the slave power for
the passage of laws protecting slavery within their limits. No means,
however impure, would be omitted to obtain them; and it is easy to see that
a slave code upon the subject of transit of fugitives, more or less stringent in
its character, would soon find its way into every statute book. When the
States now free abolished slavery within their own limits, they intended to
get rid of the evil entirely, not only in practice but as a necessity of
legislation; these provisions compel a return to it, and involve the adoption
of new laws for its regulation or exclusion.
Seventh.—The sixth section makes most of the amendments which give a
constitutional protection to slavery, unalterable without the consent of all
the States. It also includes the second section of the fourth article, which
provides that "representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States according to their respective members," including three-
fifths of all slaves, &c.; and that portion of the fourth article which requires
the delivering up of fugitive slaves. Thus, a preference is given to the slave
interest over every other; these may all be affected by a constitutional
amendment, ratified or adopted by three-fourths of the States; but the slave
clauses are to remain, except by universal consent, fixed and immovable.
No such protection is given to freedom; none to the property of free men,
unless it be what is called property in slaves; none to the freedom of the
press; none to the religion of the citizen, or to the rights of conscience.
These rights, more sacred than any other, are deemed of less importance,
and are secured by less guarantees than the right to hold a fellow man in
bondage and to traffic in his flesh. Moreover, the three-fifth representation
of slaves, and only the same rate of direct taxation, are perpetual by the
same rigid provision. This not only gives to the slave States a representation
of three-fifths of their slave property, but it secures to them an exemption
from taxation on the same property to the extent of two-fifths. But no
property whatever, in the free States constitutes a basis of representation,
and all of it is liable to, and may be taxed. Unequal and unjust as was this
discrimination in favor of the slave States, still as it formed a part of the
original Constitution, it should be maintained; but when it is sought to
extend it to new States, and to make it unchangeable without the consent of
all the States, the attempt should be resisted by every freeman. There are
other property interests more important than that of slavery, but none of
them have been so arrogant as to claim such exclusive privileges and
perpetuation.
Finally.—Other objections of a grave character might be stated, but it is not
deemed necessary. The great purpose of the Convention was to amend the
Constitution of the United States, so as to recognize and protect slaves as
property. As a direct proposition this was negatived, but the same end was
sought to be attained by indirect means, and its friends exulted in having
accomplished it. Such is the obvious effect of these amendments. If
adopted, slaves must everywhere in the Union be regarded as property, and
entitled to the same legal protection as other property. The necessary result
will be, that all State laws forbidding the bringing of slaves within their
limits, will be void, the sovereignty of the States in that respect will be
destroyed, and the National Constitution will recognize and protect property
in man.
We do not believe that the people of the State of New York will, under any
pressure of circumstances, however grave, recognize a claim so repugnant
to humanity, so hostile to freedom.
We commend to your honorable body the careful consideration of these
proposed constitutional amendments. We believe that they will, if adopted,
engraft upon our Constitution the odious doctrine of property in man; that
they will extend slavery over a vast domain once free; that they will change
the whole spirit and character of our organic law, making that to protect and
foster slavery which was intended to establish freedom; making that








NOTE OF MR. FIELD.
T   following statement shows why the vote of New York was not given
upon the first question taken in the Peace Convention, on the twenty-
seventh of February. The Journal represents the vote as divided. It was not
divided. The vote was ordered to be cast, and should have been cast in the
negative.
On Tuesday, the day preceding, a message came to me from the clerk of the
Supreme Court of the United States, that the Court was waiting for me in a
case which had stood upon the docket since December, 1859, and was now
for the first time reached in its order. The case was of great importance, for
upon its result depended the closing or reopening of a litigation which I had
conducted for nineteen years, which had embraced in its different forms
more than eighty suits, and in the course of which the Courts of the State
and of the United States had come into direct conflict. All the tribunals of
the State of New York, where the question had been raised, had decided
against my clients. The Supreme Court of the United States, by a majority
of two, had once decided in their favor.
The present case was to determine whether the Court would adhere to its
former decision. The stake of my clients was therefore immense, and I was
their only counsel.
The case being called after my arrival in Court, the Chief Justice observed
that, as it was too late to begin that day, the argument would proceed first
the next morning, at eleven o'clock, unless the Attorney-General should
claim precedence in another case. Then, thinking that the Convention would
close its business during the day, I hastened back, and the question being
soon taken, I cast the vote of the State against the proposition before the
Convention, and it was rejected by 11 to 8.
A reconsideration was moved and carried, and an adjournment taken to
half-past seven in the evening. At that hour I returned to the Convention,
but to my disappointment, and in spite of my efforts, it adjourned to the
next morning at ten o'clock, a majority of my associates voting for the
adjournment.
The next morning I endeavored to procure a meeting of the delegation
before ten o'clock, that I might obtain a formal instruction to the Chairman
in my absence to cast a vote of the State against the proposed amendments.
Not being able, however, to obtain the earlier attendance of all the
members, I waited till they appeared in the hall of the Convention, and
there, shortly before eleven o'clock, I called them together, and, all being
present, a resolution, in contemplation of my absence, was moved and
carried, that "the Chairman declare that New York voted No on each
section." Thereupon requesting Mr. King to act as temporary Chairman in
my absence, and when New York was called to cast the vote in the negative,
pursuant to the resolution, I left the hall and drove to the Capitol as rapidly
as possible, that I might be present at the opening of the Court.
Was it reasonable, nay, was it possible, that I should do otherwise? It is
known to be a rule of the Supreme Court not to postpone an argument for
other engagements of counsel. If neither counsel is present, the case goes to
the foot of the docket, to be reached again only after two or three years; if
one of the counsel only appears, he makes an oral argument, and a printed
brief is submitted on the other side. In my view, it would have been trifling
with the rights of my clients either to submit their case on a printed brief or
to postpone it for two years. I had no one to send to the Court in my place.
To despatch a letter with an excuse was a liberty I did not feel justified in
taking, and if taken, it might fail of its object, as the Court, when informed
of the circumstances, must have believed that no member of the delegation
would take advantage of my absence if he could, and that he could not if he
would, since the vote had been already determined in a meeting of the
delegation, and that determination could not be reconsidered or changed
without the desertion to the minority of one of the majority.
But whatever might be the opinion of others, my duty appeared to myself
extremely plain. There was nothing to be done in the Convention but the
merely ministerial duty of declaring what had already been determined,
which duty could certainly be performed by another as well as myself,
while, on the other hand, no one but myself could act in Court for my
clients. It is true that some of my associates expressed to me their
apprehension that the minority might appeal to the Convention, and that the
Convention might arbitrarily overrule the delegation; but I answered them
as I repeat now, that neither the minority of the delegation nor the
Convention itself had any right to interpose. We were not asking a favor,
but exercising a right. Whether a person not present could vote was not the
question. Persons did not vote except on unimportant questions and by
general consent. States voted; the vote of each State was delivered by its
Chairman, who collected the voices of his delegation and announced the
result. There was nothing in the reason of the thing, nothing in any rule or
usage of the Convention, which required the voices of the delegation to be
collected at the instant of announcing the result. They might be collected
one minute beforehand, or, as in the present instance, ten minutes, or twice
ten minutes. All that could be required was, that each member should give
his own judgment upon the particular proposition, and the sum of these
judgments it was the sole province of the Chairman to make known. There
could be no occasion for their standing by his side while he performed this
duty unless he needed their support or they feared his weakness.
I have said that there was no rule of the Convention which ordered the
matter otherwise; on the contrary, the rule as to the mode of voting—the
18th—was as follows:
"18. M       V     : All votes shall be taken by States, and each State to
give one vote. The yeas and nays of the members shall not be taken, or
published—only the decision by States."
On the twenty-first of February, Mr. Dent, of Maryland, moved the adoption
of the following rule:
"When the vote on any question is taken by States, any Commissioner
dissenting from the vote of his State may have his dissent entered on the
journal."
Mr. Chase, of Ohio, offered the following as a substitute for Mr. Dent's rule.
"The yeas and nays of the Commissioners of each State, upon any question,
shall be entered upon the Journal, when it is desired by any Commissioner;
and the vote of each State shall be determined by the majority of
Commissioners present from each State."
Mr. Chase's substitute was rejected, and Mr. Dent's rule adopted.
The usage of the Convention may be understood by a single example. The
Maine delegation consisted of her two Senators and six members of the
House of Representatives. One member only attended for the greater part of
the Convention, and cast the vote of the State. Indeed it was a frequent
practice for members to absent themselves and leave their associates to act
for them.
The State of New York had, moreover, decided for herself in what manner
her Commissioners should speak for her, by declaring in the joint resolution
of the Senate and Assembly that they should cast their "votes to be
determined by a majority of their number," not the majority of those who
should happen to be present at a particular instant on the floor of the
Convention, but a majority of the whole number. Suppose, upon a question
being put, the delegation had met for consultation, and by a formal
resolution determined that the vote of the State be No; then, instructing their
Chairman to cast the vote accordingly, had separated, and all but the
Chairman retired from the hall, could he thereupon have changed the vote
to Aye, because he disagreed with the majority and alone remained on the
floor? Or could the Convention have refused this vote of the State? And if
not, how is that question different from the one here?
It was, therefore, I must think with good reason, assumed by me when I left
the hall, that if the question should be put in my absence, which by the way
I considered uncertain, as the debate then going on might last for hours, and
I hoped still to find some means of deferring my argument to the next day, I
might certainly depend on the vote of New York being declared again as it
had been declared before, never doubting for a moment the ability and the
will of my associates to defend against all opposition the rights of the State,
their own rights, and mine.
On my arrival at the Court I did not succeed in my desire to defer my
argument to the next day; but had I done so, it would have made no
difference, as the vote in the Convention must have been called before I
reached the Capitol.
What occurred in my absence I can only know from report. Five different
statements are given: one by Mr. King in a published letter, another by the
secretary of the delegation in the minutes kept by him, the third by the
chairman of the Massachusetts delegation, who had the best opportunity to
observe what was passing, the fourth by the secretary in a correspondence
with me, and the fifth in the published Journal of the Convention.
Mr. King's statement of what occurred in my absence is as follows:
"The vote on the amendment soon followed, and before New York was
called I asked my colleagues what vote should be given, and the reply was
that in the absence of Mr. Field the vote was divided. Nevertheless, I stated
the case to the Convention, and asked permission to cast the vote as before.
This was objected to by one of the Commissioners of the minority, and
permission having been refused by the Convention, by direction of my
colleagues when the State was called I answered that the vote was divided."
The other statements are subjoined, and numbered, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
From a comparison of these statements it appears.
First: That the direction given to Mr. King, when the whole delegation were
together, regularly convened, in contemplation of my absence, was to
"declare that New York voted No."
Second: That instead of confining himself to that duty, he began
immediately upon my departure, and before the vote was demanded, to ask
anew, "what vote should be given?" and when the vote was demanded,
instead of voting No, "stated the case to the Convention, and asked
permission to cast the vote as before."
Third: That Mr. King's colleagues, though they had just resolved, in
expectation of my absence, that he should "declare that New York voted
No," yet "before New York was called," and of course before any intimation
from the Convention or its President, in answer to his question, "What vote
shall be given?" replied, "that in Mr. Field's absence, the vote was divided,"
and directed him so to declare.
Fourth: That the Convention never "decided that no person could vote who
was not present." Whatever was done, was done between the delegation and
Mr. Tyler. No order was taken by the Convention, but, on the contrary, the
objection on the part of the minority of the delegation was that "the
Convention had no control or authority in the matter."
What caused this departure from the course of proceedings prescribed by
the resolution does not clearly appear. The delegation did not rescind the
resolution; the Convention did not reverse it. I do not understand that my
associates consider it a nullity—certainly they could not have so considered
it when it was passed. I have not sufficient evidence that they changed their
minds within ten minutes, or that they have changed them yet. That the
resolution was not a nullity, but an authoritative act, binding upon every
member of the delegation, until duly reconsidered, I believed then, and
believe still.
I submit, therefore, that my reason for attending court, at its opening, was
not only sufficient but imperative; and if I had not yielded to it, I should
have incurred the reproach of my clients, and the censure of all right-
thinking men; that before I left the Convention, I did not only all that could
have been done, but all that was necessary, to make the vote of New York
certain against the proposed amendments of the Constitution; and that the
omission to record the vote of New York as it was ordered, was owing not
to any act or omission of mine, but to the efforts of the minority of the
delegation, or some of them, to prevent an expression of the opinion of the
majority, and to the failure of my associates of the majority to execute in
my absence what had been resolved when I was present.
It is certainly with regret that I write this note. My preference was for a
statement in which we all could join, but my associates refused to enter into
any joint relation of the facts.
I hope, also, it will not be inferred from any thing I have written, that I do
not regret the omission to record New York as voting against what appeared
to me an unwise and pernicious proposition. Though the importance of the
vote has been greatly magnified, and the result in my opinion would not
have been different if the vote of New York had been counted, as I believe
some of the States not voting would, if necessary, have voted in the
affirmative; and even if it had been otherwise, I think the action of the
Convention was of no importance whatever; yet, I should wish this State, of
which we are so proud, to appear always, even in a matter of ceremony, on
the side of Freedom; ever loyal to the Constitution as it is, but against
placing there a guaranty to slavery beyond the guarantees of our fathers.
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD.
N   Y   , March 20th, 1861.
I.—Extract from the Minutes of the New York Delegation, kept by their
Secretary.
"W        , February 27th, 1861.
"New York delegation met in the room, and Mr. Wadsworth moved that the
New York delegation vote No on each of the sections of the committee's
report. Messrs. Corning, Bronson, Granger, Wool, and Dodge opposed,
urging that the vote of New York be given on each section as it was called.
The majority overruled, and decided to have the Chairman declare that New
York voted No on each section.
"The question on the first section being called, Mr. King stated that one of
the members of the delegation being called away to the United States Court,
the delegation had taken a vote before he left, and he appealed to the justice
of the Convention to have it so cast, stating that the vote of the delegation
had been so cast on the previous day.
"The Convention decided that no person could vote who was not present.
"The delegation was divided."
II.—Letter from the Chairman of the Massachusetts Delegation.
"W         , March 8th, 1861.
"M  D    S  :—Your favor of the 6th instant is before me. After alluding
to the fact that 'my seat in the Peace Convention was at the table directly
under the President's chair, between him and the New York delegation,' you
desire me to inform you what took place, on the occasion of the vote of
New York being called on the morning of the 27th February. What I
observed was this:
"When the vote of New York was called for, Governor King rose and stated
in substance that you had a short time before left the Convention to argue a
case in the Supreme Court, which had been assigned for that morning, and
asked the permission of the Convention to give the vote of the State in your
absence, the same as though you were present. To this one of the
Commissioners, Mr. Corning I think it was, objected, saying that the vote of
New York was to be given as her Commissioners who were present should
decide, and that the Convention had no control or authority in the matter.
Some conversation was then had between the Commissioners who favored
and those who opposed the pending proposition, which I did not hear with
sufficient distinctness to understand, and in a minute or two Governor King
announced that the vote of New York was divided.
"This is the substance of what occurred, so far as I observed it.
"With great respect, your friend,
"J.Z. GOODRICH.
"To David Dudley Field, Esq., New York."
III.—Letter to the Secretary of the Convention.
"N   Y   , March 4th, 1861.
"D    S  :—Was any resolution passed by the Convention on Wednesday,
the 27th of February, respecting the right of New York to vote, or affecting
the vote of that State in the absence of any of her Commissioners? On one
side I am told that there was such a resolution passed, or vote taken, in my
absence; on the other side, I am told that there was not. If one was passed,
will you do me the favor to give me a copy of it, and oblige
"Yours truly,
"DAVID DUDLEY FIELD.
"C      J. W     , Esq., &c., &c."
IV.—The Secretary's Answer.
No. 135, W      ' , W         , March 5th, 1861.
"D    S  :—I have your letter. When New York was called, the inquiry
was made whether an absent member could vote, stating that one member
of that delegation was absent. The President stated that an absent member
could not vote. New York was stated divided, and did not vote.
"Respectfully, &c.,
"CRAFTS J. WRIGHT."
V.—Extract from the Journal of the Convention.
"February 27th, 1861.
"The question on the adoption of said section resulted in the following vote:
"Y   .—Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee—9.
"N   .—Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New
Hampshire, Vermont, and Virginia—8.
"So the section was adopted.
"On calling New York, the members stated that one of their number was
absent, and the delegation were divided. Inquiry was made of the President
whether an absent member could vote. The President decided he could not,
without general leave.
"New York, Indiana, and Kansas were divided."
To the Legislature of the State of New York:
The undersigned beg leave to submit a reply to the statement of Mr. D.D.
Field, to the report of the majority of the Commissioners to the Conference
Convention at Washington, respecting his absence on the final vote in that
body, on the proposed amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
The fact of his absence is admitted by Mr. Field, and attempted to be
defended at great length, but Mr. Field has omitted to state that, by the 14th
Rule of the Convention, "no member should be absent from the
Convention, so as to interrupt the representation of the State, without
leave." Mr. Field neither asked nor obtained leave of absence, and hence,
under the rule, he failed to discharge his duty, both to the Convention and
his colleagues. Mr. Field does not state that he made any application to the
court for a temporary postponement of his case, in view of the important
vote then about to be taken in Convention. But, on the contrary, argues to
show that his duty to his client was paramount to his duty as Commissioner
of the State of New York, in a question involving constitutional principles.
After Mr. Field had stated, in the presence of his colleagues in the
Convention, that he was obliged to go immediately to the Supreme Court of
the United States, he was urged by those who agreed with him in opinion, to
remain, and give the vote of the State against the proposed amendments,
and was repeatedly told that his absence would divide the vote; this was so
stated to him, by the minority of the Commissioners, and that it would be so
claimed by them before the Convention. He refused to remain, and with the
full knowledge of the effect of his absence on the question about to be
taken, he left the Convention, and thus defeated the vote of his State. We
who remained in our places, felt deeply the embarrassment, and the remarks
which were made in consequence of Mr. Field's withdrawal. We had
steadily, up to that time, sustained with him, our own, and what we believed
to be the sentiment of the State, in favor of freedom, and were, therefore,
entirely unprepared for such a determination on his part. Nor is our surprise
lessened by the manner and the certificates by which he has at great length
attempted to defend his course on this occasion. The vote of New York was
not declared until after the vote which had been previously taken in its
delegation had been stated, nor until an appeal had been made to the
Convention, and refused by its President, to enable his colleagues to protect
its vote in the absence of the Chairman of the delegation. By his absence the
vote of New York stood 5 to 5, and it was under the decision of the
Convention alone, that the vote was declared to be divided. Mr. Field has
stated that the omission to record the vote of New York against the
amendments was not owing to any act or omission of his, but to the efforts
of the minority of the delegation, or some of them, to prevent the expression
of the opinion of the majority. The objection was made after notice to him
that it would be made, and the Convention sustained it, hence the vote was
lost by his absence. Nor is the opinion of Mr. Field entitled to consideration
when he imputes to the majority a want of fidelity to him, in not claiming
and adhering to the vote which had been taken when all were present, and
which was afterwards rendered null, by his absence. They did adhere to it,
and endeavored to cast the vote accordingly. It was his duty to have been
present, and to have thus given effect to that which had been previously
agreed to. Mr. Field states, and truly, that his colleagues refused to unite in a
joint relation of the facts of the case. They refused, because they were not
satisfied with his course, and would not be responsible for it in any way. Up
to the moment of his leaving the Convention, Mr. Field had manifested
great zeal and ability in sustaining and defending the principles which a
majority of the delegation desired to advocate, and his failure at the last,






N   Y   , March 28th, 1861.
To the Legislature of the State of New York:
Informed by the newspapers of this morning that five of my associates in
the Peace Convention, after waiting nearly three weeks, made yesterday to
the Legislature a communication purporting to be an answer to the note
which I thought it my duty to append to the report, explaining why the vote
of New York was not given at a particular time, I beg leave to submit the
following in reply:
I do not perceive that my associates impugn a single statement of fact
contained in my note. My engagement in Court, the importance of the
engagement, the necessity for my keeping it, the meeting of the delegation
in contemplation of it, their resolution directing how the vote should be cast
in my absence, the neglect so to cast it, are all, by silence, admitted. Nor do
I perceive any denial of the proposition that the delegation had a right to
pass the resolution, which thus became binding on all its members until
reconsidered and reversed.
Perhaps I ought to make one exception to this use of admissions. My
associates apparently wish to have it believed, yet hesitate to assert, that the
Convention made a decision respecting the right to vote. In one place they
say, "that an appeal had been made to the Convention, and refused by its
President;" in another, that "it was under the decision of the Convention
alone that the vote was declared to be divided;" and in a third, that the
objection of the minority was made after notice to me that it would be
made, and the "Convention sustained it, hence the vote was lost," by my
absence. They should have reflected that there could have been no "decision
of the Convention" if the appeal to it was "refused by its President." The
truth beyond question is, that although my associates imagined that the
Convention decided something, it did in fact decide nothing.
My associates say further, that I argue to show that my duty to my client
was paramount to my "duty as Commissioner of the State of New York, in a
question involving constitutional principles." This is an idle calumny. My
note can be read as well as theirs; and in general will be read by the same
persons, and there is not a word in it to justify or excuse their assertion. I
never thus argued. I claimed that I had two duties to perform, and that I
performed both. I did not claim that my duty to my State was subordinate to
any other duty whatever.
When my associates assert that their Chairman left the Convention "with
full knowledge of the effect of his absence on the vote about to be taken," if
they mean that I knew or supposed that they intended to reverse their own
action, or that Mr. King would not announce the vote as it had been
resolved, or would declare the vote divided, or that they would support him
in it, or that the Convention would overrule the delegation, then they assert
what they could not know to be true, and what is not true in fact. My note
sets forth what I was told, and what I replied.
My associates argue that I failed to discharge my duty, because I did not
obtain leave of the Convention before going into the Supreme Court.
Though I do not remember to have heard before of leave granted by a
deliberative body to a member to go out for half an hour, or for one or two
hours, I will observe, by this Convention absence was expressly allowed, if
it did not "interrupt the representation of the State." My associates do
indeed claim that, when I left the hall, the State ceased to be represented,
ten Commissioners only remaining behind. The argument of this strange
position appears to be, that a State is not represented when its vote can be
divided, and that the vote of New York was divided. Here is a double
fallacy. To say that the vote was divided, begs the question. It was not
divided so long as the resolution passed by the delegation remained valid,
and its validity is not denied. The other part of the proposition is equally
fallacious. A State is represented when there are in the body delegates
authorized to represent it, whatever be their number. The arguments of my
associates seem to be, that a State could only be represented in the Peace
Convention by odd numbers, and that if it sent eight or ten representatives,
it would have no representatives at all.
But what shall I say to the following sentences:—"Nor is the opinion of Mr.
Field entitled to consideration, when he imputes to the majority a want of
fidelity to him, in not claiming and adhering to the vote which had been
taken when all were present, and which was afterwards rendered null by his
absence. They did adhere to it, and endeavored to cast the vote accordingly.
It was his duty to have been present, and to have thus given effect to that
which had been previously agreed to." Would any one imagine that the
authors were speaking of a vote, given in expectation of my absence, and to
determine what should be done when I was away? The vote was taken
because I was to be absent, and directed the Chairman how to act in that
event, but it is nevertheless pretended that the moment I became absent, the
vote became null. They might better have said that the vote would have
become null, or rather that there would have been no occasion for it in case
of my continued presence. Then they say that they adhered to it. How did
they adhere? The resolution directed the Chairman to cast the vote in the
negative. He did not obey the resolution. His associates and mine did not
insist that he should. Nobody prevented his answering "no," when the vote
was called. No reason has ever been given for his not so answering. That he
should instead have entered voluntarily into a discussion with Mr. Tyler on
the subject, and that his associates should have looked quietly on, can only
be accounted for by supposing them indifferent or bewildered.
It is not an agreeable task to write thus of old friends; but I must defend
myself when attacked, and defence cannot always be made pleasant to an
assailant.
My late friends profess to think me responsible for the loss of the vote of
New York on a certain occasion. I think them responsible for it. Which side
is right the Legislature and the people of the State will judge.
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD.
N   Y   , April 11th, 1861.
Report of a Minority of the Commissioners of New York.
I  S     , March 25th, 1861.
The undersigned, constituting a minority of the Commissioners, appointed
by the Legislature of the State of New York, under resolutions responsive to
those of the State of Virginia, referred to in the report of the majority of the
Commissioners of said State of New York, admitting the correctness of the
record of the proceedings presented by said majority, but differing from
them in much of the reasoning which they present, respectfully report:
That they entered upon the duties assigned to them, earnestly desiring to
carry out the patriotic spirit of said resolutions as therein expressed, which
said original resolutions are herein embodied as a part of this report:
NEW YORK.
C          R           appointing Commissioners from this State to
meet Commissioners from other States at Washington, on invitation of
Virginia.
W      , the State of Virginia, by resolutions of her General Assembly,
passed the nineteenth instant, has invited such of the slaveholding and non-
slaveholding States as are willing to unite with her, to meet at Washington,
on the fourth of February next, to consider, and if practicable, agree on
some suitable adjustment of our national difficulties; and whereas, the
people of New York, while they hold the opinion that the Constitution of
the United States, as it is, contains all needful guarantees for the rights of
the States, are nevertheless ready, at all times, to confer with their brethren
upon all alleged grievances; and to do all that can justly be required of them
to allay discontent; therefore,
Resolved, That David Dudley Field, William Curtis Noyes, James S.
Wadsworth, James C. Smith, Amaziah B. James, Erastus Corning, Addison
Gardner, Greene C. Bronson, Wm. E. Dodge, Ex-Governor John A. King,
and Major-General John E. Wool, be and are hereby appointed
Commissioners on the part of this State, to meet Commissioners from other
States, in the City of Washington, on the fourth day of February next, or so
soon thereafter as Commissioners shall be appointed by a majority of the
States of the Union, to confer with them upon the complaints of any part of
the country, and to suggest such remedies therefor as to them shall seem fit
and proper; but the said Commissioners shall at all times be subject to the
control of this Legislature, and shall cast five votes to be determined by a
majority of their number.
Resolved, That in thus acceding to the request of Virginia, it is not to be
understood that this Legislature approve of the propositions submitted by
the General Assembly of that State, or concede the propriety of their
adoption by the proposed Convention. But while adhering to the position
she has heretofore occupied, New York will not reject an invitation to a
conference, which, by bringing together the men of both sections, holds out
the possibility of an honorable settlement of our national difficulties, and
the restoration of peace and harmony to the country.
Resolved, That the Governor be requested to transmit a copy of the
foregoing resolutions to the Executives of the several States, and also to the
President of the United States, and to inform the Commissioners without
delay of their appointment.
Resolved, That the foregoing resolutions be transmitted to the honorable the
Senate, with a request that they concur therein.
The foregoing resolutions were passed in the House of Assembly by a vote
of seventy-three ayes to thirty-nine noes, and in the Senate by a vote of
nineteen to twelve, those in the negative, in both Houses, being all members
of the dominant party, and those in the affirmative composed of the
members of the opposition, and of those Republicans who were supposed to
be prepared to meet the State of Virginia and other sister States, in the spirit
of the resolutions adopted by the States of Virginia and New York.
A single point in the record, to which reference has been made, requires
some consideration before proceeding to the reasoning of a majority of the
Commissioners upon the propositions finally adopted by the Convention.
The majority of the Commissioners state that most of said majority were
opposed to the submission by the Convention of any amendments of the
Constitution of the United States at the present time, and in the present
excited state of the public mind.
Not only was that ground assumed by a majority of the New York
Commissioners, but some of their number argued with great ability against
the danger of touching that sacred instrument, consecrated by memories so
dear to every patriot heart.
The propositions, presented as amendments, were clear and distinct—their
adoption would in no manner disturb the general harmony of the
Constitution; yet, strangely enough, to an ordinary mind, the majority of the
Commissioners who found such danger in adopting the specific
amendments proposed, voted with a united action for a General Convention
to remodel the entire Constitution—exposed to all the hazards that must
attend such a Convention—by whose action a form of government might be
presented, in which could not be found a single trace of that Constitution
for which they professed such high veneration.
The undersigned will now consider the reasons presented by a majority of
the Commissioners against the proposition: The majority declare that the
Convention would not listen to, much less adopt any amendments in the
interests of freedom, or of free labor, or of the rights of citizens of the free
States, the only one of that character, that in relation to the securing to the
citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the
several States, &c., &c. As the undersigned have no recollection of the
propositions to which reference would seem to be made, other than that
embraced in the last clause, which they have quoted, they would call the
attention of the people of the State of New York to this subject, as one
deeply interesting in its character, and upon which it is supposed that there
is very little difference of opinion. As this statement is thrown out by a
majority of the Commissioners, in a manner to carry a belief that the harsh
and cruel enactments which deprive colored citizens of the North of the
privileges they claim in Southern States under the Constitution, it may be
well for our people to consider that such enactments are not confined to the
States fostering the institution of slavery, but exist and are enforced in some
States making peculiar claim to love for freedom and the rights of man. The
State of Illinois has a code of laws against free colored persons, citizens of
other States, as severe as those of South Carolina or Louisiana. These laws
have been recently enforced, and yet the North does not hear one word of
the wrongs inflicted upon colored citizens of other States found within the
borders of Illinois.
It will be recollected that the Constitution first presented by the State of
Oregon, contained a clause prohibiting free colored persons from residing
within that State. That Constitution received the votes of both the Senators
from New York—each expressing his views of that instrument, yet the
public censure has not fallen upon either of those gentlemen, by reason of
such action. Nor is it necessary to go beyond the election polls of this State,
claiming its fifty thousand majority for the cause of freedom and of equal
rights—and yet counting from the ballot box an hundred thousand majority
against securing the privilege of suffrage to colored persons, upon the same
conditions that it is secured to whites. These facts are presented with the
hope that they may create a spirit of charity in the public mind toward those
States whose peculiar position renders such harsh legislation certainly not
more censurable than it is in free States.
The undersigned differ entirely from the majority of the Commissioners, as
to the action of the Convention upon subjects interesting to the North. It is
known to all that Virginia, Kentucky, and it is believed all the Southern
Border States instructed their delegates to insist on the Crittenden
propositions, a material feature of which was, that in all future acquired
territory, south of 36° 30´, slavery should be permitted; and yet when this
material clause was found repugnant to the Northern sentiment, a
distinguished Commissioner from Maryland moved to limit it to present
territory, which proposition was adopted. Surely this was an important
surrender to Northern sentiment that should not have been forgotten.
The majority say, that by the first of the proposed amendments, slavery is
constitutionally established in all the territory south of the line of 36° 30´,
as if such recognition of slavery there was now for the first time to be
established by the proposed amendment. The majority of these
Commissioners are counsellors of eminent ability, and yet, for some reason
not easily comprehended, they have seen fit to ignore a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States, which declares that slavery can be
carried into all the Territories of the United States, whether south or north of
the line of 36° 30´. The famous Dred Scott decision, to which reference is
here made, was often referred to in the debates of the Convention, and was
insisted upon by many gentlemen, holding views and opinions similar to
those of a majority of the New York Commissioners, as affording all the
protection that the South could require, and claiming that the proposed
amendment was unnecessary, by reason of such protection.
The Territory of New Mexico was declared open to slavery by the
compromise act of 1850. The public mind of the North was deeply agitated
upon that subject. A distinguished statesman, who was removed from earth
before his eyes were forced "to rest upon a dismembered Confederacy," was
violently assailed for declaring that slavery could work no practical evil in
New Mexico; and yet the recent census has vindicated that assertion,
showing that in the ten years that have passed since that compromise, only
twenty-four slaves were to be found in what the majority of the committee
are pleased to call the "immense region" of New Mexico; more than half of
whom were servants of army officers, to be removed when they should be
ordered to other stations.
The Territorial Legislature of New Mexico has declared the existence and
passed laws for the protection of slavery throughout that entire Territory,
while the proposed amendment of the Constitution would exclude it from
all that portion of said Territory north of 36° 30´.
The undersigned are not only ready to vindicate their votes for that
proposed amendment, but claim that such an amendment to the Constitution
would be a great gain to the cause of freedom; taking from the action of the
Dred Scott decision, and of the Territorial Legislation, all territory north of
36° 30´; and they challenge a comparison of their votes, with the course of
those who preferred to leave this question subject to the action of that
decision, and to the legislation to which reference is made.
The second section of the proposed amendments, touching the future
acquisition of territory, met the approval of the undersigned, as certainly not
less important to the North than to the South. The history of our country
shows how hastily the assumed powers of Congress have been exercised
upon this question, and at this moment presents a startling example, of a
State of vast territory, acquired by a joint resolution of Congress, sustained
at an enormous expense, and now withdrawing from the Confederacy,
seizing upon and applying to its own use all the Government property found
within its borders. Every reflecting citizen can determine for himself where
there is the most danger to the cause of humanity, and whether territory is
more probably to be acquired from the North, and consecrated to freedom,
or from the Southwest, upon which these exciting contests might be
revived.
This proposed amendment is presented with entire confidence for the
decision of our people.
As the majority of the Commissioners do not dissent from the general
principles of the third article, but object to some of its provisions, the
undersigned would remark that the principal difference between them and
the majority would seem to be whether Congress shall be denied the power
of abolishing Slavery in the District of Columbia, without the consent of
Maryland and without the consent of the owners, or making the owners who
do not consent just compensation. Ever since the formation of the
Government, this has been a subject upon which the friends of freedom
have been divided. In the opinion of the undersigned, this question should
be permanently settled.
The power of removing slaves from one section of the country to another, is
secured by this section, but cannot be exercised against the wishes of the
State through which slaves would otherwise be taken. The power to touch at
ports, shores, and landings, with vessels having on board persons held in
bondage, and of landing, in case of distress, is embraced in this proposed
amendment, the latter clause of which will, certainly, receive the approval
of every friend of humanity. The undersigned do not join in the fears
expressed by the majority, that a resort to "impure means" could ever secure
from the Legislature of New York any laws upon these subjects, not entirely
consistent with the honor and dignity of the State.
The Fourth proposition was adopted by a vote so large as to make comment
here unnecessary.
As the Fifth proposition received the unanimous vote of your
Commissioners, it requires no comment.
The Sixth proposition is upon a subject that has been discussed ever since
the formation of the Government, and need not be dwelt upon.
The Seventh proposition presented itself with such force to the Convention
as to receive a strong vote, but seven States declaring against it. It will be
seen that this section requires Congress to provide by law for securing to
citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States.
Many other propositions were presented to the Convention, some of which
received the full concurrence of the undersigned; to others they were
opposed, and those who shared in the deliberations of the Convention do
not doubt, and will not deny, that propositions were presented whose only
object and effect could be to embarrass its proceedings.
The action of the Convention failed to secure at the hands of Congress the
legislation necessary to present it to the people of the different States, in the
manner prescribed by the Constitution. Still it is in the power, and the
undersigned trust will be in the disposition of the representatives of the
people of New York, in both Halls of its Legislation, to present them for the
acceptance or rejection of her people.
Whatever differences of political opinion may exist, there can be but one
mind as to the present critical condition of our country, or that it is the duty
of every citizen to give all the aid in his power, to sustain an administration
that has entered upon its complicated duties under circumstances of more
embarrassment than have ever before existed in our country's history.
The undersigned not only as deeply regret, but as severely condemn, the
action of those States who have attempted to withdraw from the Union, as
do the majority of the Commissioners who opposed the adoption of the
measures of conciliation presented by the Peace Convention.
Those who are conversant with the political action of the seceding States,
will have observed how strong is their desire to draw the Southern Border
States into this new Confederacy. With each of those Border States are large
bodies of active politicians, constantly influencing the public mind, and
misrepresenting, to a great extent, the opinions and designs of those who
have wrought out this revolution in the national administration. The public
mind is fearfully agitated upon these issues, and the refusal of the
Legislature of New York to present the propositions of the Peace
Convention, for the suffrages of her people, will greatly diminish the power
of the Union men of the Border States to sustain themselves in their present
trying position.
It is believed that Virginia is about to submit these propositions to her
people; let New York, who so nobly responded to the call of Virginia, show
that she, too, will be governed by the wishes of her people, and that if those
ties which have so long held these powerful States in the bonds of
brotherhood, must be severed, it shall be done only by the verdict of their





Report of the Rhode Island Peace Commissioners.
To the Honorable General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island:
The undersigned Commissioners on the part of this State, appointed upon
the request of the State of Virginia, to meet Commissioners from the other
States to confer upon the best mode of adjusting the unhappy differences
which now disturb the peace of the country, respectfully beg leave to report:
That on the 4th day of February last, at Washington, the day and place
named for the opening of the Conference, they met Commissioners from
other States, and remained with them in conference until the 27th day of
February, at which time twenty-one States were represented, when having
agreed by a majority of States to submit to Congress, to be by Congress
submitted to conventions in the several States, the annexed article in
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the Convention finally
adjourned.
This article, it will be seen, applies the old line of 36° 30´ of North latitude
to all the present Territory of the United States, prohibiting slavery north of
that line, whilst it recognizes and secures its existence south of that line
during the territorial government, and provides for the formation of new
States out of such territory with or without slavery as their constitutions
may direct.
As this partition of territory was not disadvantageous, at least to the free
States, as it disposed of the agitation consequent upon a recent decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States upon a celebrated case, and
followed a precedent which had given peace to the country upon this most
dangerous subject of controversy for upwards of thirty years, your
Commissioners gave their assent to it as the best practical solution of all
difficulties growing out of the territorial question.
New territory is no further dealt with by this article than to require, except
in certain specified cases, a majority of all the Senators from each side of
said line, to concur in its acquisition, whether made by act of Congress or
by treaty, thus giving to each class of States a check upon the cupidity of
the others.
The other sections of the article were designed in general so to define and
limit the rights, powers, and duties of both Congress and the States, with
regard to the subject of slavery, as to prevent further controversy, and to
enable and induce those most opposed in opinion and interest, by the
practice of mutual forbearance, to live in peace and amity under the same
Federal Government. It is believed that in no essential particular will this
article change the present actual state of things; its value consisting in the
security therein which it gives to all, and in the settlement made by it of
present and probable subjects of controversy.
In a great practical matter of this sort, your Commissioners deem these
results of far more importance than strict adhesion to any theory, however
plausible in the abstract, and especially than to any party declaration of
principles of a sectional cast, however vehemently argued, or numerously
adopted on either side. To deal well and wisely with the actual and real, and
whilst consulting the past and looking to the probable future for guidance,
to base his action on what is, comprises the whole duty of a statesman;
leaving to political philosophers to dream of what might have been, or in
the abstract of what ought to be. Reform, it is true, in this way comes
slowly, but it comes without the disturbance of material interests, without
agitation of human passions, and without the violent outbreaks which these
occasion—hindering and obstructing its progress in that grand and orderly
procession of moral causes and effects which expresses and marks the
providence and government of G  .
It was apparent to all that, whatever may have been the motive and origin of
the present alarming movement in the extreme Southern States, the
instrument successfully used to promote it was the agitation of their people
upon the safety of the institution of negro slavery in the States and
Territories; and various conflicting opinions with regard to the best course
to be pursued to allay this agitation were elicited in the course of this long
conference. Extremists were not wanting on the one hand, who seemed
inclined to construe the anomaly of slavery of the negro race, found in the
Constitution of a free people, into a general rule; and who proposed or
voted for propositions which they knew could not be accepted, that their
assertion might aid in the remaining States the cause of secession.
Extremists were not wanting, on the other hand, who were opposed to doing
any thing upon the subject of slavery, especially at present, lest such action
should compromise the incoming administration, and the Republican party,
and even the character of the Government itself. Without suspecting the
purity of the motives of either of these extremists, who beyond doubt
represented the views of large and respectable bodies of men in their
different sections, your Commissioners found themselves equally unable to
agree with either.
They could not ignore the fact that seven States had separated themselves
from the others and set up a federal government of their own; and that these
were ceaselessly agitating the people of the remaining Southern States by
inflammatory speeches, and writings skilfully addressed to their interests
and sympathies, to induce them to join in this new movement. They could
not doubt the assurances given to them by able and patriotic men from the
States of Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Missouri, that these attempts upon the loyalty of the people of their States
had met at least with partial success; nor, indeed, blind themselves to the
evidences of this found in the speeches and votes of individual
Commissioners from these very States. Above all, they could not be
insensible to the touching appeals of men, venerable in years, distinguished
in public service, and whose reputation for ability and patriotism was
national, to give them something in the shape of a constitutional security
with which to allay the startled fears of their constituents, beat back the
attacks of their enemies and ours, and even bring again to their duty
thousands of men in the States of the extreme South, who had been led
astray by the popular fears and impulses of the hour, and who, with the
loyal but overborne, might well look to them for support, since no other had
been afforded them in the reign of terror under which they were suffering.
In the circumstances in which the country was placed, it seemed to your
Commissioners that true policy ran in the course of generous impulse; that
in this matter we were dealing not with treason, but with the most devoted
loyalty which invoked our aid against it; that the concessions we made, if
concessions indeed they were, were made to our friends that they might be
strong enough to triumph over their enemies and ours, because the enemies
of the country.
If, as is true, in this view of their duty your Commissioners stood in the
main alone amongst the Commissioners from the Northern States, and
ranged themselves by the side of the Central States of the Union, upon
whom the weight of the civil strife must come if come it must, they need
not assure you that no dastardly fears, no feelings of base compliance,
dictated the position thus taken by them. Such motives to action neither
became them nor those whom they represented. It was because of generous
faith and earnest sympathy, of ties which no distance of time or space, and
no difference of institutions can weaken; which in our fathers' days and our
own led our heroes to hazard all for all, and at Guilford Court House, and
Eutaw, and at Erie, with desperate valor to snatch victory for our common
country out of the very lap of defeat; it was because our little State, with a
warm heart and a ready hand, has never failed in counsel or deed to stand
with the whole country in all dangers and in extremest disasters, that your
Commissioners conceived that they best represented her by averting danger
from those with whom they knew she would hasten to share it. If it be true
that the time has arrived when our sympathy for an alien and a subject race
has extinguished all sympathy for our own, and has hidden from us the ties
of a common origin, common interests, and of a common glory, then,
indeed, are we separated from our brethren, and the curse of slavery has
fallen upon us as well as upon them. Your Commissioners found nothing in
themselves to justify them in attributing such sentiments to the people of
the State; and unitedly recommend the adoption by you of the amendment
to the Constitution proposed by the Conference of Commissioners, as best
fitted to give security and ensure peace to the country.
Among the measures strenuously enforced by some of the Commissioners,
in lieu of that adopted by a majority, was the calling of a General
Convention. To this measure your Commissioners opposed their most
earnest and determined resistance. As a measure of peace, if for no other
reason, because of the long delay which it implied, it would be utterly
fruitless. But the possible danger of exposing a Constitution, framed and
adopted in the earlier and more conservative days of the Republic, to be
torn in pieces in these times of lawless irreverence and change, is too great
for any wise man willingly to encounter. The very equality of the States in
the Senate, which was won by the revolutionary sacrifices and valor of the
smaller States, now almost forgotten, would, in the judgment of your
Commissioners, be thereby greatly endangered; and your Commissioners
earnestly represent to your Honorable body that under no circumstances
should this State consent to a measure which might lead to her own
extinction. The Constitution of a great country, adopted, as this was, on
account of diversity of interests and views, with great difficulty, should be
sacred. It may and should from time to time be amended to suit a change of
circumstances, but never exposed to the danger of being uptorn. It is the
symbol of our strength, because the ligament of our Union. It has collected
about it the reverence of three generations of our people. It is the only
rallying point now for the loyalty of the remaining States; the only hope of
the restoration of the States which have left us; and, in its main features, it
should be, as it was designed to be, perpetual. At no time should a General
Convention be invited to invade it; and, of all times, this, in the judgment of
your Commissioners, would be the most dangerous.
Finally, it will be found upon an inspection of the Journal of the late
Conference of Commissioners, that the undersigned voted against many
propositions in themselves just and expressive of their sentiments and
yours, because inopportune and useless; and against others, because
introduced for the very purpose of sowing dissension among the
Commissioners and to prevent an agreement by majority upon any thing. In
this they must ask your candid construction of their conduct, looking to the
crisis, the occasion, the purpose and effect of the matter upon which they
were called to act; and their unwillingness to hazard an agreement upon that
deemed by them necessary, by tacking to it that which, however true, was at
least useless, and might in the result be dangerous.
All which is respectfully submitted by






P         , March 4th, 1861.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.
E         D         , C       C      , }B     , March 25, 1861.
To the Honorable the Senate:
I have the honor to transmit to the General Court, for its use and
information, a Report just received by me from John Z. Goodrich, Charles
Allen, George S. Boutwell, Theophilus P. Chandler, Francis B.
Crowninshield, John M. Forbes, and Richard P. Waters, Esquires, who were
appointed Commissioners on the part of Massachusetts, under a Resolve
passed the fifth day of February last, to attend a Convention of delegates
from the several States of the Union, recently held at Washington.
And I embrace this opportunity to congratulate the people of the
Commonwealth upon the fidelity, judgment, and ability with which the
Commissioners, by whom they were represented, conducted their share of
the duties of that deliberation.
And I trust that a similar intelligent, manful, and, at the same time,
charitable and patriotic adherence to principles, fundamental both in morals
and politics, will characterize the people of Massachusetts, and all their
representatives, by whatever experiences of danger or difficulty their
devotion to truth and duty may hereafter be tried.
I ask leave to call the attention of the General Court, also, to the fact that, as
yet, no provision has been adopted for the payment of the expenses incident
to the service with which the Commissioners were charged, and to
recommend that a suitable appropriation for that purpose be made at the
present session of the Legislature.
JOHN A. ANDREW.
To His Excellency J    A. A     , Governor, &c., &c.:
The undersigned, Commissioners appointed by your excellency, in
pursuance of certain resolutions passed by the Legislature at its present
session, to attend a Convention to be held in the City of Washington, with
authority to confer with the General Government, or with the separate
States, or with any associations of delegates from such States, having,
agreeably to your excellency's instructions, repaired to Washington and
conferred with the delegates of twenty other States of the American Union,
now respectfully submit the following report of the proceedings of the said
Convention, and of the action of the Commissioners from Massachusetts.
The Convention commenced its sessions on the 4th of February, and closed
its deliberations on the 27th of the same month. The Massachusetts
Commissioners repaired to Washington as early as practicable after their
appointment, and presented their credentials on the 8th of February.
The sessions of the Convention were secret; although repeated efforts were
made, with the concurrence of the undersigned, first, to remove the
injunction of secrecy, then to admit the public to witness the deliberations,
and then to procure a complete and accurate report of the debates and
doings. These efforts failed, and the undersigned are therefore able only to
transmit a copy of the Journal of the Convention.[10]
On the 6th of February a resolution was adopted, upon the motion of Mr.
Guthrie, of Kentucky, that a "committee of one from each State be
appointed by the Commissioners thereof, to whom should be referred the
resolutions of the State of Virginia, and the other States represented, and all
propositions for the adjustment of existing difficulties between the States."
Mr. Crowninshield represented Massachusetts upon this committee. At the
earliest practicable moment he called for a specific statement of the
grievances complained of by the discontented States of the Union. This call
elicited much discussion, but no definite response to the demand was ever
made either in the committee or in Convention.
On the 15th of February, Mr. Guthrie, from the committee of one from each
State, made a report recommending certain amendments to the Constitution
of the United States. This report was adopted in committee by a majority of
five States, the delegates from Kansas not having then taken their seats in
the Convention.
A copy of this report may be found upon the twenty-second and twenty-
third pages of the Journal. After much discussion and many amendments,
the several sections of the proposed article of amendment to the
Constitution were finally adopted on the last day of the session. It is to be
observed, however, that the report as a whole never received the sanction of
the Convention, although the several sections of the article of amendment
were separately approved by a majority of the States voting; and it may well
be doubted whether the entire article would have been adopted by the
Convention.
The first section was adopted by a vote of nine States to eight; four States—
New York, Indiana, Missouri, and Kansas—not voting.
The other sections were approved by larger majorities.
The undersigned declined to vote upon the last section, but the vote of
Massachusetts, with the unanimous consent of its Commissioners, was
given in the negative upon all the others. This course seemed to be
demanded, whether regard was had to the constitution of the Convention,
the circumstances under which it assembled, the nature of the propositions
submitted, the solution of the difficulties in which the Government and
people are involved, or to the character and peace of the country in the
future. The two Pacific States, whose loyalty to the Constitution and the
Union is unquestioned, could not have been represented in the Convention.
Other States failed to appoint Commissioners. The resolutions of the State
of Virginia were passed on the 19th of January; and it was expected that
within sixteen days thereafter the representatives of this vast country would
assemble for the purpose of devising, maturing, and recommending
alterations in the Constitution of the republic. As a necessary consequence,
the people were not consulted in any of the States. In several, the
Commissioners were appointed by the executive of each without even an
opportunity to confer with the Legislature; in others, the consent of the
representative body was secured, but in no instance were the people
themselves consulted. The measures proposed were comparatively new; the
important ones were innovations upon the established principles of the
Government, and none of them had ever been submitted to public scrutiny.
They related to the institution of slavery; and the experience of the country
justifies the assertion that any proposition for additional securities to
slavery under the flag of the nation, must be fully discussed and well
understood before its adoption, or it will yield a fearful harvest of woe in
dissensions and controversies among the people. Nor could the undersigned
have justified the act to themselves, if they had concurred in asking
Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution unless they were
prepared also to advocate the adoption of the amendments by the people.
It is due to truth to say that the Convention did not possess all the desirable
characteristics of a deliberative assembly. It was in some degree
disqualified for the performance of the important task assigned to it, by the
circumstances of its constitution, to which reference has already been made.
Moreover, there were members who claimed that certain concessions must
be granted that the progress of the secession movement might be arrested;
and on the other hand there were men who either doubted or denied the
wisdom of such concessions.
The circumstances were extraordinary. Within the preceding ninety days the
integrity of the Union had been assailed by the attempt of six States to
overthrow its authority; seven other States were disaffected, and some of
them had assumed a menacing and even hostile attitude. The political
disturbances had been associated with or followed by financial distress.
The Convention was then a body of men without a recognized and
ascertained constituency, called together in an exigency and without
preparation, and invited to initiate measures for the amendment of the
Constitution in most important particulars, and all at a moment when the
public mind was swayed by fears and alarms such as have never before
been experienced by the American people.
In these circumstances the undersigned thought it inexpedient to propose
amendments to the Constitution, believing that so important an act should
not be initiated and accomplished without the greatest deliberation and care.
Nor could the undersigned satisfy themselves that any or all of the proposed
amendments would even tend, in any considerable degree, to the
preservation of the Union. Although inquiries were repeatedly made, no
assurance was given that any propositions of amendment would secure the
return of the seceded States; and it was admitted that several of the Border
States would ultimately unite with the Gulf States, either within or without
the limits of the Union, as might be dictated by events yet in the future.
Indeed, no proposition was in any degree acceptable to the majority of
delegates from the border slave States that did not provide for the extension
of slavery to the Territories, and its protection and security therein.
And further, as appears from the Journal, the Convention was not prepared
to deny the right of a State to secede from the Union. Mr. Field, of New
York, introduced the following proposition, which, on motion of Mr. Ewing,
of Ohio, was laid upon the table:
"The Union of the States under the Constitution is indissoluble; and no
State can secede from the Union, or nullify an act of Congress, or absolve
its citizens from their paramount obligation of obedience to the Constitution
and laws of the United States."
After much debate and repeated attempts to avoid a direct vote, the
following proposition was rejected:
"It is declared to be the true intent and meaning of the present Constitution
that the union of the States under it is indissoluble."
A   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
York, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Kansas—10.
N   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—11.
On the last day of the session, Mr. Franklin, of Pennsylvania, moved the
adoption of the following resolution:
"Resolved, as the sense of this Convention, that the highest political duty of
every citizen of the United States is his allegiance to the Federal
Government, created by the Constitution of the United States, and that no
State of this Union has any constitutional right to secede therefrom, or to
absolve the citizens of such State from their allegiance to the Government
of the United States."
Mr. Ruffin, of North Carolina, moved to postpone the consideration of the
same indefinitely, and the resolution was thereupon postponed by the
following vote:
A   .—Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—10.
N   .—Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Pennsylvania—7.
For these reasons and others the Commissioners from Massachusetts
supported the proposition originally made by Kentucky, and introduced by
Mr. Baldwin, of Connecticut, recommending a national convention for the
purpose of revising the Constitution, and of providing for the exigencies
likely to arise from the changed and perilous condition of the country. This
measure offered an opportunity for consideration by the people, and for
careful deliberation by the convention that might be constituted for the
purpose. It is highly probable that, after the lapse of three-fourths of a
century, a convention of delegates from all the States would by general
consent propose amendments to the Constitution; and it is also probable that
such a convention would at once tend to strengthen the feeling of
brotherhood among the people of various sections, while the discussion of
the principles of the Government would render its preservation of
paramount concern to all. This measure of peace and union was rejected.
The undersigned are constrained by the force of many facts and
circumstances to believe that an exciting cause of the present difficulties,
and a serious obstacle to their removal, is the possible acquisition of
Mexico and Central America.
The proceedings of the Convention furnish evidence upon this point.
The proposition to restore the Missouri Compromise, which guaranteed
freedom north of the parallel 36° 30´ north latitude, but furnished no
protection to slavery south of that line, was rejected by the aid of the
unanimous support of the slaveholding States.
The proposition to settle the territorial question by the admission of New
Mexico as a State, was summarily discouraged by the South in the
committee.
The suggestion of one of the Commissioners from Massachusetts, that if the
Convention would leave the territorial question out of view, the difficulties
concerning the rights and relations of the existing States might be adjusted,
did not meet with a favorable response from the slaveholding section of the
country.
It is to be observed further, that the various propositions and amendments
which were in any degree acceptable to the slave States guaranteed slavery
south of said line.
It did not seem to the undersigned of signal importance, whether this
guarantee was limited to our present territories, or made in words to apply
to all future acquisitions. Whenever the line of slave States from the Gulf of
Mexico to the Pacific Ocean shall be formed, an effectual barrier will have
been raised against the migration of freemen southward. Nor can it be
assumed, that either with or without constitutional prohibition, the limits of
the republic are not to be further extended; and if the proposed line be
established by the Constitution, the fairest portions of North America will
be given up irrevocably to African slavery. Nor is the limitation of the right
of a sovereign State to fix its own boundaries, which involves the right to
acquire territory, consistent with its honor in peace, or compatible with its
dignity and necessities in time of war. The American people are fully
forewarned that it is unwise to rely upon constitutional prohibitions against
the acquisition of territory; nor can such prohibitions always withstand the
assaults of a determined and desperate majority when acting in harmony
with the tendencies of public opinion, and the real or supposed necessities
of the country.
With these views, and with this experience in mind, the undersigned did not
regard with favor the provisions contained in the second section of the
proposed article of amendment. It is also to be observed that by this section
territory may be acquired for naval and commercial stations, depots, and
transit routes, without a resort to the treaty-making power. These provisions
seem to be broad enough to permit the summary annexation of Cuba, and
portions of Central America and Mexico, by a simple law or joint resolution
of Congress.
Thus, these two sections considered together, furnished no additional
securities against territorial acquisitions, while they effectually established
and protected slavery in all territory, present and future, south of the parallel
36° 30´ north latitude. By the first section, the common law was to be so
changed, that a condition of slavery would be assumed in regard to all the
African race within the Territories, and the laws of the several slave States
would be enforced against all persons of that race who might be carried
from the existing slave States into the Territories. The language is
ambiguous, but this interpretation seems to be warranted; and, in the
opinion of the undersigned, the courts would render an interpretation
adequate to the result just indicated. It is thus seen that the only method of
establishing and protecting slavery in the Territories, is to provide for the
execution, within their limits, of the laws of the several slave States.
This section also incorporates into the Constitution of the United States the
existing laws and usages of New Mexico relating to slavery, and renders
them irrepealable during the territorial condition.
By the second section, the Senators are divided into two classes, those who
represent the slaveholding, and those who represent the non-slaveholding
States of the Union, and a majority of each class is required as a part of the
two-thirds majority necessary for the acquisition of territory by treaty. A
full exposition of this proposition would show that it is a complete and
dangerous departure from the principles of the Government, and sure to
effect its complete dissolution. When the Senate becomes two separate and
distinct bodies, and when the existence of the institution of slavery
determines where the line of division shall be, then the Government, for all
practical purposes, is at an end. This proposition was introduced by Mr.
Summers, of Virginia; and Virginia, by its delegates, also introduced and
supported a kindred proposition, by which "all appointments to office in the
Territories lying north of the line 36° 30´, as well before as after the
establishment of Territorial Governments in and over the same, or any part
thereof, shall be made upon the recommendation of a majority of the
Senators representing at the time the non-slaveholding States; and in like
manner, all appointments to office in the Territories which may lie south of
said line of 36° 30´, shall be made upon the recommendation of a majority
of the Senators representing at the time the slaveholding States."
We cannot hesitate to declare the opinion, carefully formed, that this policy
of dividing the Senate into two classes, is fraught with dangers to the
country more to be dreaded than the bold and defiant measures of those
men and States that are arrayed in open hostility to the Union. This measure
is a part of the policy of Mr. Calhoun, by which the Government was to be
changed, and the executive department so divided that nothing could be
done without the concurrence of two Presidents, one representing the
slaveholding and one representing the non-slaveholding States.
The third section contains several provisions for strengthening and securing
slavery in the District of Columbia and in the several States and Territories.
It gives to representatives and others the right to bring their slaves into the
District of Columbia, retain, and take them away, even after slavery may
have ceased to exist in that District by the constitutional action of Congress.
It secures the slave-trade between States and Territories in which slavery is
established or recognized by law or usage, with the right of transit through
free States, by sea or river, and of touching at ports, shores, and landings,
and of landing in case of distress; reserving, however, to the States and
Territories the power to prohibit the transit of slaves and the sale or traffic
therein. Thus the transportation of slaves would be a right as broad as the
limits of the republic, unless it should be restrained by the laws of
individual States, which acts might readily be regarded as a breach of
comity.
The fourth section of the article gives to the States the power of concurrent
legislation with the United States for the rendition of fugitive slaves, thus
introducing a new topic of agitation into every State, without in any degree
relieving Congress of its duty in this particular.
The fifth section prohibits the foreign slave-trade, and makes it the duty of
Congress to pass laws to prevent the importation of slaves, coolies, or
persons held to service or labor. As Congress has already, by the
Constitution, full power to regulate the migration or importation of persons
from other countries, there is no reason for such constitutional provisions
upon the subject. It alone remains to enact proper laws and secure their
faithful and prompt execution.
The sixth section declares that certain sections of the proposed article of
amendment, and certain provisions of the Constitution relating to slavery,
shall not be amended or abolished without the consent of all the States.
The undersigned, being of opinion that no such stipulation ought to be
made, and that if made, it would not be binding upon the country, did not
hesitate to give the vote of the State against the proposition.
The seventh and last section of the proposed article of amendment is in the
following words:
"Congress shall provide by law that the United States shall pay to the owner
the full value of his fugitive from labor, in all cases where the marshal, or
other officer, whose duty it was to arrest such fugitive, was prevented from
so doing by violence or intimidation from mobs or riotous assemblies, or
when, after arrest, such fugitive was rescued by like violence or
intimidation, and the owner thereby deprived of the same; and the
acceptance of such payment shall preclude the owner from further claim of
such fugitive. Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens of
each State the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States."
In a Convention duly called and assembled for the revision of the
Constitution, the undersigned would have assented to this section; and in
declining to vote thereon they intended to so declare to their associates from
the slaveholding States.
The undersigned thus set forth the doings of the Convention, and some of
the reasons by which their conduct was controlled. It was not their fortune
to concur with the action of the Convention. The concessions demanded by
the discontented States, seemed to be inconsistent with honor, justice, and
freedom, and calculated to render permanent the existing causes of
disturbance. A Union restored by unmanly concessions, would be
productive of bitter criminations and lasting hostilities, and would contain
within itself the seeds of a violent death.
But the undersigned are bound to say that the differences in the Convention
were, in the main, differences of opinion, and not of purpose. Loyalty to the
Constitution and the Union was general; and the undersigned do not doubt
that the act of Virginia, in inviting a conference with her sister States, will
be productive of beneficial results to the country.
The Commissioners from Massachusetts were much impressed by the fact,
which their personal intercourse with gentlemen from all the slaveholding
States brought to their knowledge, that the present difficulties of the country
were not caused by the pressure of grievances supposed to be actually
existing; but rather by the fear of future interference with Southern rights,
caused by entire misapprehension of the purposes of the people of the free
States. Misrepresentation of those purposes, proceeding from among
ourselves, whether prompted by ignorance of Northern sentiment, or by
sinister motives, are greatly to be deprecated.
The undersigned entertain no doubt that the intercourse between the
different sections of the country, through their representatives in
Convention, had a most salutary influence in correcting false views of
Northern sentiment, and in assuring our brethren of the South that there is
no purpose among the people of those States, who, upon principle, oppose
the extension of slavery, to disturb or touch with an unfriendly hand the
domestic relations of any other States of the Union.
In the present exigency of public affairs, each State should be careful to
perform its whole duty freely and faithfully to its sister States and to the
country; and then may it well and fearlessly demand, whether the Union
contain many States or few, that the Government shall be administered
according to the principles of equality and justice which characterize the
Constitution formed by our fathers, and which will prove a sufficient
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FOOTNOTES
[1] Mr. R      stated the substance of the amendments he proposed in a voice so
low, as not to be audible to the greater part of the Conference. They are not to be
found in the Journal, nor in the documents printed by order of the Conference,
nor were they heard by me.
[2] The speech of Mr. D     is, I believe, the only one delivered in the
Conference which I did not hear, and of which I did not preserve minutes more
or less full. The reason for the omission was this: The morning session was
protracted until a late hour, and the labor of reporting the remarks of the
members had been very severe. The evening session commenced with some
observations of my own; and after reporting the remarks of Mr. L    , which
followed mine, I found myself in such a condition of physical exhaustion that I
was obliged to retire to my room. It was during this temporary absence that the
remarks of Mr. D     were made. I was informed that his speech was very
animated and in excellent temper—that he took the position that North Carolina
was loyal to the Union, but that he fully concurred with the Southern States in
the necessity of demanding constitutional guarantees; and that if these were not
given, her relations were such with South Carolina and the Gulf States that,
however much she might regret the necessity, she could not do otherwise than to
leave the Union and unite her future with those of the seceded States.
I have been unable to communicate by letter with any of the members
representing the States now in insurrection. As Mr. D     was the only
representative from North Carolina who entered into a general discussion of the
reports of the majority and minority of the Committee of One from each State, I
was the more desirous of securing some report of his remarks. But in all the
material which has been furnished me, by the many members with whom I have
corresponded, I find that none of them preserved notes of his speech.
[3] This was a verbal amendment. I was not able to note it at the time, nor have I
since been able to procure it.
[4] I suppose these amendments offered by Mr. B             were never
printed; certainly no printed copy of them was ever distributed to the members of
the Conference, and they were never inserted in the Journal. In preserving my
notes, I naturally assumed that I could rely upon the printed copies distributed to
the members, for the various amendments offered. At the period of writing out
these notes communication with Mr. B             is impossible, and I am
obliged to omit farther notice of his amendments. I am not even able to state the
subjects to which they referred.
[5] The published Journal states that Mr. A         dissented from the vote of
New Jersey. My notes do not show that he dissented, and I think the Journal may
be erroneous in this particular.
[6] I relied upon the Journal for the individual list of the votes. In this respect the
Journal is defective, and does not give the names of the States voting. My
minutes show that the vote was taken by States with the foregoing result.
[7] The closing remarks of Mr. B       were committed to writing. I am able
through the kindness of a member of his family to avail myself of a copy.
[8] I have not heretofore expressed my own opinions upon the action of the
Conference or of delegations; but as much has been said about the vote given by
New York, or rather the division of the delegation, under which no vote was
given, it is due to the parties concerned that I should state my own understanding
of the practice of the Conference in this respect. After the rejection of the motion
of Mr. C     (found on page 209), and the adoption of the proposition of Mr.
D   , so far as my own knowledge goes it was never deemed necessary that the
entire delegation from a State should be present in order to cast its vote. I was
present all the time, and frequently cast the vote of my own State upon previous
consultation with my colleagues, when a majority of the delegation was absent.
This was frequently done, to my personal knowledge, by other States: by none
more frequently than Virginia. During several of the sessions the President
himself was absent, and the chair was filled for the greater part of the time by
Mr. A        , or Mr. M       , of Kentucky. I can recall to mind several
occasions when the vote of Virginia was cast by Mr. S      alone, no other
member of his delegation being present. When the question arose upon the vote
of New York, I was surprised that this point was not insisted upon; but deeming
it a matter exclusively for the delegation from that State to settle, I did not think
the case one in which others should interfere. L.E.C.
[9] See page 64, Proceedings of the Conference.
[10] An authentic copy of the Journal was not received until the 21st instant and
the Commissioners did not feel prepared to make a report without an opportunity
for consulting it.
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